McGill Law Journal ~ Revue de droit de McGill
ISRAEL AS A MIXED JURISDICTION
Eliezer Rivlin*
Like in most Western countries, the legal sys-
tem in Israel is constantly evolving. Israel is a mixed
jurisdiction in many respects. Historically, during the
time of the Ottoman Empire, the land of Israel was
ruled by Turkish law, which was followed by British
law during the time of the British Mandate. Today, Is-
raels legal system still reflects a mixture of civil law
and common law. This mixture is evident, for example,
in the combination of codified law and precedent-based
law. Several areas of the law were codified, at the time
of the British Mandate, in ordinances that remain
binding today. However, these ordinances were sup-
plemented and widely interpreted in Israels case law,
and an Israeli common law was created. Today, legis-
lative efforts are being made to codify this new com-
mon law.
The mixed nature of substantive law in Israel is
also illustrated by Israel’s constitutional regime. While
Israel has no formal constitution, it has a partial bill of
rights (the basic laws) enacted by its parliament. In
1995, the Israeli Supreme Court decided, referring to
American constitutional law, that it had the authority
to invalidate unconstitutional laws. In its decision,
the Supreme Court relied on a limitation clause, in-
cluded in the new basic laws and inspired by the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Since then,
the Israeli Supreme Court has developed a number of
constitutional rights from these basic laws, influenced
by both the American concept of liberty and the Euro-
pean concept of human dignity.
Finally, comparative law plays an important role
in Israeli case law. While British common law no long-
er binds the Israeli judiciary, judges have wide discre-
tion to use comparative law in their decisions. When
relevant, referring to foreign law may be of great assis-
tance to a judge by providing inspiration in a difficult
case. Utilizing many different sources of law may help
to create harmony between various jurisdictions, espe-
cially in times of increasing globalization.
limage de la plupart des pays occidentaux, le
droit isralien est en constante volution. Isral est de ju-
ridiction mixte sous plusieurs aspects. Historiquement,
lpoque de lempire Ottoman, les terres israliennes
taient gouvernes par le droit turc. Celui-ci a t suivi
par le droit britannique durant la priode du mandat bri-
tannique. Aujourdhui, le droit isralien reflte encore un
mlange de droit civil et de common law. Ce mlange est
vident, par exemple, dans la combinaison des lois codi-
fies et des lois bases sur les prcdents. Plusieurs sec-
teurs lgislatifs ont t codifis, lors du mandat britan-
nique, dans des ordonnances qui demeurent effectives de
nos jours. Cependant, ces ordonnances ont t supples et
largement interprtes par la jurisprudence isralienne,
ce qui a cr une common law isralienne . Aujourdhui,
des efforts sont faits afin de codifier cette nouvelle com-
mon law.
Une autre illustration du droit matriel mixte en
Isral est son rgime constitutionnel. Isral na pas de
constitution formelle, mais a une dclaration des droits
partielle (les lois fondamentales) adopte par son parle-
ment. En 1995, la Cour suprme isralienne a dclar, en
rfrence au droit constitutionnel amricain, avoir
lautorit dinvalider toute loi inconstitutionnelle . Dans
sa dcision, la Cour suprme sest base sur une clause de
limitation incluse dans les nouvelles lois fondamentales et
inspire par la Charte canadienne des droits et liberts.
Depuis, la Cour suprme isralienne a dvelopp un cer-
tain nombre de droits constitutionnels partir de ces lois
fondamentales, influencs la fois par le concept amri-
cain de libert et le concept europen de dignit humaine.
Finalement, le droit comparatif joue un rle impor-
tant dans la jurisprudence isralienne. Mme si la com-
mon law britannique ne lie plus les cours israliennes, les
juges ont une large discrtion pour utiliser le droit compa-
ratif dans leurs dcisions. Lorsque pertinente, la rfrence
au droit tranger peut tre dune grande assistance pour
un juge, lui fournissant linspiration ncessaire dans un
cas difficile. Lutilisation de plusieurs sources diffrentes
peut crer une harmonie entre les diffrentes juridictions,
particulirement dans une poque de mondialisation
grandissante.
