Negotiating Arms Limitation Agreements: Non-Aligned Perspectives

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Introduction

I am delighted that the editors of the McGill Law Journal have decided to devote this issue to the problems of the arms race and disarmament. Having been asked to contribute an article on the perspectives of non-aligned nations in negotiating arms limitations agreements, I shall begin with some experiences gained as representative from Sweden at the United Nations General Assembly Second Special Session on Disarmament [SSOD II] held in New York during June and July 1982.

As a citizen of Sweden, a neutral European nation that has participated in the multilateral disarmament negotiations in Geneva since their beginning in March 1962, I must state first that all of these negotiations have so far failed to achieve the solutions so badly needed. The inability of the SSOD II to elaborate and adopt a Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament, especially after several years of negotiations toward one in Geneva, accentuates this failure.

Nevertheless, there is no way to conclude international agreements on disarmament but through continued political negotiations; these will have to be pursued with redoubled effort. Experience has taught us that no longer do we have reason to believe that governments acting alone possess rational thinking and common sense. Had these two elements been present, we would have achieved genuine disarmament long ago. The world would be a different world than it is today. But that is not the case. For many of us who have participated over the years in disarmament efforts, our hopes are buoyed by the determined will of all concerned citizens who seek to stop and to alter the disastrous course that world events have taken. A similar hope was expressed by President Eisenhower when, in 1959, he said:

I like to believe that people in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than are governments. I think that people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of their way and let them have it.

Disregarding the tone of paternalism, so often heard in American Presidential statements, I cannot but agree with this remark.

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But time is dear. Twenty-four years have passed since the words “one of these days” were spoken. The Doomsday Clock on the cover of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* now stands at four minutes to twelve. Viewing the failure of the SSOD II against the background of today’s accelerating arms race, this statement by Eisenhower is now a truism.

Many of us had built high hopes on the SSOD II. Unfortunately, the weeks in New York last summer were weeks of agony and anguish. What, then, is the final assessment of the Special Session from a neutral European perspective?

Although in negative terms there is much to be said about the SSOD II, one should not forget its achievements: It approved a concluding document which, under the circumstances, is a good document. It approved guidelines for a World Disarmament Campaign to be run under the auspices of the U.N. It served as a catalyst for some of the most impressive disarmament and peace manifestations ever witnessed.

On the other hand, many points can be made in negative terms. To begin with, statements by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain were distinctly unconstructive. These two world figures left a distressing impression in the minds of delegations from non-aligned countries and indeed set a negative tone which came to dominate the negotiations. One must question the sensitivity of these two governments, especially given the reactions of delegations to an earlier statement from U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko and the message contained therein from President Brezhnev. It is no exaggeration to say that the behaviour of the two leading Western powers had a decisive impact upon the remaining weeks of the session.

I. Superpower Behaviour

Such unconstructive behaviour may be traced to two causes. It is due partly to the existing “cold-war” relations between the two superpowers, a relationship which has deteriorated sharply since the mid-1970s. It is due partly to the general attitude that the two superpowers bring to multilateral disarmament negotiations, both in New York, and in particular, at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Based on my own experiences, I would characterize this attitude as negligent and obstructive. Both powers prefer secret bilateral talks behind closed doors. They deny the Committee on Disarmament the right and the possibility to negotiate the highest priority items on its agenda, an agenda which they themselves have approved. They disregard U.N. resolutions which, though not legally, are politically and morally binding — both powers having voted in favour of many of them. By this behaviour, these powers show not only their disregard, but also their arrogance toward the world around them, which seems to exist only in relation to their own power politics and their own mutual relations.
This attitude of disregard is displayed openly by the United States; it is kept sheltered behind clever words and free-of-cost proposals by the Soviet Union. In the United States, this view of the world is revealed also by the media. In *The New York Times* of 29 June 1982, the opening day of the START talks, an editorial began as follows: “The world’s oldest established permanent floating disarmament conference reopens in Geneva today.” Those familiar with the Geneva negotiations would have thought surely of the multilateral Disarmament Committee, which began its work in 1962. *The New York Times* however, was referring to the bilateral SALT talks which began in 1969. In *The New York Times* of 3 August 1982, a short report appeared on the reopening of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva following the SSOD II. The report refers to the Committee’s work toward a proposed ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. It stated that this group is not expected to produce new agreements, but that “progress in their talks might spill over into US-Soviet negotiations”.

