Human Rights Perspectives on the Arms Race
Amynmohamed B. Sajoo*
The International Bill of Human Rights
enunciates norms placing upon governments
the political and legal responsibility to pro-
mote minimum standards of freedom, secur-
ity and material comfort. The author argues
that many governments have failed to meet
this solemn responsibility, in part because of
the massive diversion of material and human
resources to the pursuit of enhanced military
power. There is an intrinsic incompatibility
between the goals of human rights protection
and the arms race, an incompatibility which,
strangely, has been neglected by most
academics as well as the media. After re-
viewing briefly the nature of the present arms
race and consequent violation of internation-
al human rights norms, the author suggests a
reorientation of non-proliferation policy. He
concludes that only the exertion of sustained
political pressure by national populations
will persuade governments to seek alterna-
tives to the present system of international
relations, a system which desecrates basic
humanitarian norms.
La Charte internationale des droits de
l’homme prescrit des normes imposant aux
gouvernements une responsabilit6 16gale et
politique de promouvoir des standards mini-
ma de libert6, de srcurit6 et de confort mat-
riel. Selon l’auteur, plusieurs gouverne-
ments n’ont pas su remplir cette solennelle
responsabilit6, en partie A cause du ddtourne-
ment important de ressources humaines et
matrrielles dans ]a poursuite du pouvoir mi-
litaire accru. II y a incompatibilitd intrins6-
que entre les buts de ]a protection des droits
de l’homme et la course aux armements,
incompatibilit6 qui, 6trangement, est rest6e
ngligde par ]a majorit6 des auteurs et par les
media. Apras une brave revue de ]a course
aux armements contemporaine et de la viola-
tion des normes internationales des droits de
rhomme qui en drcoule, l’auteur suggre
une rdorientation de ]a politique de non-
prolifrration. II conclut que seule une pres-
sion politique soutenue de la part des popula-
tions nationales saura persuader les gouver-
nements A chercher des alternatives au sys-
tame de relations internationales existant, un
syst~me qui souille les normes humanitaires
fondamentales.
Synopsis
Introduction
I.
11.
The Nature of the Arms Race: Of Guns and Butter
The Violation of International Norms of Human Rights
A. Civil and Political Human Rights
B. Economic and Social Human Rights
*D.C.L. candidate, Faculty of Law, McGill University.
1983)
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
M. Asserting Human Rights Priorities: From Norms to Imperatives
A. Human Rights and Non-Proliferation Policy
B. Public Opinion and Human Rights Activism
Conclusion
On the day when crime dons the apparel of innocence –
peculiar to our times –
it is innocence that is called upon to justify itself.
through a curious transposition
– Albert Camus
Introduction
In a recent letter sent on behalf of the Reagan Administration to the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on War and Peace,
National Security Adviser William Clark maintained that:
our decisions on nuclear armaments, and our defense posture are guided by moral
considerations as compelling as any which have faced mankind. The strategy of deter-
rence on which our policies are based is not an end in itself but a means to prevent war and
preserve the values we cherish: individual liberty,… respect for the sanctity of human life
and the rule of law through representative institutions.’
The vortex of competitive militarization has absorbed steadily a growing
number of states, wealthy and poor, into a world in which preparedness for
mass destruction is deemed a guarantee of human freedoms. In the name of
“national security”, many governments undermine the political, social and
economic foundations of their own countries –
and some barely possess such
foundations –
as they wrestle with those who supposedly threaten their
sovereignty. If “compelling” moral considerations have persuaded govern-
ments to adopt strategies of deterrence and counterforce, nuclear warfare may
even be justified as a moral imperative. Such is the logic of the arms race.
This study is intended to call attention to an area of the international law
of human rights inexplicably neglected by academics and the media, though
understandably ignored by most politicians. On the assumption that the
intrinsic incompatibility between the goal of human rights protection and the
arms race is too obvious to be overlooked, the absence of commentaries on the
subject in leading law journals and in otherwise comprehensive texts on
I The Rebel [:] An Essay on Man in Revolt (New York: Knopf, 1956) 4.
2Text of Administration’s Letter to U.S. Catholic Bishops on Nuclear Policies, The New
York Times (17 November 1982) B 4.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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human rights is a serious omission.3 It should be pointed out that this
relationship is properly distinguished from the body of humanitarian law
concerned with standards in the actual conduct of war. The premise is that
human rights advocacy must find a voice in efforts to avert the potential
disaster threatened by ascending levels of militarization, not least in challeng-
ing the erosion of those rights that has occured even without a conflagration.
An exhaustive analysis of the relationship between the arms race and human
rights violations would demand empirical and other research beyond the
scope of this paper. Rather, the focus here is upon the cardinal elements of the
relationship, which, in turn, suggest the areas in need of detailed exploration.
International human rights norms, particularly as set forth in The Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights, 4 place upon governments the political and
legal responsibility of ensuring the implementation of minimum standards of
freedom, security and material comfort, and a duty constantly to improve
those standards. In addition, numerous resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly have drawn the attention of states to the incompatibility of
the arms race –
in its conventional and nuclear aspects alike – with human
rights norms.5 The failure to discharge these fundamental duties calls into
question the commitment of many governments both to principles of interna-
tional law and to national well-being. Populations that endorse the continua-
tion of such governmental policies share in the moral responsibility for
resulting violations.
-In their recent, authoritative treatise, M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, Human
Rights and World Public Order [:] The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human
Dignity (1980) 236, the authors make passing reference to the relationship-in the context of
the defence of human rights through the legitimate use of force. More generally, at 33, 42 and
433, the authors decry massive military spending, but their analysis is not developed further.
‘Encompassing the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, United Nations G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in (1967) 6 I.L.M. 368; the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, United Nations G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in (1967) 6 I.L.M. 360; and, to a lesser
degree, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
United Nations G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), reprinted in (1967) 6 I.L.M. 383.
