Amendments to the Canada Labour Code:
Are Replacement Workers an
Endangered Species?
Luc Vaillancourt
Recent amendments to the Canada Labour Code
concerning the use of replacement workers during legal
strikes or lockouts illustrate the ongoing process of seeking
a balance between employer and trade union interests in the
labour context. Prior to the adoption of these amendments,
neither federal legislation nor the interpretation given to it
by the Canada Labour Relations Board prohibited the use
of replacement workers by employers. However, under the
amended federal legislation, an employer’s right to use re-
placement workers has been qualified. Following the
recommendations issued by the Sims Task Force in its re-
port Seeking a Balance, employers are now prohibited un-
der the Code from using replacement workers during a
strike or lockout where such use is for the demonstrated
purpose of undermining a trade union’s representational
capacity rather than in pursuit of legitimate bargaining
goals. The author argues that while the aim of this amend-
ment to the Code is in line with attempting to maintain a
balance between employer and employee rights, the man-
ner in which the new provision is worded may pose a
challenge to its implementation. The author therefore sug-
gests that the amended provision be read in light of the em-
ployer’s duty to bargain in good faith. Such an analysis
would result in a focus on whether an employer’s use of
replacement workers is designed to undermine a trade un-
ion’s representational capacity, triggering the prohibition
on the use of replacement workers under the amended
Code. This interpretation would further the labour relations
objectives advanced by the Code, enabling employers who
comply with the Code to continue to be able to employ re-
placement workers, while protecting the role of trade un-
ions in labour relations.
Les amendements rdcents au Code canadien du tra-
vail concemant l’utilisation de travailleurs de remplace-
ment durant une grave lgale ou un lock-out illustrent le
processus continu de recherche d’un 6quilibre entre les in-
turets des employeurs et des syndicats dans le contexte des
normes du travail. Avant l’adoption de ces amendements,
ni la 1dgislation f~drale ni l’interprtation qui en 6tait don-
nde par le Conseil canadien des relations du travail
n’interdisaent l’utilisation par les employeurs de tra-
vailleurs de remplacement. Ce droit des employeurs se voit
toutefois imposer des rdserves par la legislation telle
qu’amendfe. A Ia suite des recommandations 6nises par le
groupe de travail Sims dans son rapport Vers l’quilibre, le
Code interdit maintenant aux employeurs d’utiliser des tra-
vailleurs de remplacement durant une grve ou un lock-out
lorsque le but 6tabli est de miner la capacit6 de reprsenta-
tion d’un syndicat plutbt que d’atteindre des objectifs 16gi-
times de ngociation. L’auteur soutient que, bien que
l’objectif de cet amendement s’inscrive dans le cadre d’un
effort visant A maintenir l’&iuilibre entre les droits des em-
ployeurs et des employds, sa formulation est de nature A
compliquer son interprdtation. f1 sugg&e, par cons~quent,
que Ia nouvelle disposition soit ue t la lumi~re du devoir
de 1’employeur de n6gocier de bonne foi. Une telle analyse
mettuait l’accent sur l’objectif poursuvi par l’utilisation de
travailleurs de remplacement afin de detenminer s’il est de
miner la capacit6 de reprsentation du syndicat, d6clen-
chant ainsi l’application de l’interdiction imposde par le
Code. Cette interprdtation aurait pour effet de promouvoir
les objectifs poursuivis par le Code en permettant aux em-
ployeurs qu se conforment h ses dispositions de continuer
A employer des travailleurs de remplacement, tout en pro-
tdgeant Ie r6le des syndicats dans les relations de travail.
.LL.LILL.B., LL.M. (University of Ottawa). The author would like to thank Professor Denis
Nadeau of the University of Ottawa for his guidance in the preparation of this article, and Johane
Tremblay, Senior Legal Counsel at the CIRB and Rene Caron, Legal Counsel at the CIRB for their
helpful contributions.
McGill Law Journal 2000
Revue de droit de McGill 2000
To be cited as: (2000) 45 McGill LJ. 757
Mode de rdfdrence : (2000) 45 R1D. McGill 757
758
MCGLL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGLL
[Vol. 45
Introduction
I. The Status of Replacement Workers Prior to the Amendments
A.
Contextual Analysis
1. Labour Relations in Canada: A Brief Overview
2. Replacement Workers across the Country: The Two Underlying
Philosophies among Provincial Jurisdictions
Canada Labour Relations Board Decisions
Labour Relations under the Federal Jurisdiction after the Sims
Report
1. The Sims Task Force
2. The Acquisition of the Right to Strike or Lockout
a. Legal Requirements
b. Essential Services
c. Strike/Lockout Notices
d. Strike/Lockout Votes
3. Replacement Workers
a. Views of the Majority
b. Views of the Minority
4. Legal Status of Striking or Locked-Out Employees
II. The New Provision: An Analysis
A. Prohibition Relating to Replacement Workers
1. “The Pursuit of Legitimate Bargaining Objectives”
2.
“Demonstrated Purpose of Undermining the Trade Union’s Rep-
resentational Capacity”
3. Remedial Orders
4. Other Approaches
Conclusion
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L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
759
The alternatives essentially are three. First is unilateral decision making. It re-
poses all power in the industrial relations field in one entity, either the employer
or the state. The second is bilateral decision making. It at least precludes any
one party from holding a dominating position. It, however, still eliminates an
interested party: labour, management, or the public as represented by govern-
ment. The third is a multilateral approach. It overcomes the deficiency of bilat-
eral decision making and recognizes the interplay of market and institutional
forces which is inevitable in a mixed enterprise economy operating within a lib-
eral democratic political system.
The Canadian industrial relations system is multilateral Aside from the forces of
supply and demand in the labour market, it features a high degree of employer
determination, trade union participation, collective bargaining, and government
involvement in a variety of capacities. Our central concern is with collective
bargaining and trade unionism, both of which are indispensable elements within
the total system of industrial relations. Within industry, unions serve as a coun-
tervailing power to management; and within the wider socio-economic-political
sphere, they function as potential agents for transformation in an increasingly
pluralistic society.
Collective bargaining is the mechanism through which labour and management
seek to accommodate their differences, frequently without strife, sometimes
through it, and occasionally without success. As imperfect an instrument as it
may be, there is no viable substitute in afree society.’
Woods Report, 1968
Introduction
Canadian labour relations are polarized by the interests of two major actors, em-
ployers and employees: “The holders of the financial capital necessary to operate
businesses seek to maximize their assets, whereas workers seek a better sharing of
profits’ The development of Canadian labour relations represents the search for a
balance of power between employers and employees. The right of the employer to
carry on its business and the right of employees to join a trade union and to participate
in its lawful activities are the bases upon which legislators, labour relations boards,
‘Canada, Canadian Industrial Relations: The Report of Task Force on Labour Relations (Ottawa:
Privy Council Office, 1968) at 137-38 [hereinafter Woods Report]. The Woods Report constitutes an
important source of our modem labour law; its recommendations prompted Parliament to adopt the
Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2.
2 Canada, Human Resources Development, Seeking a Balance: Canada Labour Code, Part I, Re-
view (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1995) at 138 [hereinafter Sims Re-
port]. The Sims Report also constitutes an important source of our modem labour law; its recommen-
dations prompted Parliament to adopt the recent amendments to the Canada Labour Code, ibid Con-
sequently, the federal Board, formerly known as the Canada Labour Relations Board, is now known
as the Canada Industrial Relations Board (see Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 9). For purposes of this
research paper, both will be referred to as the Board.
760
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and courts perform their balancing effort. However, providing the parties with a neu-
tral system of collective bargaining is a difficult task. The issue of whether or not em-
ployers should be allowed to use replacement workers during labour disputes is a
good example of the difficult task of balancing interests as it is a source of differences
between federal and provincial jurisdictions.
Motivated by the need to modernize federal labour legislation, the federal gov-
emnment recently amended the Canada Labour Code (“Code”) following the recom-
mendations of the Sims Task Force, a study group mandated to perform a review of
labour relations at the federal level. The legislative changes were aimed at, inter alia,
the acquisition of the right to strike or lockout, the use of replacement workers, and
the legal status of striking or locked-out employees.
Before the adoption of the recent amendments, federal labour legislation had been
interpreted such that employers were not prohibited from using replacement workers
during a strike or lockout. The new provision on replacement workers should modify
the current state of the law by prohibiting the employer from using such workers for
the demonstrated purpose of undermining the trade union’s representational capacity
rather than to pursue legitimate bargaining objectives.
A careful analysis reveals that the Board should give meaning to the new prohibi-
tion by adopting principles similar to those relating to the duty to bargain. In consid-
ering whether or not the employer has bargained in good faith with the trade union,
the Board would benefit from a legal framework for the assessment of the legitimacy
of the employer’s bargaining objectives. Where the trade union has demonstrated that
the employer breached its duty to bargain by using replacement workers, the Board
should conclude that the employer has interfered with the trade union and has there-
fore undermined its representational capacity. Accordingly, the Board could then pro-
hibit the further use of replacement workers and, if required, order other suitable
remedies.
I. The Status of Replacement Workers Prior to the Amendments
A. Contextual Analysis
1. Labour Relations in Canada: A Brief Overview
From a labour law perspective, the right of freedom of association, enshrined in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 is the legacy of vigorous battles over
3S. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, be-
ing Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter]. It is important to
note, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada sent a clear message to labour communities by
holding that associational activities, such as the right to strike, are not protected by s. 2(d) of the
Charter. See Reference re: Public Service Employees Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 S.C.R 313,
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L. VAILLANCOURT- REPLACEMENT WORKERS
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-the recognition of collective rights. The constitutionalized right to join a trade union
has deep historical roots, which are intertwined with the development of English’ and
American’ labour law. First seen as an illegal restraint of trade, particularly during the
industrial revolution, the removal of criminal and civil liability for what was consid-
ered to be criminal conspiracy in 1871 gave legitimacy to the trade union movement
in England.7 The next year, Canada followed in Britain’s footsteps and legalized trade
unions, their purposes, and the means to pursue their purposes.8
From its inception, Canadian labour legislation has had as its objective the reso-
lution of industrial conflicts. Many amendments have been brought to the legislation,
including the significant importation of the American framework for collective bar-
gaining.’0 The proclamation of the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations” proved to
be “Canada’s first comprehensive labour policy, embracing union organization, con-
tract negotiation and contract administration:”2 The features included:
provision for trade union recognition by certification, on the basis of majority
support of a bargaining agent with exclusive rights to represent all employees
in a bargaining unit; a duty for employers and recognized unions to meet and
bargain in good faith; a prohibition on specified unfair labour practices; a pro-
hibition on strikes and lockouts during the term of a collective agreement with
a related-duty to resolve differences arising within the term without stoppage of
work, usually by arbitration; and, the maintenance of a competent labour rela-
tions board to administer these provisions. 3
(4th) 277.
38 D.LRL (4th) 161; PS.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424,38 D.LR. (4th) 249; RW.D.S.U. v.
Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460, 38 DL.RL
4 For elaboration on the history of Canadian labour law, see AW.R. Carrothers, E.E. Palmer & W.B.
Rayner, Collective Bargaining Law in Canada, 2d ed. (roronto: Butterworths, 1986) at 123-25; G.W.
Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2d ed., looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1993) at pans.
1.10-1.330. See also C. D’Aost & E Delorme, “The Origin of the Freedom of Association and of the
Right to Strike in Canada: An Historical Perspective” (1981) 36 Ind. Relat 894; D. Lavery, Le droit
du grdviste a son emploi en droit amdricain et canadien: perspective historique et comparde (LL.M.
Thesis, University of Ottawa 1988) [unpublished] at 178-215.
– Canada relied strongly on the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871 (U.K.), 34 & 35 Vict., c. 32,
which refined the terms of the Combination Act, 1825 (U.K), 6 Geo. IV, c. 129, and on the Trade
Union Act, 1871 (U.K.), 34 & 35 Vict., c. 31, in search of solutions for its labour conflicts.
6 Canada was largely influenced by the National Labor Relations Act, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935),
also referred to as the WagnerAct, in terms of its framework for collective bargaining.
7 Carrothers, Palmer & Rayner, supra note 4 at 16. See also Adams, supra note 4 at para. 1.50.
8 Trade Unions Act, S.C. 1872, c. 30; Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1872, c. 31. For com-
mentary, see Adams, supra note 4 at para. 1.60; M. Chartrand, “The First Canadian Trade Union
Legislation: An Historical Perspective” (1984) 16 Ottawa L. Rev. 267 at 278.
9 Sims Report, supra note 2 at 10.
‘o Canothers, Palmer & Rayner, supra note 4 at 47. See also Adams, supra note 4 at para. 1.160.
“P.C. 1003, 17 February 1944.
12 Canothers, Palmer & Rayner, supra note 4 at 50. See also Adams, supra note 4 at para. 1.200.
” Sims Report, supra note 2 at 11.
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While the federal government played a vital role in the early development of Ca-
nadian labour legislation, the Privy Council concluded in a reference to determine the
federal jurisdiction over labour that it had no authority over labour relations as such;4
and that pursuant to the division of powers within the Constitution,” exclusive provin-
cial competence in this area is the rule.” The federal government may exceptionally
assert exclusive jurisdiction over labour relations matters if it is demonstrated that
such jurisdiction is an integral part of its primary competence over some other federal
subject.’7 In such a case, the primary federal competence prevents the application of
provincial labour legislation.” The definition of a federal undertaldng, service, or
business relates to the nature of its operation,’9 which in turn is determined by the
normal or habitual activities of the business as those of “a going concern”:
Mhe first step is to determine whether a core federal undertaking is present
and the extent of that core undertaking. Once that is settled, it is necessary to
look at the particular subsidiary operation … to look at the “normal or habitual
activities” of that department as “a going concern”, and the practical and func-
tional relationship of those activities to the core federal undertaking.?
