BOOK REVIEWS
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
Vocabulaire bilingue de la Common Law: Droit de la preuve. Ottawa: As-
sociation du Barreau canadien, 1984. Pp. xvii, 294 116.95 $]. Comment6 par
l’honorable Louis-Philippe Pigeon.*
Le Vocabulaire bilingue du droit de la preuve – Les dissidences d’un consultant
Le Vocabulaire bilingue du droit de la preuve qui vient d’8tre publi6
par l’Association du Barreau canadien dans le cadre du programme d’ad-
ministration de la justice dans les deux langues officielles est un ouvrage de
grande importance. La pr6sentation g6n6rale et la formule adoptees pour
ce lexique sont excellentes : les feuilles mobiles sont bien adapt6es i ce genre
de publication, le format restreint en facilite la consultation et la typographie
est tres bien choisie. Ce sera donc sfirement un outil pr6cieux, non seulement
pour les avocats et juges des provinces de common law, mais 6galement
pour ceux du Qu6bec. En effet, il ne faut pas oublier que non seulement le
droit de la preuve au Qu6bec est en principe celui de la common law, en
matiere p6nale de droit provincial comme en mati6re criminelle de droit
fed6ral, mais, meme en mati6re civile, ce sont essentiellement les regles de
la preuve tir6es de la common law qui y sont suivies dans les proces qui se
font comme dans les autres provinces et non comme en France.
L’6tablissement d’une terminologie frangaise normalis6e du droit de la
preuve pr6sente une difficult6 particuli6re. En droit frangais, il n’y a pas de
regles qui d6terminent ce qu’un t6moin peut dire quand la preuve testi-
moniale est admissible. De plus l’on n’y connait qu’une seule norme de
preuve en toutes mati6res civiles et criminelles: celle de << l'intime convic-
tion >> qui ne correspond A aucune de celles qui jouent un rale capital en
common law. Dans ces conditions, il est bien 6vident que souvent l’on ne
peut trouver dans la 16gislation et la doctrine juridique frangaises aucune
expression qui corresponde exactement A celles de la common law, puisque
celles-ci expriment des concepts inconnus en droit frangais. Ii faut donc
avoir recours A des 6quivalences fonctionnelles sur lesquelles on ne saurait
toujours faire l’unanimit6. Ayant pass6 en revue les expressions normalis6es
au sujet desquelles je ne saurais 6tre d’accord, il me parait A-propos de
publier mes dissidences.
*De ]a Facult de droit, Section de droit civil, Universit6 d’Ottawa.
Revue de droit de McGill
McGill Law Journal 1985
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
bad character
character
character evidence
character trait
character witness
mauvaise moralit6
moralit6
preuve de moralit6
trait de caract~re
t~moin de moralit6
La note au mot character signale la difficult6.
Sur le plan juridique, [lit-on] cet 6quivalent et les termes compos6s dans les-
‘expression <( moralit6 > auront, en fait, une rference plus large
quels figure
que le domaine de l’ordre moral; par exemple, ils d~signeront aussi, par ex-
tension, des traits de caract re qui ne rel~vent nullement de la moralit6.’
Cette conception me parait tr~s contestable. En France, le dernier alin~a
‘article 331 du Code de procedure p~nale, ajout6 en 1960, dit: <(Les
de
t~moins d~posent uniquement, soit sur les faits reproch~s A 1'accus6, soit
sur sa personnalit6 et sur sa moralit6 >.
Le l~gislateur fran~ais ne consid~re donc pas que < moralit6 >> puisse
s’6tendre i tous les aspects de la personnalit6.
Je dois ensuite souligner l’utilisation de <(trait de caract6re >) comme
6quivalent de character trait. Cela a pour consequence que l’on va appeler
< t~moin de moralit6 >> celui que l’on fait entendre sur un trait de caractre
et son t~moignage sera une < preuve de moralitl >, meme s’il s’agit d’un
trait de caract~re qui ne relve nullement de la moralit6. A mon avis, ce
manque de sym~trie est inadmissible en langage juridique.
Enfin il me faut bien signaler, ce que j’aurais peut-8tre dfl noter d’abord,
que (< mauvaise moralit6 >> cela ne se dit pas en frangais. On peut dire < mo-
ralit6 6quivoque, douteuse, dfplorable >>, etc., mais jamais o mauvaise
moralit6 >.
circumstantial evidence
preuve circonstancielle
Je regrette devoir dire qu’il y a 1A un exemple de la tendance malheu-
reuse vers l’anglicisme insidieux, le faux-ami, l’6quivalent morphologique,
contre lequel on se dffend bien mal et que l’usage fautif ne lgitime pas.
Le seul sens de <( circonstanciel >> en frangais, c’est le suivant : <( Se dit du complement qui apporte une determination secondaire de circonstance>>.2
‘Vocabulaire bilingue de la Common Law: Droit de la preuve (1984) A la p. 25 [ci-apr~s:
Vocabulaire bilingue du droit de la preuve].
2Le Petit Robert (1981), verbo circonstanciel >.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
Dans le cas pr6sent, c’est l’expression utilis6e dans le Projet de loi S-
333 qui est correcte: preuve indirecte >. Je l’ai d’ailleurs notre 6galement
dans le texte suivant:
La preuve par pr6somptions est une preuve indirecte, qui est la mise en oeuvre
d’un raisonnement par induction; on part d’un fait connu, d6nomm6 indice,
pour remonter jusqu’au fait contest6.4
collateral fact
collateral issue
fait incident
question incidente
A mon avis, c’est o fait accessoire >> et question accessoire > qui s’im-
posent.5 I1 me semble 6vident que l’on ne pourrait pas y substituer inci-
dent >>A < accessoire > sans en fausser le sens. Une demande incidente fait
partie du litige, c’est l’antithese du collateralfact qui y est 6tranger. On trouve
incident >> dans de nombreux articles du Code de procedure civile. II cor-
respond A incidental et non A collateral. A mon avis, le sens dans lequel le
Code de procedure civile se sert du mot incident >> fait qu’il ne peut pas
convenir pour exprimer une notion differente, parce que le droit de la preuve
s’intgre i la proc6dure dont il n’est qu’un aspect sp6cial.
credible evidence
credible witness
preuve cr6dible
t6moin credible
Dans la premi6re expression, evidence ne veut-il pas dire < t6moignage >
plut6t que <( preuve >> ? La question de cr6dibilit6 ne se pose qu’A l’6gard
des t6moins. Les actes ne mentent pas. On ne se demande pas s’ils sont
croyables.
Je pense donc qu’il faut dire << t6moignage croyable >> ou t6moignage
digne de foi >.
< Cr6dible > ne figure au Petit Robert que comme anglicisme. A mon
avis, l’adjectif franpais qui correspond au substantif cr6dibilit6 est croyable >
et non cr6dible >>.
Crown privilege
government privilege
state privilege
secret d’int~rt public
secret de la Couronne
Le premier 6quivalent est correct pour les trois expressions mais je ne
3Projet de loi S-33, Loifderale de 1982 sur la preuve, Ire sess., 32e Lg., 1980-81-82. (Ire
lecture, 18 novembre 1982).
4Dalloz, Nouveau repertoire de droit, 2e 6d., t. 3 A ]a p. 779, no 152.
SVoir Commission de r6forme du droit du Canada, Rapport sur la preuve (1975) aux pp.
105-6.
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
crois pas que o Couronne >> ait en frangais le sens qu’on lui pr&e dans le
second 6quivalent.
Crown witness
t~moin de Ia Couronne
t6moin i charge
Je ne crois pas que << Couronne > ait en frangais le sens de < poursuite >>
ou o poursuivant >> : o t6moin A charge>> me semble le bon 6quivalent. Je
ne vois pas l’utilit6 de l’expression en mati6re civile, on y dira << t6moin de
la demande> comme on dit << t6moin de la d6fense >.
declaration against interest
d6laration contre int6rt
La syntaxe frangaise ne permet pas cette construction. II faut se servir
de la langue frangaise comme elle est et non pas la refaire sur le mod61e de
‘anglais ; << acte contre nature > est franQais mais<< d6claration contre in-
t6rt >> ne ‘est pas.
II faut dire: <( d6claration contre son int6ret >>, meme s’il va de soi que
dans certains contextes on dira: << contre l'int6r~t >>, le remplacement du
possessif par l’article d6fini 6tant un proc6d6 courant.
declaration against penal
interest
declaration contre int6rt
p6nal
Je pense que Fortin et Viau ont raison de ne pas employer << p6nal >>
de cette fagon-1A. Ils disent : << d6claration [...] faite au d6triment de ses
int6rts juridiques p6naux >>.6 Il ne s’agit pas plus d’un < int6r~t p6nal >> que
d’un o int6ret criminel >>.
I1 faut donc dire << d6claration contre son int6r~t juridique p6nal >.
evidence in contradiction
contre-preuve
<< Contre-preuve >> ne convient pas parce que, comme il ressort claire-
ment de l’article 289 du Code de procedure civile cet 6quivalent de evidence
in rebuttal d6signe la preuve pr6sent6e par la partie qui a le fardeau de la
preuve A l’encontre de celle qui a 6t6 pr6sent6e par la partie adverse. Mais
on emploie ordinairement evidence in contradiction dans d’autres cas, par
exemple quand une partie use du droit de prouver par d’autres le contraire
de ce que son propre t6moin a dit.7 C’est une << preuve contraire >>, non une
<< contre-preuve >.
6J. Fortin & L. Viau, Cours de preuve pnale (1977) A Ia p. 18.
7Voir art. 310 C.p.c.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
evidential admission
formal admission
aveu informel
aveu formel
I1 faut dire: << aveu extrajudiciaire >> et <( aveu judiciaire >> comme aux
articles 1243 A 1245 du Code civil.8
A mon avis, << aveu informel > est incorrect et << aveu fornel >> inexact
car on s’en sert fr6quemment en parlant d’un aveu extrajudiciaire explicite.
examiner (20)
special examiner
auditeur
auditeur
L2 quivalent propos6 vient A l’encontre de la r~gle de l’emploi du langage
usuel. Un titre supprim6 en France en 1830 ne fait pas pr6cis6ment partie
de la langue courante et la fonction A laquelle il se rattachait ne correspond
gu~re A celle de ‘examiner. De plus, celui-ci a un r6le qui n’est pas passif:
en effet, dans
‘Ontario, la r6gle 3429 le charge de trancher les objections
aux questions sous r6serve de r6vision de sa d6cision par le juge.10
En France, < auditeur >> sert actuellement i d6signer un fonctionnaire
d6butant au Conseil d’Etat ou A la Cour des comptes ou encore un 616ve
de l’Ecole nationale de la magistrature, auquel on donne le titre de <( auditeur
de justice o. On est loin de 1'examiner. Faute de mieux, j'opte pour
<< enquteur >.
fact relevant to an issue
fait connexe
C’est le Groupe de travail sur la preuve,1 l qui a raison, il faut dire << fait . A l'article 22 du Projet de loi uniforme sur la preuve, 12 relevant pertinent est rendu par << pertinent> et il en est de m~me dans le Projet de loi S-33.
Je note d’ailleurs que l’on traduit irrelevance par <
legal relevance ou relevancy par << pertinence juridique o, relevance et rele-
, relevant par << pertinent >>, relevant fact par << fait
vancy par << pertinence
sVoir art. 1354-6 C.N.
9Rules of the Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Ontario Made by the Rules
Committee, R.R.O. 540/80. Et depuis le lerjanvier 1985, Rgles de procedure civile, R.O. 560/
84, r~gle 34.12(1) [version frangaise non officielle].
I0Rules of the Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Ontario Made by the Rules
Committee, r6gle 343. En vertu de la nouvelle r~gle 34.12(2) des Rgles de procedure civile,
R.O. 560/84 [version frangaise non officielle], la r6vision des decisions revient au master et
non au juge.
des rgles du preuve (1983) i la p. 296.
" La preuve au Canada : Rapport du groupe de travail federal-provincial sur l'uniformisation
12Conference sur 'uniformisation des lois au Canada, Proceedings ofthe 63dAnnual Meeting,
app. U: Loi uniforme sur la preuve (aofit 1981) A lap. 351 [ci-apras: Projet de loi uniforme].
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
pertinent >>, mais relevant to par < connexe A >. Je vois IA une malheureuse
incoh6rence.
first-hand evidence
original evidence
primary evidence
preuve originale, preuve
premiere
preuve originale
preuve primaire
Ces trois expressions sont reconnues synonymes, mais le Vocabulaire
bilingue du droit de la preuve les traite differemment. Je consid6re qu’il faut
dire << primordiale >> comme A ‘article 1337 du Code Napoleon.
Originale >> me parait incorrect dans ce sens et je crois que < pri- mordiale > vaut mieux que premiere >> ou << primaire >.
foundation witness
temoin d’admissibilit6
L’admissibilit6 d’une preuve est une question de droit qui requiert par-
fois la preuve de faits pr6alables. Le t6moin qui 6tablit ces faits-l4A ne peut
pas, A mon avis, 8tre appel6 << temoin d'admissibilit6 >. C’est un << temoin
de faits prealables >.
Au surplus, ce temoignage peut fort bien ne pas 8tre un 616ment d’ad-
missibilit6. En effet, s’il est apporte A l’appui d’une opinion d’expert, celle-
ci est recevable sans cela, comme la Cour supreme vient de le juger una-
nimement dans R. c. Abbey. 13 Autrement dit, s’il s’agit de foundation facts
au soutien d’une opinion d’expert, il ne s’agit pas d’une question d’admis-
sibilite mais de valeur de preuve.
Je note que < etablir les faits pr6alables >> est donne comme equivalent
de lay (v.) a foundation. C’est precis6ment ce que fait lefoundation witness.
Uexpression correspondante s’impose donc.
immaterial (2*)
material (20)
materiality (2*)
non substantiel
substantiel
caractere substantiel
Material et son antonyme immaterial ont deux sens dans le droit de
la preuve. Dans le premier, material est synonmyme de substantial dont
r’quivalent indiqu6 est << substantiel
. Dans le second sens, material est
correctement decrit comme suit: << Terme specifique servant a determiner
la notion de relevant evidence . Or, comme je viens de le signaler, relevance
. I1 y a donc une inconsequence inadmissible A
se rend par
13 (1982), [19821 2 R.C.S. 24, 138 D.L.R. (3d) 202.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
jurat
constat d’assermentation
Barbarisme justement d~nonc6 par G6rard Dagenais.14 I1 suffit de dire
<( constat de serment >>, comme on dit < prestation de serment >.
lead (v.) a witness
diriger le trmoin
A mon avis, r’quivalent indiqu6 ne rend pas le sens. En Angleterre,
ce verbe a pris dans l’usage son acception courante dans le droit de la preuve.
En francais, il n’en est pas ainsi, il faut donc dire:
legal evidence
moral evidence
preuve l6gale
preuve morale
On me parait ici incliner indfiment A 1’quivalence morphologique.
Puisque la notion du droit franais de la << preuve lgale >> ne correspond
pas A celle de legal evidence, e’est une erreur que de ne pas en tenir compte
car le risque de confusion est particulirement grave ici. En droit franais,
sauf les cas ofi une <( preuve lgale >> d~termin~e est requise, la (( preuve
morale
apporte le seul degr6 de certitude exig6 par la loi: ol’intime con-
viction . Au contraire, en common law, seule la legal evidence apporte ce
degr6 de certitude quel qu’il soit, beyond a reasonable doubt ou on a balance
of probabilities; la moral evidence ne ‘apporte pas. Elle convaincrait sans
doute le juge franais auquel la loi ne donne pas d’autre guide que sa cons-
cience, mais elle ne permet pas au juge britannique de tirer une conclusion,
make a finding.
J’ai not6 avec satisfaction que pour non-juridical fact, on avait cart6
une expression employee en droit franais, afin d’6viter la confusion. Cela
me paralt encore plus n~cessaire lorsque, comme dans le cas present, l’ex-
pression en cause est l’6quivalent morphologique de ‘expression anglaise.
Je crois donc qu’il faut i tout prix proposer un 6quivalent autre que
‘expression qui a un sens different, pour ne pas dire oppose, en droit fran-
ais. I1 s’agit ici d’une preuve valable en conscience et non en droit. Je laisse
aux linguistes le soin de rechercher une expression plus courte que cette
description.
‘4G. Dagenais, Dictionnaire des difficult&s de la languefrancaise au Canada, 2e 6d. (1984),
verbo o assermenter ).
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
past recollection
m6moire ant6rieure
II ne s’agit pas de m~moire mais de souvenirs. C’est pour cela que past
recollection recorded a comme 6quivalent <(souvenirs transcrits )>.
Je ne sais trop s’il faut dire: <(souvenirs effaces > , <( oublis > ou << passes . preliminary evidence preuve conditionnelle Cette expression est impropre, << conditionnelle ) n'a pas le sens qu'on lui prate ici ; << preuve sous reserve > est exact et conforme A l’usage.
prima facie evidence
prima facie proof
preuve prima facie
preuve prima facie
Conserver 1’expression latine, c’est aller A 1’encontre du principe que
les lois doivent etre rdiges en langage usuel. L’expression prima facie ne
fait pas partie du franqais courant et, depuis que le latin ne fait plus partie
obligatoire du bagage de connaissances des gens instruits, elle n’est pas
intelligible pour ceux qui n’ont pas fait d’Studes de droit assez pouss~es. En
anglais la situation n’est pas la meme : on trouve primafacie dans le Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary. Cela ne veut pas dire que l’on peut consid~rer
qu’il en va de m~me en franqais.
Depuis une dizaine d’ann~es, la 16gislation donne effet A la decision
d’61iminer les expressions latines qui ne sont pas entrees dans la langue
courante. Malgr6 les difficult~s que cela comporte et qui sont soulign~es
dans l’arret Proudlock,15 il ne peut 8tre question de revenir en arrire.
Cependant, ce m~me arrt invite A tenter de trouver mieux que << preuve
en l'absence de toute preuve contraire >. 1 faut 6videmment retrancher le
malencontreux <(toute >>, comme on l’a fait A l’article 159 du Projet de loi
uniforme 16 et dans le Projet de loi S-33.17 Je crois cependant que ce n’est
pas suffisant pour bien rendre le sens de prima facie. A mon avis, il faut
dire <(preuve suffisante jusqua preuve contraire > comme a l’article 22 du
Projet de loi uniforme.’ 8 J’admettrais aussi bien l’expression <(preuve suf-
fisante en l'absence de preuve contraire > qui a l’avantage de se rapprocher
du texte actuel du Code criminel. On pourrait aussi dire, en s’inspirant de
l’article 1352 du Code Napolon, << sous reserve de la preuve contraire >.
De toute fagon, l’addition du mot <( suffisante me paralit indispensable
pour rendre pleinement le sens de prima facie.
15R. c. Proudlock (1978), [1979] 1 R.C.S. 525, 91 D.L.R. (3d) 449.
16Projet de loi uniforme, supra, note 12 d Ta p. 429.
'"Supra, note 3.