-See, e.g., the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, United Nations G.A. Res.
3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (referring to the link
between disarmament and socio-economic development); Resolution on Effective Measures to
Implement the Purposes and Objectives of the Disarmament Decade, United Nations G.A.
Res. 31/68, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 34, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976) (deploring the
meagre achievements of the Disarmament Decade and calling upon member-states to put their
human and material resources to better use); and Resolution on Effective Measures to Imple-
ment the Purposes and Objectives of the Disarmament Decade, United Nations G.A. Res.
32/80, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 47, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977) (reiterating the
concerns expressed in Resolution 31/68).
1983]
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
The first Part of this paper outlines some of the relevant factual back-
ground in surveying the implications of the arms race, demonstrating its
derogation from the political and economic health of nations. In the second
and third Parts, the interaction of military policies and human rights norms is
analysed, and suggestions made for policy objectives and public action which
would reinforce human rights principles in their confrontation with the arms
race.
I.
The Nature of the Arms Race: Of Guns and Butter
The fact that world military expenditures in 1981 amounted to U.S.
$518.7 billion,6 or that global nuclear arsenals contain the equivalent of three
tons of TNT for every inhabitant on earth, appears in an age of information
saturation as just another statistic. So does the World Bank’s estimate that 780
million people live in absolute poverty in the Third World. 7 Yet no cogent
alternative to assessing the meaning of numerical data in terms other than
futher numerical data is discernible. Conventional statistical juxtapositions
do offer, nevertheless, some perspective on the opportunity cost of contem-
porary military expenditures. In 1977, the world’s industrialized countries
spent an average of 5.6 per cent of Gross National Product on defence, and a
meagre 0.33 per cent on foreign assistance. Indeed, the world’s developing
countries expended 5.9 per cent of GNP on defence, and 1.0 per cent on
health.8 Still more poignantly, the World Health Organization’s campaign to
eradicate smallpox cost U.S. $83 million over a period of ten years –
considerably less than the price of a single B-1 strategic bomber.’ The
campaign against malaria, a disabling disease afflicting millions in develop-
ing countries, is faltering through inadequate funding. The required amount
of U.S. $450 million is but 33 per cent of the price of a Trident nuclear
submarine.'”
In terms of vital natural resources consumed by expanding military
establishments, the United Nations has calculated that 5 to 6 per cent of global
petroleum demand in the midst of the energy crisis was diverted to national
6At 1979 prices and exchange rates. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
[SIPRI], Yearbook 1982 [:] World Armaments and Disarmament (1982), Appendix 5b, 140
[hereinafter SIPRI Yearbook 1982]
7The World Bank, World Development Report, 1980 (1980) 33.
8Ibid., 29.
9 See United Nations, Economic and social consequences of the arms race and of miltary
expenditures, U.N. Doc. A/32/88/Rev. 1, para. 66 (an updated Report of the Secretary-
General).
“Ibid.
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defence;” the figure is currently higher. Land use for artillery and bombing
ranges, nuclear weapons test areas and training grounds is a growing usurpa-
tion of a limited resource, as is the absorption of 25 per cent of the world’s
highly qualified scientists and engineers into military research during the
1970s 12 –
a trend accentuated in the 1980s. It has been calculated that the
average Western military product is twenty times as research-intensive as its
civilian counterpart. 3 Arguments with regard to the civilian spin-off from
military research and development appear unconvincing in view of the de-
monstrably superior returns which result from direct civilian activity. 4 Such
spin-offs provide, at best, incidental benefits and can scarcely justify invest-
ing society’s most advanced scientific resources in the pursuit of enhanced
military might. The ends, quite simply, condemn the means.
Appendix 1 illustrates the gravity of the socio-economic conditions
which presently beset the Third World. Six of the selected countries feature
on the World Bank’s list of the world’s poorest nations. 5 Possessing an
average literacy rate of 37 per cent, and an average life expectancy of
forty-six years, the six persist in expending as much on defence as on
education, and significantly more than on health. The Middle East remains
the dominant Third World armoury, with Israel and Syria devoting several
times as much to defence as to education and health.
The picture for the industrial world is no less an indictment of gov-
ernmental policies. Most NATO and Warsaw Pact member-states evince
predictably distorted social priorities in dedicating between 12.1 and 24.7 per
cent of central government expenditure to defence – Canada, Denmark and
Belgium being exceptions on the lower end and the U.S.S.R. on the higher
end of the scale. As already mentioned, the ratio of defence expenditure to
development assistance is extraodinarily high. Economic recession is cited
frequently as a justification by industrialized nations for the diminishing rate
of Overseas Development Assistance [ODA], representing another instance
of misplaced priorities when compared to the current rate of increase in
military expenditures.
“United Nations, The Relationship between Disarmament and Development [:1 Report of
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/36/356 (1982), para. 140, reprinted as United Nations,
Disarmament Study Series No. 5 (1982) [hereinafter Disarmament and Development].
2 See supra, note 9, para. 67. In Disarmament and Development, ibid., para. 191, the
Group of Experts was slightly more conservative, placing the absorption of scientific research
personnel into the military structure at roughly twenty per cent.
“3SIPRI, Yearbook 1981 [:] World Armaments and Disarmament (1981) 7 [hereinafter
SIPRI Yearbook 1981]. Furthermore, the extent of wastage in research and development efforts
within the context of military procurement has been monumental, at least in the United States.
See The Winds of Reform, Time [Magazine] (7 March 1983) 10-24.
‘See supra, note 11, paras 188-91.
“5 World Bank, World Development Report, 1982 (1982) 110.
