Brazeau Transport Ltee v. Canadian Pacific Railway
William Fraiberg *
Introduction
Article 17 (24) of the Quebec Civil Code says,
“A fortuitous event (cas fortuit) is one which is unforeseen, and caused
by superior force which it was impossible to resist.” ‘
Can a sudden illness inducing total absence of will be considered
a cas fortuit ? In Brazeau Transport Ltde v. C.P.R.2 the late Mr.
Justice Bernard Bissonnette of the Court of Queen’s Bench held that
it could not.
This ruling has serious implications, for it hints at an increas-
ingly social rather than individual concept of fault in the Civil Law
of Quebec.
The Facts
Defendant company’s driver drove a heavy truck down a hill in
broad daylight. After travelling about seven hundred feet he reached
level crossing, but neither slowed down nor
plaintiff company’s
braked.
A violent collision with a passing freight train ensued, resulting
in the derailment of two railway cars and almost total destruction
of the truck. The railroad sued under Articles 1053 C.C. and 1054
C.C. for damage to its freight cars.
The defendant argued that minutes before impact, its driver had
suffered a fatal heart attack, and that this was a sufficient instance
of cas fortuit to negate the driver’s, and therefore its own respon-
sibility under Article 1054 C.C.
The Superior Court found for plaintiff, rejecting defendant’s
factual plea as unsubstantiated. While in the opinion of the trial
judge the driver had indeed died of a heart attack, defendant could
Of the Junior Board of Editors, McGill Law Journal; second year law student.
i The expressions cas fortuit and force majeure are often used interchangeably,
the former relating primarily to the unforeseeability of the event, and the latter
to its irresistibility.
2 [1964] B.R. 689.
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CASE AND COMMENT
not prove that the attack came before the collision. On the proof
submitted it could as well have occurred after or at the moment of
the accident. This judgment was affirmed on appeal.
The Issues and Decisions
The issues before the Court of Queen’s Bench were: (1) Did the
driver suffer a heart attack before the accident ? (2) If so, was the
heart attack a cas fortui ?
The judges were unanimous in holding that defendant had failed
to prove satisfactorily the time of the heart attack. It was thus un-
necessary to answer the second question. Nevertheless Montpetit, J.
and Bissonnette, J. offered their comments. Both held that the heart
attack was not a cas fortuit –
Montpetit, J. vis-&-vis the trucker, and Bissonnette, J. vis-&-vis the
driver.
but from different points of view –
Montpetit, J., having acknowledged the two essential elements of
a cas fortuit as unforseeability and irresistibility, (Article 17 (24)
C.C.), held that the driver’s sudden heart attack could not exculpate
his employer when the latter had failed to have its employees medi-
cally examined. In the words of the learned judge,
“Un bon pre de famille, voiturier public se doit h lui-mgme, A ses chauf-
feurs et employees, et au public en g~n6ral de se soucier de l’4tat de sant6
de ceux A qui i confie la conduite de ses camions et selon les circonstances,
d’agir en consequence.” 3
Being in a position to know the normal risks and dangers of
highway transport, the defendant company had been imprudent and
negligent in not being concerned about the state of health of its em-
ployees. Having committed this fault of omission, the company could
not validly invoke the heart attack as a cas fortuit. By reasonable
means it could have warned itself as to the likelihood of such an
event, but had failed to do so. Therefore the heart attack lacked
the essential element of unforeseeability.
Bissonnette, J., taking a more sweeping approach to the problem,
held that in general mental aberration or the involuntary absence of
will could not be considered as a case of cas fortuit. If from the ex-
ternal circumstances fault was proved or presumed, the pathological
state of the author of the damage was irrelevant. Accordingly, heart
attack, stroke, or any other incapacitating seizure did not exonerate
him from his liability. The rationale for this position was put by
the learned judge as follows:
3 Ibid., p. 693.
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“II r~pugne A l’id~e de justice qu’ayant pris place dans un autocar, le
conducteur me pr~cipite au bas d’un parapet, sans engager sa responsabilita,
m~me si cet acte fut involontaire. D6s lors qu’on pourra rapporter preuve de
sa faute, i1 ne pourra 6chapper A la responsabilita, car sa maladie … ne
constituera pas un cas de force majeure.” 4
Doctrine and Jurisprudence
The judgment of Montpetit, J. accords with Quebec jurisprudence
on cas fortuit and its equivalent, “inevitable accident” or “act of God”,
in the common law jurisdictions of Canada. The principle elicited
from this jurisprudence is that the defendant cannot plead cas for-
tuit if he has committed a prior fault, whether of commission or
omission.
