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LIVRES NOUVEAUX
Exclusion Clauses in Contracts. By David Yates. London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1978. Pp. xxi, 197.
This book is a thoughtful and insightful examination of a legal
problem (actually, a set of interrelated legal problems) that has
vexed courts, lawyers and scholars for most of this century. Ever
since the rejection of nineteenth century laissez-faire concepts,
common law jurisdictions (and other legal systems as well’) have
been attempting to define the relationship between the right of
parties to conclude their own contractual arrangements, including
a limitation of either or both parties’ liability, and the obligation of
the legal system to protect not only the interests of the weaker
party, but also, indirectly, society as a whole.
The book was intended, in part, as a guide to the legislation
pending in the British Parliament -during the drafting of the text.
The bill emerged, in time for its definitive inclusion in the book, as
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.2 Readers outside Great Britain,
however, can also profit from the author’s treatment of the subject.
In fact, the author has deliberately broadened the scope of his work
by helpful comparisons of the British legislation and the Uniform
Commercial Code in the United States. References are also provided
to U.S., Canadian and other Commonwealth decisions and secondary
sources.
The concept of exclusion clauses is quite broad, defined by the
author as “any term in a contract restricting a remedy or a liability
arising out of a breach of a contractual obligation”. In addition
to the standard exculpatory clauses which generally comprise this
category, the author also discusses other contractual provisions
which at times can have the same effect of limiting a party’s rights
in the event of a breach: certain arbitration clauses, liquidated
damages clauses, and, in insurance contracts, excepted perils clauses
and “promissory” warranties.
1 See, e.g., Alpa, Protection of Consumers Against Unfair Contract Terms:
Legislative Patterns of Controlling Adhesion Contracts in Europe (1979) 15
Willamette L. Rev. 267.
2 1977, c. 50 (U.K.).
3P. 1.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
In the days of hand-crafted contracts, an exclusion clause was
merely another clause that appeared in the contract as a result of
the parties’ bargaining (which may or may not have been on equal
terms). The evolution of standard form contracts, however, created
serious doubts as to the validity of such clauses. While it remained
true that a party was liable for whatever document he or she
signed voluntarily (assuming there was at least the opportunity to
read it beforehand), the courts were uncomfortable about enforcing
a clause that appeared to be clearly weighted in favour of the party
that drafted the form and which was not the result of any bargain-
ing process.
While the tension between the two principles is apparent and
the situations in which it arises are ubiquitous, the law has not been
able to devise a simple way of dealing with the problem. For exam-
ple, the author devotes a relatively long section of the book to an
analysis of the law relating to exclusion clauses appearing on the
reverse side of printed tickets; the many factual and policy varia-
tions result in a variety of solutions to similar problems.
In the United States, there have been several efforts to provide
a solution to the dilemma. The Restatement of Contracts recognizes
the factual problem: “A party who makes regular use of a stan-
dardized form of agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers
to understand or even to read the standard terms” The subsequent
statement of the law is an attempt to balance the respective in-
terests of the parties:
Although customers
typically adhere to standardized agreements and
are bound by them without even appearing to know the standard terms
in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the
range of reasonable expectation.5
A similar analysis was provided by the late Karl N. Llewellyn,
who suggested a solution that, “[r]ooted in sense, history, and
simplicity, … is an answer which could occur to anyone”:”
thinking about “assent”
Instead of
to boiler-plate clauses, we can
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all.
What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered
terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more.
That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any
not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form,
4 Restatement (Second) of Contracts 237, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1970).
GIbid., 237, Comment f (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
0 Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960), 371.
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BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
the validity of exclusion clauses,8 whereas
which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered
terms.7
The British legislators opted for a test of reasonableness
in
determining
their
American counterparts adopted the concept of unconscionability.9
The former, of course, is in fact a test of validity or enforceability,
whereas the latter eschews both definition and test of validity and
focuses on the remedy available to courts in the event that un-
conscionability -is found. Yates prefers the American solution for
two reasons. The concept of unconscionability is essentially sub-
jective and consequently “can cater for the susceptibilities of the
particular parties to the agreement in a way that the more objective
criterion of reasonableness does not”.10 In addition, the concept of
unconscionability gives the court the ability to consider the conduct
of both parties to the agreement, including their conduct subsequent
to the making of .the contract, which the test of reasonableness
does not.
