Canada and the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Canada and the Adoption of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights

William A. Schabas’

Canada’s abstention from the vote on the adoption
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the
Third Committee of the United Nations’ General As-
sembly has blemished an honourable record in interna-
tional human rights. In a speech to the General Assem-
bly, External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson ex-
plained the decision as a federal concern about in-
fringing provincial jurisdiction. Even at the time, many,
including John Humphrey, found the story hard to ac-
cept.

The author’s research of archival documents now
available shows that Canadian hesitation was princi-
pally due to discomfort in the Federal Cabinet with
substantive norms enshrined in the Declaration, in-
cluding freedom of religion and of association. The
evidence suggests that provincial jurisdiction was little
more than a pretext for federal politicians who wanted
to avoid international human rights commitments.

The Canadian Government misled both domestic
and international public opinion by concealing its sub-
stantive opposition to the Declaration behind proce-
dural arguments.

L’abstention canadienne lors du vote de la Troi-
sime commission de I’Assembl6e g~n~rale des Na-
tions Unies sur la Ddclaration universelle des droits de
l’hommne a temi la r6putation, dans l’ensemble honora-
ble, du Canada en ce qui a trait aux droits de la per-
sonne. Pour expliquer la situation, le Ministre des Af-
faires ext6rieures Lester B. Pearson avait alors invoqu6
la preoccupation du gouvernement f~ddral face A
1’empi~tement
sur des comp6tences provinciales.
M~me A 1’6poque, plusieurs, y compris John Hum-
phrey, avaient de ]a difficultd a accepter cette explica-
tion.

La recherche faite par rauteur, dclair6 par des do-
cuments d’archives d~sormais disponibles, d~montre
que l’h.sitation canadienne 6tait principalement due a
un malaise au sein du cabinet fed6ral face au contenu
de la Ddclaration, notamment la libert6 de religion et
d’association.
que
I’empidtement sur les comp6tences provinciales n’6tait
qu’un pr6texte utilis6 par les politiciens fdddraux afin
d’6viter de s’engager intemationalement dans le do-
maine des droits de la personne.

sugg~rent

Les

preuves

The author believes this prelude to the Declara-
tion compels an appreciation of the obstacles faced by
those within Canada who urged the recognition of hu-
man rights norms.

Le gouvemement canadien a induit en erreur
l’opinion publique nationale et intemationale en ca-
mouflant avec des arguments procdduraux son opposi-
tion substantielle h la Ddclaration.

L’auteur croit que ce pr6lude h la Declaration
comprendre les obstacles auxquels les d~fen-

aide
seurs des droits de la personne font face au Canada.

” M.A. (Toronto), LL.D. (Montr6ai), Professor of Law and Chair, Dipartement des sciences ju-
ridiques, Universit6 du Qu6bec h Montrdal.

McGill Law Journal 1998
Revue de droit de McGill
To be cited as: (1998) 43 McGill U. 403
Mode de r6f6rence : (1998) 43 R.D. McGill 403

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Introduction

I.

International Human Rights, Canadian Foreign Policy and the Ori-
gins of the Declaration

I1. The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Com-

mons, 1947-1948

I1l. Debates in the Third Committee of the General Assembly

IV. Role of the Department of External Affairs and the Cabinet

Conclusion

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

405

Introduction

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on 10 December 1948. According to its preamble, it was to con-
stitute a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.” As the
touchstone for international human rights law, its universal significance has been reaf-
firmed on countless occasions, and most notably in the Final Ace of the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975 and the United Nations World Con-
ference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ of 1993.
The Declaration was the framework upon which the two international human rights
covenants were constructed,’ and it is cited specifically in the preambles to the three
major regional human rights instruments.’ Canada has reaffirmed its commitment to
the Declaration with its ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
its commitment to the Helsinki Final Act, and in numerous interventions during ses-
sions of the Commission on Human Rights, the Third Committee of the General As-
sembly and other international fora. The role of John P. Humphrey, who headed the
human rights secretariat of the United Nations at the time the Declaration was
drafted, and who is credited with responsibility for the first draft of the Declaration, is
recalled with great pride by Canadian diplomats, politicians and human rights activ-
ists.

Within Canada, the Declaration has played a seminal role in the development of
human rights law. Its drafting and subsequent adoption compelled Parliament to ex-
amine the issue of domestic implementation which eventually led to the enactment of
the Canadian Bill of Rights’ in 1960. The inadequacies of that legislation propelled
legislators to prepare the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,’ which was pro-
claimed in 1982. The drafting history of the Canadian Charter reveals frequent refer-

‘GA Res. 217(111), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 [hereinafter

Declaration].

2 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, 1 August 1975, art. 1(a)(vii), re-

printed in 14 I.LM. 1292 [hereinafter Helsinki FinalAct].

3 UN Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), Preamble, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661.
‘See

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966,
Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force 23 March 1976).

” See the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Eur. T.S. 5 (entered into force 3 September 1953) [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights]; American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jos4 Costa
Rica, 22 November 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force 18 July
1978); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982).

” S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. Ill. See M. Cohen, “Bill C-60 and International

Law – The United Nations Charter – Declaration of Human Rights” (1959) 37 Can. Bar Rev. 228.
7 Part I of the Constitution Ac4 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11

[hereinafter Canadian Charter].

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ence to the provisions of the Declaration as efforts were made to ensure compatibility
and complementarity between the two instruments.! On a provincial level, the Decla-
ration was a model for the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.’ Direct
reference to the Declaration is made in the Ontario Human Rights Code”‘ and the
Yukon Human Rights Act.” Canadian courts have cited the Declaration as an aid to
interpretation of the Canadian Charter, and human rights legislation in general, in no
fewer than 135 reported judicial decisions.” The Supreme Court of Canada referred to
the Declaration for the first time in 1976,” in a case which dealt with an attempt to
challenge the now repealed death penalty provisions of the Criminal Code.” Since
then it has cited the Declaration in no fewer than sixteen judgments.

Yet for Canada, the drafting of the Declaration had a bizarre prologue. Despite
the enthusiastic involvement of Humphrey, the Canadian government’s attitude to-
ward the Declaration was skeptical; at its extreme, Canada’s attitude bordered on
hostility. During the vote on the draft Declaration in the Third Committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Canadian delegation, under the personal direction and instruction
of Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson, broke rank with the vast
majority of United Nations’ members and declined to support the Declaration. The
only other states to abstain at the time were those of the so-called Soviet bloc. The
international community was astonished by Canada’s puzzling and isolated position,
so clearly out of step with that of its traditional allies, notably the United Kingdom
and the United States. Pearson quickly readjusted Canadian policy, and when the
Declaration came before the plenary Assembly three days later, Canada had joined
the near consensus and voted in favour.

“See W.A. Schabas, International Human Rights Law and the Canadian Charter, 2d ed. (Scarbor-
ough: Carswell, 1996); M. Cohen & A.F. Bayefsky, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
and Public International Law” (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 265; J.E. Claydon, “International Human
Rights Law and the Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1982) 4 Su-
preme Court L. Rev. 287.

R.S.Q. c. C-12 [hereinafter Quebec Charter]. See A. Morel, “La Charte qu6b6coise: un document
unique dans I’histoire 16gislative canadienne” (1987) 21 RJ.T. 1 at 17. See also the comments of Jus-
tice Marcel Nichols of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Qudbec (City oJ) v. Commission des droits de
lapersonne, [1989] RJ.Q. 831 at 841, 11 C.H.R.R. D/500 (C.A.).

‘0 R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19. The importance of the Declaration in the construction of the Ontario code
was stressed by P.A. Cumming in Cameron v. Nel-Gor Castle Nursing Home (1984), 84 C.L.L.C. at
para. 17,008,5 C.H.R.R. D/2170 (Ont. Comm. Inquiry).

“S.Y. 1987, c. 3, s. 1.
2 See Schabas, supra note 8 at 228-29. The first reference dates from 1970. See R. v. Buckler
(1970), 2 O.R. 614, 2 C.C.C. 4 (Prov. Ct.). A year later, the prohibition on retroactive criminal of-
fences, set out in article 10 of the Declaration, supra note 1, was invoked unsuccessfully to challenge
measures adopted during the October crisis. See Gagnon v. R., [1971] C.A. 454, 14 C.R.N.S. 321.

‘-‘Miller v. R., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680,70 D.L.R. (3d) 324.
‘ R.S.C. 1970 c. C-34.

See Schabas, supra note 8 at 228-29.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

407

I. International Human Rights, Canadian Foreign Policy and the

Origins of the Declaration
The Constitution Act, 1867′ is silent about foreign or external relations, and only
in 1909 was a Department of External Affairs created. Canada attended the Paris
Peace Conference in 1919, signing the Treaty of Versailles” and joining the League of
Nations, undertakings that comprised some limited human rights obligations, specifi-
cally in the areas of labour standards and minority rights. In 1935, Canada ratified
three International Labour Organization (“ILO”) conventions,” and shortly thereafter
invoked these new international obligations to justify labour and social legislation that
intruded on what had previously been within provincial jurisdiction.” When the
provinces challenged this in court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruled
that the federal government could not alter the division of powers in the name of re-
spect for international human rights obligations?’

Early in the Second World War, it became clear that human rights principles
would form part of the New World Order which was to emerge following the defeat
of the Axis powers. Even before the American entry into the war, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt proclaimed the “four freedoms” in a celebrated address to Congress.-”
The “four freedoms” –
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want – would eventually reappear in the preamble to the Declaration. The Atlantic
Charter,” which resulted from a shipboard meeting between President Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland, clarified the role of
human rights objectives as part of the allied war aims.’ Well before the war was over,
foreign ministries, academics and non-governmental organizations were at work pre-

” (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11, No. 5 [hereinafter B.NA. Act].
,7 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 28 June 1919, 2 Bevans
43, 225 Cons. T.S. 188 (entered into force 28 June 1919) [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles]. Canada
subsequently adopted implementing legislation: Treaties of Peace Act, 1919, S.C. 1919 (2d Sess.), c.
30.