'8Projet de loi uniforme, supra, note 12 A la p. 52.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
put (v.) in issue
mettre en cause
A mon avis, il vaut mieux dire o mettre en question > comme A l’article
30 du Projet de loi uniforme.’ 9 D’ailleurs, l’6quivalent de issue offact est
<( question de fait >>. II me semble souhaitable de reserver << mettre en cause >
comme equivalent de implead ce qui est, du reste, le sens de cette expression
d’apres le Petit Robert, au mot
summing-up (1)
resum6
Ce terme est donn6 en ce sens comme synomyme de charge dont l’qui-
valent est <( expos6 au jury ). Je ne puis voir aucune raison de le rendre
difreremment surtout en se servant du meme mot que pour le second sens.
swearing in (s.)
assermentation
Je donne raison A G6rard Dagenais 20 qui rejette ce < barbarisme
. La
necessit6 est absente: le Petit Robert consacre un paragraphe distinct A la
<(prestation de serment > . Du reste c’est l’expression que l’on trouve un peu
plus loin A taking of an oath.
vicarious admission
aveu par d6legu6
Je trouve < dlgu >> mal choisi, il n’evoque pas l’ide : ce n’est pas
une affaire de d66gation. Un pr6pos6, cas le plus fr6quent, n’est pas un
delegue.
Le mot < intermediaire ) me paraitrait pr6ferable A < d6l6gu6 ). On peut aussi songer, soit A < pr6pos6 , soit A agent ou pr6pos6 )>.
view
transport sur les lieux
L’equivalent recommand6 se trouve bien, d’une certaine mani6re, A
l’article 290 du Code de procedure civile, mais il d6signe, non pas l’examen
des lieux que vise le terme anglais view, mais uniquement le d6placement
du tribunal en vue de cet examen. En effet l’article se lit:
290. Le juge peut, au cours de l’enquete, ordonner le transport du tri-
bunal sur les lieux, pour proc~der A toute constatation utile […].
et en anglais:
290. The judge may during the trial, order that the court go to the scene
in order to make any observation […].
19lbid.
20Supra, note 14.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
Dans le Petit Robert on voit: < Descente sur les lieux: mesure d'ins- truction destin~e A faire des constatations mat~rielles >.
C’est donc descente sur les lieux >> qui est l’quivalent correct.
D’ailleurs on notera que, dans l’article 290 du Code du procedure civile,
l’expression utilis~e est < transport du tribunal sur les lieux >. Sans du
tribunal >, transport sur les lieux >> est cryptique et 6quivoque, en outre
de ne pas correspondre au terme anglais A traduire.
Qu’il me soit permis en guise de conclusion d’inviter mes lecteurs A ne
rien voir dans mes dissidences qui tende A d~pr~cier le travail m~ritoire du
Comit6 de normalisation. Comme un tribunal, le Comit6 devait se pro-
noncer sur des questions au sujet desquelles certaines divergences d’opinions
sont in6vitables. En France, comme en bien d’autres pays, l’on tient que le
respect dfi A l’autorit6 d’un tribunal collgial exige qu’il pr~sente une ap-
parence d’unanimit6. Au Canada, comme aux Etats-Unis, on suit la tradition
britannique et les dissidences sont publies. Personne, que je sache, n’en
conteste l’utilit6, je dirais m~me, la frcondit6, surtout A l’heure ofa l’on
enterre le mythe du stare decisis inexorable.
J. Robert S. Prichard, ed., Crown Corporations in Canada: The Calculus of
Instrument Choice. Toronto: Butterworths, 1983. Pp. xvi, 475 [$49.95]. Re-
viewed by Robert D. Cairns.*
This book is one of the latest in a number of collections of papers which
seek to advance our understanding of the genesis and characteristics of the
many public enterprises at all three levels of government in Canada. Ac-
cording to the Introduction, the aim is to determine the reasons why the
Crown corporation may be chosen from among the several policy instru-
ments available to government as a means of carrying out policy. The book
accepts the decision by government to make policy in a particular situation
as given, and is primarily concerned, not with the reasons for that decision,
but rather with the “calculus of instrument choice”. The book attempts to
synthesize the perspectives of different disciplines into a unified approach.
In reality, however, the book presents three different theoretical frame-
works which are more competitive than complementary. The first three
papers may be seen as illustrative of the diversity of views which are held
regarding the place of the Crown corporation.
The lead article, by lawyers M.J. Trebilcock and J.R.S. Prichard, is
consistent with the premise of the book: given the government’s decision
to intervene, for whatever reason, there is a problem of choosing instru-
ments. The choice is based on the characteristics of the instruments at the
government’s disposal and the goals the government wishes to achieve. The
government, like an experienced carpenter, chooses the best tool in its kit.
In the final article of the book, S.E Borins, a management scholar, applies
this approach in a case study of Crown corporations established during
World War II.
In the second paper, economist T.E. Borcherding considers the role of
the public sector in light of the economic theories of property rights and
public choice. These perspectives would lead one to expect a view similar
to that of Trebilcock and Prichard. The article does, in fact, begin with a
discussion of the choice among alternatives. But “Toward a Positive Theory
of Public Sector Supply Arrangments” is a survey of the literature on the
efficacy of the whole range of government instruments as compared to the
efficacy of the private sector, not a strict analysis of the Crown corporation
as compared to other government instruments. The sixth article, by econ-
omist J. Palmer and lawyers J. Quinn and R. Resendes, applies this theory
to the operations of Gray Coach Ltd, an inter-urban bus company owned
by the Toronto Transit Commission.
*Of the Department of Economics and the Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries,
McGill University. The author would like to thank the EC.A.C. for financial support during
the preparation of this review.
McGill Law Journal 1985
Revue de droit de McGill
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
The third paper, by M.A. Chandler, begins with a discussion of why
political scientists have found the more common explanations of the ex-
istence of public enterprise to be unsatisfactory in explaining variations
observed across Canada, variations which Trebilcock and Prichard call a
“mass of contradictions”.’ Included with the common explanations is the
“pragmatic approach”, of which the first two papers of the volume would
appear to be examples. Basing her observations on an empirical study of
provincial Crown corporations, Chandler attributes the characteristics and
existence of Crown corporations to the ideology of the political party in
power. Her work, in turn, relies upon the data presented in the fifth article
by management scholars A.R. Vining and R. Botterell.
If the book can be said to have a focal point, it is Chandler’s paper for
two important reasons. Hers is the only paper that benefits from and in-
tegrates the work of another paper in the volume. Also, by presenting po-
litical ideology as an alternative to the economic rationality explanation
which underlies the other two theoretical papers, she provides a contrast
which is more vivid than the rather tenuous direct connections between
them. In a sense, the principal unifying theme of the five other above-
mentioned papers is the extent to which Chandler’s paper serves as a foil
to them all.
The remaining paper, by public administration scholars J.W. Langford
and K.J. Huffinan, is an exercise in categorization of federal Crown cor-
porations. Aside from its comparability to the Vining-Botterell study of
provincial Crown corporations, it has no strong links to the other papers.
Each paper brings out points which are worthy of comment. This review
presents and criticizes the main theses of the papers, and is arranged ac-
cording to the intellectual structure sketched above. A brief general conclu-
sion follows.
As noted above, explanations of the genesis of Crown corporations
based on pragmatic considerations (such as the particular forces in operation
at the time of establishment or the institutional characteristics of the in-
strument) have been criticised by many political scientists. Trebilcock and
Prichard’s paper may be viewed as an attempt to put some theoretical flesh
on the “pragmatic approach”. In their view, the Crown corporation is chosen
by government because it is the best instrument at hand for effecting the
government’s policy purpose. No assessment is attempted of the validity of
IMJ. Trebilcock & J.R-S. Prichard, “Crown Corporations: The Calculus of Instrument Choice”
in J.R.S. Prichard, ed., Crown Corporations in Canada: The Calculus of Instrument Choice
(1983) 1 at 5.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
the purpose. Comparisons are made to other available instruments, espe-
cially government departments and regulation, which are the closest sub-
stitutes for the Crown corporation.
Trebilcock and Prichard claim that their analysis is carried out from a
lawyer’s perspective, and they do consider some of the legal-technical char-
acteristics of the instrument. But for a piece done by individuals whose
analytic comparative advantage rests with the legal aspects of the instru-
ments discussed, it contains surprisingly little legal analysis. The legal back-
ground provided is no more detailed than one might expect from a non-
lawyer doing an institutional paper of this nature.2
Rather, the analysis is done from an economic perspective. Trebilcock
and Prichard rely heavily on the economic literature, 3 a literature which,
for the most part, is the same as that reviewed by Borcherding. For example,
they use the theory of property rights in order to explain the structure of
economic rights created by various policy instruments. Their view of the
political process, as one in which politicians maximize votes at periodic
elections by using a rational assessment of policies and instruments, is that
of the so-called economic theory of government. In essence, the paper is
based on an economic analysis of how interest groups actively use the gov-
ernment as a means of promoting their own economic advantage.
The basic theme of substitutability is a simple concept drawn from
economics. Elsewhere in economics, for example, the concept is applied to
the characteristics of goods (an important idea in microeconomic theory)
or the characteristics of financial instruments (in recent times a hotly de-
bated issue in monetary economics). Here, it is applied to the characteristics
of policy instruments. Trebilcock and Prichard base their analysis on the
comparative advantages of various instruments, or on the benefits and costs
of applying one instrument instead of another.4
Trebilcock and Prichard do a creditable job, for cobblers away from
their lasts. They are able to bring their analysis to bear in a trenchant crit-
icism of a number of recent reform proposals. These include the adminis-
trative changes suggested (a) by the Lambert Commission 5 (which the authors
claim would reduce the effectiveness of the Crown corporation in many
instances, possibly forcing the use of less suitable substitutes at a cost to
21bid. at 16-22.
31bid. at 26 n. 55.
4It is of some interest in this connection to remark that the ideas of this paper formed one
chapter of an earlier study of all governing instruments by these two authors in conjunction
with two economists. M.J. Trebilcock et aL., The Choice of Governing Instrument (1982) ch.
3.
5Canada, Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, Report (March
1979).
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
effective government) and (b) by those who would “privatize” Crown cor-
porations but still pursue similar policy goals using different instruments.
Possible means of privatization considered by the authors are the sale of
Crown corporations (in whole or in part) to private interests, and free share
distributions to residents of the political jurisdiction in question, a procedure
known as “bricing” in reference to the British Columbia Resources In-
vestment Corporation, shares of which were distributed in this manner.6
Unfortunately, the bulk of the paper is a long discussion which is more
in the unfocussed tradition of pragmatism. Questions regarding the com-
pleteness of the theory seem to leap out. For example, the depiction of the
nationalization of British Columbia Hydro and Hydro-Qurbec, as being
prompted by the fact that provincial Crown corporations are not subject to
federal corporate income tax, does not address the pertinent issue of why
they were nationalized so late (the early 1960’s), nor why each was nation-
alized in two stages which came nearly two decades apart. Moreover, the
authors note that the Cape Breton Development Corporation (Devco) was
established as a last resort, after several other instruments had been tried.
If this is true of many Crown corporations, then the calculus of instrument
choice would seem to be of little application. In fact, in another of the recent,
edited collections studying Crown corporations in Canada, Tupper and Doern
observe that the Crown corporation usually is a last resort, because Canadian
governments have been committed to private enterprise. 7 This predispo-
sition is of clear importance to Chandler’s competing view based on ideology.
In addition, the instrument of the Crown corporation is commonly
used in conjunction with other instruments. Most Crown corporations are
regulated. The National Energy Programme, for example, was a compre-
hensive strategy by the federal government, applying many instruments to
exert some control over the development of the Canadian oil and gas in-
dustry. Indeed, this is admitted by Trebilcock and Prichard in their discus-
sion of Petro-Canada: “The complex array of tax incentive measures designed
to encourage exploration expenditures is clear evidence of the simultaneous
use of substitute instruments in the same industry”. 8 The use of instruments
as complements rather than as substitutes is also noted in the Introduction
to the book in connection with the promotion of Canadian culture. The
fact that several instruments may be used at once, or added to one another,
would seem to limit the general applicability of the calculus of instrument
choice, which envisions the application of one instrument instead of another.
6Trebilcock & Prichard, supra, note I at 87.
7A. Tupper & G.B. Doern, “Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada” in A. Tupper
& G.B. Doern, eds, Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada (1981) 1.
8Trebilcock & Prichard, supra, note 1 at 67.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
(Vol. 30
Borins presents an interesting historical discussion of the federal Crown
corporations established during World War II. Of some present interest is
his rather ambivalent application of the calculus of instrument choice. He
finds: “In these instances, public ownership can be seen as something of a
last resort: after trying all other possible policy instruments, the government
opted for public ownership. This appears to be the case at the present time
as well …. .”9 Indeed, the second part of his paper, on privatization, while
presented as an ideal test of the calculus because of the shift from wartime
to peacetime objectives, instead details the return to a preference for private
enterprise as the engine of development. Although C.D. Howe was not
opposed to the maintenance of commercially viable Crown corporations by
the government, particularly if they were subject to the discipline of com-
petition, and although Polymer was retained subject to this discipline,’ 0 the
thrust described by Borins was toward the private sector. The two priva-
tizations discussed raise an important issue. The aircraft industry was sold
off because of the perceived (correctly perceived, according to Borins) need
to import technology to keep it viable. Research Enterprises Ltd was first
broken up and then sold; this was an ill-advised action, by Borins’ analysis,
because Howe’s inability to recognise the interplay between research and
manufacturing and the importance of diversification was responsible for the
failure of the privatization. In the spirit of Trebilcock and Prichard, Borins
proposes substitute measures – which amount to partial privatizations –
as methods by which the failure might have been averted. Borins’ analysis
of the two privatizations seems to suggest that, without prior careful analysis,
it is not valid to proceed with privatization on the basis of preconceived
notions about the “rightful place” of the private sector.
This reviewer’s conclusion is that the calculus of instrument choice,
for all of its interesting economic analysis and thought-provoking conclu-
sions, has limitations as a theory of why Crown corporations are created.
The evidence points to there being not a tool kit but a hierarchy of instru-
ments, usually invoked sequentially but at times concurrently, in which the
Crown corporation is ranked last.
The second framework study, by Borcherding,” 1 is, in his own terms,
not a refined theory of public sector supply, but a prologue to such a theory.
On the other hand, he does not appear reluctant to have his ideas applied
by Palmer et at. to Gray Coach, Ltd.
chard, supra, note 1, 447 at 459.
9S.F. Borins, “World War II Crown Corporations: Their Functions and Their Fate” in Pri-
10Ibid, at 465.
‘T.E. Borcherding, “Toward a Positive Theory of Public Sector Supply Arrangements” in
Prichard, supra, note 1, 99 at 104.
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
Borcherding’s paper begins with a discussion of the various alternative
classes of policy instrument available to government for effecting various
purposes, suggesting that some may be more effective than others in a given
policy context. This beginning is very much in the tradition of Trebilcock
and Prichard’s calculus. Then Borcherding reproduces a table which shows
the extent of public enterprise in eighteen countries, continuing with a dis-
cussion of public provision of goods and services in the United States and
Canada. At this point, it is intimated that the subject matter of the paper
is more a comparison of all “public sector supply arrangements” to private
sector supply arrangements, than a comparison of the various public sector
arrangements. For example, long passages in the article are devoted to dis-
cussions of education, provided publicly in Canada by government de-
partments rather than Crown corporations. But the departmental organization
is compared to the private provision of educational services, possibly sub-
sidized in some way, rather than to services provided by a public firm.
Despite the great importance of provincially owned utilities, Borcherding’s
interesting intellectual history of public utility management and regulation
is concerned primarily with the original governmental decision to intervene,
and is only tangentially related to the question of the use of the Crown
corporation. (The reader will recall that Trebilcock and Prichard, in ex-
pounding their view, expressly chose not to examine the original decision.)
He observes that there were, in the post-war period, (a) a perception of
growing public sector influence on the overall structure of production; (b)
a quickly rising number of Crown corporations; but (c) a much slower rate
of asset growth in the public than in the private sector. This is a period
during which government regulation, according to prevailing perceptions,
also grew. But there is no discussion of the comparative growth of these
two instruments, or others, as one might expect in an instrument choice
analysis. Finally, the second-last paragraph of the paper explicitly places
Borcherding’s findings outside the Trebilcock-Prichard framework: “[A]ny
. More
policy will be carried out by ‘bits’ of each supply institution …
work on the possibility ofcomplementarities as well as substitutions between
alternative supply mechanisms is clearly called for.” 12
Basically, the paper consists of a literature review of three views of the
differences between (mainly unregulated) private firms and (mainly unre-
gulated) public firms: (1) the property rights literature; (2) the social choice
literature; and (3) the literature on the possibility of the existence of un-
intended government waste and needless inefficiency. All of these literatures
hold that institutions “matter” in the sense that they create different types
of incentive for self-interested economic actors.
‘2Ibid at 177.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
The first advances the view that different forms of institutional ar-
rangements affect the structure of property rights. The classical, entrepre-
neurial private firm is organized in order to reap the advantages of team
production. In team production, however, because individual contributions
to output cannot be measured precisely, there is an incentive to members
of the team to shirk, or to put forth less than the amount of effort which
they would if their rewards could be precisely linked to their efforts. The
solution is to accord to one actor, called the monitor, the rights to the residual
outputs of the firm. This property right gives the monitor the incentive to
limit shirking. The fact that the monitor has an ownership claim, which can
be sold in the capital market, ensures that he always pursues the objective
of maximizing the present value of this firm.
When one turns to analyse the modem corporation, however, the ar-
gument concerning monitoring and ownership claims becomes thinner. In
the corporation, it is the shareholders who are the residual claimants; their
wealth is in the hands of managers hired to do the monitoring. Borcherding
recognizes the limitations of the argument and responds by noting the
“abundance of instruments” which would bring management’s interest into
line with that of the shareholders. Take-overs, mergers, profit sharing, stock
options, appreciation rights and managerial reputation are all mentioned.
Also, the transferability of shares in the capital market ensures that share-
holders will have an incentive to keep close tabs on management in order
to maximize their wealth.
It is a short further step to conclude that those monitoring incentives
in the public firm are severely blunted. Shareholders (the body politic) can-
not transfer ownership claims, except through migration. Management does
not have the inducements provided by profit sharing and the like. Thus,
the theory of property rights asserts that the public firm will be less efficient
than the private firm. Management and staff will shirk more. Empirical
work is cited in support of these expectations.
The social choice literature claims that public firms will have higher
production costs and excessive outputs, because bureaucrats in the public
sector will direct the enterprise toward satisfying some of their own preferences.
Competition among firms has, since the time of Adam Smith, been
considered to be the most effective monitoring device for economic enter-
prises. In this tradition, several studies comparing the performance of public
firms competing against private firms have been done. In many cases, con-
trary to the expectations discussed above, competition appears to do the
job of monitoring: despite the differences in ownership claims, the perform-
ance of public and private firms cannot be differentiated where there is
competition.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
Furthermore, the possibility of the persistent observation of waste rep-
resents a philosophic quandary for economists. So-called “mainstream” eco-
nomic analysis depends on a paradigm by which all economic actors rationally
choose the best means available of advancing their economic welfare. But
the existence of waste would imply that all possible gains from trade are
not exhausted: this would be inconsistent with the rational choice paradigm.
Borcherding reviews another literature which, consistent with rational choice,
suggests that waste is not present in public sector supply. Rather, outputs
have subtle dimensions, and the supposed loss of efficiency in public pro-
vision as compared to private provision is reflective of relatively higher
emphasis by government on unmeasured characteristics.