The attitude of arrogance is revealed once more. If ever there was a field in which a binding international agreement is needed, it is in the field of chemical weapons. Any country with a modern chemical industry can produce chemical weapons. In the absence of an international agreement, this danger is greatly increased. But in the view of *The New York Times* correspondent, these multilateral negotiations were viewed only as a possible benefit to American-Soviet negotiations!

A few examples of official state behaviour should provide the final proof of superpower arrogance. But one caveat should be stated first. Although most of the examples are taken from the United States, no conclusions can be drawn from this fact alone. Examples of superpower arrogance are found more readily in the United States only because the United States, unlike the Soviet Union, is an open society.

In the concluding document of the U.N. SSOD II, the following was agreed on, among other things, by consensus:

>The General Assembly was encouraged by the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session [SSOD I] as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action.

The United States subsequently approved this particular sentence. The Programme of Action contains, in para. 51, the following sentence:

>[T]he negotiations now in progress on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests... should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date.
In para. 45 of the same document, nuclear weapons disarmament is to be
given highest priority in disarmament negotiations.

In my view, this 1982 U.N. document, although not legally binding, is
politically and morally binding on all parties that voted for its adoption. The
United States is such a party.

There are also legal grounds for requesting effective negotiations on a
comprehensive test ban treaty. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 5 August 1963, provides
in its Preamble that states-parties are: “Seeking to achieve the discontinuance
of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue
negotiations to this end.”

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,
recalls in its Preamble, “the determination expressed by the Parties to the
1963 Treaty . . . to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time
and to continue negotiations to this end”.

As a party to these two Treaties, the United States has a legally binding
obligation to continue negotiations in order to achieve a comprehensive test
ban treaty. The U.N. General Assembly has taken decisions repeatedly
making this issue the item of highest priority on the agenda of the Committee
on Disarmament. The United States has participated in such decisions since
1979. Despite these legal commitments, President Reagan announced, only
ten days after the adoption of the concluding document of the U.N. SSOD II,
his decision not to resume the so-called trilateral preparatory negotiations
between the U.S.A., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. on such a treaty.

This act was a violation of these two Treaties. But we should not have
been surprised. We had been given advance notice. In a speech to the
Committee on Disarmament on 9 February 1982, the then Director of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr Eugene Rostow, stated:
“Limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range
of nuclear issues.” Two points must be made here. First, the reader should
note that the word chosen was “limitations”. No reference was made to the
legally binding commitment to a comprehensive ban. Second, there is noth-
ing in these legally binding commitments of the 1960s implying that a
comprehensive test ban is merely part of “the broad range of nuclear issues”.
The language in the two Treaties quoted above is clear and unequivocal: the
“discontinuance of all test explosions for all time” is not open to interpreta-
tion. An explicit commitment to a complete test ban was made in 1963.

In the same year, the United States concluded with the Soviet Union and
the United Kingdom the Partial Test Ban Treaty. It was ratified in the U.S.
Senate, by a vote of eighty to nineteen. During the ratification debate, the late
Senate Republican leader Everett M. Dirksen said: “I should not like to have written on my tombstone: He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he did not take a first step.” After twenty years that “first step” is yet to be taken. What will be written on the tombstones of those responsible for this ominous fact? Although the negotiations in the early 1960s came very close to achieving the desired comprehensive test ban, they failed nevertheless. In his recent book, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, Glenn Seaborg, who participated in these negotiations as Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, describes the failure as a “world tragedy of the first magnitude”. Indeed, had these negotiations been successful, we might well have prevented the rapid escalation of the nuclear arms race that has occurred since 1963.

The United States must consider also the political reasons for continuing negotiations. The non-nuclear-weapon states, and particularly the non-aligned states, are voicing now their growing opposition to the behaviour of the nuclear-weapon states. These latter states are seen as obstructing the progress towards nuclear disarmament that would be in accordance with art. VI of the *Non-Proliferation Treaty*. Considering the bitter atmosphere at the first two Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences in 1975 and 1980, the United States would do well to remember that we are just two years away from the third. What will happen then if we do not have a multilaterally-negotiated comprehensive test ban treaty? Is the United States prepared to risk a collapse of the *Non-Proliferation Treaty*? Although deficient, it is the only defence the international community has against horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation.