” See ILO Convention Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertakings to Eight in the Day
and Fourty-Eight in the Week, 3 November 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 17; ILO Convention Concerning the
Application of the Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings, 17 November 1921, 38 U.N.T.S. 187; ILO
Convention Concerning the Creation of Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery, 16 June 1928, 39
U.N.T.S. 3.

‘9 See Limitation of Hours of Work Act, S.C. 1935, c. 63; Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings

Act, S.C. 1935, c. 14; Minimum WagesAct, S.C. 1935, c. 44.

” See Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1937] A.C. 326, [19371 1 D.L.R. 673 (P.C.) [also called

Labour Conventions Case].

“See Annual Message to Congress, State of the Union Address (6 January 1941).

14 August 1941, United States and United Kingdom, 55 Stat. 1603, 204 L.N.T.S 381.

“That the Atlantic Charter served to propel post-war human rights norms is perhaps no better il-
lustrated than by the reference to it in a landmark Canadian case dealing with anti-Semitic restrictive
covenants in land titles. See Re Drummond Wren, [19451 O.R. 778, [194514 D.L.R. 674 (H.C.).

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[Vol. 43

paring draft declarations of human rights designed to form part of the post-war legal
regime.”

The Charter of the United Nations’ was adopted at the San Francisco Conference
in June 1945, and was ratified by Canada on 9 November 1945. One of the four pur-
poses of the organization, as article 1 makes clear, is the promotion and encourage-
ment of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language or religion. There are several references to human rights
in the UN Charter, and a role in their protection is specifically attributed to the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Human Rights
and the Trusteeship Council.’ However, there is an inescapable tension in the UN
Charter between the enhancement of human rights, which necessarily involves inter-
ference in matters which had previously been regarded as being purely internal and of
no concern to the international community, and the admonition, stated in article 2(7)
of the UN Charter, that the Security Council shall not “intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state?’

Reflecting the great unease that many states felt with this new venture into inter-
national human rights, proposals that the UN Charter actually include a declaration of
human rights norms were rejected by the San Francisco Conference.-” One such ini-
tiative had been prepared by Canadian diplomat Escott Reid, who was part of the
country’s delegation to the Conference. The first chapter of his “draft charter” was
entitled “The rights of every man?’ Reid had prepared the draft following the 1944
Dumbarton Oaks Conference in the hope that the Department of External Affairs
might circulate it in preparation for the San Francisco Conference. However, the pro-
posal was not taken up, and senior bureaucrat Hume Wrong apparently considered it a
“wasted effort” although the Department did allow Reid to publish his proposal
anonymously.’ The proposal was in fact circulated to the delegates at San Francisco
in a pamphlet issued by the Free World Research Bureau entitled “The Constitution of

24 See L.B. Sohn, “How American International Lawyers Prepared for the San Francisco Bill of
Rights” (1995) 89 AJ.I.L 540; J. Morsink, “World War Two and the Universal Declaration” (1993)
15 Hum. Rts. Q. 357; H. Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of Man (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1945).

2 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7,59 Stat. 1031, 145 U.K.F.S. 805 [hereinafter UN Charter].
See ibid, preamble, arts. 1(3), 13(l)(b), 55(c), 56, 68, 76(c). See also A. Petrenko, “The Human
Rights Provisions of the United Nations Charter” (1978) 9 Man. LJ. 53; E. Schwelb, “The Interna-
tional Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter” (1972) 66 AJ.I.L. 337.

” Panama, Additional Amendments Proposed by the Delegation of the Republic of Panama Con-
cerning the Proposals for the Maintenance of Peace and Security Agreed Upon at the Conference of
Dumbarton Oaks, UN Conference on International Organization, Doe. 2 G/7(g)(2) (1945) at 265;
Cuba, Seven Proposals on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted by the Delegation of Cuba, UN
Conference on International Organization, Doe. 2 G/14(g) (1945) at 493. Panama and Cuba had pro-
posed declarations of human rights for incorporation within the UN Charter. At the San Francisco
Conference, the First Committee adopted a resolution calling on the General Assembly to examine
the Panamanian text and give it an effective form (see Report of Rapporteur of Committee I to Con-
mission I, Doe. 944 1/1/34(1) (1945) at 446).

2, See E. Reid, Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto

Press, 1989) at 192.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

409

the United Nations.”‘
In February 1947, Reid also managed to slip references to his
human rights proposals into a speech he drafted for Louis St. Laurent, Secretary of
State for External Affairs at the time. St. Laurent’s address was delivered to the Mont-
real branch of the United Nations’ Association at a meeting attended by Eleanor Roo-
sevelt, who had just been designated chair of the “nuclear” Commission on Human
Rights of the United Nations.”

Eleanor Roosevelt and the Commission over which she presided had been as-
signed principal responsibility for the preparation of two human rights documents: a
declaration and a covenant or treaty.’ Early in 1947, Humphrey submitted a forty-
eight-article draft to the “nuclear” Commission, composed of members sitting in their
individual capacity rather than as representatives of member states –
a temporary
situation that existed for several months prior to formal establishment of the Commis-
sion of Human Rights in accordance with article 68 of the UN Charter2 The prepara-
tion of the text of the Declaration was subsequently assigned to a small drafting
committee, in which the French jurist Ren6 Cassin played a pivotal role 3 By June
1948, after three intense sessions, the Commission adopted its final text, which was
then passed to the Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) for what would be
only perfunctory consideration. ECOSOC sent the draft to the General Assembly,
where the Declaration underwent comprehensive scrutiny and debate. In meetings
held throughout October and November 1948, the Third Committee voted no fewer
than 1,400 times on various proposals and amendments before finalizing the text on 7
December 1948. Three days later, the General Assembly adopted the text of the Dec-
laration with forty-eight member states, including Canada, voting in favour. There
were no opposing votes, although the delegations from the Soviet Union, Bielorussia,
Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, South Africa and Saudi Arabia abstained?’

From the post-war human rights situation in Canada contradictory signals
emerge. On the one hand, from a legal standpoint there had been some significant de-
velopments towards human rights protection in Canadian law. In 1938, the Supreme
Court of Canada recognized an implicit protection of freedom of expression within

” National Archives of Canada [hereinafter NAc] MG 31, E 46, Vol. 3.
See E. Reid, On Duty, A Canadian at the Making of the United Nations, 1945-1946 (Toronto:

McClelland & Stewart, 1983) at 18-23.

3′ See Economic and Social Council, Human Rights Commission, Summary Record of the First
Meeting, UN ESCOR, 1945, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1. For a history of the work of the Commission on
Human Rights in the drafting of the Declaration, see J.-B. Marie, La Commission des droits de
l’homme de I’O.N.U. (Paris: Pedone, 1975). Other works dealing with the history of the Declaration
include: A. Verdoodt, Naissance et signification de la Diclaration universelle des droits de l’homme
(Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1963); G. Johnson, “La r6daction de Ia D6claration universelle (1946-1948)”
in G. Johnson, ed., La Ddclaration universelle des droits de l’homme (Paris: UNESCO/L’Harmattan,
1991) 21; R. Cassin, “La D6claration universelle et ia mise en oeuvre des droits de l’homme” (1951)
79 R.C.A.D.I. 237.

32 See Marie, ibid. Canada was not an initial member of the Commission. In fact, Canada was not

elected to the Commission until 1963.

See Cassin, supra note 31.
Two Member States, Honduras and Yemen, were not present at the time of the vote.

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the preamble to the B.N.A. Act.’ There were also some halting moves at anti-
discrimination legislation in Ontario during the early 1940s,’ although it was Sas-
katchewan which took the pioneering step of enactment of a human rights code in
19477′

Yet Canada was in many ways a repressive society, and its human rights record
compared unfavourably in several respects with that of the United States and the
United Kingdom. For example, legislation enacted pursuant to the War Measures Act’
went well beyond that of Canada’s closest allies in prohibiting political activity and in
ordering the internment of “enemy aliens”.” Within Quebec, the “padlock law””‘ oper-
ated to prohibit the activities of communists and Jehovah’s Witnesses.’ In February
1942, the Cabinet had ordered the removal of all Japanese Canadians from an area
within 100 miles of the Pacific coast, despite that senior military and Royal Canadian
Mounted Police officials opposed such a measure on the grounds that the Japanese
minority was no threat to security. More than 20,000 persons, many of them born in
Canada, were persecuted during the war on this basis and were forced to leave their
homes and live in internment camps.” In late 1945, following the revelations of Soviet
embassy employee Igor Gouzenko, several individuals were arrested secretly and held
incommunicado, without access to counsel or to family and friends. Under the Con-
tinuation of Transitional Powers Act of 1945,” which replaced the War Measures Act
at the close of the war, habeas corpus was suspended. Those detained were subse-
quently questioned, without the assistance of legal counsel, before a secret royal
commission composed of two sitting Supreme Court judges.” Meanwhile, the racist

See Reference ReAlberta Statutes, [19381 S.C.R. 100, [193812 D.L.R. 81.
See Racial Discrimination Ac, 1944, S.O. 1944, c. 51.

37See Saskatchewan Bill ofRightsAct, 1947, S.S. 1947, c. 35.
-” S.C. 1927, c. 206.
39 See H. Laski, “Civil Liberties in Great Britain and Canada during War” (1942) 55 Harv. L. Rev.

1006.

‘ See Act Respecting Communist Propaganda, S.Q. 1937, c. 11. See also Switzman v. Elbing,

[19571 S.C.R. 285,7 D.LR. (2d) 337.

