The Rule of Law and the Justiciability of
Prerogative Powers: A Comment on
Black v. Chr tien
Lorne Sossin”
In Black v. Chritien, the Ontario Court of Appeal
addressed the issue of the courts’ ability to review the
exercise of Crown prerogative powers. While the court
held that the exercise of prerogative powers is subject
to judicial review in general, it stipulated that certain
categories of prerogative powers are not reviewable.
The court reasoned that judicial review is limited to in-
stances where the nature and subject matter of the pre-
rogative powers are amenable to the judicial process. In
Conrad Black’s lawsuit against the prime minister, the
court found that the communication between the prime
minister and the Queen represented an exercise of the
prerogative to grant honours and that such a prerogative
was non-justiciable.
The author is critical of the court’s use of the
doctrine of justiciability to shield executive officials
from judicial review. He argues that the court adopted
an undesirably formalistic approach to justiciability,
with the consequence that a significant sphere of ex-
ecutive action lies beyond the reach of the rule of law.
The author maintains that justiciability should solely
depend on the legitimacy and capacity of the courts to
adjudicate a matter. In his opinion, Black’s claim
against the prime minister was justiciable.
Dans l’arr& Black c. Chrdtien, la Cour d’appel
d’Ontario soul~ve le problme du pouvoir qu’a la cour
de rviser l’exercice des pr6rogatives de la Couronne.
Alors que la cour a d6crt6 que ces privileges sont su-
jets a la r6vision judiciaire de fagon g~n6rale, elle a sti-
puh6 que certaines catdgories de ces pr6rogatives 6taient
intouchables. La cour a jug6 que la r6vision judiciaire
se limite aux instances oh la nature et le contenu des
prdrogatives de la Couronne sont sujet a atre entendus
par le processus judiciaire. Dans cet arrat, la cour a d6-
cid6 que la communication entre le premier ministre et
la Reine reprsentait un exercice de la prdrogative
d’octroyer des honneurs et que ce privilege n’6tait pas
sujet hL ]a rvisionjudiciaire.
L’auteur critique l’utilisation que fait la cour de la
doctrine de justiciabilit6 pour protdger un officier ex6-
cutif contre la r6vision judiciaire. 11 d6montre que la
cour a adopt6 une approche formaliste de lajusticiabilit6,
approche ind6sirable, qui a pour consequence d’extraire
de ]a primaute du droit une sphere importante de l’action
executive. Lauteur maintient que la justiciabilit6 ne de-
vrait d6pendre que de la 16gtimit6 et de ]a capacit6 de
la cour de se prononcer. Selon lui, la demande de Black
4 l’6gard du premier ministre 6taitjusticiable.
“Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I should note that I had some minor in-
volvement in this case as a consultant to counsel for the appellant, and prior to that, expressed some
criticism of the judgment of LeSage J. in the motion before the Ontario Superior Court. See L. Sossin,
“Hoist on his Own Petard” The Globe and Mail (23 March 2000) A17. I wish to thank David Dyzen-
haus, Julia Hanigsberg, Peter W. Hogg, Hudson Janisch, Patrick J. Monahan, and Mark Walters for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
McGill Law Journal 2002
Revue de droit de McGill 2002
To be cited as: (2002) 47 McGill L. 435
Mode de r6fdrence: (2002) 47 R.D. McGill 435
436
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL/ REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 47
Introduction
I. Judicial Review and the Crown Prerogative
II. Justiciability and the Crown Prerogative
Ill. The Implications of Black and the Rule of Law
Conclusion
2002]
L. SOSSIN-A COMMENT ON BLACK V. CHRETIEN
Law is something more than mere will exerted as an act of
power It must be not a special rule for a particular person or a
particular case … Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the
injury of the persons and property of its subjects, is not law,
whether manifested as the decree of a personal monarch or of
an impersonal multitude.’
Introduction
The odd case of Black v. Chrjtien’ may have resulted in a happy ending for the
parties involved, but the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal represents, in my
view, a mixed blessing for Canadian law relating to the judicial review of Crown pre-
rogative powers. On the bright side, the court has confirmed that the source of gov-
ernmental authority, whether a prerogative or statutory power, should have no bearing
on whether the exercise of that authority is reviewable. By upholding the dismissal of
Black’s claim, however, the court used the justiciability doctrine as a shield to immu-
nize a category of prerogative powers from the reach of the rule of law. This is a dis-
turbing development which merits closer examination.
The litigation arose in June of 1999 when the Queen decided not to bestow a
peerage on Conrad Black. The Queen had apparently been informed by Prime Minis-
ter Jean Chr6tien that Canadian law prevented Canadian citizens from being nomi-
nated as peers. Chr6tien allegedly cited a 1919 Parliamentary resolution known as the
“Nickle Resolution”‘ as the source of this legal impediment.’ That resolution, which
was neither a statute nor an instrument with any legal effect, requested the then King
not to bestow honours and titular distinctions on subjects domiciled or ordinarily resi-
dent in Canada. Prior to that communication, in May of 1999, both Black and the
British government had allegedly been assured by the Canadian government that, as
long as Black obtained British as well as Canadian citizenship, there was no bar to his
nomination. Within a matter of days, Black promptly became a citizen of the United
Kingdom.
Black alleged that the prime minister’s intervention on the eve of his nomination
as a peer was politically motivated, and was undertaken in response to negative cover-
age of the prime minister in the Southam chain of newspapers owned by Black. Black
sued the government of Canada for negligence and the prime minister personally for
‘Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 at 535-36,4 S. Ct. 516 (1884).
2 (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 215, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 228 (C.A.) [hereinafter Black].
‘ The exact text of the resolution is reproduced in Journals of the House of Commons of the Do-
minion of Canada, vol. 55 (22 May 1919) at 295.
‘Black, supra note 2 at para. 11.
438
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negligence and abuse of power, and sought $25,000 in damages. The quantum of
damages sought suggests Black’s suit was motivated more by pride and principle than
by a desire for compensation (although, to be sure, quantifying the value of a lost
peerage is an esoteric undertaking).’
The government of Canada and the prime minister brought a motion to have all
the claims dismissed on the grounds they disclosed no reasonable cause of action.’
LeSage J. granted the motion in part, and dismissed the claim against the prime min-
ister for negligence and abuse of power on grounds that his exercise of the Crown pre-
rogative relating to foreign affairs was non-justiciable. The negligence claim against
the government (for misrepresenting that there was no bar to Black’s nomination) was
allowed to proceed.!
The Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the ruling of LeSage J.9 While
concluding that a claim against a government decision was not non-justiciable simply
because the decision was an exercise of a Crown prerogative, the court nonetheless
held that the communication between the prime minister and the Queen represented
an exercise of the prerogative of granting honours, and that such decisions were non-
justiciable. Laskin J.A. explained this holding in the following terms:
The conferral of the honour at issue in this case, a British peerage, is a discre-
tionary favour bestowed by the Queen. It engages no liberty, no property, no
5That Black sought damages through a civil suit indicates, however, that his concern was for having
been harmed in some way. If public accountability had been Black’s concern, presumably he would
have initiated an application for judicial review instead of launching a civil suit. Judicial review might
have resulted in a declaration or an order compelling the government to undertake some action but
would not have resulted in damages.