This brings us to the second example of the disregard by superpowers of international treaties. In the United States Congressional elections held on 2 November 1982, the issue of a “nuclear freeze” was included on the ballot in eleven states, fifteen counties and twenty-two cities. A majority in ten states, twelve counties and twenty-two cities voted in favour of a “nuclear freeze”. The average vote in favour was about sixty per cent. This positive result was obtained despite the Reagan Administration’s active campaign, led by the Secretary of Defense, against this issue.

A nuclear freeze would be equivalent to ending the nuclear arms race. This is something to which the United States, together with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, is legally committed, being a party to the *Non-Proliferation Treaty*. Article VI of the *Treaty* states that the parties pledge themselves to carry out negotiations in good faith in order to end the nuclear arms race at an early stage. The *Treaty* was signed by, among others, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union fifteen years ago and came into force thirteen years ago.

After fifteen years of an accelerating nuclear arms race, the following question must be raised: Are the nuclear-weapon states in breach of their
obligations under art. VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty? More particularly, was the recent campaign of the Reagan Administration against nuclear freeze a violation of art. VI? My own conclusions, based on the above considerations, are as follows. First, judging by their performance so far, one can conclude only that the superpowers have failed in their so-called role as "the trustees for humanity". This expression I quote from President Reagan himself, from a letter addressed to U.S. Ambassador Rowny, chief negotiator at the START talks, delivered on opening day, 29 June 1982. The rest of the world is justified in doubting seriously the real chances of a future as beneficiaries under these self-appointed trustees.

Second, the rest of the world asks to be equal partners in nuclear disarmament negotiations for two fundamental reasons. Alone, the nuclear-weapon states have been unable to solve the present dilemma; and all states, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, aligned, non-aligned or neutral, share a common fate of possible nuclear holocaust.

II. The Arms Race

I shall elucidate these conclusions now by turning to the arms race itself. Both its qualitative and quantitative aspects are relevant.

A. Qualitative Aspects

Qualitatively, new weapons continue to be developed that are increasingly capable of higher speeds and greater accuracy. New developments in the conventional weapons field become known rather speedily as the world witnesses even today such tragedies as the wars in Lebanon, and in the Falkland Islands. The world came to grasp quickly, for example, the new capabilities of an Exocet missile.

But while advances in conventional weapon technology, though disturbing, are usually comprehensible, the rate of development of nuclear weapons is almost incomprehensible to the human mind. In the 1982 issue of World Military and Social Expenditures, Ruth Leger Sivard writes: "The efficiency of a US car (fuel use to weight) has doubled since World War II; the efficiency of a nuclear weapon (destructive yield to weight) has increased 150 times." And again: "The World War II submarine could sink only passing ships. Now a single submarine can destroy 160 cities as far away as 4,000 miles."

The extent of military research and development is no less frightening. Military research and development exploits at present about 500,000 scientists, or about twenty per cent of the world's total scientific resources. In pure
monetary terms, twenty-five \textit{per cent} of the global research and development budget is devoted to military ends. Only twenty-three \textit{per cent} is devoted to four research areas of vital importance to human welfare and human future, \textit{i.e.} agriculture, health, energy, and environmental protection combined. One of the reasons for this gross imbalance is perhaps that, on average, a military product is said to require twenty times more research and development than an average civilian product.

Turning to estimates for particular countries, military research and development in the United States consumes thirty-five \textit{per cent} of the total research and development budget. In Japan, the figure is four \textit{per cent} and in West Germany, it is seven \textit{per cent}. In the United States, total research and development spending continues to decrease as a share of the Gross National Product, while in Japan and West Germany, the opposite is true. Some conclusions can be drawn from these figures regarding the strength, growth and vitality of the civilian economy in these countries, even in these times of deepening economic crises. Let me elaborate: The present state of the economy of the United States compared with those of Japan and West Germany — irrespective of the present cyclical crisis but related to the structural crisis — and the degree to which human, material and financial resources are used for military purposes, together with the general economic policies in the U.S., have already shown their negative effects on the civilian economy and will do so increasingly. In terms of technology, innovations and productivity growth rates, difficulties have been felt for quite some time now. These policies will have continuously negative consequences if the present course is not changed radically.