The required relationship to a federal undertalking, service, or business for the ap-
plication of the federal labour legislation is a question of degree.’ The nature of a
business determines the labour relations jurisdiction into which the business falls. Its
nature may change over time, and with it, the jurisdiction.? Despite the fact that fed-
eral and provincial governments have mutually exclusive jurisdictions over labour re-
lations matters, their respective laws embody the same fundamental principles.
,Tomnto Electric Power Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5, A.C. 396 (P.C.).
“Ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 5.
‘ For an in-depth discussion of the federal and provincial jurisdictions over labour relations matters,
see Carrothers, Palmer & Rayner, supra note 4 at 129ff and Adams, supra note 4 at paras. 3.10ff. See
also Montcalm Construction v. Qudbec (Minimum Wage Commission), [1979] 1 S.C.R 754, 93
D.L.R. (3d) 641 [hereinafter Montcalm Construction].
‘” Reference re: Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (Canada), [1955] S.C.1L 529, 3
D.L.R. 721.
85.
,B Reference re: Minimum Wage Act (Saskatchewan), [1948] S.C.R. 248, 3 D.,.R. 801; Quibec
(Commission du Salaire Minimum) v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1966] S.C.R 767, 59 D.L.R.
(2d) 145; Letter Carriers’ Union of Canada v. C.UP.W, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 178,40 D.L.R. (3d) 105.
” Canada (Labour Relations Board) v. Yellowknife (City of), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 729, 76 D.L.R. (3d)
“Northern Telecom v. Communications Workers of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 115 at 133, 98 D.L.R.
(3d) 1. See also U.MU. v. Central Western Railroad, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1112,76 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
“Montcalm Construction, supra note 16.
n Adams, supra note 4 at para. 3.125.
See e.g. Canada Labour Code, supra note 1; Labour Relations Code, S.B.C. c. 82; Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1.; Labour Code, R.S.Q. c. C-27.
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L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
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2. Replacement Workers across the Country: The Two Underlying
Philosophies among Provincial Jurisdictions
In the area of labour law, the purpose of legislation has been to provide the parties
with a neutral framework in which to resolve disputes. ‘ In this search for legislative
neutrality, one of the most sensitive issues remains whether the legislation should
permit or prohibit the use of replacement workers during a strike or a lockout.’ While
most provinces in Canada do not preclude an employer from using the services of re-
placement workers during a strike or lockout, ‘ the legislatures of British Columbia7
and Quebec have decided otherwise.”
In these two provinces, the presence of replacement workers during a legal strike
or lockout is perceived as shattering the balance of power between labour and man-
agement.’ The provisions of the labour laws in British Columbia and Quebec take ef-
fect when the parties are involved in a legal strike or lockout.’ This requires the trade
union or the employer to comply with all the conditions of the statute in order to be in
‘ See e.g. the Preamble of the Canada Labour Code, supra note 1.
s See e.g. Sims Report, supra note 2, where the members of the Task Force could not agree on the
question. It is important to note that this was the only issue that registered a dissension. For a detailed
review of the history of replacement workers in Canada, see A.L. Starkman, The Use of Labour Re-
placement in Industrial Disputes: A British-Canadian Comparison (Ph.D. Thesis, University of
Kent at Canterbury 1993) [unpublished] at 83ff.
For the purposes of this research paper, strikes and lockouts are treated identically, as the legal re-
quirements and consequences are the same for both in the context of the use of replacement workers.
See Labour Relations Code, supra note 23, s. 68. See also EJ. Harris & J.L. McConchie, “The
Labour Relations Code of British Columbia: Fundamental Changes in Our Labour Laws” (1993) 51
Advocate 29 at 40.
‘ See Labour Code, supra note 23, ss. 109.1-109.4. See also L. Martineau, “L’exp rience des dis-
positions anti-briseurs de grive selon le Code du travail (Quebec)” (1980) 35 Ind. Relat. 555; J. Ba-
zin, “Loi anti-briseurs de gr~ve: oti allons-nous?” (1981) 41 R. du B. 833; J. Bazin, ‘7La loi anti-
briseurs de gr~ve: O en sommes nous?” (1984) 44 R. du B. 600; J. Paquette, Les dispositions anti-
briseurs de grhve au Quifbec (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 1995) at 11.
The legislature of Ontario formerly banned the use of replacement workers pursuant to ss. 73.1
and 73.2 of the Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.2, but with the election of the Conservative
Party in 1995, the Government has enacted the Labour Relations Act, 1995, supra note 23, which re-
pealed those two sections. See H.C. Jain & S. Muthuchidambaram, Ontario Labour Law Reform: A
History and Evaluation of Bill 40 (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen’s University, 1995);
D.L. Rogers, “Ontario Labour Law Reform: Bill 7 vs. Bill 40” Employment and Labour Law Re-
porter 5:8 (November 1995) 87; B.A. Langille, “Has Ontario’s Anti-Scab Law Made any Differ-
ence-Legally, Economically, or Otherwise?” (1995) 3 C.L.E.LJ. 461; G. Hopkinson, “Holding the
Line: A Defence of Anti-Scab Laws” (1996) 4 C.L.E.LJ. 137. For elaboration on the provisions of
British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, see J. Paquette, “Briseurs de grave: une analyse des rgles et
recours de la Colombie-Britannique, de l’Ontario et du Quebec” in Barreau du Quebec, Service de la
formation permanente, ed., Dsveloppements rcents en droit du travail (1995) (Cowansville, Qc.:
Yvon Blais, 1995) 225 [hereinafter’ Briseurs de grve’].
o See e.g. the minority opinion in the Sims Report, supra note 2 at 138ff.
3′ See Labour Relations Code, supra note 23, s. 63(1); Labour Code, supra note 23, s. 109.1.
MCGLL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGLL
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a legal position to call for a strike or lockout. 2 The prohibition targets the work of an
employee in the bargaining unit on strike or lockout?3 In general, the employer is pre-
vented from hiring’ anyone after the beginning of collective bargaining to perform the
work of a striking or locked-out employee.’
Under federal and other provincial jurisdictions, the use of replacement workers
is not subject to similar limits. The employer’s right to use such workers is considered
essential to the maintenance of a balance of power between the parties. As noted in
the Woods Report, “the employer’s economic sanction equivalent to the union’s right
to strike rarely is the lockout: it is his ability to take a strike:’
From the employer’s point of view, replacement workers are an efficient tool by
which the market value of labour may be determined. A complete prohibition on the
use of replacement workers would shift the balance in favour of trade unions because
the parties would be forced to bargain in a “closed environmenf’, one which would
not account for the economic realities of the marketplace. Employers further argue
that during work stoppages, there is no legal restriction on the employees’ freedom to
seek other employment, therefore, employers should similarly be permitted to use re-
placement workers in order to get their work done.’ Most importantly, they argue that
it is important for both parties to maintain the viability of a business during any work
stoppage.
B. Canada Labour Relations Board Decisions
Early in the development of its jurisprudence under the Code, and at the time
when the legislation was silent on the issue, the Board allowed employers to use re-
placement workers in the course of work stoppages. The Board’s interpretation of
32See “Briseurs de gr6ve”, supra note 29 at 229 (re: British Columbia) and at 238 (re: Quebec).
3′ See Labour Relations Code, supra note 23, ss. 68(1)(e) – 68(1)(f); Labour Code, supra note 23,
ss. 109.1(a), 109.1(b), 109.1(g).
‘ One important difference between the two pieces of legislation is whether or not an employer
may have recourse to volunteers to perform the work. In British Columbia, the legislation is to the ef-
fect that no employer can hire or engage a person, whether paid or not (see Labour Relations Code,
ibidt, s. 68(1)). In Quebec, the legislation does not make such a specific reference as to whether the
restriction applies to a person paid or not. The courts have decided that the term “hire” necessarily
implies a remuneration and therefore volunteers are not considered to be replacement workers in the
province of Quebec (see Syndicat des employgs professionnels et de bureau, section locale 57
(U..E.P.B.) C.TC.-FTQ. v. Caisse populaire Saint-Charles Gamier, [1987] RJ.Q. 979 (C.A.); D.
Nadeau, “Briseurs de grave: les ben6voles A ‘abri de tout soupgon!” (1987) 18 R.G.D. 693).
‘ See Labour Relations Code, supra note 23, s. 68(1)(a); Labour Code, supra note 23, s. 109.1(a).
There are a few exceptions to this principle and one of the most important ones is the determination of
essential services: see Labour Relations Code, ibid, s. 72; Labour Code, ibid., ss. 109.1(c), 109.2,
109.2, 111.0.1-111.0.26.
Woods Report, supra note 1 at 176.
“P. Weler, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour Law (Toronto: Carswell,
1980) at 77-78.
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L. VAILLANCOURT- REPLACEMENT WORKERS
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permissible economic pressure tactics which employers could exercise upon trade
unions during labour disputes has been relatively liberal:
Numerous cases decided by this Board and by other labour relations boards
have indicated which tactics are illegal in specific collective bargaining conflict
situations. It can be said, generally speaking, that the approaches which have
been deemed illegal are the exception, rather than the rule. An employer can
change terms and conditions of employment for all employees once the con-
ciliation requirements of the law have been exhausted; it can pre-emptively, or
in a countervailing fashion, engage in general lockout or rotating lockout activ-
ity; it can hire replacement workers; it can even go out of business. But it can-
not take action that involves sanctions or discrimination against specifically
identified or identifiable employees because they exercised their right to
strike.3
The decisions of the Board on the issue of replacement workers are not numerous and
tend to focus on issues other than the legality of their use by employers.
The first decision to undertake an analysis of the status of replacement workers,
CKLWRadio Broadcasting,39 involved the filing of an application for certification by a
trade union seeking to remove the bargaining agent of a unit on strike. The Board had
to determine, inter alia, whether it should only consider the wishes of employees who
were members of the bargaining unit prior to the strike, the wishes of employees
working during the labour dispute and replacement workers, or both, for the purpose
of the representation vote.
The Board first examined the right of the employer to carry on its business during
a work stoppage within the provincial jurisdictions and noted that the only restriction
applicable at the federal level related to the discipline of employees for refusing to
perform the duties of a striking employee. Following the recommendation of the
Woods Report,’ the Code did not provide for any prohibition on the use of replace-
ment workers. The Board then approvingly referred to a judicial review decision of
the Manitoba Queen’s Bench on the eligibility of replacement workers to participate
in a representation vote:
From the standpoint of their economic interests, the striking employees remain
a group quite distinct from workmen who have been hired to replace them. In
my opinion the board has a duty to recognize this fact by treating the strikers as
a unit appropriate for collective bargaining. The board would therefore only
consider revoking the certification of the bargaining agent of the strikers if it
formed the opinion that it no longer represented a majority of the striking em-
ployees. In forming this opinion it would not be influenced by the views of
C.UPW and Canada Post (1992), 90 di 29, C.LRB. No. 965 at 11, online: QL (CLRB) [empha-
sis added].
39 Arthur T Ecclestone and NAB.E.T and CKLW Radio Broadcasting (1978), 26 di 615, 2 Can.
L.RB.R. 306 [hereinafter CKLWRadio Broadcasting 1978 cited to Can. L.R.B.].
4
‘ Woods Report, supra note 1 at 176.
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workmen who had been hired to replace the strikers. If it had the power to take
a vote, the board should have confined the vote to the striking employees.4
1
The Board also concurred with the opinion of Professor Arthurs, that striking
employees and replacement workers have divergent economic interests.4′ The Board
finally came to the conclusion that only those employees who were employed on the
day of the beginning of the strike and who still had an interest in the issue would be
permitted to decide the representational question.
In CJMS Radio Montrdal (Quibec),’ the Board was presented with a similar sce-
nario of raiding. The Board quoted at length its previous decision on the issue and de-
cided that replacement workers were not employees for the purpose of determining
the majority status of the bargaining unit; because of their temporary positions, re-
placement workers do not share any community of interest with striking employees.
The issue of replacement workers has also been studied by the Board in the con-
text of a complaint for bad faith bargaining and failure to make every reasonable ef-
fort to enter into a collective agreement. In General Aviation Services,” the Board de-
cided that the employer had committed an unfair labour practice when it failed to con-
sider the trade union’s proposal, which conceded to all the employer’s demands as to
the content of the collective agreement, with the exception that striking employees be
recalled on a seniority basis to displace replacement workers. The employer’s insis-
tence on retaining persons employed during the strike was considered to be contrary
to the intent of the Code. The Board reaffirmed that members of a bargaining unit
maintain their employee status during a labour dispute. Replacement workers may be
used in a work stoppage but they are not employees of the bargaining unit. Such
workers only benefit from legislated minimums and their temporary employment is
subject to the nature and outcome of the labour dispute.
In Eastern Provincial Airways,’5 the issue of bad faith bargaining and failure to
make every reasonable effort to conclude a collective agreement was again before the
Board. While the trade union would have accepted the employer’s demands with re-
gard to terms and conditions, it could not accept the employer’s return to work pro-
” Re Manitoba Labour Board & Brandon Packers (1960), 25 D.L.R. (2d) 531,33 W.W.R. 58 at 63.
See also G. England, ‘The Legal Response to Striking at the Individual Level in the Common Law
Jurisdictions of Canada” (1976) 3 Dal. L.J. 440.