Loranger, J. held in Alexander v. Dame Hutchison et al.,
“Celui qui plaide la force majeure ne peut 6tre exempt de toute respon-
t6 pr~cdd6 ni accompagn6 ou
sabilit6, qu’en autant que P’accident n’a pas
suivi d’une faute qui lui soit imputable.” 5
This dictum could as well be stated by saying that damage will
not be deemed unforeseeable or irresistible unless before the event
a minimum standard of reasonable care has been maintained. Thus
a warehouse company burglarized of goods entrusted to it for safe-
keeping cannot invoke cas fortuit when it has failed to provide a
night watchman”
The rule has been applied primarily vis-&-vis events external to
the author of the damage. Montpetit, J’s decision falls within this
category. He did not rule on whether the heart attack exonerated
the deceased driver from fault. Rather it was an external event that
did not exculpate the truck-owners because they could have taken
reasonable care to prevent it, but had failed to do so. Although not
the immediate cause of the damage, the defendant company was
liable under Article 1053 C.C. because its imprudence was a con-
tributing factor.
This accords with the decision in Rozinsky V. Lambert.7 Here a
garage-owner was held liable under Article 1053 C.C. for having
rented a car to a well-known drunkard who subsequently injured a
third person. Although the trucker’s imprudence was not as blatant
in the present case, it sufficed to actualize its direct liability.
4 Ibid., p. 696.
5 (1888) 11 L.N. 60.
6 Franco-Canadian Dyers Ltd. v. Hill Express Depot Ltd. [1951] C.S. 177.
7 (1939) 77 C.S. 93.
No. 4]
CASE AND COMMENT
Montpetit, J’s decision also derives doctrinal support from Do-
mat who stated a principle having its origin in the Lex Aquilia as
follows:
“Ceux qui font quelques ouvrages ou quelques travaux d’oL il peut suivre
quelque dommage h d’autres personnes en seront tenus s’ils n’ont us6 des
precautions n~cessaires pour les pr~venir.”8
Bissonnette, J’s decision, however, conflicts with the preponder-
ance of the jurisprudence and doctrine. The existing case law on the
subject makes it clear that a driver who has a sudden seizure at the
wheel will not be liable for any damage he causes, unless it appears
that he knew or ought to have known of his liability to such an
attack. 9
Thus Quebec jurisprudence has applied the same criterion to cas
fortuit induced by the physical or mental condition of the driver as
it does to events external to the driver.10 A minimum standard of
antecedent prudence must be attained before cas fortuit can be in-
voked. Put succinctly, he who allows himself to drive must to his
knowledge be in a fit condition to drive.
Several illustrations of this rule may be cited. A plea of cas
fortuit failed in Goudreau v. Scotcher,” where an employee, who to
his own and employer’s knowledge was subject to epileptic attacks,
nevertheless drove a motor vehicle and caused damage as a result
of such an attack.
In St-Georges V. Moody 12 a deaf driver who failed to hear plain-
tiff’s horn, thereby contributing to the cause of the accident, was
held at fault for having driven without a hearing aid.
Decisions from the common law provinces, which may be relied
upon as rationes scriptae, affirm the rule as well. In Hagg v. Bohnet 13
a diabetic condition, aggravated by drinking prior to his taking the
wheel, did not exonerate the defendant. On the other hand, in Des-
saint V. Carri~re 14 a seventy-year old diabetic who had suffered a
sudden dizzy spell and had no reason in fact to foresee it, having been
8 Domat, J., Tome 3, sec. iv, no. 4, p. 320; Carr6 ed., Paris, 1822.
9 See Mazengarb, O.C., Negligence On The Highway, Toronto, 1957, pp. 67 and
222.
10 As an example of an event external to the driver that was not a cas fortuit,
see Coderre v. Douville [1943] B.R. 687 where it was held that a sudden squall
of dust did not excuse negligence, but occasioned even greater care.
11 [1947] R.L. 162.
12 [1959] C.S. 259.
13 (1962) 33 D.L.R. 378.
14 [1958] O.W.N. 481.
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told by his doctor that it was quite safe for him to drive, was held
not liable.
