Plant Breeders' Rights in Canada and Abroad: What are These Rights and How Much Must Society Pay for Them?

Plant Breeders’ Rights in Canada and Abroad: What are These

Rights and How Much Must Society Pay for Them?

Natalie M. Derzko*

In 1990, Parliament passed the Plant Breed-
ers’ Rights Act in response to Canada’s interna-
tional obligations concerning intellectual prop-
erty protection for plant breeders. In this article,
the author suggests that the Act strikes a legiti-
mate balance between the exclusive ownership
rights of plant breeders to the new varieties they
create and society’s residual liberty to use them.
Society has an interest in ensuring the wide dis-
tribution of the benefits of plant breeding such
as new varieties which are insect- or drought-
resistant. However, without the assurance that
their discoveries will be protected, the interna-
tional firms which will be responsible for most
plant breeding activity will not engage in this
endeavour

The author first describes basic research
techniques used in the creation of new plant
varieties. She then discusses the rationale for
providing plant breeders with an ownership
right to the varietie
they develop. After dem-
onstrating that patent legislation is not the ap-
propriate form of protection for plant breeders,
the author examines the Plant Breeders’ Rights
Act in some detail. She outlines the require-
ments for eligibility for protection and then dis-
cusses the rights granted under the Act. Finally,
the author demonstrates how the Act forms part
of the international network of plant breeders’
rights:

The author concludes that the balance struck
in the Act provides sufficient incentive to plant
breeders while ensuring that the public can ben-
efit from the introduction of new plant varieties.
Domestically, the balance achieved between the
rights of plant breeders and the residual liberties
of farmers, as well as of the public and private
research sectors, is appropriate. Furthermore,
plant breeders’ rights legislation will not exac-
erbate international environmental problems,
such as threats to biodiversity and sustainable
development, and is not insensitive to the con-
cerns of developing countries.

Le Parlement a adoptd, en 1990, ]a Loi stir
les obtentions vigitales afin de remplir les obli-
gations du Canada en ce qui a trait h ]a protec-
tion de la proprirt6 intellectuelle des chercheurs
dans ce domaine. Dans cet article, l’auteure
sugg~re que cette loi permet d’atteindre un juste
6quilibre entre le droit de propri~t6 exclusif sur
les obtentions que revendiquent les chercheurs
et le droit rrsiduel qu’a la socidt6 de brndficier
de celles-ci. En effet, ]a distribution A grande
dchelle d’esp~ces v6gdtales qui sont, par ex-
emple, rsistantes At Ia s~cheresse et aux parasi-
tes est dans l’intr&& de ]a soci~t6. Toutefois, les
multinationales n’investiront pas dans la recher-
che sans l’assurance d’une protection adequate
pour les nouvelles obtentions vigtales.

Tout d’abord, l’auteure explique les tech-
niques de base utilisres lors de ]a crdation de
nouvelles esp~ces vdgdtales. Elle discute en-
suite les raisons pour lesquelles on accorde aux
chercheurs un droit de propridt6 sur leurs obten-
tions. Apr~s avoir d~montr6 que ]a l6gislation
sur les brevets n’est pas adaptde aux esp~ces
vrg6tales, elle examine en detail ]a Loi sur les
obtentions vigitales. Elle expose les exigences
devant 8tre satisfaites pour avoir droit A ]a pro-
tection de cette loi, puis elle 61abore sur les
droits accordds par celle-ci. Finalement, l’au-
teure ddmontre que cette loi fait partie d’un
plan international de protection des obtentions
vdgdtales.

En conclusion, l’auteure estime que l’dqui-
libre atteint par ]a Loi sur les obtentions vdgd-
tales est suffisamment stimulant pour les obten-
teurs et assure au public le bdndfice de lVintro-
duction de nouvelles esp~ces vdgdtales sur le
march6. Sur le plan national, l’dquilibre atteint
entre les intdalts des obtenteurs et ceux des fer-
miers, ainsi qu’entre ceux des secteurs public et
priv6 de Ia recherche, est opportun. En outre, la
nouvelle loi ne risque pas d’engendrer des pro-
blames environnementaux, telles des atteintes 1
la biodiversit6, et elle tient compte des prdoccu-
pations des pays en voie de ddveloppement.

*LL.B. (1993), Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; B.Sc. (1991), University of
Toronto. The author wishes to thank Professor David Vaver who provided helpful comments on
previous drafts of this article.
McGill Law Journal 1994
Revue de droit de McGill
To be cited as: (1994) 39 McGill L.J. 144
Mode de rdfdrence: (1994) 39 R.D. McGill 144

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

Synopsis

Introduction
I. Modern Plant Breeding in Canada – The Techniques and the

Vocabulary

H. A Rationale for Providing Exclusive Ownership Rights in Newly
Created Plant Varieties and a Method of Determining the Most
Appropriate Type of Ownership Right

I. The Possibility of Patenting a Plant under the Canadian Patent Act
IV. The Canadian Plant Breeders’ Rights Act
A. Preliminary Requirements of the Act
B. Subsequent Requirements of the Act
C. Degree of Protection
D. Understanding the Scope of Protection Provided by the Act
E. Dual Protection of Plants under the Patent Act and the Plant

Breeders’ Rights Act

V.

The International Phenomenon of Plant Breeders’ Rights
A. The Existing International Network of Plant Breeders’ Rights

under the UPOV Convention

B. Recent Amendments to the UPOV Convention

VI. Evaluating the Domestic and Global Consequences of Creating Plant

Variety Rights
A. Striking a Balance at the Domestic Level

1.

2.

Striking a Balance between the Rights of Plant Breeders and
the Residual Liberties of Farmers
Striking a Balance between the Interests of the Public and
Private Sectors in Plant Breeding

B. Striking a Balance at the International Level

1. Distributing the Rights to the World’s Germplasm
2. Monopoly Rights and Their Effect on the Globe’s Sustainable

Development

Conclusion

Introduction

The world of the twentieth century has been marked by change. We are
now in the midst of a genetic revolution, where one of the building blocks of

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

(Vol. 39

the economy is biotechnology.’ Most Canadians are aware of biotechnology but
understand it mostly in terms of the ability to manipulate human and other ani-
mal genes. Few people realize that the biotechnological revolution has had a
profound effect on the ability of a plant breeder to alter plant genes, thereby cre-
ating new plant varieties which are insect- or drought-resistant, or which pro-
duce increased yields.

The Science Council of Canada has stressed that “[to] retain and, if possi-
ble, increase its existing share of world markets, Canada must participate fully
in the biotechnology revolution.”2 Furthermore, the Council has targeted plant
agriculture as the sector in which to step-up biotechnological research. Growth
in the world’s population will require a corresponding increase in food produc-
tion.3 This need will be met in large part by improved plant varieties, developed
by plant breeders. In order to encourage this activity, the Council recommended
that plant breeders’ rights be created.4 It was in this context that Parliament
passed the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act’ which created a new form of intellectual
property right for plant breeders.

What are the consequences of granting such rights? They may concentrate
the ownership of an important resource in the hands of few,6 will give no rec-
ognition to third world countries which, in fact, are the genetic storehouses upon
which plant breeders depend,7 and may be linked to genetic uniformity and
genetic erosion.8 Given these potential consequences, should plant breeders be
granted exclusive rights in the “new” seeds that they create, or should these
seeds be owned collectively because they are part of the “common heritage of
mankind”? I will argue that plant breeders’ rights legislation should exist
because it strikes the best balance between the interest of plant breeders in pro-
tecting their investment in the development of new plant varieties, and society’s
interest in benefitting from them. This balance is achieved by the Canadian
Plant Breeders’ Rights Act and by the international network of plant breeders’
rights. Finally, any concerns raised about the effects of such legislation do not
require that it be dismantled, and are-more appropriately addressed in other con-
texts.

This paper will examine the intellectual property rights that plant breeders
seek nationally and internationally, as well as the local and global effects of
granting such rights to them. The discussion will be divided into several parts.
The first Part will describe the techniques and the vocabulary of modem plant

‘See generally House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative
Committee on Bill C-15: An Act Respecting Plant Breeders’ Rights, Nos. 1-10 (1989), especially
No. 2 at 13 [hereinafter Minutes].

Que.: Supply & Services Canada, 1985) at 3 [hereinafter Seeds of Renewal].

2Seeds of Renewal: Biotechniology and Canada’s Resource Industries (Report No. 38) (Hull,
3See P.R. Crosson & N.J. Rosenberg, “Strategies for Agriculture” (1989) 261:3 ScientificAmer-

ican 128 at 128.

4Seeds of Renewal, supra note 2 at 11.
5S.C. 1990, c. 20 [hereinafter Act].
6 Minutes, supra note 1, No. 2 at 14, No. 2A at 1.
7J.R. Kloppenburg, Jr., “No Hunting!” (1991) 15:3 Cultural Survival Quarterly 14 at 14.
8R.E. Rhoades, “The World’s Food Supply at Risk” (1991) 179:4 National Geographic 74 at 74.

19941

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

breeding so that the reader can gain an understanding of what is involved in cre-
ating new plant varieties. Part II will show why it is in the public’s interest and
in Canada’s economic interest to protect new plant varieties. Part III will con-
sider the possibility of patenting a plant variety under the Canadian Patent Act,9
and will comment on the value of creating such strong monopoly rights in such
a fundamental resource. Part IV will examine the Canadian scheme for plant
breeders embodied in the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act. Part V describes the inter-
national network protecting plant breeders’ rights. Finally, Part VI will consider
the domestic and international consequences of plant breeders’ rights and will
address such issues as their effect on third world countries, on genetic erosion
and on genetic uniformity.

I. Modern Plant Breeding in Canada – The Techniques and the

Vocabilary

Plant breeding is “the art and science of improving the genetic pattern of
plants in relation to their economic use.'”” It has brought the world numerous
benefits in the areas of pharmaceuticals and agriculture. The muscle relaxant,
tubocurarine, the anti-malarial drug, quinine, and the anti-leukemic drug, vin-
cristine, are all derived from plants.” Scientists are using biotechnology to
increase the yields of a substance that is extracted from the bark of the Pacific
yew tree in order to produce taxol, a drug showing marked success in the treat-
ment of ovarian cancer.” In a completely different field, companies such as
Monsanto Co., Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. and Calgene Inc. are produc-
ing tomatoes that have longer shelf-lives, 3 herbicide-resistant cotton, insect-
resistant tobacco and virus-resistant potatoes. 4 Plant breeders have also devel-
oped techniques to produce plants which do not require fertilizers. 5

Even more interesting, however, is understanding the techniques used to
achieve such results. This section will briefly describe the techniques presently
used in plant breeding and will introduce some basic vocabulary. The discussion
will focus on the technologies as they are used in agriculture and horticulture
because this is the kind of activity that is contemplated by plant breeders’ rights
legislation.

The purpose of plant breeding is to produce new varieties which are known
in the scientific community as “cultivars”.”6 A cultivar is “a clearly distinguish-

9R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4.
10 A.R. Hallauer, “Selection and Breeding Methods” in K.J. Frey, ed., Plant Breeding ! (Ames,

Ioiqa: Iowa State University Press, 1981) 3 at 3.

11See S.R. King, :’The Source of Our Cures” (1991) 15:3 Cultural Survival Quarterly 19 at 19;
S. Strauss, “Uncovering the Truth behind the Rape of Madagascar’s Rosy Periwinkle” The [Toron-
to] Globe and Mail (12 September 1992) D8.

12D. Erickson, “Secret Garden” (1991) 265:4 Scientific American 121 at 121.
13See D. Powell, “Invasion of the Mutant Tomatoes” The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (12 Septem-

ber 1992) D8; D. Erickson, “Putting Down Roots” (1990) 262:5 Scientific American 81.

