BOOK REVIEWS
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
Paul-Andr6 Cr~peau et al, 6d., Dictionnaire de droitprvi. Montr6al, Centre
de recherche en droit priv6 et compar6 du Qu6bec, 1985. Pp. xvii, 213 f19,50 $1.
Comment6 par Christophe Jamin.*
Les mots du lexique ne sont pas un simple r6pertoire indifferenci6 et immuable.’
La publication du premier dictionnaire de droit priv6 du Qu6bec est
une oeuvre n~cessaire et importante. 2
Sa ncessit6 rdsulte de la situation particuli~re du droit priv8 qu6b~cois.
Droit civil immerg6 dans un oc6an de common law, il peut en subir les
influences et s’en voir d6form. 3 Droit civil issu de la pens6e juridique
frangaise, 4 il s’en distingue aujourd’hui pour acqu~rir son originalit6. Or,
cette double 6mancipation, g6ographique et historique, s’exprime d’abord
par les mots.
Son importance provient de sa mthode d’6laboration. D~s 1978, juristes
et linguistes s’associaient pour le d~pouillement des textes juridiques d’ori-
gines fedrale et provinciale et aboutissaient A une nomenclature du droit
priv6 au Qu6bec comprenant 13 000 termes. A l’issue de ce premier travail,
un comit6 francophone s’orientait vers la redaction du pr6sent ouvrage.
Chaque mot faisait alors l’objet d’une analyse syst~matique regroupant lgis-
lation, jurisprudence et doctrine pertinentes pour permettre la redaction
d’un projet de d6finition. Celui-ci 6tait ensuite pr6sent6 lors d’une r6union
hebdomadaire du comit6 de redaction du Dictionnaire en vue de son appro-
bation 6ventuelle.
*Boulton Fellow, Facult6 de droit, Universit6 McGill. M. Jamin pr6pare une these de doctorat
1C. Hag~ge, L’homme de paroles: Contribution linguistique aux sciences humaines, Paris,
en droit, Universit6 de Paris I.
Fayard, 1985 A la p. 55.
2P.-A. Cr~peau et al., 6d., Dictionnaire de droit priv, Montr6al, Centre de recherche en droit
priv6 et compar6 du Qu6bec, 1985 [ci-apr s le Dictionnaire].
3Si les deux syst6mes juridiques peuvent avoir des principes de politique comparables, il
n’en demeure pas moins que des diftrences essentielles subsistent: voir R. David, (Les carac-
t~res originaux de ]a pens~e juridique anglaise et amdricaine)) (1970) 15 Arch. phil. dr. 1.
4Le Code civil du Bas-Canada de 1866 reprend largement le Code Napoleon de 1804.
@McGill Law Journal 1986
Revue de droit de McGill
1986]
BOOK REVIEWS
La mise en oeuvre d’une telle procedure ne pouvait aboutir qu’a des
definitions rigoureuses qui se rdduisent souvent A des formules nettes et
sans 6quivoque. Mais les auteurs ne se sont pas born6s d de telles figures
abstraites. Ainsi, pour mieux cerner le sens de certains termes et en fixer
les limites, signalent-ils, outre les anglicismes et les expressions specifique-
ment qudbdcoises, les synonymes, les antonymes, ou encore les analogies.
En outre, rexplication 6tymologique est fr&juente5 et l’indication de la langue
d’origine, tr~s souvent le latin, est systdmatiquement mentionnde.6
Enfin, de nombreux exemples, citations et remarques permettent de
situer le mot ou l’expression dans son contexte. A vrai dire, certains d’entre
eux constituent de vritables intrusions dans le r6gime des moyens de techni-
que et des institutions ainsi ddfinies, 7 marquant les limites d’un tel ouvrage
qui ne peut etre, en aucune fagon, un repertoire. Cependant, une liste d6tail-
1e des auteurs et des ouvrages cites, qu’on trouve A la fin du Dictionnaire,
permettra au lecteur intrigu6 de poursuivre sa r6flexion A partir de ces pre-
miers indices.
Une m~me limite se retrouve dans la d6finition de notions floues,
controversees ou complexes. Citons le terme <
une personne 6trang~re a un rapport juridique >.8 Certes, l’affirmation est
exacte, mais elle n’exprime pas l’absence d’homog~nit6 de la notion.9 Citons
encore le mot contrat> qui est un <
constitue le critdre du contrat,”I il n’en demeure pas moins que cette analyse
subjective a pu 6tre contestde au regard d’une conception plus.objective des
5Sur l’intdrt et les limites du recours a 1’6tymologie, en particulier lorsque le sens originaire
du mot n’a pas 6t6 confirm& par l’usage, voir E Gdny, Science et technique en droit priv6positif,
t. 3, Paris, Sirey, 1921 aux pp. 460-61.
6Les termes latins reprdsentent 4,5 pour cent des definitions.
7 Voir P Roubier, Th~orie gtn~rale du droit, 2e 6d., Pads, Sirey, 1951 A la p. 117. Lauteur
distingue deux sortes de vocables juridiques: ceux qui ddsignent les moyens de technique et
ceux qui d6signent les institutions.
8Dictionnaire, supra, note 2 A la p. 185.
9Voir J.-L. Goutal, Essai sur le principe de l’effet relatifdu contrat, Pads, L.G.D.J., 1981, no
10 et s. Eauteur distingue quatre catdgodes de tiers selon que l’on se rapproche du ofoyer
contractuel>>: les penitus extranei, qui n’ont aucun lien avec les contractants; les tiers qui, sans
acqurir de droits d’un contractant, ont contract6 avec lui; les ayants cause A titre particulier
et enfin, les ayants cause universels et i titre universel.
IODictionnaire, supra, note 2 A la p. 50.
“H. Kelsen, ((La thdorie juridique de la convention>> (1940) Arch. phil. dr. soc. jur. 33; J.
Ghestin, Les obligations: Le contrat, Pads, L.G.D.J., 1980, no 188 et s.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 31
conventions reposant sur les notions d’int~ret 2 ou d’6change.’ 3 Une telle
analyse permettrait de mieux comprendre l’6volution actuelle du droit des
contrats qui derive d’une logique lib~rale, fond~e sur les notions de volont6
et de responsabilit6, A une logique sociale, oii la notion d’6quilibre devient
pr~pondrante, ainsi que le d~montrent l’introduction dans le Projet de Code
civil du Quebec d’un principe g6n6ral de 1sion ou l’existence d’une Com-
mission des clauses abusives en France. 14 Enfin, que dire de la d6finition
du terme droit>>, confondu avec un ensemble de r~gles … sanctionn~es
par la puissance publique>>15 et dont l’inspiration strictement positiviste est
trop certaine. Sans aller jusqu’a partager le pessimisme de M. Villey sur la
capacit6 des juristes i ddfinir leur mati~re,16 nous reconnaissons qu’un tel
exercice est fort complexe et que le volume, non seulement d’un diction-
naire, mais d’un trait6, n’y suffirait pas. Aussi, en d~sespoir de cause, ne
faudrait-il pas se tourner vers l’ordre plus lager des beaux-arts pour y puiser,
A l’exemple de M. Jestaz, une d6finition du droit qui est comme une critique
de celle donnbe par le Dictionnaire:
Le droit est l’art de r6soudre, si possible A l’avance, les difficult6s n6es de la
vie en soci6t6 selon des crit~res dejustice et sous l’arbitrage au moins virtuel
de l’autorit6 tenue pour l6gitime. Cet art qui est un art de la solution tend de
plus en plus A s’exprimer sous forme de r~gles au point qu’on le confond avec
l’fNtude de celles-ci, voire avec la mati~re mfime de ces r~gles. 17
Ainsi, d’une reserve que nous formulions quant i la limite du Diction-
naire tenant A la bri~vet6 des d6finitions donn6es, ndcessaire dans un tel
ouvrage, nous sommes insensiblement passbs a une critique sur leur contenu
‘2R. Demogue, Trait des obligations en gnral, t. 1, Paris, Arthur Rousseau, 1923, no l6bis:
(Ce qui caractfrise I’acte bilatral: convention ou contrat, c’est d’etre une transaction entre
deux int~rts oppos6s >; J. Martin de la Moutte, L’actejuridique unilatral: Essai sur sa notion
et sa technique en droit civil, Paris, Sirey, 1951, no 33: <<[Le] caractre propre de ]a convention
est de naltre de besoins qui s'opposent, se rencontrent, et entre lesquels les contractants s'ef-
forcent d'6tablir un 6quilibre transactionneb>; G. Rouhette, Contribution d l’ tude critique de
la notion de contrat, these de doctorat en droit, Universit6 de Paris, 1965 A la p. 631 ct s. [non
publi~e]. Sur ce fondement, l’auteur d6finit le contrat comme oun acte productif de normes
… bilatrales, c’est-A-dire liant deux centres d’int&r&s>.
13Sur la question, voir Ghestin, supra, note 11, no 176. La volont6 perd de son importance
‘4Sur cette dvolution, voir Ie remarquable ouvrage de E Ewald, L’Ettat providence, Paris,
au profit du dfplacement de valeurs entre les patrimoines des parties.
Grasset, 1986.
17
ISDictionnaire, supra, note 2 A la p. 72.
‘6Voir M. Villey, Philosophie du droit, t. 1, 3e 6d., Paris, Dalloz, 1982, no 8 oft I’auteur
rapporte que Kant d~niait aux juristes la capacit6 de rdpondre fA la question: qu’est-ce que le
droit (quid jus)?
p. Jestaz, (
1986]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
m~me.18 D’une analyse trop subjective du contrat a une conception trop
positiviste du droit, on pergoit une identit6 de traits des differentes d~fi-
nitions du Dictionnaire: leur extreme classicisme. Derriere <
tonomie de la volont619 et, d’autre part, une 6cole moderne de juristes
positivistes qui, sous l’avalanche des textes, ne s’en font souvent que les
commentateurs ?20
On pourrait, cependant, nous reprocher d’etre injuste dans notre cri-
tique. N’a-t-on pas pris des termes trop importants dont la discussion ne
peit etre men~e dans un tel ouvrage, qui doit nrcessairement simplifier?
Pourtant, ce classicisme parait dans des d6finitions de termes plus << ano-
dins>>. Nous n’en prendrons que quelques exemples pour les opposer A une
doctrine civiliste contemporaine qui, essentiellement frangaise, marque les
limites d’une critique A nuancer en fonction de la r6alit6 qu~brcoise. 21
accessoire
Relevons d’abord le mot <
ment r6cente qui lui est consacr6e permettra d’en complter, voire d’en
180n ne peut, en effet, comparer notre critique de la definition de ((tiers>> qui tient A une
absence de nuance que ne peut rectifier un dictionnaire i celle de <(droit> ou de <(contrat>>
qui porte sur le concept m~me que ces termes recouvrent.
‘9En affirmant que d’accord de volontrs>> existe en vue de produire des effets de droit, les
auteurs ne prrcisent pas qui, de la volontE des parties ou du droit objectif, en est a l’origine.
On ne peut donc dire avec certitude que les auteurs du Dictionnaire se rattachent A l’ cole
librrale.
20pour une critique de l’attitude contemporaine des juristes, voir Villey, supra, note 16, no
2 et s. Voir aussi Ewald, supra, note 14 A la p. 434:
A l’gard de l’nonc6 de la loi, les juristes deviennent des techniciens, des praticiens
d’un droit qui devient lui-meme de plus en plus technique. Rs s’attachent i mettre
de l’ordre dans Ia proliferation ind6finie d’un arsenal l~gislatif et r~glementaire de
plus en plus complexe. Mais ce n’est plus A eux que l’on peut demander de nous
guider quant a la definition d’une politique de droit. Ils ne sont plus les gardiens
du droit.
2 Uoriginalit6 qu~b~coise mentionnre au debut de cette Etude s’exprime tant par des insti-
tutions distinctes du droit fmnais que par des institutions communes dont l’6volution a rMvel
des divergences. Ainsi, les conclusions de theses frangaises reposant sur une analyse du droit
positif ne sont pas toujours transposables dans le contexte qurb~cois. Mais la comparaison,
alors n cessaire, entre les deux rralit6s juridiques se rvle parfois difficile en l’absence de theses
qu~brcoises sur ces differentes questions. A ce sujet, voir P.-G. Jobin,
Trav. Assoc. Henri Capitant 65 A la p. 70 ofa l’auteur recense seulement onze theses de doctorat
consacr~es au droit civil qu~brcois entre 1960 et 1975. La parution du Dictionnaire, supra,
note 2, par les controverses qu’il peut engendrer sur telle ou telle definition, ne peut que susciter
des vocations …
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31
critiquer la d~finition.22 Si celle-ci sugg~re que la notion ne peut etre envi-
sag~e isol~ment et qu’elle n’existe que dans un rapport d’accessoire A prin-
cipal, les expressions de orattachement>>23 ou de
employees par le Dictionnaire sont peut-8tre trop vagues. Elles ne pr~cisent
pas comment s’op~re ce rapprochement. Or, M. Goubeaux montre que celui-
ci peut 8tre le fait d’une affectation –
l’accessoire vient se joindre au prin-
le principal permet A l’accessoire de naitre
cipal,25 ou d’une production –
et le soutient.26 En outre, quelle que soit la source du rapport d’accessoire
i principal, ‘accessoire peut 8tre d~fini, selon l’auteur, comme ce qui s’ajoute
au principal et lui est subordonn6 sans, pourtant, s’y absorber.27
De IA, l’impossibilit6 de soutenir que l’accessoire < est soumis A la meme
r~gle l~gale>> que le principal. En effet, <
De Ua, encore, le refus d’avoir une conception purement quantitative
de la notion, comme pourrait le laisser croire la definition de l’adjectif.