6 For the purposes of such a motion, the test is whether, based on the pleadings alone, it is “plain
and obvious” that there is no cause of action, assuming all the facts alleged to be proven, and reading
the pleadings in their most generous light. Further, where the law is not fully settled in a given area,
the action should be permitted to continue. See Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 at
980,74 D.L.R. (4th) 321.
7 LeSage J. concluded:
The PM’s conduct here complained of is not within the reach of the court because
it was not a justiciable order or decision regulating conduct. It is not within the power
of the court to decide whether or not the advice of the PM about the prerogative honour
to be conferred or denied upon Black was right or wrong. It is not for the court to give
its opinion on the advice tendered by the PM to another country. These are non-
justiciable decisions for which the PM is politically accountable to Parliament and the
electorate, not the courts. Similarly, any question about the propriety of the PM’s moti-
vation is for Parliament and the electorate, not for the courts.
Black v. Chrtien (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 532 at par. 27, 184 D.L.R. (4th) 755 (Sup. Ct.).
8Ibid. at para. 10.
9Black, supra note 2 at para. 77.
2002]
L. SOSSIN – A COMMENT ON BLACK V. CHR”IEN
439
economic interests. It enjoys no procedural protection. It does not have a suffi-
cient legal component to warrant the court’s intervention. Instead, it involves
“moral and political considerations which it is not within the province of the
courts to assess”.
In other words, the discretion to confer or refuse to confer an honour is the
kind of discretion that is not reviewable by the court. In this case, the court has
even less reason to intervene because the decision whether to confer a British
peerage on Mr. Black rests not with Prime Minister Chrtien, but with the
Queen. At its highest, all the Prime Minister could do was give the Queen ad-
vice not to confer a peerage on Mr. Black.
For these reasons, I agree with the motions judge that Prime Minister
Chr6tien’s exercise of the honours prerogative by giving advice to the Queen
about granting Mr. Black’s peerage is not justiciable and therefore not judi-
cially reviewable.’0
While his claim against Prime Minister Chr6tien was dismissed, Black was able
to become eligible for a peerage by renouncing his Canadian citizenship, which he
did. On 31 October 2001 he took his seat in the House of Lords as Lord Black of
Crossharbour.” Prime Minister Chrtien presumably is happy as well. He has had his
dubious championing of the 1919 Nickle Resolution validated, and more to the point,
will not have to endure the indignity of the disclosures and media scrutiny of a civil
suit. The British government and Crown have avoided an embarrassing entanglement
in Canadian affairs. Finally, the Canadian taxpayers will be spared funding an expen-
sive defence against a litigant with near-bottomless resources.
Black represents, at first glance, a significant and positive watershed in Canadian
public law. The Ontario Court of Appeal has confirmed that the Crown may be civilly
liable for the misuse of a prerogative power. This judgment has helped to eliminate an
obsolete vestige of Canada’s monarchial past. However, as I argue below, by finding
Black’s claim against Prime Minister Chr6tien to be non-justiciable, the court left in-
tact a sphere of executive authority that is effectively immune from the rule of law.
This is not an acceptable or a justifiable immunity, even for (and, perhaps, especially
for) a constitutional monarchy rooted in the common law.
This comment is divided into three parts. In Part I, I outline the scope of judicial
review of the Crown prerogative power and its application in Black. In Part H, I ex-
amine more specifically the justiciability of prerogative powers and the rationale
adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Black. Finally, in Part II, I analyze the im-
‘0 Ibid at paras. 62-64 [reference omitted].
” See K. Makin & J. Saunders, “Black Set to Give Up Canadian Citizenship” The Globe and Mail
(19 May 2001) Al; R. Fumess, ‘Black Suit vs. PM Iurfed by OCA” The Lawyers Weekly (1 June
2001) 8; “Lord Black of Crossharbour” The Globe and Mail (1 November 2001) Al. For this reason,
Black also has decided not to appeal the case further to the Supreme Court of Canada.
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plications of Black and situate this decision within a broader jurisprudence on the rule
of law in Canada.
I. Judicial Review and the Crown Prerogative
The very nature of a Crown prerogative is that it is discretionary. Dicey famously
described this common law set of powers as “the residue of discretionary or arbitrary
authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown”‘” The
Crown prerogative once constituted the central source of executive authority in Eng-
land and its colonial holdings. Today, it remains the source for a disparate set of ex-
ecutive powers, including foreign affairs (e.g. treaty-making and diplomatic appoint-
ments); defence and the armed forces (e.g. sending peacekeepers abroad); passports,
pardons, and the prerogative of mercy; the hiring and dismissal of certain public offi-
cials; honours and titles; copyright over government publications; the law of heraldry;
incorporating companies by royal charter; collecting tolls from bridges and ferries;
and the right to proclaim holidays.” This list is by no means exhaustive.
The scope of the Crown prerogative, over time, has been diminished. Since the
House of Lords’ landmark ruling in A.G. v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel,” it has been well
settled that the prerogative power of the Crown could be displaced by statute. Hogg
and Monahan set out six areas where the Crown prerogative power remains meaning-
ful: powers relating to the legislature; powers relating to foreign affairs; powers relat-
ing to the armed forces; appointments and honours; immunities and privileges; and
the emergency prerogative.’5
The Crown prerogative has always been part of the common law, and because it is
the function of the courts to declare what the law is, courts have accepted that judicial
review is an appropriate means by which to define the existence and scope of pre-
2 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmil-
lan, 1959) at 424. This definition was cited by Laskin J.A. in Black, supra note 2 at para. 25, in turn
citing the earlier adoption of this approach by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference as to the
Effect of the Exercise by his Excellency the Governor General of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy upon
Deportation Proceedings, [1933] S.C.R. 269, (sub norm Re Royal Prerogative of Mercy Upon De-
portation Proceedings) [1933] 2 D.L.R. 348. More recently, the idea of the prerogative power repre-
senting a “residue of miscellaneous powers” was accepted in Vancouver Island Peace Society v. Can-
ada, [1994] 1 FC. 102, 64 FT.R. 127 (T.D.), aff’d (1995), 16 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 24, 179 N.R. 106
(F.C.A.). See generally P.W. Hogg & PJ. Monahan, Liability of the Crown, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
2000); S. Payne, “The Royal Prerogative” in M. Sunkin & S. Payne, eds., The Nature of the Crown: A
Legal and Political Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 77.
” For a description of each of these prerogatives, see H. Olson & P Lordon, “Crown Prerogatives”
in P Lordon, ed., Crown Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at 61.
[1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.).
‘5 Hogg & Monahan, supra note 12 at 18-19.