“See W. Kaplan, State and Salvation: The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Fight for Civil Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); MJ. Penton, Jehovah’s Witnesses in Canada, Chatnpi-
ons of Freedom of Speech and Worship (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976). See also Saumur v. Quebec (City
o]), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, 4 D.LR. (2d) 641; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121, 16 D.L.R.
(2d) 689.

42 See K. Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was: A History of Japanese Canadians (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1991); B. Broadfoot, Years of Sorrow Years of Shame: The Story of the Japa-
nese Canadians in World War 11 (Toronto: Doubleday, 1977); A.G. Sunahara, The Politics of Racism:
The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians During the Second World War (Toronto: Lorimer, 1981). See
also Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians v. Canada (A.G.), [1947] A.C. 87, [1947] 1
D.LR. 577 (P.C.).

” S.C. 1945 (2d Sess.), c. 25, as rep. by Continuation of Transitional Measures Act, 1947, S.C.

1947, c. 16.

” See M.H. Fyfe, “Some Legal Aspects of the Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage”
(1946) 24 Can. Bar Rev. 777. On the anti-Communist climate in general, see R. Whitaker & G. Mar-
cuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1994).

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

411

treatment of Canadians of Japanese origin did not end with the surrender in the Pa-
cific theatre. Rather it was only in 1949 that discriminatory measures were finally re-
pealed, those interned allowed to return without restriction to British Columbia and
their right to vote restored. ‘

II. The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of

Commons, 1947-1948
On 26 May 1947, a resolution of the House of Commons proposed the creation of
a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with a mandate “to consider the question of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms, and the manner in which those obligations ac-
cepted by all members of the United Nations may best be implemented!” The resolu-
tion added:

And, in particular, in the light of the provisions contained in the charter of the
United Nations, and the establishment by the economic and social council
thereof of a commission on human rights, what is the legal and constitutional
situation in Canada with respect to such rights, and what steps, if any, it would
be advisable to take or to recommend for the purpose of preserving in Canada
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 7

The Committee held seven sessions during June and July 1947, under the chair of J.L.
Ilsley, hearing as witnesses R.G. Riddell and E.R. Hopkins, of External Affairs, P.
Varcoe and D.H.W. Henry, of the Department of Justice, and John P. Humphrey, of
the United Nations’ Secretariat. Riddell, who was chief of the first political division at
External Affairs, filed various preparatory materials for the Declaration with the
Committee, including the forty-eight-article initial draft whose authorship is attributed
In Humphrey’s testimony before the Committee, he modestly de-
to Humphrey.’
scribed the document as being produced by the “secretariat”. 9

The Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, Hopkins, explained that

the Declaration:

4 See Continuation of Transitional Measures Act -Revoking Certain Portions of Orders in Coun-

cil with Respect to the Japanese, SOR/48-92, s. 3.

House of Commons Debates (26 May 1947) at 3422.
47 bid.
” See Commission on Human Rights Drafting Committee, Draft Outline of the International Bill of
Rights, UN ESCOR, UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3, Appendix D at 57-62. See also “Memorandum from
Lester B. Pearson to Louis St. Laurent” (18 June 1947) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-W-40.

‘ See Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1947) at 90
[hereinafter Joint Committee on Human Rights 1947]. He also conceded that “the final project [was]
elaborated by Professor Cassin for the drafting committee” (ibid. at 96), adding that “Professor Cassin
used the secretariat documents as the basis of this draft, in that some of the sections are textually the
same” (ibid. at 97). Humphrey told the Commission: “Professor Cassin, who is president of the
Commission, and who was familiar with the French position and the French member of the Commis-
sion on Human Rights was asked to take the secretariat draft and rewrite it with the idea of presenting
something that could be put forward in the form of a declaration” (ibid. at 105).

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would eventually be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations
and approved by a Resolution of that body, in which case it would have only a
quasi-juridical force, a moral force having the character of a strong recommen-
dation. It would however be of a highly persuasive nature.”

He clearly distinguished the Declaration from a human rights treaty, which was also
being considered and which would, in contrast with the Declaration, bind states that
ratified or acceded to it. Humphrey also sought to appease Parliamentarians by in-
sisting upon the non-binding nature of the Declaration, stating: “a resolution of the
General Assembly has no binding effect on international law,” although he added pru-
dently: “I think it would be an element in the building up of international jurispru-
dence. You cannot take it for granted that it would have no legal significance at all.”
The Committee requested that provincial attorneys general and heads of Canadian law
schools be solicited for their views on the power of the Federal Parliament to enact a
comprehensive bill of rights applicable to all of Canada, and recommended that a joint
committee be appointed to resume its work at the next session.’-

The Committee reconvened in April 1948,'” with Riddell and Hopkins again the
featured witnesses. Riddell reviewed human rights developments in the United Na-
tions, noting that the Canadian Government had received a report from the Commis-
sion on Human Rights on its December 1947 session,” with a request for comments.”
Secretary of State for External Affairs St. Laurent replied to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations on 1 April 1948, explaining that Canada must seek the advice of
Parliament before expressing its views. St. Laurent provided the first public hint of
reticence within the Government by launching the suggestion that the United Nations
might consider postponing the adoption of the Declaration for at least another year:

I have the honour to refer to your letter of January 9, 1948, in which was en-
closed a report on the Second Session of the Commission on Human Rights,
and to inform you that the proposals contained in the draft International Bill of
Human Rights have been closely considered by officials of the government,
and it is expected that they will be considered by a Joint Parliamentary Com-
mittee on Human Rights. A discussion of this subject by parliament has not yet
been possible, however, and the Canadian Government would not wish to ex-

“Ibid. at 13.
,Ibid. at 93. Many years later, Humphrey would be one of the more outspoken advocates of the
view that the Declaration constitutes a codification of customary norms and is thus binding on all
States. See J.P. Humphrey, “La nature juridique de la D6claration universelle des droits de l’Homme”
(1981) 12 R.G.D. 397; J.P. Humphrey, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Im-
pact and Judicial Character” in B.G. Ramcharan, ed., Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal
Declaration (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 21; J. Humphrey, “The International Bill of Rights:
Scope and Implementation” (1976) 17 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 527.

“See Joint Committee on Human Rights 1947, supra note 49 at iv.
“Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1948) at 22
[hereinafter Joint Committee on Human Rights 1948].

“UN Doc. E/600.
“House of CommonsDebates (13 February 1948) at 1181.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

413

press views on a matter of such importance without having had the benefit of
learning the opinion of Parliament…

The Canadian Government is anxious that ample opportunity be afforded to
comment on the International Bill of Rights both at the meeting of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council in July and at the meeting of the General Assembly
in September.

It is the opinion of the Canadian Government that the final drafting of an Inter-
national Bill of Rights is a serious task involving the reconciliation of differing
philosophies and judicial principles. It is therefore respectfully suggested that
the final expression by the United Nations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms may well require much more time than is at present contemplated,
and that postponement of approval of the Draft Bill from the 1948 to the 1949
Session of the General Assembly might be with advantage taken into consid-
eration.?

Riddell told the Committee that some hoped the Declaration would be in final
form by the autumn of 1948, but said that “my own personal view is that the process
of revision will be a rather longer one.” Hopkins added that a common approach to
human rights might be difficult because of ideological differences between the east
and west. Hopkins returned to the distinction between the draft Declaration and the
proposed treaty, still in embryonic form, noting that the Declaration would “have the
character of a recommendation and what lawyers call a persuasive value. It would not
create binding and positive legal obligations.’ When asked bluntly by one Parlia-
mentarian whether a General Assembly declaration would bind Canada, Riddell an-
swered: “No, sir. The actions of the General Assembly of the United Nations consti-
tute simply recommendations to the member states.” ‘ In its final report to Parliament,
the Committee concluded:

Although not legally binding upon States, such a document, being a statement
of principles, will tend to influence the course of legislation in States which
consider themselves morally bound by its provisions, and will, therefore, pro-
mote human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

The parliamentarians spent several sessions examining the draft Declaration arti-
cle by article. The text that they worked from had been adopted by the Commission
on Human Rights at its December session, although the Committee was aware that the
Commission was to meet again in June 1948, and that additional changes to the draft
were to be expected.” The proceedings are a revealing guide to prevailing attitudes on
human rights matters and to the nervousness with which much of Canada’s political

Supra note 53 at 51.
Ibid at 2Z
‘IbiL at 33.
59IbiL at 35.
Ibid at 207.

“A copy of the draft had been brought to the attention of the Canadian legal community by John
Humphrey. See J.P. Humphrey, “The Draft International Declaration and Covenant on Human Rights”
(1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 548; also J.P. Humphrey, “The Draft International Declaration of Human
Rights” (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 1106.

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[Vol. 43

elite approached the question. Although on a few occasions there was a suggestion
that the Committee might formally vote upon proposed amendments, in the end it
simply discussed the proposed provisions and left it for others to interpret the tenor of
its comments. Among the few real proposals to emerge was the suggestion that “the
name of God should be embodied” in the Declaration. One honourable member
urged that where draft article 1 referred to “dignity and rights”, the words “and rights”
should be replaced with “being vested by their Creator with unalienable rights.”‘- An
apparent consensus emerged recommending that Cassin’s text of article 1 be replaced
with the following: “All men are born free and equal in dignity being vested by the
Creator with unalienable rights. They are endowed by Him with reason and con-
science, and should act towards one another like brothers.”

When attention turned to the non-discrimination provision of the draft Declara-
tion, which would eventually become article 2, some parliamentarians expressed con-
cern about how this might apply to Canadians of Japanese descent and to Amerindi-
ans.” At one point, the Chair noted:

Somewhere in these articles there is the right of movement of citizens within
their own country, and if you wish to have a law preventing a movement of the
Japanese from one part of the country to the other which we have at the present
time it could well be argued it is contrary to this declaration.”