Eaccessoire n’est pas ce qui est de peu d’importance. 29
confirmation
Pour la d6finition de la confirmation>>, les auteurs du Dictionnaire
ont certainement rejet6 la conception classique qui voit dans celle-ci, outre
la renonciation au droit de demander l’annulation de l’acte, sa reparation
par la suppression du vice dont il 6tait entach6. 30 Ici, point de r6ference A
l6ment essentiel.>>
2 2G. Goubeaux, La rbgle de l’accessoire en droit priv6, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1969.
23D~finition de l’adjectif ((accessoire>> donn~e par le Dictionnaire, supra, note 2 A la p. 4:
(
250n s’accorde aujourd’hui pour dire que les sfiret~s sont des accessoires de la cr6ance qu’elles
garantissent. Or, ‘art. 2016 C.c.B.-C. d~finit l’hypothktue comme
note 22, no 19 et s.
26Ainsi, le fruit est un accessoire du principal: voir J. Carbonnier, Droit civil, 7e d., Paris,
Presses universitaires de France, 1973 aux pp. 73-75. Or, les fruits ne sont pas au service de
la chose frugifere et ont un but qui leur est propre: voir Goubeaux, ibid., no 21 et s.
27Cette phrase resume ‘analyse de Goubeaux, ibid., no 23 et s.
28 bid. Tel est, par exemple, le cas dans toutes les situations ofi le principal disparaissant,
l’accessoire lui survit: Goubeaux, ibid., no 48 et s.
291bid., no 13 et s.
30Pour une telle analyse, voir C. Aubry et C. Rau, Cours de droit civilfranqais, t. 4, 6e dd.
par E. Bartin, Paris, tditions techniques, n.d. A lap. 385: <(La confirmation est I'actejuridique
par lequel une personne fait disparaitre les vices dont se trouve entach6e une obligation contre
laquelle elle eut pu se pourvoir par voie de nullit6 ou de rescision.)> Dans le meme sens: G.
Marty et P. Raynaud, Droll civil, t. 2, Paris, Sirey, 1962, no 201 ; H., L. et J. Mazeaud, Lecons
de droit civil, t. 2, vol. 1, 6e 6d. par E Chabas, Paris, Montchrestien, 1978, no 309.
19861
BOOK REVIEWS
un acte qui serait purge de ses vices par la confirmation. 31 Cependant, il
n’eut peut-etre pas fallu s’arr6ter lA. Sans aller jusqu’A reprendre l’analyse
de M. Couturier,32 qui voit dans la confirmation une simple renonciation
au droit de critiquer un acte regulier quelle que soit la gravit6 du vice ou
la nature de la nullit6 et dont on a pu dire qu’il deformait la realit6, 33 les
redacteurs du Dictionnaire auraient pu reprendre une distinction importante
entre la confirmation-renonciation (ou confirmation stricto sensu) et la con-
firmation-reparation (ou regularisation) que M. Ghestin a recemment
systematise.34
La d6finition donnee ne serait ainsi que celle de la premiere notion, la
renonciation au droit de critique, sans recouvrir la seconde qui s’analyse
<(en une intervention portant sur l'acte et visant A le rendre conforme A la
regle qu'il violait par son contenu initial>.35
Or, la difference n’est pas simplement formelle. En particulier, alors que
la confirmation-renonciation n’a d’effet qu’A l’6gard du renongant, la regu-
larisation rend l’acte valable A 1’6gard de tous.
On aurait ainsi pu definir la confirmation comme
I1 s’ensuit que la necessit6 de distinguer entre les actes frappes de nullit6
relative qui, seuls, pourraient donner lieu A confirmation, et les actes frappes
de nullit6 absolue, s’estompe. Pour la regularisation, elle n’a pas de sens
dans la mesure ofi cette forme de confirmation a pour but de reparer le
vice37 et, pour la confirmation stricto sensu, elle pourrait meme 6tre contes-
tee: une telle confirmation ne peut-elle 8tre valable si, au moment off elle
intervient, elle ne heurte plus l’interat general ?38
31Ddfinition du nom <
Acte juridique unilatdral par lequel une personne, en renoniant au droit d’invoquer la nullit6
relative d’un acte antdrieur, le valide rdtroactivement.>)
32G. Couturier, La confirmation des actes nuls, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1972.
33La critique est de Ghestin, supra, note 11, no 797.
34lbid., no 797 et s. On peut voir les premiers lindaments d’une telle analyse dans G. Ripert
et J. Boulanger, Trait de droit civil, t. 2, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1957, no 737-44; G. Farat, L’ordre
public economique, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1963 aux pp. 419-20.
35Ghestin, ibid., no 797.
36Ibid.
37C. Dupeyron, La regularisation des actes nuls, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1973, no 343.
38Voir Couturier, supra, note 32, no 319 et s.; et Ghestin, supra, note 11, no 840 et s.
Cependant, cette opinion est minoritaire et ne correspond ni A Ta jurisprudence qudbecoise:
voir J.-L. Baudouin, Les obligations, 2e 8d., Cowansville, Qu6., Yvon Blais, 1983, no 318 et
s.; ni A Ta jurisprudence dominante de la Cour de cassation frangaise: voir Cass. civ. Ire, 4
mai 1966, D.1966.Jur.553 (note P. Malaurie), J.C.P. 1967.11.15038 (note J. Mazeaud).
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 31
dette de valeur
Les auteurs du Dictionnaire ne donnent qu’une definition fonctionnelle
de la notion de <
Frangois, si la dette de valeur rdalise un transfert de valeur dans le temps
dujour de sa naissance au jour de son execution, ce m~canisme n’est possible
que parce qu’< elle a pour objet une valeur autre que mon6taire qui 6chappe
de ce fait au nominalisme>>.40 Et c’est pr~cis~ment en recherchant l’objet
(la valeur) de la prestation due par le drbiteur qu’on pourra aboutir A une
definition conceptuelle qui, seule, permettra vraiment de distinguer la dette
de valeur d’une dette de somme d’argent assortie d’une clause d’indexation.
Ainsi pourrait-on 6crire que
les dettes de valeur sont des obligations qui ont pour objet une valeur autre
que mon6taire: intermEdiaires entre les obligations de somme d’argent et les
obligations de fournir une prestation en nature, elies s’ex~cutent comme les
premi~res par le versement d’une somme d’argent, mais comme les obligations
en nature elles restent i l’abri de la d~pr~ciation mondtaire et leur 6valuation
se fera de manire A exprimer toujours la valeur r~elle de ]a chose qui est au
fond l’objet de l’obligation.4′
Mais, nous dira-t-on, le Dictionnaire mentionne le caract~re interm~diaire
de la notion de dette de valeur. Cependant, pourquoi l’avoir fait simplement
en remarque alors que cet 6lment proc~de de la definition meme du terme? 42
aurait
permis de mieux cerner le caract~re intermddiaire ou hybride de la notion.43
conceptuelle et fonctionnelle –
Confondre les deux analyses –
nullit6 absolue
Les auteurs du Dictionnaire retiennent que la << nullit6 absolue >> << sanc- tionne la violation d'une r~gle de formation d'un acte juridique visant A prot6ger ... l'ordre public ... >>.44 C’est reprendre l’analyse classique45 dont
39D~finition du nor dette de valeur> donn~e par le Dictionnaire, supra, note 2 a la p. 65:
40G.L. Pierre-Frangois, La notion de dette de valeur en droit civil: Essai d’une thorie, Paris,
L.G.D.J., 1975, no 59.
411bid., no 143.
42La definition donn~e par le Dictionnaire, supra, note 2 A la p. 65 est suivie, aux pp. 65-
66, de la remarque suivante: <(La dette de valeur s'analyse comme une notion intermdiaire
entre l'obligation de somme d'argent et l'obligation en nature .... D
43Pierre-Frangois, supra, note 40, no 143: <([La] dette de valeur n'est ni une notion purement
conceptuelle ni une notion purement fonctionnelle.)>
“Dictionnaire, supra, note 2 A la p. 131.
45Voir en ce sens Mazeaud, supra, note 30, no 299 et s.; B. Starck, Droit civil: Obligations,
Paris, Librairies techniques, 1972, no 1631 et 1633.
19861
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
on peut trouver le fondement dans le Code civil du Bas-Canada.46 Mais
celle-ci n’en parait pas moins incomplete A une 6poque ofi le l~gislateur
multiplie les lois d’ordre public. Une distinction entre diverses categories
d’ordre public parait, aujourd’hui, souhaitable. Ainsi que l’avait deji remarqu6
Ripert,47 un ordre public 6conomique li6 A l’interventionnisme croissant de
l’Etat doit apparaitre A c6t6 de l’ordre public traditionnel, l’ordre public
moral et politique
En outre, cet ordre public 6conomique doit faire lui-meme l’objet d’une
nouvelle distinction. Dans certaines situations, le l6gislateur peut sanction-
ner les abus engendr~s par la puissance 6conomique d’une des parties en
r~tablissant un 6quilibre contractuel rompu. On doit alors parler d’ordre
public de protection. Tel est le cas des textes visant A prot6ger les salaries,
les locataires ou encore les consommateurs. Leur violation postule une nul-
lit6 relative: ces textes ne doivent pouvoir 8tre invoqu~s que par ceux qu’ils
visent A prot6ger. Mais il est d’autres situations, d~finissant un ordre public
de direction, ofi l’Etat intervient dans la vie conomique du pays pour en
maintenir les grands 6quilibres ou y exercer une emprise plus dirigiste. Les
infractions aux r~gles ainsi 6dict6es ne peuvent qu’entrainer une nullit6
absolue, car elles contreviennent A une certaine conception de l’intr& g~nral.
Cette division interne A l’ordre public 6conomique49 pourrait 8tre repor-
t~e dans l’ordre public classique. Dans la majorit6 des cas, celui-ci vise une
certaine conception de l’int~rat g~n~ral,50 mais il peut aussi constituer un
ordre public de protection. Ainsi, les r~gles visant l’incapacit6 des mineurs
sont g~n~ralement d’ordre public, mais elles n’ont t6 6tablies que pour <
cependant, ‘affirmation est moins nette.
46Art. 13 et 990 C.c.B.-C.
47G. Ripert, (L’ordre 6conomique et la libert6 contractuelle > dans Recueil d’Otudes sur les
sources du droit en l’honneur de Franqois Geny, t. 2, Paris, Sirey, n.d., 347. Voir aussi: G.
Ripert, Le rmgime democratique et le droit civil moderne, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1936, no 140 et s.
48Ghestin, supra, note 11, no 107.
49C’est tout au moins de cette fagon qu’elle est pr6sent~e: Ghestin, ibid., no 106 et 778 ofl,
50C’est en cela qu’on a pu le rapprocher de l’ordre public 6conomique: J. Ghestin, Le contrat
dans le nouveau droit quebtcois et en droitfranqais: Principes directeurs, consentement, cause
et objet, Montr6al, Institut de droit compar& de l’Universit6 McGill, 1982 A la p. 35. Peut-on,
cependant, qualifier l’ordre moral et politique d’ordre public de direction? Nous le pensons,
car si l’ordre public classique, plus diffus dans le corps social, ne pr6sente pas le caractre
d’instabilit6 de l’ordre 6conomique, il n’en demeure pas moins qu’il imprime, dans l’ordre
moral et politique, une forme de direction i la socit6.
51H., L. et J. Mazeaud, LeCons de droit civil, t. 1, vol. 3, 6e Ed. par M. de Juglart, Paris,
Montchrestien, 1976, no 1245. Dans le m me sens, voir C. Atias, Les personnes: Les incapacites,
Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1985, no 89; Ripert et Boulanger, supra, note 34, no
706; G. Marty et P. Raynaud, Droit civil, t. 2, 2e Ed., Paris, Sirey, 1967, no 503; J. Carbonnier,
Droit civil, t. 2, 9e Ed., Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1972, no 123.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31
de l’ordre public n’est peut-etre plus entre un ordre moral et politique et
un ordre 6conomique, mais entre l’ordre public de direction et l’ordre public
de protection. Et l’infraction aux regles edictees par le premier implique une
nullit6 absolue alors que la violation des regles imposees par le second
entrane une nullit6 relative.
Ainsi, les auteurs du Dictionnaire auraieft dfi preciser que la nullit6
absolue sanctionne la violation d’une regle de formation d’un acte juridique
visant A prot6ger l’ordre public de direction et ce, aussi bien en matieres
morale et politique qu’economique.
simulation
Selon la definition du Dictionnaire, la <
la volont6 de deux personnes. 52
C’est affirmer, conformement A la doctrine classique, le caractere
conventionnel de la simulation.53 Mais M. Dagot a bien montr6 que ce
caractere n’avait rien d’evident et qu’il 6tait inspir6 de la theorie classique
des contre-lettres A un contrat. Selon lui, on aurait 6tendu A l’ensemble de
la simulation la conception des contre-lettres en exigeant, sans veritable
discussion, la necessit6 d’un <
oii celui-ci est difficilement concevable. Tel est le cas pour les actesjuridiques
unilateraux que sont les dissolutions fictives de societ655 ou les legs deguises
sous une reconnaissance de dettes, alors que le legataire ignore tout du legs.