Another serious problem caused by devoting massive spending to military research and development is the effect of new technology on doctrines and strategies. Improvements in the speed, accuracy and efficiency of weapons force the strategic planners to rethink the way in which they would use the new weapons. Both military and political strategies are forced to change. The now prevalent "flexible-response" doctrine is the obvious example. It is of particular importance to examine the arguments made in its defence.

Proponents of the doctrine contend that the accuracy and efficiency of modern nuclear weapons systems make it possible to deliver "surgical strikes" using "clean bombs" against specific military and political targets of the perceived enemy. These strikes would be made in response to a previous attack, and thus it would be possible to engage in limited nuclear war.

In my view, the doctrine breaks down for two reasons. First, while the theory might appear logical on paper, it cannot be applied to conditions in the actual circumstances of Europe. As the second smallest, most densely populated and most weapon-studded continent, Europe is hardly a stage on which
"surgical strikes" could be played out. The technicians speak of "Circular Error Probable". It refers to the size of the area around a target within which fifty per cent of the weapons launched would land. With improvements in the precision and accuracy of weapon systems, this circle is reported to be as small as 100 feet in diameter. This is a wonderful achievement for military research and development, but it means nonetheless that fifty per cent of the weapons used would fall outside the circle. In densely populated Europe, even minute variance could result in unbelievable devastation.

Second, in considering nuclear doctrines adapted to the latest technical improvements, the strategic thinker sometimes has to make use of arguments which show clearly the hollowness of the nuclear era. When the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction [MAD] came under attack some years ago, it was argued by some strategic thinkers, in attempting to justify new theories, that MAD was unacceptable not only militarily, but also morally. It is difficult to follow that kind of argument. If strategists call a particular nuclear doctrine "immoral" but do not want to give up nuclear weapons, nor even proclaim no-first-use, another doctrine must be established that would be moral, or at least less immoral. The presupposition must be that strategists are prepared actually to use nuclear weapons in war, but are anxious to use them as morally as possible. Hence the flexible response and the counterforce doctrines were born, giving rise to theories of "a limited nuclear war". In turn, these developed into ideas of "a fightable and winnable nuclear war".

As a European, I have every reason to reflect on these new strategies and their effects on other Europeans. It is becoming more and more obvious that limited nuclear strikes, while horrific in themselves, would have, in turn, dire consequences: They would not remain limited. As a result, the "flexible-response" doctrine is encountering increasing public resistance, and has been indeed a catalyst for the peace movements in Western Europe. Ironically, recent attempts by both powers to develop this doctrine further, by the deployment or production of new types of intermediate-range weapons, have served only to expose the contradictory propositions behind the doctrine, and indeed, behind nuclear weapons themselves.

B. The Dilemma

We begin to see now the dilemma of our age. Our theories of defence are predicated upon the assurance of our own destruction. To protect ourselves, we must be prepared to destroy ourselves. What is worse, complete and final destruction could be brought about not only by intention, but even by accident.
The need to rid Europe of this insane situation is obvious, but achieving removal of weapons is as difficult as it is necessary. The plethora of weapons that have been implanted almost light-heartedly in and around Europe in the last three decades cannot be removed overnight. And we do not see any indication of a sincere will to remove the threat imposed on Europe by this so-called balance of terror. Herein lies the dilemma: reliance on deterrence leaves the world in a precarious situation at best; the achieving of disarmament appears to be a near-impossible endeavour. On the one hand, we have the hollowness of unacceptable nuclear doctrines, the concept of deterrence and the existence of nuclear weapons themselves. No increased security is gained by any state through a relentless build-up of arms. The only thing increased is the risk of nuclear holocaust. On the other hand, we have the difficult but solvable problem of achieving arms limitation agreements and ultimately disarmament. This is the political and moral dilemma of our age. It is shared not only by the nuclear-weapon states, it is shared by all of us.

From a slightly different perspective, the dilemma has never been expressed more eloquently than by Archibald MacLeish, a great American man of letters. In his essay called "Master or Man", published in 1978, he wrote:

Prior to Hiroshima it had still been possible — increasingly difficult but still possible — to believe that science was by nature a human tool, obedient to human wishes and that the world science and its technology could create, would therefore be a human world, reflecting human needs, our human purposes. After Hiroshima, it was obvious that the loyalty of science was not to humanity but to truth — its own truth — and that the law of science was not the law of the good — what humanity thinks of as good, meaning moral, decent, humane — but the law of the possible. What it is possible for science to know, science must know. What it is possible for technology to do, technology will have done. If it is possible to split the atom, then the atom must be split. Regardless, Regardless . . . of anything.