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HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
The foregoing review illustrates what SIPRI describes as “the other side
of the weapon coin: that, even if the arms are not ultimately used in war, they
‘kill’ indirectly by diverting scarce economic resources from basic develop-
ment needs such as nutrition, medical care, housing and education.” ‘6 But, of
course, weapons continue to kill directly as well. Since 1945, approximately
133 armed conflicts have been fought, almost exclusively in the Third World,
and with a few exceptions, the weapons have been supplied by the industrial-
ized nations.” The Third World share of total arms imports for the period
1979-81 was approximately 62 per cent, of which the Middle East accounted
for 27.3 per cent, and North Africa 9.2 per cent. The Soviet Union and the
United States together exported 70.1 per cent of all major weapons exported
in the same period.”
including two major powers –
Trends in nuclear weapon proliferation are even more disturbing. Not-
withstanding the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 9 by 114
countries,’ several states with a proven nuclear weapons manufacturing
capacity –
are conspicuously absent from the
list of contracting parties. The relatively easy conversion of nuclear technolo-
gy from civilian to military uses has rendered policy distinctions enunciated
by many governments of rather dubious value in practice. Canadian experi-
ence in this regard, witnessed by “Candu” reactor sales to Argentina, India,
Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan, offers a lesson in technological
misappropriation. 2′
The combination of strategic and economic interests of arms suppliers on
the one hand, and of the perceptions of “national security” by arms importers
on the other, has aggravated what was already a complex and unstable
situation. Regional tensions exacerbate the problem.
Requirements of national security, as interpreted by national govern-
ments, constitute the classic justification for arms spending. States have the
right in international law to provide for individual and collective self-
6SIPRI Yearbook 1981, supra, note 13, 117.
1
17Ibid., 105.
1″SIPRI Yearbook 1982, supra, note 6, 176.
“9Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafterNon-Proliferation Treaty] (entered into force 5
March 1970).
2As of 31 December 1981. See United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Year-
book (1981), vol. 6, Appendix I, 399-412.
2
1 Noble, Canada’s continuing search for acceptable nuclear safeguards [1978] Int’l Per-
spectives, passim, especially 43-4 (July/August) (a publication of the Dep’t of External
Affairs, Canada). See also United Nations Association in Canada, Canada the Arms Race and
Disarmament (1980) 15-7.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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defence,’ and under the prevailing international system, they also enjoy the
exclusive privilege of judging the degree of actual and potential threat to their
sovereignty. The concept of national security connotes not only physical
survival, but also the desire to safeguard particular values and modes of social
ordering. Between the superpowers, mutual suspicion engendered by con-
flicting values and social structures has prompted the notion that mere
coexistence may be incompatible with the national security of either side.
Accordingly, the doctrine of deterrence has developed, with periodic varia-
tions in strategy depending on current nuclear capability. From “massive
retaliation” in the 1950s, to “flexible response” and finally “mutually assured
destruction”, the nuclear stategy of the major powers has evolved into defence
based on the threat of collective annihilation.” The latest variation on deter-
rence was articulated in the Carter Administration’s Presidential Directive 59,
of 1980, contemplating selective nuclear strikes as a means of rendering
nuclear warfare winnable. The Reagan Administration’s emphasis on first-
strike nuclear weapons heightens the dangers inherent in the Carter initiative,
and subjects mankind to the paradox of self-defence through offensive
targeting.
The simple possession of armaments has seldom been judged the sole or
even the principal cause of war; the peculiarity of the contemporary arms race
lies in the possibility that mere possession may stimulate conditions that
generate conflict. When the price of national security is the sacrifice of
socio-economic development, the abridgement of civil and political rights,
and an escalation in the level of international insecurity, one is entitled to
question existing governmental priorities.
A second major justification for arms spending centres on the contention
that a positive correlation between economic growth and expanding military
sectors has boosted employment and industrial development, not least in the
fragile economies of the Third World. 24 The issue has been analysed else-
where in this special issue. Suffice it to point out here that, on balance,
available empirical evidence seems to fall short of supporting such a
2 See United Nations Charter, art. 51. For general discussion, see D. Bowett, Self-Defence
in International Law (1958).
2See Keeny & Panofsky, MAD versus NUTS [:] Can Doctrine or Weaponry Remedy the
Mutual Hostage Relationship of the Superpowers? (1981) 60 Foreign Affairs 287; Falk,
Meyrowitz & Sanderson, Nuclear Weapons in International Law (1980) (Occasional Paper
No. 10, Princeton World Order Studies Program), reprinted in (1980) 20 Indian J. Int’l L. 541
(for a succinct appraisal of United States doctrines and strategy); and Bundy, Kennan,
MacNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance (1982) 60 Foreign Affairs
753.
24See, e.g., G. Kennedy, The Military in the Third World (1974); and E. Benoit, M.
Millikan & E. Hagen, Effect of Defense on Developing Economies (1971), vols 1 and 2.
1983]
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
correlation.” Indeed, as the 1980 North-South Report argues, the basic
problem of disparity between wealthy and underdeveloped regions is com-
pounded by military spending and the resulting diversion of scarce
resources.
26
H. The Violation of International Norms of Human Rights
A.
Civil and Political Human Rights
It is axiomatic that the right to life underlies the entire corpus of
international human rights law. Solemn proclamations of this right are con-
tained, inter alia, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights27 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1 The Universal Dec-
laration, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 “as a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”, has grad-
ually gained recognition as customary international law. 29 In furtherance of
the Declaration and the Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights represent
specific formulations of human rights standards, to which parties are legally
bound.30 What practical meaning can these individual and collective human
rights have when threatened by the prospect of extinction of the species?
The atrocities committed during the Second World War, particularly the
Nazi persecution of the Jews, motivated the adoption of the Genocide
Convention. 3, It is somewhat improbable that a legal post-mortem of a
nuclear war, with Nuremberg-style trials, will be feasible. Rather, the spirit
and the letter of the Genocide Convention require application to thwart the
escalation of the arms race into a third world war. The Convention defines
genocide as comprising “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”, 32 declaring it a
“See, e.g., Disarmament and Development, supra, note 11; and Center for Policy Alterna-
tives, Disarmament andDevelopment: The Case ofRelativelyAdvancedDeveloping Countries
(1980).