This reasoning is the basis for the arguments of the final section of the
paper which contains further literature review and some conjectures con-
cerning choices among instruments. Here, Borcherding appears to have in
mind, without stating it, a loose ordering of policy instruments, viz., (1)
public provision, (2) regulation, (3) contracting out (to private firms), (4)
subsidization, and (implicitly) (5) private provision without government
intervention in the market. This ordering would be based on: (a) increasing
difficulty for the government to monitor activities in an industry; (b) in-
creasing ability of voters to monitor the redistributive policies of govern-
ment (Borcherding defines politics to be “the social act of one group coercively
appropriating to itself the wealth of another under the protection of the
state’s constitution”13); and (c) increasing productive efficiency (based on
an analysis of property rights in the economic returns and hence manage-
ment’s monitoring incentives). In addition, the reverse ordering would be
that of increasing directness and selectivity in redistribution. The same or
similar characteristics would appear to apply to public provision of goods,
the order in this case being: (1) departmental organization, (2) Crown cor-
porations, and (3) mixed enterprises (partly owned by government). Pre-
sumably, policy implementation in each individual market will require a
different combination of monitoring ease, openness, efficiency and selectiv-
ity. Somehow, an instrument is selected that provides the best combination.
Determining exactly how this selection is made would appear to be the type
of result sought in the Trebilcock-Prichard paper. As mentioned before,
however, Borcherding’s analysis leads him to close by observing that, rather
than limiting itself to a single choice, government may employ multiple
complementary instruments.
The Borcherding paper may well be viewed by many who read this
volume, especially economists, as the major contribution of the book. The
paper is a competent review of a diverse economic literature and provides
,3 Ibid. at 152.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
the reader with a useful bibliography. The paper also provides a tortuous
reconciliation of the conflict between the public-choice-property-rights lit-
erature, which broadly concludes that public enterprise is wasteful, and the
literature which contends that the existence of such waste would conflict
with the central paradigm of economics. It is a useful contribution to have
these literatures reviewed conveniently in one place.
One of the main problems with Borcherding’s suggested direction for
research would appear to be the competition between property rights and
market structure as predictors of public firm behaviour, a competition dis-
cussed by Borcherding early in the paper. That part of the discussion which
produces the ordering inferred above is based on the property rights analysis.
But, when Borcherding turns to consider distinctions among different types
of public supply, market-structure considerations become important: “Crown
corporations… are about as attuned to the market as they are to politics
and, given competitive pressures, often differ little from counterpart private
firms in their behaviour.”‘ 14 His comparison between Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore may be seen in this light, even though the key point is relegated to
a footnote: more interventionist Singapore’s government agencies and de-
partments compete with each other, with salutary effects according to the
article which Borcherding cites. Thus competition may collapse the Borch-
erding ordering in the direction of greater efficiency, irrespective of the
property rights established by the instrument. The collapse may take in even
government departments as supply instruments. Basing one’s analysis solely
or mainly on the literature of property rights would, therefore, seem dan-
gerous even in a prologue to a theory.
Moreover, the theory of property rights simply is not sharp enough to
identify the differences in incentives to management in modern bureaucratic
organizations. In the modern corporation, the shareholder does not have
full time to devote to monitoring the performance of a company in which
he holds shares. Indeed, optimal portfolio choice dictates that he spread
risk across a wide variety of holdings. Many stocks are held by financial
institutions, with the ultimate owners being even further removed from the
monitoring process. Take-over attempts are subject to severe “free rider”
problems: other shareholders who merely hold on to their shares while a
new, presumably more efficient management is installed, will reap the full
benefit of the take-over. The rules of thumb by which private corporate
performance is judged are biased toward short-term expediency rather than
the long-term benefit of shareholders. Motivations of pay, power, prestige
and the quiet life must surely affect private managers as much as public
ones. Managers of public firms which can make a profit (which are not
14lbid. at 171.
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
regulated or directed to make cross-subsidies) have an interest in a healthy
“bottom line” to increase their autonomy, i.e., their immunity from “gov-
ernment take-over”. The imprecise theory of property rights cannot pretend
to measure the effects of these and many other forces in different types of
enterprise. Instead of distinctions between private and Crown corporations,
the greater divide may be between entrepreneurial and managerial firms,
private or public. One might be led to question whether market structure
is a more important consideration than property rights. If so, then it might
be expected that performance of public and private firms in comparable
market structures, including regulated market structures, would be similar.
This expectation would also be consistent with the economic paradigm,
unlike expectations which contemplate the existence of waste.
The competing bureaucracies of Singapore raise interesting questions.
Is competition sufficient to monitor the efficiency of competing public firms,
as it appears to be when public firms compete with private firms? A Crown
competitor to Petro-Canada was mentioned in the National Energy Pro-
gramme, but was never established. Would such an arrangement have re-
sulted in a more effective instrument? Would competition increase further
if the public firms reported to different ministers, or belonged to different
governments?
Another important problem which troubles Borcherding’s discussion is
the variation between provinces and countries in the use of public enterprise.
Comparing Canada to the United States, he argues that one factor in the
observed variation may be the ability of disadvantaged resources to flee,
noting that nationalized factors at the provincial level are often of the natural
monopoly or natural resource sort.15 This does not explain why natural
monopolies in the United States are less likely to be nationalized; nor does
it explain why Vining and Botterell’s Appendix II shows that nearly all
provincial resource corporations (in forestry, mining and oil and gas) have
been established only quite recently, since 1970; nor does it explain the
irregular temporal pattern of the establishment of provincial power utilities.
Differences in levels of government intervention between Hong Kong and
Singapore are weakly attributed to external checks by London, but no reason
is given as to why highly taxed mobile factors do not leave Singapore for
Hong Kong.
Palmer, Quinn and Resendes demonstrate an intimate knowledge of
Gray Coach and the interurban bus industry of Ontario. They write in
15This statement may be somewhat misleading, or arguably incorrect. Tupper and Doern,
supra, note 7 at 12, note that natural resource industries, despite their importance to Canada,
have only recently been the targets of nationalization. See also R.D. Cairns, “Exhaustible
Resources and Public Firms in Canada” in R. Hirshhorn, ed., Government Enterprise: Roles
and Rationales (1984) 379.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
Borcherding’s tradition but do not depend upon him: they present their own
version of the theory, with a few additions. Their reasoning yields predic-
tions that Gray Coach will: (a) avoid accounting losses; (b) cross-subsidize
trips to and from Toronto; (c) be managed so as to maximize the combined
size of Gray Coach and the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), thus im-
plying a lower-than-normal rate of profit; and (d) be managed so as to give
managers an easy life, so that, for example, there will be too much capital
and labour employed. Examinations of profitability data, productivity data,
and regression results lead the authors to conclude that their predictions
are borne out.
In the third sentence of this paper, we are told that “[t]he major purpose
of this study is to provide some empirical confirmation for a positive theory
of managerial behaviour in public enterprise”.1 6 This scientifically indefen-
sible statement is likely just a poor choice of words. But it does remind one
of Posner’s charge against writers in this tradition (his own) that the sample
of firms or industries chosen to test the effectiveness of theory is often not
random;’ 7 i.e., the firm, Gray Coach, may have been selected by the authors
because it appeared to fit the theory, rather than as an independent test of
the theory. One question remained at the back of this reviewer’s mind
throughout, one that was only partially answered in the text:’ 8 in view of
the discussed importance of incentives to TTC management, why was Gray
Coach studied rather than the TTC itself?
In the “confirmation for a positive theory”, much is made of managerial
incentives as a means of expanding the size of public enterprise; managers’
rewards, being in terms of pay, power and prestige, are allegedly positively
related to the combined size of the TTC and Gray Coach. The paper provides
an algebraic demonstration of how transfer pricing techniques between the
two can be used to effect this result.
In this demonstration, the authors do address some public policy issues,
but not necessarily the ones related to the public firm. According to the
presentation, Gray Coach is ineffectively regulated by the Ontario Highway
Transit Board. The TTC receives an Ontario government subsidy which is
a constant fraction of its costs. Metropolitan Toronto determines the fraction
of costs that fares will meet and makes up the TTC deficit with its own
subsidy. This subsidy, however, is reduced to an amount equal to (reported)
Gray Coach profits. One may conclude that combined TTC-Gray Coach
profits are constrained to zero by Metropolitan Toronto; but within this
16J. Palmer, J. Quinn & R. Resendes, “A Case Study of Public Enterprise: Gray Coach Lines
Ltd” in Prichard, supra, note 1, 369 at 369.
17R. Posner, “Theories of Economic Regulation” (1974) 5 Bell. Econ. Mgmt Sci. 335.
‘sPalmer, Quinn & Resendes, supra, note 16 at 370.
19851
BOOK REVIEWS
constraint the Ontario government subsidy provides an incentive to increase
the size of the TTC system, and the Metro Toronto subsidy provides an
inducement to non-profit-maximizing behaviour. (Realistically, however,
Gray Coach must show consistent, if small, accounting profits.) Given a
zero-profit constraint and ineffective regulation of Gray Coach costs, the
incentives provided by the subsidies would be such as to increase Gray
Coach costs and to transfer Gray Coach profits to the TTC where they would
be used for system expansion. Thus, the effects found by the authors from
their productivity and profitability data (which are, they admit, weak) may
not be related to the incentives faced by Gray Coach as a public firm, but
instead to the subsidy schemes, coupled with the strong regulation of TTC
fares and ineffective regulation of Gray Coach fares. Given a zero-profit
constraint, incentives to private managers of this combination of policies
might not be any different. This type of result was, in fact, anticipated by
Trebilcock and Prichard. 19
The evidence from the regression model presents yet deeper problems.
The authors assume a single linear demand function for bus service in
Ontario, relating trips to fares and other variables. From these results, they
draw a number of conclusions. If, instead, one made the equally likely
hypothesis that demand was log-linear, then in each transport market (ori-
gin-destination pair), the price elasticity of demand would be the same and
constant. If there is a constant elasticity of demand across markets, and if
costs rise by equal percentage amounts in all markets, then Ramsey pricing2
(once achieved) would dictate equal percentage fare increases in all markets.
Ironically, the observation that such fare increases are sought by Gray Coach
at hearings is held out by the authors as an example of management’s seeking
a quiet life!2′
A still more fundamental objection can be made to the model than the
observation that a simple, accepted variation of the authors’ assumptions
could alter their interpretation of an observed practice. The more likely
economic hypothesis would be that, rather than there being a homogenous
market for bus transportation throughout Ontario, there would be a separate
market for each origin-destination pair – possibly even at each hour of the
day in various seasons of the year. Each separate market would then have
19Supra, note 1 at 27-8.
20When constraints on profitability are imposed on a firm producing several commodities,
marginal cost pricing is no longer optimal. Instead, deviations from marginal cost pricing are
required. Under certain conditions, optimality is achieved by “Ramsey Prices”, where the
deviation of price from marginal cost, when expressed as a proportion of marginal cost, is
related to the elasticity of demand. See, e.g., W.J. Baumol & D.E Bradford, “Optimal Departures
from Marginal Cost Pricing” (1970) 60 Amer. Econ. Rev. 265.
2’Palmer, Quinn & Resendes, supra, note 16 at 413.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
different demand parameters, and possibly different cost parameters (e.g.,
for seasonal or geographic factors). Thus, estimations which point to a dis-
tinct difference in the pricing of trips to Toronto might not be evidence of
inefficient pricing (Palmer et aL’s interpretation), but simply a characteristic
of the particular market. Alternative speculations about characteristics of
the Toronto market could be made which are consistent with the results but
no less conjectural than the authors’ speculations about the performance of
public enterprise in general, or Gray Coach in particular.
In the multi-firm regressions that involve not just Gray Coach but four
private Ontario bus companies, it is not true that the results support the
conclusions drawn. It is hard to obtain any firm conclusions from this mixed
bag of results. Gray Coach simply does not appear to be as anomalous as
the authors claim, especially in the regressions involving fares per kilometre
which the authors themselves prefer for institutional reasons which are
discussed in the text.
Borcherding writes: “Recent work … attempt [sic] to model the ‘Iron
Triangle’ between legislature, bureaucracy, and interest group(s), but this
richer context is longer in descriptive reality and/or theoretical curiosities
than it is in testable implications which conform to a wide range of situa-
tions. In any case, almost none of this… literature lends itself to summary
statistics which address themselves to simple efficiency measurements. ”22
Clearly, so-called political markets are characterized by interactions even
more complex that those of the “iron triangle”. One is confident that Borch-
erding, Palmer, Quinn and Resendes would be among the first to aver that,
despite some very interesting insights, positive analyses are not a suitable
basis for policy recommendations concerning the public firm.
In the third paper of the volume, Chandler examines the relationship
of public ownership to political parties which are at the centre of the political
process. She finds that two of the main explanations for state intervention
in the Canadian economy –
the economic environment and Canadian
political culture – cannot explain variations through time and across prov-
inces in the rate of creation of Crown corporations. A third explanation,
pragmatism –
that the Crown corporation is a response to particular sit-
uations rather than the working of a political philosophy –
provides no
general criterion for analysis, and hence lacks explanatory power. A major
assumption running through the three explanations, according to Chandler,
is that political institutions have little independent effect. Consequently,
political forces have been disregarded in the study of public enterprise. In
contrast, Chandler finds that partisanship and ideology are of considerable
utility in explaining policy choice.
22Borcherding, supra, note 11 at 144.
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
She assigns each provincial political party into one of two categories:
left (New Democratic Party and Parti qu~b~cois) and non-left or right (Pro-
gessive Conservative, Liberal and Social Credit). Then she applies the Vin-
ing-Botterell data, finding that, since 1920, governments of the left have
been more likely to utilize public ownership as an instrument of policy, and
also have done so at a greater rate. Nevertheless, as observed by Vining and
Botterell, the parties of the right have created large numbers of Crown
corporations. Chandler explains this observation by classifying Crown cor-
porations into three types. This classification, which is by ideological func-
tion rather than by ostensible pragmatic purpose, is as follows: (1) those
which are facilitative or supportive of private sector economic initiatives,
for example, infrastructural investments in transportation and communi-
cations; (2) those which are nationalistic, that is, supportive of interests
within the province, in that the province from which investment capital
comes is more important than the public-private distinction (but, apart from
this, the market still dominates the economy); and (3) those which are
redistributive, in a way that is explicitly contrary to the dictates of the market.
Parties of the right, by Chandler’s analysis, are inclined to utilize the first
two types of Crown corporation (especially the first) but parties of the left
are more inclined to utilize the third type; often, however, redistribution
may involve a measure of “nationalism” (provincial regionalism), so that
some overlap betwen left and right may occur in the second category.
Analysis on the basis of ideological predisposition stands in dictinct
contrast to the analyses of the first two papers. Indeed, the authors of these
papers show their discomfort with Chandler’s challenge to the extent that
they try to ignore it.23 Ideology as a political force runs counter to the
inexorable economic rationality that underpins the former analyses. (One
is reminded of theological debates over predestination.) Chandler admits,
for example, the possibilities of (a) a greater willingness on the part of some
political parties to incur the high costs of monitoring Crown corporations,
and (b) an inclination on the part of some individuals, because of their
ideology, to become involved in movements favouring redistribution even
if they do not stand to gain or lose personally from the redistribution.
However, despite the persuasiveness of the Chandler thesis, some ques-
tions remain. In her discussion of the nationalistic Crown corporation, Chandler
takes a position which is consistent with positive economic analyses of
nationalism. But the positive economist’s dilemma regarding rationality
again arises: “As with other nationalistic policy-making, although everyone
is said to gain, the benefits are in fact less widely distributed than they might
23See, e.g., Trebilcock & Prichard, supra, note 1 at 5 and 11 n. 37.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
appear to be.”’24 Nationalism is a persistently observed phenomenon, es-
peciallyin successful economies. Persistently observed policies mustbe benefi-
cial (at worst not harmful) to. a broad majority, or else one must assume
that the majority is persistently fooled. But this assumption runs counter
to “rational expectations”, one of the foundations of the economic analysis
of politics.
A further issue relates to how one might categorize one of the more
important interventions of recent years, the intervention in the oil industry.
G6linas observes that energy has been the field in which a second wave of
nationalizations has taken place; 25 in most countries, these changes have
taken place faster than in Canada. Lewin notes that, in several countries in
Western Europe, the state has moved to dominate several strategic sectors
of the economy, including energy26 – Chandler would appear to identify
this positive role for the state with the left. Yet Lewin persuasively argues
(as does Pratt in the same volume, 27 but from a very different perspective)
that the interventions in energy were pragmatic, rather than ideological. Did
events catch up with left ideology in the 1970’s? Or, were the interventions
in the oil industry actually facilitating, the only action motivated by ideology
being the Americans’ refusal to establish a national oil company?
The major insight of public choice theory is that government may be
used by interest groups to redistribute wealth to themselves. Chandler’s
insight is that redistribution may also be occasioned by ideology of the party
in power, rather than solely by a quasi-economic reponse by politicians to
forces in the “political market”. But an economist would try to penetrate
beyond the question of the genesis of the Crown corporation (the subject
of this volume) to examine the genesis of ideology. The Chandler analysis
takes the ideology as given. Economists, in the tradition of Harold Innis
whom Borcherding cites, would try to seek the genesis of political ideologies
in objective technological and economic factors. As in the oil industry,
pragmatism and ideology may be horns on the same goat.
The paper by Vining and Botterell provides the vital data on which the
Chandler paper is based. The authors note that the definition of Crown
corporation varies substantially among provinces, and thus that their ex-
ercise is an art, rather than a science. However, this conclusion emphasizes
24A. Chandler, “The Politics of Public Enterprise” in Prichard, supra, note 1, 185 at 214.
25A. G61inas, “Public Enterprise and Public Interest: Independance and Accountability –
Summary of Discussions” in A. G61inas, ed., Public Enterprise and the Public Interest: Pro-
ceedings of an International Seminar (1978) 14 at 16.
Experience” in W. Stanbury & F Thompson, eds, Managing Public Enterprise (1982).
26A.Y. Lewin, “Public Enterprise, Purposes and Performance: A Survey of Western European
27L. Pratt, “Oil and State Enterprises: Assessing Petro-Canada” in Stanbury & Thompson,
ibid.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
the importance of a theoretical framework to data-gathering exercises. For
example, when Vining and Botterell were considering the problem of def-
inition, the Trebilcock-Prichard framework of the substitutability of instru-
ments would have suggested a government inclination to create subtle variations
of the Crown corporation and to create hybrid instruments in order to obtain
a desired mix of characteristics. Such a tendency would militate against
strict classifications. One is also struck by the difference in conclusions
regarding the importance of ideology that follow from Vining and Botterell’s
aggregated study and Chandler’s disaggregated study. Because a well-defined
theoretical framework for their data collection was not available to them,
Vining and Botterell were unable to analyse the significance of some of the
statistics gathered. For example, the study fails to account for the fact that
the bulk of total Crown Corporation assets are controlled by only a few
Crown corporations and the fact that some provinces have higher absolute
amounts of Crown corporation assets or higher assets per capita than others.
These comments are hardly to be interpreted as unfavourable to the
path-breaking work of Vining and Botterell. The merit of their work as a
basis for future research is confirmed by the fact that it has already proved
indispensible to the Chandler paper. The remarks are indicative of the ru-
dimentary state of our understanding of public enterprise, in which theory
and empirical work advance tentatively, each dependent on the other. In
retrospect, for example, Vining and Botterell’s highly useful Appendix II,
in which Crown corporations are listed by functional category (industry
classification), might have been even more useful if information such as
that provided in Langford and Huffman’s Table I had been included (for
example, the mandate of each corporation).
Langford and Huffnan also have the same difficulty finding a definition
of a Crown corporation. Again, Trebilcock and Prichard’s conclusion that
the definition might vary from one policy context to another would have
been a useful starting point. For example, the criticism of the Lambert
Commission for not pushing “the development of its approach to the limit”
might have been muted by an appreciation of the place of the Crown cor-
poration among other instruments.28 Langford and Huffman’s compilations
will, however, be of use to future research on the federal Crown corporations,
which were not a focus of study in this volume.