Yates has concentrated on one aspect of the problem that has
bothered other commentators: the distinction that appears to be
called for between commercial and consumer transactions. Yates
agrees with the popular conception that these two situations should
be treated differently by the law, presumably because of a business
person’s ability to protect his or her interest. Yet this assumption
is too facile if it is intended as a serious analysis, for business
people are also forced into accepting standard form agreements,
which they are unlikely to read; they too can be unfairly surprised
by the specific terms of the contract into which they have entered.
In fact, the concept of unconscionability is applicable in com-
mercial settings. For example, in C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied
Mutual Insurance Co.,” the Supreme Court of Iowa found a pro-
vision in a commercial insurance policy to be unconscionable. The
policy had been obtained by the fertilizer company to provide it
with protection in the event of, inter alia, burglary. When an
incontrovertible burglary occurred, however, the insurance company
disclaimed liability on the ground that the occurrence did not fall
within the policy’s explicit but unusual definition of “burglary”.
After an extensive review of the difficulties of form contracts, the
7 Ibid., 370.
8The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, 1977, c. 50, s. 11(1) (U.K.).
9 U.C.C. 2-302 (1972).
1o P. 190.
11227 N.W. 2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
Court concluded that, by virtue of the unexpected definition, the
liability-avoiding provision in the policy was unconscionable.
Yates is proud of the empirical research he undertook in pre-
paring the book.12 He claims to have conducted his research
“amongst the business and consumer communities”. 13 Most of his
statements, however, seem to reflect an emphasis on the interests
of the business community. For example, he tells us that his con-
clusion about the inadequacy of the state of the law “to provide a
solution to the commercial problems of commercial men” was
based on information “which was given with great enthusiasm by
legal departments of the various business interests consulted”. 4
In contrast, his major conclusion about the consumer interest has
to do with “the apparent influence [it] now carries with both the
legislature and the judiciary”. 1
There is, no doubt, an economic justification for the interest of
businesses in seeking to exclude or limit their liability in certain
circumstances. Llewellyn eloquently described it in these terms:
The content of the standardized terms accumulates experience, it avoids
or reduces legal risks and also confers all kinds of operating leeways and
advantages, all without need of either consulting counsel from instance
to instance or of bargaining with the other parties.’0
Yates is neither so eloquent nor so helpful. In slightly over two
pages, he assays to highlight the concepts of transaction costs and
the optimal distribution of loss in a society. While this is admittedly
a brief book, a somewhat more extended treatment of this subject
would have been expected, particularly in light of the academic
literature on the economic analysis of the law that has appeared in
recent years.’ 7
Yates shows insight in his major criticism of the attempts of
both the common law and the legislature to deal with the subject
of exclusion clauses: they both mandate an analysis of the terms
of the contract aside from the exclusion clause in order to ascertain
the parties’ intentions and thereby determine if effect should be
given to the exclusion clause. Yates persuasively argues that the
exclusion clause is very fundamentally a part of the agreement and
12 P. v.
13 Ibid.
‘4 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Llewellyn, supra, note 6, 362.
17 See, e.g., Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal (1975) 18 S.
Law & Econ. 293; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 2d ed. (1977), especially
84-88; Kronman & Posner, The Economics of Contract Law (1979), 67 et seq.
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BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
that no understanding of the parties’ real intentions can be gained
if such clause is excluded, even initially, from consideration. He
suggests that the proper task of the court is to “interpret the con-
tract as a whole, including the exclusion clause, to ascertain what
was agreed, and [the court] may then interfere to protect the
consumer interest in accordance with a statutory criterion, in the
light of the contract as a whole”.’ s This approach certainly appears
more fruitful and more respectful of the parties’ expectations.
In summary, this book is an excellent introduction to what is
still a complicated subject for which our legal systems are slowly
groping for reasonable solutions. To the extent that it has caused
us to reflect more deeply on the subject and has presented us with,
if not completely new ideas, at least a concise analysis of existing
concepts, this book is a welcome addition to the legal literature
in the area and should be of great interest to scholars, judges and
lawyers on both sides of the Atlantic and throughout the world of
the common law tradition.