However, a driver has not discharged his duty of care merely by
being examined routinely by a physician who does not warn him not
to drive, if he has failed to inform the latter of pains which forecast
a fatal heart attack. 15
In MacPherson v. Mallabon 16 a less rigorous standard of exculpa-
bility was adhered to. There the driver suffered a sudden indeter-
minate seizure from which he apparently died minutes after colliding
with plaintiff’s parked car. No post mortem was conducted to estab-
lish the actual cause of death, and no enquiry was made into the
driver’s prior state of health. The court ruled, however, that it was a
reasonable conclusion that he was overcome before the collision, and
this in itself sufficed to exculpate him.
Despite the foregoing deviation, it is submitted that the true test
as to the exonerating force of a sudden seizure is that offered by the
Supreme Court of Canada. In Gootson v. The King,’ a driver in the
employ of the Crown suffered an epileptiform seizure with the result
that his car mounted a sidewalk and injured a pedestrian. Ruling on
whether the attack rebutted the presumption of negligence, Rand, J.
held at page 35:
… “That involuntary act was of such a nature that it might or might not
have been negligent, depending upon the antecedent experience of the driver.
The negligence would lie in the fact, if it were so, of his undertaking to
operate an agency of such potential danger, knowing that at any time he
might be taken with such a seizure.” i
The distinction between Bissonnette, J’s decision and the jurispru-
dence is that the latter deems involuntary absence of will a cas fortuit
if the facts show that it could not have been foreseen. Bissonnette, J.
however, refused to apply this concrete test of foreseeability. In his
view a sudden seizure is not a cas fortuit a priori because it is always
foreseeable, whether or not the driver himself foresaw it. Although
this reasoning is at best implicit in the present case, Bissonnette, J.
was more explicit in Bertrand v. Dame Anderson.’9
“Mais par ailleurs laction int6rieure du conducteur d’un vWhicule m~me
si son effet est impr6vu n’acquiert pas n~cessairement le caract6re d’irr~sisti-
bilit6 h telle enseigne que ce conducteur doit pr6voir… qu’une reaction de sa
15 Turner’s Transport Ltd. v. Anderson et al. 1962-64 D.R.S. 85-575, Sept. 10,
1962 (N.S.) Q.B.
16 (1958) 11 D.L.R. 350.
17 (1948) 4 D.L.R. 33.
‘5 Ibid., p. 35.
19 [1963] B.R. 523.
No. 4]
CASE AND COMMENT
383
condition physique ou mentale, m~me si l’une ou Fautre 6tait imprivisible, se
posera pour autrui comme cause d’un dommage. Ce que j’entend dire par 1A,
c’est que la victime a le droit de se pr6valoir d’un fait qui, tout en 6chappant
A la prudence ant6rieure de son auteur peut 6tre dans l’explrience quotidien-
ne de la vie, normalement pr~visible.” 20
Thus the learned judge applied an abstract test of foreseeability. A
heart attack cannot be a cas fortuit because it is an event normally
foreseeable in the daily experience of life. Support for this radical
narrowing of personal exculpability was found by Bissonnette, J. in
the work of Mazeaud and Tunc. 21 A cursory examination of the latter’s
treatise reveals a premise for this harsh position in the refusal to
consider any subjective element in civil fault.
… “La faute ne doit pas s’appr~cier in concreto en tenant compte de l’6tat
d’Ame de l’agent, mais in abstracto en comparant la conduite du dfendeur b
celle qu’aurait tenue une autre personne; analyser la faute civile in concreto,
c’est confondre responsabilit6 civile et responsabilit6 p~nale.” 22
According to the authors the acts of an automaton are ipso facto
different from those of a bon pare de famille and therefore faulty. The
only mitigating factor allowed in this in abstracto appreciation of fault
is the placing of the bon pare de famille in the same external circum-
stances as the defendant. Obviously an absence of will, no matter how
induced, is not an external circumstance. The fictional bon pare de
famille, the standard of comparison, is by definition in full possession
of his reasoning powers. Therefore incapacitating illness –
“les faits
internels” –
are irrelevant to the determination of fault. Civil fault
consists of failing to behave, even unintentionally, in the accepted
social manner. The authors maintain that if the courts are prepared to
impose liability for acts occasioned by mdmentary lapses of will, such
as simple negligence or inattention, they should be equally prepared
to do so for acts stemming from a total absence of will. The social
character of fault demands a total rejection of any subjective assess-
ment of individual conduct.2 3
Critique of the Decisions
Montpetit, J’s application of the test of antecedent responsibility
to an instance where heart attack is pleaded as cas fortuit is in full
accordance with the jurisprudence, doctrine, and provisions of the
Civil Code.
20 Ibid., p. 527.
21 Mazeaud, H. and L., and Tunc, A., Trait Thgorique et Pratique de la Res-
ponsabilit Civile, Paris, 1957, Tome 1, no. 459 et s. p. 508.