2002]
L. SOSSIN – A COMMENT ON BLACK V. CHREFIEN
rogative powers.”‘ Reviewing the exercise of those powers, however, was another
story. Historically, these powers were understood as the unfettered terrain of the mon-
arch and outside the province of the courts. This doctrine has been described in the
following terms:
If it is claimed that the authority for the exercise of discretion derives from the
royal prerogative, the courts have traditionally limited review to questions of vi-
res in the narrowest sense of the term. They can determine whether the pre-
rogative power exists, what is its extent, whether it has been exercised in the
appropriate form and how far it has been superseded by statute; they have not
normally been prepared to examine the appropriateness or adequacy of the
grounds for exercising the power, or the fairness of the procedure followed be-
fore the power is exercised, and they will not allow bad faith to be attributed to
the Crown.17
This approach largely has been discarded in the United Kingdom through a series
of recent judgments which have held that the exercise of prerogative powers, includ-
ing those exercised by ministers, will be generally subject to judicial review (a con-
clusion based on the plausible premise that prerogative powers can be abused or mis-
used just as any other governmental authority).” Since the landmark ruling of the
House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service,”
courts in the United Kingdom have accepted that there is now no principled distinc-
tion that flows from whether the source of governmental authority is statutory or pre-
rogative in nature.
In the context of the prerogative of mercy, for example, courts have been willing
to intervene to hold that a decision on whether to grant mercy was invalid because the
minister failed to consider other forms of pardon.” In R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex
parte Smith, the Queen’s Bench Division reviewed a defence policy prohibiting gays
and lesbians from serving in the military’ The government argued that the defence of
the realm was a prerogative power. Brown L.J. held that the matter was justiciable and
concluded, “To my mind only the rarest cases will today be ruled strictly beyond the
” For an early confirmation of this approach, see Case of Proclamations (1611), 12 Co. Rep. 74,77
E.R. 1352 (K.B.). See also R. Brazier, “Constitutional Reform and the Crown” in Sunkin & Payne,
supra note 12, 337 at 359.
7 S.A. de Smith, de Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th ed. by J.M. Evans (Lon-
don: Stevens & Sons, 1980) at 286-87 [footnotes omitted].
” For a review of this case law, see B. Hadfield, “Judicial Review and the Prerogative Powers of the
Crown” in Sunldn & Payne, supra note 12, 197.
“[1985] 1 A.C. 374, [198413 All E.R. 935 (H.L.) [hereinafter Civil Service Unions cited to A.C.].
2 0See R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, exparte Bentley (1993), [1994] Q.B. 349,
[1993] 4 All E.R. 442.
21 [1995] 4 All E.R. 427 (Q.B.D.) [hereinafter Smith], aff’d (1995), [1996] Q.B. 517, [1996] 1 All
E.R. 257 (C.A.).
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[Vol. 47
court’s purview.”‘ As there were no national security interests at stake in Smith, the
court held that the challenge to the policy on human rights and irrationality grounds
could proceed.’ In Burmah Oil v. Lord Advocate, the House of Lords concluded that
the Crown was required to pay compensation to a party that had suffered damages as
a result of the exercise of a Crown prerogative.’
Until recently in Canada, however, the traditional approach held sway and the ex-
ercise of a Crown prerogative generally was held to be immune from judicial review.’
While the Canadian view was modified to accommodate judicial review of the exer-
cise of the prerogative power under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,”6
whether or not these powers are subject to judicial review on non-Charter grounds
remained an open and somewhat murky question.’
Laskin J.A. adopted a similar approach in Black, acknowledging that “[t]he court
has the responsibility to determine whether a prerogative power exists and, if so, its
scope and whether it has been superseded by statute “‘ Laskin J.A. found that the
prime minister’s communication was an exercise of the prerogative power related to
granting honours, and concluded:
In my view, in advising the Queen about the conferral of an honour on a Cana-
dian citizen, the Prime Minister was exercising his honours prerogative, a pre-
rogative power that is beyond the review of the courts.29
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the prime minister was in fact ex-
ercising the prerogative power relating to the conferral of honours seems open to
challenge. The prime minister has no authority over the Queen’s choice of whom to
nominate for a peerage, nor was the prime minister in fact expressing any opinion on
at 446.
2’Ibid.
21 bid.
[1965] A.C. 75 (H.L.).
See e.g. Re Doctors Hospital and Minister of Health (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 164, 68 D.L.R. (3d)
220 (Div. Ct.), Cory J.
26 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter Charter]. In Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 18 D.L.R. (4th)
481 [hereinafter Operation Dismantle cited to S.C.R.], the Supreme Court confirned that the exercise
of a prerogative power, such as a decision relating to foreign affairs, was subject to review for consis-
tency with the Charter.
In Operation Dismantle, ibid. at 471, Wilson J. highlighted the words of Lord Devlin in Chandler
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962] 3 All E.R. 142 at 159: “It is the duty of the courts to be as
alert now as they have always been to prevent abuse of the prerogative.”
2’ Black, supra note 2 at para. 29.
“‘ Ibid. at para. 5. It is worth noting that Laskin J.A. did not comment on whether the communica-
tion additionally was an exercise of the prerogative power over foreign affairs, as LeSage J. had held
in the court below.
2002]
L. SossIN-A COMMENT ON BLACK V. CHRETIEN
whether Black was a worthy nominee. Similarly, the conclusion of the motions judge
that the prime minister’s communication was an exercise of the prerogative relating to
foreign affairs seems to lack an air of reality. The communication in question in no
way related to Canadian-British affairs. Plainly, what the prime minister communi-
cated to the Queen was a legal opinion which had the intent and effect of barring
Conrad Black from eligibility for a peerage. There is no need to categorize this com-
munication abstractly. Any act of a prime minister in his or her official capacity that is
not authorized by statute and not ultra vires must by definition be authorized by an-
other kind of authority, whether a common law or a prerogative power of some kind.
The rationale for the Ontario Court of Appeal’s desire to attach the label of a particu-
lar prerogative power to the prime minister’s conduct in Black is analyzed below.
Certainly, the more significant aspect of the judgment from the perspective of Ca-
nadian public law is the affirmation that the exercise of Crown prerogative powers
properly may be the subject of judicial review on substantive grounds. Laskin J.A.
stated this bluntly: “I agree with Mr. Black that the source of the power-statute or
prerogative-should not determine whether the action complained of is reviewable.’
Subsequently, he expressly adopted the House of Lords’ expanded approach to re-
viewing the exercise of prerogative powers:
[The expanding scope of judicial review and of Crown liability make it no
longer tenable to hold that the exercise of a prerogative power is insulated from
judicial review merely because it is a prerogative and not a statutory power. The
preferable approach is that adopted by the House of Lords in the Civil Service
Unions case. There, the House of Lords emphasized that the controlling con-
sideration in determining whether the exercise of a prerogative power is judi-
cially reviewable is its subject matter, not its source. If, in the words of Lord
Roskill, the subject matter of the prerogative power is “amenable to the judicial
process”, it is reviewable; if not, it is not reviewable. Lord Roskill provided
content to this subject matter test of reviewability by explaining that the exer-
cise of the prerogative will be amenable to the judicial process if it affects the
rights of individuals.3′
Lord Roskill’s embrace of judicial review over the exercise of prerogative powers
in the United Kingdom, however, had some limitations. Lord Roskill saw the scope of
this review power as limited to contexts where an individual’s legal rights, obligations,
or legitimate expectations are affected by the exercise of a prerogative power. 2 In
o Ibi& at para. 44.