Tel est meme le cas pour de simples faits juridiques: l’e1ection d’un domicile
ou d’un siege social fictifs.
52D6finition du nom <
<
53Voir, en ce sens, Demogue, supra, note 12, no 159; E. Gaudemet, Theorie grngrale des
obligations, Paris, Sirey, 1965 A la p. 232; Ripert et Boulanger, supra, note 34, no 586; A. Colin
et H. Capitant, Cours 6l6mentaire de droit civil francais, t. 2, l0e 6d. par L. Julliot de ]a
Morandire, Paris, Dalloz, 1948, no 185 et s.; Marty et Raynaud, supra, note 30, no 273 et
327; Martin de ]a Moutte, supra, note 12, no 244 et s.; H. de Page, Traitt l61mentaire de droit
civil beige, t. 2, 3e 6d., Bruxelles, Emile Bruylant, 1964, no 618.
54M. Dagot, La simulation en droit priv, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1965, no 12 et s.
55Cass. civ., 2 avril 1924, S.1927.1.261. On pourrait encore citer cet arr~t ofi un patron avait
d6guis6 une retenue op6rfe pour couvrir une assurance contre les accidents du travail sous un
article du r~glement d’atelier intitul6 <
novembre 1910, S.1911.I.142.
1986]
BOOK REVIEWS
Bien plus, il semble que la jurisprudence, tout au moins frangaise, n’ait
jamais exig6 la preuve d’un accord simulatoire pour admettre la simula-
tion.56 La convention entre les parties>> dont nous parle le Dictionnaire
ne serait pas ainsi de l’essence de la simulation!
Uanalyse, fort incomplete, de ces quelques termes tend simplement A
montrer cette tendance du Dictionnaire a un trop grand classicisme dans
les d6finitions. Or, si le droit est un ph~nom~ne essentiellement histo-
rique>>, 57 celles-ci doivent 6voluer pour correspondre a l’tat le plus avanc6
de la pens~ejuridique. Mais les auteurs du Dictionnaire, parce qu’ils r~digent
un dictionnaire, ne peuvent aller au fond des controverses suscit~es par la
doctrine la plus moderne, sans pourtant les ignorer au risque de retenir des
formules d~pass~es. Aussi doivent-ils jouer entre ces extremes que sont des
d6finitions trop approfondies ou trop superficielles, trop modernes ou trop
classiques, pour trouver un juste milieu qui regoive l’assentiment du plus
grand nombre, ou tout au moins presenter l’6tat de ces controverses pour
les notions les plus incertaines. C’est en appr6hendant la r~alit6 juridique
dans sa modernit6 et sa diversit6 que le Dictionnaire deviendra, dans ses
6ditions successives, 58 une oeuvre, non seulement n~cessaire et importante,
mais aussi novatrice.
Cependant, sa version actuelle constitue drji un outil indispensable,
tant pour les 6tudiants, dont les premieres ann~es A la Facult6 repr~sentent
bien souvent ‘apprentissage d’un langage, que pour les universitaires et les
praticiens qui pourront y trouver la d6finition qui leur manque parfois ainsi
que d’utiles 6lments de r6flexion pour une recherche plus avanc~e.
56Dagot, supra, note A, no 23 et s.
57Ewald, supra, note 14 i la p. 42.
58Le Dictionnaire devrait
une version definitive comprenant plus de 10 000 termes.
re publi6 par tranches successives et cumulatives pour atteindre
Wojciech Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due: Social Justice and Legal Theory.
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel, 1985. Pp. xii, 329 J37.50]. Reviewed
by A. Grant McCrea.*
Mr Sadurski’s main aim in this book is to argue for a theory of dis-
tributive justice as an “equilibrium of benefits and burdens”.’ He begins
by contending that only distributive, as opposed to commutative, justice
constitutes justice properly so called. Much of the remainder of the book
is concerned with establishing the central role of the concept of “desert”,
or deserving, in his theory. Desert, Mr Sadurski asserts, is fundamental to
the determination of just distributions beyond the level of the satisfaction
of basic needs.
Whatever the merits of Mr Sadurski’s tolerably interesting thesis, they
are far outweighed by the confused and superficial nature of much of the
discussion in this book. It is astonishing that a respectable academic pub-
lisher such as Reidel would publish work in this condition. There is virtually
no evidence of the editorial hand. Sentences such as “[t]he second type of
theory, as exemplified by Rawls, is not restricted by such conditions but, in
turn, it has no claim as a justification of the obligatoriness of justice” abound, 2
and they are highly distracting.
Mr Sadurski clutters up the discussion with innumerable trivial digress-
ions and silly arguments. One can forgive the author his awkward use of
English, which is apparently not his mother tongue, but neither he nor his
editors should feel proud of the extraordinary amount of dross in this book.
My original intention had been to use this review as a forum to discuss
the lamentable lack of rigour in evidence in much recent scholarship in the
philosophy of law, but this book’s shortcomings extend so far beyond lack
of rigour as to render such a discussion inappropriate. The author seems
to feel that lists of examples are adequate substitutes for real argument. For
instance, at page 81 he comes to the far-reaching conclusion that “it is both
unjust and impossible [Mr Sadurski adores unequivocal terms such as
“impossible”] to abolish classifications of legal subjects by legal rules” on
the basis of two short paragraphs containing two “examples”. Even more
absurd is the claim at page 179 that “[t]his highly unsystematic and far from
exhaustive list [which includes such profound observations as: “[W]e have
*Associate, White & Case, New York, N.Y.
‘W. Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due: Social Justice and Legal Theory (Dordrecht, The Neth-
2lbid. at 61.
erlands: Reidel, 1985) at 101.
McGill Law Journal 1986
Revue de droit de McGill
1986]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
reached an unprecedented degree of global mass communication through
radio, TV, press, tourism etc.”] shows that the use of the notion of ‘world
community’ is justified, and that McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman are right
… “. Earlier, he disposes of the problem of free will in just four pages. 3 It
seems he also believes that argument by majority rule is acceptable. See
page 89, where we are informed that “[w]e do not condemn as violative of
the principle of equality … programs … if we approve of the aim” and that
“[ilt is now widely accepted that racial classifications are not forbidden per
se”.
Mr Sadurski is given to forming grand conclusions on the basis of
skimpy argument (e.g., “Everything depends on the criteria of classification
…. [I]t is impossible [sic] to treat people equally in one respect without …
treating them unequally in other respects”, 4 or “[N]o characteristic is irrel-
evant per se” 5). Some of his other indulgences are less egregious from a
philosophical point of view, but they are just as annoying. These range from
superficial displays of erudition, such as the shallow and irrelevant discus-
sions of U.S. case law,6 to non sequiturs7 to belabouring of the obvious. 8
The author spends pages knocking over straw men, as at page 63 where he
discusses the proposition that “[o]ne possible answer would be that those
who are worse off have no choice anyway”, while important issues languish
unattended. See, for example, page 178, where the author informs us that
he will not “discuss the problem of the justice constituency in detail here”.
In a theory which balances benefits bestowed against burdens imposed upon
the individual, the determination of the relevant group to which the indi-
vidual belongs 9 is crucial. This is even more obviously true in the case of
distributions at the level of basic needs, for what is a “basic need” is relative
to the standards of the community.
This is all very unfortunate, for Mr Sadurski’s thesis is not lacking in
interest. Moreover, Part II of the book –
“Justice as Equilibrium” – does
not suffer quite as grievously from the author’s peccadilloes. My patience,
31bid. at 131-34.
4lbid. at 80.
5lbid. at 91.
6See, e.g., ibid. at 89.
7See, e.g., ibid. at 84, where the author states: “It is difficult to see how this can be made
compatible with a democratic creed.” The reference to democracy leaps at the reader from
nowhere.
sAt one point we read that “the fact that this judgment is held by others does not amount
to producing a good reason for it”, a trite but simultaneously astonishing claim given the
author’s proclivity, noted above, for arguing in just that manner. Ibid. at 75.
9For example, the world of all individuals or only those members of a particular state or
society.
734
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31
however, was taxed beyond the point of caring by the accumulated annoy-
ances noted in this review. Perhaps a more forgiving reader would have the
stamina to separate the wheat from the chaff. In the meantime, Mr Sadurski
would be well advised to hire a good editor to turn this book into a decent
fifty-page journal article.
Peter Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1985. Pp. xxxiv, 455 [$99.50]. Reviewed by David Stevens.*
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, “it
means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many
different things”.
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master –
that’s all.”
The complexity ofanalysis and the profusion of vocabulary in the law
of restitution indicate that the language of restitutionary claims is not sus-
ceptible of the kind of rigorous usage one expects in a language of legal
justification. One has the sense that in this area of the law there have been
too many Humpty Dumpties and not enough Alices, with the result that
there can be few masters 6f restitutionary analysis. Perhaps this is not a
surprising state of affairs. Although modem English philosophy has been
preoccupied with the problem of language for nearly a century, it is only
recently that students of Anglo-American private law have begun to take
seriously the proposition that law is, among other things, a language.2 Had
common-law lawyers taken an interest in this feature of law earlier, they
might have diagnosed a case of aphasia in its early stages and done some-
thing about it before the affliction brought them to the point of virtual
incapacity to communicate.
One would think that men and women as practical as lawyers are sup-
posed to be would be able to express, in a comprehensible manner, the
grounds for recovery in situations where the defendant has received from
the plaintiff a benefit that he does not deserve to keep. Recovery of money
paid by mistake is an easy case which ought to admit of straightforward
derland (New York: N.W. Norton, 1971) at 163.
*Of the Faculty of Law, McGill University.
1L. Carroll, “Through the Looking Glass” in DJ. Gray, ed., Lewis Carroll: Alice in Won-
2See, e.g., W. Twining & D. Miers, How To Do Things with Rules, 2d ed. (London: Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1982); J.B. White, The Legal Imagination (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); W.R.
Bishin & C.D. Stone, Law, Language, and Ethics (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1972);
and B. Danet, “Language in the Legal Process” (1980) 14 L. & Soc’y Rev. 445.
McGill Law Journal 1986
Revue de droit de McGill
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 31
legal justification. 3 But, as Peter Birks observes in Introduction to the Law
of Restitution, English lawyers have barely begun to expose the “skeleton
of principle”, the common sense behind the mass of technical detail, which
holds the law of restitution together.4 The rationalizing enterprise com-
menced in contract and tort law over a century ago is just now being under-
taken in an area of civil responsibility at least as transparent as contract or
tort.5 Remnants of a nineteenth-century legal language based on long-abo-
lished forms of action and the divided jurisdiction of equity and law survive
with near-undiluted force in the modem restitution lawyer’s vocabulary.6
3The law, as it stands, is not clear as to what kinds of mistake will ground recovery. Mistake
of law, in particular, has generated enormous confusion. The early nineteenth-century authority
of Bilbie v. Lumley (1802), 2 East 469, 102 E.R. 448 (KB.), which first denied recovery of
payments made under a mistake of law, has been roundly condemned by academics and not
a few members of the judiciary as “monstrous”, “hasty and ill-considered” and “unfortunate”.
The more recent criticisms include: R. Goff& G. Jones, TheLaw ofRestitution, 2d ed. (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1978) at 90-92; G.B. Klippert, Unjust Enrichment (Toronto: Butterworths,
1983) at 147-56; G. Klippert, Case Comment (1983) 21 U.W.O. L. Rev. 289; G.E. Palmer, The
Law of Restitution (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978) at 336-57 and 466-79; C.A. Needham, “Mis-
taken Payments: A New Look at an Old Theme” (1978) 12 U.B.C. L. Rev. 159. See also Hydro-
Electric Comm’n of the Township of Nepean v. Ontario Hydro (1982), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 347 at
349, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 193, Laskin C.J.C. and Dickson J. dissenting [hereinafter Nepean cited
to S.C.R.]. Yet the rule still survives as law in Canada with its numerous exceptions and
circumventions: see, e.g., the majority decision in Nepean, supra at 380.
Even in situations where recovery is available, the ground of recovery varies from case to
case. The action for money had and received, equitable tracing and the constructive trust are
the predominant modes of justification. See Barclays Bank, Ltd v. W J Simms Son & Cooke
(Southern) Ltd (1979), [1980] Q.B. 677, [1979] 3 All E.R. 522 (C.A.) [hereinafter Barclays
Bank]; and Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd (1979), [1981]
Ch. 105, [1980]2 W.L.R. 202 (H.L.). But even these avenues of recovery are not always deployed
in a manner which would indicate that they have an intelligible purpose: see Bank of Nova
Scotia v. Cheng (1981), 33 Nfld & PE.I.R. 89 (Nfld S.C.T.D.).
4P Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) at 1.
5Many have even suggested that restitutionary recovery is more obviously justifiable than
recovery in contract. R Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1979) at 4, has argued that “the grounds for the imposition of [promise-based obligations]
are, by the standards of modem values, very weak compared with the grounds for the creation
of benefit-based… obligations.” See also L.L. Fuller & W.R. Perdue Jr, “The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages” (1936) 46 Yale L.J. 52 at 53-54 and 56-57.
For synopses of the transformation of contract law in the nineteenth century, in addition to
Atiyah, see A.W.B. Simpson, “Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law” (1975) 91
L.Q. Rev. 247 [hereinafter “Innovation”]; A.W.B. Simpson, “The Horwitz Thesis and the
History of Contracts” (1979) 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533; and M.J. Horwitz, The Transformation
ofAmerican Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977) c. 6.