Thomas M. Haney*
18 p. 187.
* B.S., M.BA., Loyola University of Chicago; J.D., LL.M., The University of
Chicago; Assistant Professor, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
Legal and Institutional Aspects of the International Monetary System:
Selected Essays. By Joseph Gold. Washington: International Monetary Fund,
1979. Pp. xx, 633.
“In these days, there are many new fields in which international
law is developing. Monetary law as a sector of public international
law is largely a postwar phenomenon, and the Fund is at the center
of it” (p. 390). With this focus, Joseph Gold, General Counsel and
Director of the Legal Department of the International Monetary
Fund, has written scores of essays over the past three decades on
law and the international monetary system. Associated with the
Fund virtually since its inception, Mr Gold has been a direct
participant in the shaping of international monetary law and, given
his scholarly gifts, he has also been a prime elucidator of the details
and direction of its evolution. The volume under review represents
a collection of fourteen articles, most of which have been published
previously in various legal journals during the period 1967 to 1977.
Each article has been slightly edited and brought up-to-date with
a short concluding note on the consequences of the Second Amend-
ment to the Fund’s Articles of Agreement which became effective
on April 1, 1978.1 It is useful to have these articles collected in one
volume since they comprise not only a ready source of reference for
students of monetary law, but also a tour d’horizon of the legal
principles, structures and mechanics of the world’s financial system
within which the Fund occupies such a central role.2
The volume opens with an extended introductory essay which
weaves together two major themes: the desirability, even necessity,
of a world monetary system regulated by international law, and the
need for flexibility in the operation and development of that system.
In 1944 the Bretton Woods conference3 ushered in a new legal order
to which the major nations of the non-communist world bound
themselves. Though characterized by various economic and political
crises throughout its life, it remained intact until August 15, 1971,
1 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Second Amend-
ment effective April 1, 1978 pursuant to modifications approved by the
Board of Governors in Resolution No. 314, April 30, 1976, Summary Pro-
ceedings (1976).
-2 For a short initial overview of this topic, see Gold, The International
Monetary Fund and International Law, An Introduction (1965).
3 Delegates from 45 countries met at Bretton Woods, N.H. in July, 1944 and
agreed to the establishment of a post-war international monetary system.
The delegates drafted the Articles of Agreement (a multilateral treaty) which
constituted, the charter for the new International Monetary Fund, the entity
designed to administer the new system and itself created by the Articles.
1980]
BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
when the United States unilaterally decided to cut the dollar’s tie
to gold and consequently to allow the value of its currency to
respond more directly to changes in underlying market forces (p.
95). The regime of floating exchange rates which followed this
decision placed most members of the Fund in a position of illegality
since they were now acting in deliberate contravention of inter-‘
national obligations to -which they had previously committed them-
selves. A skeptic may have been tempted to see this as renewed
evidence of the truly anarchic condition of inter-state relations
which remain essentially unregulated by the fragile structure of
public international law, but Mr Gold is firmly convinced of the
contrary. Even during the period of widespread illegality prior to
acceptance of the Second Amendment 4 there remained an impulse
toward legality of which the Second Amendment itself is evidence.
States continued to seek a legitimacy which exonerated and ration-
alized policies resulting from political and economic necessities.
States seem to abhor uncertain environments and law does provide
order and coherence. With the Second Amendment the law adapted
to changing circumstances.
Throughout the history of the Fund there has been a dynamic
tension between the responsibilities of the Fund and the sovereign
right of states to pursue independent policies. Mr Gold delicately
and eloquently addresses the implications of this tension as they
have become more apparent in recent years. During the liquidity
debates of the 1960’s” the Fund began to see its central monetary
authority eroded by the assertiveness of the Group of Ten.’ The
4 Supra, note 1.
5 The destabilizing effects of the U.S. balance of payments deficit was a
highly contentious issue during the 1960’s. It was clear that the deficit had to
be reduced but this reduction, it was feared, would have caused a severe
decline in world reserves (illiquidity) which were composed to a large
extent of U.S. dollars. A new method of creating liquidity was therefore
needed and after years of debate (mainly between the industrial nations),
a new reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right, was created under the
auspices of the Fund. On July 28. 1969 the Special Drawing Account of the
IMF came into being when the First Amendment to the Articles of Agree-
ment was ratified. Modifications were approved by the Board of Governors
in Resolution No. 23-5, May 31, 1968, Summary Proceedings (1968).