26The Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: A
Program for Survival (1980) 124-5 [hereinafter North-South Report].
27 Article 3.
28Supra, note 4, art. 6.
29See, e.g., Humphrey, “The World Revolution and Human Rights” in A. Gotlieb, ed.,
Human Rights, Federalism, and Minorities (1970) 147, 149.
“Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 39/27, 289 (1969), reprinted in (1969) 8 I.L.M. 679.
3 Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(adopted by the U.N. General Assembly 9 December 1948; entered into force 12 January
1951).
32Ibid., art. II.
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crime under international law “whether committed in time of peace or in time
of war”.33 Nuclear strategy involving the targeting of hundreds of large
population centres runs counter to the most fundamental objective of the
Convention. It also violates a cardinal principle of the laws of war –
contained in the Declaration of St Petersburg and Hague Convention No. IV of
1907 –
that “[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy
is not unlimited”. 34
The contention that the most recent targeting theory –
counterforce
seeks to minimize civilian casualties by concentrating on military and admin-
istrative centres utterly lacks cogency as a stance for humanitarian values. In
practical terms, target-discrimination with regard to military-related indus-
trial concentrations that are close to population centres would be virtually
impossible to achieve. 35 Furthermore, the strategic value of targeting military
installations in a retaliatory strike is sufficiently questionable as to suggest
that massive strikes against civilian centres are, in fact, envisaged.36 The
argument that deterrent strategy seeks to avert and not to precipitate warfare is
at best circular. Worse, it seems to place the sanctity of life at the mercy of a
doctrine of mutual destruction.
The preservation of international peace is recognized as the most fun-
damental norm in the United Nations Charter which expresses in its Preamble
the determination of the contracting parties “to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war” and the desire “to ensure the acceptance of principles
and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the
common interest”. Article 1 of the Charter proclaims, among the purposes of
the United Nations, the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 2 expresses the principle of the non-use of force in international
relations. Two resolutions passed by the General Assembly in 1981 reflect the
long-standing opinion of the community of nations that “the use of nuclear
weapons would be a violation of the UN Charter and a crime against
humanity”37 and that “states and statesmen that resort first to the use of
nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity”. 3
1
33Ibid., art. I.
3Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention [No. IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631.
-5See, e.g., Keeny & Panofsky, supra, note 23, 293-304.
36Ibid.
37Resolution on the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War, United
Nations G.A. Res. 36/921, 36 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51) 64, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981),
3 Declaration on the Prevention ofNuclear Catastrophe, United Nation G.A. Res. 36/100,
36 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51) 76, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981).
1983]
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
Inevitably, norms designed to protect life and international peace are the
first casualties of the arms race. The threat to use force has been fashioned into
a foreign policy instrument of the major powers despite such declarations as
that contained in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act which states that “[n]o consid-
eration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in
contravention of this principle”. 39 But even the Final Act is symptomatic of
the tendency, noted at the beginning of this paper, to subordinate human
rights, including the right to life, to the goals of national security. It is more
often the case that the intimate nexus between these two objectives is not even
recognized. Governments continue to perceive national security in narrow
military terms as the overriding imperative in international relations, irrespec-
tive of the price. While “the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence” 4 in the event of an armed attack constitutes a reasonable limitation
of the principle of the non-use of force, military strategy based upon the
employment of nuclear weapons, as we have seen, exceeds greatly any
rational interpretation of the concept of “self-defence”.
It was foreseeable that the growing militarization of national life would
have a negative impact upon civil and political rights such as free expression
and privacy. Proliferation of military and defence-related facilities and the
expanding and increasingly assertive national security apparatus in many
countries, are creating conditions highly inimical to the advancement of civil
liberties and human rights .41 Electronic surveillance of employees’ activities,
the recording of the most private biographical data of personnel, and restric-
tions upori the free expression of opinion steadily are becoming “standard
procedure” even in traditionally open societies.42 Security constraints will
almost certainly escalate, ostensibly to forestall espionage and other threats to
national security. As the global arms build-up continues and expectations of
violence grow, the prospect of the Orwellian construct as the dominant form
of organized community becomes progressively less fanciful.
B.
Economic and Social Human Rights
Human rights norms designed to enhance respect for life and a peaceful
environment have an essential counterpart in the right to minimum socio-
39Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, FinalAct, 1 August 1975, Principle
II, reprinted in (1975) 14 I.L.M. 1292.
40 United Nations Charter, art. 51.
41See, e.g., Sieghart, Nuclear Power and Human Rights (1977) 18 I.C.J. Rev. 49; and
Halloran, Pentagon to Give Polygraph Tests to Personnel to Fight Disclosures, The New York
Times (10 December 1982) A 1.
42Sieghart, ibid., and sources cited therein.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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economic conditions promoting human well-being. Thus, in accord with the
Universal Declaration, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
CulturalRights recognises in its Preamble that healthy socio-economic condi-
tions as much as civil and political rights, are a prerequisite for “the ideal of
free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want”. The implementa-
tion of the normative regime of socio-economic rights set forth in the Cove-
nant and Declaration constitutes not only a treaty obligation upon the parties
to the Covenant, but also a moral obligation upon all states. Furthermore, in
such as the right to an
so far as the relevant provisions in the Declaration –
adequate standard of living and the right to education –
have attained the
status of international customary law, all states are under a clear obligation to
act accordingly.
The limits upon permissible derogation from the regime of rights pro-
vided for in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are
circumscribed clearly:
[Tihe State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only
in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose
of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.4′
The negative impact of current levels of military expenditure upon the
performance by states of their obligations under the regime of socio-economic
rights is well illustrated by a brief examination of three basic provisions of the
Declaration and the Covenant. The right to education is recognised in art. 26
of the Declaration to be “directed to the full development of the human
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms”.” Article 13 of the Covenant is framed in similar terms.