61t is apposite to recall that Lord Atkin’s famous dictum about “the ghosts of the past
stand[ing] in the path ofjustice clanking their medieval chains” was made in a restitution case:
United Australia, Ltd v. Barclays Bank, Ltd (1940), [1941] A.C. I at 29, [1940] 4 All E.R. 20
(H.L.) [hereinafter United Australia cited to A.C.].
1986]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
Birks does not offer any explanation for this phenomenon. 7 Rather, his
aim is to make a textbook contribution to the subject that, in the manner
of such nineteenth-century monuments of legal scholarship as Chitty on
Contracts or Addison on Torts, reveals the underlying structure of discourse
in restitution cases. His goal is “to find the scheme on which the law in
those cases can be most elegantly and efficiently arranged”, “stripping” the
law of “its merely intellectual errors and presenting it clearly, according to
a system which would be economical and rational. ‘ 8 Birks claims, somewhat
disingenuously, that he is working in the spirit of Austinian positivism,
maintaining a categorical distinction between description and evaluation.
Thus, his enterprise is exclusively to describe, a step prior to evaluation in
the Austinian tradition. In fact, the book presents a radical departure from
traditional ways of conceiving issues and articulating justifications in this
category of private law.9 As a result, despite Birks’ claim to descriptive
neutrality, it contains significant evaluative suggestions, much as one might
expect of a novel description. In most of his effort and in a good deal of
his execution, Birks is right. His treatise is a welcome contribution to English
private law, as valuable in its own way as is the text by Sir Robert Goff and
Professor Gareth Jones to which Birks quite rightly pays respectful tribute.10
This review discusses the major ideas presented in Birks’ book and
offers a modest critique of the system he has constructed. Much of Birks’
analysis is an elaboration of ideas first presented in article form, but the
book has fashioned these ideas, and others, into an integral system of basic
principles.’I It is apparent that the book has been written less to alter the
7An explanation would have to take account of political and cultural factors, as well as purely
doctrinal and intellectual ones. Some of this story is chronicled in Atiyah, supra, note 5 at
479-90, but his interests lie elsewhere than in showing why a rationalistic view of these claims
did not emerge in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century English private law. Indeed, he thinks,
supra at 768-69, that the arguments in favour of the modem contender for such a unifying
theme – unjust enrichment –
are “misconceived”.
Underlying the repugnance felt by most common-law lawyers of that era for any non-con-
tractual unifying principle to the restitution cases was their half-articulated suspicion that the
recognition of any such principle would entail the disintegration of contract law. An investi-
gation of the nature of this suspicion would be a fruitful starting point in the search for an
explanation.
8Birks, supra, note 4 at vii.
9The pretension to descriptive neutrality remains a necessary rhetorical attribute in this kind
of endeavour, as it was for its nineteenth-century precursors in contract and tort. See Simpson,
“Innovation”, supra, note 5.
‘OSupra, note 3.
‘These include the following works by P. Birks: “Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law”
(1971) 24 Curr. Legal Probs 110; “Restitution for Services” (1974) 27 Curr. Legal Probs 13;
“Restitution and Wrongs” (1982) 35 Curr. Legal Probs 53; “Restitution and the Freedom of
Contract” (1983) 36 Curr. Legal Probs 141; “English and Roman Learning in Moses v. Mac-
ferlan” (1984) 37 Curr. Legal Probs 1; and with J. Beatson, “Unrequested Payment of Another’s
Debt” (1976) 92 L.Q. Rev. 188.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31
way modem English courts think about restitutionary problems than to
influence the way English academics conceive of them. Perhaps one day, a
generation hence, the shape of arguments in English courts will change as
a result of acceptance of the ideas presented in this book. Irrespective of its
chances for success on that front, as a book that advocates a major restruc-
turing of analysis in this area of law, Introduction to the Law of Restitution
merits closer scrutiny than one might be inclined to give modern treatises
on torts or contracts based on rational structures developed decades ago.
Another reason for responding to Birks in some detail is to alert Canadian
readers to those features of his approach which have little or no relevance
in a Canadian setting. Since the law of restitution in Canada is markedly
different from its counterpart in England, it is worthwhile to indicate these
differences and explain the reasons for the divergence.12
I. Definitions and the Legal Status of Unjust Enrichment
Birks starts with a definition of “restitution”. It is a word, he observes,
that is incongruous in the series: contract, tort, trust, restitution.13 The first
three terms name events, “composite set[s] of facts giving rise to legal con-
sequences”, or, as some prefer, causes of action or sources of civil liability.14
‘2The most significant difference is that Canadian courts, by and large, have accepted an
analysis based on unjust enrichment: see Degiman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada (1954),
[1954] S.C.R. 725, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785; County ofCarleton v. City of Ottawa (1965), [1965]
S.C.R. 663, 52 D.L.R. (2d) 220; and Pettkus v. Becker (1980), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 117 D.L.R.
(3d) 257. Pockets of resistance remain, however: see, e.g., Nicholson v. St Denis (1975), 8 O.R.
(2d) 315, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 699 (C.A.). See also Klippert, Unjust Enrichment, supra, note 3 at 28-
35.
‘3This division of private-law claims is theoretical or conceptual rather than practical or
empirical in nature. It therefore does not require that all private-law claims fall into one and
only one of the categories. Rather, it serves merely to structure the discourse in private-law
disputes and to provide criteria of relevance for legal arguments.
This review proceeds on the rather simplistic assumption that contract, tort, trust and unjust
enrichment exhaust the categories of civil liability in common-law jurisdictions. It does not
argue this point, however, and in fact, the division is probably neither exhaustive nor entirely
accurate. For example, on the former point, Birks suggests that there is a fifth category of
“miscellaneous” claims, roughly corresponding to the category of the civil-law jurisdictions
identified by the phrase, “obligations which arise from the operation of law solely” (Arts 983
and 1057 Civil Code of Lower Canada). On the latter point, it may be that the cases compre-
hended by “trust” are more properly divided between “contract” and the miscellaneous claims.
For recent attempts to rationalize the common law’s civil liability regime into such basic
categories, see A.S. Burrows, “Contract, Tort and Restitution – A Satisfactory Division or
Not?” (1983) 99 L.Q. Rev. 217; and R.A. Samek, “The Synthetic Approach and Unjustifiable
Enrichment” (1977) 27 U.T.L.J. 335.
‘4Supra, note 4 at 9.
1986]
BOOK REVIEWS
“Restitution”, by contrast, denotes a type of legal response and more prop-
erly belongs in the series: compensation, punishment, restitution. Further,
“restitution” is a word with several distinct connotations: “There can be
restitution of a thing or person to an earlier condition and restitution of a
thing to a person.”15 Birks suggests that modem lawyers have chosen the
second connotation, preferring to label the first “compensation” or “res-
toration to the status quo ante”.
But, he argues, there are problems with the second connotation. It fails,
for example, to embrace all cases that modem lawyers would include in the
law of restitution. 16 It also inadvertently takes in one extremely large body
of law, property law, which is not restitutionary according to the conception
of modem lawyers.’ 7 Consequently, Birks modifies his preliminary defini-
tion, “Restitution is the response which consists in causing one person to
give back something to another”, to “Restitution is the response which
consists in causing one person to give up to another an enrichment received
at his expense or its value in money”. 18 Birks then proceeds to specify the
causative event in restitution cases which is the missing term in the series:
contract, tort, trust, ? . “Unjust enrichment at the expense of another” is
the event which, analogous to the other events named in the series, moti-
vates common-law courts to respond with restitution. Just as sale, lease,
agency and partnership are instances of contract, payments by mistake,
payments made under compulsion, payments made on bases which fail,
quantum meruit, quantum valebat and the like are instances of unjust
enrichment.
Most English judges (with such notable exceptions as Lords Wright,
Atkin and Denning), when given the occasion to speak on the status of
unjust enrichment in English law, have rejected it in categorical terms.’ 9 A
recent example of this hostile posture is Lord Diplock’s statement in Orakpo
v. Manson Investments Ltd
My Lords, there is no general doctrine of unjust enrichment recognised in
English law. What it does is to provide specific remedies in particular cases of
‘ 51bid. at 10.
161n particular, it does not include the class of case which Birks calls restitution for wrongs,
as to which, see infra, “Unjust Enrichment and Wrongs”.
17Supra, note 4 at 13-16.
18lbid. at 11 and 13.
19For Lord Denning, see Greenwood v. Bennett (1972), [1973] Q.B. 195 at 200, [1972] 3
W.L.R. 691 (C.A.). For Lord Wright, see Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe
Barbour, Ltd (1942), [1943] A.C. 32 at 62-63, [1942] 2 All E.R. 122 (H.L.) [hereinafter Fibrosa
cited to A.C.]; and Brooks Wharf & Bull Wharf Ltd v. Goodman Bros (1936), [1937] 1 K.B.
534 at 545-46, [1936] 3 All E.R. 696 (C.A.) [hereinafter Brooks Wharfj. For Lord Atkin, see
United Australia, supra, note 6 at 27. For more recent approval, see Nissan v. A.G. (1967),
[1968] 1 Q.B. 286 at 351-52, [1967] 2 All E.R. 1238 (C.A.), Winn L.J., aff’d (1969), [1970]
A.C. 179 (H.L.).
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 31
what might be classified as unjust enrichment in a legal system that is based
upon the civil law.20
Unlike their Canadian counterparts, judges in England do not appear to be
persuaded that significant benefits are to be gained by admitting unjust
enrichment to the ranks of legal doctrine. Birks, however, argues that these
advantages are clear and compelling. He asserts that an identical principle
and the same problems are present in such diverse doctrines as quantum
meruit for services rendered pursuant to an unenforceable contract and the
constructive trust for money paid by mistake. Unjust enrichment, in iden-
tifying the essential unity of these claims, not only avoids the confusing
fragmentation of legal doctrine, it also helps to expose some of the tenacious
legal fictions which English lawyers have used, unconsciously one supposes,
to the detriment of legal discourse and justice in this field of law.2 1 The
argument which denies unjust enrichment any legal status is probably moti-
vated by an atavistic desire to preserve historic patterns of juristic speech
and to retain the basic division of the rules of civil liability between common
law and equity. Perhaps, too, there is an innate bias among common-law
20(1977), [1978] A.C. 95 at 104, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 229 (H.L.). Other examples include Sinclair
v. Brougham (1914), [1915] A.C. 398 at 415, [1914-15] All E.R. Rep. 622 (H.L.), Viscount
Haldane L.C.:
[B]roadly speaking, so far as proceedings in personam are concerned, the common
law of England really recognizes … only … two classes [of claims], those founded
on contract and those founded on tort.
See also Baylis v. Bishop of London (1913), [1913] 1 Ch. 127 at 140, 107 L.T.R. 730 (C.A.),
Hamilton L.J. quoted with approval in Holt v. Markham (1922), 128 L.T.R. 719 at 725 (C.A.),
Scrutton J.:
To ask what course would be ex aequo et bono to both sides never was a very precise
. Whatever may have
guide, and as a working rule it has long since been buried …
been the case 146 years ago, we are not now free in the twentieth century to admin-
ister that vague jurisprudence which is sometimes attractively styled “justice as
between man and man”.
2’With respect to the fragmentation point, the principle brings together quantum meruit,
quantum valebat, some of the money counts, contribution, indemnity, tracing, equitable liens,
some aspects of the constructive trust and some aspects of subrogation and rights akin to
subrogation. Predominant examples of legal fictions include the requirement in equity that
there be a fiduciary relationship in order for equitable tracing or the constructive trust to be
available and the implied-contract theory of quasi-contract which, although dismissed by almost
everyone today, still has a damaging influence on many areas of quasi-contractual doctrine.
As to the first, see, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd,
supra, note 3; English v. Dedham Vale Properties Ltd (1977), [1978] 1 W.L.R. 93, [1978] 1 All
E.R. 382 (Ch.D.); and Goodbody v. Bank of Montreal (1974), 4 O.R. (2d) 147, 47 D.L.R. (3d)
335 (H.C.). As to the second, see Goff& Jones, supra, note 3 at 5-11. For a recent attempt to
revive the implied-contract theory, see R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 2d ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1977) at 97-98.
On legal fictions generally, and their role in the development of legal doctrines, see L.L.
Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967); H.S. Maine, Ancient
Law, 9th ed. (London: John Murray, 1883) c. 2; and R. Demogue, Les notionsfondamentales
du droit prive (Paris: Librairie nouvelle de droit et de jurisprudence, 1911) at 238-52.
1986]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
lawyers against a conception which seems extravagantly metaphysical. To
the latter, Birks responds that “the word ‘unjust’ might, with a different
throw of the dice, have been ‘disapproved’ or, more neutrally, ‘reversible”‘. 22
In any event, “unjust enrichment” is no more opaque or abstract than
“contract” or “tort”.