6 The Group of Ten originated when the Fund entered into the General
Agreements to Borrow with ten of the major industrial nations in 1962.
Subsequent to that, the Group of Ten became a distinct “caucus” within
the Fund and, because of its economic and financial power, exerted a pre-
ponderant influence over the international monetary system. The ten mem-
bers are the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United
Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Canada,
the Netherlands, Belgium and
Sweden.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
post-Second Amendment Fund has clearly seen the balance of
authority shift inexorably in the direction of the states which com-
pose the Fund, especially of those states whose weighted voting
power remains preponderant. The author expresses no surprise
at this since he realizes that states must be concerned with the
distribution of power in the world, a distribution which is affected
by the solution of even the most sophisticated monetary problem
(p. 124). Monetary law evolves within this context. After three
decades of intimate involvement in inter-state negotiations, Mr
Gold’s political sense is finely tuned.
The Fund has been given a mandate to promote the maintenance
of a stable system of exchange rates, to facilitate convertibility
between the currencies of its members, to provide balance of pay-
ments financing in cases of non-fundamental disequilibrium, to
monitor and manage global liquidity and, most recently, to promote
the flow of resources to developing members. The amended Articles
of Agreement7 give the Fund the legal authority to accomplish
these goals; however, this authority is subject to certain constraints.
In two essays on the role of sanctions or “pressures” in the Fund’s
operations,8 Mr Gold examines the effects of these constraints on
the Fund’s ability to enforce its decisions. For example, although it
is no longer illegal for a nation to allow its currency to float, nor does
there exist any binding norm which would force a nation to change
an untenable exchange rate for its currency, the Fund has the
ability to exert certain pressures, such as increasing burdens or
denying benefits even to the point of forcing a member to withdraw
from the Fund, to encourage compliance. However, due to the high
majorities necessary to activate enforcement measures, the formal
remedies of the Fund remain largely unused. Even so, the Fund
has been enjoined to continue “firm surveillance” in its monitoring
of the system and a graduated series of remedial actions remains
possible.9 In the end, however, Mr Gold asserts that it is cooperation
and not coercion upon which the reformed global monetary system
has been based. The author notes, however, that “in monetary
affairs the modern international law of cooperation is affected by
centrifugal as well as centripetal forces” (p. 236).
7 Supra, note 1.
8″
‘Sanctions’ of the Fund”, ch. 3 (originally published (1972) 66 Am. J.
Int’l L. 737); ” ‘Pressures’ and Reform of the International Monetary System”,
ch. 4 (originally published (1974) 7 J. Int’l L. and Pol. 423).
OFor an extensive treatment of the Fund’s leverage in its stand-by arrange-
ments with members, see Gold, The Stand-By Arrangements of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (1970).
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BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
Mr Gold further explores the constraints within which the Fund
operates in essays’ which discuss the “political” bodies in the
Fund and the legal techniques which have been utilized to modify
the Fund’s organization. The Outline of Reform”1 which was finally
presented by the Committee of Twenty” in 1974 set the stage for
the Second Amendment. 13 The Committee made the presumption
that reform of the system could best be effected through the legal
technique of amendment of the Fund’s Articles rather than any
alternative techniques. This was reminiscent of the decision taken
seven years previously
(Special
Drawing Rights) also through amendment of the Articles (p. 138).