” H. Arthurs, “The Right to Strike in Ontario and the Common Law Provinces of Canada” (Pro-
ceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on Comparative Law, 1966) [unpublished] at 192-93
(cited in CKLWRadio Broadcasting 1978, supra note 39 at 311).
4′ Association des employgs de CJMS and CJMS Radio Montrial (Qudbec) (1978), 33 di 393, 1
Can. L.R.B.R. 426.
“I.A.M.A.W, Local 2413 and General Aviation Services (1982), 51 di 71, 3 Can. L.R.B.R. 47
[hereinafter General Aviation Services cited to di].
” Canadian Air Line Pilots’Association and Eastern Provincial Airways (1983), 54 di 172, 5 Can.
L.R.B.R. (N.S.) 368 [hereinafter Eastern ProvincialAiways cited to di]. The decision was reversed in
part on other grounds by the Federal Court of Appeal in (1984), 65 N.R. 81, ECI. No. 338 and No.
355, online: QL (FCJ).
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L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
767
posal which contemplated a selective recall of employees who had participated in the
strike out of seniority and non-recall of some other such employees, without a right to
grieve, as a condition precedent to reaching a collective agreement. The Board agreed
with the trade union that it could not accept the employer’s return to work proposal
because to have done so would have violated the duty to represent all employees in
the bargaining fairly and without discrimination pursuant to section 37 of the Code.
At the outset of its analysis, the Board noted that there was no specific provision
in the Code setting minimum standards for the return to work of strildng or locked-out
employees at the end of a labour dispute. The Board also observed that there was no
prohibition regarding the use of replacement workers. However, the Board decided
that, after interpreting subsection 3(2) and subparagraph 94(3)(a)(vi) of the Code,’
“employees cannot be deprived of any term or condition of employment whatsoever
because of participation in a lawful strike!’ and that the employer’s conditional pro-
posal constituted an unfair labour practice”
The Board placed important limits on the right of the employer to carry on its
business during a work stoppage in the decision of Brewster Transport Company.”
The complaint of the trade union alleged violations by the employer of various provi-
sions of the legislation during their collective bargaining, including the employer’s of-
fer of more favourable terms and conditions of employment to replacement workers
than those proposed to the trade union at the bargaining table. As a matter of policy,
the Board found that the employer’s proposal constituted an unfair labour practice be-
cause it interfered with the exclusive role of the trade unionY
The discussion in Rogers Cable TV (British Columbia)’ concerned the em-
ployer’s alleged unfair labour practice of disciplining bargaining unit members for
acts committed on the picket line in the course of a lawful strike. The trade union ar-
“Old ss. 107(2) and 184(3)(a)(vi) of the Canada Labour Code, supra note 1.
,’Eastern ProvincialAirways, supra note 45 at 211.
/ibd at 213. The Board’s rationale was followed in Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local
4030 and Nolisair International (Nationair Canada), Service de Personnel Sol-Air and MY Air Sol
Services (1992), 89 di 94, C.L.R.B. No. 960, online: QL (CLRB), where the employer refused to sign
a collective agreement and imposed additional conditions to the trade union such as the inclusion of
supervisors and replacement workers in the bargaining unit after an agreement in principle had been
reached.
” Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1374 and Brewster Transport Company (1986), 66 di 1, 13
Can. L.RB.R. (N.S.) 339 [hereinafter Brewster Transport Company cited to di].
‘0 The Board would have imposed a remedial order on the employer for a similar offer in Syndicat
des employds de bureau de Voyageur (CNTU) and Voyageur (1989), 77 di 14, 90 C.L.L.C. para.
16,021 (C.L.R.B.) [hereinafter Voyageur cited to di], had the trade union produced evidence to allow
the Board to conclude that the conditions offered to the replacement workers were better than those
offered to the locked out employees.
51 LB.E.W, Local 213 and Rogers Cable TV (British Columbia), Vancouver Division and Rogers
Cable TV (British Columbia), Fraser Division (1987), 69 di 17,16 Can. L.R.P (N.S.) 71 [herein-
after Rogers Cable TV (British Columbia) cited to di].
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gued before the Board that the employer had no disciplinary power over employees
once a legal work stoppage had been initiated because no rights or obligations re-
mained from the collective agreement. The Board rejected the argument after affirm-
ing that the employment relationship between the employer and employees is of an
ongoing nature, even though there is no right or obligation attached to the execution
of work during strikes and lockouts:
In the overall scheme of the Code, strikes and lockouts are expected to be tem-
porary suspensions in the employment relationship during which collective
bargaining differences are ironed out. While these periods of economic sanc-
tions last, employees have no obligation to report to work or to perform serv-
ices on the employer’s behalf. The employer on the other hand need not pro-
vide work to the employees, in fact, he has a legal right to call on others to per-
form the services necessary to keep the business operating. 2
The employment relationship between employers and employees is maintained
throughout the labour dispute. For example, striking or locked-out employees benefit
from a priority to return to work over replacement workers at the end of a conflict.
Accompanying this priority, there is an obligation for striking or locked-out employ-
ees not to conduct themselves in a manner that could jeopardize their continued em-
ployment relationship with the employer. Consequently, the Board concluded that at
the completion of a legal work stoppage, the employer is permitted to make use of its
restored disciplinary power, provided that it is not for reasons prohibited by the Code.
The Board had to decide in Thys and Muir and Canada Post53 whether or not the
employer had committed an unfair labour practice by preventing two employees of a
striking bargaining unit, non-members of the trade union, from working during the
labour dispute. The Board concluded that the employer’s hiring of certain trade union
members and non-members, as well as replacement workers to perform work during
the strike, did not have the effect of denying the complainants any right under the
Code, While employees enjoy the right to return to work after a strike, they do not
have any corresponding right to work during a strike. Nor did the employer’s selective
hiring have the effect of denying the complainants any right under the Charter. Be-
cause the freedom of association recognized by subsection 2(d) of the Charter does
not include the right to strike, the Board found that likewise, this freedom does not in-
clude the right not to strike nor the ancillary right to work during a strike.
In Nolisair International (Nationair Canada),’ the Board faced another raiding
situation where a trade union filed an application for certification seeking to represent
all members of a bargaining unit and replacement workers. The Board reiterated that
the general scheme of the Code precluded it from giving replacement workers an in-
lIbid. at 36.
5 John J.F Thys and Terry T Muir and Canada Post and Fred Danells and C.U.P.W (1989), 77 di
111, 4 Can. L.R.B.R (2d) 291.
‘ Union indipendante des agents de bords de Nationair and Nolisair International (Nationair
Canada) and C.U.RE. (Airline Division) (1992), 90 di 144,93 C.L.L.C. para. 16,018 (CLR.B.).
2000]
L. VAILLANCOURT- REPLACEMENT WORKERS
terest in the representation of members of a bargaining unity The Board also rejected
the raiding trade union’s argument that, pursuant to subsection 2(d) and section 15 of
the Charter, the definition of employees ought to include replacement workers.
The most recent decision of the Board on the status of replacement workers is that
of Royal Oak Mines.’ This matter involved, among other issues, a raid by a trade un-
ion seeking to represent some members of the bargaining unit and replacement work-
ers working during the lockout. Despite their temporary status, the Board recognized
replacement workers as employees within the meaning of the Code and that they were
therefore free to join a trade union of their choice, pursuant to subsection 8(1) of the
Code and subsection 2(d) of the Charter. However, replacement workers are not to be
included in the bargaining unit on strike or lockout because there exists no community
of interest between them and striking or locked-out employees. Furthermore, the
Board determined that the composition of the bargaining unit remains unchanged for
the entire duration of the labour dispute by virtue of subsections 24(3) and 38(5) of
the Code, and that subsequent changes to the bargaining unit are to be negotiated by
the parties. In addition, replacement workers do not enjoy the right to participate in
the representational issues facing the bargaining unit engaged in the strike or lockout;
eligibility is limited to persons employed on the day prior to the commencement of
the work stoppage.
While the Board had the necessary powers to decide some of the issues sur-
rounding the-use of replacement workers, the Board had limited ability to remedy
situations where the employer would use replacement workers as a means of under-
mining the capacity of the trade union to represent employees Parliament sought to
provide, inter alia, additional powers to the Board, and to modernize the Code by ap-
pointing the Sims Task Force to review the federal labour legislation.
-” In this regard, the Board referred to United Steelworkers of America and Bird Machine, [1990]
S.L.RB.D. No. 40 at 24, online: QL (SLRB), a decision of the Saskatchewan Labour Relations
Board, which noted.
Replacement workers are employed to advance management’s interests in times of
strike or lock-out. They have no immediate interest in, nor do they derive any benefit
fiom, negotiating the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement with the em-
ployer. This observation of the function of replacement workers is in no way pejorative,
but rather a reflection of the reality that they do not share a community of interest with
striking employees in attaining the fundamental goals of collective bargaining.
Giant Mines Employees’Association and Royal Oak Mines’CAS.A. W, Local No. 4 (1993), 92 di
1, 21 Can. L..B.R. (2d) 55; reconsidered in (1993), 92 di 153, 93 C.L.L.C. para. 16,063 (C.L.R.B.).
On the question of bad faith bargaining and failure to make every reasonable effort to enter into a
collective agreement, this matter ultimately went to the Supreme Court of Canada, see infra note 57.
See for example C.A.SAW, Local No. 4 and Royal Oak Mines (1993), 93 di 21, 94 C.L.L.C.
para. 16,026 (C.L.RB.), aff’d (1994), 167 N.R. 234 (F.C.A.), aff’d [1996] 1 S.C.R. 369, 133 D.LR.
(4th) 129 [hereinafter Royal Oak Mines cited to S.CY., which dealt with the question of bad faith
bargaining and failure to make every reasonable effort to enter into a collective agreement.
770
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C. Labour Relations under the Federal Jurisdiction after the Sims
Report
1. The Sims Task Force
Following the appointment of a Task Force to inquire into Part I of the Code on
June 29, 1995 by the federal Minister of Labour,9 the legislation has undergone sig-
nificant modifications which reflect changes in labour relations. The Sims Task Force
was mandated to conduct a comprehensive review of the law governing collective
bargaining for private sector employers and trade unions within the federal jurisdic-
tion.’ Their work focused mainly on the administration of the Code and labour rela-
tions processes, such as representation, collective bargaining, and rights and obliga-
tions during work stoppages. The report, entitled Seeking a Balance, benefited from a
consensus between labour and management on many important issues, and among the
members of the Task Force on all the proposed changes, the only exception being the
issue of the use of replacement workers.”‘
The recommendations of the Sims Report were given serious consideration by the
Government which presented Bill C-66′ before the House of Commons.” The Bill,
which captured the essence of the recommendations of the Task Force never reached
“Part I (Industrial Relations) of the Canada Labour Code, supra note 1.
“Sims Report, supra note 2 at 247. The group was composed of Rodrigue Blouin and Paula Knopf,
members, and Andrew C.L. Sims, chair.
bid. at 248:
The Task Force is to identify options, and where appropriate make recommendations
for legislative changes, with a view to improving collective bargaining and reducing
conflict, facilitating labour-management cooperation, ensuring effective and efficient
administration of the Code, and addressing the changing workplace and employment
relationship.
See also section 2 of the Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, for a definition of “federal work, un-
dertaking or business”.
61 Sims Report, supra note 2 at ix-xii (Executive Summary). There is no specific definition of “re-
placement worker” in the legislation. However, the prohibition relating to replacement workers refers
to “a person who was not an employee in the bargaining unit on the date on which notice to bargain
collectively was given and was hired or assigned after that date to perform all or part of the duties of
an employee in the bargaining unit on strike or locked our’ (Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s.
94(2.1)).
62 Bill C-66, An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code (Part I) and the Corporations and Labour
Unions Returns Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 2d Sess., 35th Parl., 1997
(died on the Order Paper when Parliament was dissolved on April 27, 1997) [hereinafter Bill C-66].
For a thorough analysis of Bill C-66, see D. Monet, “La rdforme du Code canadien du travail” in Bar-
reau du Qulbec, Service de la formation permanente, ed., Ddveloppement rdcents en droit du travail
(1997) (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 1997) 1.
“House of Commons Debates (4 November 1996) at 6065 (1st reading Bill C-66); House of Com-
mons Debates (4 March 1997) at 8625 (2d reading Bill W-66); House of Commons Debates (9 April
1997) at 9491 (3d reading Bill C-66).
200
L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
third reading by the Senate due to an election call in the spring of 1997.’ In its next
parliamentary session, the Government remained committed to modernizing its labour
law and re-introduced a similar Bill’ before the House of Commons’ and the Senate,’
which finally came into force on January 1st, 1999. The new amendments have modi-
fied the rights and obligations of parties at the different stages of labour relationships,
particularly during strikes and lockouts, which directly or indirectly impact on the use
of replacement workers.
2. The Acquisition of the Right to Strike or Lockout
a. Legal Requirements
In our system of collective bargaining, a collective agreement entered into be-
tween an employer and a trade. union-also binding upon the employees–is for a
fixed period of time.6′ The legislation seeks to protect industrial peace by prohibiting
strikes and lockouts during the term of a collective agreement.” Before the employer
or the trade union may engage in a legal work stoppage, certain requirements must be
met, ‘ including the notification by one party to the other of its intention to bargain in
good faith to renew, revise, or enter into a new collective agreement.’ In the event that
“Senate Debates (10 April 1997) at 1863 (lst reading Bill C-66); Senate Debates (25 April 1997)
at 2128 (2d reading Bill C-66).