When Birks comes to specify the precise legal status to be accorded to
unjust enrichment, though, his argument takes a strategic turn. It would not
be prudent for an English textbook writer, in the inhospitable environment
fostered by English courts, to argue for a full-fledged doctrine of unjust
enrichment. Too much has been said against it by distinguished members
of the English bench and bar for it to be tenable to claim today that unjust
enrichment is a source of legal obligation or a cause of action in English
law. Hence, Birks asserts that it is preferable to say that “[t]here are cir-
cumstances in which the law does not permit one person to be enriched by
subtraction from another” rather than to say that “the law does not permit
one person to be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.”23
In the characterization preferred by Birks, unjust enrichment is merely
the “generic conception” of events that call for restitution. It serves the
limited purpose of permitting the needed rationalization and stabilization
of patterns of legal discourse. The latter formulation is said by Birks to be
dynamic and normative. It is a “general principle” and not a “generic con-
ception”, prescriptive rather than descriptive. Birks maintains that there is
a danger that the prescriptive formulation will cause lawyers inadvertently
to disregard precedent and to ignore such intermediate concepts in the law
of restitution as mistake, compulsion or necessity, which have been devel-
oped decisionally.
It is just as easily argued that there is an equally serious danger that
his descriptive formulation will cause lawyers to be fixated by precedent.
They will then fail to make justifiable extensions of restitutionary relief in
situations where no obvious precedent exists.
There is another objection to this aspect of Birks’ argument, however,
which is more fundamental: the distinction he draws between the descriptive
and prescriptive formulations is one with very little by way of difference.
The critical point is that both formulations identify a set of normative
criteria which defines what is to count as a good legal argument or a sound
22Supra, note 4 at 19.
23Ibid. at 23-24.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31
judicial decision in restitution cases. 24 The only difference is that Birks’
descriptive formulation merely gives implicit or covert recognition to the
“general principle” he ostensibly rejects. But it is recognition nonetheless,
since the descriptive formulation is expressly intended to alter radically the
pattern of normative discourse in restitution cases. It is doubtful whether
Birks would dissent from these criticisms, given his opening claim that the
chief purpose of re-classifying the relevant common-law and equitable doc-
trines into one category is to cleanse the law of its “intellectual errors” so
as to reveal its underlying “skeleton ofprinciple”.25 His use of the descriptive
formulation is best explained as a guarded way of expressing acceptance of
that principle, intended solely to give the arguments developed in the remainder
of the book the appearance of conforming with the persistent denial of the
principle’s existence in English law.
This strategy also partially explains Birks’ retention of “restitution” as
the name for his subject. Given his persuasive arguments that, in its pristine
version, it is incongruous in the list of causative events and inherently
ambiguous as a legal concept, one wonders why it should be retained as a
term of art.Why not say simply that unjust enrichment is a cause of action
in English law? This, in fact, is precisely what the contrived definition of
restitution says: “restitution” is stipulated by Birks to mean “reversal of the
enrichment”, and the ground calling for reversal is identified, if only guard-
edly, as unjust enrichment at the expense of another.2 6 Since, however, unjust
enrichment is a category of claim forever banished from English law, Birks
is forced to call his body of law something else, “restitution”, and to argue,
rather tenuously, that his constrained definition of restitution does not entail
recognition of the unwholesome general principle.2 7 This strategy allows
Birks to conclude, at the end of Chapter 1, that his point of view is not a
radical departure from the conservative perspective of English courts. 28
“Restitution”, despite its obvious failings as an organizing principle and
24The following is a representative sampling of the kinds of statements Birks makes, ibid.
at I and 18, respecting the importance of recognizing the normative criteria: Restitution is in
“desperate need… [ofJ a simple, even an over-simplified, account ofhow its pieces fit together”;
and the “reluctance to deal in the language of unjust enrichment has to be overcome, for it
has done and is doing enormous damage to the whole law of restitution …
2SIbid. at vii and I [emphasis added].
26The statement is not entirely accurate since Birks modifies this stipulation to take account
of the restitution-for-wrongs cases. It is argued infra, “Unjust Enrichment and Wrongs”, that
this particular modification is misconceived.
27This move on Birks’ part is somewhat surprising since he is one of the few to have identified
the inappositeness of the name “restitution”. See also Samek, supra, note 13.
28Supra, note 4 at 26-27.
1986]
BOOK REVIEWS
legal concept, serves well as a Trojan horse for a cause of action in unjust
enrichment. 29
Canadian readers ought to be alerted to Birks’ conceptual finesse, not
least because our courts have not exhibited anything like the hostility towards
unjust enrichment as a cause of action as that associated with English courts.30
There is, therefore, no need to obfuscate in Canada by disguising the cause
restitution – peculiarly
of action in unjust enrichment as a legal response –
defined. “Restitution” thus presents a good case for Ockham’s razor. It may
be used henceforth as a shorthand expression for “reversing an enrichment
gained at the expense of another” but, recognizing that it is a term of con-
venience only, nothing further can turn on its “true” meaning.
One last observation about the word “restitution” is appropriate. It has
been seen that it carries several connotations: restoration of the status quo
ante (rejected by Birks); restoration of property belonging to the plaintiff
(rejected by Birks); and reversal of an enrichment (adopted by Birks). In
restitution, thus defined, the plaintiff recovers because the defendant has
received a benefit directly or indirectly from the plaintiff that he does not
deserve to keep. Such claims comprise the entire law of unjust enrichment.3′
There is another class of case where the defendant enriches himself
through the breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff. In Reading v. R., for
example, Sergeant Reading made a large profit by breaching his duty to the
Crown.32 In this case and others like it, defendants are enriched unde-
servedly, but it is not possible to say that anything has been received, directly
or indirectly, from the plaintiff. The circumstances of the receipt indicate
that it is probably not right for Sergeant Reading to keep his profit, but it
is not clear who should get it or why, since the plaintiff has not lost its
equivalent. Indeed, the plaintiff has not lost anything. In Chapters 2 and
10, Birks characterizes these cases as “restitution for wrongs” and he argues
that restitution is awarded on the basis of the wrong, not because the defend-
ant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff.
Notice that “restitution” has just acquired yet another meaning. By
Birks’ convention, “restitution” comes to mean sometimes reversing an
Carswell, 1982) at 39-47.
29For a construably similar effort, see G.H.L. Fridman & J.G. McLeod, Restitution (Toronto:
30See the cases cited, supra, note 12.
311t is not property law because the plaintiff is unable to say that the defendant’s benefit –
money, services or goods –
is, at the date of the action, still his property. It is not tort, contract
or trust law because the nexus between the plaintiff and the defendant required by each of
these categories of civil liability is not present. These points are developed in the second section
of the review.
32(1948), [1948] 2 K.B. 268, aff’d (1949), [1949] 2 K.B. 232 (C.A.), aff’d (1951), [1951] A.C.
507 (H.L.) [hereinafter Reading].
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 31
enrichment and sometimes forcing the defendant to give up to the plaintiff
gains made through the commission of a wrong.33
Birks is correct when he asserts that the recognition of unjust enrich-
ment “effects no change [to the law] except what comes from better under-
standing of what is there already” 34 if he means that the essential integrity
of case law will remain undisturbed insofar as the motivating intuitions,
some of the reasons and most of the results of litigation are concerned.
Much of the traditional language of justification, however, is odd, even
antiquarian, and ought to be abandoned. There is a lot of nineteenth-century
urlderbrush which the generic conception or principle, when correctly applied,
helps clear away. Taking this step enhances the intelligibility of this very
small, and otherwise transparent, corner of English private law.
II. Differentiation
A. Unjust Enrichment and Contract
Accommodating a new category of civil liability in English law requires
demarcation of the conceptual boundaries between the newcomer and the
better-established categories of contract, tort and trust. In Chapter 2 of his
book, entitled “Differentiation”, Birks examines the fit of unjust enrichment
in the law of obligations and its relationship to the law of property. He first
outlines the Roman-law origins of obligations arising quasi ex contractu and
observes that what English lawyers came to call quasi-contract in the late
nineteenth century is similar to, but not the same as, Roman law’s obligation
quasi ex contractu. The Roman classification denoted a group of situations
where the relief granted was analogous to that available for breach of con-
tractual obligations. Consequences flowing from the receipt of a mistaken
payment were the same as those which attached to the receipt of a loan
(mutuum). They were therefore sanctioned by the same action, condictio,
or debt. Similarly, negotiorum gestio attached the same consequences to the
unsolicited intervention in the affairs of another as availed in the contract
of mandate, namely that the gestor was obliged to conduct his intervention
with care. But because English law never has recognized the “quasi-man-
date” obligation of negotiorum gestio, its quasi-contract category was not
co-extensive with the Roman category quasi ex contractu.
33″That’s a great deal to make one word mean,” Alice said in a thoughtful tone. “When I
make a word do a lot of work like that,” said Humpty Dumpty, “I always pay it extra.” Carroll,
supra, note 1 at 164.
34Supra, note 4 at 27.
1986]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
The implicit basis of this aspect of English law, argues Birks, has always
been unjust enrichment. But because of the name, and owing to two other
factors, liability in quasi-contract attracted a delinquent association with
contractual obligations. The two other factors were the mistaken inclusion
of some situations vindicated by the writ of debt (one of the sixteenth-
century precursors to unjust enrichment) in assumpsit and Sir William
Blackstone’s erroneous explanation of quasi-contractual obligations as aris-
ing by implication from obligations grounded in the social contract. Birks
argues that these three factors gave rise to the predominant view in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that quasi-contract was really “sort-
of-contract”, involving the fictional implication of essentially contractual
obligations in what we now recognize as unjust enrichment claims. This
view yielded spectacular errors in several famous cases, including Sinclair
v. Brougham, 35 and led to unsuccessful attempts at rectification by Lord
Wright in Brooks Wharf and Fibrosa and by Lord Atkin in United Australia.
Birks recounts the history of this error in a lucid fashion, and his attribution
of complicity to Blackstone is original and persuasive.36
Having argued that quasi-contract is not contract, thereby removing
one obstacle to the demarcation of the contract/unjust enrichment boundary,
Birks goes on to observe, following the American Restatement of the Law
of Restitution, that many categories of equitable relief are also based on
unjust enrichment.37 This point raises the contract/unjust enrichment boundary
problem in a different context. The observation that a good deal of equity
is based on the imperative against unjust enrichment is complemented by
the corollary observation that a great many of equity’s doctrinei are con-
tractual in substance. The constructive trust is a telling but hardly unique
example of an equitable doctrine that appears contractual in some guises
and based on unjust enrichment in others.38 If the niceties of legal language
De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, Ltd (1920), [1920] A.C. 508, [1920] All E.R. Rep. 80 (H.L.).
35Supra, note 20. There are many examples. Another particularly interesting one is A.G. v.
36But here, as in several other key places in the book, Birks fails to put the language of law
back into its social context. In the result, although his explanation is persuasive and conceptually
sound on its own terms, it fails to satisfy completely. He asserts supra, note 4 at 34, for example,
that “it is a quite remarkable coincidence of legal history, to have the same error re-inforced
from three angles.” It is difficult to believe that this mistake was the result of such a coincidence
and that England’s nineteenth-century lawyers were so insensitive to the political implications
of their technical discourse.
37Restatement of the Law ofRestitution Quasi-Contracts and Constructive Trusts (1937).
38Whenever the constructive trust is deployed to satisfy the plaintiff’s expectation interest,
it is contractual in substance. The law is sometimes ambivalent about the legal status of a
statement made by the defendant owing to technical problems relating to contract formation,
third party enforcement of contracts, or the Statute of Frauds. These technical problems aside,
the law is reasonably certain that the statement should be construed as a legally-binding promise
in favour of the plaintiff. The ambivalence can be resolved by calling the enforcement of the
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31
are put to one side, it becomes apparent that a similar observation can be
made with respect to estoppel, promissory estoppel and the resulting trust.
Says Birks, on the contractual aspect of this argument:
Local difficulties may for a time obscure the fact that contracts, like roses,
remain the same under all names. If I induce and assume responsibility for
your expectation in relation to a particular matter, then, whatever words I have
actually used, the effect is that I have promised you that I will make that
expectation good. If the law then says that that promise is legally binding and
can be enforced against me, then, whatever words the law actually uses to
describe that enforceable promise, there is, according to jurisprudential usage
freed from local constraints, a contract. 39
The lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that common-law lawyers
ought to examine the various doctrines of equity carefully in their endeavour
to re-classify the rules of civil liability into the categories of contract and
unjust enrichment. Unfortunately, there recently has been a tendency on
the part of restitution lawyers to attempt to explain too much of equity with
unjust enrichment,40 in much the same fashion, ironically, that nineteenth-
century common lawyers attempted to explain too much of the common
law with contract.
B. Unjust Enrichment and Wrongs
There are situations where courts award a plaintiff the value of a benefit
that his defendant has obtained as a consequence of a breach of a duty
imposed by the law of torts, the law of trusts or, as some have argued, the
law of contracts. Are these unjust enrichment claims, or are they tort, trust
or contract claims or something else entirely? To put this question in a
slightly different way, how is the recovery of the defendant’s profit or saved
expense to be justified in those cases where there has been no apparent
subtraction from or loss to the plaintiff?
expectation interest a constructive trust, thereby preserving the integrity of contract doctrine.
Textbook examples include Inwards v. Baker (1965), [1965] 2 Q.B. 29, [1965] 1 All E.R. 446
(C.A.); Affrtteurs Rbunis Socit6 Anonyme v. Walford (1919), [1919] A.C. 801 (H.L.); and
Bannister v. Bannister (1948), [1948] 2 All E.R. 133, [1948] W.N. 261 (C.A.).