In total, the collection does provide some new perspectives on Crown
corporations in Canada. The discriminating reader will come away with a
useful series of questions to ask policy-makers respecting, for example, the
28J.W. Langford & K.J. Huffman, “The Uncharted Universe of Federal Public Corporations”
in Prichard, supra, note 1, 219 at 229.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
current privatization debate. In considering the privatization of, say, Air
Canada, one might ask what the nature of the gain from such a policy would
be: whether it would result from the use of a different, now more effective
policy instrument; whether efficiency would be served by the change in
property rights resulting from a change in institution; whether a policy of
deregulation of the Canadian air industry would be more or less efficient
than privatization; or whether the main benefit of privatization would be
ideological.
But the reader will have to be quite discriminating to reap these benefits
at minimum cost. The book appears to have been published with undue
haste. The editor has been too indulgent of verbosity. Inexactitude, which
could have been easily eliminated by referees, is all too common. As a
Quebecer, this reviewer would observe that Hydro-Qu6bec, not Ontario
Hydro, is the largest Crown corporation in Canada. As a Canadian, he would
question a frequently used metaphor concerning “legislative and executive
arms of government”; if the legislature is an arm, then the executive (as the
name suggests) is better compared to a hand. Furthermore, the book is
poorly copy edited.29
Because the basic concept of the Trebilcock-Prichard paper is uncom-
plicated, the reader may wish to skip to page seventy-five, where a pointed
twenty-two page criticism of reform proposals begins. One may also wish
to follow Borcherding’s own advice and skip to Section V, where a sufficient
distillation of his literature review can be found along with all of his con-
jectures about public sector supply. Chandler’s paper is worth considering
critically and in full. The data provided by Vining and Botterell and by
Langford and Huffman, as well as their methodologies, will be of lasting
value to researchers in the field. The Palmer-Quinn-Resendes paper adds
little if anything to Borcherding’s paper. Borins succeeds in presenting the
lessons of history in a relatively crisp fashion. Treating reading as a instru-
ment, the reader may find that this assessment will encourage the best cal-
culus of instrument choice.
29There are many errors in spelling and in English usage. In addition, all of the papers are
inconsistent in their use of Canadian and American spellings; at least once (at page 303) this
inconsistency occurs in the same sentence. One would expect, in view of the subject, place of
publication, and sponsorship of the book, the use of Canadian spellings alone.
Jules Deschnes, Justice et pouvoir – A Passion for Justice. Montr6al:
Editions Wilson & Lafleur – Sorej, 1984. Pp. xiii, 300 [30 $1. Comment6
par Yves Ouellette.*
II faut une robuste assurance pour entreprendre de publier des discours
ou des conferences. J’admets au d6part entretenir de vieux pr6jug6s A l’6gard
des recueils de morceaux choisis en g6n6ral et des collages de conferences
en particulier. Les causeries sont faites pour 6tre 6cout6es et il m’est toujours
apparu que ces oeuvres oratoires s’accommodent mal de la lecture, surtout
s’il s’agit de discours de fin de diner, pr6sent6s devant des associations de
gens d’affaire ou meme de personnes savantes.
Le juriste ne r6siste pas facilement i l’habitude de tout classifier. On
peut, A vrai dire, classer les conferenciers en trois cat6gories : le lecteur,
l’improvisateur et l’acteur. Le lecteur a pr6par6 son expos6 minutieusement
et se sentirait sans doute diminu6 s’il laissait croire que son oeuvre n’a pas
6t6 enfant6e dans la douleur. Les yeux riv6s sur son texte, dont tous les
passages lui semblent vou6s A l’immortalit6, il semble ignorer superbement
son auditoire et s’il a la chance de n’8tre pas presbyte, ne s’en 61oignera ou
ne lvera les yeux vers la salle que pour s’assurer que son public est toujours
attentif et ravi. L’improvisateur ne s’embarasse pas des plans savamment
construits en deux parties, avec transitions et sous-sections. Naturel et spon-
tan6, il sait bien ofi commencer sa conf6rence, butine ici et lA, s’attarde au
hasard sur quelques th6mes inattendus, mais son probl6me est de savoir
comment conclure. L’acteur, lui, veut s6duire ou captiver son auditoire,
plut6t que lui d6montrer qu’il maitrise parfaitement son sujet. II recourt
tant6t A l’humour ou l’ironie, tant6t aux sentiments ou a la passion.
Le sommet de l’art est 6videmment de combiner chez un m~me con-
ferencier les meilleurs 616ments des trois genres. Peu d’orateurs y parvien-
nent. Ayant eu la chance d’entendre quelques-unes des conferences que vient
de faire paraitre le juge Desch~nes, je peux t6moigner qu’il est de ceux-lA.
Publier une conference, c’est cependant prendre le risque d’exposer A tous
les regards le corps sans voile d’une personne imparfaite. Lire une confe-
rence, plut6t que de l’couter, c’est toute la difference entre 6tudier la trans-
cription de t6moignage et voir un t6moin d6poser, avec ses h6sitations et
ses r6actions. Mais on a bien publier les discours de Cic6ron, les plaidoyers
de Maurice Gargon et on publie bien des pieces du th6itre. L’ouvrage que
vient de faire paraitre le juge Desch~nes m’oblige A me r6concilier avec ce
genre de publications, q’ue j’ai longtemps consid6r6es, A tort ou i raison,
comme servant plus les int6r&s des auteurs que ceux des lecteurs.
*Professeur titulaire, Facult de droit, Universit& de Montreal.
Revue de droit de McGill
McGill Law Journal 1985
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
L’ouvrage se compose de dix-neuf causeries et communications datees
de juillet 1979 a juin 1984, donn~es au Canada et A l’tranger. L’auteur a
choisi de les presenter dans leur ordre chronologique, plutot que de tenter
de les classer par themes ; compte tenu de 1’6clectisme des sujets trait~s, ce
choix apparait fort justifi et offre l’avantage de permettre au lecteur de
suivre le cheminement de sa pens~e et de ses champs d’int~rts : l’ind~pen-
dance de la magistrature, le rrle des avocats, les droits linguistiques et les
rapports entre le pouvoir judiciaire et le pouvoir politique. Les textes sont
publies dans leur langue originale, les deux tiers en frangais. Ces derni~res
anndes, le juge Deschenes a tourn6 les yeux vers la scene internationale et
un effort de classement de ses textes conduit A distinguer entre la dimension
locale puis intemationale de son oeuvre litt6raire et de son action.
J’6tablirais, dans la cat~gorie de textes d’int6rt local, plusieurs sous-
groupes :
A – Texte 1, < Justice et pouvoir o, causerie donn6e devant la Chambre
de commerce frangaise au Canada, A Montreal, le 23 janvier 1980; texte 8,
< L'ind~pendance de la magistrature
, allocution prononc~e devant la Con-
f-erence inter-sections du Barreau du Quebec A Hull, le 4 dfcembre 1981;
texte 11, < Les pouvoirs politique et judiciaire devant la d6sob6issance ci-
vile o, communication pr~parde pour l'Association du Barreau canadien
dans le cadre de son assembl~e annuelle A Toronto, le 2 septembre 1982.
B - Texte 2, < De la creation au jugement dernier ou de la libert6
cratrice du juge >, allocution prononc~e lors du diner du centenaire de
l’Ordre des comptables agr6s du Quebec, A Qu6bec, le 19 novembre 1980 ;
texte 4,
loque international de droit civil compar6 prononc~e A Montreal, le 3 oc-
tobre 1981.
C.- Texte 9, << Quelques observations sur la langue des tribunaux >>,
allocution prononc~e devant les juges d’expression frangaise des provinces
de common law, A Val-David, le 2 avril 1982; texte 10, o Le bilinguisme
devant les tribunaux : Le pass6 est-il garant de l’avenir ? >, communication
prrpar~e pour l’Association du Barreau canadien, prononc6e au Mont Ste-
Marie, Quebec, le 5 juin 1982 ; texte 12, < L'volution historique du statut
juridique des langues au Canada >>, conference prononc~e A l’ouverture du
Colloque : o Throrie et r~alit6 de 1’6galit6 juridique des langues au Canada >>,
A Qu6bec, le 4 novembre 1982.
D – Texte 13, << Police et libert6 en l'an 2000 )>, conference prononc~e
A l’ouverture du 75e congr~s de l’Association canadienne des chefs de police,
A Montreal, le 26 aofit 1980.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
E – Texte 3, << La passion de la justice >>, allocution prononc~e lors de
la c~r~monie de prestation de serment par les nouveaux avocats, A Montreal,
le 10 d~cembre 1980 ; texte 5, < Les dix commandements de l'avocat devant
la Cour >>, allocution prononc~e devant 1’Association du Jeune Barreau de
Montreal, A Montreal, le 4 novembre 1981 ; texte 7, < Etrangers dans leur
propre pays : sur la mobilit6 des juges et des avocats au Canada > , causerie
prononc~e devant 1’Association des juristes d’expression frangaise de l’On-
tario, A Ottawa, le 21 novembre 1981 ; texte 6, < La pi~t6 filiale >>, allocution
prononc~e lors de la s6ance de prestation de serment par les nouveaux
avocats, A Montreal, le 19 novembre 1981 ; texte 15, < French Advocacy in
North America >, causerie prononc~e lors du congr~s annuel de The As-
sociation of Trial Lawyers of America, i Montreal, le 22 juillet 1980 ; texte
17,
Victoria Bar Association, A Victoria, Colombie-Britannique, le 25 mars 1982.
Je classerais dans une seconde categorie des textes plus r6cents qui
r~v~lent que l’int~r&t du juge Deschenes le porte maintenant sur la scene
intemationale:
– Texte 19, <(International Law: Its Impact on the Average Cana-
dian >>, conference prononce devant la section albertaine de l’Association
du Barreau canadien, A Calgary, le 28 janvier 1984 ; texte 16,
de la Conference sur les normes minimales d’ind~pendance judiciaire, sous
les auspices du Comit6 sur l’administration de la Justice de l’Association
du Barreau international, A J6rusalem, le 2 mars 1982 ; texte 14, << London-
Edinburgh and Ottawa-Quebec : A Study in Parallels >>, conference pronon-
c~e sous les auspices du Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, au
Queen’s College, Cambridge University, le 10 juillet 1979 ; texte 18,
locution pr~sent6e devant l’Assembl~e g~n~rale de la section pratique g&
n6rale de l’Association du Barreau international, A New-Delhi, le 18 octobre
1982.
La causerie, m~me une fois publi~e, ne se prate pas toujours facilement
A des analyses pouss.es du droit. Meme si les textes du juge sont g~n~ra-
lement document6s, compte tenu des sujets trait6s, et d~passent le style
6ditorial, ses propos sont largement anecdotiques. D’aucuns pourront donc
reprocher A l’auteur de ne pas avoir produit une oeuvre doctrinale. Ce n’6tait
certes pas sa prtention et ce qui importe apr~s tout, c’est qu’il ait fait oeuvre
utile. Lauteur ruisselle de talents : il a le sens de l’histoire et puise volontiers
son inspiration dans les civilisations 6gyptiennes. II a le verbe hait et la
plume audacieuse.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
Si au plan juridique tous les textes ne pr6sentent pas un 6gal int6ret,
j’ai, pour ma part, particuli~rement appr6ci6 le premier, <(Justice et pou-
voir >, oii l’auteur rappelle aux politiciens qu6b6cois leur obligation de res-
pecter l’autorit6 des tribunaux. Apr~s avoir relev6 les propos regrettables de
certains membres du gouvernement qu6b6cois, suite A des arr~ts invalidant
certaines dispositions de la Loi 101,’ le juge 6crit :
II faut r~agir avec vigueur contre une situation propre au Qu6bec ofi le
d6dain que le pouvoir civil affiche envers la justice menace d’une d6gradation
graduelle nos institutions les plus pr6cieuses et, A travers elles, la libert6 de
chaque citoyen. 2
La critique est s6v6re, maisjuste. Ce gouvernement qui, aux olympiades
de l’ultra vires, remporte l’or, l’argent et le bronze se devait d’etre rappel6
A l’ordre. I1 se pourrait bien que les paroles du juge ne soient pas tomb6es
dans les oreilles de sourds. Alors qu’en toute fin de 1984, la Cour sup6rieure
d6clarait inop6rantes, comme incompatibles avec la Charte des droits et
libert~s de la personne du Qu6bec, 3 certaines dispositions de la Loi 101 sur
la langue de l’affichage, 4 le porte-parole du gouvernement exprima, cette
fois, ses r6actions avec dignit6 et respect pour le pouvoir judiciaire.
Dans deux autres textes, La libert6 cr6atrice du juge
et Codifica-
tion : valeurs et langage >, I’auteur souligne la contribution et l’action vi-
vifiantes des tribunaux dans l’6volution du droit et des valeurs sociales. Cela
mqritait aussi d’8tre dit. Face A l’immobilisme du 16gislateur, A ]a d6gradation
du processus l6gislatif et A la multiplication des coquilles 16gislatives >, le
citoyen doit pouvoir compter sur la protection d’une magistrature b6n6fi-
ciant d’une longue tradition d’excellence et d’ind6pendance, et capable, au
besoin, d’une certaine forme de judicial statesmanship. I1 est vrai que le
premier architecte de la Charte canadienne des droits et libert6s5 est pro-
bablement la Cour supreme du Canada, par ses grands arr~ts des ann~es
cinquante: Saumur,6 Boucher,7 l’Aliance des professeurs de Montreal,8 Birks,9
‘Charte de la languefranqaise, L.R.Q., c. C-1I1.
2J. Desch~nes, o Justice et pouvoir >> dans J. Desch~nes, Justice et pouvoir – A Passion for
Justice (1984) I aux pp. 11-2.
3Charte des droits et liberts de la personne, L.R.Q., c. C-12.
4Ford c. PG. Quebec (28 d6cembre 1984), Montr6al 500-05-002008-843 (C.S.).
5Charte canadienne des droits et liberts, Partie I de I’annexe B de la Loi de 1982 stir le
Canada (R.-U.), 1982, c. II.
6Saumnurc. City of Quebec (1953), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 641, 106 C.C.C. 289.
7Boucher c. The King (1950), [1951] S.C.R. 265, [1950] 1 D.L.R. 657, 96 C.C.C. 48.
8L’Alliance des professeurs catholiques de Montreal c. Labour Relations Board of Quebec
(1953), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 161.
9Birks & Sons c. City of Montreal (1955), [1955] S.C.R. 799, [1955] 5 D.L.R. 321.
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
Chaput,’0 Switzman,” Roncarelli.12 On reconnaitra, par ailleurs, qu’au Qu-
bec, l’interpr~tation litt6rale des textes et le syndrome du code complet
conservent encore une faveur certaine et que de nos jours, comme dans les
ann~es cinquante, <('action civilisatrice des tribunaux >> fait encore, et plus
souvent qu’A son tour, un cofiteux detour par Ottawa.
En outre, dans la tradition canadienne, le r6le cr6ateur du juge, bien
que reel et significatif, est tout de m~me limit6. L’intr8t g~n~ral est dter-
min6 par le lfgislateur et le juge n’a pas A apporter des modifications A la
loi, au nom d’une conception de l’quit6 qui lui est personnelle. La loi
exprime le droit et la transgression de la loi risque d’amener l’arbitraire.
Cependant, le vacuum laiss6 par la loi est souvent important et permet alors
au juge, dans son r6le constitutionnel d’interprte de la loi, de faire inter-
venir des considerations d’ordre public ou de public policy et d’ quilibrer
des valeurs sociales parfois contradictoires. Somme toute, la contribution
ou << 'action civilisatrice >> des juges doit etre 6valu6e comme une compo-
sante parmi d’autres, d’un vaste ensemble judiciaire, comme l’a 6crit Jaffe:
The ultimate question should be not what the English judges have made of
the law of torts but what English lawmakers as a whole – Parliament and the
judges – have made of the law of torts.’3
Les textes les plus rcents du juge t6moignent d’un inter& croissant
pour les questions judiciaires de dimensions nationale et internationale.
L’homme semble se sentir A l’6troit au Quebec et ces textes rendent compte
notamment des importants travaux sur l’ind~pendance de la magistrature,
qu’il a mends pour le compte du Conseil canadien de la magistrature.’ 4 Le
juge y dMfend, avec ferveur et opiniitret6, un principe qui lui est cher, et
c’6tait sans doute pour lui une fagon d’afficher concr~tement cette ind~pen-
dance que de publier les causeries prononc~es A Cambridge et A New-Delhi
qui, mgme vues du Quebec, peuvent apparaitre insolites.
I1 est toujours risqu6 pour un juge de faire des dclarations extrajudi-
ciaires ; s’il traite d’une question en termes juridiques mais dans l’abstrait,
il risque de se faire citer par un plaideur, dans une affaire qu’il doit juger ;
s’il choisit de traiter d’une question aussi difficile que l’ind~pendance ju-
diciaire ou la r~forme constitutionnelle en termes non juridiques, on sug-
g6rera qu’il prend des licences avec l’obligation de reserve, concept dont le
“Chaput c. Romain (1955), [1955] S.C.R. 834, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 241, 114 C.C.C. 170.
“Sivitzman c. Elbling, (1957), [1957] S.C.R. 285, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 337, 117 C.C.C. 129.
12Roncarelli c. Duplessis (1959), [1959] S.C.R. 121, 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689.
13 L.L. Jaffe, English and American Judges as Lawmakers (1969) A la p. 5.
‘4J. Desch~nes, Mattres chez eux: Une etude sur I’administration judiciaire autonome des
Trihunaux (1981).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
contour est bien impr6cis. Aussi les canadiens se sont habitu6s A voir leurs
juges monter sur le Banc comme sur le Mont Olympe et, selon le mot de
Lamartine, se situer ni A gauche, ni i droite, mais au plafond.
Le juge Deschenes s’est acquis non seulement au Qu6bec mais aussi au
Canada, dans l’opinion comme sur la sc6ne judiciaire, une stature et une
notori6t6 qui lui permettent sans doute d’avoir son franc parler et, dans un
langage toujours correct, de donner des legons de droit ou de civisme aussi
bien aux avocats qu’aux policiers et aux politiciens. En sol qu6b6cois, oa
tout finit par un proc~s, un grief ou un projet de loi, le droit et la politique,
s6par6s en th6orie, se rencontrent et fraternisent volontiers en pratique, et
l’on ne se scandalise pas qu’un juge, fusse-t-il alors juge en chef de la Cour
sup6rieure, se porte publiquement et courageusement A la d6fense de l’au-
torit6 et de l’ind6pendance de la magistrature et d6nonce le peu d’6gard de
certains politiciens pour la r~gle de droit. Devant le silence des clercs, il est
heureux que quelqu’un ait hauss6 la voix. En territoire 6tranger cependant,
ce genre de d6claration peut atre regu diffremment.
Conferencier recherch6 et auteur prolifique, le juge Desch~nes, il faut
lui en savoir gr6, a eu l’6nergie et la pers6v6rance de s’extirper du terrible
quotidien et d’avoir livr6 au public des textes sobres et courageux qui consti-
tuent, pour les gens de loi et les politiciens, un v6ritable examen de cons-
cience. Ce dernier ouvrage du juge Desch~nes devrait 8tre offert A tous les
nouveaux avocats. Sur les rayons de ma biblioth6que, il est rang6 A proximit6
des oeuvres de Lord Denning.
D.W.M. Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada, 2d ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1984.