22 Ibid., no. 59, p. 509.
23 Ibid., no. 461-2, p. 511.
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It is, however, respectfully submitted that Bissonnette, J’s blanket
rejection of sudden illness as a cas fortuit cannot be justified under
the present state of our law. The Civil Code manifestly requires a
subjective test before liability can be imposed. Article 1053 C.C.
reads,
“Every person capable of discerning right from wrong is responsible for
the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive act, impru-
dence, neglect or want of skill.”
The article imposes a general obligation of care on all citizens
whenever they put themselves into positions where they may cause
harm. However, to qualify as debtors of the obligation they must
first be capable of discerning right from wrong –
a qualification
that obviously demands that they be in possession of their faculties.
Whether or not a defendant meets this criterion must be determined
by an in concreto test. Only after it has been shown that the de-
fendant was capable of reasoning at the time that fault is imputed
to him, is the court justified in comparing his conduct with that of
the abstract bon pare de famille.
For purposes of imposing delictual or quasidelictual liability the
Civil Law of Quebec has divided the human being into a controlling,
reasoning self and a submissive, corporeal self. It is in effect the
former to which fault is imputed. Support for this view is found in
Pothier, who said,
… “Il n’y a que les personnes qui ont l’usage de la raison qui soient capa-
bles de ddlits et de quasi-ddlits.” 24
Mazeaud and Tunc, on the other hand, view the author of any
damage as a unity, and therefore at fault, even if in a state of patho-
logical incapacity. While most of the French tribunal have not
accepted their reasoning, the words of the Code Napolon at least
make it feasible by failing to qualify the notion of fault by any
prior subjective requirement. 25 Our Codifiers, however, explicitly
ruled out persons of deranged or undeveloped intellect as debtors
under Article 1053 C.C.
Thus Bissonnette, J. could not invoke an abstract test of fault
to exclude sudden illness as a cas fortuit. He relied instead on an
abstract test of foreseeability which had the same effect. Because of
the latent possibility that he will suffer a seizure at the wheel of
his car, a driver will be liable, even though before the occurrence,
24 Pothier, R.J., Des Obligations, no. 118.
25 An English translation of Article 1382 C.N. reads, “Any act by which a per-
son causes damage to another makes the person by whose fault the damage occur-
red liable to make reparation for such damage.”
No. 4]
CASE AND COMMENT
he feels perfectly healthy. This test clearly conflicts with the juris-
prudence, which requires that the driver’s mental or physical condi-
tion be such as to make incapacity probable, or at least intensify
its possibility. By adopting it, Bissonnette, J. denied the subjective
and individualist aspect of fault which the present state of our law
demands.
Conclusion
Although the decision of Bissonnette, J. is objectionable in law,
one can easily sympathize with the sense of social responsibility
which motivated it. The innocent victims of automobile accidents
should be adequately compensated. However, to impute fault to the
innocent driver flies in the face of legal reality.
There is another way to achieve increased driver liability under
our present law. This would lie in the courts tightening the standard
of antecedent care to be met by a defendant who pleads cas fortuit.
It is reasonable to demand that the physical and mental condition
of any person who drives a car be such that he does not pose a threat
to the safety of others. The mere feeling of good health is not a
sufficiently rigorous standard. Every driver should inform himself
as to the state of his health by undergoing a routine medical exami-
nation annually. Failure to do so should prevent his invoking any
sudden seizure at the wheel as a cas fortuit. This was the require-
ment of antecedent prudence imposed by Montpetit, J. on a trucking
company. There is no reason why non-professional drivers should
not have to meet the same standard.2 6
Further we cannot go. To do so would involve amending the Civil
Code so as to allow for a strictly objective test of fault. An alter-
native lies in removing automobile accidents from the realm of
fault altogether through the establishment of a general insurance
fund to which all car-owners would contribute..2
7
26 In Bertrand V. Dame Anderson, op. cit., the defendant had asthma, arterio-
sclerosis, and an occlusion of the coronary artery which might have induced his
fainting at the wheel. Nevertheless, he had never been treated by a physician and
was therefore ignorant of his predisposition to seizure. Bissonnette, J. could
have ruled that the failure to have himself examined ruled out a plea of cas for-
tuit, instead of rejecting a seizure per se as a cas fortuit.
27 See Accidents de la circulation, an article by Paul Langlois in Milanges Bis-
sonnette, Montreal, 1963 at pp. 367-8.