Conversely, the constructive trust can be deployed to effect a reversal of an unjust enrichment:
see, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. Israel-British Bank (London) Lid, supra, note 3; and
B.C. Teachers’ Credit Union v. Betterly (1975), 61 D.L.R. (3d) 755.
Constructive trusts are available in other situations as well. For example, they are deployed
to justify the distribution of family assets on the breakdown of marital relations. See Dickson
J.’s concurring opinion in Rathwell v. Rathwell (1978), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436, 83 D.L.R. (3d)
289; and Pettkus v. Becker, supra, note 12.
39Supra, note 4 at 47 [reference omitted].
40See, e.g., Goff & Jones, supra, note 3, which consistently makes this error.
1986]
BOOK REVIEWS
This question has arisen in many cases. Strand Electric and Engineering
Co. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd4l is a leading case on the recovery of
expenses saved by a defendant through the commission of a tort, Reading
v. R.42 on the recovery of profits made in the commission of a “wrong”
Boardman v. Phipps43 on the recovery of profits made through the innocent
breach of a fiduciary duty, and City of New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable
Ass’n 44 on the recovery of expenses saved through a breach of contract.
Birks is clearly correct in asserting that the vast majority of these cases
cannot be explained by unjust enrichment: in most of them, there is no
conceivable way to say that the defendant was enriched by receiving some-
thing from the plaintiff. Birks explains these cases as instances where res-
titution in the sense of “giving up”, and not “giving back”, is awarded on
account of “wrongs”. He therefore calls them “restitution for wrongs”. His
discussion penetrates much of the judicial and academic confusion sur-
rounding this class of case;45 as such it merits careful assessment. 46
Strand Electric, Reading, Boardman and City of New Orleans do not
represent the historical paradigms in the restitution-for-wrongs category.
Birks argues that at least some of the waiver-of-tort cases do, and it is
therefore with these cases that he begins his discussion. 47 Since some of the
waiver-of-tort decisions are to be included in the restitution-for-wrongs cat-
egory, Birks adopts the convention of discussing “wrongs” rather than “torts”.
He then notices that the term “waiver” is ambiguous and misleading
and, on that account, argues that it ought to be abandoned. It has, he sug-
gests, at least three possible connotations. 48 It could mean that the plaintiff
may choose to ignore the wrongful character of the defendant’s act and
recover the value received in unjust enrichment. An example would be
recovery of benefits obtained through duress. The plaintiff may sue for the
tort of duress and recover damages, or he may ignore the tort of duress and
sue in unjust enrichment to recover the value of the benefit involuntarily
transferred. Secondly, waiver could mean that the plaintiff may elect to
extinguish the wrong by accepting as valid the actions of his defendant. The
41(1952), [1952] 2 Q.B. 246, [1952] 1 All E.R. 796 (C.A.) [hereinafter Strand Electric].
42Supra, note 32.
43(1966), [1967] 2 A.C. 46, [1966] 3 W.L.R. 1009 (H.L.) [hereinafter Boardman].
449 So. 486 (Sup. Ct La 1891) [hereinafter City of New Orleans]. The plaintifffailed to recover
45″Restitution and Wrongs”, supra, note II.
46The ideas that are summarized in the text that follows are contained in Chapter 2,
47For a fresh look at the waiver-of-tort cases that, in some respects at least, coincides with
the critique of Birks’ restitution-for-wrongs cases developed below, see S. Hedley, “The Myth
of’Waiver of Tort” (1984) 100 L.Q. Rev. 653.
“Differentiation”, and Chapter 10, “Restitution for Wrongs”.
the defendant’s saved expense in this case.
48Supra, note 4 at 314-18.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 31
sole example is the case where the plaintiff ratifies the act of a self-styled
agent. Such a plaintiff is permitted to sue for the price of a chattel sold by
his defendant where the latter, at the time of the sale, was purporting to act
as the plaintiff’s agent. In so doing, the plaintiff extinguishes the wrong.
Thirdly, waiver may mean that a plaintiff has a choice of two remedies
deriving from a single wrong. The example offered by Birks is United Aus-
tralia, where the conversion of a cheque gave rise to a claim for money had
and received and a claim in conversion. The essential feature of this third
group of claims is that, in making out either of the alternative claims, the
plaintiff is required to prove the same wrong.
Although the second sense of waiver is perhaps the one for which the
label is most appropriate, it is an historical anomaly and therefore does not
merit special attention. The case cited as an example of it would be dealt
with today as an instance of waiver in the first or third sense. Birks is
concerned, instead, to draw a hard distinction between the first sense, which
he calls “alternative analysis” (highlighting the availability of alternative
characterizations of the facts) and the third sense, which he calls “restitution
for wrongs” (highlighting the contingent nature of the restitutionary claim).
His argument proceeds to an examination of this distinction.
In the alternative analysis cases, the conceptual division of private law
claims into tort, unjust enrichment, contract and trust allows for overlapping
characterizations in individual fact situations. There is nothing to object to
here. The principal issues it raises for the law are whether the plaintiff should
somehow be restricted to one or the other of the characterizations and, if
not, what the timing of his election between the two should be. This is a
familiar but difficult issue on the contract/tort boundary and proved prob-
lematic on the tort/unjust enrichment boundary as United Australia showed.49
The restitution-for-wrongs cases comprise the more intriguing half of
the dichotomy. If there is to be such a category of claim, then two obvious
questions arise: does it take in more than the relevant instances of the
traditional waiver-of-tort claims? And if so, which other wrongs give rise
to a claim of restitution (giving up) and why? To the first question, Birks
answers an unqualified yes, thus justifying his initial change in terminology
from “torts” to “wrongs”. Birks asserts, in answer to the second question,
49For treatments of the contract/tort overlap, see: M. Bridge, “The Overlap of Tort and
Contract” (1982) 27 McGill L.J. 872; G.H.L. Fridman, “The Interaction of Tort and Contract”
(1977) 93 L.Q. Rev. 422; B. Morgan, “The Negligent Contract-Breaker” (1980) 58 Can. Bar
Rev. 299; W.D.C. Poulton, “Tort or Contract” (1966) 82 L.Q. Rev. 346; and J. Blom, “The
Evolving Relationship Between Contract and Tort” (1985) 10 Can. Bus. L.J. 257.
1986]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
that there are three alternative tests to determine whether a particular wrong
should give rise to a claim of restitution (giving up):
1. Deliberate Exploitation of Wrongdoing: If the defendant deliberately com-
mitted the wrong complained of in order to make a profit, he should be
forced to give it up to the plaintiff. If the defendant, for example, deliberately
defamed the plaintiff in order to increase sales of his book, the plaintiff
should be entitled to the profits stemming from the defamation.
2. Anti-Enrichment Wrongs: Some acts are designated legal wrongs as a
matter of policy, at least in part, to prevent enrichments. The duty not to
exploit trade secrets related in confidence, for example, is based partially
on a prohibition against obtaining a benefit by committing the wrong of
breach of confidence. 50 Similarly, and more obviously, the duty not to inter-
fere with a property entitlement of the plaintiff is designed as a matter of
policy to prevent enrichment.51 The test is whether the defendant has enriched
himself through the commission of an anti-enrichment wrong.
3. Prophylaxis: Finally, the law imposes an obligation to give up enrichments
where they have been gained through the breach of a fiduciary duty. The
law does this, as a matter of policy, to protect the integrity of fiduciary
relationships, notwithstanding that no corresponding harm was caused to
the plaintiff5 2
Birks concludes by illustrating the application of these principles in several
problematic cases, namely, profits made through breach of contract, profits
made through interference with contractual relationships, profits made through
breach of fiduciary duties and profits made through breach of confidence.
There are two major problems with Birks’ analysis of the restitution-
for-wrongs cases. A portent of the first problem lies in Birks’ admission to
having considerable difficulty in including United Australia as a member,
let alone a paradigm, of the restitution-for-wrongs category. It is, he says,
as easily classified as a member of the alternative-analysis category:
On the facts of United Australia there is … some doubt whether there can or
cannot be said to be a subtraction as well as a wrong.53
50The example is Peter Pan Mfg Corp. v. Corsets Silhouette Ltd (1962), [1964] 1 W.L.R. 96,
[1963] 3 All E.R. 402 (Ch.D.) [hereinafter Peter Pan].
51The example is Strand Electric, supra, note 41.
52There may be other cases where the law acts to protect a particular class of relationship.
The point is that if a gain has been obtained through the breach of a duty arising out of the
relevant kind of relationship, the law requires that it be given up, notwithstanding the lack of
actual harm to the plaintiff.
53Supra, note 4 at 321.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31
More importantly, he observes that the distinction between alternative ana-
lysis and restitution for wrongs is very frequently a difficult one to draw:
Though there are many cases in which plaintiffs have obtained restitution from
wrongdoers it is not often possible to say whether they succeeded on the basis
of alternative analysis or restitution for wrongs. In particular there are very
few cases which fall unequivocally into the latter category ….54
It bears repeating that the possibility of drawing this distinction is stated
by Birks to be of some importance. He is clearly correct in this assessment.
The distinction marks the conceptual boundary between all unjust enrich-
ment claims that also happen to involve wrongs and all those restitution
claims in which courts order defendants to give up benefits obtained through
the commission of a wrong where there is no loss or subtraction in the
plaintiff corresponding to the benefit.
More will be said concerning the nature and importance of this dis-
tinction below, but the first problem can be identified immediately. It lies
in the attempt to include UnitedAustralia, and numerous similar cases such
as Strand Electric and Peter Pan Mfg Corp. v. Corsets Silhouette Ltd, in the
restitution-for-wrongs category in the first place. Notwithstanding Birks’
argument to the contrary, the entire sub-category of anti-enrichment wrongs
belongs in the alternative-analysis half of the dichotomy. Strand Electric is
a paradigm case in that category and therefore the one best suited to illus-
trating this point.
Strand Electric involved both a tort claim and an unjust enrichment
claim. As a tort claim, the relevant issue was the compensation to which
the plaintiff was entitled by virtue of the loss caused him by the defendant’s
tortious act. As an unjust enrichment claim, the relevant issue was the
enrichment the defendant received at the expense of the plaintiff. There is,
on the facts of Strand Electric, the paradox that the defendant had more in
its hands, so to speak, than the plaintiff apparently had lost. It is this paradox
which leads Birks to maintain, mistakenly, that Strand Electric should not
be explained as a tort claim or an unjust enrichment claim, because there
was no equivalency between the plaintiff’s recovery and his actual loss (tort)
or subtraction (unjust enrichment). The paradox is obviously problematic
for the tort characterization. In the unjust enrichment characterization, it
surfaces in the guise of two related conundrums that have been discussed
with some frequency in the restitution literature: whether a plaintiff’s recov-
ery is restricted to the apparent subtraction or extends to include the entire
541bid. at 318.
1986]
BOOK REVIEWS
amount of the defendant’s gain;5 5 and whether a plaintiff is permitted to
count the saved expense of his defendant as a benefit, negative though it
may be, for the purposes of an unjust enrichment claim.5 6
The paradox from the tort perspective dissolves once it is recognized
that there is a critical problem respecting the quantification of loss in all
the possessory tort claims. Indeed, the common law has always allowed a
range of possibilities on this issue, sometimes equivocating completely by
leaving the matter to the plaintiff’s discretion. For example, historically the
plaintiff was permitted to choose the value of the chattel at the date of
judgment and sue in detinue or choose the value of the chattel at the date
of the wrongful act and sue in conversion. The issue will remain unsettled
precisely because this tort claim is designed to vindicate a wrong committed
to the plaintiff’s property. That wrong and the resultant loss can be char-
acterized in any number of ways.5 7 As plaintiff’s counsel suggested in Strand
Electric, there is no reason in principle for the range of choice afforded the
plaintiff or the court in this class of tort claim to be restricted so as to
exclude recovery of the rental value of a chattel in the appropriate case.
When the loss is so characterized, the recovery is equivalent to the loss.
Strand Electric was thus properly dealt with as a tort claim.
The paradox dissolves from the perspective of the unjust enrichment
claim for the same reason. All that need be recognized is that the economic
value taken from the plaintiffwas originally in the form of a property interest
in a chattel. Property interests have economic value in at least three distinct
55See Lamine v. Dorrell (1705), 2 Ld Raym. 1216, 92 E.R. 303 (Ch.D.), a waiver-of-tort case
where the plaintiff waived the torts of detinue and trover and sued the defendant in money
had and received for the price received by the defendant on the sale of the plaintiff’s debenture.
It seems, on these facts, that the plaintiff did not actually lose anything save the fair market
value of the debentures at the date of the conversion or the date of trial. If the sale price was
greater than the respective fair market values, was the plaintiff entitled to it instead?
561n Strand Electric, supra, note 41, it was at least arguable that the plaintiff did not actually
lose anything. It never was entitled to the receipt of any rent for the chattel, so no rental
payments were actually taken from it. Was it nevertheless entitled to the defendant’s saved
expense?