14J.H. Barton, “Patenting Life” (1991) 264:3 Scientific American 40 at 42.
15R.F. Weaver, “Beyond Supermouse: Changing Life’s Genetic Blueprint” (1984) 166:6
16By comparing similar and differing characteristics, botanists classify plants into specific
groupings. In order of increasing specificity, plants fall into a division, class, order, family, genus,

National Geographic 818 at 840.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

‘ [Vol. 39

able group of cultivated plants which, when reproduced under control, retains
its distinguishing characters.”‘ 7 These distinguishing characters result from the
plant’s genetic makeup, or genotype, and from the surrounding environmental
conditions.” However, it is the genotype that is manipulated by breeders.

The creation of plant varieties, or cultivars, has been an important human
activity ever since Mexican Indians tamed wild grasses to produce corn. 9 Men-
del revolutionized plant breeding in 1865 by establishing the foundation of the
science of heredity, now known as genetics.2″ One of this science’s important
principles is that each characteristic of an organism is determined by the exis-
tence of a gene –
a piece of the hereditary material (DNA) found in each cell
of an organism.2 Biotechnology, also known as genetic engineering, is the mod-
em form of plant breeding. It continues to use Mendel’s principles of genetics
as a foundation and has provided yet a third step in the development of plant
breeding techniques.

Traditional plant breeding can introduce new varieties sexually by means
of pollination. Without intervention, plants either self-pollinate or cross-
pollinate with the same variety. However, in plant breeding, the breeder takes
pollen from one type of plant and transfers it to the flower of another plant to
produce progeny which incorporate the different characteristics of the two par-
ents.22 This procedure is called “crossing”. As one might imagine, this method
takes a great deal of time if several crosses must be made and does not always
yield completely uniform results. A great deal of experimentation is required to
ensure that the characteristic being bred into the plant will show up consistently
each time the seed is planted.’

Using this technique, many different kinds of crosses can be performed
which yield different results. For example, when two different inbred lines are
crossed, the resulting plant is called a hybrid. Hybrids tend to be more vigorous
and productive than the parents but these characteristics are not transmitted to
a sufficient extent to the next generation. This creates a natural form of protec-
tion for the plant breeder and forces the farmer to buy new hybrid seeds each
season.24 Another crossing technique is breeding by selection. Using this tech-
nique, a favourable characteristic can be enhanced by selecting and propagating

species and variety. See Library of Parliament (Research Branch), Plant Breeders’ Rights by T.
Curren (Hull, Que.: Supply & Services Canada, 1990) at 2. Thus, as alluded to above, the breeder
manipulates plants in the lowest category.

17J.R. Thomson, An Introduction to Seed Technology (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1979) at

240.

‘8 Curren, supra note 16 at 2.
‘ 9R. Lewis, “Agritechnology: Building a Better Plant” in D. Calhoun, ed., 1988 Yearbook of Sci-

ence and the Future (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1988) 101 at 101.

20J.R. Welsh, Fundamentals of Plant Genetics and Breeding (New York: John Wiley & Sons,

1981) at 4.

2 1A cell is the basic building block of all living things.
22Welsh, supra note 20 at 69.
23Lewis, supra note 19 at 102.
24e use of this natural form of protection is discussed in J.J. Wolf, “The ‘Genetic Message’
from the Cornfields of Iowa: Expanding the Law of Trade Secrets” (1989) 38 Drake L. Rev. 631
at 634, n. 21.

1994] .

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

plants with that characteristic. Similarly, to eliminate an unfavourable character-
istic, these plants are simply eliminated from the stock. 5

The traditional plant breeding methods described above cannot be used for
all plants because some plants reproduce asexually without a pollination system.
Examples of asexually reproducing plants are strawberries, potatoes, perennial
grasses, legumes and rootstocks.26 In some of these cases, a plant breeder must
use cuttings of the plant in order to make the necessary crosses. 7

Agritechnology involves the application of the latest biotechnological
(genetic engineering) advances to agriculture. As already mentioned, this mod-
em method of plant breeding is also founded in Mendel’s principles of genetics
and yields similar results to the traditional method. However, agritechnology
saves time and space, introduces countless forms of new varieties, and ensures
consistency in crop quality.’ With this technique, rather than manipulating the
characteristics of plants at the organismal level, as described above, the plant
breeder manipulates cells. Two principal methods are used.

The first involves protoplast .fusion followed by cell culture. Protoplast
fusion involves removing the cell walls of the two different kinds of plant cells,
suspending these protoplasts in a medium, and then adding a chemical or a cur-
rent of electricity that fuses the protoplasts together. These fused protoplasts
regenerate a cell wall and begin to multiply when placed in a nutrient medium.29
From this cell culture, an undifferentiated mass of plant cells grows –
a callus
– which can be further manipulated to form artificial seeds.

The second method involves the use of a cell culture in conjunction with
recombinant DNA technology to produce artificial seeds. In recombinant DNA
technology, the gene which codes for a particular characteristic in one kind of
plant is removed from its cell and inserted into the cell of another kind. This
insertion technique requires a vehicle that can enter the plant cell. Plasmids, cir-
cular structures of genetic material which can hold the specific gene in question,
and viruses can both be used as vehicles for insertion.30

Neither traditional nor modem plant breeding techniques are effective if there
is an insufficient amount of germplasm (hereditary material) from which to select
the varieties that will be crossed. All plant breeders recognize the importance of
collecting, classifying, storing, maintaining and distributing plant genes. The Sci-
ence Council of Canada confirmed the importance of having storage facilities
when it recommended that “Canada needs a national system of culture collections
that could be used by biotechnologists all across the country.”‘” Thus, any compre-
hensive breeding program must include a gene storage program.

2-5Curren, supra note 16 at 4-5.
26Welsh, supra note 20 at 79.
27Ibid. at 267.
28See Lewis, supra note 19 at 102.
29E.C. Cocking & R. Riley, “Application of Tissue Culture and Somatic Hybridization to Plant

Improvement” in Frey, ed., supra note 10, 85 at 91.

30Weaver, supra note 15 at 834.
31Seeds of Renewal, supra note 2 at 5.

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 39

As can be seen from this brief description, plant breeding involves numer-
ous advanced scientific techniques. It is a time-consuming process, and when
performed on a large scale, it is a costly process. This suggests that plant breed-
ers must be encouraged to invest their knowledge, time and money so that the
public can -benefit from the latest drought-resistant wheat or insect-resistant
potato.

II. A Rationale for Providing Exclusive Ownership Rights in Newly
Created Plant Varieties and a Method of Determining the Most
Appropriate Type of Ownership Right

There is no reason to protect the creation of new plant varieties unless
doing so would be in the public interest and in Canada’s economic interest. Fur-
thermore, there is no reason for choosing exclusive ownership rights as the
means of protection unless there are clear advantages to using this type of sys-
tem. In this Part, we identify Canada’s economic interest as well as the public
interest in the creation and protection of new plant varieties, and we provide a
rationale for choosing ownership rights as the most appropriate form of protec-
tion for new plant varieties. We examine the rationale and the interests from a
global perspective. Finally, having found that the exclusive ownership right is
an appropriate form of protection, we determine how to recognize which type
of ownership right best addresses the concerns of plant breeders, farmers and
the public at large.

Canada’s economic interest stems from the need to have its industries
remain competitive in light of the increasing globalization of the world econ-
omy. At the moment, Canada’s corporations and agricultural industry compete
economically with those of other countries. However, in order to continue doing
so, these corporations must gain a competitive advantage in the future.
Although the best way to create such an advantage is by way of technological
advancement,” it is often difficult to encourage companies to invest time and
money into agricultural innovation when there is no guarantee that they will
reap profits from their developments. In the absence of any kind of protection,
there is the ever-present risk that the newly developed plant variety will be cop-
ied by a competitor, and consequently, inventors will be discouraged from
undertaking any kind of innovative activity.

The general public also has an interest in technological advancement for
several reasons. First, technological advancement brings about healthy eco-
nomic change, which in turn provides a stable or improving standard of living
for the public. Second, once technological advancement occurs, it is desirable
that society be able to obtain access to inventions and to the knowledge that led
to them. Obtaining access to such information can often be very difficult in the
absence of any protection for the inventor. This is because inventors who finally
choose to expend the necessary time and money fear losing their competitive
advantage and, consequently, attempt to create their own protective mechanism

32See G.Y. Bertin & S. Wyatt, Multinationals and Industrial Property: The Control of the

World’s Technology (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1988) at 24-26.

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

by keeping their invention secret. Third, apart from the benefits that the public
reaps from technological advancements made by Canadian corporations, the
public as a group of consumers has an interest in attracting the investment of
foreign corporations so as to ensure that it is getting the best products for the
best prices. As with domestic corporations, foreign corporations will be unwill-
ing to do business in Canada in the absence of a system of protection.

Thus, unless a system of protecting inventions and the knowledge that led
to them exists, technological advancement in the areas of agriculture and hor-
ticulture will be minimal and Canada and its people will lose in the long run.33
Canada will fail to remain competitive and this will lead to an unhealthy econ-
omy, and to a Canadian society which is unable to educate itself with respect
to the latest technological innovations in the area of plant breeding. The lack of
a system of protection will also mean that Canadians will be unable to obtain
some of the best agricultural products.

As already mentioned, biotechnology in the agricultural sector is one area
in which significant technological advancements are occurring. At a time when
the world’s population continues to increase, and the world’s biodiversity is at
risk, these advancements are definitely in Canada’s interest and in the public
interest. They can lead to efficient crop production and to the creation of diverse
kinds of crops. Furthermore, given the global need for food and biodiversity,
wide distribution of biotechnological creations is essential so that everyone in
the world can benefit.

However, a market structure involving large, multinational firms and
domestic firms with large international markets will be the price society must
pay so that everyone can access technological advances. This is because
[t]he dimensions of national markets are often inadequate; and, therefore, in order
to realise economies of scale in production and to spread the high research and
development costs the firm will seek new, foreign, markets.34

Thus, agritechnological advancement must be seen in a global context.

To remain competitive, a firm will seek worldwide protection for its bio-
technological advantage. Firms could try to protect themselves through the use
of trade secrets, however, “[b]oth theoretical and empirical evidence shows …
*that multinationals are more interested in establishing an efficient apparatus for
protection primarily based on the use of patents.”’35 Domestic corporations with
international markets would likely have the same preference for patent-like pro-
tection. Because it is these corporations whose innovation we are trying to trig-
ger, it is rather important to tailor the method of protection to their desires so
long as that method does not carry with it great negative implications. This sug-
gests that for Canada’s corporations to be players in the global markets, for
Canada’s agricultural industry to gain access to the newest plant varieties, and

33These economic policy arguments are usually put forward to justify patent-like legislation. See
e.g. E.T. Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1973) at 31-41.

34Bertin & Wyatt, supra note 32 at 10-11.
351Jbid.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

for Canada to be attractive to foreign investors, Canada must provide some form
of patent-like protection to plant breeders.

There are many forms of protection, but a patent-like system, based on pro-
prietary rights, creates an appropriate trade-off between corporate desires and
the needs of the general public. A patent-like system would benefit the public
because it would make the new plant variety available for consumption or use,
and provide disclosure of some key information about the new variety. Thus,
either the Patent Act or a completely new patent-like scheme such as the Plant
Breeders’ Rights Act, could be used to provide protection. It is important to
stress, however, that because of the globalization of this industry, either choice
will only be effective if Canada’s legislation becomes part of a network of such
rights around the world.