The Outline specified thorough changes to be made in the Articles
and in the institutional structure of the Fund. Although the Second
Amendment represented an extensive overhaul of the existing
Articles, the reform fell short of that originally envisaged by the
drafters of the Outline, for it was conceded that total reform would
have -to be an evolving process. As Mr Gold makes clear, monetary
law develops cautiously and pragmatically. 4
to create new reserve assets
Ultimate authority within the Fund remains with the Board of
Governors with each member represented by one governor. Although
each member is formally equal in keeping with the guiding principle
of uniformity (the subject of another essay in the volume’5 ), the
varying strengths and diversity of the members are recognized
by the mechanism of weighted voting in the decision making of the
Board. Since the Fund’s underlying rationale is economic in nature,
this mechanism is considered justified. The Executive Board, com-
‘0 “Legal Technique
in Creation of a New International Reserve Asset:
SDR’s and Amendment of the Fund’s Articles”, ch. 2 (originally published
(1969) 1 Case W. Res. J. of Int’l L. 105); “International Monetary System and
Change: Relations Between Mode of Negotiation and Legal Technique”, ch.
” ‘Political’ Bodies in the Fund”, ch. 6 (originally published (1977) 2 J.
5;
Int’l L. and Econ. 237).
” “Outline of Reform”
in International Monetary Fund, International
Monetary Reform: Documents of the Committee of Twenty (1974), 7-48.
12 Established in 1972 as an ad hoc committee of the Board of Governors of
the Fund. Its mandate was to study the international monetary system and
make recommendations concerning its reform.
13 Supra, note 1.
14 For detailed information concerning certain legal changes with respect
to the status of SDR’s, gold and currencies, see Gold, SDR’s, Gold and
Currencies, Third Survey of New Legal Developments, IMF Pamphlet Series
No. 26 (1979).
15″Uniformity as a Legal Principle of the Fund”, ch. 13 (originally pub-
lished (1975) 7 Law and Policy in Int’l Bus. 765).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
posed of twenty directors representing various constituencies made
up of one or more members, is in continuous session to direct the
Fund’s operations and also reaches its decisions through weighted
voting. The Managing Director and staff report to the Executive
Board. An Interim Committee, modelled on the Committee of
Twenty itself and supposedly preparing the way for a powerful
central Council of the Fund, is responsible for supervising the con-
tinuing reform of the monetary system but is proscribed in its
present form from taking decisions. Meanwhile the major industrial
nations continue to meet as the informal Group of Ten,1 or the more
exclusive Group of Five,1
to exert significant influence even to the
point of acting as a tacit steering group for the Fund’s activities.
(The animosity which this has caused among the members excluded
from the Group has been partly mollified by the constitution of the
Interim Committee.) Notwithstanding the growth of the Fund’s
institutional structure, the most important constraint built into the
newly reformed Fund is the requirement for an eighty-five per cent
favourable vote for most major decisions (p. 27). In effect, the
United States and the European Economic Community each retain
the legal right to veto motions.
Given the structural limitations within which the Fund operates,
there still exists significant scope for the organization to exercise
its mandate. While there is no mechanism for self-amendment of its
Articles, the Fund possesses the ability to vary certain provisions
of its charter in order to enable it to adapt to unforeseen circum-
stances. In another essay,”” Mr Gold lucidly discusses this dimension
and extrapolates its possibilities to other areas of developing inter-
national law. Similarly, the author explains the powers of the Fund
to dispense with certain requirements normally expected of its
members and, more unusually, to suspend the operation of certain
charter provisions.’ 9 Both powers are designed to increase the
Fund’s flexibility and Mr Gold’s explication of them will prove
useful not only for students of monetary law but also for students
of international organization in general.
16 Supra, note 6.
17The United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France and Japan.
‘ 8 “Amendment and Variation of Their Charters by International Organi-
zations”, ch. 8 (originally published (1973) 9 Revue Belge de Droit Inter-
national 50).
19″ ‘Dispensing’ and ‘Suspending’ Powers of International Organizations”
ch. 9 (originally published
national Recht 169).
(1972)
19 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Inter-
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BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
The subtle adaptability of the Fund’s operations is further
exemplified in an essay20 on conditionality and unconditionality
in the-use of the Fund’s resources. Drawings by a member from the
various tranches assigned to it may be subject to certain conditions
imposed by the Fund. Drawings beyond the gold tranche elicit
scrutiny to ensure that the member’s policies are such that they
will necessarily be temporary in nature. The Fund has the respon-
sibility of safeguarding its resources and of encouraging the con-
formity of the policies of its members with the interests of inter-
national stability. Mr Gold explains that in the course of its history,
the Fund has learned that a too inflexible definition of conditionality
tends to be counter-productive. In the present environment, there-
fore, the Fund’s’credit tranche policies have been formulated in
general terms and conditionality is defined on a case-by-case basis.
intentionally so,
we might suspect. Mr Gold’s conception of international monetary
law is neither static nor complete. The shifting forces that define
the limits of law are particularly volatile in the realm of monetary
law. Principally through the work of the Fund, which to no small
extent has been the work of Joseph Gold, a coherent body of law is
developing and adjusting to a changing world.