The right to an adequate standard of living is established in art. 25 of the
Declaration, to which art. 11 of the Covenant adds “the continuous improve-
ment of living conditions”. Finally, art. 23 of the Declaration recognizes the
right to work, with states undertaking, under art. 6 of the Convenant, to adopt
appropriate “policies and techniques” for “the full realization of this right”.
Appendix 11″ demonstrates that the much-vaunted limitations on the
capacity of Third World states to discharge these international obligations are
at least compounded, if not caused, by their pursuit of national defence
priorities. Equally, as Appendix 2 16 indicates, neither “the continuous im-
provement of living conditions” nationally, nor the promotion of transnation-
al stability, is facilitated by the policy priorities of industrialized states. A
43Supra, note 4, art. 4.
4Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 26(2).
4″lnfra.
4Infra.
1983]
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
United Nations report states that “[t]he challenge of nation-building, which
involves the function of providing socio-economic content to political free-
dom, has been accentuated for most of the newly-independent countries by an
adverse strategic environment”. 47 The report recognizes that “an overriding
preoccupation with national security” constitutes “for all societies, irrespec-
tive of their level of development… the strongest single stimulus for military
spending”.48
Prevailing high rates of illiteracy, poverty leading to starvation and
worldwide problems of unemployment have failed to reverse the defence-
related priorities of states. The subordination of socio-economic needs to
perceived security requirements has only accentuated the global economic
and political imbalance, thus escalating the level of insecurity. 49 The appre-
ciation that radical disparities in standards of living in an interdependent
world are a serious political and security hazard was not lost on the United
Nations General Assembly which adopted, by a consensus, the 1974 Dec-
laration of a New International Economic Order,” aimed at redressing
existing injustices and achieving greater “effective” equality. Whereas states
ought to enjoy equal opportunities to determine the course of their national
development, “in a system characterized by radical inequality of condition,
equality of opportunity would only lead to discrimination in favour of the
stronger”. 5 Progress on the implementation of the New International
envisaging affirmative action in favour of underde-
Economic Order –
has been minimal in the eight years that have elapsed since
veloped nations –
the adoption of the Declaration. By contrast, military expenditures have risen
substantially in the industrialized and Third World alike, with governments
paying scant attention to their legal and moral obligations.
The threat to socio-economic rights posed by the arms race is not
confined solely to the costly diversion of resources, nor even to the wasteful
depletion of non-renewable natural resources by the military sector. Activi-
ties which undermine the integrity of the human environment ultimately
jeopardize the elemental means of support for human society and are an
encroachment upon the collective as well as the individual right to improved
4’Disarmament and Development, supra, note 11, para. 218.
4 Ibid.
” 9For general expressions of the same sentiment, see North-South Report, supra, note 26;
and United States, Council on Environmental Quality, The Global 2000 Report to the
President: Entering the Twenty-First Century (1980), vols I, II and III.
IoDeclaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, United Nations
G.A. Res. 3201, 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doe. A/9559 (1974); and
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, United
Nations G.A. Res. 3202,6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
5 1Disarmament and Development, supra, note 11, para. 80.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
living conditions. As the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment recognised, the right to life itself is at stake:
[T]hrough the rapid acceleration of science and technology, man has acquired the power
to transform his environment in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale. Both
aspects of man’s environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his
well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights –
even the right to life itself.”
The environmental devastation that can be caused by conventional
weaponry has been well documented, particularly with reference to the
Vietnam War. 3 It has been estimated that over fourteen million tons of
munitions were directed against South Vietnam by the United States, convert-
ing to “more-or-less permanent craters” approximately 100,000 hectares of
the country’s surface area.m The use of defoliants altered the natural land-
scape beyond recognition. More recently, within the span of a few weeks,
several major urban centres in Lebanon, including its capital, have been
devastated and tens of thousands made homeless.
Nuclear weapons would inflict environmental damage immeasurably
greater and more persistent than anything witnessed previously. Nuclear
weapons tests in the atmosphere have proven to be a major environmental
hazard, offering an insight into the potential destruction that might result from
full-scale nuclear warfare. Numerous resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly have censured these tests on grounds of environmental
abuse.” The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere,
12Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, in
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
48/14, and Corr. 1, reprinted in (1972) 11 I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Environment]. Principle 26 of the Declaration accordingly provides: “Man and his
environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass
destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs,
on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons.”
51 See UNESCO, The Dangers to Man and his Environment Inherent in Modern Armaments
and Techniques of Warfare: An Introduction andDescriptivelAnnotatedBibliography (1978).
-‘Chapter 3, The military impact on the human environment, in SIPRI, Yearbook 1978 [:]
World Armaments and Disarmament (1978) 43, 44. See further, ch. 11, The environmental
aftermath of warfare in Viet Nam, in SIPRI, supra, note 6, 363-87.
-1 See, e.g., Resolution on the Continuation of Suspension of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear
tests and Obligations of States to refrain from their Renewal, United Nations G.A. Res. 1648,
16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 3, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961);Resolution on the UrgentNeed
for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests, United Nations G.A. Res. 2604B, 24
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 18, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); and Resolution on the Urgent
Needfor Cessation of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests and Conclusion of a Treaty Designed
to Achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban, United Nations G.A. Res. 3257, 29 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 31) 20, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
19831
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
in Outer Space and Under Water56 has made a salutary contribution to
environmental conservation, despite its small impact upon the arms race as
such. The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment also
censured nuclear weapons tests, resolving:
(a) To condemn nuclear weapons tests, especially those carried out in the atmosphere;
(b) To call upon those States intending to carry out nuclear weapons tests to abandon their
plans to carry out tests since they may lead to further contamination of the environment. 7
It is not surprising, then, that the use of nuclear weapons would also
seem to run counter to peremptory environmental protection norms. The law
of armed conflict, as expressed in the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional, 8
contains a prohibition against the use of weapons which cause massive
environmental damage: “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.” 59
Nuclear weapons are by no means the only grave threat to the human
environment. Research into biochemical warfare is currently undergoing a
period of significant expansion. The 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling ofBacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction has not prevented states from
employing these particularly abhorrent weapons.:
The environmental consequences of the arms race, ranging from the
present squandering of scarce resources to the potential devastation of popula-
tion centres and entire nations, including the spectre of human extinction,
constitute the ultimate denial of human rights. Jonathan Schell sums up our
predicament thus:
The peril of human extinction, which exists not because every single person in the world
would be killed by the immediate explosive and radioactive effects of a holocaust –
something that is exceedingly unlikely, even at present levels of armament – but because
a holocaust might render the biosphere unfit for human survival, is, in a word, an
ecological peril. The nuclear peril is usually seen in isolation from the threats to other
forms of life and their ecosystems, but in fact it should be seen as the very center of the
as the cloud-covered Everest of which the more immediate, visible
ecological crisis –
kinds of harm to the environment are the mere foothills.”