6Bill C-19, An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code (Part I) and the Corporations and Labour
Unions Returns Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess., 36th Parl., 1997
(Royal Assent on June 18, 1998; Proclamation on January 1, 1999) [hereinafter Bill C-19]. The dif-
ferences between Bill C-66 and Bill C-19 are found in the changes to the wording of a few provisions,
particularly those dealing with replacement workers and off-site workers. For a detailed comparison
of the two bills, see J.R. Hassell, “The New Board, Replacement Workers and Strikes/Certification Is-
sues for Non-Union Employers and More!” (Labour and Employee Relations for Federally Regulated
Employers, Insight Conference, 1 December 1997) [unpublished] at 37.
6House of Commons Debates (6 November 1997) at 1619 (lst Reading Bill C-19); House of
Commons Debates (12 March 1998) at 6821 (2d Reading Bill C-19); House of Commons Debates
(25 May 1998) at 7178 (3d Reading Bill C-19).
67 Senate Debates (26 May 1998) at 1529 (lst Reading Bill C-19); Senate Debates (8 June 1998) at
1680 (2d Reading Bill C-19); Senate Debates (18 June 1998) at 1868 (3d Reading Bill C-19).
s. 67(1).
6′ Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s. 56.
6Ibid,
70 ]bid, s. 88.1; Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 38; Bill C-66, supra note 62, cl. 38 (minor difference in
the wording of the provision of Bill C-66) provides an exception for collective agreements which in-
clude the possibility of revision during their term (see Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s. 49(2)).
As well, the employer may not change the work conditions of employees prior to the acquisition by
one of the parties of the right to strike or lockout (see Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 50(b)).
7l Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 89(1).
7 Ibid, s. 49(1). The period of three months immediately preceding the date of expiration of the
term of the collective agreement in which a party may require the other to commence collective bar-
gaining has been extended to four months following the coming into force of Bill C-19, supra note
McGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGLL
[Vol. 45
the parties, while acting in good faith, have failed to bargain collectively or have bar-
gained collectively but have failed to enter into or revise a collective agreement, one
of them may inform the Minister of Labour of their failure to agree,7′ forcing the latter
to take action.” The Minister may, in the alternative, consider it advisable to take ac-
tion in this regard on her own initiative.” The Minister may appoint a conciliation of-
ficeri” or a conciliation commissioner,7′ require the establishment of a conciliation
board,” or notify the parties of her intention not to take any action (through the issu-
ance of a “no-board report”).’
With the advent of the new amendments, parties still have to go through a con-
ciliation process” but the new process’ is now limited to one stage prior to the acqui-
sition of the right to strike or lockout. The Minister may only take one of the above
actions with respect to any particular dispute involving a bargaining unity This ap-
proach is different from the former two-stage conciliation process where the Minister
would first appoint a conciliation officer’ and then, if required, appoint a conciliation
commissioner, establish a conciliation board, or issue a “no-board” reportY While
65. This modification was drafted to take into account the new one-step conciliation process, see be-
low. See also Sims Report, supra note 2 at 99.
” Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s. 50(a). See also Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 996.(1); Bill
C-19, supra note 65, cl. 45(2); Bill C-66, supra note 62, cl. 45(2) (power of the Board to require that a
party include in or withdraw from a bargaining position specific terms or to direct a binding method
of resolving those terms).
” Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 71(1).
kTIid, s. 72(1).
“6Tbid., s. 72(2).
‘ The duties of the conciliation officer are found at Canada Labour Code, ibid, ss. 73(2)(a),
73(2)(b); Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 32; Bill C-66, supra note 62, cL 32.
7 The duties of the conciliation commissioner are found at: Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 74(2);
Bill C-19, ibid, cl. 33; Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 33.
” The duties of the conciliation board are found at: Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 74(2); Bill C-19,
ibid., cl. 33; Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 33.
‘o Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 72(1).
“Ibid, ss. 70.1-79. The parties in dispute may agree to be bound by the recommendations of the
conciliation officer or the report of the conciliation commissioner or conciliation board; the parties
may also include in their collective agreement a provision to the effect that any matter arising out of
collective bargaining be referred to a person or body for final and binding determination (ibid, ss. 78-
79; Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 33; Bill C-66, supra note 62, cl. 33).
“2 Canada Labour Code, ibid, ss. 70.1, 71, 72(3), 73(2)(b), 74-79; Bill C-19, ibid, cls. 30-33; Bill
C-66, ibid, cls. 30-33.
“3 Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 72(3); Bill C-19, ibid, cl. 31; Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 31. The Minister
may, however, direct the conciliation commissioner or the conciliation board to reconsider their report
and clarify or amplify any part of it (see Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 76; Bill C-19, ibid., cl. 33; Bill
C-66, ibid, cl. 33).
Ss. 72 and 73 of the Canada Labour Code, ibid, prior to their amendment on January 1st, 1999.
Ss. 74 and 75 of the Canada Labour Code, ibid, prior to their amendment on January 1st, 1999.
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L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
773
parties valued the previous conciliation process, ‘ changes were required to reduce
what was perceived as a time inefficient and “politically managed” process: “iTihe
parties have come to believe that conciliators are delaying the release of reports in or-
der to strategically effect the timing of industrial action in order to accom[m]odate
political and public interests. The parties see this as an unwarranted manipulation of
free collective bargaining.”‘
Even though conciliation between parties is now more expeditious because of the
one-step process and the time limits imposed for a conciliation officer, commissioner,
or board to report to the Minister,’ what is regrettable about Bill C-19 is its failure to
remove the power of appointment from the Minister.8′ The legislation did not follow
the recommendation of the Sims Task Force that appointments regarding the concilia-
tion process be made by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ‘ rather than
by the Minister, in order to preserve ministerial neutrality.’
Once the parties have gone through conciliation, they must respect a “cooling-
off” period ‘ before any work stoppage may legally take place. This period begins af-
ter the actual or deemed issuance by the Minister of a report written by the concilia-
tion officer, commissioner, or board, or a “no-board” report.’ Initially fixed at seven
days by the legislator, the period of time has now increased to twenty-one days before
the parties may be in a position to strike or lockout. ‘ In addition, three new prerequi-
sites to a legal strike or lockout were added through the adoption of Bill C-19: the
“Sims Report, supra note 2 at 109: ‘While they [the parties] often have little expectation that con-
ciliation will, in itself, bring them to settlement, the conciliation process serves to bring them together,
focus the areas in dispute, force each side to reexamine its position and bring accountability to each of
the negotiating teams.”
/bid at 112.
Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s. 75(1); Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 33; Bill C-66, supra
note 62, cl. 33.
89 Canada Labour Code, ibiL, s. 72(1).
” The role of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has been officially recognized in the
legislation at s. 70.1 of the Canada Labour Code, ibid; cl. 30 of Bill C-19, supra note 65; cl. 30 of
Bill C-66, supra note 62.
9′ Sims Report, supra note 2 at 114-15.
“Adams, supra note 4 at para. 2.3850:
In most of the jurisdictions, there is a “cooling-off” period which must be observed be-
fore a strike can legally occur. The time span is generally seven to fourteen days from
the date on which the Minister releases either the report of the conciliation board or a
statement notifying the parties that such a body will not be appointed. Sometimes other
prerequisites must be fulfilled before a strike or lockout can occur. These include the
taking of a strike vote or providing notice to the Minister or opposing party of the strike
date. In Quebec, however, employees are free to strike ninety days after the employer
has been notified of the intention to bargain.
93 Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s. 89(1)(d); Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 39; Bill C-66, supra
note 62, cl. 39 (the “cooling-off” period would have been fourteen days under Bill C-66).
94Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 89(l)(d); Bill C-19, ibid, cl. 39; Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 39.
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maintenance of essential services, the giving of strike or lockout notices, and the tak-
ing of strike or lockout votes.
b. Essential Services
With regard to essential services,” while strikes and lockouts arise between em-
ployers and trade unions, their consequences are not necessarily limited to those di-
rectly involved and may affect the general public to different degrees, ranging from
minor inconvenience and economic loss to danger to public health and safety.’ Be-
cause “federal infrastructure industries provide the major threads of our national eco-
nomic and social fabric”‘7 some restrictions on the parties’ right to strike or lockout
were required to prevent immediate and serious dangers to the safety and health of the
public. ‘ Under the new framework, emphasis is put on the agreement between parties
as to what services, if any, should be maintained during a work stoppage. ‘ Interven-
tion only takes place if the parties fail to agree or because of a ministerial referral.'”‘
The Board is vested with broad powers to make orders, to subsequently review
these orders, and to direct the parties to undergo a binding resolution of their dispute
where the maintenance of services renders the exercise of the right to strike or lockout
ineffective.”0 ‘ Once an application for the determination of essential services has been
filed by one of the parties or by the Minister, the work conditions are under status quo
until the right to strike or lockout is acquired, unless the parties agree otherwise. The
employer must accordingly not alter the rates of pay, any other term or condition of
employment, or any right or privilege of the employees in the bargaining unit or of the
bargaining agent.’9’ Similarly, the employees must continue to perform their work.
During the work stoppage, the employer must offer the same work conditions present
9 For a general discussion on essential services, see L Bernier, ed., Strikes and Essential Services
(Quebec: Presses de l’Universit Laval, 1994).
Sims Report, supra note 2 at 151.
“Tbid.
The Sims Report dismissed the possibility of imposing a complete ban on the right to strike or
lockout based on any threat to health or safety because no circumstances under the Code justified
such a totalitarian measure (ibid at 152). It preferred to force the parties to maintain essential services
while facing a labour dispute over interest arbitration, final offer selection, or use of back-to-work
legislation (ibid at 159-63).
9 Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, ss. 87.4(1) – (3); Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 37; Bill C-66,
‘” Canada Labour Code, ibid., ss. 87.4(4)-(5); Bill C-19; ibid, cl. 37; Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 37. See
supra note 62, cl. 37.
also Sims Report, supra note 2 at 154.
,0, Canada Labour Code, ibid, ss. 87.4(6)-(8); Bill C-19, ibid, cl. 37; Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 37. The
Board also has the power to issue an order requiring an employer to comply with or cease contraven-
ing with these sections.
” Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 87.5(1); Bill C-19, ibid., cl. 37; Bill C-66, ibid., cl. 37. See also
Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 99(1)(a); Bill C-19, ibid, cl. 45(1); Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 45(1) (power of
the Board to issue an order requiring the employer to comply with or cease contravening with this
subsection and to pay compensation to employees).
2000]
L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
before the strike or lockout to the members of the bargaining unit assigned to the
maintenance of services, again unless the parties agree otherwise.’ 3 For the purpose of
preserving the parties’ right to strike or lockout, an application for review of an order
or a ministerial referral does not suspend the labour dispute.”
c. Strike/Lockout Notices
The parties must also give strike/lockout notice of seventy-two hours prior to any
action being taken, unless a legal lockout or strike has occurred.” This new technical
requirement seeks to prepare the parties better for a labour dispute, particularly em-
ployers, by discouraging the unauthorized premature disruption of work and most im-
portantly by focusing the parties on negotiations to encourage settlement before a
specific deadline.”4 Where no strike or lockout has occurred pursuant to the notice
given by one of the parties, the trade union or the employer must provide a new notice if
it wishes to initiate a strike or lockout, unless the parties agree otherwise in writing.'”7
d. Strike/Lockout Votes
With the addition of mandatory strike votes before the acquisition of the right to
strike,'” the Canada Labour Code now conforms with all provincial labour statutes
which require the holding of secret ballot strike votes. The Sims Task Force observed
that the decision to take strike action is of particular importance for employees and it
should be treated as such:
We believe that a mandatory strike vote adds an important element to collective
bargaining. Unions and the employees they represent are not disconnected
from one another. Unions, as democratic organizations, customarily take their
mandates from their members, particularly on crucial questions like the deci-
sion to take industrial action. A visible and proximate reaffirmation of that fact
Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 87.5(3); Bill C-19, ibid, cl. 37; Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 37.
” Canada Labour Code, ibid, ss. 87.2(1)-(2); Bill C-19, ibid., cl. 37; Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 37.
o6Sims Report, supra note 2 at 116.
Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s. 87.2(3); Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 37; Bill C-66, supra
‘ Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 87.5(2); Bill C-19, ibid, ci. 37; Bill C-66, ibid., cl. 37. See also
Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 99(1)(a); Bill C-19, ibid, cl. 45(1); Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 45(1) (power of
the Board to issue an order requiring the employer to comply with or cease contravening with this
subsection and to pay compensation to employees).
note 62, cl. 37.
0″ The legislation also requires the holding of lockout votes where employers bargain as a group.
‘
The provision only mirrors the requirement of strike votes; the analysis provided for strike votes is
applicable to lockout votes with the necessary adjustments (see Canada Labour Code, ibid., ss.
87.3(2),(3),(5)-(7); Bill C-19, ibid., cl. 37; Bill C-66, ibid, cl. 37. See also Sims Report, supra note 2
at 106).
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is healthy because it reinforces the legitimacy of the union’s position in the eyes
of the employer, the employees and the public at large.'”
Under the federal labour legislation, the holding of a strike vote must occur less
than sixty days prior to the declaration of a strike.”‘ The provision reveals the legisla-
tor’s concern that the strike vote be held in the context of the current state of bargain-
ing. The strike vote represents more than just the expression of support for the trade
union’s position, it also conveys an implicit rejection of the employer’s stance.”‘ Con-
sidering the fact that strike action affects all employees working for the employer, se-
cret ballot strike votes must include the entire workplace involved in a dispute,
whether or not the employees are members of the trade union.”‘2
While it is the bargaining agent’s responsibility to direct a strike vote, an em-
ployee may challenge the validity of such a vote”3 if the trade union does not comply
with the statutory conditions.”‘ It is important to note that the Board may summarily
dismiss such an application if it is satisfied that even if the alleged irregularities were
proven, the outcome of the vote would not be different.”5 But if the Board is to declare
the vote invalid, it may order that a new vote be held pursuant to certain conditions.”6
In addition, there is no need for a trade union to hold a strike vote if an employer has
initiated a legal lockout because since the collective agreement is no longer applicable
between the parties, there cannot be any limit on the trade union’s immediate right to
give its notice to strike in reply to such action.