Having found that patent-like ownership rights are preferred by the major
innovators and provide positive results for the public, we are now in a position
to be able to determine which ownership-based system is best. The system that
is ultimately chosen must provide sufficient incentives to plant breeders to cre-
ate new plants and sufficient disclosure to the public. The superior system is the
one that provides a monopoly ownership right which is broad enough to encour-
age plant breeders to invest in biotechnological advancements, but no broader.

The appropriate legislative scheme is the one that creates a balance
between the interests of breeders and of the public. However, because we have
come to the conclusion here that a form of ownership right is the most appro-
priate form of protection, it is no longer appropriate to discuss the “interests”
of the public and of the plant breeder. The term “balancing the interests”
wrongly suggests that rights are held by two entities. Under an ownership
scheme, rights will be granted to one entity only. It is, therefore, more accurate
to describe an ownership situation as does Fitzgerald in Salmond on Jurispru-
dence.36 Fitzgerald describes ownership as a right which has a residual character
in which unrestrained activity is allowed.

Therefore, it is best to state that the most appropriate legislative scheme
will be the one that creates a balance between the scope of the ownership right
and the size of the residual liberties of farmers and breeders to use the creation
for their own purposes. I use the terms “rights” and “residual liberties” to make
the distinction between the access to plant varieties and to germplasm which is
exclusive to the holder of the right, and the residual access t6 the plant variety
and to the germplasm which remains for the public following a grant of the
right. This residual access is a liberty, in the jurisprudential sense, because the
public at large is at liberty to obtain access to certain aspects of the innovation.
This language of rights and liberties will be used throughout the paper when an
ownership-based protection scheme is being evaluated.

36See P.J. Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1966)
at 215-49. Fitzgerald describes ownership as a right which has a residual character (ibid. at 247).
This residual character could be seen to encompass the liberties of persons to have free access to
new plant varieties or to germplasm. Fitzgerald describes liberties as the areas within which the
law permits unrestrained activity (ibid. at 224-28).

19941

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

MI. The Possibility of Patenting a Plant under the Canadian Patent Act

If we accept that the granting of a proprietary right is the best way to
encourage investment in the creation of new plant varieties, it is then important
to determine whether a patent right is the most appropriate form of protection,
or whether a sui generis right would be more appropriate. If a new plant variety
could be patented, then the scope of the protection would be large in that the
recipient would acquire the exclusive right to make, use and sell the new plant
variety.37

The Patent Act contains three main requirements that a creation must meet
before it can be seen as a patented invention. First, the creation must be an “art,
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”38 It follows that the
creation must be a product of human intervention and not a product of nature.
Second, the creation must be new, useful and non-obvious.39 If these first two
criteria are met, then the creation will qualify as an invention. The third crite-
rion, that of proper disclosure, is the final one that must be met before the inven-
tion is patentable. Subsection 34(1) of the Patent Act sets out the extent of the
necessary disclosure:

34. (1) An applicant shall in the specification of his invention

(a) correctly and fully describe the invention and its operation or use as

contemplated by the inventor;

(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the method of con-
structing, making, compounding or using a machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains,
or with which it is most closely connected, to make, construct, com-
pound or use it;

(c) in the case of a machine, explain the principle thereof and the best
mode in which he has contemplated the application of that principle;
(d) in the case of a process, explain the necessary sequence, if any, of the
various steps, so as to distinguish the invention from other inventions.

The purpose of this disclosure requirement is to permit the public to benefit
from the knowledge that led to the invention and to reproduce the invention.

Applying these three requirements to a non-conventional creation such as
a new plant variety introduces numerous conceptual difficulties and stretches
the meaning of the Patent Act. First, plants are peculiar candidates for pat-
enting because, as living things, they reproduce. Because reproduction is a nat-
ural occurrence, and plant breeding relies on this reproduction to create new
plants, it is often difficult to distinguish between changes that have come about
naturally and those that have resulted from human intervention. This in turn
makes it difficult to classify a plant, or its propagating material, as a “manu-
facture” or a “composition of matter”. The second problem with obtaining a
utility patent for a plant is the difficulty in meeting the written disclosure
requirement.

37Patent Act, supra note 9, s. 42.
38Jbid., s. 2 (definition of “invention”).
39 Ibid., ss. 2, 27.

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 39

In the United States, these two difficulties led Congress to enact the 1930
Plant Patent Act 40 and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act.4 As we shall see,
however, it is now accepted in the United States that utility patents can be
obtained for plants. Canada, on the other hand, has taken its usual slow and cau-
tious approach with respect to frontier questions in intellectual property. It was
only in 1990 that Parliament adopted specific intellectual property legislation
for plants, and to this day, Canadian courts have not accepted that plants are pat-
entable. In fact, the official position of the Canadian Patent Office is that
“[p]lants and animals are not patentable subject matter. 42

The Supreme Court of the United States ushered in a new era by granting
intellectual property rights in living things in Diamond v. Chakrabarty43 In that
case, the Court held that a live, human-made micro-organism was a “manufac-
ture” or “composition of matter” and was therefore patentable subject matter.
This conclusion stemmed from the Court’s finding that “Congress intended stat-
utory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man’. ‘ *
This broad approach led to the subsequent revolutionary decision in Ex parte
Hibberd,45 which stands for the proposition that plants, seeds and tissue cultures
can be protected by utility patents as well as by the specific plant protection stat-
utes. In the case, the maize seeds were held not to be patentable because “[tihe
disclosure [was] inadequate to enable one skilled in the art to make and use the
invention.” However, the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals and
Interferences did suggest that, as with micro-organisms, deposition of the seed
in a permanent collection, freely accessible to anyone after the patent is issued,
would constitute sufficient disclosure.46

After the United States’ bold approach to the patenting of micro-organisms,
Canada’s Patent Appeal Board and Commissioner of Patents followed suit in Re
Application of Abitibi Co.47 The Board found that micro-organisms were patentable
under the Patent Act4s and concluded that the ideal form of disclosure would
include both their deposit and a written description. “But if the organism [could]
subsequently only be reproduced from itself, [the Board did] not see why the
inventor should be deprived of his reward provided, by deposition, he [made] it
available to others.”’49

The Canadian equivalent of Ex parte Hibberd is Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v.
Canada (Commissioner of Patents).0 However, when faced with the question of

4035 U.S.C. 161-64 (1988). ”
417 U.S.C. 2321-2582 (1988).
42Canadian Patent Office, Manual of Patent Office Practice (Ottawa: Canadian Patent Office,

1990) para. 12.03.01.

Plants” (1989) 16 AIPLA Q.J. 418, which discusses the impact of this case.

43447 U.S. 303 (1980).
441bid. at 309.
41227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (1985). See also N.J. Scay, “Protecting the Seeds of Innovation: Patenting
46Ex parte Hibberd, ibid. at 447.
47(1982), 62 C.P.R. (2d) 81.
4 1bid. at 88.
491bid. at 91.
50(1989] 1 S.C.R. 1623, 60 D.L.R. (4th) 223, 25 C.P.R. (3d) 257, 25 C.I.P.R. 1 [hereinafter Pio-
neer Hi-Bred cited to S.C.R.], aff’g (sub norn. Re Application for Patent of Pioneer Hi-Bred)

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

protecting a new soybean variety which had -been developed through artificial
cross-breeding, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down a highly unsatisfy-
ing and highly criticized judgment.” The Court chose not to address the press-
ing question of whether plants were patentable subject-matter, but rather
decided the case on the issue of whether there had been sufficient disclosure.
The Court held that the patent applicant had failed to disclose everything that
was essential to permit others to duplicate the “invention”; only the materials
were mentioned but not the plant breeding method. The Court also decided that
the deposit of a sample of the seed of the new variety did not meet the disclosure
requirements of the Patent Act. 2

As emphasized by Ledgley and Stewart, this case did not determine
whether or not higher life forms are patentable in Canada, but rather only that
the deposit of a sample of a new plant variety, by itself, does not meet the dis-
closure requirements of the Patent Act. 3 The decision in Pioneer Hi-Bred was
limited to the question of sufficiency of disclosure because of the lack of judi-
cial expertise in scientific areas,’ combined with Pioneer Hi-Bred’s weakness
in the preparation of its case.5

A detailed critique of the reasoning applied in Pioneer Hi-Bred by the var-
ious courts is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that many ques-
tions were left unanswered and that, of the questions that were addressed, many
were addressed poorly. For example, the Supreme Court stated that “[tihe inter-
vention made by Hi-Bred does not in any way appear to alter the soybean repro-
ductive process, which occurs in accordance with the laws of nature.”56 This
fails to take into account the following point made by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
of the United States Supreme Court:

It only confuses the issue, however, to introduce such terms as “the work of
nature” and “laws of nature.” For these are vague and malleable terms infec-
ted with too much ambiguity and equivocation. Everything that happens may be
deemed “the work of nature,” and any patentable cbmposite exemplifies in its
properties “the laws of nature.” 57

Inherent in the Court’s thinking about the “laws of nature” concept was the
potential difference that could exist between the patenting of new plant varieties
created by traditional and modern plant breeding techniques. Creating such a

Can. Bus. L.J. 333 at 340.

Hi-Bred” (1990) 7 Can. Intell. Prop. Rev. 290 at 290-91.

[1987] 3 F.C. 8, 11 C.I.P.R. 165, 14 C.P.R. (3d) 491 (C.A.), aff’g (1986), 11 C.P.R. (3d) 311 (Pat.
App. Bd. & Pat. Comm’r.).
51See e.g. R.W. Marusyk, “The Patentability of New Plant Life Forms in Canada” (1990) 16
52Pioneer Hi-Bred, supra note 50 at 1643.
53C.J. Ledgley & M.I. Stewart, “Patent Protection for Plants and Animals in the Wake of Pioneer
54This point is clearly illustrated in J.R. Rudolph, “Biotechnology, Pioneer Hi-Bred and Patent
55Pioneer Hi-Bred, supra note 50 at 1640-41.
561bid. at 1634.
57Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 at 134-35 (1948). See also E.J.
Sease, “From Microbes, to Corn Seeds, to Oysters, to Mice: Patentability of New Life Forms”
(1989) 38 Drake L. Rev. 551 at 557.
58Pioneer Hi-Bred, supra note 50 at 1640-41. This distinction with respect to the patentability

Law: Judicial Expertise Missing?” (1990) 7 Can. Intell. Prop. Rev. 69.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

difference in patentability would likely seem artificial to a plant breeder since
the same effort may be involved using either technique, and the same result may
be obtained.

The impact of Pioneer Hi-Bred, whether or not the judgment was strong
or weak, remains the same: the possibility of patenting plants in the near future
appears slim in Canada. The Patent Office and the Federal Court of Canada
have refused to regard plants, pods and seeds as patentable subject matter.s9 The
Supreme Court has not commented on this issue other than indicating that “[it]
must … be very cautious regarding the scope of [its] pronouncements.”‘6 Fur-
thermore, it has placed an onerous disclosure requirement on the plant breeder
which may be difficult to meet.

The inability of plant breeders to secure protection in Canada under the
Patent Act in the wake of Pioneer Hi-Bred, highlighted the need for specific
plant breeders’ rights legislation. In any event, patent legislation is not entirely
appropriate in that it does not strike the proper balance between the residual lib-
erty of the public to freely access plant varieties, and the exclusive ownership
rights of plant breeders to exploit their new plants and plant genes. This is
because such legislation creates a very strong monopoly right of ownership. As
argued in the previous Part, if a narrower monopoly right can provide sufficient
financial incentive to stimulate plant breeding, then it should be used. The rights
typically contained in plant breeders’ rights legislation are less exclusive than
those contained in patent legislation.6′ The Canadian Plant Breeders’ Rights Act
both addresses the incentive problem and provides a more favourable allocation
of rights and residual liberties.