3 1Ibid at para. 47 [reference omitted].
32 Civil Service Unions, supra note 19 at 417:
If the executive in pursuance of the statutory power does an act affecting the rights of
the citizen, it is beyond question that in principle the manner of the exercise of that
power may today be challenged on one or more of the three grounds which I have
mentioned earlier in this speech. If the executive instead of acting under a statutory
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Black, Laskin J.A. adopts this limitation as well.3 Since Conrad Black had neither a
right to nor an expectation of receipt of a peerage, the court concluded that not even
the expanded scope for judicial review over the prerogative power applied in this case.
Specifically, Laskin J.A. adopted what he referred to as the “subject matter” test from
Lord Roskill’s reasons in Civil Service Unions, under which, Laskin J.A. explained, in
a somewhat circular fashion, that “[o]nly those exercises of the prerogative that are
justiciable are reviewable.”‘
In the passage from Civil Service Unions adopted in
Black, Lord Roskill stated:
Many examples were given during the argument of prerogative powers which
as at present advised I do not think could properly be made the subject of judi-
cial review. Prerogative powers such as those relating to the making of treaties,
the defence of the realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours, the
dissolution of Parliament, and the appointment of ministers as well as others
are not, I think, susceptible to judicial review because their nature and subject
matter are such as not to be amenable to the judicial process. The courts are
not the place wherein to determine whether a treaty should be concluded or the
armed forces disposed in a particular manner or Parliament dissolved on one
date rather than another.3
Laskin J.A. cited these remarks as support for his conclusion that the prerogative
of granting of honours, as a category of prerogative powers, cannot support a justici-
able, legal challenge.’ In my view, Laskin J.A. has misapprehended the meaning of
this passage. I do not believe Lord Roskill intended to categorize a set of powers that,
in and of themselves, were immune from judicial review because they did not affect
an individual’s rights, obligations, or legitimate expectations. Indeed, if this was his
intent, it seems odd to include the prerogative of mercy with the granting of honours.
An exercise of the prerogative of mercy typically will affect an individual’s rights, ob-
ligations, and legitimate expectations,3 as Laskin J.A. himself observed elsewhere in
power acts under a prerogative power and in particular a prerogative power delegated to
the respondent under article 4 of the Order in Council of 1982, so as to affect the rights
of the citizen, I am unable to see, subject to what I shall say later, that there is any logi-
cal reason why the fact that the source of the power is the prerogative and not statute
should today deprive the citizen of that right of challenge to the manner of its exercise
which he would possess were the source of the power statutory. In either case the act in
question is the act of the executive.
33Black, supra note 2 at para. 49.
Ibid. at para. 50.
3 Civil Service Unions, supra note 19 at 418 [emphasis added].
Black, supra note 2 at para. 58.
This point is echoed by Hadfield, supra note 18 at 217. Also, as mentioned above, U.K. courts
post-Civil Service Unions have accepted the justiciability of decisions relating to the prerogative of
mercy. See Smith, supra note 21.
2002]
L. SossIN – A COMMENT ON BLACK V. CHRtIIEN
445
his reasons.’ Rather, I believe Lord Roskill was making the point that where a public
decision calls for a delicate balance of competing policy, ideological, political, social,
moral, and historical concerns, judicial resolution may be inappropriate. Some pre-
rogative powers such as the granting of honours will often require such balancing.
The exercise of other prerogative powers, such as the granting of a passport, will
rarely involve such balancing. In Black, however, there was no delicate political or
moral decision-making at issue. It should be reiterated that the prime minister was not
deciding whether Black was worthy of an honour, but rather whether he was legally
entitled to the honour.” In this sense, the prime minister’s communication was no dif-
ferent than the communication of a transportation department official as to whether an
individual is legally entitled to a driver’s license. Why should one public official’s le-
gal opinion be reviewable while another public official’s legal opinion be immune
from judicial accountability?
The troubling aspect of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s reasoning is that it simply
exchanges one type of formalism for another. Now, the question is no longer “Is the
exercise of authority based on a Crown prerogative?” but rather “Is the exercise of
authority related to the conferral of honours?” For Laskin J.A., prerogative powers fall
into specific subject-matter categories (for example, the prerogative of honours, the
prerogative of foreign affairs), and these categories in turn fall along a spectrum of re-
viewability. In his reasons, he distinguished non-justiciable prerogative powers such
as the granting of honours from those prerogative powers at the other end of the spec-
trum, such as granting passports and, significantly, the prerogative of mercy, which he
observed are no longer viewed as “royal favours”, and would presumably give rise to
justiciable claims if exercised wrongfully.’
Black, supra note 2 at para. 55.
Whether the prime minister expressed a legal opinion, or merely expressed Canadian policy, is
open to interpretation. However, on a motion to strike a claim, all the facts as alleged must be ac-
cepted as true. Black alleged that the prime minister had informed the Queen that conferring a peer-
age on Black would represent a “contravention of Canadian law” (ibid. at para. 11). Laskin J.A. sub-
sequently characterized the distinction between expressing a law or a policy as missing “what this
case is about’ (ibid at para. 57). In that same passage, he stated that the prime minister was engaged
in advising the Queen about Canadian policy (ibid.).
Laskin J.A. explained this distinction with respect to the prerogative of mercy as follows:
Though on one view mercy begins where legal rights end, I think the prerogative of
mercy should be looked at as more than a royal favour. The existence of this preroga-
tive is the ultimate safeguard against mistakes in the criminal justice system and thus in
some cases the Government’s refusal to exercise it may be judicially reviewable. That
was the view taken by the English Queen’s Bench Division in Re Secretary of State for
the Home Department, Exp. Bentley. There, the court held that the Home Secretary’s
decision not to grant a posthumous conditional pardon was judicially reviewable.
1bid at para. 55 [reference omitted].
446
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Because Laskin J.A. adopted what he termed the “subject matter” approach, the
question of how to characterize the prime minister’s communication becomes cru-
cially important. In this regard, he concluded as follows:
Focusing on wrong legal advice or the improper interpretation of a policy
misses what this case is about. As I see it the action of Prime Minister Chrtien
complained of by Mr. Black is his giving advice to the Queen about the confer-
ral of an honour on a Canadian citizen. The Prime Minister communicated
Canada’s policy on honours to the Queen and advised her against conferring an
honour on Mr. Black. 4
This characterization of the prime minister’s action in Black is one-dimensional and
difficult to sustain. Whether the prime minister communicated Canada’s policy on
honours to the Queen, or legal advice to the Queen, he made what could be charac-
terized as an administrative decision pertaining to Mr. Black. 2
In Liability of the Crown, which was written before the Ontario Court of Appeal’s
decision, Hogg and Monahan make a similar point in criticizing LeSage J*’s dismissal
of Black’s claim on justiciability grounds. 3 They are highly skeptical of immunizing a
category of prerogative powers from judicial review (and emphasize that if the prime
minister’s actions had been taken pursuant to a statute, there would have been no sug-
gestion that those actions were not reviewable).4 In a variation of the Civil Service
Unions approach, a key distinction for Hogg and Monahan is whether the power exer-
cised relates to a particular, named individual. They view this distinction as analogous
to the scope of procedural fairness in administrative law, where the duty of fairness
will apply where the rights, interests, and privileges of a particular individual are af-
fected. Since the action in Black was targeted at a specific, named individual, Hogg
and Monahan conclude that it should have been considered justiciable.5
This approach, while overcoming the problem of formalism highlighted above,
sidesteps the problem of justiciability. There may be prerogative decisions (for exam-
ple, upon whom to bestow the Order of Canada) that are not matters capable of adju-
dication in a court even though they affect named individuals. The government may
consider a range of partisan, social, and cultural factors in selecting individuals to
honour that do not lend themselves to objective evidence or judicial resolution. On the
other hand, certain legislative or policy decisions (for example, the decision to adhere