C. **Quantitative Aspects**

The relentless arms race has also its quantitative aspects. Total world military expenditures, estimated for the year 1982 at 650 billion U.S. dollars, are beyond what even the human mind can grasp. To demonstrate that they are completely beyond anything reasonable, I shall give two examples. First, in the 1982 issue of *World Military and Social Expenditures*, Ruth Leger Sivard notes: “The world's stockpile of nuclear weapons is equivalent to 16,000 million tons of TNT. In World War II 3 million tons of munitions were expended, and 40-50 million people died.” Second, according to estimates in 1955 by the U.S. Strategic Air Command, 600 to 700 nuclear warheads landing on Soviet targets would be sufficient to destroy completely all defence capability of the U.S.S.R. The United States has somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 warheads; and, according to available information, the
Reagan Administration plans to increase the number to 40,000. Even assuming that 700 warheads were necessary to destroy Soviet defence capability, for what purposes does the President intend to use the remaining 39,300?

The Reagan Administration has held repeatedly to its firm position that the U.S. has lost its nuclear superiority to the Soviet Union. The position is contradicted equally repeatedly by American domestic authorities, and one is not hard-pressed to find examples. In an article in the 1982 Spring issue of Foreign Policy, Editor Charles William Maynes writes:

America needed superiority in weaponry to make America again “war-proof”. Technological dominance would make any attack on the US as immediately suicidal as the attack on Pearl Harbour had been ultimately suicidal for the former military rulers of Japan. Acting on these lessons the US has since World War II led the way in repeatedly introducing new and more potent technology into the arms race.

In the 1981 issue of World Military and Social Expenditures, Ruth Leger Sivard notes that in the action-reaction game between the superpowers in the nuclear era, the United States has led the way in all but two of twelve cases of innovations in nuclear military technology. The alleged loss of American superiority is simply not true.

III. Arms Limitation Agreements

A. Why Failure?

Why have multilateral disarmament negotiations failed? The question is especially perplexing given that in 1978, the U.N. General Assembly stated unanimously in the Final Document of SSOD I that “the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind”. For decades now, the world community has tried, through political negotiations, to secure genuine and durable peace through disarmament. Despite these efforts, not a single nuclear weapon system has been dismantled unless obsolete and useless. The number of nuclear warheads continues to increase. Why, then, have we failed so dismally?

While the question is open to much conjecture, it is wise to look to both the military and political motives that lie behind a continued arms race. One can discern at least three factors. First, there is “mirror-imaging”. Both superpowers have a conviction that they must have at least what they believe their adversary to have. Herein lies the source of the well-known action-reaction problem. Second, and closely related to the first factor, there is the extraordinary secrecy that pervades the arms race. Secrecy poses overwhelming difficulties for efforts to assess the resources and intentions of the perceived adversary. It creates a vicious circle of distrust: secrecy leads to distrust and lack of confidence, which in turn triggers further secrecy. As long
as the vicious circle is kept in motion, so is a never-ending arms race. Third, there is the factor of lead time. With today’s sophisticated and intricate technology, the period required for planning, development and production of new weapon systems is about ten years. A lead time of this size causes additional speculation about the intentions and plans of the adversary. What sophisticated new weapons will “they” have ten years from now? What, therefore, must “we” begin developing now in order to keep our place in the arms race?

A second explanation for the failure of disarmament negotiations is found in the manner in which these negotiations have been carried out. I have already noted above the arrogant attitude that the superpowers have brought to the multilateral disarmament negotiations in the forty-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The fate of the work toward a comprehensive test ban treaty demonstrates the kind of results we can expect from such attitudes. In their arrogance, the superpowers regard the other thirty-eight nations, and even the rest of the world, primarily in the context of their own bilateral relations.