IV. The Canadian Plant Breeders’ Rights Act

The previous three Parts provided the necessary background information to
understand the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act. We found that creating exclusive
ownership rights, if drafted properly, could strike a proper balance between the
interests of plant breeders and those of the public. We also found that the Patent
Act would have to be broadly interpreted if it were to apply to plant varieties
and that, in any case, patents cannot strike an appropriate balance between these
competing interests. This Part will focus on the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act itself
by examining the preliminary and subsequent requirements for eligibility, and
the degree of protection afforded by the Act.62 This analysis will demonstrate

of various breeding techniques is also made in the Manual of Patent Office Practice, supra note
42. At para. 12.03.02, the Manual states:

Inventions for new plants and animals are not patentable. Processes for producing
plants and animals which require significant technical intervention by man may be pat-
entable. Traditional biological breeding processes used for the production of plants and
animals are considered essentially natural biological processes and are not patentable.

59See Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1987] 3 F.C. 8 at 13-14, 11

C.I.P.R. 165 (C.A.).

6Pioneer Hi-Bred, supra note 50 at 1632.
61This point is illustrated very well in W.L. Hayhurst, “Exclusive Rights in Relation to Living
62Unfortunately, as of the writing of this paper, no cases have been heard interpreting the Act.

Things” (1991) 6 I.P.J. 171 at 185.

Therefore, the analysis will be based on the content of the Act only.

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

that the Act was created for valid reasons, that it is drafted with the peculiarities
of plants in mind, and that it strikes the appropriate balance between the inter-
ests in question.

A. Preliminary Requirements of the Act

Just as the Patent Act requires that the art, process, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter to be patented be new, useful and non-obvious,63 the
Plant Breeders’ Rights Act contains equivalent preliminary requirements which
must be satisfied. Subsection 4(1) states that the Act will apply to a variety that
is prescribed by regulation and which is found to be a new variety by the Com-
missioner, pursuant to the procedure set out in subsection 27(1). In section 2, the
Act describes a new variety as being one that complies with the requirements
in section 4. A plant variety is described in section 2 as “any cultivar, clone,
breeding line or hybrid of a prescribed category of plant that can be cultivated.”
The Plant Breeders’ Rights Regulations’ set out the categories to which
the Act and the Regulations apply: african violet, alfalfa, apple, barley, bean,
cherry, chrysanthemum, corn, dianthus, flax, grapes, oats, pea, pear, poinsettia,
potato, potentilla, rape, rose, soybean, strawberry, wheat and yew. Pursuant to
international obligations, the number of eligible varieties will have to increase
with time. For now, however, the application of the Act is limited to plant breed-
ers producing a new variety in one of these categories.

Within this subset of plant varieties, the application of the Act is further
restricted by subsection 4(2) of the Act. Subsection 4(2) states that a plant vari-
ety will qualify as a new variety if it:

(a) is, by reason of one or more identifiable characteristics, clearly distinguish-
able from all varieties the existence of which is a matter of common knowl-
edge at the effective date of application for the grant of the plant breeder’s
rights respecting that plant variety;

(b) is stable in its essential characteristics in that after repeated reproduction or
propagation or, where the applicant has defined a particular cycle of reproduc-
tion or multiplication, at the end of each cycle, remains true to its description;
and

(c) is, having regard to the particular features of its sexual reproduction or vege-

tative propagation, a sufficiently homogeneous variety [emphasis added].

Section 4(3) adds:

(3) In paragraph (2)(c), “sufficiently homogeneous variety” means such a variety
that, in the event of its sexual reproduction or vegetative propagation in sub-
stantial quantity, any variations in characteristics of plants so reproduced or
propagated are predictable, capable of being described and commercially
acceptable [emphasis added].

When determining whether a plant variety is a matter of “common knowledge”
in paragraph 4(2)(a) of the Act, section 5 of the Regulations states that the fol-
lowing criteria should be considered:

(a) whether the variety is already being cultivated or exploited for commercial

purposes; or

63Patent Act, supra note 9, ss. 2 (definition of “invention”), 27.
64SOR/91-594 as am. by SOR/93-87, sch. I [hereinafter Regulations].

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 39

(b) whether the variety is described in a publication that is accessible to the pub-

lic.

The preliminary requirements of subsection 4(2) can be summarized as requir-
ing the plant variety to be: (1) clearly distinguishable or distinct; (2) stable; and
(3) sufficiently homogeneous. The additional information provided in the enu-
merated sections qualify these three requirements and help to determine whether
they have been met. Notice that there is no “utility” requirement as found in the
Patent Act but that there are “stable” and “sufficiently homogeneous” require-
ments which were introduced due to the nature of plant breeding. As mentioned
in Part I, breeding involves crossing two different kinds of plants to introduce,
accentuate or remove certain characteristics which render the variety “new”.
Stability and homogeneity are reached only after numerous crosses so that the
gene coding for the characteristics becomes a part of the plant’s complement of
genetic material.

In addition to the requirements of section 4, section 7 contains the “no prior
commercialization” requirement. In this section, the Act provides that a new
variety will not qualify for protection if a breeder, or his or her legal represent-
ative, sold or concurred in the sale of that variety either inside or outside of Can-
ada prior to the effective date of the application.65 The effective date is the date
on which the application is received by the Commissioner, or a date prescribed
by the Regulations.

We can see that if a plant: (1) is prescribed in Schedule I of the Regula-
tions; (2) is clearly dlistinguishable, or distinct; (3) is stable; (4) is sufficiently
homogeneous; and (5) has not been commercialized, then it has satisfied the
preliminary requirements of the Act and is on its way to being granted protec-
tion. The fact that the plant breeder need not prove that the variety is useful
somewhat reduces the threshold that must be met to qualify for a plant breeder’s
right. As we will see later, the lower threshold for the requirements results in
a more limited grant of rights than those provided by the Patent Act.

B. Subsequent Requirements of the Act

Once the threshold test has been met, the plant breeder must provide suf-
ficient disclosure about the new variety, must maintain the propagating material,
and must give the new variety a denomination, or a name.

The need to disclose certain information about the variety is hinted at in
subsection 4(3) which was set out above. This section states that the character-
istic must be “capable of being described”. The disclosure requirement is elab-
orated in paragraph 9(1)(c), which provides that an application for the grant of
any plant breeder’s rights must be “supported by the documents and any other
material prescribed.” Sections 19-21 of the Regulations describe in more detail
that information which must be provided to the Commissioner. Most of section
19 contains administrative information that is easily ascertainable; however,

65Although the description of the prior sale provisions in this paper is short, it suffices for the
purposes of this paper. For specific questions regarding these provisions, please refer directly to
the details of the wording found in s. 7 of the Act, supra note 5.

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

paragraphs (i) and (n) are of particular interest. Paragraph 19(1)(i) requires that
the manner in which the plant variety was developed be disclosed. Paragraph
19(l)(n) requires disclosure of the manner in which the propagating material
will be maintained. Section 20 of the Regulations contains the following addi-
tional disclosure requirement:

20. An application referred to in subsection 19(1) shall be supported by

(a) the results of comparative tests and trials to demonstrate that the plant

variety is a new variety; and

(b) photographs and a detailed description of the plant variety that illustrate
that the plant variety is clearly distinguishable pursuant to paragraph
4(2)(a) of the Act.

In order to verify the information that is in the application, the Act has cre-
ated what could be described as an “ongoing disclosure obligation”. Section 30
requires that the applicant maintain the propagating material throughout the
period of registration, that is, throughout the entire period that the applicant has
been granted rights under the Act.’ The applicant must maintain the propagating
material so that, upon request, the Commissioner may be provided with the new
variety. Furthermore, the Commissioner has the right to inspect the maintenance
facility.

Apart from the initial and ongoing disclosure obligations, the plant breeder
must designate the new variety by a denomination pursuant to section 14. If the
proposed denomination is unsuitable, misleading or confusing then the Com-
missioner can request that the denomination be changed. Because Canada’s leg-
islation is part of an international framework of plant breeders’ rights, the Act
also provides for international uniformity with respect to a new variety’s
denomination.67 The denomination becomes the generic name of the new vari-
ety6″ and must be clearly recognizable from the variety’s trade-mark or trade
name.

69

We see from the preliminary and subsequent requirements that the Plant
Breeders’ Rights Act is much better tailored than the Patent Act to the particular
characteristics of plants. As a result, fulfilling these requirements is a much less
onerous task for the plant breeder. We will see below that in return for these spe-
cifically tailored and less onerous requirements a narrower monopoly right is
granted.

C. Degree of Protection

Having considered the requirements for protection under the Act, we now
come to the most important section in this entire discussion on the Plant Breed-

66Section 2 of the Act, ibid., defines “propagating material” as “any reproductive or vegetative
material for propagation, whether by sexual or other means, of a plant variety, and includes seeds
for sowing and any whole plant or part thereof that may be used for propagation.”

671bid., s. 14(4). S.D. Schlosser, “The Registration of Plant Variety Denominations” (1988) 29
IDEA 177, elaborates on the the international requirements for these denominations as set out in
article 13 of the UPOV Convention (infra note 89) and criticizes the requirements’ inadequacies.

6Slbid., s. 15.
69Ibid., s. 14(6).

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

ers’ Rights Act: the degree of protection provided. There are three reasons for
this section’s importance. First, the protection afforded by the Act is what under-
lies the Act’s existence. Plant breeders will not bother applying for these rights
if they do not feel that the gains outweigh the costs in terms of the time and
money required to create a new plant variety and then to apply for the certifi-
cate. Likewise, the cost of disclosing what is often highly sensitive information
may also be too high a price to pay if there is an insufficient degree of protec-
tion.7″ Second, the degree of protection is important because it determines the
monopoly protection that is granted to the breeder, and the consequent restric-
tion on the ability of other groups such as farmers and other plant breeders to
use the variety. Third, the global consequences of having such rights in Canada,
as well as in other industrialized countries, may be related to the degree of pro-
tection, as we will see later. The protection afforded under the Act includes: the
nature and term of the actual monopoly right, the ability to assign this right, the
ability to get a protective direction, and finally, the mechanisms available to
enforce the right. This protection can be limited by a compulsory licence issued
to another person by the Commissioner, as set out in sections 32 and 33 of the
Act.

The nature of plant breeders’ rights is described in subsection 5(1):
5. (1) Subject to this Act, the holder of the plant breeder’s rights respecting a plant

variety has the exclusive right
(a) to sell, and produce in Canada for the purpose of selling, propagating

material, as such, of the plant variety;

(b) to make repeated use of propagating material of the plant variety in
order to produce commercially another plant variety if the repetition is
necessary for that purpose;

(c) where it is a plant variety to which ornamental plants or parts thereof
normally marketed for purposes other than propagation belong, to use
any such plants or parts commercially as propagating material in the
production of ornamental or cut flowers; and

(d) to authorize, conditionally or unconditionally, the doing of an act

described in paragraphs (a) to (c).

According to section 2, the word “sell” in subsection 5(1) includes “agree
to sell, or offer, advertise, keep, expose, transmit, send, convey or deliver for
sale, or agree to exchange or to dispose of to any person in any manner for a
consideration.” Subsection 5(2) states that the exclusive right in paragraph
5(1)(a) does not apply to the sale of the propagating material outside of Canada.
But, if that propagating material is subsequently used in Canada, this will con-
stitute infringement of the holder’s rights. Subsection 5(3) states that the sale by
the holder of the right to a purchaser implicitly authorizes the purchaser to resell
the propagating material as a distributor might do. However, a sale does not
authorize the purchaser to produce the propagating material and then to sell it.
Finally, subsection 5(4) allows the plant breeder to require that royalties be paid
by a party to whom authority has been conferred under paragraph 5(1)(d).