* Deputy Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Israel. This article is based, in part, on a previ-
ous work: Eliezer Rivlin, Thoughts on Referral to Foreign Law, Global Chain-Novel,
and Novelty (2009) 21:1 Fla J Intl L 1.
Citation: (2012) 57:4 McGill LJ 781 ~ Rfrence : (2012) 57 : 4 RD McGill 781
Eliezer Rivlin 2012
782 (2012) 57:4 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
Israel can serve as a unique example of a multi-layered mixed legal
system. Historically, the Israeli legal system was composed of several
chronological layers. First, Turkish law, originating in the Ottoman
erathe region that is now the state of Israel was part of the Ottoman
Empire for four hundred yearswas the law of the land.1 Essentially, Ot-
toman law was Islamic religious law influenced by European (e.g., Austri-
an, Swiss, and French) law.2 Then, British law became the law of the
land. At the end of the First World War, the region was conquered by the
British army and it became a part of the British Mandate under the
League of Nations. For thirty years, the region was strongly influenced by
the British legal system.3 The rules of English common law and the prin-
ciples of equity were imported into the region. It was only in 1980, more
than thirty years after the British Mandate had ended, that these binding
links to the English common law were disconnected.4 After the establish-
ment of the state of Israel in 1948, and since then, the Israeli Parlia-
mentthe Knessethas enacted new statutes that have turned the Is-
raeli legal system into a modern onean original system in many senses.
Israel is still a mixed jurisdiction today. Its legal system reflects a
mixture of English legal traditions and Continental European standards
and principles. For years, Israels private law has been governed by one
kind or another of civil code. The Ottoman civil code was the first code to
be absorbed into the local system, though almost all of the Ottoman laws
have since been abolished.5 A unique kind of civil codification was also en-
acted by the British during their mandate. The Tort Ordinance is a good
example: it is still in force in Israel and was, in fact, a codification sum-
marizing the English common law in the field of torts.6 In a way, it was a
restatement of the law that was based on the English common law; but
1 Daniel Friedmann, The Effect of Foreign Law on the Law of Israel: Remnants of the
Ottoman Period (1975) 10:2 Isr LR 192 at 196 [Friedmann, Effect of Foreign Law].
2 Benjamin Akzin, Codification in a New State: A Case Study of Israel (1956) 5:1 Am J
Comp L 44 at 45-47.
3 See generally S Ginossar, Israel Law: Components and Trends (1966) 1:3 Isr LR 380
at 382-84; Norman Bentwich, The Legal System of Israel (1964) 13:1 ICLQ 236 at
236-42.
4 Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 57081948, 1 LSI 7, s 11 (Isr) [Law and
Administration Ordinance].
5 Friedmann, Effect of Foreign Law, supra note 1 at 201-206; Repeal of Mejelle Law,
57441984, 38 LSI 212 (1983-84) (Isr); Ruth Gavison, Abolition of the Mejelle as a
Source of Law (1984) 14 Mishpatim 325 (in Hebrew).
6 Civil Wrongs Ordinance, No 36 of 1944, Palestine Gazette 1944, vol 26, No 1380 (1st
Supp), 129 [Tort Ordinance]; Izhak Englard, The Law of Torts in Israel: The Problems
of Common Law Codification in a Mixed Legal System (1974) 22 Am J Comp L 302 at
303-17.
ISRAEL AS A MIXED JURISDICTION 783
as opposed to the American Restatement,7 the Tort Ordinance is binding.
In the modern state of Israel, legislators have codified a system of private
law in a series of statutes.8 These statutes were influenced by both com-
mon law principles and Continental concepts. The German and Italian in-
fluences are easily discernible; the statutes were influenced by civil law
ideas like good faith.9 The system was supposed to be transformed, from a
system in which the adjudicative process was the main resource for devel-
oping the law, into a codified system in which the code is the main re-
source for creating the lawa system typical of the civil law. Yet when
this piecemeal code was implemented by the courts, it was exercised in a
non-Continental way, by creatively interpreting the code and by filling
the gaps left by general standardstypical of Continental statuteswith
concrete instructions.10 Substantial parts of Israels private law are now
about to become a unified civil code, the purpose of which is to harmonize
the case law resulting from the application of this piecemeal code.