B. A Moratorium is Needed First

In an editorial in the May 1980 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Editor-in-Chief, Professor Bernard Feld discusses the idea of a moratorium on weapons development pending the conclusion of disarmament treaties. He considers the main problem to be that the two superpowers negotiate arms control while simultaneously engaging in a vigorous race to increase and to improve the same weapons the negotiations are supposed to control. It is common knowledge now that the pace of negotiations is much slower than the pace of technological development. Efforts to limit, then, would seem to be in vain unless the development of the arms under consideration is frozen during the negotiating period. Prior agreement on a moratorium on further development and deployment is a prerequisite for success in arms limitation negotiations.

Numerous examples prove this point. During various phases of the SALT I talks, the introduction of new “bargaining chips”, the multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles [MIRVs] and cruise missiles, caused the negotiations to drag. Momentum remained strong and steady nevertheless in the technological development of these new missiles — mankind was blessed with MIRVs and cruise missiles.

The long, drawn-out negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty are another case in point. While the work toward such a treaty has stretched over decades now, underground test explosions have continued unchecked by any
agreements whatsoever. The most recent example is the planned U.S. MX missile. In his statement of 22 November 1982, President Reagan introduced this new weapon as a “bargaining chip” in the START talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva. Without a moratorium on these kinds of developments, the likelihood of success in future negotiations is lowered enormously.

Conclnsion: The Futnre

Has disarmament a chance? We are in a race with time, and we are losing. I believe that our chances of success depend upon two factors. Both provide a cause for some hope. The first is the possibility of a fundamental change in power structures. The second is growing public awareness.

There are already indications of fundamental power shifts, and, I believe, the beginning of a decline in superpower influence. We have witnessed already a relative rise in the power and influence of countries like Japan and some members of the European Community. Such shifts in power make it more difficult for the superpowers to exert their military and political influence. Furthermore, there could be major shifts in economic power. Both the United States and the Soviet Union run the grave risk of allowing their economies to falter by continuing the pursuit of a ruinous arms race in times of serious economic difficulties. Thus, the economy could become an important factor in the disarmament process. It is widely acknowledged that one prerequisite of national security is a strong and healthy world economy. It is therefore of utmost importance to identify the factors which have caused our global economic crisis. One finds it difficult not to have the impression that the arms race is one of the major causes. A U.N. Governmental Expert Group that I chaired was charged with carrying out a comprehensive study on the relationship between disarmament and development. After three years of study, our report was submitted to the 36th Session of the General Assembly in 1981. Our analyses show convincingly the devastating effects on the economy caused by devoting human, material and financial resources to the arms race. Based on extensive research, we drew a number of conclusions which can be summarized in two points. First, a fundamental choice must be made. The world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour and accept the heavy burden that it places on the economy, or, it must move consciously toward a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both. Second, there is a mutual self-interest among all countries in effective disarmament, irrespective of economic and social systems, or levels of economic development. In the words of Dr Christoph Bertram, a strategic thinker of repute, the economy could become a factor for disarmament. Indeed, it is a positive sign that the General Assembly decided in 1982, at its 37th Session, to place this important economic issue on its agenda at regular intervals.
The other cause for hope is rapidly growing public awareness. For a growing number of people, the fundamental issue has changed from one of deterrence and military balance to one of survival. Change is being wrought, albeit slowly, by a growing awareness of the real threat posed by nuclear weapons. For the first time since Herman Kahn published *Thinking About the Unthinkable* in 1962, people are thinking about the unthinkable. Suddenly, they have understood that they must do so because military and political leaders, by their rhetoric of "controlled nuclear counter-attacks" and "protracted conflict periods", have made the unthinkable not only thinkable but also possible, if not probable. Much has been said about the imperative need for a change of wills and minds, but we have waited a long time for that change and our patience has run out. People understand now that this present trend must be stopped for the sake of survival. Recently, many of us have gained new hope because of the appearance of this potentially significant political force.

George F. Kennan has called the forceful popular peace movements in Western Europe, North America and Japan the most striking phenomena of the early 1980s. Already they are having an influence upon political events. In Sweden, it is our hope that these movements will continue with increased momentum, and that they will lead eventually to the successful completion of multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

In my view, these popular movements are crucial. The lesson that we have learned from past negotiations is profound: World political leaders continue to show a dangerous lack of knowledge, insight and imagination in coping with the problems and issues in this, our thirty-eighth year of the nuclear era. They are unlikely to change their modes of thinking. Who, then, can turn around this calamitous course of history? If we can form an international constituency and cast a global ballot for disarmament, then it is we, the people.