70When breeders find that the cost of disclosure is too costly, they will look to trade secrets as
an alternate form of protection. The factors that determine whether or not to disclose are discussed
in W.L. Casey, Jr. & L.S. Moss, “Intellectual Property Rights and Biotechnology” (1986) 27 IDEA
251.

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

All of the rights described in section 5 exist for a term of eighteen years,
as stated in subsection 6(1). This term is from the dateof issue of the certificate
and is subject to the necessary maintenance fees. The rights can be assigned in
accordance with section 31 and are enforced by means .of civil remedies as set
out in sections 41-51. In addition, when applying for the grant of a plant breed-
er’s right, a breeder can also apply for a protective direction under sections
19-21. A protective direction will give a breeder the same kind of protection it
would have with a plant breeder’s right while the application is pending in the
Plant Breeders’ Rights Office, on two conditions. First, the breeder must subse-
quently be granted the right. Second, every person applying for a protective
direction must undertake to sell only in three cases: in good faith for purposes
of scientific research; as part of a transaction involving the sale of the plant
breeder’s rights; or for the purposes of accumulating stock for subsequent resale
by that other person.71 This undertaking to sell only in particular circumstances
is only applicable prior to any grant of plant breeders’ rights.

At a later date, if a person opposing the grant of a plant breeder’s rights
certificate makes an application under section 32, the Commissioner may decide
that the right must be qualified by a compulsory licence. Determining whether
such a licence should be granted involves the weighing of two competing inter-
ests.72 On the one hand, the Commissioner wishes to ensure that the “plant vari-
ety is made available to the public at reasonable prices, is widely distributed and
is maintained in quality.”‘ On the other hand, the Commissioner must keep in
mind one of the main purposes of the Act, namely that “there is reasonable
remuneration, which may include royalty, for the holder of the plant breeder’s
rights respecting the plant variety.”’74 A compulsory licence could have a serious
detrimental effect on a plant breeder trying to maximize a return on research
investment. This is because a licence automatically reduces the scope of the arti-
ficially created monopoly of the breeder.

D. Understanding the Scope of Protection Provided by the Act

What protection does a plant breeder get from a grant under the Plant
Breeders’ Rights Act? It is important to note that the right only relates to the
propagating material. This includes the seed, artificial or natural depending on
the breeding technique, and the cuttings, or parts of the plant, if the plant repro-
duces vegetatively. The rights do not extend to the actual plant. This is done
because, unlike inert objects that are patentable, and unlike unicellular orga-
nisms that replicate into exact copies of each other, higher organisms such as
plants start off from a cell and then grow and differentiate into a complete plant.
The difficulty lies in having to decide what should and should not be protected.
Legislators have chosen to address this particular concern by creating a separate
“patent-like act” for plants and to limit the protection to the seed or other prop-
ag’ating material.

71Act, supra note 5, s. 19(2).
721bid., s. 32(2).
731bid., s. 32(2)(a).
74Ibid., s. 32(2)(b).

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

(Vol. 39

This fundamental point is better explained by means of an example. In the
case of a wheat crop that reproduces by means of seeds, there is no exclusive
right to the plant that grows from the seed that is sold. The breeder has the
exclusive right to produce the seed and to sell it. However, once sold to a
farmer, the farmer can grow the seed into a plant, sell the plant and retain these
profits. The profits from the sale of the plant, of the actual wheat, are not those
of the breeder, and the act of selling the wheat does not constitute infringement.
The farmer can also plant the seed, grow it, retain the subsequent seed, grow the
subsequent seed and then sell the resulting plant without infringing a breeder’s
exclusive rights. This last limitation on the holder’s right is often referred to as
the “farmer’s exemption”. Likewise, if a breeder had a plant breeders’ rights
certificate, sold seeds to a farmer, and then the farmer resold these seeds to
someone else, this would not constitute infringement either, as a result of sub-
section 5(3).75 Of course, if the farmer were to plant the seed, grow it and then
subsequently sell the new seeds that are generated, this would constitute
infringement.76

Thus, the holder of the right has an exclusive right to sell the propagating
material in Canada. Furthermore, although the right does not extend to sales
outside of Canada, if the propagating material is subsequently used in Canada,
the subsequent use will constitute infringement.

In addition to the exclusive right to sell the propagating material, the breed-
er has the exclusive right to repeatedly use the propagating material of the new
variety in order to produce subsequent plant varieties. At first glance, this right
does not seem to provide for the breeder’s exemption found in the UPOV Con-
vention, which is the international agreement creating the international network
of plant breeders’ rights.77 This exemption provides that a protected variety may
be used as an initial source of variation by other breeders for the purpose of cre-
ating other varieties. However, this would be an incorrect interpretation of the
right. As we shall see in Part VI,the Act was created in order to ratify the UPOV
Convention. National Corn Growers Ass’n v. Canada (Import Tribunal)7″ estab-
lished that enabling legislation must be interpreted in light of the international
convention which is being implemented. Therefore, because the UPOV Con-
vention contains a breeder’s exemption, such a right must also exist under the
Act.

75This scenario is similar to the situation in Canmar Grain Inc. v. Radloff (1986), 52 Sask. R.
161, [1987] 6 W.W.R. 427 (Q.B.), which was labelled as Canada’s first plant breeders’ rights case
in P. Cramer, “Canada’s First Plant Breeders’ Rights Case Blooms in Sask.” The Lawyer’s Weekly
(11 July 1986) 8. In that case, however, there was no legislation yet in place. The dispute arose
from the breach of an exclusive distribution agreement with a farmer. The breach occurred because
the farmer sold seeds to other farners when the contract prevented such distribution.
76For further exploration of this type of exemption, please refer to the American Court of
Appeals Federal Circuit decision in Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1202 (1992).
In that decision, the Court discussed the scope of the crop exemption (the American equivalent to
the farmer’s exemption) in the context of the American Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.
2321-2582 (1988).

77See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
78[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 at 1371, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 449 at 482-83 [hereinafter National Corn Grow-

ers cited to S.C.R.].

19941

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

Plant breeders’ rights seem to be somewhat similar to the Patent Act and
dissimilar to the Copyright Act79 in that a breeder need not prove that his or her
variety was actually copied in order to prove infringement. To prove infringe-
ment, it is sufficient to show that the infringing variety is the same as the pro-
tected variety. On the other hand, as pointed out by Hayhurst, the Act is similar
to the Copyright Act in that it expressly allows a holder of plant breeder’s rights
to authorize the performance of acts within his or her exclusive domain.”

E. Dual Protection of Plants under the Patent Act and the Plant Breeders’

Rights Act

We have examined the content of the rights granted under the Act and have
compared some of these rights with those granted under other intellectual property
statutes. However, two important questions remain unanswered. First, if a plant
breeder’s right refers to the propagating material, does this include the genetic
material within the seed? Second, could parts of the seed, the actual seed, or the
whole of the plant still be patented if the seed is already protected under the Act?
The answer to the first question affects the answer to the second question.

If the breeder has the exclusive right to make repeated use of the seed in
order to create subsequent varieties, then the breeder must have some kind of
exclusive right to the cells and the genes within the seed. This exclusive right
would likely refer to the entire complement of genes as arranged in the plant
variety, but would not extend to the individual genes. The exclusive right cannot
extend to individual genes because, according to the breeder’s exemption, other
plant breeders have the right to use a: new plant variety as an initial source of
variation. Given that variation in a plant occurs due to changes in its gene com-
plement, it follows that in order to exercise the breeder’s exemption a breeder
must be given unencumbered access to the individual genes.

Having determined the answer to the first question, we can consider the
issue of dual protection. In answering this question, we must distinguish
between the seed and the plant, and the parts within the seed.

We have seen the reluctance of the Supreme Court of Canada to allow pat-
ent protection for the plant, seed and pod of a soybean variety in Pioneer
Hi-Bred. We have also found that patent protection is unnecessary to provide
plant breeders with a sufficient financial incentive to produce new plant varie-
ties. It is therefore unlikely that a lower court would be willing to protect plants
and seeds, especially if they are already being protected by the Plant Breeders’
Rights Act. Furthermore, as we will see more clearly below, because Canada is
now a party to the UPOV Convention on plant breeders’ rights, Canadian courts
are prevented from granting protection under both a patent act and a plant
breeders’ rights act. The answer with respect to patenting parts of the seed is

79R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
80 These points about similarities and differences of the Act and the Copyright Act are made in
Hayhurst, supra note 61 at 186. This article is worth reading as it is one of the few articles that
has looked at Canada’s Plant Breeders’ Rights Act. An American article suggests that an intellec-
tual property right that protects a plant is most similar to a copyright (D.B. Bernstein, “Is a Plant
Patent a Form of Copyright?” (1986) 27 IDEA 31).

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

more difficult. Hayhurst argues that despite this ban on dual protection, plant
breeders may be able to get protection for cell lines, modified cells, genes and
plasmids under the Patent Act.”‘ However, if we consider that the breeder has
some exclusive rights that extend to the complement of genes in the new variety,
then the ban on dual protection would still hold with respect to the genes and
the cells. This would mean that no further protection could be afforded by the
Patent Act. Of course, if a breeder could show that the Patent Act allowed for
the patenting of plant cell lines, plant cells and plasmids in the 1960s, when the
international convention on point was open for signature, then Hayhurst may be
right. This is because the international agreement in question provides an excep-
tion to the ban on dual protection where such protection was allowable at the
time specified above.s2

Having considered the technical arguments that can be made supporting
and opposing dual protection, we should also examine what kind of effect dual
protection would have on the delicate balance between the proper allocation of
rights and residual liberties. At this more abstract level of analysis, it is clear
that the balance created by the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act would be destroyed
if dual protection were allowed. The protection of plants would not be limited
to the propagating material, nor would the exclusive right be subject to the far-
mer’s and breeder’s exemptions.

V. The International Phenomenon of Plant Breeders’ Rights

In the previous- Part, we explored the content of Canada’s Plant Breeders’
Rights Act and found that at a domestic level the legislation balances the rights
of plant breeders and the residual liberties of the public by confining the right
to the propagating material, and by providing exemptions for farmers and breed-
ers. In this Part, we examine this legislation in the international context as it
exists now, and as it may potentially exist in the future. Consideration of this
context is essential because agritechnology has taken on a global perspective as
we saw in Part II. Understanding these rights at the international level will allow
us to make a final evaluation of the positive and negative impacts of plant
breeders’ rights legislation.

A. The Existing International Network of Plant Breeders’ Rights under the

UPOV Convention

The need to provide plant breeders with protection was recognized well
before the Canadian Plant Breeders’ Rights Act was proclaimed into force on

8 tIbid. at 187-88. This, in fact, also seems to be the position of the Canadian Patent Office.
821nternational Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 2 December 1961, 815
U.N.T.S. 89, arts. 2(1), 31, 37. The exception to the ban on dual protection arises from the joint
operation of article 2(1), which creates the ban on dual protection, article 31, which specifies the
time at which the Convention was to enter into force, and article 37, which states the following:
“This Convention shall not affect existing rights under the national laws of member States of the
Union or under agreements concluded between such states.” Countries which protected plants by
way of patent legislation before the coming into force of the Convention were able to continue
doing so since article 2(1) did not affect these existing rights. The United States was such a country.