But a Member of Parliament from British Columbia quickly interjected that there was
no human rights violation in the treatment of the Japanese, who had been interned not
because of “race” but because of “loyalty or subversive attitudes” As for Aboriginal
peoples, it was questioned whether the Declaration’s democratic rights provision
(eventually article 21) might entitle them to vote (status Indians were not allowed to
vote in Canada until 1960).” However, Senator Gouin explained that “they have the
right to choose to be wards of the state and not vote, or to vote and have freedom.”‘

Concern was expressed about the right to life provision (article 3 in the final
draft). Cassin had intentionally omitted reference to the death penalty, with the view
that the Declaration would evolve into an abolitionist instrument.’ Unaware of Cas-
sin’s intentions, the Committee Chair noted:

Certainly there is an exception in countries which have capital punishment. I
suppose that is covered by a subsequent section and so therefore all the decla-
ration amounts to is that everyone has the right to life, except those whose lives
are taken away by process of law ”

2Joint Committee on Human Rights 1948, supra note 53 at 52.
‘Ibid at 59.
“See ibid. at 72.
“6Ibid. at 74-75.
“6Ibid. at 75. In fact, no Japanese-Canadian was ever charged with subversive activities.
“See Canada ElectionsAct, S.C. 1960, c. 39, s. 14.
” Joint Committee on Human Rights 1948, supra note 53 at 72.
69 See Commission on Human Rights Drafting Committee, Summary Record of the Second Meet-

ing, UN ESCOR, 2d Sess. UN Doc. EICN.4/AC.1/SR.2 at 10.

“Joint Committee on Human Rights 1948, supra note 53 at 76.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

415

A member of the Committee, Marquis, was skeptical: “It seems to me that we are
going as far as advocating the removal of capital punishment?” Marquis was also in-
trigued by the possibility that the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment (article 5 of the final draft) might outlaw hanging
but the Chair reassured him otherwise. Members of the Committee also concluded
that whipping would not be prohibited by the provision.”

The economic and social clauses of the Declaration, which are found in articles
22-26 of the final version, were treated with considerable levity by the Committee.
Member of Parliament John Hackett described the right to an adequate standard of
living as being “a statement of political economy, not human rights?”‘ When it came
to the right to rest and leisure (article 24 in the final version) Senators and Members
of Parliament joked about whether vacations should be compulsory, and the Chairman
said “[t]hey should be frequent and they should be long.’

In its conclusions, the Committee noted that it had not attempted to redraft the
Declaration, but simply to examine critically the principles set out in the working
draft generated by the Commission at its December 1947 session. Nothing, however,
suggests that the parliamentarians supported the Government’s suggestion that adop-
tion of the Declaration be delayed. Nor, in general, was the negativity which would
characterize so much of the Department of External Affairs’ behaviour in the coming
months in any way endorsed. The report states:

Your Committee considers that the Declaration would be more effective if
stated in a shorter, more concise form. As there is no assurance that any spe-
cific draft prepared by your Committee would be accepted by the United Na-
tions, your Committee does not suggest any particular revision of the draft
submitted but recommends that the Government, in presenting its views to the
United Nations, have in mind the views of members of your Committee as re-
ported in the record of proceedings and evidence. 6

To an extent, this is what took place. The proceedings of the Committee were
analysed by bureaucrats and digested in a briefing book which was prepared to guide
the Canadian delegation at the 1948 session of the General Assembly. The briefing
book stated:

The Committee considered that the Declaration would be more effective if
stated in a shorter, more concise form. While not suggesting any particular re-
vision of the draft submitted, the Committee recommended that the Govern-
ment, in presenting its views to the United Nations, have in mind the views of
the Committee as reported in the record of proceedings and evidence. At its
meeting members of the Parliamentary Committee declared they were much
impressed with the Draft Declaration of Human Rights submitted by the dele-
gation of China (UN Doe. E/CN.4/AC.1/18) to the drafting committee of Hu-

7 lbiL at 77.
” See ibid.
” See ibid. at 96.
7′ Ibi at 155.
71 Ibid. at 157.
76 Ibid at 207.

MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

[Vol. 43

man Rights Commission. The Committee felt that this draft was an appropriate
length and yet embodied all the essential principles. If a similar Declaration
were submitted again to the Economic and Social Council, the Canadian dele-
gation should support it. The United States delegation has also consistently fa-
voured a shorter Declaration, and stated that it was “impressed and encour-
aged”by the draft Declaration submitted by China. In considering the Declara-
tion submitted by the Human Rights Commission, the Canadian delegation
should take into account the views of the Parliamentary Committee which gen-
erally was opposed to unnecessary articles, e.g. Article 5 [the right to recogni-
tion everywhere as a person before the law, article 6 in the final version], and to
articles which appeared to define the duties of the state, e.g. Articles 21-22
[dealing with economic and social rights, articles 22 to 26 in the final version].
In accordance with the views of members of the Committee, the delegation
should at least place on the record the view that the name of God should be
embodied in the first article of the Declaration.n

The text of the briefing book follows with a catalogue of comments “based on the
views of members of the Committee and of the Department of External Affairs.” It
states that the preamble should be written “simply and directly,” urging a reference to
“human beings” and “the spirit of brotherhood” with which the official who drafted
the memorandum felt the Parliamentary Committee would “probably agree.’ It noted
the concern of the Committee with emergency powers, and the fact that the possibility
of derogation in such circumstances would at the very least be implicit. The com-
ments were quite detailed on many provisions, including those respecting marriage,
incitement of discrimination, elections and economic and social rights.

Canada seemed proud of the fact that its elected officials had reviewed the draft
Declaration, something that few, if any, of the other members of the United Nations
had apparently taken the trouble to do. At the summer 1948 meeting of the ECOSOC,
a Canadian delegate, L.A.D. Stephens, referred to the work of the Joint Parliamentary
Committee and told members of the Council that the Committee “had been able to re-
port on [the draft Declaration] in highly favourable terms.” Conveying one of the
suggestions to emerge from the Committee’s deliberations, he said that Canada “fully
agreed” with an amendment to article 1 that would indicate the “Creator” as the
source of rights, and pledged that “the Canadian delegation to the General Assembly
would be anxious to support such an amendment.”‘

Stephens also singled out article 23 (article 26 in the final version) dealing with
the right to education. He said that the provision might have been more appropriate in
a UNESCO resolution. A reference to the incitement of discrimination (article 7 in the
final version) was described as being vague, and Stephens said it should either be
clarified or deleted.’ As for the economic and social rights clauses (articles 22-26 in
the final version), the Canadian representative said that they went beyond the purpose

“Commentary for the Use of the Canadian Delegation” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-3-

40″2″.

UN Doc. E/SR.216 at 655.

7′ In its final version, art. 7 of the Declaration, supra note 1, states: “[AII are entitled to equal pro-
tection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination’

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

417

of the Declaration, and became, in effect, a proclamation of governmental responsi-
bilities. “A simple general statement of the right to social security would have been
preferable.” But Stephens cautioned that these were only minor criticisms, “and did
not detract from the admiration which the Canadian delegation felt for the Declara-
tion in general.”‘ According to Stephens, Canada “would support the Declaration,
with the necessary modifications, in the conviction that its adoption would add to the
sum total of human dignity, happiness and decency”‘ – In the months to follow, this
relatively unequivocal public Canadian support was to become, at the best of times,
half-hearted.

Canada’s principal allies, the United Kingdom and the United States, had left no
doubt as to their enthusiasm for the Declaration and their determination that it should
be adopted at the autumn session of the General Assembly. A meeting in London of
Commonwealth representatives with British diplomats made clear the United King-
dom’s support of the Declaration. Acting High Commissioner R.A.D. Ford reported
to Ottawa:

The United Kingdom feel on the whole that there is an advantage in presenting
it to the Assembly at the present time. They propose to make minor changes in
the articles concerning the right to asylum, the right of equal pay, and the right
to work. Article 21 concerning the right to work they now feel may be inter-
preted to mean that Governments are required to find work for everyone. In the
United Kingdom’s opinion, it is simply a matter of finding the correct nomen-
clature. In general, they would prefer to see textual changes kept to a minimum.
They are anxious to have further consultations between various Common-
wealth delegations in Paris on the draft before it goes before this Assembly.1

Canada was also well aware of the level of support in the United States for the
Declaration, just as the Americans were aware of the emerging Canadian reticence.
At a meeting of the United States Delegation on 25 September 1948, Dean Rusk re-
ferred to the meetings of the Parliamentary Committee earlier in the year stating, in-
correctly, that Canada intended to apply the Declaration in domestic law when it was
eventually adopted. But when he suggested a meeting with the Canadians to address
their “legitimate serious concern,” Eleanor Roosevelt warned that while “there was no
way to prevent discussion’
if “detailed discussion was begun, there was serious ques-
tion as to whether the Declaration would be gotten through at all.”‘” On 28 September
1948, the members of the Canadian delegation who were assigned to the Third Com-
mittee had lunch with Eleanor Roosevelt at the Hotel Raphael, the headquarters of the
Canadian delegation. According to the report the Canadian delegates filed with Ot-
tawa the next day:

‘”Supra note 78.
“‘ Ibid.

IbL at 655.
“Letter from R.A.D. Ford to Escott Reid” (13 September 1948) NAc RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-

DG-2-40.

m””Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Paris, Hotel d’1dna, 25 September
1948, 9:15 am” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General: The United Nations, Part I
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1975) at 292-93.