,9 Sims Report, ibid at 105. In recent years, there seems to be a tendency in the legislature to give
employees more possibilities to express their wishes on matters that concern them. See e.g. s. 108.1 of
the Canada Labour Code, ibid, which allows the Minister to give the opportunity to employees to
vote on the employer’s last offer.
” Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 87.3(1); Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 37; Bill C-66, supra note 62,
cl. 37. The holding of a strike vote may be performed more than sixty days prior to the authorization
of a strike by the trade union; a longer period of time may be agreed to in writing by the parties (this
option would not have been available to the parties under Bill C-66).
.. Sims Report, supra note 2 at 105.
12bid
’13 Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s. 87.3(4); Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 37; Bill C-66, supra
note 62, cl. 37. To avoid unnecessary delays, the employee must challenge the strike vote no later than
ten days after the announcement of the results of the vote.
” Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 87.3(3); Bill C-19, ibid., cl. 37; Bill C-66, ibid., cl. 37. See also
Sins Report, supra note 2 at 105.
‘ Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 87.3(6); Bill C-19, ibid., cl. 37; Bill C-66, ibid., cl. 37. See also
Sims Report, ibid
Sims Report, ibid
“‘ Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 87.3(7); Bill C-19, ibid., cl. 37; Bill C-66, ibid., cl. 37. See also
2000]
L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
3. Replacement Workers
a. Views of the Majority
As noted above, the Sims Task Force did not achieve unanimity on the question of
whether replacement workers should or should not be used in a labour dispute.’
However, the study group felt the need to clarify the law in this area to reduce con-
frontational disputes over the extent of the parties’ rights.” For many reasons, labour
and management representation were also divided on the question.”‘ Employers on
the one hand believed that they should be entitled to use replacement workers because
of their reduced ability to cope with strikes, because they are unequally vulnerable to
a prohibition on replacement workers, and because of the negative consequences a
prohibition would have on investments. On the other hand, trade unions demanded a
complete ban on the use of replacement workers due to the employees’ difficulties in
finding alternate work during labour disputes, the potential for violence on the picket
lines, the negative impact on the duration and results of strikes, and the threat re-
placement workers pose to collective bargaining rights. More fundamentally, the par-
ties expressed different views on work and work stoppages:
From an employer’s perspective, the obligation to bargain is an obligation to
bargain over the terms of work for their employees. They retain, in their view,
the residual right to get the work done in other ways, restrained only by any
commitments that they make through collective bargaining (for example, a
prohibition on contracting out). Such commitments end, in any event, once a
work stoppage takes place.
From the union’s perspective, employees retain a permanent connection to their
job until terminated. The Code maintains employees’ status during a work
stoppage, and protects them against retaliation for exercising their right to
strike. Employees often perceive themselves as having almost a proprietary
right not just to employment, but to the performance of the work. They there-
fore see it as an invasion of this proprietary right when someone else takes over
their job.120
The parties also had different views with respect to the purpose of work stoppages.
Employers consider collective bargaining as being an instrument to determine the
market value of work. Trade unions perceive strikes and lockouts as being a test of re-
sistance between the financial ability of an employer versus that of the employees to
survive a work stoppage:
Some see collective bargaining as an important market instrument. The strike
or lockout tests competing views of the market value of work. The union
“7 Sims Report, ibid at 122-31 (A.C.L. Sims and P. Knopf for the majority) and at 138-50 (R.
Blouin for the minority).
Ibid at 122.
“‘Ibid
at 122-28.
Ibid at 124.
778
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maintains that the work is worth a specified price; the employer, in turn, be-
lieves it can get the work done for less. The availability of willing replacement
workers and the efficiency with which they perform the work tests these as-
sumptions. If replacement workers are unavailable or unsatisfactory, the em-
ployer is persuaded to raise its offer. If they work well, this pressures the em-
ployees, through their union, to reduce their demands to the market level.
Others see the strike as being fought on the more limited field of the financial
ability of the employer to survive a shutdown versus the ability of the employ-
ees to survive without wages. Under this perception, the employer is seen as
garnering an unfair advantage by maintaining a revenue stream during a shut-
down. Employers argue that employees are not precluded from seeking alter-
native employment during a work stoppage and that to achieve balance, em-
ployers should not be prohibited from using alternate sources of labour.”‘
Through a consideration of the two prevailing philosophies under the provincial
labour statutes, the majority preferred a middle ground solution,'” whereby replace-
ment workers would only be prohibited where the employer uses such workers for the
demonstrated purpose of undermining the trade union’s representative capacity rather
than to pursue legitimate bargaining objectives.” The majority of the Task Force felt
that strikes and lockouts should be fought in terms of bargaining issues, and not in
terms of the question of representation. Thus, the majority sought to preserve the ba-
sic balance of collective bargaining.'”
The prohibition applies to employers who convert economic interest disputes into
representation disputes: the prohibition is directed at employers who are pursuing
goals beyond the economic position they wish to achieve and who sustain labour dis-
putes because employees are represented by a trade union.'” Nevertheless, the major-
ity felt strongly that in our system of collective bargaining, employers should retain
the ability to use replacement workers for legitimate purposes as they may be neces-
sary to sustain the financial viability of the workplace, particularly when employers
are confronted with a harsh economic climate or unacceptable trade union demands.'”
The majority of the Task Force could not provide a clear test to determine when
replacement workers are used by employers for illegitimate ends, but it suggested that
“[s]uch intention can be inferred from reports of unfair labour practice complaints and
,’ Ibid. at 124-25. See also Arthurs, supra note 42 at 192 (cited in CKLWRadio Broadcasting 1978,
supra note 39 at 311), where Professor Arthurs notes that the “[r]esort by the employer to the labour
market to keep his plant running is part of the test of economic realities which the strike is intended to
be”.
,2 See House of Commons Debates (19 February 1998) at 4168 (debates for 2d reading Bill C-19),
where the Hon. Lawrence MacAulay (Minister of Labour) led off the debate on Bill C-19 and said
that “we have adopted a reasonable middle of the road approach that can be accepted as a workable
compromise by both labour and managemene’.
,23 Sins Report, supra note 2 at 129.
22 Ibid. at 130.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
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L. VAILLANCOURT- REPLACEMENT WORKERS
from first-hand accounts of the disputes themselves.”” The wording of the provision'”
gave rise to heated debates in the House of Commons, in the Senate, and before the
committees to which it was presented. Following the death of Bill C-66, the Minister
modified the wording of the provision to better reflect the recommendation of the
Sims Task Force:’
No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall use, for the dem-
onstrated purpose of undermining a trade union’s representational capacity
rather than the pursuit of legitimate bargaining objectives, the services of a
person who was not an employee in the bargaining unit on the date on which
notice to bargain collectively was given and was hired or assigned after that
date to perform all or part of the duties of an employee in the bargaining unit
on strike or locked out.,o
To enforce this provision, the Board has been vested with the power to require the
employer to stop using, for the duration of the dispute, the services of replacement
workers when an unfair labour practice has been committed.’3′
b. Views of the Minority
The minority of the Sims Task Force issued a separate recommendation on the
question of replacement workers. It would have prohibited employers from using such
‘JbidL
‘ S. 42(2) of Bill C-66, supra note 62:
No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall use, for the purpose of
undermining a trade union’s representational capacity, the services of a person who was
not an employee in the bargaining unit on the date on which notice to bargain collec-
tively was given and was hired or assigned after that date to perform all or part of the
duties of an employee in the bargaining unit on strike or locked out.
,9 See House of Commons Debates (19 February 1998) at 4168 (debates for 2d reading Bill C-19),
where the Hon. Lawrence MacAulay (Minister of Labour) said-
While concerns about the clarity of the replacement worker provision in Bill C-66 were
debatable, I have decided to act. Again, after consultation with the stakeholders this
summer, the provision has been reworded to more accurately reflect the narrative used
in the Sims task force majority recommendations.
‘ S. 94(2.1) of the Canada Labour Code, supra note 1 [emphasis added]; s. 42(2) of Bill C-19, su-
pra note 65. The addition of the word “demonstrated” in the provision was not meant to increase the
burden of proof (see House of Commons, Bill C-19, An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code (Part
I) and the Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act and to make consequential amendments to
other Acts (minutes of proceedings of 24 March 1998) (Ottawa: Standing Committee on Human Re-
sources Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities, 1998) at 15 [hereinafter “Minutes of
Proceedings”], where Mr. Mike McDermott, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, said: “Some of them
[interest groups] expressed the view that the wording of C-66 was not sufficiently clear with respect to
the burden of proof. We were of the view that it was clear enough in Bill C-66 but we eventually con-
cluded that it was possible to add this word without changing the tenor of this provision.”)
131 Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 99(b.3); Bill C-19, ibid, cl. 45(2); Bill C-66, supra note 62, cl.
45(2). See also Part ]IA.3: Remedial Orders, below.
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workers from the beginning of the bargaining process until the conclusion of a collec-
tive agreement or the decertification of the trade union.'” The minority would have
adopted this restrictive approach because while it views strikes and lockouts as con-
stituting valid economic pressure tactics exercised by the parties to promote their re-
spective interests, in contrast, the use of replacement workers
undermines the structural elements that ensure the internal cohesion of the col-
lective bargaining system, by introducing a foreign body into a dispute between
two clearly identified parties. It upsets the economic balance of power, com-
promises the freedom of expression of workers engaging in a strike or lockout,
shifts the original neutral ground of the dispute, and leads eventually to a per-
ception of exploitation of the individual.’ 33
In essence, the minority was concerned with maintaining the balance of power
between the parties throughout the work stoppage as it existed prior to the bargaining
dispute.” While the minority would have prohibited the use of replacement workers,
it would not have prevented employers from subcontracting work outside their prem-
ises to ensure the economic survival of the workplace as the subcontracting of work
was considered by the minority to be the equivalent of alternate work for employees.”‘
In addition, the minority would have made two exceptions to the proposed ban of re-
placement workers: the non-compliance by a trade union with its obligation respect-
ing essential services and the maintenance or repairs necessary to keep the workplace
or equipment in working order. 6
4. Legal Status of Striking or Locked-Out Employees
Along with the replacement-workers provision, the Sims Task Force felt obliged
to clarify the legal status of striking or locked-out employees.’ The new provision
“‘ Sims Report, supra note 2 at 138.
3 Ibid.
1Ibid,
“‘ Ibid. at 149.
“4 Ibid. at 150.
“‘ The dissent of Locke J. in Canadian Paciflc Railway v. Zambri, [1962] S.C.R. 609, 34 D.L.R.
(2d) 654 had caused confusion with regards to the right of reinstatement of striking and locked out
employees. See Adams, supra note 4 at para. 10.540:
All Canadian statutes provide that the employment relationship does not cease solely
because an employee has ceased to work as a result of a strike or lockout. However, in
obiter, M. Justice Locke of the Supreme Court of Canada, in C.P.RI Co. v. Zambri, ex-
pressed the view that employers were nevertheless at liberty to engage others to fill the
places of strikers and were not obligated to continue the employment of striking em-
ployees at the termination of a strike if there was no work for them to do. This is also
the American approach, On the other hand, the line between lawful discharge and law-
ful permanent replacement can be seen as a “fine” one. The policy behind requiring
employees to be prepared to lose their jobs when engaging in strike activity is to con-
vey the seriousness of strike action and its impact on both the community and the em-
ployer. But the refusal to re-employ long-standing striking employees in favour of
2000]
L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
gives an express statutory right to striking or locked-out employees to return to work
at the, end of a work stoppage in preference to any person hired during the conflict.
Such discrimination was previously prohibited by the Code, although not in express
terms.39 The Sims Task Force also wanted to clarify that the obligation of the em-
ployer to reinstate striking or locked-out employees in the bargaining unit over re-
placement workers would not be tantamount to employees having a right to a collec-
tive agreement. The right to return to work upon the end of a strike or lockout does
“scab” replacements has a punitive connotation, carries with it the seeds of ugly picket-
line violence and is amenable to the characterization of being “inherently destructive”.
These countervailing policy considerations prompted some Canadian jurisdictions to
deal specifically with the right of strikers to the return of their positions, Ontario and
Quebec having the most explicit beneficial provisions for striking employees. In effect,
the American “Mackay” doctrine expressed in Zambri has been seen in these jurisdic-
tions as too discouraging of collective bargaining. Importantly, the Canada [Labour
Relations] board, pursuant to its general unfair labour practice sections, has character-
ized the refusal to re-employ striking employees as an unfair labour practice even with-
out specific statutory direction.
See also K.S. Cornwell, Post-Strike Job Security of Strikers and Replacement Workers: A United
States-Canada Comparison (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen’s University, 1990).
3 Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s. 87.6; Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 37; Bill C-66, supra
note 62, cl. 37. See Sims Report, supra note 2 at 134. See also ss. 99(1) and (2) of the Canada Labour
Code, ibid.; Bill C-19, ibid., cs. 45(l)-(2); Bill C-66, ibid., cls. 45(l)-(2) (power of the Board to issue
an order requiring the employer to comply with or cease contravening with these sections, to reinstate
employees and to pay them compensation).