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

1 August 1990.3 The first country to enact such legislation was the Netherlands,
in 1941. Now there are more than 900 seed trading firms actively engaged in
plant breeding in that country.”M Similar increases in plant breeding activity
occurred85 in the United Kingdom and in the United States after these countries
enacted similar legislation in 1964,86 and in 1930 and 1970,7 respectively. The
results from New Zealand are also encouraging: “[lts [plant variety rights] leg-
islation in 1974 [resulted] in a five-fold increase in available plant varieties and
the development of a valuable export industry in pasture and crop seeds.” 8

Because plant trading is not restricted to domestic markets, countries with
plant breeders’ rights legislation moved in 1961 to protect their investments in
export markets through an international agreement. The International Union for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants was created by the first UPOV Con-
vention, signed on 2 December 1961. The acronym is derived from its French
name – Union pour la protection des obtentions vigetales. The Convention
was revised on 10 November 1971 and again on 23 October 1978. Canada
became a party to the Convention on 4 March 1991.89 The following twenty
countries are signatories to the 1978 UPOV Convention: Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Canada ratified the 1978 UPOV Convention by enacting the Plant Breed-
ers’ Rights Act. It is for this reason that the Act is referred to as “implementing
legislation”. Justice Gonthier, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court
of Canada, established the importance of considering the relevant international
agreement when analyzing implementing legislation:

[W]here the domestic legislation is unclear it is reasonable to examine any under-
lying international agreement. In interpreting legislation which has been enacted
with a view towards implementing international obligations, as is the case here, it
is reasonable for a tribunal to examine the domestic law in the context of the rel-
evant agreement to clarify any uncertainty. Indeed where the text of the domestic
law lends itself to it, one should also strive to expound an interpretation which is
consonant with the relevant international obligations.

83The following publication provides a very good explanation of the various pieces of legislation
which existed worldwide before Australia and Canada passed similar plant breeders’ rights legis-
lation: Australia, Parliament of the Commonwealth, Senate Standing Committee on National
Resources, Plant Variety Rights (Canberra, Aust.: Australian Government Publishing Service,
1984) at 1-9.

84Minutes, supra note 1, No. 6 at 24.
S5Ibid., No. 6 at 24-25.
86The United Kingdom enacted the Plant Varieties and Seeds Act 1964 (U.K.), 1964, c. 14, to
give effect to the 1961 UPOV Convention, which was amended by the Plant Varieties Act 1983
(U.K.), 1983, c. 17, to give effect to the 1978 UPOV Convention. See Common Law Institute of
Intellectual Property, The Scope of Intellectual Property Protection for Plants and Other Life
Forms (Report, Part 1) by N.J. Byrne (London: Intellectual Property, 1989) at 3.

87Supra notes 40, 41.
18 J.G. Starke, “A New Class of Personal Property By Statute” (1989) 63 Aust. L.J. 515 at 517.
89The 1961.UPOV Convention can be found at 815 U.N.T.S. 89, U.K.T.S. 74 (1962) whereas
the 1978 amendments are found at U.K.T.S. 11 (1984). The 1991 amendments have not yet been
reported in any treaty series.

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 39

Second, and more specifically, it is reasonable to make reference to an inter-
national agreement at the very outset of the inquiry to determine if there is any
ambiguity, even latent, in the domestic legislation. The Court of Appeal’s sugges-
tion that recourse to an international treaty is only available where the provision
of the domestic legislation is ambiguous on its face is to be rejected. 90

Therefore, the 1978 UPOV Convention must be considered to be the primary
interpretive tool of the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act. As mentioned in the previous
Part, the Act must be interpreted both in light of the Convention and so as to
give effect to the provisions of the Convention, even where the provisions of the
implementing legislation seem to differ from it. Furthermore, recourse to the
Convention is not limited to cases where the meaning of a provision in the Act
is unclear.

This analytical approach requires that we now turn to the Convention. A
comparison of the Act and the Convention reveals many similarities. For exam-
ple, the conditions required for protection in Article 6 of the Convention parallel
those of the Act at section 4.

Article 5 of the Convention, which sets out the scope of protection, is par-
ticularly important since it clarifies the meaning of section 5 of the Act. First of
all, it implicitly contains the farmer’s exemption because the rights of the breed-
er extend only to the propagating material. It follows that the farmer can sell the
grown plant for profit and, more importantly, can retain seed and grow it in
future seasons, all without infringing on the breeder’s rights. Second, article
5(3) contains a breeders’ exemption which, as we saw in the previous Part, does
not appear to be included in paragraph 5(l)(b) of the Act. This provision in the
Act should be read so as to incorporate the words of the Convention at article
5(3):

5. (3) Authorisation by the breeder shall not be required either for the utilisation
of the variety as an initial source of variation for the purpose of creating
other varieties or for the marketing of such varieties. Such authorisation
shall be required, however, when the repeated use of the variety is neces-
sary for the commercial production of another variety.

There are other examples where the Convention provides the proper con-
text for interpretation of the Act. Article 4 sets out the rate at which new botan-
ical genera and species must be added to the prescribed categories of the Act,
and article 8 specifies the minimum period of protection which can be granted.
Article 9 of the Convention states that “the free exercise of the exclusive right
accorded to the breeder may not be restricted otherwise than for reasons of pub-
lic interest.” This informs the compulsory licencing provisions of the Act. Fur-
thermore, article 2(1) of the Convention, which bans dual protection for a plant
variety under plant breeders’ rights legislation and patent legislation, and the
exemption in article 37, establish the entire context in which the Act should be
interpreted.9

“National Corn Growers, supra note 78 at 1371.
91Note that article 37 allows those countries that provided the possibility of double protection
during the period in which the Convention was open for signature, to continue to do so. New Zea-
land and the United States are examples of such countries. For more information on double pro-

19941

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

The Convention also contains provisions for its administration. Without
provisions on national treatment,92 rights of priority,93 and the organs of the
Union,94 a global network of plant breeders’ rights could not have been estab-
lished.

B. Recent Amendments to the UPOV Convention

On 19 March 1991, the UPOV Convention was once again revised in light
of advances in technology that had occurred since 1978. The amendments con-
tained in the 1991 UPOV Convention are not binding on Canada or most of the
other countries mentioned above. However, it is interesting to see which amend-
ments have been made because not only do they indicate how plant breeders’
rights might look in the future, but they also indicate what the acceding parties
see as being inadequacies in the present international network of such rights.

In this section, we will look at some of the more important changes that
have occurred.95 Most of the important changes, as we will see, increase the
monopoly rights of the plant breeder. This disturbs the balance between the
rights of plant breeders and the residual liberties of the public which exists in
the 1978 UPOV Convention, and in the legislation of the various acceding
countries.

First, the ban on dual protection no longer exists in article 2. This disposes
of the issues that were discussed previously concerning the possibility of pat-
enting parts of the plant, such as genes and plasmids, when the propagating
material is already protected by the Act. It will also put all countries that have
acceded to the Act on an equal footing. In addition, it will give plant breeders
the opportunity to amass greater monopoly rights with respect to plants and
germplasm. Those groups that believe that germplasm is part of the “common
heritage of mankind 96 will view the elimination of the ban on dual protection
as a negative change.

Second, the minimum duration of the monopoly right has been increased.
Article 19 changes the minimum period of the breeder’s right from 18 years for
trees and vines, and 15 years for all other species, to periods of 25 years and
20 years, respectively. These durations are similar to those found in New Zea-
land’s Plant Variety Rights Act 1987.97

The 1991 UPOV Convention also provides for the possibility of extending
the breeder’s right to harvested material and to the product made directly from

tection in these countries, see C. Brown, “Protecting Plant Varieties: Developments in New Zea-
land” (1988) 18 Vict. U. Well. L. Rev. 83; Seay, supra note 45.

92UpOV Convention, supra note 89, art. 3.
93Ibid., art. 12.
941bid., arts. 15-28.
95Much of the information regarding the amendments to the UPOV Convention was obtained

from B. Greengrass, “The 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention” (1991) 12 E.I.P.R. 466.

96This concept will be discussed in more detail in Part VI, below, in which the consequences

of the legislation on the Third World are discussed.

971987, No. 5, s. 14.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

harvested material. This “cascade effect” is set out in articles 14(2) and 14(3).
The right would cascade to the harvested material, but only where the entire
plants, and parts of plants, were “obtained through the unauthorized use of prop-
agating material of a protected variety.” These cascading rights could not be
exercised if “the breeder has [had] reasonable opportunity to exercise his right
in relation to the propagating material of the variety.” 98

Other important changes have been made to the scope of the right in terms

of the fanner’s and breeder’s exemptions. As stated by Greengrass:

Article 14(1) of the 1991 [UPOV Convention] provides that, in respect of the
propagating material of a protected variety, any production, reproduction (multi-
plication), conditioning for the purpose of propagation, offering for sale, selling or
other marketing, exporting, importing, or stocking for any of these purposes, shall
require the authorization of the breeder. Accordingly, the basic scope of the pro-
tection extends to all production or reproduction (multiplication) without refer-
ence to its purpose and, unlike the 1978 [UPOV Convention], does not have the
effect of creating, by implication, a ‘farmer’s privilege’. 99

Although the legislative presumption is not to provide a fanner’s exemption,
article 15(2) states that, within reasonable limits, such an exemption can be
granted by the contracting party, so long as the legitimate interests of the breed-
er are protected.

The breeder’s exemption has been qualified by the principle of essential
derivation in article 14(5), also referred to as the “minimum distance between
varieties” principle. ‘I This principle ensures that a breeder will not make a min-
imal change in a protected variety using genetic engineering techniques and
then pass it off as being another new variety worthy of protection. This amend-
ment is necessary to prevent abuse of the breeder’s rights and will not disturb
the balance between the public’s residual liberties and the breeder’s monopoly
rights. The essential derivation principle will ensure that the monopoly rights
that are available in a plant variety will flow to the party that invested the most
in its creation. If developing countries were to accede to the Convention, they
might use the essential derivation principle to prevent breeders from making
minor changes to crops located in their countries, and then passing the varieties
off as their own.

As mentioned above, most of these new rights have the effect of increasing
the monopoly rights available to plant breeders at the expense of free access to
plant germplasm. These amendments were adopted unanimously by the twenty
member states of the 1978 Convention.” The change in attitude in favour of
increased monopoly rights reflects a corresponding disinterest in ensuring
accessibility to new plant varieties. One way that the UPOV countries could
have indicated their interest in protecting society’s interests would have been to
require member states to establish and maintain accessible germplasm storage
facilities for the new, protected plant varieties. This kind of requirement already

98Greengrass, supra note 95 at 470.
991bid. at 469.
IByme, supra note 86 at 10.
’01Greengrass, supra note 95 at 466.

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

exists in the Australian legislation,”m and it is unfortunate that it did not find its
way into the latest amendments to the UPOV Convention.

VI. Evaluating the Domestic and Global Consequences of Creating Plant

Variety Rights
An evaluation of Canada’s Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, and of plant.breed-
ers’ rights legislation worldwide, requires that one consider the balance created
between the rights of plant breeders and the residual liberties of the public. 3
This has been emphasized throughout the paper, and specifically in Part II. The
balance that is struck inevitably leads to certain consequences at the domestic
and international levels. In this Part, we examine some of the arguments that
have been made against the legislation, all of which claim that the Act will have
negative consequences.

A. Striking a Balance at the Domestic Level

At the domestic level, two main attacks have been made against plant
breeders’ rights legislation. The first attack is based on the balance created
between the monopoly rights of the breeder and the residual liberties of the
farmer with respect to the seeds. The second attack is based on the alleged det-
rimental effect that this legislation will have on the public sector’s research
effort.

1.