4 Ibid. at para. 57.
4 1 It should be noted that the prime minister’s advice was not binding on the Queen, either in law or
convention. In practice, however, it would be hard to imagine circumstances in which the Queen
would confer an honour on a Canadian citizen where the prime minister had advised against her do-
ing so.
43Hogg & Monahan, supra note 12 at 19-21.
“Ibid. at20.
41 Ibid.
2002]
L. SOSSIN-A COMMENT ON BLACK V. CHR7IEN
447
to a particular international treaty) may be well documented and turn on judicially
cognizable questions of international and domestic law. Hogg and Monahan acknowl-
edge the importance of a case by case approach, concluding: “In short, it seems pref-
erable in each case to determine whether the particular issues raised in the litigation
are amenable to judicial review, rather than to apply a blanket immunity for any and
all exercises of the prerogative which fall within a particular category.” Therefore, it
is neither the source nor the target of government action that should determine justi-
ciability; rather, justiciability should turn solely on questions of legitimacy and capac-
ity of the courts to adjudicate a matter.
I. Justiciability and the Crown Prerogative
In Black, Laskin J.A. linked his understanding of the “subject-matter” of the pre-
rogative power (that is, which category or prerogative power it falls into) with the jus-
ticiability of the challenged government action:
At the core of the subject matter test is the notion of justiciability. The no-
tion of justiciability is concerned with the appropriateness of courts deciding a
particular issue, or instead deferring to other decision-making institutions like
Parliament. Only those exercises of the prerogative that are justiciable are re-
viewable. The court must decide “whether the question is purely political in
nature and should, therefore, be determined in another forum or whether it has a
sufficient legal component to warrant the intervention of the judicial branch”.
Under the test set out by the House of Lords, the exercise of the prerogative
will be justiciable, or amenable to the judicial process, if its subject matter af-
fects the rights or legitimate expectations of an individual. Where the rights or
legitimate expectations of an individual are affected, the court is both compe-
tent and qualified to judicially review the exercise of the prerogative.”
Justiciability is an elusive concept, but generally is held to refer both to the ca-
pacity and legitimacy of courts to undertake the adjudication of a matter.” There are
two germane questions before any court making a determination of justiciability.
First, can the matter be determined according to objective, judicially cognizable stan-
dards and evidence? Second, is the matter appropriate for adjudication given the con-
stitutional, political, and legal systems in Canada? In other words, does the court have
the capacity and legitimacy to decide the case?
The Ontario Court of Appeal, in adopting Lord Roskill’s finding in Civil Service
Unions that the source of governmental authority (whether based on prerogative or
4 Ibid.
“‘ Black, supra note 2 at paras. 50-51 [references omitted, emphasis added].
41 See generally L. Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada
(Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1999) at 1-26 [hereinafter Sossin, Boundaries].
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statute) should have no bearing on the question of judicial review, has resolved (in my
view, correctly) the question of legitimacy. The court has held that the exercise of a
prerogative power by the prime minister (or, presumably, by cabinet or by any indi-
vidual minister) is not a “purely political” question, and that judicial review over the
exercise of prerogative powers per se is not inappropriate. 9 This is in keeping with the
recent trend in the Supreme Court, summarized succinctly by Lamer C.J.C. in the Re
Provincial Judges Remuneration as follows: “[T]he exercise of all public power must
find its ultimate source in a legal rule.”‘ It follows that it is the duty of the courts to re-
solve claims that these legal rules have been violated.
It is problematic to suggest that some prerogative powers will give rise to justici-
able claims while others will not, just as it would be problematic to suggest that some
statutes give rise to justiciable rights and obligations but others are beyond the prov-
ince of the courts. It is important to emphasize here that if the government wishes to
immunize a public power from judicial review, it may attempt to do so through statu-
tory means. Privative clauses in statutes that authorize executive action have been up-
held as severely restricting the scope of judicial review.’ Further, if the government
wishes to subject a particular power to political rather than legal remedies, this also
may be accomplished through legislative means. In Canada (Auditor General) v.
Canada (Minister of Energy, Mines, and Resources),’ the Court declined to intervene
in a dispute between the auditor general and a minister over disclosure of documents
because the statute empowering the auditor general contained a reporting requirement
in response to non-compliance. In other words, since a mechanism was put in the
statute for resolving (or at least airing) disputes, the Court held that it would be inap-
propriate to intervene.
While Canadian courts have yet to embrace a formal “political questions” doc-
trine of the kind that characterizes the American constitutional jurisprudence,” they
, Even if the exercise of some prerogative powers has political dimensions, the Supreme Court held
that it is incumbent on courts to disentangle the legal from the political dimensions of such decisions,
and proceed to adjudicate the legal aspects where possible. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [19981
2 S.C.R. 217 at paras. 26-28, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Secession Reference].
o [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at par. 10, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577.
” Statutes cannot, however, entirely preclude judicial review of executive action. As a constitutional
standard, review will always remain for executive authority taken without jurisdiction, or for executive
action that is patently unreasonable. See Crevier v. Quebec (A.G.), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220, 127 D.L.R.
(3d) 1.
52 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 49, 97 N.R. 241.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 at 208-37, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962). The origin of the “political
questions” doctrine is the U.S. Constitution, which provides, inter alia, “The judicial Power shall ex-
tend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution …; to Controversies …” (U.S.
Const. art. III, 2, cl. 1). This has been interpreted as limiting the power of judicial review in the U.S.
to “cases and controversies”, which exclude, for example, reference questions posed by the executive.