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Mrs Roosevelt emphasized United States desire for the Declaration to pass at
this Assembly, saying moral force of a declaration would be great. No United
States legislation would be needed for a declaration. United States dislikes cer-
tain aspects, but is willing to have the Declaration in its present form pass
without major change so as to avoid endless discussion, especially by USSR.
United States particularly dislikes clause on freedom to work. We mentioned
our dislike of clauses on duties of Governments. We also showed our dislike for
Declaration’s parts of which we did not believe in. Mrs Roosevelt thinks only
one clause biased to USSR way of thinking and suggests we all do as USA has
done, viz. to declare what we understand by each clause. She abhors possibility
of detailed debate when it took two years for eighteen to agree and thinks gen-
eral acceptance of Declaration can be used as means of education of peoples
and Governments (and, I suspect, of anti-Communist propaganda).’

There were public signs of opposition within Canada, notably in a resolution of
the influential Canadian Bar Association (“C.B.A.”), adopted on 3 September 1948,
stating that “the said draft declaration ought to be examined with the utmost care in all
its juridical aspects before further action is taken, so that there may be no misunder-
standing as to the meaning and effect thereof.”‘ The 1948 Convention of the Associa-
tion, held at Montreal’s Windsor Hotel from 31 August to 3 September, exuded an ob-
sessive antagonism to the question of judicial protection of human rights.” It opened
with a disgraceful defence of Quebec’s “padlock law” by keynote speaker Premier
Maurice Duplessis:

In the province of Quebec you will find law-abiding citizens. We may have
some legislation which you do not like. We respect your opinion, but we like
the legislation we have. On more than one occasion this so-called extraordinary
law called the padlock law has proved to have served the interests of the prov-
ince and of Canada at large.’

This was followed by the presidential address of John T. Hackett, a Montreal lawyer
and Member of Parliament for the Conservative Party, consisting principally of a dia-
tribe on the draft Declaration. Earlier in the year, Hackett had played a particularly
cynical role in the debates of the Special Joint Committee on the Declaration. For
Hackett,

‘ (September 1948) NAc RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-2-40, No. 74. 29. Prime Minister
MacKenzie King also had Mrs Roosevelt for dinner on 29 September, although there is nothing to
suggest that they discussed the Declaration. King noted in his diary that his rooms were almost im-
mediately adjacent those of Eleanor Roosevelt at the Raphael Hotel. See W.LM. King, Mackenzie
King Diaries: 1893-1949 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980) at no. 259-60.

The 1948 Yearbook of the Canadian Bar Association and the Minutes of Proceedings of the Thir-
tieth Annual Meeting (Ottawa: National Printers, 1949) at 142 [hereinafter 1948 Yearbook of the Ca-
nadian Bar].

In his study, Walter S. Tarnopolsky interpreted the proceedings in the Canadian Bar Association
somewhat more charitably, downplaying the organization’s hostility to human rights: see W.S. Trno-
polsky, The Canadian Bill ofRights, 2d ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1975) at 6-7.

“1948 Yearbook of the Canadian Bar, supra note 86 at 19.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

419

These human rights and fundamental freedoms exist in Christian civilization.
They do not exist elsewhere. They have never existed elsewhere.

His message was that the protection of human rights would be achieved not by decla-
rations under the aegis of the United Nations but by the promotion of Christianity.

Ill. Debates in the Third Committee of the General Assembly

The Canadian delegation to the 1948 Paris session of the General Assembly was
initially headed by Minister of Transport Lionel Chevrier, although Prime Minister
Mackenzie King himself, in one of his last official gestures before retiring, attended
briefly at the beginning of the session.’ There were efforts from the United States
Government, during the summer of 1948, to urge Secretary of State for External Af-
fairs St. Laurent to stand as president of the General Assembly.9′ However political
changes were afoot in Ottawa and St. Laurent preferred to stay at home. King left for
Europe on 13 September, and from then St. Laurent was Acting Prime Minister. He
returned id early November only to formalise his resignation and officially transfer
authority to St. Laurent. Lester B. Pearson joined the Cabinet in the foreign affairs
portfolio on 10 September despite the fact that he was yet to hold a seat in the House
of Commons. Pearson spent part of October campaigning in a safe constituency in
Northern Ontario.’ – After winning the by-election on 25 October he left the same
night on the train for Ottawa and then flew to Europe to take charge of the General
Assembly delegation. ‘

The work of the General Assembly is carried out principally by its six commit-
tees. Human rights questions, as a general rule, fall to the Third Committee. The re-
port of ECOSOC, containing the draft Declaration, was accordingly examined by the
Third Committee prior to being submitted for final approval by the plenary General
Assembly. In the Third Committee, Canada’s delegation was headed by Ralph May-
bank, a Member of Parliament, assisted by R.M. MacDonnell, H.H. Carter and K.C.
Brown. In his opening statement on 1 October, Maybank referred to the work of the
Parliamentary Committee, which he said had “reported favourably on the general ob-
jectives of the draft declaration and had suggested a number of amendments, to which
he would refer at a later stage.”” Maybank noted that Canada “deplored” the fact that

Ibid at 100, 142.
King arrived in Paris on 20 September and left for London on 5 October, where he spent the rest
of the month before returning to Canada. While in London he met briefly with Lester Pearson, who
was on his way to Paris to lead the delegation at the General Assembly. See W.L.M. King, supra note
85 at nos. 259-60.

” Dean Rusk broached the idea with the Canadian charg6 d’affaires in Washington early in August

1948: see NAc RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-2-40.

” See J. English, Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson, vol. 1 (1897-1948) (Toronto:
Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989); J.A. Munro & A.I. Inglis, eds., Mike, The Memoirs of the Right
HonourableLesterB. Pearson, vol. 2 (1948-1957) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).

See English, ibid. at 331-32; Munro & Inglis, ibid at 9.

“UN GAOR, C3, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions, 3d Sess., 90” Mtg., Pt.1. at 40-41

(1948) [hereinafter Official Records of the Third Committee].

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[Vol. 43

the draft Declaration had not been discussed in any detail during the ECOSOC ses-
sion that summer. He added, “as I am sure all delegations here recognize, that the
Commission on Human Rights had not accomplished the miracle of producing a per-
fect text.”

At the appropriate time the Canadian Delegation will make a number of sug-
gestions designed to clarify the wording of individual articles in the present
text.
… [W]hile my Government endorses the general objectives of this draft Decla-
ration of Human Rights, the extent to which it can act in the field of human
rights is circumscribed and is a subject which would have to be carefully stud-
ied by competent legal authorities at the proper time. This, however, is a matter
which can be left in abeyance, as the present document before us is a simple
declaration whose endorsement does not require legislative action by member
states.

In conclusion I would like to state again my conviction that, with good-will and
a common belief in the importance of defining human rights in simple and un-
mistakable terms, we can in this Committee approve a declaration which will
be of real significance in the history of man’s striving to achieve a greater
measure of dignity and freedom.”5

This statement was not entirely accurate. The Parliamentary Committee had not in
fact proposed a number of amendments. Probably the most certain of its conclusions
was the idea that the Creator be mentioned somewhere in the Declaration. Raising the
spectre of provincial jurisdiction was plainly insincere, and Maybank virtually admit-
ted as much in his speech when he said the matter could be “left in abeyance” because
the Declaration was no more than “a simple declaration whose endorsement does not
require legislative action by member states.” In any event, this matter had been ade-
quately explained to the Parliamentary Committee by the Legal Advisor to External
Affairs and by Humphrey, and appeared to pose no difficulties. But the argument was
a convenient one, implying to uninformed delegations from other states that the intri-
cacies of Canada’s inscrutable constitution might explain and even justify a less en-
thusiastic approach to the Declaration.

As the debates unfolded, Maybank’s promise to present the amendments that the
Parliamentary Committee had allegedly proposed evaporated. In fact, Canada never
did move any amendments.” To be fair to Maybank, his instructions from Ottawa over
the next few days hardly encouraged him to participate. On 7 October the delegation
received a discouraging telegram, and a day later a personal message arrived from St.
Laurent to Lionel Chevrier indicating the Acting Prime Minister’s serious misgivings

5 NAc RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DM-1-40. See also: (1 October 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700,
File 5475-DN-40, No. 91; (1 October 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DP-40, No. 92; “Prog-
ress Report on Committee III, November 1, 1948, despatch by R.G. Riddell to Escott Reid” NAC RG
25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-2-40. For the exact wording of Maybank’s speech in the summary rec-
ords of the Committee, see Official Records of the Third Committee, supra note 94.

* See “Report on Draft Declaration of Human Rights up to the 23 November –

(Articles 1 to 22,
inclusive), November 25, 1948” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DM-1-40 No. 31 at 5, 8 [herein-
after “Report on Draft Declaration of Human Rights”].

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

421

about the Declaration. The statement that, “We were advised not to take a prominent
part in the discussion on individual articles, until our position on the Declaration as a
whole had been further clarified” 4 summarised a subsequent report from Paris. The
Canadian delegation read the signals from Ottawa without difficulty and on 11 Octo-
ber 1948, wrote back: “In accordance with your instructions the Canadian delegation
will not sponsor nor support the early passage of the Declaration on Human Rights in
its present form.'” When article 1 was being debated, Brazil sought to insert a refer-
ence to God, something vigorously opposed by both the United States and the Soviet
Union, who argued that the issue had been exhaustively canvassed in the Commission
on Human Rights. Maybank and his associates quietly forgot the work of the Parlia-
mentary Committee and said nothing, although according to the delegation’s report to
Ottawa on the proceedings, they were prepared to support the Brazilian amendment?
In fact, Canada abstained on the amendment, which was defeated, and voted in favour
of the article as a whole at the end of the debate.'”