This collection of essays has no conclusion –
This book certainly has my recommendation. It is a useful com-
pendium and even the non-specialist will find it a helpful survey, if
not in its entirety, at least in substantial part. However, the reader
will find that there is some minor repetition of material, due to
the nature of the various essays presented.
Louis W. Pauly*
20 “Use of the Fund’s Resources: ‘Conditionality’ and ‘Unconditionality’ as
Legal Concepts”, ch. 11 (originally published (1971) 6 3. Int’l L. and Econ. 1).
*M.A., M.Sc. Mr Pauly studied international relations and public inter-
national law at the London School of Economics and Political Science and
is now employed in the International Division of The Royal Bank of Canada.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
Medico-Legal Aspects of Family Law. By B. M. Dickens. Toronto: Butter-
worths, 1979. Pp. xi, 145.
It has often ‘been remarked that in the area of medical law there
are no “right” answers, in the sense that there is no obviously
correct or better solution to a given problem; rather, there are
“right” questions to be asked in coming to a decision on what course
of action should be adopted. Dickens’ book raises such questions in
relation to artificial insemination, birth control, abortion, genetic
counselling, in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, and medical
treatment of minors. Each of these topics is the subject of a
separate chapter.
For such an extensive range of controversial issues, this is a
relatively short work. But it seems that Dickens has recognized
(what this reviewer believes to be true) that in dealing with such
topics, any one of which could itself be the subject of a book, there
is no middle ground between an exhaustive study and a relatively
short but comprehensive work. It is to the book’s credit that it is
concise, precise and accurate, and, because of a certain density of
style, conveys much information in few words.
These factors mean that the book must be read with care and
that attention to nuance is important. Where Dickens indicates
there is doubt on a point, he means that there is genuine doubt, and
not just, for instance, that he is academically querying some well-
recognized approach of the law.
Readers (including this reviewer) will not agree with all the
conclusions drawn on what the law probably is in ambiguous areas,
nor will they agree with all the recommendations or proposals put
forward. But such consensus cannot be expected. One of the book’s
contributions is that it adds to the dialogue which must take place
with respect to medico-legal problems.
Because of the way in which the book is organized –
under
specific topics –
there is some repetition, as Dickens himself notes
in the preface. In fact, reading the book as a whole gives one a
sense of reading a series of papers. This repetition, however, has the
advantage of accessibility for persons only wanting to make use of
a chapter on a particular topic. Similarly, for reasons of accessibili-
ty, it is probably a happy accident that the contents of this book
did not form part of a larger work on family law as originally
intended by the publishers, thus making it available to a wider
range of readers.
The book is a valuable reference source for Canadian law in the
areas covered. It includes a case list and a table of relevant statutes.
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BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
There is constant i eference to American law on medico-legal issues,
which is most useful, as this is more developed than Canadian law
and may indicate trends which will be followed in Canada. Oc-
casionally, however, United States authorities may be relied on too
strongly as far as their relevance in demonstrating the legal situa-
tion in Canada is concerned. For example, Roe v. Wade’ seems to
be used to support the statement that “[tlhere appears to be no
legal obligation …
to promote the live birth of an unborn viable
foetus” (p. 58). This may or may not be the case in Canadian law,
but perhaps it could have been made clearer that the Canadian
position on this matter will depend on many factors other than
just a United States Supreme Court decision.
In conclusion, Medico-Legal Aspects of Family Law is a valuable
introduction to the medico-legal field for those unfamiliar with it,
and is a complete and rapid source book for those specialized in
this area of law. It will be of use to a much wider range of persons
than just those involved in the practice of family law.
Margaret A. Somerville*
‘410 U.S. 113 (1973).
* Of the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Medicine, McGill University.