2002]
L. SosslN – A COMMENT ON BLACK V. CHRTIEN
have found disputes non-justiciable that raise a purely political matter, or that impugn
the wisdom of government action, or for which Parliament has provided, by statute, a
political rather than legal remedy.’ None of these are applicable to the Black case. Be-
cause the effect of Black is to allege an abuse of process on the part of the prime min-
ister, this raises a prima facie legal issue. As Wilson J. affirmed in Operation Disman-
tle, once a legal issue is raised, the courts have no discretion to decline to adjudicate
the matter simply because it also happens to raise issues of political sensitivity.5
Once the question of appropriateness has been resolved, the focus of the justi-
ciability analysis turns to the capacity of the court to adjudicate the particular matter
before it. Canadian courts have held that where a matter is hypothetical, abstract,
premature, moot, of a purely political, spiritual or moral matter, or not susceptible to
proof, the judicial process lacks the capacity to resolve the matter’ The action at issue
in Black would appear to be a matter for which a court would have sufficient capacity
to determine. The evidence that Mr. Black sought to proffer was not of a kind unsus-
ceptible to proof or incapable of being weighed by the court. Indeed, much of the
factual evidence is uncontested. The prime minister did not dispute providing the legal
advice to the Queen regarding Black’s nomination. The correctness of that legal ad-
vice, and the prime minister’s motivations for offering it, are not beyond judicial un-
derstanding or expertise; indeed, the contrary appears to be the case.
According to Black’s account of the facts, which must be accepted as true for the
purposes of the motion to dismiss the claim based on the pleadings alone, the prime
minister chose to intercede in an effort to exact retribution against Conrad Black for
his Southam newspapers’ coverage of the prime minister. This is a serious allegation
of abuse of power. As to whether Black’s evidence could bear out his claims if tested
at trial, this is another question, and one which now is unlikely ever to be resolved.’
Judicial review is also excluded where a non-judicial forum is provided by the Constitution for the
resolution of disputes, such as the power given to the Senate to adjudicate impeachment claims. See
Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
54See Sossin, Boundaries, supra note 48, c. 4.
” Operation Dismantle, supra note 26 at 472. Wilson J. was referring to the review of prerogative
powers under the Charter, but there is no principled reason to adopt a different view to claims which
go to the heart of the rule of law, as discussed in more detail below.
” It was on these grounds that the claim in Operation Dismantle was dismissed. In that case, prov-
ing the claim against the government would have required evidence that Canada had become a more
likely target for nuclear destruction by the Soviet Union as a result of permitting the U.S. to test cruise
missiles on Canadian soil. For further discussion, see Sossin, Boundaries, supra note 48 at 48-55.
” While much of the damaging evidence consisted of remarks made during private conversations
between Black and Chr6tien, which cannot be corroborated, the prime minister’s eleventh-hour inter-
vention, reversing Canada’s stated position on Black’s nomination, is suspicious. Black’s allegation
that the Nickle Resolution was a mere pretext for an ulterior agenda is at least credible. As Black
pointed out in his facturn, the Nickle Resolution applied only to persons resident or domiciled in Can-
ada, which Black was not. Further, according to Black’s claim, this resolution has been routinely ig-
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Rather than consider the issue of the court’s capacity in the context of the particular
facts and circumstances of the case, the Court of Appeal in Black simply emphasized
the discretion implicit in the prime minister’s prerogative authority. Laskin J.A. as-
serted that “[e]ven if the advice was wrong or careless or negligent, even if his mo-
tives were questionable, they cannot be challenged by judicial review.'”8 In my view,
the Ontario Court of Appeal has used the doctrine of justiciability in an undesirably
formalistic fashion, so as to remove a significant sphere of executive action from the
reach of the rule of law. In the following section, I consider the implications of this
holding for the rule of law, and for its cardinal principle that no discretion is absolute.
III. The Implications of Black and the Rule of Law
The rule of law is a contested notion.59 In the Secession Reference, the Court de-
scribed the importance of the rule of law in the following terms:
The principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law lie at the root of our
system of government. The rule of law, as observed in Roncarelli v. Duplessis
is “a fundamental postulate of our constitutional structure”. As we noted in the
Patriation Reference, “[t]he ‘rule of law’ is a highly textured expression, im-
porting many things which are beyond the need of these reasons to explore but
conveying, for example, a sense of orderliness, of subjection to known legal
rules and of executive accountability to legal authority”. At its most basic level,
the rule of law vouchsafes to the citizens and residents of the country a stable,
predictable and ordered society in which to conduct their affairs. It provides a
shield for individuals from arbitrary state action.’
Following Roncarelli v. Duplessis, the rule of law has come to embrace the prin-
ciple that no discretion is “untrammelled”.6′ No matter how wide a grant of statutory
authority (or how broad a prerogative power), all government decision-making must
conform to certain basic tenets, such as being rendered in good faith and not for ulte-
rior or improper motives.
nored in numerous instances over the years, including the cases of Sir Conrad Swan and Sir Neil
Shaw, who had received titles during the tenure of Chr6tien’s government. Whatever one makes of the
Nickle Resolution, it does not appear to constitute an enforceable, legal barrier to a Canadian citizen’s
nomination for a titular honour. See plaintiff’s Amended Statement of Claim, Black v. Jean Chritien
and the Attorney General for Canada, Court File No. C33887 at para. 16.
58Black, supra note 2 at para. 65.
For recent appraisals, see A. Hutchinson, “The Rule of Law Revisited: Democracy and Courts” in
D. Dyzenhaus, ed., Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Oxford: Hart, 1999) 196;
J. Jowell, Q.C., “Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review” [2000] Pub. L.
671; T.R.S. Allen, “The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason: Consent and Constitutionalism” (1999)
115 L.Q. Rev. 221.
60 Supra note 49 at par. 70 [references omitted].
61 [1959] S.C.R. 121 at 140, 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689 [hereinafter Roncarelli cited to S.C.R.].
2002]
L. SOSSIN-A COMMENT ON BLACK V. CHRETIEN
The rule of law has little meaning if it cannot be meaningfully enforced. Is there a
principled basis on which to say that certain categories of executive action should be
entirely immune from judicial review for breach of the rule of law? While justiciabil-
ity concerns will sometimes render specific decisions inappropriate for adjudication
(that is, courts may lack the legitimacy or capacity to adjudicate them), this must be
considered on a case by case rather than a categorical basis. As a general point, I
would contend that any allegation of a breach of the rule of law by the prime minister
in the exercise of an executive power (whether statutory or prerogative in origin)
raises a prima facie justiciable claim. As Professor Wade stated:
The powers of public authorities are … essentially different from those of pri-
vate persons. A man making his will may, subject to any rights of his depend-
ants, dispose of his property just as he may wish. […] This is unfettered discre-
tion. But a public authority may do none of these things unless it acts reasona-
bly and in good faith and upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest…
The whole conception of unfettered discretion is inappropriate to a public
authority, which possesses powers solely in order that it may use them for the
public good.6
A similar notion has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Roncarelli,3
and elevated in the Secession Reference to the status of part of Canada’s unwritten
constitution.’ Nonetheless, as several observers have emphasized, notwithstanding the
Roncarelli case and a handful of others, the rule of law has rarely been the basis for a
judicial remedy in Canada.’ Indeed, the post-Roncarelli Supreme Court of Canada
62 W. Wade, Administrative Law, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) at 399-400,
cited with approval by Laws J. in R. v. Somerset County Council, exparte Fewings, [1995] 1 All E.R.
513 at 524.