Pp. cxvi, 1240 [$95.00]. Reviewed by David M. Paciocco.*
It is fitting that a favourable review of Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada,
Second Edition’ should be published in the McGill Law Journal. McGill
was the birthplace of the first edition of this remarkable book.2 To read the
book is to acquire unbridled respect for its author. The extent of his un-
derstanding and the scope of his work are daunting, even to a trusts teacher.
Yet, if there is a problem with the work, it lies in that very fact; Waters,
Law of Trusts in Canada is an intimidating book. As a result, its use, but
not its usefulness, will be diminished.
I want to be very clear here. The above observation is less an indictment
of the author than it is a comment on the nature of the practice and study
of law. Though time is scarce for most of us, it is a necessary ingredient in
the acquisition of a sophisticated knowledge of a subject such as trusts. The
book does not provide quick, easy answers, but this is not a criticism of
Waters. He is to be applauded for resisting the temptation. In an area like
trusts law, quick, easy answers can be, and most often are, misleading.
Waters does not mislead.3 However, in his effort to be comprehensive and
*Of the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa.
‘D.W.M. Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada, 2d ed. (1984).
2The idea of this book “was conceived … at the University of Saskatchewan”. The book
was written at McGill. D.W.M. Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada, Ist ed. (1974) at v-vi.
31n his preface, Waters states that he has endeavoured to provide “a reliable work of reference
for the courts and practitioners”. Waters, supra, note I at vii. I think that he has succeeded.
I do not always agree with his analysis, but that is as likely attributable to my developing
comprehension of the subject matter as to problems with his analysis. The book rarely overstates
the law, and its propositions are generally well supported. I did notice, though, that Waters
may have overstated the holdings in the cases cited in footnote 10 at page 205. Waters extracts,
from these cases, the proposition that before statutory formalities requirements can be avoided
by resort to the doctrine that they cannot be used to perpetrate a fraud, “it must be established
that the transferee knew or had notice at the time of the conveyance that he was to hold for
another”. The first two cases cited turn on the fact that there vas no indication by the settlor
that a trust was intended until after the transfer, a very different issue. There is obiter support
for his proposition in the last case cited in that footnote. Yet, the proposition seems inconsistent
with dicta in Rochefoucauld v. Boustead (1896), [1897] 1 Ch. 196 (C.A.) and in Bannister v.
Bannister (1948), [1948] 2 All E.R. 133 (C.A.). At page 1070, Waters notes that variation of
trusts legislation which employs the language “who by reason of infancy or other incapacity
is incapable of assenting” could be interpreted to include “persons who, though not mentally
imcompetent, are of weak intellect or senile”. No authority is advanced to support that prop-
osition, and it seems quite untenable.
Another example of potential unreliability occurs at page 359 where Waters refers to Ro-
chefoucauld v. Boustead, ibid., as a constructive trust case. In that case, Lindley L.J. said at
page 208: “The trust which the plaintiff has established is clearly an express trust …” While
Lindley L.J. arguably so held to avoid a limitations statute, I think Waters should have ad-
dressed this point. Again at page 130, Waters states the broad proposition that “though Equity
Revue de droit de McGill
McGill Law Journal 1985
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[Vol. 30
accurate, he has compromised his goal of providing “a readable book for
students in all situations”. 4 The text is well written, and sentence by sen-
tence, it is easy enough to read. 5 But Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada is
still not a book that can be “read”; it is a treatise that must be “studied”.
Some of the book’s difficulty can be attributed to the subject matter.
Waters is the bearer of bad news; the law of trusts is as conceptual as the
law gets, and building bridges between the cases is often an exercise in trying
to make sense of questionable judicial reasoning. In part, however, respon-
sibility for the intimidating nature of the work must lie with the author. He
has asked his readers to gorge themselves on trust law.
In the preface to his first edition, Waters admitted that his “first inten-
tion was to write something of more modest size”. 6 He “soon found” that
his object of ensuring “that Canadian material saw the light of day”7 made
a more modest book impossible. Yet the imposing stature of the book cannot
be explained on that basis alone. In certain places, the book appears to be
a teacher’s manual, complete with examples that seem to have been selected
with instruction in mind.8 In other places, it appears to have been written
for the neophyte trust student. It explains the history of the trust 9 and
includes a sizeable introductory section that points to the differences be-
tween the trust and other related legal and equitable concepts.10 Sometimes
the book seems to have been written with the specialist practictioner in
may wish to follow the basic rule that there is no trust until the property is vested in the
trustees, it has been inclined to ignore the rule and deem the trust to have come into existence,
when it would be inequitable to deny to the would-be donor the sufficiency of his incomplete
transfer on trust”. I doubt this proposition. The “particular” case cited in support of it, Re
Gardner (1923), [1923] 2 Ch. 230, is subject to trenchant criticism.
It is perhaps unfair to suggest that there are other cases where statements are not convincingly
supported or where errors have arguably been made without pointing to them specifically, but
other aspects of the book gave me some trouble. The point is, however, that this author has
given us 1200 pages of material, and large sections can be read before there is any room to
argue with what he says. The book is as reliable as a work of this magnitude can be.
4Waters, supra, note 1 at vii.
5Many of the sections have been rewritten and, where this has been done, comprehensibility
has been improved.
6Waters, supra, note 2 at v.
71bid.
8For examples, see ibid. at 3-4, the first two pages of the Introduction and, at 301-4, the
discussion of “The Resulting Trust Situations”.
9This historical discussion is not confined to the introduction, but can be found interspersed
with the contemporary law throughout the book. This might irritate the practitioner.
‘Waters, supra, note 1 at 31-87. From a pedagogical point of view, I prefer to see this
material blended into the course. I have found it to be an exercise in diminishing returns to
try to distinguish a trust from other equitable or legal concepts when students have only a
passing familiarity with the trust. Given that this book is intended for students and practitioners
alike, it was sensible for Waters to segregate this material as he did.
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
mind.”I Elsewhere, it seems to have been dedicated to providing a general
survey for the lawyer who does not require a detailed knowledge of the
subject matter.’ 2 It also serves as a bibliography of other literature in the
area.’ 3 Often, the book acts as an annotation service, canvassing in great
detail those cases which could justifiably have been mentioned in passing,
relegated to the footnotes, or left out completely.14 At times, it serves as a
law reform exercise, offering insightful criticisms and helpful suggestions. 15
And, at times, it takes on the character of a scholarly essay, critically pur-
suing a specific theme in detail.’ 6
While such remarkable diversity hardly seems to be a fair basis for
criticism, this diversity does detract from the accessibility of the book’s
contents.’ 7 The Law of Trusts in Canada, in each of its editions, is, to use
Waters’ own description, a “treatise”. I can recall perusing the first edition
as a second year law student. It struck me unfavourably. The book looked
like hard work then and it still looks like hard work. I have heard practi-
tioners make the same point. I can only berate myself now for believing
that an understanding of the law could be found in the C.E.D.’s, and for
” ‘For example, I found the discussion of the “referential trust” to be beyond my own knowl-
edge and understanding. Waters, supra, note 1 at 227-8.
‘2The general description of the taxation of trusts would not generally assist a specialist
practitioner, but it does provide an excellent base for alerting the general practitioner to the
tax implications of a trust. Ibid., ch. 13.
raThe footnotes include generous references to related works. Indeed, Waters’ survey of the
literature includes a relatively detailed explanation of the change made by the editors of Un-
derhill on Trusts and Trustees since Waters’ first edition regarding the classification of trusts.
Ibid. at 19-20.
14An example is provided by Waters’ discussion of “The Resulting Trust, 2(2)(b)(i) Rebutting
illegality and fraud”, where certain lower court and appellate level cases,
the presumption –
which have since been dwarfed in significance by more recent developments, are explained in
some detail. Ibid. at 319-31.
ISWaters offers many suggestions for reform. The positions he takes are generally convincing,
although I disagree with some of them. For example, I disagree that sections 9 and 10 of the
Statute of Frauds, R.S.O. 1980, c. 481, should be repealed. While section 9 is often avoided
by the courts where it comes down to a contest between a beneficiary and the trustee of an
informal trust (which is supposed to be utterly void and of no effect), the writing requirement
probably lessens the number of cases where a “trustee” is in a position to deny a trust.
16The work demonstrates frequently that the trust concept is malleable and can accomodate
the needs of a modem society, but strict adherence to its original form unduly diminishes that
flexibility.
17The Statute of Frauds section provides a good example. Waters, supra, note 1 at 188-204.
It takes over twenty pages to set out what the various provincial statutes require. By writing
a book on Canadian trust law, Waters, of necessity, dedicates passages to one province that
are of little interest to the typical lawyer or student in another province. The di.cussions of
the varieties of trust legislation and the trustee acts provide further examples. It is all in there.
At times, weeding through it can be a task.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
expecting Waters to provide me with short, snappy conclusions. An under-
standing of the law cannot be conveyed so economically, particularly in a
subject area like trusts where “bottom-lining” is a euphemism for deception.
Waters does come as close as an author reasonably can to providing “one-
stop shopping”,18 while retaining the rigour required of such an analysis.
The kernel of criticism that remains after the foregoing comments, then, is
that many practitioners and students will not do the work that is often
required to tap the wealth of knowledge that is contained in the book.
The Second Edition: What Does It Add to the First?
In his preface to the second edition, Waters explains why a new edition
of his book was necessary. He cites two general reasons: “the abundance of
new publications” dealing with the law of wills, trusts and estate planning,
and the occurrence of major changes in the relevant law. 19 In his second
edition, Waters takes the opportunity to incorporate references to recent
legal publications. In addition, he assesses the changes in the law of con-
structive trusts, the taxation of trusts, and the matrimonial property legis-
lation along with its impact on the constructive and resulting trusts. He also
describes further business and commercial uses of the trust, changes in the
law as it pertains to trustees’ duties and “other [changes] of a less obvious
kind”. 20
When I first read the opening line in Waters’ preface (“In the ten years
since the first edition of this work much has happened”), I must confess to
having experienced a certain unease. As a trust teacher accustomed to be-
ginning my course with the “constants” of trust law (the three certainties,
constitution and formalities) where little seems to be happening, and where
the typical case for instruction was decided in the context of a succession
dispute occuring in England at some time around Canadian confederation,
18Frequently, where there is not space to develop a point, Waters refers his reader to other
works. It is hard to criticize an author who has given us 1200 pages of text on the ground that
he left something out. I would have liked, however, to have seen illustrations of how the
Americans use their constructive trust concept. This, I believe, would have added to the dis-
cussion. More importantly, I would have expected more on the application of the “is or is
not” test for discretionary trusts. The confused state of that test is only partially revealed by
Canadian authority. This is one area where Waters’ priority in using Canadian material may
have unduly diminished the importance of a detailed analysis of the English case law.
1gWaters takes the opportunity to tighten up some of the textual portions in the first edition
which did not require updating. He also improves the cross-referencing to other parts of the
book by adding footnotes. Waters, or his editors, also makes minor changes in the footnote
style and has italicized the use of foreign legal terms appearing in the text. Neither he nor his
editors take the opportunity, as is so often the case with second editions, to inject printing
errors into the work. I have read large tracts of the book and have found almost no proofreading
errors.
20Waters, supra, note 1 at vii.
19851
BOOK REVIEWS
I came to think of the law in my subject as static. Could it be that I had
missed a great number of new developments? Mercifully not. My problem
was one of perspective. Recent changes had slowly been absorbed into my
course without giving me the impression that much of significance was
happening. 2′ I taught each of these individual developments but, with the
exception of constructive trusts, I continued to characterize my subject as
one of gift and succession, a course where little old ladies give consols to
their husbands’ godsons and where marriage settlements cause internecine
warfare among aristocratic families. In the second edition, Waters has suc-
ceeded not only in incorporating the changes into his book, but also in
accomplishing a much more difficult task; he has painted the larger picture,
showing how these sporadic developments have re-characterized the law of
trusts as a vital and resilient body of doctrine that must be carefully fitted
into the contemporary setting. This has affected the way I teach the course
and should change the way that practitioners perceive the trust. In short,
there is plenty of new material to justify the additional one hundred-sixty
odd pages that make up the difference in length between the first and second
editions.22
The Constructive Trusts Section
I wish to single out Waters’ new chapter on constructive trusts for a
relatively detailed discussion. The emerging shift in the basis of the con-
structive trust from an “institutional model” 23 to a “remedial model” 24 is
2 1In part, my surprise at discovering “new” developments can be attributed to the fact that
I did not study trust law until 1978, four years after Waters’ first edition was published. Much
that was “new” to trust law was included in my initial introduction to the subject.
221 should emphasize that a 160 page supplement would not have done the job of a second
edition. Waters has rewritten some portions of the text and has been able to drop others. The
succession and gift tax section has been shortened, a change made possible by the repeal of
legislation. Most importantly, Waters has interpreted the new developments in a thematic way
that should provide guidance in anticipating how courts will respond, and in predicting further
developments.
23Under the “institutional model”, the constructive trust is conceptualized according to
analogies drawn to the express trust. To use Waters’ language, courts using the “institutional
model” “fell into describing what the position of a person [the constructive trustee] is like”.
Certain situations could be said to be “like the express trust; there was a trustee and a bene-
ficiary, there was trust property and duties with regard to the property which fell upon the
trustee”. Waters, supra, note 1 at 380. In other words, certain classes of cases came to be treated
as “constructive trust” situations because they were sufficiently analogous to the express trust
to yield to that description.
24Under the “remedial model”, the constructive trust has the raison d’Otre of preventing
unjust enrichment and is not confined to rigid classes of cases. The search for analogies to the
express trust is abandoned and the constructive trust is liberated to remedy unjust enrichment.
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[Vol. 30
trust law’s most significant development since 1974. Unfortunately, Waters
has not treated this major development sufficiently in his second edition.
In general, the discussion is clear and helpful, and his elaborate treatment
of the traditional English constructive trust is very well conceived. However,
his treatment of Pettkus v. Becker25 causes me some difficulty. I am con-
cerned that Waters’ discussion of this case and of its long-term significance
pays too little attention to the impact that the remedial model constructive
trust could have upon the creditors, secured and unsecured, of the nominal
owner.
To my mind, the only merit of the institutional model was that it
proceeded cautiously. It provided the plaintiff with a proprietary right in
specific property only where that property could broadly be said to have
come to the constructive trustee as a consequence of his relationship with
the constructive trust beneficiary. The advantage of this cautious growth
was that it increased the odds that a court would impose a constructive
trust only where it was desirable to give a plaintiff priority over third parties
with respect to trust property; if a general remedial constructive trust de-
velops, the test for its use must take account of the merit in giving the
plaintiff such a priority. I see this function as having been played by Mr
Justice Dickson’s reference in Pettkus v. Becker to a “causal connection”
between the plaintiff and the property. 26 Where it can be said that the con-
structive trustee probably would not have gained ownership without the
involvement of the plaintiff, third party creditors of the constructive trustee
who are defeated in favour of that plaintiff have less cause to complain. 27
Yet Waters treats the test for the imposition of the remedial constructive
trust as having only three aspects: “there must be an unjust enrichment, a
corresponding deprivation and an ‘absence of any juristic reason –
such
for the enrichment'”. 28 Waters then
as contract or disposition of law –
describes the references in the judgment in Pettkus v. Becker to a “causal
connection” between the plaintiff and the property, as Dickson J.’s trans-
lation of these three elements. 29 So understood the test loses its sensitivity
to the rights of third parties.
25(1980), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257 [hereinafter cited to S.C.R.].
26Ibid. at 852.
27They are not losing an exigible asset because of the declaration. The assets would not have
been available to them in the first place had it not been for the plaintiff, who therefore has
higher equities over the property than does the defendant. Still, the defendant’s creditors may
have been induced to lend money because the asset was in the defendant’s name.
28Waters, supra, note I at 385. Waters seems to adopt the criteria as articulated by Mr Justice
Dickson.
29Ibid. at 386. According to this interpretation of the case, a court faced with facts like those
in Deghnan v. Guaranty Trust Co. and Constantineau (1954), [1954] S.C.R. 725, [1954] 3
D.L.R. 785 would seem to have jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust and to give the
plaintiff priority over the estate’s claimants.
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
Waters does alert his readers (including judges) of the need to bear the
interests of third parties in mind when considering the remedial constructive
trust.30 However, he speaks of this needed sensitivity to the interests of third
parties only after discussing the case law, and he refers to this concern as
a task that “await[s] the courts”. 31 I think that Dickson J. was trying to
account for the needs of third parties in the test which he applied in Pettkus
v. Becker by insisting on a “causal connection”. Moreover, Waters does not
take the opportunity to elaborate upon the solutions that he offers; namely,
exhausting personal remedies before resorting to the constructive trust where
third parties might be affected, and providing the court with discretion to
determine whether a particular constructive trust should carry with it the
right to trace.32 Finally, I feel some reluctance in accepting Waters’ conclu-
sion that the “constructive trust is now clearly recognized as a remedy, the
basis of which is the prevention of unjust enrichment”. 33 While this is a
logical conclusion from much of what Dickson J. said, his Lordship also
noted that the third requirement of the test was met in the case because
“one person in a relationship tantamount to spousal prejudice[d] herself in
the reasonable expectation of receiving an interest in property”, 34 a holding
that arguably takes on added significance in that it resembles an “institu-
tional model” analysis, drawing support by analogy. Furthermore, before
setting out his three part test, Mr Justice Dickson specifically asked: “How
then does one approach the question of unjust enrichment in matrimonial
causes?” 35 Because of this, I do not think that we can unequivocally rule
30Waters, supra, note 1 at 389-95.
3 Ibid. at 394.
32 1 have some problems with these solutions as described by Waters. First of all, he notes
that the Restatement of Restitution provides for a priority of remedies, suggesting that the in
personam remedies (such as for money had and received and quantum meruit) should be
brought first. “Only when these actions are inadequate, usually when the defendant has in-
sufficient or no funds with which to. meet his liability, are American courts willing to entertain
the equitable propriety remedies, the constructive trust and the equitable lien.” Waters, supra,
note I at 391. This is precisely where third parties would be injured by the use of the remedy.
Whether Waters endorses this approach is unclear. He says later that “[t]he discretion of the
court should always be exercised in favour of localising the dispute and applying a remedy
which, while solving that problem, does not create ripples which carry to the edge of the pond.”
Waters, supra, note 1 at 395. What then is his solution? Does he advocate the use of the
constructive trust only where third parties are not subjected to the proprietary rights of the
plaintiff, or only where they are?
I have difficulty with his second solution as well. Is there value in using the concept of a
constructive trust if the beneficiary does not receive a right to possess the specific trust property?
Why not just leave him to his personal action?
I have read too much of Waters’ work to be confident that I have identified weaknesses in
his understanding of the implications of his suggestions. At the very least though, these un-
answered questions constitute problems of communication and elaboration in this section of
the work.
33Jbid. at 388.
34Pettkus v. Becker, supra, note 25 at 849 [emphasis added].
3 Ibid. at 848.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
out the possibility that spousal and quasi-spousal constructive trust cases
are sui generiS.36
It would not be unusual to have a vital constructive trust remedy for
dealing with unjust enrichment in the spousal context alone. In much the
same way, we already have a particularly vital constructive trust mechanism
to prevent fiduciaries from taking advantage of their privileged positions.
Indeed, proprietary rights arising out of “spousal relationships” have, in
recent times, been treated as sui generis both by statute and in the case
law. 37 Consequently, it is not surprising that the notion of “unjust enrich-
ment” came to be discussed in “spousal property” cases and that the con-
structive trust was recognized as remedial in this area. The courts had been
using the remedial constructive trust analysis for some time but had been
reluctant to admit it. Mr Justice Dickson simply ended the charade. This
does not necessarily mean that the remedial constructive trust has become
a generally-available legal instrument. I believe that, subject to carefully
structured protection for third parties, it should be accepted by the courts.