In spite of its Continental influences, we should not characterize the
Israeli legal system as a civil law systemthough one of a kind in many
ways, it should still be classified as a common law system for several rea-
sons. First, judge-made law is still an important part of the law in Israel.11
In fact, a rich body of Israeli common law has developed over the years,
both in the sphere of public law and in the field of private law. Also, the
rule of precedent is part of our system.12 Furthermore, judgments are ar-
ticulated in the way common law decisions are articulated, as opposed to
the way judgments are articulated in Continental legal systems. Yet Isra-
7 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).
8 See e.g. Contracts (General Part) Law, 57331973, 27 LSI 117 (1972-73) (Isr) [Contracts
(General Part) Law]; Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 57311970, 25
LSI 11 (1970-71) (Isr); Sale Law, 57281968, 22 LSI 107 (1967-68) (Isr); Sale (Apart-
ments) (Assurance of Investments of Persons Acquiring Apartments) Law, 57351974, 29
LSI 18 (1974-75) (Isr); Gift Law, 57281968, 22 LSI 113 (1967-68) (Isr). See generally
Daniel Friedmann, Independent Development of Israeli Law (1975) 10:4 Isr LR 515
[Friedmann, Independent Development].
9 See e.g. Contracts (General Part) Law, supra note 8, ss 12, 39; Companies Law
57591999, 44 LSI 1, ss 192, 198, 254 (Isr). See also Friedmann, Independent Devel-
opment, supra note 8 at 543-44.
10 Meir Shamgar, The Supreme Court of Israel: Present Trends and Concepts (1985)
20:2-3 Isr LR 175 at 176-79; Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, translated
by Sari Bashi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). See also Robert D Cooter &
Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Mod-
els (1996) 16:3 Intl Rev L & Econ 295.
11 Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence and Accountability in Israel (1984) 33 ICLQ
979 at 979-90.
12 Basic Law: The Judiciary, 1984, SH 78, s 20, online:
784 (2012) 57:4 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
el is not a typical common law system that just develops from case to case.
Rather, it is a combination of a chain novel (using Dworkins meta-
phor),13 in which the judge is bound by legal history, and creative judicial
innovation.
Israel is also a mixed legal system with regard to the content of its
law, similar to Louisiana and Quebec, which combine legal concepts from
both civil law and common law. For instance, Israels constitutional re-
gime is a mixed one. Unlike the United States, Israel has never adopted a
comprehensive written constitution.14 The Knesset chose to create a con-
stitutional regime in a piecemeal fashion by adopting basic lawseach
serving as a chapter of the constitution. In 1992, the Knesset enacted two
basic laws that awarded constitutional status to certain fundamental
rights: Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty. Together, they created our bill of rights, which includes the
right to human dignity; the right to property, individual autonomy, and
freedom; and the right to privacy.15 It is, however, a partial bill of rights.
Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to equality are not
mentioned explicitly in our basic laws.
Prior to 1992, human rights were protected by the Israeli common
law. Important human rights were developed by the Israeli Supreme
Court using a liberal interpretation of legislation. Lacking the constitu-
tional power of judicial review, the Israeli Supreme Courtwhen using its
limited powerswas very much inspired by American constitutional case
law. The American liberal approach to interpreting the US Constitution
was adopted by the Israeli Supreme Court when interpreting our regu-
lar legislation. Then, when the Israeli bill of rights was adopted in 1992,
the Israeli Supreme Court decided that the court had been granted the
13 Ronald A Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited (1982) 34:2 U Fla L Rev 165 at 168;
Ronald Dworkin, Laws Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1986) at 228-29.
Dworkin … compared the judicial decision making to the writing of a chain novel.
The judge, as the chain-novel’s author, should be connected to the decisions of the past.
He must consider past decisions as a part of a continuing story. … Each deciding judge
writes upon a background to which he must adhere (Eliezer Rivlin, Thoughts on Re-
ferral to Foreign Law, Global Chain-Novel, and Novelty (2009) 21:1 Fla J Intl L 1 at 14
×.).
14 Meir Shamgar, On the Written Constitution (1974) 9:4 Isr LR 467 at 469; The Honor-
able Dalia Dorner, Does Israel Have a Constitution? (1999) 43:4 Saint Louis ULJ 1325
at 1325.