39 S. 3(2) of the Canada Labour Code, ibid., provides:
3(2) No person ceases to be an employee within the meaning of this Part by reason
only of their ceasing to work as the result of a lockout or strike or by reason only of
their dismissal contrary to this Part.
Ss. 94(3)(a)(vi) and (d)(i) of the Canada Labour Code, ibid, also provide:
94(3) No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall
a) refuse to employ or to continue to employ or suspend, transfer, lay off or otherwise
discriminate against any person with respect to employment, pay or any other term or
condition of employment or intimidate, threaten or otherwise discipline any person, be-
cause the person
(vi) has participated in a strike that is not prohibited by this Part or exercised any right
under this Part;
d) deny to any employee any pension rights or benefits to which the employee would
be entitled but for
(i) the cessation of work by the employee as the result of a lockout or strike that is not
prohibited by this Part …
See e.g. Eastern Provincial Airways, supra note 45; Union of Bank Employees (Ontario), Local 2104
and C.LC. and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1986), 65 di 1, 86 C.L.C. 16,023
(C.L.R.B.); Brewster Transport Company, supra note 49; Graham Cable TV/FM and Communica-
tions, Electronic, Electrical, Technical and Salaried Workers of Canada (1986), 67 di 1, 86 C.L.C.
para. 16,039 (C.L.LB.).
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not mean that the parties will necessarily be in agreement with the terms and condi-
tions of a collective agreement.'”
When reviewing the prohibition for filing an application for certification or de-
certification of a bargaining unit during the first six months of a strike or lockout
without the consent of the Board, the Sims Task Force reached the conclusion that the
time frame “sometimes encourages posturing during bargaining in the hope that de-
certification will ensue after six months of stalled negotiations”‘”” The modified sub-
sections 24(3) and 38(5) of the Code’2 address this concern by replacing the artificial
time period with a general requirement for a party to obtain the consent of the Board
during a work stoppage.
In accordance with the Board’s approach to employees’ representation votes dur-
ing labour disputes, subsection 29(1.1) of the Code restricts the participation to em-
ployees in the bargaining unit on the date on which notice to bargain collectively was
given.’ This provision has the effect of excluding replacement workers from such
votes because of their temporary status. The rationale behind this codification is to
state clearly that permanent employees have the right to participate whether they sup-
port their trade union or return to work voluntarily during the strike or lockout.”
In sum, the changes introduced by the enactment of Bill C-19 with regard to la-
bour disputes will force employers and trade unions to fulfill more requirements be-
fore they are able to acquire the right to strike or lockout. However, the effect of these
new provisions should better circumscribe the debate and encourage earlier settle-
ments while clarifying the rights and obligations of the parties during a work stop-
page.
II. The New Provision: An Analysis
A. Prohibition Relating to Replacement Workers
Prior to the introduction of subsection 94(2.1) of the Code, federal labour legisla-
tion, as well as the interpretation given to it by the Board, did not prohibit the em-
ployer from using replacement workers. The implementation of the new provision
will not render the use of replacement workers illegal, but may prevent an employer
from using replacement workers in the event of a breach of the Code. Simply put, the
application of subsection 94(2.1) of the Code will constitute a serious interpretive
“40 Sims Report, supra note 2 at 134. It is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the possibility of
trade union discipline, employees are not entitled to nor prohibited from continuing to work for the
employer during a labour dispute (ibid at 137).
at 135.
‘4’Ibid
‘ Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, ss. 24(3), 38(5); Bill C-19, supra note 65, cls. 11, 20; Bill C-
66, supra note 62, cls. 11, 20.
‘ Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 29(1.1); Bill C-19, ibid, cl. 13; Bill C.-66, ibid, cl. 13.
‘”Sims Report, supra note 2 at 135.
2000]
L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
challenge to the Board. The new provision sits in between the two principal philoso-
phies respecting replacement workers by prohibiting employers from using such
workers for the demonstrated purpose of undermining the trade union’s representa-
tional capacity rather than the pursuit of legitimate bargaining objectives. Considering
the vague language used in the new provision and the difficulty of making any ana-
lytical comparison with the existing provincial provisions, the Board will most likely
refer to the work of the Sims Task Force to determine the parameters of the new pro-
hibition.”
Divergent positions between employers and trade unions are to be expected with
regard to the appropriate interpretation to be given to the new provision by the Board.
From the perspective of a trade union, the mere use of replacement workers under-
mines their representational capacity and the Board should accordingly prohibit their
use because strikes and lockouts should be limited to the exercise of economic pres-
sure tactics between parties without allowing the employer to bring third parties into
the relationship. From the perspective of an employer, the prohibition on the use of
replacement workers should only be exercised by the Board in special circumstances.
The addition of the word “demonstrated” to the provision before its final adoption,
with respect to the burden of proof, should be indicative of the high threshold a trade
union must meet before the Board may prohibit the use of replacement workers. Op-
posing views are also to be expected with respect to what should constitute the appro-
priate remedial orders for the breach of subsection 94(2.1) of the Code.
Beyond the diverging perspectives between employers and trade unions, the rec-
ommendations of the Sims Report make it clear that subsection 94(2.1) of the Code
cannot be regarded as a general prohibition on the use of replacement workers.” An
employer is legally entitled to use the services of replacement workers to put eco-
nomic pressure on the trade union in order to achieve its collective bargaining ends.’ 7
This is also confirmed by the adoption of subsection 29(1.1) and section 87.6 of the
Code, which indirectly recognize the employer’s right to use replacement workers.”‘
Nevertheless, subsection 94(2.1) of the Code differs from the pre-existing body of
‘4 The Sims Report, ibid, provides a thorough analysis of all the changes performed to the labour
legislation. The legislature was inspired by most of the recommendations made by the Task Force,
often word for word, to adopt the new amendments. It is also common practice for the Board to refer
to such reports to determine the intent of the legislature in passing certain provisions of the Code. For
example, the Woods Report, supra note 1, has been examined by the Board in NAB.E.T and CKLW
Radio Broadcasting (1977), 23 di 51 at 57, 77 C.L.L.C. para. 16,110 (C.L.R.B.) [hereinafter CKLW
Radio Broadcasting 1977 cited to di] and by the Supreme Court of Canada in Lavigne v. O.PS.E.U.,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, 81 D.L.R. (4th) 545.
‘4 Sims Report, ibid at 131.
“‘Ibid at 130.
‘4, Ss. 29(1.1) and 87.6 of the Canada Labour Code, supra note 1; cls. 13 and 37 of Bill C-19, supra
note 65; cls. 13 and 37 of Bill C-66, supra note 62, provide respectively that replacement workers are
not employees of the bargaining unit and that striking or locked out employees have the right to be
reinstated in the bargaining unit after a labour dispute in preference to replacement workers.
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law; an employer will be prevented from further use of replacement workers in a labour
dispute if its purpose is, for example, to attack the trade union’s representational status.149
The question then becomes, how should the Board interpret this partial prohibition?
In the author’s opinion, after careful analysis of the new provision, the Board
should find most of its answers by referring to the principles associated with the duty
to bargain.” In order to determine whether or not the employer has respected its duty
to bargain with the trade union, the Board would benefit from a legal framework for
the assessment of the legitimacy of the employer’s bargaining objectives. Where the
trade union has demonstrated that the employer has breached its duty to bargain and
has used the services of replacement workers to commit the breach, the Board should
conclude that the employer has interfered with the trade union and has therefore un-
dermined its representational capacity. The Board should then prohibit the employer
from further use of replacement workers in the bargaining process in which the parties
are engaged and, if required, should order other suitable remedies.
1. “The Pursuit of Legitimate Bargaining Objectives”
Before deciding on the legality of the use of replacement workers, the Board will
have to give meaning to the terms “legitimate bargaining objectives”. The legislation
has not defined the expression nor has the Board interpreted this wording in its previ-
ous decisions. The substance of these terms should be discovered by interpreting the
new provision in light of the legislative objectives of the Code. These objectives are
set out in the Preamble,'” which the Board has often used to interpret other provisions
of the Code.’ The legislative objectives seek primarily to encourage free collective
bargaining and constructive settlement of disputes between employers and trade un-
“‘ Sims Report, supra note 2 at 130.
“0 For a comprehensive analysis of the duty to bargain under Canadian jurisdictions, see Adams,
supra note 4 at paras. 10.1360-10.1700. See also the Woods Report, supra note 1 at 163-64 and GJ.
Clarke, Clarke’s Canada Industrial Relations Board, looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book,
1999) at 12-1 to 12-9 for an overview of the development of the duty under the federal jurisdiction.
R. & Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d ed. (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths,
1994) at 259 describes the primary function of a preamble as “the recitals constituting a preamble
[that] may mention not only the facts which the legislature thought were important but also principles
or policies which it sought to implement or goals to which it aspired”.
,’ bid at 261, outlining the uses of preambles: “Since preambles are an integral part of an enact-
ment, they are part of the context in which the words of the enactment must be read. As such, they
may be relied on to help resolve ambiguity, determine the scope or generally understand the meaning
and effect of legislative language”. The Board came to a similar conclusion in Union des Artistes
(UDA), Syndicat gdndral du cindma et de la tdlvision Radio-Canada (CNTU) and C.U.P.E. and Soci-
at Radio-Canada/Canadian Broadcasting (1982), 44 di 19, C.L.R.B. No. 383 at 239-40, online: QL
(CLRB): “The preamble to an act can thus serve or be used to limit the field of application or the
scope of an act or of any of its provisions … or, when the act includes imprecise terms, can serve, on
the basis of the objectives it expresses, to clarify the meaning of these terms”. See also Clarke, supra
note 150 at 2-1ff.
2000]
L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
785
ions.” The duty to bargain imposed on the parties is the principal means to achieve
these objectives:
The purpose of collective bargaining legislation is to bring the parties to the
bargaining table where they will present their proposals, articulate supporting
arguments and search for common ground which can serve as the basis for a
collective agreement. The duty to bargain, no matter how phrased, has been
elaborated over time by labour boards to prohibit certain specific conduct, ie.,
misrepresentations, and at times to censure a party’s entire bargaining stance
where “having regard to in all the circumstances”, a labour board concludes
that the real object of that party is to avoid a collective agreement.’m
Given the objectives of our system of collective bargaining and the role of the
duty to bargain, the Board would be justified in applying principles similar to those
which are applied to the duty to bargain in good faith and to make every reasonable
effort to enter into a collective agreement pursuant to paragraph 50(a) of the Code to
determine the legitimacy of the employer’s bargaining objectives under subsection
94(2.1) of the Code. Even if the terms used in these two provisions are different, the
Sims Report seems to suggest that they share similar purposes: “No one believes that
the utilization of replacement workers is a legitimate practice if its purpose is to rid
the workplace of union representation or undermine the role of the union rather than
to achieve an acceptable collective agreement”‘
The employer’s use of replacement workers occurs after bne of the parties has
obtained the legal right to strike or lockout, a right which is acquired, pursuant to sec-
tion 89 of the Code, in part as a result of unsuccessful collective bargaining. Accord-
ingly, when faced with a complaint of an unfair labour practice, the Board should
3 Preamble of the Canada Labour Code, supra note 1:
WHEREAS there is a long tradition in Canada of labour legislation and policy de-
signed for the promotion of the common well-being through the encouragement of free
collective bargaining and the constructive settlement of disputes;
AND WHEREAS Canadian workers, trade unions and employers recognize and sup-
port freedom of association and free collective bargaining as the bases of effective in-
dustrial relations for the determination of good working conditions and sound labour-
management relations;
AND WHEREAS the Government of Canada has ratified Convention No. 87 of the
International Labour Organization concerning Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organize and has assumed international reporting responsibilities in this
regard;
AND WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada desires to continue and extend its support
to labour and management in their cooperative efforts to develop good relations and
constructive collective bargaining practices, and deems the development of good in-
dustrial relations to be in the best interests of Canada in ensuring a just share of the
fruits of progress to all….
‘ Adams, supra note 4 at para. 10.1400.
‘ Sims Report, supra note 2 at 129 [emphasis added].
786
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adopt principles similar to those which apply to the duty to bargain in order to assess
the employer’s bargaining objectives. This approach would be more consistent with
the application of the legislation as a whole. Furthermore, the use of such principles is
supported by the fact that the employer has a continuing duty to bargain from the
moment the notice to bargain is given until the conclusion of a collective agreement”
or, in the absence of a collective agreement, throughout a work stoppage.” The em-
ployer’s bargaining objectives are the subject of continuing scrutiny and this scrutiny
should be particularly intense where replacement workers have been hired.
Pursuant to paragraph 50(a) of the Code, the duty to bargain is related to the
manner in which negotiations are conducted rather than to the content of the parties’
proposals.”‘ This duty is composed of two elements of equal importance, good faith
and making every reasonable effort to enter into a collective agreement, both of which
must be respected by the parties in the course of collective bargaining. The Supreme
Court of Canada recently had the opportunity to describe the nature of the duty:
There may well be exceptions but as a general rule the duty to enter into bar-
gaining must be measured on a subjective standard, while the making of a rea-
sonable effort to bargain should be measured by an objective standard which
can be ascertained by a board looking to comparable standards and practices
within the particular industry. It is the latter part of the duty which prevents a
party from hiding behind an assertion that it is sincerely trying to reach an
“4 The Board has been following the fundamental principles enunciated in CKLW Radio Broad-
casting 1977, supra note 145 at 87-89, when presented with a matter involving the duty to bargain:
This does not mean parties cannot, in the exercise of free collective bargaining, engage
in hard or ruthless bargaining …
There is no rule in collective bargaining, like chess, that either party must move first.