Yet, there is always the danger of inaccuracy in generalizing from what may
well be sui generis developments. As I have noted, Waters is careful to
maintain a balanced approach throughout the book; however he may have
failed to do so in this instance by being definitive in his reading of Pettkus
v. Becker.
Continuing Change and Development
The law of trusts did not stand still after Waters completed his initial
manuscript for the second edition. Accordingly, by inserting an Addendum,
he has conscientiously accounted for the changes and developments until
the time when the book finally went to press. Even since then, significant
361 am not unmindful that His Lordship also said, “[t]he equitable principle on which the
remedy of constructive trust rests is broad and general; its purpose is to prevent unjust en-
richment in whatever circumstances it occurs.” Ibid. at 850-1. That can certainly be, and
probably should be, interpreted to make the remedial constructive trust generally available.
On the other hand, a “principle” is not a rule; the restitutionary principle of unjust enrichment
may support other rights such as quantum ineruit. It can follow from the passage and from
the others contained in the judgement that the remedy of the constructive trust is appropriate
only where the relationship is spousal or quasi-spousal or in other established categories of
“constructive trust”.
37For example, the initial “spousal property” cases used a resulting trust analysis to concede
a spousal interest in property that did not originate in the plaintiff spouse, an unusual appli-
cation of the resulting trust.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
events have occurred, the most noteworthy being the decision of the Su-
preme Court of Canada in Guerin v. The Queen38 which all but makes
Waters’ section on “Trust and Government Obligation” irrelevant. 39
Conclusions
I want to close this review as I opened it. This is a remarkable book.
Waters has chronicled the development and application of the trust vehicle
in Canada, a task that needed doing. Moreover, he has done so with the aid
of a masterful understanding of the nature and operation of the trust, and
with the kind of general perspective and insight that few can acquire, even
after years of study. Finally, he has demonstrated a continuing commitment
to the education of “students in all situations” about the law of trusts in
Canada. It is only hoped that lawyers and students who encounter trust
problems will choose to tap what can only be described as a phenomenal
wealth of reliable information.
38(1984), [1984] 2 R.C.S. 335, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 55 N.R. 161.
391n addition, the Supreme Court of Canada decided Maroukis v. Maroukis (1984), 54 N.R.
268. Although it does not raise trust issues directly, the Court’s holding that a judge has no
power under the Family Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 252, s. 4 to declare a spousal property
interest retroactively, raises the question of whether a constructive trust analysis could enable
a judge to hold that a spouse’s equitable property rights under a constructive trust arise at the
time of an unjust enrichment, and thereby take precedence over the interests of the constructive
trustee’s judgement creditors who obtain judgement after the unjust enrichment but before the
beneficiary sues.
Katherine Connell-Thouez & Bartha Maria Knoppers, Contemporary Trends
in Family Law : A National Perspective. Toronto : Carswell, 1984. Pp. vi, 327
145 $]. Comment par Jean Pineau.*
En mars 1983, la section << Droit de la famille >> de l’Association ca-
nadienne des professeurs de droit tenait, A Montebello, une assembl~e au
cours de laquelle plusieurs conferences 6taient donn6es. Mmes Bartha M.
Knoppers et Katherine Connell-Thouez ont regroup6 ces diffIrents textes
et les pr6sentent en un volume qui vient d’6tre publi6 sous le titre Contem-
porary Trends in Family Law: A National Perspective.
L’introduction r~dig~e par les << 6diteurs >> (dans le sens anglo-am~ricain
du terme) reflfte le contenu de l’ouvrage: onze communications d6coup6es
en trois << themes >> respectivement intitul~s, dans l’ordre:
1 – L’6galit6 conjugale et les droits patrimoniaux
2 – La reconnaissance des droits des enfants
3 – Le r6le de l’ttat dans la reconnaissance des droits des membres
de la famille.
Sous le premier theme, nous trouvons, tout d’abord, le texte de M.
Germain Bri~re, intitul6 << Le R6gime matrimonial primaire dans le nouveau
Code civil du Qu6bec >>. L’auteur analyse les dispositions du nouveau Code
civil du Qu6bec, que certains appellent malencontreusement << r6gime ma-
trimonial primaire >>, qui ne sont que l’expression des effets imp6ratifs et
imm6diats du mariage. Dans le cadre des droits et devoirs des 6poux, sont
envisages le principe d’6galit6 des 6poux et les cons6quences qui en d6cou-
lent, tant sur le plan patrimonial (contribution aux charges du mariage,
obligation aux dettes << m6nageres >, par exemple) qu’extrapatrimonial (nom
des 6poux, direction morale de la famille). L’autetir s’attaque ensuite aux
<< quatorze articles qui, dans le nouveau Code civil, tendent A assurer la'
protection de la residence familiale >,I qu’il s’agisse des meubles affect6s A
l’usage du m6nage ou encore du logement familial (dont l’un des 6poux est
le locateur seul titulaire du bail, ou bien le propri6taire), articles qui viennent
considrablement perturber les r~gles gouvemant les r6gimes matrimoniaux.
On sait, en effet, que le 16gislateur qu6b6cois a banni du nouveau Code civil
les r6gimes conventionnels de communaut6 qu’il consid6re anachroniques,
mais a impos6 A tous les Qu6b6cois qui choississent de se marier sous des
r6gimes de type s6paratiste, des mesures d’ordre public qui sont de type
incontestablement communautaire, ce qui permet de s’interroger sur la co-
h6rence de la politique adopt6e.
Le second texte, dont l’auteur est Mme Connell-Thouez, est intitul6
*Professeur titulaire, Facult6 de droit, Universit6 de Montr6al.
‘G. Bri~re, < Le RWgime matrimonial primaire dans le nouveau Code civil du Qu6bec > dans
K. Connell-Thouez & B.M. Knoppers, d., Contemporary Trends in Family Law: A National
Perspective (1984) 11 A la p. 19.
Revue de droit de McGill
McGill Law Journal 1985
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
<< Matrimonial Property Regimes in Quebec Before and After the Reform
of 1981 : Adapting Traditional Institutions to Modern Reality > . A la lecture
du titre, on peut 8tre amen6 h penser que cette &ude porte sur les regimes
matrimoniaux et sur l’impact que peuvent avoir sur eux toutes les dispo-
sitions d’ordre public, communes i tous les r6gimes. Or, apr~s un bref his-
torique sur les regimes matrimoniaux en droit qu~b~cois, l’auteur traite de
la prestation compensatoire, en tentant tout d’abord d’en rechercher les
origines qu’elle semble trouver dans l’id~e d’une attribution prrferentielle
du logement familial, qui aurait notamment pour but de preserver l’envi-
ronnement des enfants, et d’une << reallocation of family resources >>.2 L’au-
teur fait alors appel i certaines 16gislations 6trangres, m~thode comparative
d’un intr8t incontestable, qui cependant s’av~re ici dangereuse, dans la
mesure ofi chacun des rrgimesjuridiques invoqu~s n’est pas clairement situs
dans son contexte particulier: aussi n’est-il pas certain que le lecteur r6us-
sisse A s’y retrouver sans se tromper. L’expos6 ne nous parait pas d~montrer
clairement ce qu’est la prestation compensatoire : la r~gle de droit essentielle
est formul~e dans l’article 559 C.c.Q. et non point dans l’article 459 C.c.Q.
qui, en d6finitive, n’offre qu’une modalit6 d’ex6cution des articles 439, 533,
559 C.c.Q. et 735.1 C.c.B.-C. ; il ne s’agit pas ici de < prot~ger >> le logement
familial. On a 6galement l’impression que, dans les r6gimes de separation
de biens, le juge pourrait : reallocate property between spouses in spite of
their matrimonial agreement when the facts show that one spouse has en-
riched the patrimony of the other >),3 alors que, dans le cadre du regime
legal, il serait difficile d’imaginer une telle situation << where unjust enrich-
ment of one party could occur >.4 Toutefois, aucun 6claircissement n’est
donn6 sur cette notion d’enrichissement injuste de l’un des 6poux, qui r6-
sulterait de l’appauvrissement de l’autre. Or, nous semble-t-il, tout l’int6r&t
du d~bat reside prcis~ment dans le contenu de cette notion : si les tribunaux
l’interpr~tent largement, < en 6quit6 >> ou plus exactement selon l’idee que
le juge se fait de l’6quit6, autant dire alors, que les regimes matrimoniaux,
quels qu’ils soient, n’existent plus. Est-il en soit 6quitable, en effet, que la
femme marine sous le regime 16gal et qui, par un labeur acharn pendant
dix ou vingt ans a accumul6 des acquts, voie la masse de ses biens partag~e
avec un mari qu’elle a fait vivre durant autant de temps et qui, lui, a dilapid6
ce qu’il avait pu gagner ? Si les tribunaux interpr~tent strictement la notion
d’enrichissement et d’appauvrissement corr~latif, la prestation compensa-
toire ne sera alors qu’une application particulire de l’enrichissement sans
2K. Connell-Thouez, <(Matrimonial Property Regimes in Quebec Before and After the Re-
form of 1981 : Adopting Traditional Institutions to Modem Reality > dans Connell-Thouez &
Knoppers, ibid., 27 a la p. 38.
-‘Ibid. A la p. 47.
41bid. A la p. 48.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
cause, qui peut se rencontrer aussi bien dans le regime legal (enrichissement
injuste des propres de l’un des 6poux) que dans le r6gime de s6paration. I1
ne s’agit plus ici de (reallocation of family resources >. Ces alternatives
n’apparaissent pas dans le texte propose. I1 est loin d’8tre certain, nous
semble-t-il, que par l’intrusion de la prestation compensatoire, le lgislateur
qu~b~cois permette une redistribution des biens en tant que telle. En re-
vanche, par l’adoption des articles 449 i 458 C.c.Q., pr~sent~s pr~c~dem-
ment par M. Bri~re, le l6gislateur fait souffler sur les Qu6b~cois un vent
incontestablement communautaire qui perturbe consid~rablement tous les
regimes de type s6paratiste, y compris le rfgime legal.
Sous le mame premier th~me, un troisi~me texte nous est propos6:
aucun doute, ces objectifs sont-ils louables, mais encore faut-il les traduire
comme par enchantement –
5J. Payne, < Policy Objectives of Private Law Spousal Rights and Obligationso dans Connell-
Thouez & Knoppers, ibid., 55 A la p. 99.
19851
BOOK REVIEWS
en termesjuridiques et parvenir 6ventuellement d les concilier, en particulier
ceux qui sont 6nonc6s en premi6re et troisi~me place.
Vient ensuite le second theme qui est pr6sent6 par les <( 6diteurs > sous
l’intitul6: (The Recognition of Children’s Rights >>, qui regroupe apparem-
ment deux sous-th~mes > , l’un portant sur la reconnaissance des droits de
groupes particuliers d’enfants et l’autre portant sur les m6canismes proce-
duraux destin6s A prot6ger les droits des enfants.
Ce sont tout d’abord, MM. F Murray Fraser et H. David Kirk – dans:
< Cui Bono? Some Questions Concerning the 'Best Interests of the Child'
Principle in Canadian Adoption Laws and Practices > qui s’interrogent sur
ce qu’est le meilleur int6rt de l’enfant > dans le cadre non point du droit
des provinces anglaises sur l’adoption, mais plut6t du droit de la Colombie-
Britannique. Les auteurs remarquent que le seul principe de l’int6rt de
l’enfant est insuffisant i guider les tribunaux qui doivent prendre en consi-
d6ration un ensemble d’616ments pertinents. Partant de l’id6e que le divorce
est de plus en plus souvent la cause de dissolution du mariage et que, de
plus en plus souvent, le divorce est suivi d’un remariage, ils cherchent A
d6montrer que la situation et l’int6r~t de l’enfant sont differents selon que
l’adoption concerne des parents et un enfant qui n’ont entre eux aucun lien
par le sang ou au contraire, selon qu’elle est demand6e par le nouveau
conjoint de l’un des parents. A priori, dans le premier cas, l’intervention
d’organismes particuliers (A l’image de nos osocit6s d’adoption >) s’av6re
n6cessaire, alors qu’elle parait inutile dans le second cas, tout au moins s’il
n’y a pas contestation. Tout en comparant ces deux types d’adoption, ils
examinent six points particuliers qui visent la question de la confidentialit6
des dossiers m6dicaux, celle du caractre ill6gitime de l’enfant adopt6 (ca-
ract~re qui, en r~gle g6n6rale, ne touche pas l’adoption lors d’un second
mariage du parent biologique), celle de la connaissance par l’enfant de son
6tat d’enfant adoptif, celle du changement de nom et de l’6tablissement d’un
nouvel acte de naissance, et enfin le probl~me de la rupture totale et d6fi-
nitive avec la famille biologique ou, au contraire, du maintien de la relation
avec celle-ci. Les cinq premiers points 6voqu6s sont esquiss6s et le sixi6me
est escamot6: c’est tout le probl~me bien connu aujourd’hui, au Qu6bec,
pos6 par le < Mouvement Retrouvailles >. Les auteurs concluent, enfin, que
l’adoption faite par le nouveau conjoint du parent biologique b6n6ficie da-
vantage au nouveau > parent adoptif qu’A l’enfant lui-m~me, ou encore
au parent biologique qui trouve lA un moyen d’enlever i l’ex-conjoint toute
possibilit6 de maintenir quelque lien avec l’enfant du divorce! Si tel est le
cas –
les auteurs ont raison de souhaiter
que la 16gislation soit repens6e, surtout si l’on considre que le remariage
peut 6galement conduire a un second divorce …
ce qui n’est pas impensable –
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
La communication suivante porte sur l’ex~cution des ordonnances re-
latives A la garde: << The Enforcement of Custody Orders: Current Deve-
lopments ), sous la signature de Mme Christine Davies, et pose le grave
probl~me de l'enfant enlev6 par l'un des parents. Partant de la position
pr~valant en droit commun et qui voulait que l'int6r~t de l'enfant flt la
consideration essentielle, rauteur note avec raison que, la bonne adminis-
tration de la justice 6tant 6galement un 61ment qui ne doit pas atre n~glig6,
ii est de bonne politique qu'une ordonnance relative A la garde ne puisse
pas &re rendue par un tribunal autre que celui que s'est d6jA prononc6 sur
celle-ci, A d~faut de quoi la justice attribuerait, en quelque sorte, une prime
A 'enl~vement. Une telle position est adopt~e par une certaine jurisprudence
(ainsi en est-il du Quebec), alors qu'une jurisprudence contraire s'appuie
sur le concept de juridiction parens patriae )> pour justifier l’intervention
du tribunal < 6tranger >> (ainsi en est-il en l’Ontario). L’auteur analyse ensuite
les <
comparer avec la nouvelle Loi uniforme, adopt~e seulement par deux pro-
vinces, 7 destin~e A remplacer le texte lgislatif pr~c~dant et qui fait l’objet
de commentaires precis et appropri6s. Mme Davies 6nonce enfin les grandes
lignes de la Convention sur les aspects civils de l’enlkvement d’enfants8 et
termine son essai par une intrusion dans le droit criminel, A la suite de
l’adoption et de la mise en vigueur, le 4 janvier 1983 du Projet de loi9 qui
traite notamment de l’enl~vement des enfants. On le constate, si l’enl~ve-
ment n’ tait pas une chose courante jusqu’aux ann~es cinquante, it est au-
jourd’hui devenu un r~el probleme qui exige une intervention l~gislative
d6licate, mais ferme: la Loi uniforme et la Convention de La Haye sont des
6Voir pour I’Alberta, Custody OrdersAct, R.S.A. 1980, c. E-17 ; pour la Colombie-Britanniquc,
Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, art. 38-42; pour le Manitoba, Custody Orders
Act, S.M. 1975, c. 4, abrog~e par la Loi sur l’ex~cution des ordonnances de garde, S.M. 1982,
c. 27, art. 20; pour le Nouveau-Brunswick, Loi sur l’execution des ordonnances de garde extra-
provinciales, L.N.B. 1977, c. E-15, abrog~e par la Loi sur les services d l’enfant et t lafamille
et sur les relations familiales, L.N.B. 1980, c. C-2.1 ; pour Terre-Neuve, Custody Orders Act,
S.N. 1976, No. 24, art. 130-2.2; pour l’Ile-du-Prince-tdouard, Custody Orders Act, S.P.E.I.
1975, c. 68; pour la Saskatchewan, Custody OrdersAct, R.S.S. 1978, c. E-18 ; pour la Nouvelle-
tcosse, Reciprocal Enforcement of Custody Orders Act, S.N.S. 1976, c. 15 ; pour les Territoires
du Nord-Ouest, Custody Orders Act, O.N.W.T. 1981 (2d sess.), c. 2 ; seuls l’Ontario et le Yukon
ne disposent pas de l~gislation analogue.
7L’Ontario et le Nouveau-Brunswick: Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 68, Part
III et Loi sur les services ei l’enfant et ai lafamille et sur les relations familiales, L.N.B. 1980,
c. E-2.1.
8Conference de La Haye de droit international priv6 [ 1951-80] Recueil des conventions 264
9Loi modifiant le Code criminel en matire d’infractions sexuelles et d’autres infractions
contre la personne et apportant des modifications corrklatives 6 d’autres lois, S.C. 1980-81-82-
83, c. 125.
(conclue le 25 octobre 1980).
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
tentatives dont l’efficacit6 reste ii prouver. L’expos6 de Mme Davies est
structur6, clair et convaincant.
Vient ensuite un expos6 sur << Education Rights of Disabled Children
in Four Canadian Provinces o, pr6sent6 par M. Donald Poirier qui, s'in-
t6ressant au droit qu'ont les enfants handicapes A recevoir une 6ducation
appropri6e, examine les lois scolaires adopt6es dans quatre provinces : d'une
part, la Saskatchewan et rOntario qui possedent une mandatory legisla-
tion,10 d'autre part le Nouveau-Brunswick et la Colombie-BritanniqueI 1 qui
ont une permissive legislation. En effet, si on s'accorde A reconnaitre A tous
les enfants le droit A l'6ducation, toutes les 16gislations n'imposent pas robli-
gation de fournir des classes speciales aux enfants handicapes. L'auteur si-
gnale alors l'impact que paraissent avoir les tendances nouvelles du droit
administratif qui consacrerait un certain affaiblissement de pouvoir discre-
tionnaire 6ventuellement exerc6 par les commissions scolaires, ainsi que les
effets des legislations provinciales sur les droits de la personne ou ceux
(6ventuels ou hypothetiques ?) de la Charte canadienne des droits et li-
bert~s.'2 Est enfin posee la question de savoir ce que signifie << 6ducation
appropri6e > : doit-on mettre ‘enfant dans une classe normale et lui assurer
une aide sp6ciale ? Doit-on lui organiser une classe sp6ciale ? Doit-on lui
<< apporter o, chez lui, l'education appropri~e ? Autant de questions qui ne
connaissent pas des r6ponses certaines.
Mmes E. Diane Pask et Anne Jayne se penchent 6galement sur un
probleme particulier A certains enfants : <
quels s’ajoutent 56 autres mineurs accept6s ant6rieurement A la mise sur
pied de ce programme. C’est la situation de ces << mineurs non accom-
pagn6s > qui est 6tudi6e, enfants ou jeunes gens qui ont r6ussi A atteindre
les camps de r6fugies, s6par6s de leur famille volontairement ou acciden-
tellement. Les auteurs se demandent si les mesures prises dans le cadre de
la protection de ces mineurs tiennent compte de la culture traditionnelle
vietnamienne et dans quelle mesure –
dans les d6cisions relatives au pla-
cement de ces enfants – on doit prendre en consideration les cons6quences
‘OVoir The Education Act, 1978, S.S. 1978, c. 17 et Education Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 129.