5614 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, reprinted in (1963) 2 I.L.M. 889.
“Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, supra, note 52.
11 Geneva Protocol I Additional Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I, reprinted in (1977) 16 I.L.M. 1391.
“Ibid., art. 35, para. 3.
‘A decade after the use of napalm in Vietnam, biological warfare has reportedly been
conducted in Afghanistan. See U.S. Assails Soviet for Reported Use of Toxin Weapons, The
New York Times (30 November 1982) A 1. See also Wolfe, Chemical andBiological Warfare:
Medical Effects and Consequences (1983) 28 McGill L.J. 732. For the text of the Convention,
see 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. 8062, reprinted in (1972) 11 I.L.M. 310.
61J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth (1982) 111 [emphasis in original].
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
I. Asserting Human Rights Priorities: From Norms to Imperatives
A.
Human Rights and Non-Proliferation Policy
The export of weapons and weapon technology has developed in the last
two decades into a significant component of industrialized nation-Third
World diplomacy, thus expanding the dimensions and the sphere of the arms
race. Global arms exports now exceed an estimated U.S. $2.5 billion per
annum for initial transfers alone; follow-up sales of spare parts, maintenance,
support, and training triple those earnings. 62 The volume of weapon exports to
the Third World in 1980 was nearly twice the volume of world trade in
general.’63
Respect for human rights can scarcely prosper in a system of transnation-
al relations dominated by the impulse to sell arms to nations which threaten to
use them upon the slightest potential breach of perceived national security.
United States Senator William Proxmire warns that “arms trafficking has
become a new international currency” prompted by “short-term greed”:
Under the justification of business is good for our balance of payments or if we do not sell
weapons someone else will and that will cost us jobs and we are just supplying a
self-defense need, the arms merchants and their government spokesmen are turning the
world into a vast armed camp. . . .The world is too populated by irrational concepts and
intemperate leaders to long avoid a series of local conflagrations.,
Large-scale transfers of conventional weaponry into particular regions
has also increased the pressure on states to “go nuclear”, with the potential for
triggering regional nuclear competition. The proliferation of nuclear technol-
ogy has effectively circumvented the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty,65 as well
as the 1977 guidelines of the “London Club”. 6 While art. I of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty prohibits nuclear weapons or weapon-technology trans-
fers to non-weapon states, art. IV recognizes the “inalienable right” of states
to peaceful uses of nuclear technology. 67 But available evidence permits little
zine] (24 March 1980) 62.
61See World Arms, The Scramble to Cash in on Weapons Exports, Business Week [Maga-
61See SIPRI Yearbook 1982, supra, note 6, XXVII.
126 Cong. Rec. S3507, S3518 (daily ed. 3 April 1980) (Statement of Senator Proxmire).
6Supra, note 19.
6International Atomic Energy Agency, Doe. INFCIRC/254 (1978). The Guidelines for
Nuclear Transfers were agreed to by the Nuclear Supplier Group (the “London Club” consist-
ing of sixteen nations, including the superpowers), and attached to communications addressed
in January 1978 to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
67Article IV, para. 2 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra, note 19, obliges parties to
undertake “to facilitate and … to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
materials and scientific information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy”.
1983]
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
justification for the conceptual distinction between civilian and military uses
of nuclear technology. The otherwise laudable articulation of the right to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy in fact creates a paradox whereby the ratifica-
tion of the Treaty facilitates the availability of nuclear materials for prospec-
tively swift conversion to military purposes. Furthermore, art. X provides for
withdrawal from the Treaty upon advance notice of three months. Hence the
conversion to military ends may even be achieved without contravening the
letter of the Treaty.
By virtue of art. VI, the Non-Proliferation Treaty commits the major
nuclear-weapon powers – with the important exceptions of China and France
to disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. This commitment is
–
reciprocated by non-weapon states in their renunciation of the “nuclear
option”. The continuation of the nuclear arms race, which could potentially
result in the extinction of the human race, is tantamount to legal contempt for
an essential obligation under the Treaty.
The ominious expansion of nuclear weapons technology in Asia, the
Middle East, Southern Africa, and Latin America is, in part, a consequence of
the failure of non-proliferation policies.’ Those regions pay a high price for
the acquisition of this technology in terms of political stability, economic
development and the observance of civil liberties. Neither the demands of
geopolitical security of arms suppliers nor those of national security or
domestic stability of arms importers are satisfied in the long term by the
proliferation of sophisticated and dangerous arsenals. On the other hand,
writing human rights criteria into effective policy decisions on economic and
military assistance and weapons sales requires more than unilateral goodwill,
and considerably more than a rhetorical commitment to humanitarian
principles.69
The United States rejected U.S. $1 billion worth of arms contracts in the
initial fifteen month period of the Carter Administration, and slashed military
aid to Argentina, Ethiopia and Uruguay, all on grounds of human rights
abuses.7″ Yet, despite their unseemly records, Iran, the Phillipines and South
Korea were exempted from the restrictions. Even prior to the abandonment of
61 See generally, E. Lefever, NuclearArms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma (1979)
(a Brookings Institute monograph); and SIPRI, Yearbook 1977 [:] World Armaments and
Disarmament (1977) 6-14, particularly the tabular summary at 8-11.