0 In Roncarelli, supra note 61 at 140, Rand J. stated: “there is no such thing as absolute and un-
trammelled ‘discretion’, that is that action can be taken on any ground or for any reason that can be
suggested to the mind of the administrator” This principle has been affirmed by the Supreme Court
on many occasions, most recently in Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and
Social Services), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281 at para. 16,200 D.L.R. (4th) 193,2001 SCC 41.
Supra note 49. See also Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at 748-50,
19 D.L.R. (4th) 1, in which the Supreme Court held that the rule of law had constitutional status by
virtue of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 186Z
6 In Roncarelli, supra note 61, Premier Duplessis of Quebec, acting through the Manager of the
Liquor Commission, revoked the liquor license of a tavern owner who had been actively supporting
Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Supreme Court quashed the revocation based on the premier’s disregard for
the rule of law. For examples of applications of Roncarelli in civil cases, see Gershman v. Manitoba
Vegetable Producers’Marketing Board (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 114, [1976] 4 W.W.R. 406 (Man.
C.A.); Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply & Services) v. Nilsson (1999), 246 A.R. 201, [1999]
9 WAV.R. 203 (Q.B.), leave to appeal granted (1999), 181 D.L.R. (4th) 380 (Alta. C.A.).
66See H.W. Arthurs, “‘Mechanical Arts and Merchandise’: Canadian Public Administration in the
New Economy” (1997) 42 McGill LJ. 29 at 49, n. 31; D. Mullan, “The Role of the Judiciary in the
Review of Administrative Policy Decisions: Issues of Legality” in MJ. Mossman & G. Otis, eds., The
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[Vol. 47
case law has made it less likely, from a practical perspective, that the rule of law will
provide a meaningful restraint on government action in the future.
In Thorne’s Hardware v. Canada,’ a case cited by Laskin J.A. as authority for the
non-justiciability of the prime minister’s action in Black, a federal Order in Council
that altered the boundaries of the port of St. John was challenged. The applicant
claimed that the cabinet decision had been motivated by the ulterior and improper
purpose of expanding the revenue base of the National Harbours Board. While con-
ceding that there could be review in “an egregious case” of the cabinet’s failing to ob-
serve jurisdictional limits or “other compelling grounds”, ‘ Dickson J. (as he was
then), writing for the Court, held that “[d]ecisions made by the Governor in Council
in matters of public convenience and general policy are final and not reviewable in le-
gal proceedings.”‘9 Dickson J. was unwilling even to review the evidence that alleged
that the cabinet had acted in bad faith, contrary to the rule of law. He found that it was
“neither our duty nor our right to investigate the motives which impelled the federal
Cabinet to pass the Order in Council”‘ and observed that “governments may be
moved by any number of political, economic, social or partisan considerations.”‘”
Somewhat ironically, Dickson J. was prepared to examine the evidence to “show that
the issue of harbour extension was one of economic policy and politics; and not one
of jurisdiction or jurisprudence.” ‘
In Consortium Developments (Clearwater) Ltd. v. Sarnia (City of),”3 the Supreme
Court applied the Thorne’s Hardware principle in the context of a municipal corpora-
tion’s appointment of a board of inquiry under Ontario’s municipal legislation. Writ-
ing for the Court, Binnie J. held that the applicants had no right to examine municipal
councillors with a view to establishing that they had improper motives in voting for
the creation of a board of inquiry, holding that the “motives of a legislative body com-
posed of numerous individuals are ‘unknowable’ except by what it enacts” 4 As David
Mullan observed in his analysis of Consortium Developments,
In other words, provided there are no jurisdictional infirmities on the face of the
text of the resolution appointing the board of inquiry, it may not matter whether
all of the councillors acted on the basis of the most outrageous motivations or,
put more accurately, it is not for the courts to assist the applicant in any way in
Judiciary as Third Branch of Government: Manifestations and Challenges to Legitimacy (Montreal:
Th6mis, 2000) 313 at 321.
6 [1983] 1 S.C.R. 106, 143 D.L.R. (3d) 577 [hereinafter Thorne’s Hardware cited to S.C.R.].
“‘Ibid. at 111.
61 Ibid.
“Ibid. at 112.
Ibid. at 112-13.
“Ibidl at 115.
71 [1998] 3 S.C.R. 3, 165 D.L.R. (4th) 25 [hereinafter Consortium Developments].
‘4 Ibid at para. 45.
2002]
L. SOSSIN-A COMMENT ON BLACK V. CHR”IEN
453
an attempt to build an evidential record establishing that that was the case. Only
if the information is volunteered explicitly and that information goes as far as
establishing that all members of council voting for the resolution were acting in
“bad faith” will there be any possibility of success on an application to enjoin
the continuation of such an inquiry or, presumably, any other form of legislative
or executive action. 5
Also in 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the case of Wells v. New-
foundland.7 Wells was a controversial consumer representative member of the New-
foundland Public Utilities Board, whose position was eliminated under the terms of a
statutory restructuring of the board. His litigation concerned whether he was entitled to
compensation for this constructive dismissal (at the time, Wells was six months short of
having his pension vest). Writing for the Court, Major J. concluded that, while Wells’
position could be terminated by statute, absent express statutory provisions to the con-
trary, contract law and contract remedies governed the employment relationship. Conse-
quently, as the Crown was in breach of its contract with Wells, he was entitled to com-
pensation by way of damages. Major J. framed the issue of the obligation upon govern-
ments to respect the rights of individuals in the following terms:
In a nation governed by the rule of law, we assume that the government will
honour its obligations unless it explicitly exercises its power not to. In the ab-
sence of a clear express intent to abrogate rights and obligations-rights of the
highest importance to the individual–those rights remain in force. To argue the
opposite is to say that the government is bound only by its whim, not its word.
In Canada this is unacceptable, and does not accord with the nation’s under-
standing of the relationship between the state and its citizens.’
In the spirit of this comment, Major J. discussed, in obiter, whether the rule of law
could apply to legislative action, which in this case might have entitled Wells to an
administrative law remedy in addition to civil damages. Brushing aside “anecdotal”
suggestions that the statutory restructuring was specifically intended to remove Wells
from the Board, Major J. found no “evidence” of bad faith and on this basis, distin-
guished Wells from Roncarelli.*” What Major J. could have stated but chose not to, is
simply that the principle in Roncarelli had no application in the legislative context.”
75 Mullan, supra note 66 at 327 [emphasis added]. I also drew this conclusion in L. Sossin, “Devel-
opments in Administrative Law: The 1997-98 and 1998-99 Terms” (2000) 11 Supreme Court L.R.
(2d) 37 at 87-88.
76 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 73 [hereinafter Wells].
]bid at para. 46.
79Ibid at para. 58.
” Major J. did reafirm that the duty of procedural fairness has no application to the legislative
realm (ibid at 222 [references omitted]):
Both the decision to restructure the Board, and the subsequent decision not to re-
appoint the respondent, were bonafide decisions. The decision to restructure the Board
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As I have suggested elsewhere,’ Major J. appeared to imply in Wells that if the evi-
dence had established that “personal animus” motivated the enactment of the statute at
issue, it could have been nullified as a breach of the rule of law and therefore ultra vi-
res legitimate legislative power.8′
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Charter should not provide a right
that has no remedy.’ There is no reason that this same principle should not apply to
the rule of law doctrine in Canada’s unwritten constitution as well. 3 The Supreme
Court’s decisions in Thorne’s Hardware and Consortium Developments appear at
odds with this principle. While these decisions admittedly leave open a remedy for
egregious violations in circumstances where executive officials publicly announce that
they have acted in bad faith, the Court has removed most potential abuses of power
from any judicial remedy.