1’Voir Loi scolaire, L.R.N.B. 1973, c. S-5 ; Loi sur l’enseignement spcial, L.R.N.B. 1973, c.
A-19; School Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 375.
1’2Charte canadienne des droits et libert~s, Partie I de rannexe B de la Loi de 1982 sur le
Canada (R.-U.), 1982, c. 11, art. 32(2) [ci-apr~s: Charte canadienne].
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
(Vol. 30
des differences entre les cultures canadienne et vietnamienne. Envisageant
d’abord les probl~mes de protection que posent ces enfants alors m~me
qu’ils vivent au Canada dans une famille vietnamienne –
cette famille
pouvant elle-m~me avoir des probl~mes propres A son 6tat de r~fugi~e –
les auteurs rel~vent ensuite les difficult6s qui surgissent dans le cadre des
foyers canadiens qui accueillent ces enfants; les programmes gouverne-
mentaux pr6voient d’ailleurs un taux important de rupture entre ces mineurs
et la famille d’accueil. Les raisons peuvent &re multiples: les traumatismes
n6s de la tragique aventure du r6fugi6 et l’incompr~hension n~e des differ-
ences culturelles. C’est alors que se pose la question du role de la culture
dans la protection due i ces enfants : doit-on faire abstraction de leurs
origines ou doit-on reconnaitre l’importance de l’identification de l’enfant
A une communaut6 culturelle minoritaire ? C’est cette derni~re option qui
est privil~gi~e par les auteurs afin de determiner quel est le meilleur int~r~t
de l’enfant. II s’agit lA d’une 6tude extremement s~rieuse et document~e qui
pose des problmes aussi vastes que d~licats.
Vient ensuite le texte propos6 par M. Leonard J. Pollock, < Represen-
tation of Children : the Alberta Experience >>. L’auteur part de l’ancien prin-
cipe qui voulait que le pare efit un droit quasi absolu quant A la garde de
l’enfant, sans que l’int6r~t de celui-ci fut pris en consid6ration, pour en
arriver A l’initiative prise par le juge Manning de la Cour supreme d’Al-
berta, 13 qui, dans un contexte familial d’aggressivit6, nomma i ‘enfant un
amicus curiae. La Cour supreme du Canada14 reconnut ult~rieurement aux
tribunaux ce pouvoir de d6signer, dans les esp ces touchant A la garde ou
A la protection des enfants, un << ami de la Cour >> charg6 de representer
l’enfant. L’auteur d~crit alors les fonctions de l’amicus curiae, particuli6-
rement en Alberta, et relive quelques probl~mes qui laissent perplexes.
L’intervention judiciaire fait aussi l’objet de l’6tude pr~sent~e par Mme
Bartha M. Knoppers, mais sur un tout autre plan:
Apr~s avoir trac6 bri~vement l’6volution legislative de la puissance pater-
nelle, l’auteur expose, dans une premiere partie, < The Impact of the New
Philosophy of Equality Within the Family >>, et dans une seconde partie,
intitul~e judicieusement << Towards the Marriage of the Family and the Ju-
diciary o, est esquiss6 le r6le attribu6 par le lgislateur aux tribunaux.
Sous le couvert du principe d'6galit6, l'auteur invoque tout d'abord la
lbgislation nouvelle reli~e i '< identit6 >> de l’enfant, sur le nom de celui-ci,
sur son domicile (rfgle inchang~e), sur l’6tablissement de la filiation de
13 Woods c. Woods (1966), Edmonton (S.C. Alta) [non publi6].
4Beson c. Director of Child Welfare (1982), [1982] 2 R.C.S. 716, (sub nom. Re Beson and
1
Director of Child Welfare) 142 D.L.R. (3d) 20 [ci-apr~s: Beson].
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
l’enfant n6 dans le mariage ou hors de celui-ci (probl~me qui en v~rit6
soul~ve de nombreux points d’interrogation) et sur certaines conditions de
l’adoption qui touchent au consentement parental. On en vient alors A exa-
miner la place faite par le lgislateur au meilleur inter&t de l’enfant: A cet
6gard, on mentionne les questions de garde, de droit de visite et de maintenance.
Quant au r6le des tribunaux, l’auteur relive, en premier lieu, les dis-
positions nouvelles sur la d~ch~ance de l’autorit6 parentale et fait 6tat du
pouvoir d’appr~ciation – qu’on peut estimer exorbitant –
laiss6 au juge
dans ce domaine. Sont ensuite pass~es en revue les diverses r~gles de droit
qui font actuellement, ou qui feront ult~rieurement du tribunal, le tiers
arbitre essentiel h l’appaisement des chicanes.
L’essai suivant, sign6 par S.I. Bushnell, a pour titre: < The Welfare of Children and the Jurisdiction of the Court Under Parens Patriae . On a d6jA rencontr6, en Alberta, l'amicus curiae, tr~s proche parent du parens patriae que l'on trouve maintenant dans la legislation ontarienne, mais aussi dans celles de Saskatchewan, de Colombie-Britannique, du Nouveau-Bruns- wick et de Terre-Neuve. 15 Le but de l'auteur est de tenter de determiner ce qu'il faut entendre par parens patriae powers, le concept paraissant avoir un contenu multiple. Apr~s un brefhistorique sur l'origine, l'auteur observe qu'en Angleterre, the power has been with the judiciary since time im- memorial >,16 mais que
[e]ven if it is considered as part of the prerogative it should be noted that this
does not involve any law-making ability. The Sovereign, or agents of the So-
vereign, cannot alter the law, but must act within it.’ 7
15Pour l’Ontario, Unified Family Court Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 515, art. 4(3): ((The Court has
and may exercise the same parens patriae powers as the Supreme Court in respect of any matter
before it. > ; An Act to Amend the Children’s Law Reform Act, S.O. 1982, c. 20, art. 71 : <(This
Part does not deprive the Supreme Court of its parens patriae jurisdiction.)> Pour la Saskat-
chewan, The Unified Family Court Act, 1978, S.S. 1977-78, c. 41, art. 12(2): <(The Court has
and may exercise the same parens patriae powers as the Court of Queen's Bench [... ]. Pour
la Colombie-Britannique, Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, art. 5(3): < Nothing in
this Act shall be construed as limiting or restricting the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to act in a parens patriae capacity respecting a child before the court. > ; Supreme Court
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 397, art. 11(5): < A local judge has the parens patriae jurisdiction of the
court. ) ; Family and Child Service Act, S.B.C. 1980, c. 11, art. 21 : Nothing in this Act limits
the inherent jurisdiction of the Crown, through the Supreme Court, over infants, as parens
patriae [... ]. > Pour le Nouveau-Brunswick, Loi modifiant la loi sur l’organisation judiciaire,
L.N.B. 1978, c. 32, art. 9, ajoutant art. 11(9):
88, art. 7(2) : (The Unified Family Court has and may exercise jurisdiction as parens patriae. >
‘6S.I. Bushnell, (The Welfare of Children and the Jurisdiction of the Court under Parens
Patriae> dans Connell-Thouez & Knoppers, supra, note 1, 223 A la p. 228.
17lbid.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
II nous d6montre ensuite ce qu’en font ou tentent d’en faire les tribunaux
canadiens : on invoque souvent le concept l oft il n’a que faire, mais s’agit-
il vraiment d’unjudicial override? Dans les affaires Glover’8 la Cour d’appel
de l’Ontario a eu l’occasion de pr6ciser le sens de inherent power: <
que ce pouvoir puisse etre exerc6 << in contravention of any statutory pro-
vision >> ;20 cette d6cision qui fut maintenue par la Cour supreme du Canada
semblait affaiblir l’existence d’un judicial override, meme si, selon une opin-
ion dissidente, il y avait un << paramount public interest in the enforcement
of custody orders affecting the well-being of children >>.21
L’auteur 6tudie ensuite quelques d6cisions r6centes et notamment af-
faire Beson22 dans laquelle, au contraire, la Cour supreme du Canada << used
the override power ofparens patriae , concept de parens patriae permettant
au tribunal << to fill gaps in legislation and to exercise judicial review when
appropriate >>.23 I1 fait alors une int~ressante et p6n6trante analyse compar6e
entre la position de la Cour supreme et celle de la Chambre des Lords24
dans une affaire i laquelle rfere et sur laquelle s’appuie le plus haut tribunal
canadien qui n’en retient cependant que l’une des conclusions: celle qui lui
plaisait. La Cour supreme aura cependant i se prononcer A nouveau dans
une affaire d6licate, Re Eve,25 qu’ont eu a trancher les tribunaux de lIle-
du-Prince-Edouard et qui est clairement et remarquablement expos6e par
l’auteur. S’agissant d’une mere qui demande i la Cour d’ordonner la st6r-
ilisation de sa fille majeure, handicapfe mentale, la question est de savoir
qui fait la loi : le juge ou le l~gislateur ?
Dans sa conclusion, l’auteur pose le probl~me tel qu’il est, reel et inqui~tant:
the heart of the matter is judicial power; power that is being masked by re-
ference to parens patriae and legitimized by the ancient ancestry of the term,
18Glover c. Glover (No. 1) (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 392, 113 D.L.R. (3d) 160 (C.A.) [ci-apr~s:
Glover (No. 1), cit6 aux O.R.], conf. (sub nom. Glover c. Ministre du Revenu national) (1981),
[1981] 2 R.C.S. 561 ; Gloverc. Glover (No. 2) (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 401, 113 D.L.R. (3d) 174
(C.A.) [ci-apr~s: Glover (No. 2), cit6 aux O.R.], conf. (sub non. Glover c. Bell Canada) (198 1),
[1981] 2 R.C.S. 563.
19Glover (No. 1), ibid. A Ia p. 399.
20lbid.
2′ Glover (No. 2), supra, note 18 A la p. 411.
22Supra, note 14.
23Bushnell, supra, note 16 aux pp. 233-4.
24R. c. Liverpool CitY Council (1981), [1982] A.C. 363, [1981] 2 All E.R. 385 (H.L.).
25(1980), 27 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 97, et add. 28 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 359, 115 D.L.R. (3d) 283 (P.E.I.
C.A.), inf. 10 R.EL. (2d) 317 (P.E.I. S.C. Fam. Div.).
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
although not its meaning. By assuming the vast power the judges are going
back before time immemorial to when the will of the sovereign was law; now
it is the will of the judges. 26
On ne cesse, en effet, d’invoquer l’int6rt public, le meilleur int6rt de l’en-
fant : quel est-il ? I1 est celui que le juge croit qu’il est. Doit-on s’en r6jouir ?
Le dernier essai, pr6sent6 par les < 6diteurs )) sous le couvert d'un troi-
si~me th6me, est intitul6 Family Law and the Liberty Interest: Section 7
of the Canadian Charter of Rights >. Celui-ci aussi a d~ja 6t6 publi6 ailleurs
sous la signature de MM. Nicholas Bala et J. Douglas Redfearn.
Les auteurs tentent d’analyser l’impact que peut avoir, sur le droit de
la famille, l’article 7 de la Charte canadienne, selon lequel
7. Chacun a le droit a la vie, A la libert6 et A la s~curit6 de sa personne.
1 ne peut etre port6 atteinte A ce droit qu’en conformit avec les principes
de justice fondamentale.
Selon eux, ce droit A la libert6 inclut a freedom to enjoy family life >27 et
protege les droits des parents contre l’ing6rence indue de l’Etat dans le
domaine familial. Aux fins de leur d6monstration, ils s’appuient sur la jur-
isprudence am6ricaine, sur le pr6ambule de la Dclaration canadienne des
droits28 et sur les d6clarations du Solliciteur g6n6ral.29 Ils s’interrogent en-
suite sur ce que sont les principes de justice fondamentale, qu’ils assimilent
A ceux de justice naturelle et reprennent l’6nonc6 de certaines r~gles univ-
ersellement reconnues, mais, comme le dit le juge cit6, < qui ne me viennent
pas A l'esprit imm6diatement >> ;30 ils 6piloguent ensuite sur la notion de due
process pour en venir i la conclusion, regrettable selon eux, que vraisembl-
ablement la Charte canadienne restreint au domaine proc6dural. Ce sont
ces principes que les auteurs vont tenter d’appliquer au droit de la famille :
ainsi en serait-il des 16gislations qui refusent au p~re ill6gitime ou aux parents
nourriciers d’avoir certains droits de contr6le sur le sort de ‘enfant lors
d’un litige qui affecte celui-ci. Ce serait 6galement le cas des 16gislations
relatives au statut juridique des enfants, afin de permettre A ceux-ci de faire
valoir leurs droits < fondamentaux > contre l’Etat ou contre leurs parents:
on voit A nouveau le pouvoir judiciaire l’emporter sur le l6gislatif! Sont
la p. 246.
26Supra, note 16 A la p. 241.
27Ibid.
28S.R.C. 1970, app. III.
29Canada, Procs-verbaux et teinoignages du Comit mixte sp&ial du Senat et de la Chambre
des communes sur la Constitution du Canada. (Prsidents: H. Hays & S. Joyal) no 41 (20
janvier 1981).
30R. c. Elns (29 septembre 1982) (C.S.) [non publi6], M. le juge Lanct6t.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
envisag6es ensuite les mesures prises par l’ttat contre les parents, si
est justifi6 de limiter parfois les droits des parents,
‘IEtat
it is wrong to conceive of this as a situation where the court or state is somehow
protecting constitutional rights of the child. Rather this should be viewed as a
situation in which the state limits the constitutional rights of parents, and
sometimes those of a child, to promote the welfare of the child.3’
Les auteurs exposent quelques situations auxquelles, selon eux, la Charte
canadienne pourrait s’appliquer : ce serait le cas d’une 16gislation trop vague
sur des points essentiels, le cas de r~gles de preuve douteuses et le cas
d’arrestation d’un enfant. Il est permis de se demander si les auteurs ne
d6passent pas les limites des r~gles proc6durales.
Les auteurs fondent incontestablement beaucoup d’espoir sur la Charte
canadienne, A la lumi~re de la jurisprudence am6ricaine. II reste A savoir si
cette Charte s’applique au droit civil qui rel~ve des provinces et si son
application est vraiment souhaitable en la mati~re. On en revient A la ques-
tion pr6c6demment pos6e : le juge doit-il faire la loi ?
Apr~s avoir lu ce volume de 280 pages, nous ne pouvons malheureuse-
ment pas dire que nous nous sentons transport6s d’aise: onze sujets trop
divers et dispers6s, trait6s par quatorze auteurs qui ont chacun de la o com-
munication >> une idde bien particuli~re. Malgr6 tout le mal que se sont
donn6 les 6diteurs pour apporter a l’ouvrage une ide directrice qui lui
communiquerait une certaine unit6, le fil est t6nu. Certes, on s’y int6resse
beaucoup aux enfants et A… l’int6rt des enfants ; mais le titre du volume
correspond-il vraiment i son contenu ? S’agit-il vraiment d’une (
d’une province i l’autre, les diverses 16gislations sur un sujet commun dans
une <
trait6 la question que, vraisemblablement, il lui plaisait de traiter, ce qui
rend artificiel le d6coupage en themes et sous-th~mes; en outre, plusieurs
d’entre eux ont dejd publi6 leur texte ailleurs – d’oi l’absence d’in6dit –
ou nous promettent de le publier ult6rieurement. Si une juxtaposition de
communications disparates peut faire le bonheur d’une revue p6riodique,
peut-elle faire aussi bien, et si int6ressants les expos6s soient-ils, l’objet d’un
volume qui pr6tend traiter des tendances contemporaines du droit de la
famille ? Le v6ritable titre, nous semble-t-il, pourrait 8tre seulement : << Fam-
ily Law Subsection of the C.A.L.T.: Montebello 1983 >. Cela n’enl~ve au-
cunement leur m6rite,aux 6diteurs qui ont peut-6tre commis l’erreur
d’entreprendre une tdche malais6e: colliger onze textes 6parpill6s et plus
encore d’auteurs.
31N. Bala &J.D. Redfeam, < Family Law and the 'Liberty Interest': Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights)> dans ConneUl-Thouez & Knoppers, supra, note 1, 243 A la p. 271.
R. St J. Macdonald & D. Johnston, eds, The Structure and Process of In-
ternational Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory. The Ha-
gue: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983. Pp. vii, 1234 [$120.00]. Reviewed by Stephen
J. Toope*
In the introductory paper to this outstanding collection of essays, the
editors warn that international law is becoming increasingly fragmented.
They sense a worrisome “loss of control” within the discipline.’ Due to the
overwhelming complexities of international life, lawyers are “virtually dri-
ven to specialization”. 2 At the same time, the relentless waves of political –
change and technological development and the suffocating expansion of
information have turned international law into a “reactive” discipline, 3 cut
adrift from sound theoretical moorings. This book is an attempt to re-
establish those moorings, to re-examine the underlying theories and basic
principles of international law. It is a provocative enterprise, engaging the
efforts of many eminent contemporary specialists. The scope of the book
is enormous. The papers are of a high quality, almost without exception.
How odd, then, that the overall effect of these thirty-eight essays is strangely
muted, betraying a sense of ennui, of frustration and uncertainty. In the
end, this book reveals more about international lawyers than about inter-
national law. What it reveals is malaise, but a malaise that is being disturbed
all-too-tentatively by occasional flashes of confidence-restoring insight.
The editors, two distinguished professors of international law at Dal-
housie University in Halifax, have assembled an impressive group of con-
tributors from around the globe. Included are theorists such as Alfred Verdross,
Myres McDougal and Julius Stone. There are international civil servants,
including A.O. Adede of the United Nations and Daniel Vignes of the Eu-
ropean Community. Most prominently, the community of international
legal academics is represented by such scholars as Oscar Schachter, D.W.
Bowett, Shabtai Rosenne, and Ian Brownlie. One might sadly conclude,
after reading the list of contributors, that international law remains an ex-
clusively male preserve, for no female author is included. The non-Western
world is better represented. There are five contributors from less-developed
countries and three from socialist nations, including one Chinese academic.
*A.B. (Harv.), LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill), Ph.D. Candidate, Trinity College, Cambridge.
1R. St J. Macdonald & D. Johnston, “International Legal Theory: New Frontiers of the
Discipline” in R. St J. Macdonald & D. Johnston, eds, The Structure and Process of Inter-
national Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (1983) 1 at 3 [hereinafter
Structure and Process].
2Jbid. at 1.
3 bid.
(McGill Law Journal 1985
Revue de droit de McGill
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
The editors are to be applauded for broadening the scope of the con-
tributions beyond the all-too-predictable collection of American and Western
European writing that often passes for “international” discussion. Indeed,
this book must be one of the few recent English-language compendia in
which American scholars are, if anything, under-represented.
The contributions are divided into four sections. The first five essays
survey the various schools of jurisprudence. By far the most revealing is a
paper by the Soviet author, Vladimir Kartashkin, who now serves as a
Special Assistant to the Legal Counsel of the United Nations. 4 His essay on
the Marxist-Leninist approach to international law is enlightening, relatively
frank and largely free of the jargon that befuddles much Soviet scholarship.
The contribution by McDougal and Reisman5 is also useful, being a state-
ment by the present leaders of the “Yale School” that is uncharacteristically
straightforward and, as always, thought-provoking.