571n the tort of conversion, for example, the plaintiff’s loss is quantified in different ways
depending on the circumstances, e.g., the plaintiff may be entitled to the market value of stocks
at the date he first became aware of their conversion and is not limited to the market value
at the date of conversion (see Dominion Securities Ltd v. Glazerman (1984), 29 C.C.L.T. 194
(Man. C.A.)); he may be limited to the cost as opposed to the retail price of inventory wrongfully
seized under a debenture (see Ronald Elwyn Lister Ltd v. Dunlop Tire Canada Ltd (1985), 52
O.R. (2d) 88, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 684 (C.A.), rev’d.(1982), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 726, 135 D.L.R. (3d)
1); he may be limited to the purchase price of platinum as opposed to its value at the date of
trial (see Canadian Laboratory Supplies Ltd v. Engelhard Industries of Canada Ltd (1975), 12
O.R. (2d) 113, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 65 (H.C.), rev’d on other grounds (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 202, 78
D.L.R. (3d) 232 (C.A.), aff’d (1979), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 450, 97 (3d) D.L.R. 1).
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 31
ways: the usus, abusus and fructus of the civil law. How the value is par-
ticularized according to these three interests is a problem for individual fact
patterns. There can be no objection in principle to characterizing it as usus,
as in Strand Electric, especially considering that this was exactly how the
defendant itself valued the chattel. 58
The crux of Birks’ problem lies in wanting to be too materialistic in
defining “subtraction”. Money paid by mistake is always an easy case on
this issue because it is obvious that when money is mistakenly paid, there
has been a “subtraction” from the plaintiff and that the subtraction is equal
to the quantity of money paid. But economic value can come in many forms
besides money. When it does, as in the case of property interests in chattels,
the court must be careful to conceptualize the “subtraction” problem in the
way that best identifies that aspect of the property interest that was taken
from the plaintiff.
Arguments to similar effect could be made for most of the other cases
Birks includes in his sub-category of anti-enrichment wrongs. These cases
all involve situations in which the law is attempting to give a remedy for
the misappropriation of a property entitlement or a legal interest akin to a
property entitlement. As such, there must always be a direct correspondence
between the plaintiff’s loss and the plaintiff’s recovery (the tort character-
ization) or the defendant’s gain and the plaintiff’s subtraction (the unjust
enrichment characterization). What makes them problematic is that the
quantification of the loss or subtraction has to be conceived of in other than
conventional ways. But as Strand Electric shows, that only puts them nearer
the frontier of the relevant category, not beyond it, since the novel concep-
tion of the loss or subtraction required is, nonetheless, juristically sound.
Moreover, from a common sense point of view, it is the only reasonable
characterization of the loss or subtraction given the peculiar facts of the
cases concerned.
The thrust of these arguments is that Birks’ initial enterprise of explain-
ing private law, so far as is possible, in terms of the categories of tort, trust,
contract and unjust enrichment is not to be abandoned so readily. The
purpose of that enterprise is to achieve a rationalization of the language of
private-law justification by making it conform with basic norms that are
intelligible to the modem mind. Grounding the relevant claims in such
norms has the singular virtue of permitting arguments by analogy and crit-
icisms of legal decisions based on principle. Birks is too willing to gather
these claims into a category consisting of a miscellany of”policy”-motivated
rules.
581n Lamine v. Dorrell, supra, note 55, the subtraction was identified as abusus.
1986]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
This latter observation sets the stage for the discussion of the second
major problem with Birks’ treatment of restitution for wrongs: it is the more
fundamental criticism that the restitution-for-wrongs category lacks unity
and intelligibility. As a result, there can be no basis for comparing or con-
trasting it with any other category of private law claim or for determining
its membership.
In Chapter 2, where Birks introduces the argument for the two meanings
of restitution, he makes the rather weak claim that the division of his subject
into restitution meaning “giving back” and restitution meaning “giving up”
is more economical involving, regrettably, some “artificial specialization of
the terminology”. 59 The dichotomy is thus first recommended on the basis
of mere convenience. Birks’ equivocation regarding the anti-enrichment
cases is another indication that his embrace of the dichotomy is only ten-
tative. In Chapter 10, however, where Birks discusses the restitution-for-
wrongs cases in more detail, he maintains that the dichotomy is substantive
and not merely conventional. Readers are told at the beginning of the chap-
ter that, in embarking on the study of these cases, they are crossing a “major
divide”. 60 This point is reinforced by Birks’ claim that the distinction between
alternative analysis and restitution for wrongs is of crucial importance.
The second description of the distinction is better. Whereas unjust
enrichment is of the essence of restitution meaning “giving back”, there is
no unity to the cases in which restitution means “giving up” except, perhaps,
that the restitutionary claims comprehended by it are not unjust enrichment
claims. It is this feature, however, which makes it particularly inappropriate
to talk about the two classes of claim as belonging to the same area of law.
It demonstrates that there is no conceptual similarity between the two except
the superficial one that the response to both might, by convention only, be
called “restitution”. Including restitution for wrongs in the same book as
unjust enrichment is akin to devoting a separate chapter to tort damages
in a treatise on contract.
But even if there is some value in examining the restitution-for-wrongs
cases alongside the unjust enrichment cases, it is doubtful whether the cases
Birks includes as restitution for wrongs are adequately explained by that
rubric. There is a lack of integrity in the category in the sense that the
reasons for recovery in these cases are inextricably tied to the social purposes
of the discrete areas of law in which they arise and therefore can be explained
solely in the light of those purposes. Calling these cases “restitution” does
59Supra, note 4 at 42.
601bid. at 313.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31
not aid in the identification of the reasons for legal intervention. This argu-
ment can be illustrated by re-examining the cases Birks gives as examples
of his first and third principles.
1. Deliberate Exploitation of Wrongdoing: The defamer’s profits present a
problem for tort law. Conventional tort-law analysis prefers to deal with the
issue of the basis and quantum of the plaintiff’s recovery as one concerning
the availability of punitive damages. 61 Perhaps there is some attraction in
deviating from conventional usage by calling the plaintiff’s recovery “res-
titution”: if the plaintiff recovers the actual profits made by his cynical
defendant, there is at least the appearance of a benefit being given up. But
calling the recovery “restitution” does not explain the court’s intervention,
and this is exactly what needs to be known if the recovery is to be justified.
If the resolution of this latter problem is not to be found within the scheme
of corrective justice presented by tort law, that is to say, if there is no
conceivable way to characterize the defendant’s profits as the plaintiff’s loss,
then the resolution must be that such recovery represents a policy-motivated
private-law claim. The policy advanced in the case of the defamer is the
one set out for punitive damages by Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard.62
“Penalty” is a more apt description than “restitution” because it identifies
the nature of the response to the plaintiff’s claim and leads directly to the
articulation of the reason for intervening: for policy reasons the law wants
to punish the defendant.
3. Prophylaxis: The fiduciary’s profits present a problem for trust law broadly
conceived. The explanation that Birks gives for this case is probably right.
Recovery of profits made through at least some breaches of fiduciary duty
is, like the recovery in the case of the defamer, an instance of a private-law
claim being deployed instrumentally for the advancement of a specific policy
objective. 63 In this case, the general object is to deter breaches of fiduciary
duty by imposing severe sanctions when they occur. As in the case of the
6 Sometimes, however, the recovery can be justified as an actual loss, in which case the
orthodox view is to distinguish such recovery as “aggravated damages”: see G.H.L. Fridman,
“Punitive Damages in Tort” (1970) 48 Can. Bar Rev. 373 at 379; and D.L. Hawely, “Punitive
and Aggravated Damages in Canada” (1980) 28 Alta L. Rev. 485.
62(1964), [1964] A.C. 1129 at 1226, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367 (H.L.):
[T]here are certain categories of cases in which an award of exemplary damages
can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strengths of the law and thus affording
a practical justification for admitting into the civil law a principle which ought
logically to belong to the criminal.
In the discussion which follows, Lord Devlin sets out three categories of claim for punitive
damages. There is considerable doubt whether Canadian courts have felt restricted by these
categories: see Fridman, ibid.; and Hawley, ibid.
63See also E.J. Weinrib, “The Fiduciary Obligation” (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. I. There may be
other justifications, including the possibility in some cases that recovery of the fiduciary’s gain
is a surrogate measure for the plaintiff’s actual loss.
1986]
BOOK REVIEWS
defamer, “restitution” is inadequate as the name for this type of recovery
because it does not identify the nature of or reason for the intervention.
There is a further objection to Birks’ analysis. Given that the relevant
policies in both cases constitute strong reasons for moving against the defendant,
there still has been no explanation as to why the plaintiff, and not the State
or some third party, should recover from the defendant, nor what the quan-
tum of the plaintiff’s recovery should be.64 Birks does not attempt to answer
these questions but merely presumes that the relevant policies are best
implemented by a private-law claim in which the measure of recovery is
restricted to the defendant’s profit. But his resolution of these issues is not
obviously the best one and requires, in any event, more in the way of
argument than Birks is able to offer. Since the claims are policy-motivated,
there can be only pragmatic arguments as to the appropriateness of the
resolution, the soundness of which can be tested solely by reference to the
specific policy sought to be implemented. Presuming the recovery is “res-
titutionary” obscures this enquiry.
The implication of the foregoing analysis is that Birks’ initial question
– which wrongs give rise to restitution in the “giving up” sense? –
is
misconceived. The discussion of the two examples suggests that there is no
internal coherence to the “restitution for wrongs” category. Rather, the law
responds with favour to the plaintiff’s claim in these cases for a variety of
policy reasons related to the social purposes of the area of private law in
which the claims arise. Further, the law selects the plaintiff and quantifies
his recovery on a purely pragmatic basis connected with the policy interest
which supports the initial intervention. The fact that there is no unity or
intelligibility to this class of case means that there is no basis in principle
to identify additions to it.65
64For a recent case which overlooks these issues and calls the claim “unjust enrichment”,
see Rosenfeldt v. Olson (1984), 59 B.C.L.R. 193, [1985] 2 W.W.R. 502 (S.C.), rev’d (1986),
[1986] 3 W.W.R. 403 (B.C.C.A.), rev’d (31 July 1986) no. 19893 (S.C.C.) [unpublished], where
money paid into a trust set up by the RCMP in favour of a murderer’s wife and child in
exchange for information relating to the murders was recovered by the victims’ families.
65Birks argues, e.g., for the possibility of having restitution-for-wrongs claims available for
some instances of breach of contract. He suggests that City of New Orleans is a type of case
in which the test of deliberate exploitation ought to be brought into play so as to allow recovery
of profits against an unscrupulous contract breaker. For a better reasoned justification of the
recovery, see E.A. Farnsworth, “Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement
Principle in Breach of Contract” (1985) 94 Yale L.J. 1339; but compare G. Jones, “The Recovery
of Benefits Gained from a Breach of Contract” (1983) 99 L.Q. Rev. 443. On the non-availability
of exemplary damages for breach of contract, the leading case in Ontario is Cardinal Con-
struction Ltd v. R. (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 575, 122 D.L.R. (3d) 703 (H.C.), aff’d (1981), 38 O.R.
(2d) 161, 128 D.L.R. (3d) 662 (C.A.).
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 31
C. Unjust Enrichment and Property
The last boundary question to be examined, that between property and
unjust enrichment, is the most complex. Any attempt to draw the boundary
between property and unjust enrichment raises the more general problem
of distinguishing the whole law of obligations from the law of property. It
also raises issues concerning the integrity of the various classes of claim
within the law of obligations itself.
There is a sense in which the whole law of obligations is contained in
the law of property. Contract, for example, can be conceived of as the con-
sensual transference of “right”, and “right” in turn can be conceived of as
the generic name for property. Thus, a breach of contract always involves
a transgression of a property entitlement. Parallel arguments can be made
with respect to tort and unjust enrichment since tort, broadly conceived,
concerns illegitimate interference with “right” and unjust enrichment, broadly
conceived, concerns defective transference of “right”.
Moreover, the categories on the obligations side of the distinction can
be collapsed, with some ingenuity, into each other. The history of English
private law provides some very striking illustrations of this point.66 What
makes each of the categories intelligible to the modern mind, and therefore
worthy of independent consideration, is that they involve substantially dif-
ferent kinds of legal relationships: the nexus between plaintiff and defendant
in each category is defined in essentially different ways. The common law
can be said to “know” that the nature of the nexus is the crux of the matter
in its expression “cause of action”; the civil law “knows” this in its express-
ion “source of civil liability”. Thus, contract involves the consensual for-
mation of obligations, tort, the imposition of obligations on the basis of
fault, and unjust enrichment, obligations arising on a defective transference
of “right”.
At this level of abstraction, however, it is difficult to discern the diff-
erence between those portions of tort law where property entitlements are
vindicated and unjust enrichment, since both of these kinds of claim deal
66A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of
Assumpsit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); S.EC. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Com-
mon Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981); and C. Fifoot, History and Sources of the
Common Law: Tort and Contract (London: Stevens & Sons, 1949). This point is often lost
sight of by those who argue against a cause of action in unjust enrichment. They mistakenly
assume that contract and tort are inherently intelligible and mutually exclusive categories of
claim when they argue that unjust enrichment, by contrast, “exerts influence over many branches
of the law, while providing the complete explanation of none”: see, e.g., S. Hedley, “Unjust
Enrichment as the Basis of Restitution – An Overworked Concept” (1985) 5 Legal Stud. 56
at 59; and G.H.L. Fridman, “Restitution Revindicated, Or, the Wonderful World of Professor
Samek” (1979) 29 U.T.L.J. 160.