15 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1992, SH 114, online:
online:
erty (Isr), 1992, SH 60, online:
by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – Amendment, 1994, SH 90, online:
ISRAEL AS A MIXED JURISDICTION 785
authority to invalidate legislation that infringed upon the fundamental
human rights enumerated in the two basic laws.
Once again, statute law and common law were intertwined: the Israeli
Supreme Court had decided that the basic laws were the supreme Law of
the Land,16 though there is no supremacy clause in the basic laws. In
1995, the Israeli Supreme Court decided, referring to the American deci-
sion Marbury v. Madison, that it has the authority to invalidate uncon-
stitutional laws.17 The limitation clause of the bill of rights,18 influenced
by the Canadian Charter, was used by the court to gain the power of judi-
cial review.19 In fact, the court replaced the American case laws concept of
constitutional scrutiny with a written test for judicial review. Further-
more, the Israeli Supreme Court has decided that the constitutional pro-
tection of certain rights that are not enumerated in the basic laws can be
derived from the fundamental rights mentioned in the Israeli partial bill
of rights. The court has decided that equality20 and freedom of speech21
are well within the penumbra of the bill of rightsthey are rights that
are not explicitly mentioned in the constitutional document, but which
can be derived from the basic right to liberty and human dignityand are
thus protected by the basic laws.
As you can see, our constitutional regime is a mixed onea very
mixed oneconsisting of a partial bill of rights included in a written doc-
ument, an Israeli constitutional common law, a judge-made supremacy
clause,22 a written limitation clause taken from the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, and some innovations taken from old American de-
cisions from as early as the nineteenth century on the one hand and from
the European notion of human dignity on the other hand. In fact, human
dignity, as in European conceptual frameworks, stands at the core of our
penumbra. In this manner, we departed from the American penumbra,
16 US Const art VI, cl 2.
17 CA 6821/93 Bank Mizrahi v Migdal Cooperative Village, [1995] 2 Israel Law Reports 1
at 220-23, online:
ing Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L Ed 60 (1803).
18 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 15, s 8.
19 Bank Mizrahi, supra note 17 at 215, citing Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s
1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK),
1982, c 11.
20 HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Government v Knesset, [2006] Tak-Al 2006(2) 1559,
online:
21 HCJ 10203/03 HaMifkad HaLeumi Ltd v Attorney General et Al, [2008] Tak-Al 2008(3)
3172, online:
22 EA 92/03 Shaul Mofaz v Chairman of the Central Elections Committee, [2003] IsrSC
57(3) 793, online:
786 (2012) 57:4 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
which uses the right to liberty as a conceptual framework to award consti-
tutional protection to fundamental rights not mentioned in the bill of
rights. We departed from the American penumbra, at the core of which
stood liberty. The notion of human dignity, protected by the Israeli basic
lawsand which serves as a tool to protect additional rightswas in-
spired very much by the German Basic Law. Yet when human dignity
was interpreted by the Israeli Supreme Court, it was flavoured with the
American notions of liberty and equality.
And yet another mixture: the Israeli bill of rights provides that [t]he
purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order
to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish
and democratic state.23 Is there a conflict between a Jewish and a
democratic state? Is Jewish different from democratic? Is Israel a re-
ligious state? Is there a separation between church and state? These were
the questions that stemmed from the declared goal of the Basic Law: Hu-
man Dignity and Liberty. There is, no doubt, a tension between the values
of the state of Israel as a Jewish state and its values as a democratic
state.24 Furthermore, it was decided by the Israeli Supreme Court that
the phrase democratic state means not only free elections and majority
rule, but also protecting human rights and securing an independent judi-
ciary.25 In order to decrease the tension between Jewish and democrat-
ic, Jewish values were interpreted by the Israeli Supreme Court to reflect
universal values, thus allowing the values of democracy and Jewish val-
ues to co-exist.26 Indeed, Israel is a Jewish state, being the national home
for Jews, but the state must treat Jews and non-Jews equally. Although
there is no separation of church and state in the country, Israel is not a
religious state and the Jewish religion is not a state religion. The legal
system in Israel is liberal and secular; yet questions of personal status
mainly marriage and divorceare adjudicated by religious courts, which
apply religious law.27
An interesting example of the combination of various legal legacies
can be found in the Tort Ordinance. As mentioned above, the Israeli Tort
Ordinance, enacted during the British Mandate, reflected the British
common law of the time by codifying the existing common law of torts in
23 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 15, s 1(a).