The Ontario Court of Appeal in Black appears to have confirmed that the prime
minister, in exercising the Crown prerogative relating to the granting of honours, has
absolute discretion (although presumably subject, following Operation Dismantle, to
judicial scrutiny under the Charter). This means that even if the prime minister’s
communication had been made in bad faith, it could not give rise to a judicial remedy.
was deliberated and enacted by the elected legislature of the Province of Newfound-
land. This is fatal to the respondent’s argument on bad faith, as legislative decision
making is not subject to any known duty of fairness. Legislatures are subject to consti-
tutional requirements for valid law-making, but within their constitutional boundaries,
they can do as they see fit. The wisdom and value of legislative decisions are subject
only to review by the electorate. The judgment in Reference re Canada Assistance Plan
was conclusive on this point in stating that: “the rules governing procedural fairness do
not apply to a body exercising purely legislative functions”.
L. Sossin, “Developments in Administrative Law: The 1999-2000 Term” (2000) 13 Supreme
Court L.R. (2d) 45 at 67.
“I For an intriguing example of this approach, see Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp.,
[1997] 9 W.W.R. 258, 157 Sask. R. 199 (Q.B.) (holding that a legislative scheme that was “arbitrary”
could offend the rule of law although the agriculture scheme at issue in the case could not be so char-
acterized), aff’d [1999] 11 W.W.R. 51, 157 Sask. R. 199 (C.A.) (upholding the trial judge’s finding
that the legislation was valid, but expressly reversing the trial judge’s reasoning on the rule of law is-
sue).8 2 See e.g. Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 at para. 50, 69 O.R. (2d) 448, Lamer J. (as he was
then).
83 It is clear, however, that some aspects of the constitution, such as constitutional conventions, only
provide for declaratory legal remedies, not substantive ones. See the Reference re Resolution to
Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, (sub nom Reference re Amendment of the Constitution
of Canada) 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1. On the renewed emphasis in Canada on the unwritten constitution, see
M. Walters, “The Common Law Constitution of Canada: Return of Lex non Scripta as Fundamental
Law” (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 91; D. Dyzenhaus, “Baker and the ‘Unwritten’ Constitution” (2001) [un-
published, archived at McGill Law Journal].
2002]
L. SossIN-A COMMENT ON BLACK V. CHRtIEN
Even if the prime minister, in communicating Canadian policy regarding honours to
the Queen, had simply made up a legal rule that did not exist at all, no legal conse-
quences would follow. While it is difficult to generate heartfelt sympathy for Black’s
plight, the target of a prerogative power could as easily have been a more vulnerable
individual, and the basis for intervention could as easily have been that individual’s
ethnic, ideological, or social affiliations. To allow such abuses of power to remain
immune from judicial scrutiny appears on its face to eviscerate the supremacy of the
rule of law. Can Roncarelli and Black be reconciled?
Some have pointed to the fact that Roncarelli involved the revocation of a license,
an administrative decision toward the judicial end of the decision-making spectrum,
and thus attracts closer scrutiny than discretionary decisions at the legislative or policy
end.’ Once again, however, this approach tempts a return to formalism. The duty of
fairness no longer turns on the categorization of a particular decision (unless, that is, it
is a truly legislative decision to which no duty of fairness applies). Resurrecting such
distinctions to justify immunizing certain governmental decisions from the reach of
the rule of law is unjustified and potentially dangerous. An alternative approach
would be to impose greater scrutiny on government decisions based on the authority
vested in, and integrity expected of, the decision-maker. On this basis, where a pre-
mier and attorney general (as in Roncarelli) or a prime minister (as in Black) has his
or her actions challenged, a higher standard is appropriate.
The better view is to err on the side of allowing rule of law claims to go forward.
While Black’s claim was framed in abuse of power, and sought damages rather than
an administrative law remedy against arbitrary action, the principle at stake is analo-
gous. It will be rare where evidence can be proffered that demonstrates decision-
makers acted in bad faith, or for ulterior or arbitrary motives. Roncarelli, where Pre-
mier Duplessis testified as to his ulterior motives, was surely exceptional in this re-
gard.” Other claimants, however, must be permitted to gather evidence to make their
case. In Consortium Developments, this may well have meant compelling municipal
councillors to testify, but limiting the questions they could be asked, or the use that
could be made of the answers. The judicial regulation of discovery, however, can
mitigate the potential for abuse or malicious civil suits. Fishing expeditions and open-
ended attempts to harass governments can be filtered out.
As indicated above, it is unclear whether the facts as alleged by Black in this case
could have been proven. What is clear, at least to me, is that the doctrine of justi-
ciability should not be used as a shield to protect executive officials from the reach of
the rule of law. This is equally important in claims raising the tort of abuse of process
against a public official. As the Ontario Court of Appeal itself pointed out in Odhavji
‘ See Mullan, supra note 66 at 324.
“Supra note 61 at 134-37.
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Estate v. Woodhouse,’ the concern for the rule of law lies at the core of the tort of
misfeasance in public officeY
In Black, Laskin J.A. is certainly correct that no Canadian has an entitlement to an
honour, and that the interest at stake in this decision was trivial at best (except, of
course, to Mr. Black).’ I would argue, however, that the court’s vigilance regarding
alleged breaches of the rule of law should not depend on the gravity of a particular
decision.
Conclusion
Any arbitrary decision for which a public official cannot be held accountable rep-
resents an important erosion of some of the most basic and fundamental tenets of our
legal and political systems. Where such a decision emanates from the prime minister,
careful scrutiny is justified. There is no clear basis in an enlightened, constitutional
monarchy for “royal favours” of any kind, and certainly no justification to insulate
such favours from judicial accountability. Any alleged breach of the rule of law raises
an important and justiciable legal issue (subject to the concerns outlined above re-
garding judicially cognizable standards).
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Black has significantly diminished the
vestiges of monarchial power in Canada. By the same token, however, the court has
given its imprimatur to the untrammelled discretion of the prime minister in exercis-
ing certain Crown prerogatives, such as the granting of honours. For these reasons,
Black represents both one important step forward, and one disturbing step back, on
the road to reconciling the exercise of prerogative powers with the rule of law.
‘6 (2000), 52 O.R. (3d) 181 at para. 22, 194 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
granted 7 September 2001.
87 Borins J.A., writing for the majority, adopted the following remarks of Lord Steyn in Three Rivers
District Council v. Bank of England (No. 3), [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1220 at 1230 (H.L.): “The rationale of
the tort is that in a legal system based on the rule of law executive or administrative power ‘may be
exercised only for the public good’ and not for ulterior and improper purposes.”
8 Black, supra note 2 at para. 62.