The second part of the book contains essays which explore connections
between international law and the social sciences. In view of various es-
sayists’ recurring stress upon the “scientific” nature of international law –
a troublesome and ill-defined description –
it is unfortunate that no paper
attempts in any rigorous fashion to relate international law to scientific
method. Whether any such relationship exists in fact is debatable, but it
behooves those who talk of a “science of international law” to describe in
detail what they mean. 6 The essay by Julius Stone on sociological perspec-
tives in international law is enlightening and cogently argued. 7 His criticism
of Professor McDougal’s tendency to destroy analytical clarity by burying
all ideas in a morass of inter-related “values”, “objectives”, “processes”,
and “claims” is well taken.8 But the characterization of Professor Falk’s
world order models as ultimately “utopian” is perhaps too dismissive, or,
at least, too pessimistic.9 Indeed, Professor Stone’s essay largely reflects the
4V. Kartashkin, “The Marxist-Leninist Approach: The Theory of Class Struggle and Con-
temporary International Law” in Structure and Process, supra, note 1, 79.
263.
8Ibid. at 271.
9Ibid. at 279-81.
Structure and Process, ibid., 103.
5M. McDougal & W.M. Reisman, “International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective” in
6See, e.g., the passing allusions to international legal “science” in Macdonald & Johnston,
supra, note 1; McDougal & Reisman, ibid.; and in D. Johnston, “The Heritage of Political
Thought in International Law” in Structure and Process, ibid., 179. One is inclined to suspect
that unsubstantiated allusions to legal “science” may be attempts –
to connect law with supposedly “objective” scientific method, thus objectifying essentially
subjective evaluations. There is an element of the absurd in such attempts for, at least since
the seminal work of Thomas Kuhn, it is trite to observe that even in the natural sciences, the
notion of objectivity has been increasingly called into question. See T. Kuhn, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (1970).
perhaps unconscious –
7J. Stone, “A Sociological Perspective on International Law” in Structure and Process, ibid.,
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
spirit of the entire volume, revealing most clearly the pessimism that un-
derlies much of its contents.
In the third section of the book, eleven authors explore “fundamental
concepts” in international law, including “subjects”, “sovereignty”, “cus-
tom”, “equality” and “state responsibility”. Overall, the quality of the con-
tributions is high, although the analysis in this section tends to follow well-
worn paths. Bin Cheng’s essay on custom includes a critical discussion of
Canada’s assertion of rights in arctic waters and in an expanded territorial
sea which will be of particular interest to Canadian readers.’ 0 Ian Brownlie’s
paper on “Recognition” is a refreshingly honest, if sometimes ill-humoured,
attempt to deal with a complicated topic, a welcome return to first principles
which eschews traditional theoretical categories. I I
With some exceptions, the contributions to the fourth part of the book,
entitled “Some Modem Controversies”, are less engaging. The treatment of
such important topics as human rights, the future of dispute settlement and
the role of coercion in international law are largely descriptive and, therefore,
rather predictable. On the other hand, Oscar Schachter’s essay on the ev-
olutionary development of the international legal system is magisterial,’ 2
including as it does a balanced view of the relationship between law and
power a view which recognizes that many factors “of a non-legal character”‘ 3
influence norms and procedures of a legal system, but which challenges the
empty assertion that international law is nothing but a creature of power
politics.’ 4 Theodor Schweisfurth’s paper on the role of political revolution
in international legal theory’ 5 is also most enlightening, particularly in its
description of the evolving views of Soviet legal scholars.
The editors have given the final word to Covey Oliver and he has met
the responsibility with bravado. In an admittedly impressionistic essay re-
flecting the rich experience of a distinguished academic and diplomat, Pro-
fessor Oliver discusses the future place of idealism in international law.’ 6
and Process, supra, note 1, 513 at 539-41.
10B. Cheng, “Custom: The Future of General State Practice In a Divided World” in Structure
1I . Brownlie, “Recognition in Theory and Practice” in Structure and Process, ibid., 627.
12O. Schachter, “The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International Society” in
Structure and Process, ibid., 745.
13 Ibid. at 747. One could argue further that all factors influencing norm creation are, in
some senses, “legal”.
‘4For a view which emphasizes the role of sheer force, see G. Schwarzenberger, “The Con-
ceptual Apparatus of International Law” in Structure and Process, supra, note 1, 685 at 699.
1ST. Schweisfurth, “The Role of Political Revolution In the Theory of International Law”
in Structure and Process, ibid., 913.
16C.T. Oliver, “The Future of Idealism in International Law: Structuralism, Humanism and
Survival” in Structure and Process, ibid., 1207.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
It is with this essay, coming as it does after some twelve-hundred pages of
text, that one begins fully to sense the needs of contemporary international
lawyers, primarily the need for reassurance and for hope, a need that has
been hinted at throughout this massive collection.
Professor Oliver puts the matter starkly:
It is all too evident that international law is in serious need of resuscitation
today, not only in actual effectiveness but in the very expectation of its being
able to be effective. 17
It is this pessimism about even the possibility of effectiveness that permeates
much of the book.
One might well ask, then, whether there is anything in the preceding
pages that suggests appropriate means of resuscitation, that points to the
underlying value of the work of international lawyers? Given the quality of
the contributors, one’s instinct is to answer in the affirmative. Yet such is
the pessimism revealed that the way forward can only be extrapolated by
negative implication. In fact, to extract the real lessons of this book it is
necessary to look behind the text, to the authors themselves. There one will
find the central, yet unarticulated question, namely, what is the role of the
international lawyer in the contemporary world community? It is this im-
plicit question that seems to have conditioned the inquiry of many of the
contributors to this volume of essays. If the unarticulated question is lib-
erated from the penumbra of concern and made explicit, the needs of the
future might be easier to identify. To describe what it is that international
lawyers can and should do is to reveal determinative assumptions about
what international law can and should be.
It is not the purpose of this short essay to elaborate exhaustively upon
the role of international lawyers and, in any case, the author has no particular
credentials to undertake such a task. But it is possible to articulate certain
ideas and impressions prompted by the insights revealed in the collection
of essays under review. Indeed, one would hope that the appearance of a
book such as this one, full of contradictions, antipathetic approaches and
critical observations, will prompt wider debate. To frame this debate around
the role of the international lawyer would provide structure and, more im-
portantly, might encourage frankness: how better to prompt any group of
lawyers to debate freely than to ask them to talk about themselves?
Undoubtedly, there is significant interest in the international legal com-
munity in such a process of self-evaluation and self-criticism. The seventy-
fifth Anniversary Convocation of the American Society of International Law
in 1981 was devoted to the awe-inspiring topic, “Order, Freedom, Justice,
17Ibid. at 1209.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
Power: The Challenges for International Law”. It is fascinating to note, in
the published proceedings, how often the debate, although formally framed
around specific issues, nevertheless returned again and again to the role of
international lawyers. With but few exceptions, the prevailing mood was
pessimistic. Professor Falk took an almost apocalyptic view:
To restate, never have we needed international law so badly to deal with fun-
damental problems of order and justice in the world and yet never, at least in
this century, has the situation and outlook for international law seemed so
bleak.’8
In this deep malaise, Professor Falk was joined by Burns Weston1 9 and
Oscar Schachter.20 On the other hand, some commentators reject such neg-
ative evaluations and question the need for introspection, arguing that in-
ternational lawyers are already too self-absorbed. 21 Given the wide-spread
melancholy in the profession, however, it seems that the answer is to share
concerns, not to bury them.
What, then, is to be done? First, it must be noted that within the dis-
cipline of international law there are at least four sub-categories: academic
lawyers, foreign office lawyers, international civil servants, and private in-
ternational lawyers. Each has a distinct role to play, and although it may
be argued that certain basic values should be promoted by all international
lawyers (values such as justice, human dignity, the peaceful settlement of
disputes), the emphasis here will be upon the role of public international
lawyers, and particularly upon their role in relation to their own national
governments.
In their introductory essay to the volume under review, the editors note
that increasing specialization will transform international lawyers into “ex-
perts”, thereby undercutting the classical conception of the international
“jurist”. According to Macdonald and Johnston, the expert will not be ex-
pected “to display the same impeccable degree of impartiality that was
traditionally expected of the classical ‘jurist’ in a nominally less politicized
age”. 22 This matter of expectations is important, for if international legal
“experts” come to be seen only as advocates, a major change of emphasis
will have occurred within the profession, a change that should not be viewed
with complacency. International law does not share an identical legacy with
the Anglo-American common law. The founders of the “Law of Nations”
‘8R.A. Falk, “The Future of International Law” (1981) 75 Proc. Am. Soc. Int’l L. 8 at 10.
19B.H. Weston, “Promoting Training and Awareness – The Tasks of Education in fnter-
national Law” (1981) 75 Proc. Am. Soc. Int’l L. 159.
200. Schachter, Remarks (1981) 75 Proc. Am. Soc. Int’l L. 23. Professor Schachter did manage
to summon up a modicum of hope, however.
21For example, see Cheng, supra, note 10 at 515.
22Macdonald and Johnston, supra, note 1 at 9.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
were steeped in a civilian, but more importantly, in a natural law tradition
which influences the structure of the international legal system to this day;
it is a system which does not function primarily through processes of third-
party adjudication. International lawyers have never been solely barristers.
Their idealized role, whether as statesmen or publicists, has always incor-
porated a consensual perspective rooted in certain global values. Verdross
and Koeck point out, for example, that the early Spanish theorists postulated
a doctrine of international law “according to which a statesman must, during
all his actions, always have in mind the common good of mankind”. 23 This
is not to say that most, or even the majority of, statesmen always fulfilled
their obligation to the world community. Nevertheless, the classical view
provided a standard by which to measure the acts of statesmen. It is a
valuable standard, not one which should lightly be discarded. It has even
greater relevance for Western international legal academics whose role in
society is shaped by scholarly values which mesh most comfortably with a
legal-theoretical viewpoint that stresses independence and commitment to
universal values of human dignity. The need for jurists has not passed, even
if growing legal-societal complexity forces them to focus their analysis upon
topics of narrower scope. Being an “expert” does not necessarily require a
limited, xenophobic outlook.
It would seem, however, that despite the great need for jurists in an era
of growing politicization in international discourse and of ominous threats
of global destruction, Macdonald and Johnston are correct in describing the
attitude of many contemporary international lawyers who, acting as experts,
advise their own governments or justify governmental action with little
regard to traditional notions of concern for the common good of mankind.
Professor Richard Falk has descried this trend:
International lawyers have not upheld the fundamental mission of their profes-
sion. The fundamental mission of international lawyers is to study the means
whereby the power of the modem nation-state may be restrained by the rule
of law. All too often, lawyers have allowed themselves to become “co-opted
geopoliticians”, and their main mission becomes to justify, rationalize and,
occasionally, to apologize for the nationalistic policies and actions of their
governments. 24
When academic lawyers become mere apologists, they betray both the tra-
ditional values of their profession and the essence of scholarship. Even
foreign office lawyers should sometimes find it necessary to question the
policies of their own government in order to maintain the integrity of their
profession. At one stage in his career, Jules Basdevant, later a Judge on the
in Structure and Process, supra, note 1, 17 at 26.
23A. Verdross & H. Koeck, “Natural Law: The Tradition of Universal Reason and Authority”
24R.A. Falk, Remarks (1982) 76 Proc. A. Soc. Int’l L. 23.
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
International Court of Justice, felt compelled to resign his position as Legal
Advisor to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to disagreement over
general policies. 25
Judge Basdevant’s action is, however, an all-too-rare example of prin-
cipled role identification. There seems to be an expectation today that the
main function of foreign office lawyers is to seek justifications for whatever
policy their government chooses to pursue.26 Concerned academics have
noted a growing parochialism and bias even in ostensibly independent in-
ternational legal scholarship. Preoccupation with this trend is a recurring
theme in The Structure and Process of International Law. In his contribu-
tion, Johnston holds up Grotius as a valuable example to present day in-
ternational lawyers precisely because “he rarely allowed his cosmopolitan
perspective to become blurred by an excessively nationalistic bias”. 27 How-
ever, Schachter alludes to the contemporary reality “that many of the legal
scholars have close links with their official communities and there are often
pressures on them, sometimes obvious and sometimes subtle, to conform
to the official point of view”. 28 This reality has led other scholars to de-
nounce the provincialism and ethnocentrism of much contemporary inter-
national legal scholarship. 29 The response to this pressing problem cannot
be the abdication of any active, policy-forming role for lawyers. States re-
quire international lawyers in their foreign policy bureaucracies. Moreover,
academic lawyers sometimes serve a useful function as government advi-
sors, shaping policy in conformity with international law. It is essential,
however, for such advisors to recognize that they must remain “outsiders”;
they cannot cast off the moral imperatives of their juristic and scholarly
role simply because they operate temporarily in a governmental environ-
ment. Even state-employed international lawyers are subject to special moral
strictures associated with their profession.
25See M. Lachs, “Teachings and Teaching of International Law” (1976) 151 Rec. des Cours
161 at 232 n. 40. It should be noted that Judge Lachs, a present member and former President
of the International Court of Justice, served in the Polish Foreign Affairs Ministry from 1947-
1967.
26See, e.g., Professor D’Amato’s response to Professor Falk’s pessimism: there is law and
there is mere justification. Not all arguments are equal and much legal argumentation –
“especially that which is government inspired” –
is nothing more than “rationalization”,
which can be distinguished from authoritative writing. A.A. D’Amato, Remarks (1981) 75 Proc.
Am. Soc. Int’l L. 279 at 280. This response is hardly encouraging.
27Supra, note 6 at 185. Grotius is also, of course, held up as a good example by Professors
Falk and Weston. They postulate a contemporary “Grotian moment”, the dangers of which
call for the same cosmopolitan perspectives brought to bear by Grotius upon the problems of
his age. See Falk, supra, note 18 at 14 and Weston, supra, note 19 at 159.
28Supra, note 12 at 765.
29See, e.g., C.T. Oliver, Remarks (1981) 75 Proc. Am. Soc. Int’l L. 14 at 15; and R.A. Falk,
Remarks (1981) 75 Proc. Am. Soc. Int’l L. 278.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
The wide sway of parochialism and nationalism is linked closely to the
underlying pessimism evident throughout the Macdonald-Johnston volume.
There appears to be a fear amongst international legal professionals that
state power is not controlled adequately. More worrisome is the stultifying
belief that it cannot be controlled. Despite Luzius Wildhaber’s simple yet
powerful assertion that “[s]overeignty must be mitigated by the exigencies
of interdependence”, 30 there remains a prevalent belief that, as Wolfgang
Friedmann once put it, “[t]oday we are witnessing both the climax and the
profound crisis of the era of the national state and of national sovereignty. ’31
The climax of the era of national sovereignty threatens to deprive the
international legal profession of its traditional raison d’tre. The power of
the state may be so overwhelming as to appear to represent the natural order
of things, an order which is immutable. If national governments seem ca-
pable of doing whatever they wish, the international lawyer may feel help-
less, his role reduced to that ofthe expost facto source of “legal” justification.
He may accept that role as the only one remaining to him. And yet, “[t]he
tendency of States to do anything which they consider themselves capable
of doing and likely to get away with, is the very fendency which international
law must often resist.”’32 To resist effectively, international lawyers must
first resist the temptation to become mere technical “experts”. They must
refuse to become “co-opted geopoliticians”. They must reassert their status
as jurists, people learned in the law and possessing a vision that transcends
national boundaries.
This prescription for renewed confidence has a simple ring, and some
might argue that it is but a bold leap into the obvious. Yet this simple idea
is being forgotten, most clearly by the prophets of power, but more tellingly
by some international lawyers who reject any simplistic view of the identity
between law and might. In the concluding essay of The Structure and Process
of International Law, Professor Oliver makes a plea for modest goals. He
argues that international lawyers, particularly American lawyers, tend to
overstate their role.33 This observation is correct as a description of those
lawyers who see law as the only mode of social ordering, who preach “au-
tonomy” of the law and neglect the vast range of factors that influence any
“legal” decision. But Oliver goes on to recommend that international law-
yers become “technicians-after-the-fact” of value choice, implying that val-
30L. Wildhaber, “Sovereignty and International Law” in Structure and Process, supra, note
1,425 at 440. See also the strong words of C. Jenks, The Prospects oflnternationalAdjudication
(1964) at 497: “Sovereignty unless treated as the creature of law, is the negation of law.”
31W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964) 31.
32 p. Allott, “Language, Method and the Nature of International Law” (1971) 45 Brit. Y.B.
33Supra, note 16 at 1209.
Int’l L. 79 at 81.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
ues can be formulated only in a formal political arena. Modesty taken to
this extreme would amount to an abandonment of the traditional role of
international jurists; they have never been mere technicians, experts in the
service of their states’ interests alone. International jurists have long strug-
gled to shape values in an admittedly “political” process that is wider than
the formal domain of inter-state politics. Contemporary international law-
yers should not allow pessimism to pre-empt that struggle. Indeed, in the
nuclear age, international jurists have, to adopt the words of Professor Vlasic,
“a special moral and professional obligation” to be active proponents of
values that can help to ensure the continued existence of the human race.34
The Structure and Process ofInternational Law is not a reassuring book.
It reveals all of the doubts and confusions that beset the contemporary
international legal profession. The tendency is to submit to the logic, if not
the ethic, of raison d’etat and to limit the role of the international lawyer
to that of the expert, defined as a careful technician. It cannot be doubted
that international lawyers have every reason to be pessimistic. The glowing
optimism of the immediate post-Second World War era has been shattered
by ever-increasing international lawlessness, much of it perpetrated or spon-
sored by states. Any sensitive intellect must feel deep concern. But it is
worthwhile to remember Gramsci’s dichotomy between “pessimism of the
intellect” and “optimism of the will”. 35 For the profession as a whole to
give in to despair now would be a monumental abdication of responsibility
at a time of crisis and of wide public concern. That concern should not be
mocked by professional inaction and silence. A former legal counsellor in
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office has asserted the urgent need
for careful, confident action:
It can be argued that it is the duty of the international lawyer, like the moral
philosopher and the theologian, not to become so desperate about the state of
the world as to feel inclined to move into related, seemingly more practical
and everyday, fields. On the contrary, his duty is to insist on the essential,
objective element of his craft (law, morality, religion) ever more calmly and
firmly as the need of the world for such things, whether or not the world realizes
it, increases. 36
Clearly, The Structure and Process of International Law is not all des-
peration and pessimism. In the face of harsh reality, many international
lawyers around the world do get on with the job. Their voices are raised in
support of human dignity, justice and peace. This excellent book reflects
341.A. Vlasic, “Disarmament Decade, Outer Space and International Law” (1981) 26 McGill
L.J. 135 at 204. See also Vlasic, “Raison d’Etat v. Raison de l’Humanit6 – The United Nations
SSOD II and Beyond” (1983) 28 McGill L.J. 455.
35Quoted in Schachter, supra, note 20 at 23.
36Allott, supra, note 32 at 123.
364
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
much valuable experience, both “practical” and “theoretical”. It is a useful
sourcebook for the review of basic concepts and a challenging attempt to
begin a reconstruction of international legal theory. It is important to re-
iterate, however, that many of the essays were written in a spirit of doubt
and diminishing self-confidence. This collection of essays cannot be allowed
to foretell the future, for ultimately the sights are set too low. International
lawyers must struggle to regain a more expansive vision of their potential
role. If they are willing to assert their scholarly independence, their com-
mitment to global perspectives –
if, in short, they become jurists once
again –
the malaise can be defeated. International lawyers can become
effective once more.