The duty to bargaining does not cease when a work stoppage commences, although
actions of the parties are appraised in that climate …
In the absence of an indication of a change in positions a refusal to meet was not con-
trary to the Code.
… General Aviation Services, supra note 44 at 83.
,.. For an elaboration of the extent of the duty to bargain, see De WlIbiss (Canada), [1976] 2 Can.
L.R.B.R. 101, [1976] March O.L.R.B. Rep. 49. This interpretation has been followed in CKLWRadio
Broadcasting 1977, supra note 145. In the latter case, the Board also concluded (at 58):
[Glood faith bargaining and reasonable efforts to conclude collective agreements are
required of parties, but entering a collective agreement is not necessarily the result of
bargaining. Conciliation is the preferred method of settling impasses but economic
sanction is the ultimate test of bargaining strength. To ensure the parties respect each
other’s rights and to encourage constructive bargaining and the development of good
relations, the parties are required to bargain in good faith and make every reasonable
effort to enter into a collective agreement.
2000]
L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
agreement when, viewed objectively, it can be seen that its proposals are so far
from the accepted norms of the industry that they must be unreasonable.”9
The duty to bargain has been interpreted by the Board as fulfilling two labour re-
lations purposes: first, the recognition of the trade union as the bargaining agent of
employees and second, the fostering of rational, informed discussion.” The recogni-
tion of the trade union requires the employer to approach collective bargaining with
the objective of concluding an agreement. The quality of discussion is broader in its
application, covering situations where the employer engages in “hard bargaining” but
does so in good faith and where the employer makes a pretense of bargaining, com-
monly known as “surface bargaining”….
While parties are allowed to act in their individual self-interest and take firm po-
sitions which may be unacceptable to the other side, the employer cannot advance
through the bargaining process with the intention not to conclude a collective agree-
ment.’ 2 The distinction between “hard bargaining” and “surface bargaining” lies es-
sentially on an appreciation of the facts of each case and must take into account the
For a critical analysis of the extent of the duty to bargain, see G.W. Adams, ‘Towards a New Vitality:
Reflections on 20 Years of Collective Bargaining Regulation!’ (1991) 23 Ottawa L. Rev. 139.
… Royal Oak Mines, supra note 57 at 396-97.
‘6 CKLW Radio Broadcasting 1977, supra note 145 at 85. The Board approved the interpretation
given by the Ontario Labour Relations Board to the duty of good faith bargaining in De WIbiss (Can-
ada), supra note 158; Canadian Industries and United Steelworkers, [1976] May O.L.RB. Rep. 199.
See also Adams, supra note 4 at para. 10.1430.
161 CKLWRadio Broadcasting 1977, supra note 145 at 85.
” In Syndicat des employss de commerce et de bureau du Comtd Lapointe (C.N.T U.), Locals 675-
6, 675-7, 675-11, Syndicat des commis-comptables d’Alna, (C.N.TU), Locals 675-9, 675-10 and
Syndicat des employds de commerce de La Baie, Local 675-8 and Royal Bank of Canada (K~wgamt
Jonqui~re, La Baie and Alma) (1980), 41 di 199, [1982] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 16 at 212, the Board cited
with approval the Ontario Labour Relations Board’s decision in The Daily 7imes and Toronto 7ypo-
graphical Union No. 91, [1978] July O.L.R.B. Rep. 604,2 Can. L.R.B.R. 446:
Surface bargaining is a term which describes a going through the motions, or a pre-
serving of the surface indications of bargaining without the intent of concluding a col-
lective agreement. It constitutes a subtle but effective refusal to recognize the trade un-
ion. It is important, in the context of free collective bargaining, however, to draw the
distinction between “surface bargaining” and hard bargaining. The parties to collective
bargaining are expected to act in their individual self-interest and in so doing are enti-
tled to take firm positions which may be unacceptable to the other side. The Act allows
for the use of economic sanctions to resolve these bargaining impasses. Consequently,
the mere tendering of a proposal which is unacceptable or even “predictably unaccept-
able’ is not sufficient, standing alone to allow the Board to draw an inference of “sur-
face bargaining”. This inference can only be drawn from the totality of the evidence in-
cluding, but not restricted to, the adoption of an inflexible position on issues central to
the negotiations. It is only when the conduct of the parties on the whole demonstrates
that one side has no intention of concluding a collective agreement, notwithstanding its
preservation of the outward manifestations of bargaining, that a finding of “surface”
bargaining can be made.
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parties’ entire relationship.’63 It is precisely the distinction between “hard bargaining”
and “surface bargaining” which is an appropriate and comparable basis for an analysis
of the new provision.'” The Sims Report recognized a link between the use of re-
placement workers and “surface bargaining” or “bad faith bargaining”:
Some argue that it is not the ability to use replacement workers itself that is
objectionable so much as its frequent abuse. They point out the correlation
between the use of replacement workers and efforts to undermine the trade
union and destroy its bargaining agency.
This argument mirrors experience with the duty to bargain in good faith. La-
bour boards have moved to restrain bargaining proposals that indicate an inten-
tion to dislodge the union rather than to achieve a particular bargaining result.
The distinction between this form of bad faith bargaining and hard bargaining
is never easy to discern. However, such conduct is often accompanied by other
conduct indicative of the same intention. While labour boards are reluctant to
interfere with genuine bargaining positions, they are not, nor should they be,
reluctant to intervene when bargaining positions become thinly disguised unfair
labour practices aimed at undermining the union’s right to represent employ-
ee.165
The next step in the analysis is to determine whether or not the employer’s “sur-
face bargaining” or bad faith bargaining resulting from the use of replacement work-
ers undermines the trade union’s representational capacity.
2. “Demonstrated Purpose of Undermining
Representational Capacity”
the Trade Union’s
While the terms “undermining the trade union’s representational capacity” are not
defined in the legislation, previous decisions of the Board dealing with unfair labour
practices may shed light on the meaning of the new legislative terminology. The leg-
islation gives employees the right to join the trade union of their choice and to partici-
pate in its lawful activities,'” and also gives the trade union the exclusive rights and
duties to represent employees.'” One of the Board’s functions is to ensure that these
163 Ibid.
In this regard, the well-known text of Clarke, supra note 150 at 14-21, reaches a similar conclu-
sion:
The Board has already noted that the Code provisions on bargaining in good faith are
not designed to assist a party which takes an unreasonable bargaining position. A
similar principle would apply to any application regarding replacement workers. How-
ever surface bargaining, which demonstrates a desire not to conclude a collective
agreement and violates the obligation to bargain in good faith, may provide a compara-
ble test for the application of this new provision on replacement workers.
‘6 Sims Report, supra note 2 at 128.
‘6Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s. 8(1).
l67 Ibid., ss. 36-37.
2000]
L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
789
rights are protected and, if the employer contravenes them,'” to remedy any unlawful
actions through the imposition of appropriate orders.'” The Board has concluded in
several decisions, 7 that the employer’s interference in the trade union undermines its
representational capacity:.7′
This review of the jurisprudence reveals that the protection afforded by section
184(1)(a) [now section 94(1)(a)] against interference takes a number of forms.
This protection in fact mirrors the many constantly changing forms that the
right to join a union may take, this right constituting, according to the title of
section 110 [now section 8] of the Code, one of the “basic freedoms:’ Section
184(1)(a) prohibits both deliberate and unintentional violation of this right. The
protection it affords is aimed at both actions that seek to undermine the status
of the bargaining agent and those that merely have this effect. It also extends to
those actions that compromise the integrity of the bargaining unit which the
union represents. Finally, this protection continues to apply both in the absence
and in the presence of a collective agreement. This explains what we referred to
earlier as the “omnibus” nature of the protection of section 184(1)(a). This
protection does not extend-and this is confirmed by section 110–to unlawful
activities …1
The logical inference to draw from the foregoing, in light of the new provision on
replacement workers, would be that the employer’s “surface bargaining” or bad faith
bargaining, which is a failure by the employer to recognize the trade union as the bar-
gaining agent of employees, interferes with the trade union and undermines its repre-
sentational capacity.” This interpretation is in keeping with the Board’s previous de-
’68Ibid, s. 94.
161 !bia, s. 99.
“0 Brewster Transport Company, supra note 49 at 58; John Brown and S.I. U. and Sedpex (1988), 72
di 148 at 160, C.L.R.B. No. 667, online: QL (C.L.R.B.); C.U.PE., Broadcast Division and Canadian
Broadcasting (1994), 96 di 122 at 129 and 131, 27 Can. L.R.B.R. (2d) 110 [hereinafter Canadian
Broadcasting cited to di]; PS.A.C. and Aroports de Montrial (1995), 97 di 116, C.LR.B. No. 1115
at 18-20 and 29, online: QL (CLRB); National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General
Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) and Canadian National Railway (1996), 100 di 50 at 56-
57, C.L.R.B. No. 1154, online: QL (C.L.KB.); G.S.U. and Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1996), 101 di
127, C.L.R.B. No. 17 at 29-30, online: QL (CLRB).
… For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that the terms “trade union’s representational capac-
ity”, “trade union’s status”, and “trade union’s right of representation” are synonyms.
2 PS.A.C. and Canada Post (1985), 63 di 136, C.L.R.B. No. 544 at 66-67, online: QL (CLRB)
[emphasis added].
3 Adams, supra note 4 at paras. 10.1500ff, noted that “[b]y reinforcing the employer’s recognition
of the union as the exclusive representative of the employees for which it holds bargaining rights, the
duty to bargain in good faith plays a cornerstone role.” For example, the Board decided in Voyageur,
supra note 50 at 37, that the employer’s letter sent to its employees, “which was in fact part of the
bargaining process, was a thinly veiled threat that sought to undermine the bargaining agent’s author-
ity. This letter also constituted evidence of bad faith bargaining”. In Canadian Broadcasting, supra
note 170 at 129, the Board came to the following conclusion:
As both sections 94(1)(a) and 50 of the Code are aimed, among other things, at pro-
tecting the viability of the union and its role of exclusive bargaining agent entrenched
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cisions, where it concluded that an action by the employer which violates its duty to
bargain could also amount to an interference with the trade union, contrary to para-
graph 94(l)(a) of the Code. For example, the Board has decided that an employer, by
sending letters directly to its employees during collective bargaining, violated para-
graphs 50(a) and 94(1)(a) of the Code because the communications constituted an at-
tempt to bargain directly with the employees and were intended to malign and de-
mean the trade union in the eyes of its members.’74 The Board also concluded that an
employer’s proposal to engage replacement workers during a strike and to offer them
terms and conditions of employment superior to those already offered to the bargain-
ing agent could result in a violation of paragraphs 50(a) and 94(1)(a) of the Code.’75 In
another decision, the Board found that an employer’s direct communications with its
employees, during collective bargaining, which undermines or discredits the trade
union in the eyes of its members, contravened paragraphs 50(a) and 94(1)(a) of the
Code, which “are aimed, among other things, at protecting the viability of the union
and its role of exclusive bargaining agent ..,,,.
Considering the broad meaning given by the Board to the terms “undermining the
trade union representational capacity”, the employer’s use of replacement workers to
pursue illegitimate bargaining objectives should be considered by the Board as an-
other means by which an employer may undermine the bargaining agent’s right of
representation, just as it is in cases where an employer attempts to bargain or commu-
nicate directly with employees, or proposes better working conditions to replacement
workers than those already offered to the trade union. The employer’s use of the
services of replacement workers to pursue bad faith bargaining should be considered
by the Board not only as contravening the duty to bargain but also as interfering with
the trade union and therefore undermining its representational capacity.
This inference does not mean, however, that an employer’s failure to bargain in
good faith and its use of replacement workers should automatically constitute an un-
fair labour practice under subsection 94(2.1) of the Code. What remains are the ques-
tions of who should bear the burden of proof and what the threshold of such proof
should be.
The first question is relatively simple to answer. Because subsection 94(2.1) of
the Code is not an unfair labour practice siabject to the reverse onus provision in sub-
section 98(4) of the Code, the burden should fall on the trade union to prove that re-
placement workers should be prohibited because of the employer’s bad faith bargaining.
in section 36(l)(a) … , an employer’s direct communications with its employees, while
collective bargaining is in progress, that undermines or discredits the union in the eyes
of the employees effectively contravenes both sections of the Code.
7 Eastern ProvincialAinvays, supra note 45 at 214.
“s Brevster Transport Company, supra note 49 at 60. In this case, the Board concluded that the em-
ployer’s proposal violated s. 94(1)(a) of the Code and noted that “[t]he principle enunciated above
might equally apply in the context of a violation of subsection 148(a) [now s. 50(a)] although it was
not argued as such”.
” Canadian Broadcasting, supra note 170 at 129.
2000]
L. VAILLANCOURT- REPLACEMENT WORKERS
The second question requires more analysis because the legislator has not defined
the terms “demonstrated purpose”, nor has the Board interpreted the expression.
There is also no such burden of proof in existing Canadian labour legislation. With re-
spect to the term “purpose”, a careful reading of the provision seems to indicate that
the legislator has added to the legislation an unfair labour practice which requires
proof of “anti-union animus”.'” It is the employer’s use of replacement workers which
seeks to undermine the status of the bargaining agent, and not the mere use of such
workers, which would constitute an unfair labour practice.’78 This is also confirmed in
subsection 29(1.1) and section 87.6 of the Code, which indirectly recognize the right
of the employer to use replacement workers and which appear to have limited the
scope of the unfair labour practice to the employer’s illegal motivation.'”