At times, the Canadian delegation seemed to find the whole matter of a declara-
tion of riglhts rather tiresome. The dispatch to Ottawa described the debate on article 4
(slavery and servitude) as “anaesthetic”.'”‘ The Third Committee discussion on article
6 (recognition as a person before the law) provided the occasion for Canada’s first
substantive contribution. The provision had disturbed the Parliamentary Committee,
which believed it to be superfluous.”‘ Delegation member Carter told the Third Com-
mittee that Canada supported the provision, adding that “Canadian national law had
for a long time admitted the right of every individual to recognition of his juridical
personality.”” ” Carter gave as an example of its importance the fact that the right to le-
gal personality had been denied in Nazi Germany. Mysteriously, the delegation’s re-
port to Ottawa claimed that the essence of Carter’s intervention concerning draft arti-
cle 6 was to tell the Committee that “we were not entirely convinced of its neces-
,0
sity.”

When the Committee came to the provisions dealing with economic and social
rights (articles 22-26 in the final version) Canada made an important statement indi-
cating its discontent with the provisions, and invoking the now familiar spectre of
provincial jurisdiction. In several telegrammes to Ottawa the Canadian delegation
built-up to the event, which had become the highlight of its participation in the Third

qIbid.

(11 October 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 165.
“Report on Draft Declaration of Human Rights”, supra note 96 at 7.

“” (13 October 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DN-40, No. 186.
‘ (22 October 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DN-40, No. 252.
See “Commentary for the Use of the Canadian Delegation”, supra note 77 at 2, 9.

“‘ See UN GAOR, C3, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions, 3d Sess., 111th Mtg., UN Doc.

A/C.3/SR.111 (1948) at 225.

” Ibid.
“‘2″Report on Draft Declaration of Human Rights”, supra note 96 at 9. See also: (25 October 1948)

NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DN-40, No. 268.

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Committee.”‘ Canada’s statement is reported as follows in the summary records of the
debates:

After careful consideration, the Canadian delegation has come to the opinion
that it should abstain from voting on these four articles, but we wish immedi-
ately to stress the fact that no one should interpret our abstention as an opposi-
tion to the principles set forth in article 20 [article 22 in the final version] and in
those three immediately succeeding articles. We wish to make it clear, however,
that, in regard to any obligations that may arise under the Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, the Federal Government in Canada will not invade the field of
provincial jurisdiction, particularly in regard to education. It is for this reason
that I shall abstain on these articles.”

As pledged, Canada subsequently abstained in the vote on all of the economic and so-
cial rights.”‘ The Canadian delegation report described article 23, which recognizes
the right to work, as the “most contentious single article of the Declaration?”‘ This
was an exaggeration, because the provision was carried handsomely by thirty-nine
votes, with only Canada and China abstaining, and the United States opposing.””

The Declaration contains no provision dealing with the rights of ethnic minori-
ties, although one had been drafted by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities”‘ and had been defended by Yugoslavia, the
Soviet Union and Denmark in the Third Committee.”‘ Many states were uneasy with
the issue because of the failure of the League of Nations’ minorities protection system
and the suspicion that it had been exploited by Nazi warmongers.”‘ Maybank made an
important statement in opposition to the inclusion of a minority-rights clause in the
Declaration, based on the questionable premise that Canada had no problems in this
area:

” See (15 November 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DN-40, No. 393; (13 November
1948) NAc RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DN-40, No. 386; (12 November 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700,
File 5475-DN-40, No. 379; (10 November 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DN-40, No. 367.

“‘ For the original text, see: “Report on Draft Declaration of Human Rights”, supra note 96. For the
exact wording in the summary records, see the Official Records of the Third Committee, supra note
94 at 500-01. See also: (16 November 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DN.40, No. 402; (22
November 1948) NACRG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-2-40, No. 458.

“” See “Report on Draft Declaration of Human Rights”, supra note 96 at 15; “Final Report, Item 58,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Supplementary to and continuing Interim Report submitted
under cover of despatch No. 31 of 25 November from Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, by J.H.
Thurrott, Second Secretary at the Canadian Embassy in Brussels, sent to George Ignatieff, December
21, 1948” NAc RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DM-1-40 at 2,7 [hereinafter “Final Report, Item 58″].

” “Final Report, Item 58”, ibid at 5.

See ibid at 689.

.. See UN Doe. E/CN.4/52 at 9-10.
“2 See A. Verdoodt, “Influence des structures ethniques et linguistiques des pays membres des Na-
tions Unites sur la rcdaction de la D6claration universelle des droits de l’homme” in LiberAmicorn
Discipulorumque Rend Cassin (Paris: Pedone, 1969) at 403-16.

‘” See P. de Azcarate, League of Nations and National Minorities (Washington: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 1945); P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); T.D. Musgrave, Self Determination and National Minorities (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

423

Some attempt has been in the Committee, to define the word “minority”, and
thus give its proper context in these resolutions. It has been stated that the
problem of minorities may arise as the result of the arrival in a country of new
settlers from a foreign country, or it may arise from the unfavourable circum-
stances in which certain indigenous national groups may find themselves.

I can say quite confidently that for Canada the problem of minorities, regarded
in either of these two ways, does not exist; that is to say it is not pre-set in the
sense that there is discontent. In the first place, Canada is a country made up of
English speaking and French speaking Canadians, and I trust by the very use of
these words I am making clear that neither of these groups falls in the category
of a “minority”referred to in these draft resolutions. These two peoples, who
comprise the greatest number of Canadian citizens, carry on their lives and ac-
tivities with complete amity one towards the other, and each has its own lan-
guage and makes use of its own educational facilities and contributes its own
cultural tradition to our country.”‘

Maybank did not return to the subject of indigenous peoples, although he did discuss
the status of immigrants:

There were many European and non-European immigrants in Canada. They
were free to worship as they pleased and to speak their own language. The
Government’s policy was one of voluntary assimilation, looking forward to the
day when the immigrant would regard himself as a Canadian citizen. While
Canadians were free to use whatever language they wanted, the question of
education remained within the jurisdiction of each province and the Federal
Government neither wished nor was able to interfere in that connection.”,

Maybank told the Committee that he would vote against proposals, although he could
support referring the matter to ECOSOC for further study.”‘ In the end, the General
Assembly decided to leave the question for another day”7 and, of course, an important
minority rights provision was finally included in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.”‘ Canada also voted against another unsuccessful Yugoslav pro-
posal seeking to add a national rights provision to the Declaration on the grounds that
it was superfluous.”‘

,’ “Final Report, Item 58”, supra note 108, App. H.
… Official Records of the Third Committee, supra note 94 at 729.
“‘ See (29 November 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-2-40, No. 497: “Debate com-

pleted on proposals for new articles concerning position of minorities. Maybank spoke several times
supporting Haiti’s proposal (Third Committee, Draft International Declaration of Human Rights,
Haiti: Draft Resolution, UN GAOR, 3d Sess. UN Doc. A/C.3/373 (1948)) for reference of these arti-
cles to ECOSOC, recommending that they be studied by Commission on Human Rights and Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, which passed by roll
call 24-0-16:’ See also: “Final Report, Item 58”, supra note 108 at 9.

GA Res. 217C(III).

“‘Supra note 4, art. 27. Indeed, in one of its first rulings, the Human Rights Committee concluded
that Canada had breached article 27 of the Covenant, in a case dealing with aboriginal women. See:
Lovelace v. Canada (Comm. No. 24/1977), YB.H.R. Ctee. 1981-82, Vol. II, UN Doc. CCPR/3/Add.1
at 320, H.R. Ctee, Sel. Dec. under the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 83.

“‘ See “Final Report, Item 58”, supra note 108 at 10.

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[Vol. 43

IV. Role of the Department of External Affairs and the Cabinet

Many years after the Paris session of the General Assembly, Humphrey wrote: “I
knew that the international promotion of human rights had no priority in Canadian
foreign policy.”‘ The archival documents confirm the very minor role the Declaration
played at the Department of External Affairs in the preparation for the third General
Assembly. A 112-paragraph document entitled “Views of Canada on Matters Before
the United Nations” prepared by External Affairs bureaucrats for the Assembly did
not even mention the Declaration.’2’ In late August, Pearson, who was then the high-
est-ranking civil servant in the Department, met in Washington with Dean Rusk of the
State Department and Gladwyn Jebb of the Foreign Office to discuss the agenda of
the Assembly, but in the extensive notes on the discussions there is no reference to
human rights nor to the Declaration. Yet as the Third Committee debates wore on
the Declaration became a growing preoccupation of Canadian policy makers. During
the autumn of 1948 it appeared on the agenda of the Cabinet on three occasions and
frequently received the personal attention of the Prime Minister.

A September memorandum to the Cabinet from the Department of External Af-

fairs advising on the General Assembly read:

The Delegation should give general support to the draft Declaration of Human
Rights … but it should seek to avoid the adoption of proposals which have not
been given adequate consideration, particularly from a legal point of view. On
matters as difficult and important as these it might be wise for the Assembly to
adopt the International Labour Organization technique of a first reading at this
session and a second reading at the 1949 session.’2

These instructions, which implied a strategy of stalling the proceedings for at least
one year and which were evidently out of step with the strategy of Canada’s closest
allies, were approved by Cabinet on 21 September 1948.24 However, a telegramme
dated 28 September 1948, from E.A. C6t6, a member of the Canadian delegation who
had already arrived in Paris, was sent to George Ignatieff in the United Nations Divi-
sion of External Affairs. It stated, “[w]e do not feel [the Declaration] can be sup-
ported” ‘”

On 4 October 1948, Chevrier and Maybank cabled Ottawa for instructions. They
expressed concern, “lest defenders of provincial rights in Canada should misinterpret

“”J.P. Humphrey, Human Rights, A Great Adventure (Dobbs Ferry, NJ.: Transnational Publishers,
,2’ “Views of Canada on Matters Before the United Nations” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DO-

1984) [hereinafter Human Rights, A Great Adventurel.

‘2 See “Notes on Conversations with Mr Rusk and Mr Gladwyn Jebb on UN Assembly Agenda,

August 27, 1948” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-2-40.