Striking a Balance between the Rights of Plant Breeders and the
Residual Liberties of Farmers

At the domestic level, there has been a concern that the monopoly rights
of plant breeders would be created at the expense of farmers. Opponents argued
that as a result of this legislation, “farmers would pay patent fees for protected
seeds and plants, [would pay] higher seed costs, and [would] suffer from lack
of choice.”‘” However, proponents suggested that this legislation would bring
new varieties to Canada from which farmers could benefit, which in turn would
greatly increase their export sales:

[T]he prairie farmer would be much better off if there was more research being
done both in the private and public sectors. Certainly [the Act] would encourage
that sort of research and give the producers a much greater choice of varieties from
which to choose. One only has to look at the European experience, for example,
where they have had dramatic increases in crop yields. I think this is partly due
to vastly improved varieties of seed. 05
The concerns raised about the balance that would be created between farm-
ers and commercial plant breeders are untenable. The higher prices, although a

12See Plant Variety Rights Act 1987, 1987, No. 2, ss. 10(1), 33. See also Plant Variety Rights,

supra note 83 at 3, regarding Australia’s germplasm storage system.

0 3A similar analysis was carried out by Szcezpanik in her article evaluating the effect of the
1
recent EC Directives on biotechnology (V. Szcezpanik, “Regulation of Biotechnology in the Euro-
pean Community” (1993) 24 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 617). The two Council Directives in issue
were Council Directive 90/219 of 23 April 1990 and Council Directive 90/220 of 23 April 1990.

‘0Minutes, supra note 1, No. 3 at 7.
’51bid., No. 6 at 11.

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 39

setback, would provide Canadian farmers with better seed of improved varie-
ties.”0 Furthermore, safeguards have been placed in the legislation. First, the Act
contains the farmer’s exemption which allows farmers to plant their own bins.’07
Second, there is a system of compulsory licencing in the Act which ensures that
farmers will get seed at reasonable prices. There is also an advisory committee
to which farmers can voice their concerns as to pricing.” 8 Based on the safe-
guards in the Act, and the reality that Canadian farmers will be better off if Can-
ada remains competitive and if they receive the best and newest varieties avail-
able, it must be concluded that domestically, the proper balance has been struck.

2.

Striking a Balance between the Interests of the Public and Private
Sectors in Plant Breeding

Many Canadians were also concerned that the introduction of plant breed-
ers’ rights legislation would cause the quantity and quality of plant breeding in
the public sector to decrease, that the role of the public sector in this area would
change, and that large corporations would eventually control the growing of
commercial seed. In this subsection, we will examine statements from various
sources describing public and private sector involvement before and after the
implementation of the Act, and we will comment on the balance or imbalance
that is created.

In 1989, most research into plant breeding carried out in Canada was
government-funded;’ it occurred mostly at agricultural faculties and govern-
ment departments. The Science Council of Canada found that “Agriculture Can-
ada and the National Research Council had the greatest involvement in govern-
ment research into plant biotechnology…”. In response to the public’s concerns
stated above, governmental spokespeople emphasized that the publicly-funded
breeding effort would remain unchanged and might increase.”‘ Researchers
from the public sector were also not concerned that publicly-funded research
would suffer from the introduction of such legislation.” 2

The Canadian Seed Trade Association, a voluntary association of seed
companies operating in Canada, qualified the findings of the Science Council of
Canada. It was not particularly positive about the amount of plant breeding in
Canada before the Canadian Plant Breeders’ Rights Act was enacted:

There is very little plant breeding, public or private, in our vegetable, horticultural
and ornamental crops grown in Canada. Compare that to the Netherlands which
is one of the major suppliers to Canada, almost all of those varieties coming from
private sector breeders. We see severe danger signals on the horizon regarding
Canada’s ability to stay competitive without things like plant breeders’ rights.
Even in our major crops, we see the new canola varieties being registered. I
believe there were 11 last year, 9 came from the private sector and 7 from Sweden.

l6Ibid., No. 6 at 4.
10Act, supra note 5, s. 5(1).
10 1Ibid., ss. 32, 73, 74.
109Curren, supra note 16 at 10.
“0Seeds of Renewal, supra note 2 at 4.
“‘Curren, supra note 16 at 10.
2See Minutes, supra note 1, No. 5 at 5-8.
1

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

So here we have one of our largest important crops in Canada. Now the plant
breeding efforts in Canada are being surpassed by plant breeding activity in other
parts of the world. 113

This association found that in 1989, before the Act was in place, the private
sector was spending about $17 million in research and development of varieties
and said that it would be prepared to increase that commitment by at least 40
per cent if plant breeders’ rights legislation were enacted. This would translate
into a $561 million benefit to farmers and consumers”. by producing greater
yields of crops for lower prices. In terms of minor crops, which are of use only
in Canada, it found that far more varieties were developed by the private sector
than by the public sector. Furthermore, in terms of agricultural research being
done in the private sector, King Agro, which was recently acquired by SANOFI
of France, and Pioneer Hi-Bred were engaged in the “greatest amount of
research and development in Canada.”‘ 15

Mr. Mooney, the representative from the Canadian Council on Interna-
tional Co-Operation, suggested that the private sector is more involved in plant
breeding than the public sector. Furthermore, for the most part, the leading com-
panies involved in plant breeding are taking over the smaller companies.1 6
According to Mr. Mooney:

There is a myth going around that there is a whole lot of small biotech boutiques
out there working in agriculture and getting involved in plant breeding. That is not
true. There are in fact few of them involved in this field and those that are are
owned by the seed companies or the multinationals that control the seed compa-
nies. 117

The comments from these various sources paint a rather interesting picture
of the players that were involved in plant breeding in 1989, before the Act was
in place, and that would be involved as a result of the legislation. It appears that
the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act will encourage greater investment in both sec-
tors, but that the private sector will be the most profitable because it will be able
to engage in economies of scale and in mass production. Furthermore, profita-
bility will likely be concentrated in the hands of multinational companies. The
question, therefore, is whether the greater profitability of the private sector, and
specifically of multinational firms, as a result of the Act should be seen as cre-
ating an unacceptable imbalance between the public’s residual liberties and the
breeder’s exclusive ownership rights.

The answer must be given in light of the analysis found in Part II: In that
Part, it was found that it is in the public interest to ensure that new varieties are
created and that these varieties get distributed widely. It was also stated that
concentration of market power was an inevitable consequence of wanting wide
distribution of new varieties. Given these realities, it seems that the public must
choose between the lesser of two evils. The analysis so far suggests that the gov-

“131bid., No. 6 at 25.
“14lbid., No. 6 at 27.
“151bid., No. 6 at 31.
“6lbid., No. 2 at 14; No. 2A at 1-10.
“7lbid., No. 2 at 14-15.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

eminent made the proper choice in enacting the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act
because it provides an appropriate allocation of rights and liberties. That this is
a proper choice is further evidenced by looking at the needs of people world-
wide. With a steadily growing world population, we require an equivalent
steady increase in food production. One way to cope with the necessary increase
is to encourage the development of high-yielding crops, as well as insect- and
drought-resistant crops. This can be achieved by encouraging the private sector
to create and to widely distribute new varieties by way of the Plant Breeders’
Rights Act. It is worth noting that even though the profits may lie in the private
sector, this will in no way deny public sector breeders the right to make use of
the breeder’s exemption. This is because the breeder’s exemption is found
implicitly in the Act, as suggested earlier, and is equally available. to any breeder
irrespective of affiliation. Furthermore, government spokespeople have empha-
sized that public sector research will not be forgotten.

B. Striking a Balance at the International Level

A heated debate exists about the merits of the international network of
plant breeders’ rights legislation. Two main allegations are made regarding the
consequences of granting monopoly rights to breeders of new varieties. First, it
is alleged that companies involved in plant breeding which derive new varieties
from the germplasm found in developing countries do not provide these coun-
tries with compensation. Secondly, it is alleged that granting monopoly rights
to plant breeders “encourages and seeks to solidify an agricultural system that
is environmentally damaging and incompatible with the concept of sustainable
development.””… These issues will be addressed in turn.

1.

Distributing the Rights to the World’s Germplasm

In understanding the first allegation, we must start from the premise that
germplasm, or genetic material, is considered to be part of the common heritage
of mankind and thus should be available without restriction.”9 As a result of this
generally accepted ideology,

[f]or over two centuries scientists from the advanced industrial nations have freely
appropriated plant genetic resources from Third World nations for use in the plant
breeding and improvement programs of the developed world. 120
Opponents of this ideology allege that the industrialized world is gathering
knowledge and germplasm from informal innovators of the Third World, are
calling it their own,’
and are not compensating the informal innovators for that
which they gather. As stated by Kloppenburg, the usual crops associated with
agricultural economies of industrialized nations – maize, wheat, soybeans,

“8lbid., No. 7 at 21.
“I9J.R. Kloppenburg, Jr. & D.L. Kleinman, “Seeds of Controversy: National Property Versus
Common Heritage” in J.R. Kloppenburg, Jr., ed., Seeds and Sovereignty: The Use and Control of
Plant Genetic Resources (London: Duke University Press, 1988) 173 at 174.

120Ibid. at 173.
121See Minutes, supra note 1, No. 2 at 8.

19941

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

potatoes, alfalfa, barley, sorghum, tomatoes, cotton, tobacco –
the Third World.’22

all originated in

Mr. Mooney states that the Third World has considered enacting similar
plant breeders’ rights legislation,”
imposing levies on genetic resources and
refusing access to their germplasm. This would ensure that breeders from devel-
oped countries would provide compensation for the genetic resources that they
take, or else be unable to obtain any genetic resources at all. Without undertak-
ing such actions, Third World countries find themselves in a dilemma because
the concept of mankind’s heritage contains.a double standard. On the one hand,
the gene banks and land races of Third World countries are accessible to all for
free, and on the other hand, the mutant lines, special stocks and genetic stocks
of private breeders in developed countries are available to a select group of
breeders only. 24

How does a proponent of plant breeders’ rights legislation answer such
allegations? The picture that is painted seems manifestly unfair. However,
before commenting on this issue, it is important to look at the arguments on the
other side.

Barton and Christensen respond to the concern that the developing coun-
tries do not have access to the genetic stocks of private breeders. They state that,
in fact, developing nations are able to obtain seeds and to conduct their own
plant breeding programs. Furthermore, other than increases in the price of seed
sold to the developing nations, plant breeders’ rights legislation will have little
effect on them.”2 They do, however, state that patent legislation would have a
much more serious effect on the Third World.

Sedjo emphasizes that plant breeding firms do fulfill a very important
research and development function. They are needed to make the investments
that will result in the effective utilization of natural genes, and then to market
the results:

While it may be true that under current institutional arrangements breeders are
able to capture most or all of the commercial benefits that are generated by the
application of technology to newly discovered germplasm, it is also true that their
investments are a critical prerequisite for the realization of almost any of the social
benefits from newly discovered plant genetic resources.12 6

Sedjo acknowledges that the debate between the two sides is a question of the
social values attributed to the initial and improved resource.

122Kloppenburg, supra note 7 at 14.
123Minutes, supra note 1, No. 2 at 21.
‘241bid., No. 2 at 24-25. D.A. Rose would agree that multinational corporations must be prepared
to yield some of their control over genetic resources to the developing world if they wish to profit
from the agritechnological revolution (“Changing Relationships in Technology Transfer to the
Third World: Case Study of Biotechnology in Agriculture” (1985) 11 Rutgers Comp. & Tech. L.J.
531).

’25J.H. Barton & E. Christensen, “Diversity Compensation Systems: Ways to Compensate
Developing Nations for Providing Genetic Materials” in Kloppenburg, ed., supra note 119, 338 at
340-41.
126R.A. Sedjo, “Property Rights and the Protection of Plant Genetic Resources” in Kloppenburg,

ed., ibid., 293 at 296.