1986]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
with situations where there has been a defective transference of “right”. The
only difference is practical. The tort claims arising on defective transference
of property entitlements usually depend on the continued existence of an
identifiable res. In unjust enrichment, the vindication of “right” is expanded
to include situations where there has been a defective transfer of a benefit
which, by its nature, is not and usually never was, in the form of an iden-
tifiable res. This is always the case where the benefit was in the form of
services and money and sometimes the case where the benefit was in the
form of goods. This point is crucial because it is the only way to mark the
boundary between unjust enrichment and these kind of tort claims. 67
These abstract problems surface in positive law in the common law
and equitable doctrines of tracing, equitable liens, some instances of the
money counts and the constructive trust. They are dealt with in Chapter
11 of Birks’ book, entitled “The Second Measure of Restitution”. I have
written on these problems elsewhere so will confine myself to outlining
Birks’ thesis in regard to them and providing an abbreviated critique. This
area of the common law is easily one of the most complex and perplexing
and Birks’ discussion is detailed and subtle.
The common sense of the matter is contained in two contradictory
propositions. On the one hand, as a claim in corrective justice not involving
the vindication of a property interest per se, one would think that the cause
of action in unjust enrichment would give rise to recovery in the form of
money only. On this view, the court, so far as it is able, should calculate
the value of the enrichment and give it back to the plaintiff in money, in
the same way as it calculates damages in contract and tort. On the other
hand, there are many situations where the defendant is possessed of an asset
which is easily identifiable as having come, through a series of intermixtures
and substitutions, from the plaintiff, but which, by the rules of property law,
cannot be said to belong to the plaintiff. A straightforward example of this
phenomenon is presented by the early nineteenth-century English case of
Taylor v. Plumer.68 Plumer gave money to his broker to buy one thing,
exchequer bonds, but the broker, having decided to abscond to America,
purchased American investments and some bullion instead. Plumer’s attor-
ney caught up with the broker before he could leave Falmouth and took the
investments and bullion. The broker’s assignee in bankruptcy sued Plumer
in conversion. It was held that the investments and bullion belonged to
Plumer and the action therefore failed. Intuitively, this result seems correct.
The legal justification for Plumer’s success, however, is much less clear.
67For an attempt to explain some parts of quasi-contract as essentially proprietary in nature,
thereby overlooking this distinction, see S.J. Stoljar, The Law of Quasi-Contract (Sydney: Law
Book, 1964).
68Taylor v. Plumer (1815), 3 M. & S. 562, 105 E.R. 721 (K.B.) [hereinafter cited to M. & S.].
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31
Previous efforts to explain the fact that the above-mentioned common
law and equitable doctrines seem to be unjust enrichment claims which give
rise to recovery of a specific asset or fund belonging to the defendant have
characterized the doctrines as “restitutionary” or “instrumental” “proprie-
tary claims”. The effort to justify the proprietary nature of the relief granted,
though, has come to nought. The only justification offered heretofore has
been that “instrumental” relief should be granted when the court thinks it
“appropriate”. 69
Birks thinks there are better reasons than mere convenience supporting
the proprietary effect of these doctrines. He says that these doctrines involve
situations where a second measure of recovery in restitution is at stake. He
calls the second measure “value surviving”, contrasting it with the prima
facie measure which he calls “value received”. He suggests that there are
two distinct categories of claim in which the second measure should be
available to unjust enrichment plaintiffs; only the first category is relevant
here. The first category he identifies gives rise to claims he calls “proprietary
claims” and comprises situations where the plaintiff maintains throughout
what Birks calls a “proprietary base”. This category and the reasons sup-
porting it are offered as a fundamental justification of the areas of positive
law mentioned.
The simplest way to expand on and to criticize Birks’ rationalization
of the “proprietary claims” is to begin, not with the reasons why “proprie-
tary” relief is available, but with an identification of the interests of the
plaintiff that are served by having “proprietary claims” in the first place.
There are three such interests. First, the defendant may be insolvent, in
which case the point of the “proprietary claim” from the standpoint of the
plaintiff is to achieve priority over the defendant’s creditors. Second, the
investment of the original benefit received by the defendant may have resulted
in a profit to him, in which case the plaintiff might like to have the original
back plus the appreciation. Third, the original benefit may have passed into
the hands of a third party, such as the initial recipient’s wife, in which case
the plaintiff might like to sue the wife and the original recipient together.
It is readily seen that each of these three interests requires arguments
that, in some manner or form, participate in the concept “property”. Hence,
the appellation “proprietary claims”. If this is what the plaintiff is after, how
does he justify getting it? Assuming the plaintiff can show that there has
been an initial unjust enrichment, Birks’ answer is as follows:
The only satisfactory basis for raising a restitutionary proprietary right in
the assets in which, by substitutions and intermixtures, the original enrichment
69See, e.g., Goff & Jones, supra, note 3; Fridman & McLeod, supra, note 29; and, to a lesser
extent, Klippert, Unjust Enrichment, supra, note 3.
1986]
BOOK REVIEWS
now survives is as follows: the circumstances of the original receipt by the
defendant must be such that, either at law or in equity, the plaintiff retained
or obtained the property in the matter received by the defendant, and then
continued to retain it until the moment at which the substitution or inter-
mixture took place.
And later the answer is formulated:
[I]f he wishes to assert a right in rem in the surviving enrichment, the plaintiff
must show that at the beginning of the story he had a proprietary right in the
subject-matter, and that nothing other than substitution or intermixtures [that
are morally neutral or fortuitous acts] happened to deprive him of that right
in rem.70
This is almost right.
A clear case of a true property claim is first required in order to contrast
it with the “proprietary claim” in unjust enrichment. Consider the case of
a converter who is still in possession of the plaintiff’s chattel. Suppose he
goes bankrupt. There is no question that the plaintiff has a priority claim
in the bankruptcy estate. He simply says that he still owns the chattel and
makes the estate itself a defendant in a personal action in conversion. This
is how the common law articulates and justifies that priority claim. The key
feature of this fact situation for present purposes is that there is an iden-
tifiable res in the possession of the defendant, or his bankruptcy estate, which
came from (indeed, we say, still belongs to) the plaintiff.
What if, prior to his bankruptcy, the defendant had sold the chattel and
purchased another? Does the plaintiff still have the priority claim? This
modification of the initial fact pattern raises a possible instance of a resti-
tutionary “proprietary claim”. The examples could be multiplied but two
more will suffice for the purposes of demonstration: these two, together with
the first, parallel the interests of the plaintiff outlined above. Suppose the
same defendant sells the original chattel and buys an appreciating asset. Is
the plaintiff entitled to claim the value of the appreciated asset? Suppose
the same defendant sells the original chattel, buys another, and gives it to
his wife. Can the plaintiff sue the wife?71
The correct answer to each of these three questions must be one that
is consonant with the nature of the action which justifies the recovery that
70Supra, note 4 at 378-79 [footnotes omitted].
71The leading articles on “restitutionary proprietary claims” which deal with the questions
raised are M. Scott, “The Right to ‘Trace’ at Common Law” (1966) U.W. Aust. L. Rev. 463;
R.M. Goode, “The Right to Trace and Its Impact in Commercial Transactions” (1976) 92 L.Q.
Rev. 360 and 528; S. Khurshid & P. Matthews, “Tracing Confusion” (1979) 95 L.Q. Rev. 78;
D. Friedman, “Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property or the
Commission of a Wrong” (1980) 80 Colum. L. Rev. 504. On “proprietary claims” generally,
see Goff & Jones, supra, note 3, c. 2; and Klippert, Unjust Enrichment, supra, note 3, c. 7.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 31
the plaintiff seeks. In all three examples, assuming that the plaintiff cannot
bring a true proprietary claim, he must justify his recovery on the basis of
another cause of action. It is suggested that the relevant cause of action is
unjust enrichment. Thus, in the first example, he must say that the estate
(and therefore all the creditors of the estate) would be unjustly enriched if
it were not forced to give back the value of the second chattel. Similarly,
in the second example, the plaintiff must say that the enrichment retained
by the defendant is equal to the value of the appreciated asset, and in the
third example, he must say that the defendant’s wife is unjustly enriched.
The crucial point to recognize is that the complex and sometimes arbi-
trary rules governing the right to trace through substitutions and intermix-
tures are subsumed under these more fundamental questions: the tracing
rules have justificatory force only to the extent that they are subsumed in
the cause of action in unjust enrichment. Recall, here, the initial point that
unjust enrichment claims are problematic precisely because they never deal
with situations where there is an identifiable res that belonged to and still
belongs to the plaintiff. That is to say, simply, that they are not true pro-
prietary claims. The issues raised in the first and third examples, therefore,
are best understood as problems of causation in unjust enrichment. We have
no difficulty with causation in the parallel property claims because there is
an identifiable res that can be followed into the hands of the estate or of
the wife. The issue raised in the second example concerns a problem of
quantification of the recovery in unjust enrichment. There is no analogous
problem in the parallel property claim because there is, in such a claim, an
identifiable res, the market value of which determines the quantification of
the recovery.72
The problem with calling the recovery “proprietary” is that such a label
merely asserts the conclusion. It does not attempt to explain the fictions or
arbitrary rules which are called in aid of its invocation. To return to the
example of Taylor v. Plumer, it is merely the conclusion to say that the
investments and the bullion “belonged”, in equity or at law, to Plumer. In
order to come to that conclusion, one is forced to resort to arbitrary or
fictional justifications such as: the broker was acting as Plumer’s agent when
he purchased them or, Plumer retained a beneficial interest in the invest-
ments and bullion, because any argument to the contrary would be “mis-
chievous in principle”. 73 On the facts of Taylor v. Plumer, the first justification
is clearly false. The second merely restates the conclusion without offering
justification. There is no sleight of hand involved, however, in saying that
the broker’s creditors would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to
72Although choosing the characterization and timing for the market value is problematic.
73Taylor v. Plumer, supra, note 68 at 574.
1986]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
rank equally with the plaintiff in regard to the value of those assets. On this
characterization of the conclusion, the tracing rules resolve a question of
causation in the law of unjust enrichment: through those rules, the law is
asking whether the value represented by the American investments and the
bullion came from the plaintiff. If so, and if the circumstances surrounding
each transfer of that value indicate that it was unjustly obtained, then the
plaintiff is entitled to his “priority”. The unjust enrichment analysis thus
explains why the tracing rules are being applied in a way that the “pro-
prietary claims” analysis cannot. Analogous arguments can be made for all
the other common law and equitable doctrines having similar effect.
The criticism of Birks’ formulation implicit in these observations is
that his formulation begs the question ofjustification. He states thdit if there
is an original proprietary base that can be traced through “neutral” inter-
mixtures and substitutions, then a plaintiff is entitled to the priority in the
defendant’s bankruptcy, to the appreciated asset, or to a claim against the
wife. He does not say what is to count as a proprietary base or which
intermixtures and substitutions are morally neutral and therefore irrelevant.
But this is exactly what we need to know in order to apply his analysis and
justify the recovery.
In fact, it is clear from Birks’ discussion of “proprietary claims” that
all the cases he describes as “proprietary claims” are more simply described
as straightforward unjust enrichment claims and that there are no unjust
enrichment claims which are not also, in effect, one of his “proprietary
claims”. Since, in Birks’ view, unjust enrichment is the relevant “causative
event” in the restitution-meaning-giving-back cases, there are no such res-
titution claims which are not also “proprietary claims”. “Proprietary claims”,
therefore, is an unhelpful and redundant concept.
Conclusion
The argument in this review can be summarized as follows:
(1) Unjust enrichment is a cause of action in Canadian law. It includes all
those claims that in the nineteenth century were classified as quasi-contract.
It also comprehends many aspects of equitable doctrine. It is preferable to
attempt to unify the various claims so included as instances of the action
in unjust enrichment, because, without such a basic principle, this entire
area of law is unintelligible. This is the same argument that was advanced
in the case of contract and tort law over a century ago and involves the
completion of the transition from a writ-based system of private law to a
source-based system of private law.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 31
a legal response –
(2) “Restitution” is an inappropriate name for this area of law. “Restitution”
is the name of a fact –
and, as such, is incapable of
serving as the name of a legal principle. In any event, it is inherently ambig-
uous and therefore not helpful as the name of anything.
(3) Unjust enrichment is essentially distinct from those cases where courts
require the defendant to pay penalties to the plaintiff because of a wrong
committed by the defendant. The latter group of cases can be explained
only by reference to the specific policy objectives of the areas of law and
social life in which they arise. The similarity between these cases and the
unjust enrichment cases is only superficial and arises because of a misguided
impulse to call the remedy available in both “restitution”.
(4) There a~e no restitutionary “proprietary claims”. The difference between
the law of unjust enrichment and the law of property is that the latter deals
with situations where there is a single identifiable res, the former where
there is no res, only identifiable value. Tracing, equitable liens, instances of
the constructive trust and instances of the money counts are all examples
of unjust enrichment claims where the possibility of following value, through
various forms or from person to person, is in issue.
It is hoped that enough has been said to indicate that these points are
substantially correct, even if they call for fuller elaboration. The importance
of raising them in a review for Canadian readers is to indicate the points
at which the structure of the analysis in Introduction to the Law ofRestitution
is misleading or mistaken. Canadian readers are singled out for special
attention because Canadian law recognizes a cause of action in unjust enrich-
ment. Points (2), (3) and (4) are all logical consequences of this recognition.
The remainder of the book, fully two-thirds of it in volume, deals with
the problems of identifying and quantifying benefit, determining whether a
benefit is unjustly retained and the defences available in an unjust enrich-
ment claim. This portion of the book is excellent, and is not affected by the
errors outlined here. On this basis, the book is commended to Canadian
lawyers.