The interpretation of the term “demonstrated” represents a greater challenge. The
addition of the word “demonstrated” through Bill C-19 has been said by the Minister
to “more accurately reflect the narrative used in the Sims Task Force majority recom-
mendations.”‘” It was also said at the parliamentary committees stage respecting Bill
C-19 that “it was possible to add this word [“demonstrated”] without changing the
tenor of this provision.””‘ Should the addition of the word “demonstrated” change the
interpretation to be given to the new provision?
Contrary to what has been said about the provision, the answer would have to be
that the word “demonstrated” increases the threshold the trade union has to meet.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “demonstrate” as “to derive from admitted premises
by steps of reasoning which admit of no doubt”‘” But for the addition of this word,
the trade union would only have had to prove that the employer used replacement
workers during the labour dispute and failed to bargain in good faith to establish the
commission of an unfair labour practice. Following subsection 94(2.1) of the Code,
‘7 For examples of unfair labour practices requiring proof of “anti-union animus”, see Adams, su-
pra note 4 at para. 10.100.
‘ This is also the interpretation given by Monet, supra note 62 at 38 to the term “purpose” under
Bill C-66, supra note 62, which is nonetheless applicable under the current legislation.
‘ As previously mentioned, ss. 29(1.1) and 87.6 of the Canada Labour Code, supra note 1; cls. 13
and 37 of Bill C-19, supra note 65; cls. 13 and 37 of Bill C-66, ibid, provide respectively that re-
placement workers are not employees of the bargaining unit and that striking or locked out employees
have the right to be reinstated in the bargaining unit after a labour dispute in preference to replace-
ment workers.
‘”House of Commons Debates (19 February 1998) at 4168 (debates for 2d reading Bill C-19).
“‘ The addition of the word “demonstrated” in the provision was not meant to increase the burden
of proof (see “Minutes of Proceedings”, supra note 130 at 15, specifically the explanation of Mr. Mi-
chael McDermott, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister. See House of Commons, Bill C-19, An Act to
amend the Canada Labour Code (Part I) and the Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act and
to make consequential amendments to other Acts (minutes of proceedings of 28 April 1998) (Ottawa:
Standing Committee on Human Resources Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities,
1998) at 15, more specifically the explanation of Mr. Michael McDermott, Senior Assistant Deputy
Minister).
‘”Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s.v. “demonstrate”.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
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the trade union should be required to establish a link between the employer’s bad faith
bargaining and use of replacement workers. To prove that an unfair labour practice
has been committed under the new provision, the trade union should be required to
demonstrate that the employer used replacement workers to pursue illegitimate bar-
gaining objectives and therefore undermined the trade union’s representational capac-
ity.
The preceding analysis of the prohibition relating to replacement workers leads to
the following conclusions:
1. The employer who bargains in good faith and uses replacement workers should not
be prohibited from further use because it does not have any “anti-union animus”;
2. The employer who bargains in bad faith and uses replacement workers should be
found in breach of paragraph 50(a) of the Code but should not be prohibited from
further use because it does not necessarily have the required “anti-union animus”;
3. The employer who bargains in bad faith by using the services of replacement
workers should be prohibited from further use because it has the required “anti-
union animus”.
Because the trade union does not benefit from a reverse onus, establishing this un-
fair labour practice on a balance of probabilities constitutes a heavy burden, particu-
larly when considering the difficulty of proving the employer’s “anti-union animus”
or that the employer sought to undermine the bargaining agent’s status by using re-
placement workers. The employer’s unlawful intention may be implicitly drawn from
circumstantial evidence linking its bad faith bargaining and/or the commission of
other unfair labour practices with its use of replacement workers. As previously men-
tioned, the Sims Report has indicated that the employer’s intention to undermine the
trade union’s representational capacity “can be inferred from reports of unfair labour
practice complaints and from first-hand accounts of the disputes themselves.”” There-
fore, the greater the number of unfair labour practices committed by the employer, the
greater the possibility that the Board will infer that the employer had the required
“anti-union animus”.
The new provision represents another tool a trade union may use to have an em-
ployer’s bad faith bargaining sanctioned by way of a prohibition on the further use of
replacement workers, an additional remedial power granted to the administrative tri-
bunal following the adoption of the recent amendments. Are there any other remedies
the Board may impose on the employer for the breach of subsection 94(2.1) of the
Code?
“‘ Sims Report, supra note 2 at 130.
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L. VAILLANCOURT- REPLACEMENT WORKERS
3. Remedial Orders
Following the recent amendments to the federal labour legislation, the Board has
been given new powers to remedy the employer’s illegitimate use of replacement
workers. Specifically, in the event of a breach of subsection 94(2.1) of the Code, the
Board is vested with the power to order the employer to comply with or cease contra-
vening this section”4 and to stop using, for the duration of the dispute, the services of
replacement workers.” In addition, the Board has been given the power to order an
employer to do or refrain from doing anything that it is equitable to require of the em-
ployer in order to remedy or counteract any consequence of the contravention or fail-
ure to comply that is adverse to the fulfilment of those objectives.”
The Board also disposes of the power to order the employer to include in or with-
draw specific terms from a bargaining position. The Board may also direct a binding
method of resolving those terms in the case of a contravention of the duty to bar-
gain.’ In light of the Sims Report, this power seems well-suited to remedy a breach of
the new provision on replacement workers:
[Als we have already indicated with respect to the illegitimate use of replace-
ment workers, where the Board finds bargaining proposals, or the lack of them,
to be a veneer for efforts to rid the worksite of the union, then we think it can,
and in extreme cases, must use its remedial powers to counteract that action.”
The Board may decide to impose one or many of these remedial measures on the
employer in the case of a violation of subsection 94(2.1) of the Code.
Despite the prohibition on the use of replacement workers, the employer should
still be allowed to contract out work during a labour dispute, as it is a right of man-
agement.’ 9 When the parties reach the stage of strike or lockout, the employer is no
longer bound by the provisions of the collective agreement which may have prevented
the contracting out of work. The employer should maintain its right to contract out, as
it is not subject to any restriction under the Code.
‘ Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, s. 99(1); Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 45(1); Bill C-66, supra
.’ Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 99(1)(b.3); Bill C-19, ibid, cl. 45(2); Bill C-66, ibid., cl. 45(2).
note 62, cl. 45(1).
See also Sims Report, supra note 2 at 131.
“6 Canada Labour Code, ibid., s. 99(2), as am. by S.C. 1991, c. 39, s. 3. See also Sims Report, ibid.
at 212-13.
7 Canada Labour Code, ibid, s. 99(1)(b.1); Bill C-19, supra note 65, cl. 45(2); Bill C-66, supra
note 62, cl. 45(2). See also Sims Report, ibid.
. Sims Report, ibid at 213.
” ‘The managerial right of contracting out is explained in Carrothers, Palmer & Rayner, supra note
4 at 513-20.
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4. Other Approaches
The Board could adopt other approaches to the issue of replacement workers but
further analysis should prove them not to be better-suited. For example, the Board
could assess the validity of each bargaining objective of the employer and of the trade
union. Although the initial reluctance of the Board to subject the parties’ bargaining
objectives to review has recently been relaxed through the decision in Royal Oak
Mines'” and through the addition of some of the new remedial powers,’9′ such an ap-
proach has been rejected in the past, because it would threaten the parties’ freedom,
which represents the cornerstone of our system of free collective bargaining:’
The Board is not an instrument for resolving bargaining impasses. Proceedings
before the Board are not a substitute for free collective bargaining and its con-
comitant aspect of economic struggle. Therefore, the Board should not judge
the reasonableness of bargaining positions, unless they are clearly illegal,
contrary to public policy, or an indicia, among others, of bad faith. Because
collective bargaining is a give and take determined by threatened or exercised
power, the Board must be careful not to interfere in the balance of power and
not restrict the exercise of power by the imposition of rules designed to require
the parties to act gentlemanly or in a genteel fashion. At the same time, the
Board must ensure that one party does not seek to undermine the other’s right
to engage in bargaining or act in a manner that prevents fulL informed and ra-
tional discussion of the issues.’93
It could be possible for the Board to adopt an approach similar to that which has
been developed in the United States, and recognize a distinction between an economic
strike and unfair labour practice strike. In matters presented before the National Labor
Relations Board, the nature of the strike determines the right of reinstatement of
striking employees after a work stoppage. The employer may use replacement work-
ers for any kind of strike and may also hire such workers in preference of striking
employees if the strike has not been caused or prolonged by its unfair labour prac-
tices,'” The adoption of such an approach by the Canada Labour Relations Board
seems very improbable, given that the nature of a labour dispute has very little rele-
vance under the Code; the right to return to work after a work stoppage is automatic
“0 Supra note 57 at 400. See also Adams, supra note 4 at para. 10.1575.
… Canada Labour Code, supra note 1, ss. 99(1)(b.1), 99(2).
z’ See e.g. Syndicat des employds de CHNC New Carlisle (CNTU) and Radio CHNC (1984), 55 di
61 at 75, C.L.R.B. No. 450, online: QL (C.L.R.B.) (decision involving the duty to bargain).
‘9’ CKLW Radio Broadcasting 1977, supra note 145 at 58-59 [emphasis added]. See also Clarke,
supra note 150 at 12-1:
The Board assumes an unobstructive role in overseeing the parties’ bargaining. The
Board does not seek to be a referee between the parties, preferring instead to let the ad-
versarial system designed by Parliament take its course. However, the Board will en-
sure that negotiations by both employers and unions are carried out in good faith and
that the parties have as their main intent the concluding of a collective agreement.
s For a comprehensive analysis of the issue of replacement workers in the United States, see W.T.
Krizner, “The Mackay Doctrine: Much More Than Mere Dicta” (1998) 49 Lab. LU. 997.
2000]
L. VAILLANCOURT – REPLACEMENT WORKERS
for striking employees.” As well, the Board has only twice discussed the nature of a
strike or the distinction between economic strike and unfair labour practice strike in
its prior decisions and the approach has not received much favour.”
The adoption of principles similar to those of the duty to bargain would appear to
be a preferable approach for the Board because it would promote the legislative ob-
jectives of the Code, and would provide a framework for the assessment of the legiti-
macy of the employer’s bargaining objectives and offer more consistency with the
Code as a whole.
Conclusion
The development of Canadian labour relations illustrates the search for a balance
of powers between employers and employees, which began with the legalization of
the right to join a trade union and the adoption of a system of collective bargaining,
and is ongoing through the modernization of labour legislation. This balancing effort
performed by legislators, labour relations boards, and courts is not an easy task and
the issue of whether or not employers should be allowed to use replacement workers
during labour disputes still represents a source of disagreement between federal and
provincial jurisdictions, and is a good example of the struggle to balance interests.
Prior to the adoption of the recent amendments, federal labour legislation did not
prohibit the employer’s use of replacement workers during a strike or lockout. While
the objectives pursued by Parliament and the Board were the encouragement of free
collective bargaining and the constructive settlement of disputes, in some labour con-
flicts, the employer used the services of replacement workers to rid its workplace of
trade union’s representation rather than to achieve bargaining objectives without being
subject to effective orders by the Board. Following the recommendations of the Sims
Report, the new provision on replacement workers was designed to rectify this aber-
ration by prohibiting the employer from using such workers for the demonstrated
purpose of undermining the trade union’s representational capacity rather than to pur-
sue legitimate bargaining objectives.
In essence, the legislative response sought to protect the basis of our system of
collective bargaining, namely the right of the employer to carry on its business and the
right of employees to join a trade union and to participate in its lawful activities. Par-
liamentary committees consulted the interested parties on the issue, tried to reach con-
sensus between them and pursued legitimate objectives. However, the lack of sim-
plicity in the language used for the new provision will present a significant challenge
to the Board because of the inevitable difficulties of interpretation. The wording of the
new provision will certainly be centre-stage for much debate over the extent of the
… See Part LC.4: Legal Status of Striking or Locked-Out Employees, above.
6
I.B.E.W, Local 529 and Central Broadcasting Company (1975), 10 di 8, C.LR.B. No. 48,
online: QL (CLRB) and Eastern Provincial Airways and Canadian Air Line Pilots’ Association
(1983), 51 di 209,3 Can. L.R.B.R. (N.S.) 75.
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rights and obligations of employers and trade unions, and it may take some time be-
fore a consistent approach is established and followed by the labour community.
Despite the apparent difficulties of interpretation, meaning should be given to the
new provision by adopting principles similar to those that apply to the duty to bargain.
In determining whether or not the employer has bargained in good faith with the trade
union, the Board would benefit from a legal framework through which to assess the
legitimacy of the employer’s bargaining objectives. It should be concluded that the
employer has interfered with the trade union, and has therefore undermined its repre-
sentational capacity, only where the trade union has demonstrated that the employer
failed to bargain in good faith by using the services of replacement workers. Further
use of replacement workers by the employer should then be prohibited and, if re-
quired, other suitable remedies should be ordered.
If interpreted in the manner proposed, this partial prohibition on the use of re-
placement workers should constitute a useful tool for the fulfillment of labour rela-
tions objectives. Vested with the power to prevent further use of replacement workers
during a strike or a lockout, the Board has the necessary authority to provide an ap-
propriate remedy to a trade union for prejudice caused by an employer whose objec-
tives are to undermine the bargaining agent. The possibility of imposing such a radical
constraint on the employer’s right to carry on its business should reduce the occur-
rence of regrettable labour disputes such as that which took place in the case of Royal
Oak Mines, at a time when the Board had less remedial power than it does under the
amended legislation. Conversely, the employer who is complying with the legislation
and bargaining in good faith should retain its right to use replacement workers. The
balance which has been struck in the new provision of the Canada Labour Code
should be beneficial to employers, trade unions, and labour relations overall.