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 39

To put the entire problem into perspective, it is also important to realize
that most plant breeders do not utilize primitive cultivars because often “unim-
proved forms of germplasm exhibit many traits that cannot be tolerated in mod-
em cultivars” and this results in a high failure rate. 27 Furthermore, when
samples are taken, they leave the country no poorer than before, and in fact may
make the country richer since a sample stored in the country and abroad could
prevent extinction of the species.”n

Although taking samples from a country is seen by many to be “robbery”,
this would only be true if breeders were taking away “national property” with-
out consent. However, it is difficult to classify germplasm as being the national
property of one country because that germplasm “may have existed for thou-
sands of years and have been subject to [numerous] migrations and … disper-
sals,” which make it virtually impossible to pinpoint the original “owner” of the
germplasm 29

With some of the arguments laid out on both sides of the debate, the reader
should be quick to realize that although a problem does exist, its degree is
uncertain, and its solution unknown. However, in seeking a solution, the answer
is not to eliminate plant breeders’ rights legislation. As we saw in Part II, an
absence of legislation would result in less investment and may translate into
severe consequences for the whole world since everyone would lose out on new
varieties. This legislation provides an important incentive to plant breeders and
may in fact be beneficial to the Third World because its countries can also gain
access to the latest high-yielding or disease- and drought-resistant new varie-
ties. 30

Given that some experts feel the main negative impact on the Third World
countries is that they must pay more for seeds that have genes originating from
their lands, perhaps the solution is to provide the developing countries with
these new varieties but with an abatement in price. This abatement could mean
that Third World countries would not have to pay royalties if it is found that
they contributed substantially to the existence of the new variety. This gesture
would recognize their contribution to the creation of new plant varieties. It
would probably not be a good idea, however, to charge breeders for germplasm
samples since this will simply discourage plant breeders from diversifying their
use of germplasm, and will aggravate the next problem that we will discuss
below.

Of the various experts who have spoken on these issues, norei-hi

sug-
gested that eliminating such legislation is the answer, Most have suggested that
to rectify any imbalance between the private breeders and the Third World, gov-
ernment and breeders should provide financial, technical and research assist-

127W.L. Brown, “Plant Genetic Resources: A View from the Seed Industry” in Kloppenburg, ed.,

ibid., 218 at 220-21.

1281bid. at 222.
129D. Wood, “Crop Germplasm: Common Heritage or Farmers’ Heritage?” in Kloppenburg, ed.,
130Kloppenburg and Kleinman stated that there is a very great dependence of developing coun-

ibid., 274 at 277.

tries on improved crops from other continents (supra note 119 at 180).

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

ance to the Third World so that they may improve their germplasm storage sys-
tems and their plant breeding programs.’
In fact, “Canada does fund quite sub-
stantially the operation of the International Board for Plant Genetic Resources,
and Canada also links very closely with the gene banks that are linked through
that network” throughout the world. 32

If the solution is to provide assistance to developing countries, then this is
something that should be implemented not by a piece of intellectual property
legislation, either at the domestic or at the international level. Intellectual prop-
erty legislation is enacted for a different purpose entirely and would not lend
itself to being combined with the purpose of assisting developing countries.
Developing an assistance program would require the participation of other
organs of the United Nations. As for the other possible solution, that of provid-
ing seed to developing countries at a lower rate, this should be implemented
with the help of an international agreement on point. Given that the solutions
cannot be resolved within plant breeders’ rights legislation, and given that such
legislation has many positive aspects, two conclusions can be made. First, the
imbalance between breeders of the First and Third Worlds should be addressed
separately. Second, actual plant breeders’ rights legislation should remain sub-
stantially unchanged and should definitely not be eliminated.

2.

Monopoly Rights and Their Effect on the Globe’s Sustainable
Development

In addition to the issue discussed above, opponents of the legislation argue
that plant breeders’ rights will result in greater emphasis on a reduced number
of crops which in turn will result in genetic uniformity.33 It has been stated that
this would lead to genetic erosion, which is an “overall loss of genetic diversity
resulting from the extinction of different plant varieties.’ 134 This threat to bio-
diversity is one of the most serious for our environment today.

There is no doubt that genetic erosion and genetic uniformity are extremely
serious issues. In our modem form of plant breeding and crop growing, where
the world’s population is dependent on a limited number of crops, our food sup-
ply is clearly vulnerable to drought, disease, and insect infestation.135 In fact,

131See Brown, supra note 127 at 227; J.R. Harlan, “Seeds and Sovereignty: An Epilogue” in
Kloppenberg, ed., supra note 119, 356 at 358. See also C. Juma, The Gene Hunters: Biotechnology
and the Scramble for Seeds (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989) in which the author
describes in detail the potential impact of biotechnology on Africa and emphasizes that “Africa
must innovate at technological, institutional and political levels: conventional agriculture and
industry must adapt to the emerging transformations as must the intellectual as well as the policy
environment” (ibid. at 5).

’32Minutes, supra note 1, No. 8 at 27. See also R.G. Adler, “Biotechnology Development and
Transfer: Recommendations for an Integrated Policy” (1985) 11 Rutgers Comp. & Tech. L.J. 469,
in which the author emphasizes the need for the United States to store germplasm and to make it
accessible via a freer biotechnology transfer policy.

133See Minutes, ibid., No. 7 at 21.
134E.M. Baker, “Patents, Plants and Biotechnology – Policy and Law” (1987) 14 Western State

Univ. L. Rev. 529 at 538.

135See Rhoades, supra note 8 regarding the vulnerability of our food supply.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

history can tell of the consequences of growing limited crop varieties. In 1970,
half of the orange crop of Southern Florida and Texas was destroyed when a vir-
ulent new fungus attacked the crop. Ireland’s famous potato famine of 1845 also
was a result of a Mexican fungus that destroyed the genetically similar potatoes
in that country. It is also thought that the ancient Maya civilization of 900 A.D.
was hit with crop destruction due to the genetic uniformity of its maize crops.’36

However, as important as this issue is, the existence of plant breeders’
rights legislation is not the source of the problem. First of all, the risk of genetic
uniformity existed well before this type of legislation. Furthermore, the previ-
ously mentioned statistics on the increase of new plant varieties as a result of
the legislation would suggest that the legislation is actually increasing genetic
diversity in the world’s crops. This increase in plant varieties will provide farm-
ers with the ability to plant diverse crops so as to ensure that the historic prob-
lems of genetic uniformity are avoided. Finally, when scientists speak of threats
to biodiversity, these seem to result mostly from the elimination of habitats such
as the extinction of the rain forest,’37 and not from the kinds of crops that are
grown in order to feed the world’s population.

Although plant breeders’ rights cannot be directly linked to genetic ero-
sion, it is true that something must be done to preserve the richness of germ-
plasm available to the world population, much of which is found in the devel-
oping countries. While it is unfair to expect developing countries to preserve
their genetic varieties if they have low yields or are otherwise inadequate, it is
fair to expect the whole world to take part in the storage and maintenance of
germplasm. This is in fact what is taking place. Canada has a Plant Gene
Resource Centre in Ottawa which is linked to other such germplasm storage
centres around the world. 3 Furthermore, there is an International Board for
Plant Genetic Resources which devotes its time to this task.3

The final question one should ask is whether a storage system should have
been put in place in the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act to store important new plant
varieties in addition to the international efforts for storing naturally occurring
germplasm. The answer is yes. As mentioned above, Australia does require that
the plant breeder deposit his or her new variety for storage at a genetic resource
centre and specifies that this deposit does not become part of the national gene
bank collection.” Requiring such a deposit would facilitate the exercise of the
breeder’s exemption and would ensure that there is free access to these genes
once the term of the plant breeder’s monopoly is over.

1361bid. at 84.
137See e.g. E.O. Wilson, “Threats to Biodiversity” (1989) 261:3 Scientific American 108.
138See Minutes, supra note 1, No. 8 at 27-28.
139Note that although the developed countries strongly support the endeavour to store germ-
plasm, they strongly oppose the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, devised by
the IBPGR, which states that the private genetic stocks of breeders are also part of the common
heritage of mankind and should also be stored for easy access. For more information on this point,
see H.J. Bordwin, “The Legal and Political Implications of the International Undertaking on Plant
Genetic Resources” (1984-85) 12 Ecology L.Q. 1053.

14See Plant Variety Rights Act 1987, supra note 102, s. 33.

1994]

PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS

Although the legislation is lacking because it does not provide for the
national storage of new varieties, this does not mean that the legislation is com-
pletely deficient. Furthermore, it is not deficient because it is not directly linked
to genetic erosion.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have looked at Canada’s Plant Breeders’ Rights Act from
many perspectives. For background knowledge, we explored the research tech-
niques used to create new plant varieties. Then we looked at the rationale for
providing protection to new plant varieties in the form of an ownership right.
We considered the reasons why the Patent Act was not resorted to for protection
of new plant varieties. Finally, having set the stage, we examined the Act itself
and observed its structure in terms of the requirements for eligibility and the
rights that flow from the Act. The rights created by the Act parallel those found
in the 1978 UPOV Convention but are much narrower than those contained in
the amended UPOV Convention of 1991. These rights were then tested against
certain allegations that suggest that this legislation has not created an appropri-
ate balance between monopoly rights and residual public liberties.

From this lengthy consideration of the issues, several conclusions can be
drawn. First, because of its connection to biotechnological developments relat-
ing to agriculture, the Act will become increasingly more important. Although
the public sector will seek protection under the Act, it is likely that large trans-
national corporations, such as Pioneer Hi-Bred, Monsanto and Calgene, will
reap the greatest profits as a result of the Act’s protection. These corporations
have been calling for some kind of protection, given that most other industrial-
ized countries already have plant breeders’ rights legislation, and Canadian
courts have not been favourably inclined to grant patent protection for new plant
varieties.

The Act itself is well-tailored to the peculiar characteristics of plants. The
tests of distinctness, homogeneity, novelty and stability can be applied logically
to new varieties without having to stretch the meaning of the legislation. Fur-
thermore, the disclosure requirements are less onerous than those under the Pat-
ent Act but should include deposition as a requirement, and not just maintenance
of the propagating material.

The legislation itself grants narrower monopoly rights than the Patent Act
and so a better balance is created between the breeder’s rights and those of the
rest of the population, including farmers and other breeders. Furthermore,
although the extraction of germplasm from developing countries is a problem,
this problem is not substantially worsened by the existence of plant breeders’
rights and should be addressed outside of the context of the Act. The Act also
does not contribute to genetic erosion in a substantial way. On the contrary, the
Act will encourage the innovation of new plant varieties and will provide more
assurance that adaptable crops will continue to be created. However, the Act
should establish a storage system for new plant varieties to maintain genetic
diversity and to facilitate a researcher’s access to new varieties.

178

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 39

A great deal of effort has been put into the drafting of the Plant Breeders’
Rights Act. It is similar to the UPOV Convention to which many developed
countries adhere. The fact that these developed countries now have strong
breeding industries strongly supports the existence of such an Act in Canada.
This evidence proves that the monopoly rights under the Act provide plant
breeders with sufficient incentive to create new varieties.

A compromise must always be reached when there are competing claims
to rights and liberties. In the case of plant breeders’ rights, we are faced with
competing claims to the rights in new plant varieties. This paper has shown that,
both domestically and internationally, plant breeders’ rights legislation creates
a healthy balance between monopoly rights and residual public liberties without
destroying the plant breeders’ incentive to create new varieties of plants.