9See Tonelson, Human Rights: The Bias We Need (1982) 49 Foreign Policy 52; and R.
Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (1981), passim.
70 See Cohen, “Human Rights Decision-Making in the Executive Branch: Some Proposals
for a Co-ordinated Strategy” in D. Kommers & G. Loescher, eds, Human Rights andAmerican
Foreign Policy (1979) 216.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
President Carter’s constructive policy in the wake of sustained domestic
opposition and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Administration was
accused of inconsistency in dividing the world into “countries unimportant
enough to be hectored about human rights and countries important enough to
get away with murder”.71′ The Reagan Administration runs no such risk in its
arms policy, having negotiated substantial weapons sales with Saudi Arabia,
Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, El Salvador, and Guatemala, among others. In
professing to “deal with the world as it is, rather than as we would like it to
be”,72 this Administration has apparently subordinated human rights and
non-proliferation to “realpolitik”.
France and the Soviet Union have long pursued vigorous arms-export
policies, exhibiting little regard for human rights criteria in seeking to further
their geopolitical interests or to increase revenue. In the period 1979-81 the
Soviet Union acquired the largest share of the export market in major
weapons, predominantly by selling to the Third World.73 French defence
policy actually depends on weapons exports to justify its “autonomous”
stance which has resulted in an enormous military-industrial complex; an
estimated forty per cent of its national arms production is exported . 4
Two conclusions may be drawn from these facts: coordination of
weapons-supply restraints has been minimal, and the persistently one dimen-
sional definition of “security” has afforded no inducement to suppliers or
importers to reduce transfers. If the experience of the Carter Administration
illustrates the acute difficulty of translating human rights concerns into viable
national policy without multilateral cooperation, President Reagan’s
weapons transfer policy reveals total indifference toward both legal and moral
obligations under international law.
The redefinition of both national and international “security” to encom-
pass legal, political and socio-economic values inspired by the Universal
Declaration, is an urgent imperative if states are to restrain proliferation and
the arms competition between the superpowers. On the premise that neither
the Soviet Union nor the United States could conceivably favour an increase
in the number of states capable of launching conventional or nuclear war, the
coordination of weapons-supply policies is of mutual as well as global
interest. But the record of bilateral arms negotiations and prevailing arms
7, Barnet, U.S. Needs Modest, Uniform Standard on Human Rights, Los Angeles Times (12
March 1977), cited in Cohen, ibid., 224.
72Quoted in Pierre, Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy (1981) 60 Foreign Affairs 266, 277.
See also Blechman, Nolan & Pratt, Pushing Arms (1982) 46 Foreign Policy 138.
73 The Soviet share was 36.5percent, with the U.S. obtaining 33.6per cent, and France, 9.7
per cent. SIPRI Yearbook 1982, supra, note 6, 176.
74See Pierre, supra, note 72, 273-5.
1983]
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
transfer policies of the major powers offers neither evidence of the existence,
nor the imminent emergence, of such a perception of mutuality. The neces-
sary reorientation in the outlook and operation of the system of transnational
relations will require the application of organized pressure upon governments
at the national and international levels, rather than the traditional public
abdication of foreign policy responsibility to national governments. Private
individuals and non-governmental agencies have a duty to see that interna-
tional norms are enforced.
B.
Public Opinion and Human Rights Activism
The arms race is, in effect, a process of progressive militarization, not
simply between governments but between states. It is conducted in the name
of “national interest”, “national security” and “national sovereignty”. Implic-
itly, the responsibility for its consequences, in terms of growing insecurity,
the erosion of human rights and the threat of total destruction, rests ultimately
with national populations. Certainly in democratic states, this responsibility
is political as well as moral, and citizens are therefore as much actors as they
are victims and spectators in the arms race. Public inertia can be explained
perhaps as a combination of political apathy, a sense of helplessness and
ignorance of the facts. However, recent developments in the West –
such as
the deployment of “theatre” nuclear weapons in Europe and the cruise and
MX missile progammes –
have succeeded in arousing public protest in the
NATO countries to an appreciable degree, holding out the prospect of a potent
“grass-roots” international movement for disarmament.
This movement may receive impetus from the deteriorating economic
conditions in Western and East Bloc countries. Shrinking social welfare
exemplified by the Reagan Administration’s slashing of
programmes –
multiple public benefits, from child care to food stamps –
accompanied by
rising unemployment, cannot but provoke public opposition to growing
military apppropriations. East Bloc citizens undergo the additional strain of
“bridging the competition gap” in military technology, foregoing a larger
proportion of GNP in the process than do their Western counterparts. 75
At the First Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations
General Assembly in 1978, member-states concurred on the need to develop
“an international conscience” through the dissemination of information on the
arms race. 76 The Second Special Session in June 1982 launched a World
7 See U.S. leading Soviets 15-1 in arms know-how: Report, The [Montrdal] Gazette (3
March 1983) B-16.
76Final Document of the United Nations General Assembly First Special Session on
Disarmament, United Nations G.A. Res. S-10/2, 10 (Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 4) 3,
U.N. Doe. AIS-10/2 (1978), reprinted in (1978) 17 I.L.M. 1016.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
Disarmament Campaign, “recognizing that world public opinion may exer-
cise a positive influence on the attainment of meaningful measures of arms
limitation and disarmament” and “aware of the public concern at the dangers
of the arms race … and its negative social and economic consequences”.”
The failure of the Second Special Session to agree on a comprehensive
programme of disarmament and on most other agenda items serves to high-
light the urgent importance of mobilizing public opinion as a “positive
influence” on national governments.