24 Ruth Gavison, Jewish and Democratic? A Rejoinder to the Ethnic Democracy Debate
(1999) 4:1 Israel Studies 44 at 44.
25 Bank Mizrahi, supra note 17 at 196-98, 230-32.
26 CA 506/88 Shefer v State of Israel (1993), [1992-94] Israel Law Reports 170 at 281.
27 See generally Izhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel (1987) 35:1 Am J Comp L
185.
ISRAEL AS A MIXED JURISDICTION 787
one coherent, legally binding text. Over the years, the Israeli courts de-
veloped, step by step, the Israeli common law doctrines, interpreting the
language of the Tort Ordinance to suit the changing times and circum-
stances. For example, the courts understanding of the statutory definition
of negligence has evolved over the years to include, inter alia, the famous
Hand formula,28 though the language of the Tort Ordinance still reflects
the rule stated in Donoghue v. Stevenson.29 The judicially updated defini-
tion of negligence was later adopted in the draft of the new Israeli codifi-
cation project. Looking at the evolution of tort law in Israel, we can see
somewhat of a pattern: first, the development of common law doctrines by
the English courts; then, the collection of these doctrines into one binding
ordinancein fact, a codification; next, the progression and growth of the
codified doctrines through Israeli case law; and at last, once again, the act
of adopting notions from Israeli case law in a codifying statute. A similar
process is occurring in other countries as well, including Commonwealth
countries. Australia, for example, has recently begun the process of codify-
ing each one of its states common law doctrines into one unified statute.
Similarly, the Restatements in the United States combine and unify the
general body of the American common law. Although the Restatements
are not formally binding, they are highly influential, and they represent
the need that each legal system occasionally has to combine all the exist-
ing case law into one organized and harmonized document to be inter-
preted and further developed by case law.
Another aspect of the mixture of different legal legacies is the use of
comparative research in Israeli case law. In light of the peculiar nature of
the Israeli system, reference to foreign law in generaland to American
law in particularis not self-evident. As a system with many peculiari-
ties, one might think that Israel could not benefit from comparative law.
Yet the Israeli courts have always demonstrated a willingness to refer to
foreign law. As I have illustrated, foreign law was historically part of the
countrys legal system. When the state of Israel was established, the Is-
raeli legislature decided that, whenever there was a lacuna in domestic
law, the court ought to refer to the English common law.30 Since the abol-
ishment of this mandatory reference in 1980, reference to foreign law has
depended on the willingness and discretion of judges to use comparative
28 CA 5604/94 Hemed v State of Israel, [2004] IsrSC 58(2) 498, online:
States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F (2d) 169 at 173, 1947 US App LEXIS 3226 (2d Cir
1947).
29 Tort Ordinance, supra note 6, s 50(1); Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] AC 562 at 580,
[1932] All ER Rep 1 HL (Eng).
30 Law and Administration Ordinance, supra note 4, s 11.
788 (2012) 57:4 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
law in their decisions.31 The legal obligation to refer to foreign law has
been replaced by an impressive willingness to use comparative law. The
extensive use of foreign law has shaped both the sphere of public law and
the framework of private law. Presumably, the willingness of our judges,
throughout the years, to learn from their colleagues abroad is a result of
our countrys mixed legal history, but it is also a result of the mixed per-
sonal histories of the judgesmany of whom were born and educated in
European countries, the United States, or the Commonwealth countries
joining together to create a rich global chain story.
Whatever the reason may be, the fact is that, in our judicial work, Is-
raeli judges rely heavily on comparative law. American and Common-
wealth cases are often cited in our decisions. In this respect, we differ
from a commonly heard American insight: indeed, the most robust dispute
regarding reference to foreign law is the one occurring in the US Supreme
Court and the American academy. This controversy focuses on the issue of
using foreign law in constitutional interpretation, yet American courts of-
ten rely on foreign law in other legal spheres. Justice Scalia and Professor
Posner represent eloquently the belief that American judges should be
very careful about citing foreign judicial decisions.32 Similar ideas are also
expressed by some legal scholars, such as Steven Calabresi, who believe
that the American nation is a shining city on a hill, capable only of
teaching other nations and not of learning from them.33 Justices Kennedy
and Ginsburg, however, represent a different stance.