’23 “Memorandum to Cabinet, 7 September 1948” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-2.40. See
also: “Statement for the guidance of the Canadian Delegation” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-
1-40.

‘2’ See “Cabinet Conclusions, September 21, 1948” NAC RG 2, A5A, VOL. 2642.
‘2’ “Telegram from Cot6 to Ignatieff, September 28, 1948″ NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-2-

2-40.

40, No. 63.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

425

the Government’s position in supporting the Declaration,”” adding that it seemed im-
possible to get the General Assembly to agree to a Declaration that did not touch on
subjects within provincial jurisdiction –
such as ownership of property, marriage,
hours of work and education. They elaborated that other federal states, such as the
United States and Australia, appeared unconcerned with the problem. “Nevertheless,
we must avoid embarrassing the Government on the provincial rights issue, at the
same time recognizing that any hesitation might be construed as opposition to human
rights by those who are active in their support at home.”” This was clearly distorting
the issues and the tenor of the debates to date because the Parliamentary Committee,
the briefing book and the Cabinet instructions had not suggested that the delegation
should endeavour to tease out the issues that might be of provincial jurisdiction. It had
been clearly explained to all concerned that the Declaration was not a source of
binding obligations. Thus,
there was no question of trampling on provincial
jurisdiction.

The 4 October 1948 cable considered four hypotheses. The first was to hope that
enough amendments would be introduced to delay adoption. This would lead to the
Declaration being referred back to ECOSOC for further study. “This, of course,
would only postpone the question of our attitude,”” noted the telegramme. The sec-
ond alternative was to support the Declaration and try to simplify it. This would once
again make clear for the record that federal action in the field of human rights was
circumscribed. “This is the line taken in ECOSOC and in Mr Maybank’s speech”” it
said, referring to Maybank’s declaration in the Third Committee on 1 October. An-
other suggestion was to abstain from voting on amendments or on a completed draft
because of the lack of federal authority. The cable noted that “[t]his would be a new
development in Canadian policy on this subject and would require considerable ex-
planation.””‘ In fact, this was not far from the course that Canada eventually adopted,
although the cable clearly underestimated the amount of explanation that would be
required for such an extreme strategy. The telegramme ruled out a final possibility,
which was to vote against the Declaration, because such a move “would be inter-
preted as opposition to human rights, especially as other federal States will vote in fa-
vour.”‘

In conclusion, the Canadian delegation reminded Ottawa of the position of its al-

lies and other Member States:

The United States wants to have present draft accepted on ground that it is the
best compromise likely to emerge. United Kingdom is not quite so keen but
will do its best to have present draft accepted with a few amendments. Austra-
lia and New Zealand are generally in favour, while South Africa is opposed.
”
Western Europe and Latin America are strongly in favour. 3

‘,. (4 October 1948) NAc RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-2-40, No. 109.
I7 ibid.
1″ Ibd
“1’ Ibid
J’Ibid
“‘ Ibid.
“‘ Ibid.

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[Vol. 43

Lester B. Pearson, the newly named Secretary of State for External Affairs, who
was then somewhat preoccupied by the by-election in Algoma, had his Under-
Secretary Escott Reid draft a memorandum to the Acting Prime Minister Louis St.
Laurent’3 . Reid noted that the Canadian delegation had been under “considerable
pressure” from members of the United States delegation – particularly Eleanor Roo-
sevelt –
to support the Declaration.” But Reid then reminded St. Laurent that the
Parliamentary Committee had concluded “that there were many inadequacies in the
present draft” and “[t]hat the Committee expressed a preference for a simpler form of
Declaration.”‘” He concluded by informing the Acting Prime Minister that the Cana-
dian Bar Association had discussed this matter recently in Montreal and thought it
was desirable that the draft be referred to a body of experts for study before any final
decision was taken by the General Assembly.” This was a rather negative way to ex-
plain the issues to St. Laurent. In reality, the Parliamentary Committee had been posi-
tive about the Declaration. For the first time, however, reference was made in the rec-
ord to the C.B.A. Perhaps Reid understood that this might strike a responsive chord in
St. Laurent.

At the same time, Pearson prepared a telegram of instructions for the delegation
in Paris. He said that “it would be difficult for us to oppose actively the adoption of a
Declaration strongly supported by the United States and the United Kingdom,” but
added that “we would not, repeat not, wish to be responsible in any way for its adop-
tion in its present form at this session of the General Assembly'” He evoked the pos-
sibility of supporting a simplified text –
along the lines of one proposed by China.”
He urged the delegation to secure a complete revision of the draft that would exclude
Soviet amendments, adding that “[a]ll attempts by Soviet States to amend it would
have to be voted down. Such a Declaration, [however], might be a useful weapon in
the cold war”‘
If that failed, Pearson advised the delegation to attempt to have the
draft referred to a body of international jurists, preferably the International Law
Commission (“I.L.C.”), which had just been established, noting that “[y]ou will no
doubt be aware of the resolution passed recently by the Canadian Bar Association.’
As a last resort,

it is our view that in the absence of instructions to the contrary, you should ab-
stain from voting for the adoption of the draft in its present form, explaining
that the present Declaration is so ambiguous in some of its articles as to raise
genuine doubts regarding the meaning and effect of its provisions. You might
also indicate that under the constitutional arrangements in Canada, as a federal
state, the field of human rights is one in which the provinces of Canada are di-

3701, File 5475-DR-40.

“See “Memo from Escott Reid to the Acting Prime Minister, October 7, 1948” NAC RG 25, Vol.
‘ IbidL
1B Ibid.
-6 See ibid.
“‘ (8 October 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 110 [hereinafter “Telegram from

Pearson to the Delegation in Paris”].
“See UN Doc. F/CN.4/AC.1/18.

“Telegram from Pearson to the Delegation in Paris”, supra note 137.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

427

rectly concerned, and that accordingly the Canadian delegation feels particu-
larly anxious that, even though the Declaration will not have an absolutely ju-
ridical force, its terms should not be such as to invite disputes in their interpre-
tation.”

Pearson had left instructions that the draft cable be discussed with Acting Prime
Minister St. Laurent, and that it be sent only if the latter agreed. Pearson noted in the
text of the message itself that its contents had been reviewed with St. Laurent. The
National Archives indicate that St. Laurent “suggested certain minor alterations which
were incorporated” although there is nothing to indicate what these were. When the
powerful J.W. Pickersgill of the Privy Council Office returned St. Laurent’s comments
on the telegramme to Ignatieff of External Affairs, he suggested that a supplementary
telegramme be sent to the delegation setting out “Mr. St. Laurent’s misgivings re-
garding the Declaration.”” This suggests that Pearson’s pronounced lack of enthusi-
asm for the Declaration was still too mild for the Acting Prime Minister. Pearson’s
original cable, incorporating St. Laurent’s suggestions, went out on 8 October, but Ig-
natieff immediately reacted to Pickersgill by preparing a second text for St. Laurent’s
consideration. This time, it was to be labelled “personal and confidential” and was
intended only for Cabinet colleague Chevrier, and not for the entire delegation in
Paris. Clearly, St. Laurent was highly distressed by the domestic political implications
of the Declaration. Ignatieff’s draft cable stated:

However, I feel sure that you will agree that the adoption of the Declaration in
its present form at this session of the Assembly might prove to be a source of
embarrassment to the Government, particularly if the Canadian delegation were
to take an active part in its adoption. It might, indeed, merely serve to provoke
contentious even if unfair criticism of the Government. I realize that the ap-
proach indicated in our telegram under reference might place the delegation in
some difficulties, especially with the United States delegation. In particular, we
would not wish to be on record as opposing in principle the adoption of a dec-
laration of human rights. We do, however, have real apprehensions concerning
the adoption of a Declaration in terms that may be open to criticism on juridi-
cal and political grounds and which might serve to provoke contention in the
domestic as well as in the international field.”2

Even these words were not enough for St. Laurent, who then included an additional
sentence that goes to the heart of his worries:

I am particularly concerned about the uses which could be made of the text of
articles 17, 18, 19 and 22 [freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom
of assembly, and the right to employment in the public service] as an under-
taking not to discriminate against communists because of their political views

140 Ibid
“‘ “Memo to Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 14, 1948″ NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File

5475-DR-40.

” “Draft Telegram for Chevrier from St. Laurent, October 8, 1948” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File

5475-DR-40.

MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

[Vol. 43

and of article 27 as obliging a state to provide higher education to everyone at
the cost of the state if he cannot pay for it.’4′

In the corner of the note, someone had initialled “OK”. The cable, as drafted by Igna-
tieff and amended by St. Laurent, was then sent out later in the day on 8 October
1948.'”

Within External Affairs, the senior bureaucrats quickly realized that they were
playing with a hornets’ nest. A few days later, Ignatieff sent a memo to Reid stating
that “[i]n the light of Mr. St. Laurent’s views on the matter, I am not proposing that we
send any further comments to the Canadian delegation at the present time:”‘ The two
telegrammes, one authored by Pearson and a second harsher message, signed by St.
Laurent, surely left the delegation in Paris with the impression of indifference –
if
not outright hostility –
to the Declaration amongst the highest levels in Ottawa. It
was essentially like a wet blanket for Canadian efforts in the Third Committee. From
receipt of the St. Laurent telegramme, Canadian participation was reduced to a few
perfunctory comments and the occasional negative speech. The delegation cabled Ot-
tawa on 11 October 1948, to confirm that it had understood the new tone: “In accor-
dance with your instructions the Canadian delegation will not sponsor nor support the
early passage of the Declaration on Human Rights in its present form.’