An aroused public opinion can also promote compliance with interna-
tional human rights norms which protect life and international peace by
furnishing cogent evidence of the prevailing common morality on permissible
conduct in war. The “Martens Clause” in the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV
provides that in situations lacking precisely determinable rules of warfare,
general principles of international law derived “from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience” are to be applied.78 The crystallization of principles of
morality into principles of law can hardly occur without unequivocal and
public manifestation. Silent opposition to the arms race, particularly the
nuclear arms race, may well be interpreted as tacit endorsement of gov-
ernmental policies, promoting relentless accumulation of armaments and
preparations for war. Historical evidence is not lacking to demonstrate the
potency of public opinion in the shaping of both national foreign policy and
international law. For instance, public reaction to United States involvement
in Vietnam, and more recently in El Salvador, and the pressure of the
disarmament lobby in the 1960s for serious bilateral negotiations with the
Soviets achieved tangible policy results.79 Also, it is arguable that worldwide
public outrage against the atrocities committed by the Nazis formed an
important background to the judgments at Nuremberg, particularly in the
interpretation of “crimes against humanity”.8″ While less responsive to public
pressures than its counterparts in Western democracies, the Soviet Govern-
ment is by no means immune to domestic and international pressure.
Public awareness and activism concerning nuclear issues has found
expression in the United States through two traditional outlets: national
debate and legal action. Referenda on a weapons freeze and reactions to the
“Concluding Document of the United Nations General Assembly Second Special Session
on Disarmament, U.N. Doc. A/S-12/32 (1982).
“Hague Convention No. IV, supra, note 34, Preamble [emphasis added]. See also Falk,
Meyrowitz & Sanderson, supra, note 23, 22-3.
“See Voorst, The Critical Masses (1982) 48 Foreign Policy 82; and Sigal, Kennan’s Cuts
(1981) 44 Foreign Policy 70.
8See D. O’Connell, International Law, 2d ed. (1970), vol. 2, 744.
1983]
HUMAN RIGHTS-PERSPECTIVES
MX missile offer evidence of public concern with military affairs. A lawsuit
by 1,192 plaintiffs in a Utah Federal District Court on grounds of governmen-
tal negligence in atomic testing between 1951 and 1963 allegedly resulting in
over 300 cases of cancer, could be particularly relevant in the context of the
nuclear arms race.8 The trial is expected to be long and drawn-out, but worth
noting is the refusal of the judge to dismiss the case on the basis that the
“discretionary function exemption” provides immunity when orders leading
to injury originate at high levels of government. 2 The outcome of the trial
may have a significant bearing on the possibilities of advancing the cause of
peace and nuclear disarmament through the machinery of the courts.
Judicial perception of fundamental human rights imperatives in relation
to military policies would probably be assisted by the exposition of the
ethical-legal context of these rights. Weapons-deployment decisions, for
instance, may be viewed in terms of the immunity of the individual or group
from acts that threaten the right to life. Nuclear weapons tests could be
interpreted as violating the claim against the state for the provision of reason-
able security of life. National constitutional provisions, 3 as well as interna-
tional conventions and declarations safeguarding fundamental human rights,
provide a sound legal basis for anyone wishing to challenge governmental
priorites which exacerbate the arms race.
Conclusion
There is no dearth of international law in general, or of human rights law
in particular, applicable to the conduct and the socio-economic implications
of the arms race. Nuclear war, as well as preparations for it, constitute a
flagrant defiance of the basic tenet of human rights: the right to life. Data on
current world military expenditures, the relentless qualitative up-grading of
ever more destructive weapons by the majors powers I and the conduct of the
arms race by proxy in the Third World, present a grim picture. Negotiations
8See Expert Calls Fallout Probable Cause of Leukemia, The New York Times (21
September 1982) A 13.
82 See Milieu of Cold War is Recalled at Fallout Trial, The New York Times (14 November
1982) 32.
83 See, e.g., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of Schedule B, Canada
Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), which states in s. 7: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.”
” See Halloran, U.S. Plans Big Spending Increase for Military Operations in Space, The
New York Times (17 October 1982) A 1; and Boffey, Pressures are IncreasingforArms Race
in Space, The New York Times (18 October 1982) A 1.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
for arms control continue to postulate “bargaining from strength” which
implies the perpetuation of the arms race in the cause of peace. But, peace, as
Joyce comments, means more than the absence of war:
It is not the “peace” unilaterally proclaimed by sovereign states intent on leaving their
erstwhile enemies under threat of further hostility. It is not a compromise between rivals
who cannot get what they want by war… It is certainly not the spurious doctrine of
deterrence, which drives on the arms race to excesses and perils.”
In the short term, the assertion of human rights criteria in determining national
policies must aim primarily at the prevention of nuclear conflict. However,
attention must be directed as well to the urgent non-military threat to peace
posed by economic deprivation and inequality, a situation which is aggra-
vated by the arms race, and which demands immediate and systematic
reallocation of resources in accordance with international socio-economic
rights.8 6 The fostering of a world system that caters concurrently to global
security and to the implementation of basic human rights will require a
sustained effort of immense magnitude, an effort for which contemporary
national governments exhibit neither the inclination nor the capacity.
Opinion, said Pascal, is the sovereign of the world. The momentum of
public opinion and activism probably represents, in the final analysis, the
greatest prospect for the reversal of the arms race and the protection of human
rights. If preserving the status quo persuades governments to continue the
arms race, then self-preservation should persuade populations to seek an
alternative to a system which desecrates the most basic humanitarian norms.
“J. Joyce, The New Politics of Human Rights (1978) 232.
“Proposals have been advanced by United Nations member-states suggesting mechanisms
for resource reallocation from the military to the civilian sector, a summary of which appears in
Disarmament andDevelopment, supra, note 11, paras 337-70. Action has yet to be taken upon
any of these proposals.
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