Judges in Israel do look outside. Despite the traditional Jewish belief
that the people of Israel are a light to all the nations, our legal system
does not share the notion that we are the only ones who can shine and
lead the way for other nations. We have never underestimated the values
and principles that characterize the more mature jurisdictions, and we
understand the benefits that result from exchanging views. There are
many reasons for this openness to foreign law. Indeed, the English lan-
guage serves as a bridge to the Anglo-American system. But language is
not the only reason for referring to the American legal system or the
Commonwealth legal systemsas discussed earlier, the fact that many
Israeli justices were born or educated in foreign countries and the legal
obligation to refer to foreign law in certain instances are additional rea-
31 Foundations of Law, 57401980, 34 LSI 181 (1979-80), s 1 (Isr).
32 Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 at 624-28, 125 S Ct 1183 (2005) (Scalia J, dissenting);
Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 at 589, 598, 123 S Ct 2472 (2003) (Scalia J, dissenting),
citing Richard A Posner, Sex and Reason (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1992) at 343.
33 Steven G Calabresi, A Shining City on a Hill: American Exceptionalism and the Su-
preme Courts Practice of Relying on Foreign Law (2006) 86:5 BUL Rev 1335 at 1338.
ISRAEL AS A MIXED JURISDICTION 789
sons for referring to other legal systems. We are, of course, very careful
when using comparative law. One must be quite rooted in the system that
one refers to in order to be sure that its rules and ideas are interpreted
properly. In order to leverage and use foreign law in a meaningful way,
one must hold considerable knowledge and expertise in both foreign and
local law. For one to have access to foreign law, one must possess both the
technical tools to approach the law and an understanding of its normative
substance.
Reference to foreign law is beneficial only when the law referred to is
relevant and when judges can derive assistance from it. Indeed, it con-
tributes to yet another mixture of jurisdictions. Global judicial co-
operation can assist domestic courts to achieve progress and overcome ir-
rational judicial conservatism by relying on the global market of innova-
tions. At the same time, reliance on foreign law can also serve as a re-
straint imposed upon domestic courts, preventing them from exceeding
the borders of the general consensus about what a legal system should
look like.34 It is usually more appropriate and helpful to look to foreign
law for a way of thinking rather than for a specific decisionto look for
certain analytical discussions rather than for a concrete outcome. This
concept reflects the nature of mature and developed legal systemswhich
may correspond on the level of ideas, if not on the level of local outcomes.
Exchanging views is always beneficial; judges do so whenever they
convene at international conferences. Yet a reference to foreign law is not
necessarily a dialogueat least not a conscious dialogue. Development of
domestic law via reference to foreign law can be confined to only one par-
ty, the legal system making the reference, while the legal system being
referenced is unaware of its involvement in the process. Such a reference
can trigger efficient, though uncoordinated, co-operation between different
legal systems. In this process, each system contributes its own innova-
tions to the common pool of developing law.
To sum up, Israel is a mixed jurisdiction in many respects. First, from
an historical perspective, current Israeli law has evolved from a mixture
of common lawEnglish and Israeliand codification; second, at present,
Israeli law uses well-developed comparative legal analysis in a careful
and mature way.
Looking to the future of mixed jurisdictions and, in general, to the fu-
ture of all legal systems, I am sure that the global village we live in will
induce more mutual influence between legal systems. I believe that the
mutual impact between legal traditions will be enhanced, not only by the
34 Rivlin, supra note 13 at 3. Reference to foreign law is first and foremost conditioned up-
on a willingness to turn to foreign legal systems.
790 (2012) 57:4 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
ease of communication between legal scholars and judges around the
world, but also by the fact that we are currently faced with common global
challenges that will require various legal systems to work together. These
challenges include cross-border internet business, the activity of global
corporations and the complexities that these corporations present, world-
wide environmental issues, and international refugee problems. Chal-
lenges like these will likely induce co-operation between countries and en-
courage the mixture of legal systems, so that our mixed history will be
carried into the future.