At some point in October, the former president of the C.B.A., John Hackett, met
personally with St. Laurent to discuss the Declaration.’W Hackett and St. Laurent had
been childhood friends, and had even attended a seminary together. At the C.B.A.’s
annual meeting in September, Hackett was elected chair of its Committee on Legal
Problems on International Organization for the Maintenance of Peace. He was also in
close contact with the American Bar Association (“A.B.A’). The latter had taken a
position opposed to the Declaration, and the report of its Special Committee for
Peace and Law Through United Nations suggests that the American lawyers were en-
couraged by the position of their Canadian colleagues.” During his meeting with St.
Laurent, Hackett indicated his fears that the Canadian delegation would support the
draft Declaration in a more or less revised form. Senior officials in External Affairs,
no doubt with the knowledge and encouragement of St. Laurent, prepared a letter in-
tended to reassure Hackett.”‘ Although the letter was formally signed by Pearson,”‘ he

” “Hand-written Memo to File by Acting Prime Minister of Canada” NAc RG 25, Vol. 3701, File

5475-DR-40.

‘” See (8 October 1948) NAG RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 118.
‘ “Memorandum to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from George Ignatieff,

October 14, 1948″ NAcRG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40.

‘” (11 October 1948) NAG RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 165.
“‘. See “Letter from George Ignatieff to ‘Gerry’, October 30, 1948″ NAc RG 25, Vol. 3701, File

5475-DR-40.

‘” See Annual Report of the American Bar Association, Including Proceedings of the Seventy-First

Annual Meeting (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1949) at 287.

‘4’ See “Letter from George Ignatieff to ‘Gerry’, October 30, 1948″, supra note 147.
,” In a selection of documents published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Pearson is indicated at the author of the letter. See “Letter from L.B. Pearson to John T. Hack-
ett” (28 October 1948) in H. Mackenzie, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 14

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

429

did not see the text before it was sent. A copy was subsequently cabled to the delega-
tion in Paris with the suggestion that it be discussed with Pearson.”

The letter dated 28 October 1948, was described as “background information” for
Hackett’s “confidential use.””‘ Hackett requested this because he was to attend a
meeting of the A.B.A.’s Special Committee on Peace and Law Through United Na-
tions in Washington from 29-31 October 1948.”‘ Indeed, it may well have been
drafted for American consumption as a message to conservative circles in Washington
that Canada could be counted upon to obstruct passage of the Declaration, even if
their own delegation, under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, was equally deter-
mined for it to succeed. The letter indicated that the Canadian delegation was under
“special instructions to have full regard to the terms of the resolution adopted by the
Canadian Bar Association at its recent meeting.”” It noted that the Legal Adviser of
the Department was present at the Montreal meeting of the C.B.A. In what was al-
most certainly an allusion to St. Laurent’s telegramme of 8 October, it added that
“supplementary advice, almost in the terms of the resolution in question, was subse-
quently sent to the Delegation” 5 The telegram elaborated that Canada felt the draft
Declaration to be “unacceptable” and said that Canadian efforts in the Third Com-
mittee would focus on a reference of the problem to the I.L.C. if possible. The letter
indicated that Canada was well aware of the support of the United States delegation
for the Declaration. It concluded:

Indeed, the present intention is to abstain from voting, should the matter be
pressed to this point, and to explain that the present draft is so ambiguous in
some of its articles as to realize genuine doubts as to their meaning and ef-
fect.’

St. Laurent had decided to bring the matter to Cabinet. On 8 November, Ottawa
asked for Pearson’s recommendations on the appropriate course to follow in prepara-
tion for the 17 November Cabinet meeting.”‘ Pearson replied with a personal tele-
gramme for St. Laurent and Brooke Claxton, who had assumed the position of Acting
Secretary of State for External Affairs in Pearson’s absence. Pearson explained that
reference of the Declaration to the I.L.C., a delaying tactic that had initially appealed
to Ottawa, “would be overwhelmingly defeated””‘ because “[n]early all the other

(1948) (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1993) [hereinafter Docu-
ments on Canadian External Relations] at 354-55.

“.. See “Letter from George Ignatieff to ‘Gerry’, October 30, 1948″, supra note 147.
152 Ibid.
‘ See The 1949 Yearbook of the Canadian Bar Association and the Minutes of Proceedings of the

Thirty-FirstAnnual Meeting (Ottawa: National Printers, 1949) at 191.

‘” “Letter from George Ignatieff to ‘Gerry’, October 30, 1948”, supra note 147.
“Ibid.
*”‘Letter from L.B. Pearson to John T. Hackett” (28 October 1948) in Documents on Canadian

External Relations, supra note 150 at 354-55.

“17 See (8 November 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 217.
‘- (9 November 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 316 [hereinafter “Telegram
from Pearson to St. Laurent and Claxton”]. Another member of the delegation, R.G. Riddell, wrote to
Reid in Ottawa: “Such a proposal will be defeated. Even so, the Canadian delegation would then
probably be in a better position to explain our abstention on the Declaration as finally approved by

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[Vol. 43

including the United Kingdom and the United States –

delegations –
are anxious to
get the Declaration approved by this Assembly.’
Pearson noted that the version to
be adopted would most certainly contain “features found objectionable in the original
text by the Parliamentary Committee and by the Canadian Bar Association.”” He also
referred to the economic and social clauses of the draft Declaration “which raise
questions of provincial jurisdiction in Canada.””‘ Pearson proposed that Canada make
a general statement in the Third Committee on the economic and social clauses “em-
phasizing our constitutional position and our consequent inability to vote in favour of
these articles” ‘ 2 In addition, once the entire Declaration was adopted by the Third
Committee, Canada would make a further statement:

This would be to the effect that we originally planned to put forward a proposal
that the Declaration be referred to the International Law Commission. We
would then say that from the course of debate in the Committee, and from in-
formal conversations, it was evident that such a proposal would not be ap-
proved. Accordingly we did not wish to take up the time of the Committee by
advancing a proposal certain to be defeated. We were, however, still of the
opinion that the Declaration in its present form contained clauses which needed
further detailed examination and, accordingly, we would abstain from voting
on the Declaration as it now stood. We might also refer back to Maybank’s
statement of 1st October deploring the Economic and Social Council’s failure
to examine the Declaration at its 7th Session. Finally we might again refer to
our jurisdiction problem with specific reference to Articles 20 to 23. When the
Declaration came before the plenary session we could again explain our ab-
stention, in similar terms, if this appeared necessary. In this way we would have
made our case clear, at each stage of discussion, and our position on the Decla-
ration as a whole would be fully on record.”‘

Escott Reid transmitted the Pearson telegramme to Acting Minister Claxton with
his own comments. Reid referred to what External Affairs was now characterizing as
the “serious misgivings” of the Parliamentary Committee about the Declaration.”‘ In
fact, the Parliamentary Committee had been generally favourable, as anyone at the
time could have quickly ascertained by rereading its proceedings – or for that matter
the briefing book prepared by External Affairs for the guidance of the delegation. In
his telegramme, Pearson had asked that the proposed modification in Canadian strat-

Committee Ill” (“Progress Report on Committee III, November 1, 1948” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3699, File
5475-DG-2-40).

“”Telegram

from Pearson to St. Laurent and Claxton”, ibid. See also Official Records of the Third
Committee, supra note 94 at 201, where a member of the Canadian delegation, Macdonnell, said: “In
view of the limited time at the Committee’s disposal, he thought the Committee might consider the
possibility of postponing the discussion on the declaration of human rights to another session of the
Assembly, or of referring it for study to another organ of the United Nations:’

from Pearson to St. Laruent and Claxton”, ibid.

“‘”Telegram
161 Ibid
1” Ibid
“0 Ibid
’64See “Proposed Action by Canadian Delegation, Memo for Acting Secretary of State for External
Affairs, November 10, 1948, from Reid” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40. See also: “Memo-
randum from George Ignatieff to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 13,
1948″ NAc RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

431

that is, the decision not to seek reference to the I.L.C. –

egy –
be communicated to
Hackett of the C.B.A. Accordingly, on 13 November 1948, a letter was sent to Hack-
ett explaining the changes in the Canadian position.”

Claxton asked Reid to draft a telegramme for Pearson in anticipation of the result
of the 17 November 1948 Cabinet meeting. Claxton was unwilling to drop the idea of
a reference to the I.L.C. His view was that in the debate on the economic and social
articles of the draft Declaration, Canada should:

plant the seed of a suggestion about the reference of the whole Declaration to
the International Law Commission for further study and polishing after this
session of the Assembly is through with it and before it is formally adopted.
[Claxton] would hope, from his experience in other international conferences,
that this suggestion might be picked up by other delegations, who would say
that they hoped that the Canadian delegation would eventually submit a formal
resolution to this effect.’

He also wanted the Canadian delegation “to point out very carefully and precisely” to
the Third Committee that the economic and social clauses “and other articles in the
Declaration raise for Canada questions of limitations on federal jurisdiction”‘ 7 How-
ever, Claxton was also unsure about the political consequences of an abstention. Reid
wrote in a memo to Ignatieff:

[Claxton] is, I think, inclined to believe that if we fail in having the Declaration
referred to the International Law Commission it may be necessary for us, on
the final vote, to vote for the Declaration, after having restated our caveat about
provincial jurisdiction and expressed regret that the Assembly did not see fit to
refer the whole Declaration to the International Law Commission for further
study.”

Ignatieff’s view was that given Canada’s statement on the economic and social
clauses, which had already been made,”
it was better to leave the matter to Pearson’s
discretion in determining the tactics “so long as the Canadian position on the jurisdic-
tional question is clearly put.””‘

Cabinet discussed Canada’s position on the Declaration and decided on three
points. First, Canada was to abstain in the vote on the economic and social clauses on
the ground that their subject matter was not within the jurisdiction of the Government
of Canada. On the same ground it would also abstain from voting on the resolution for
adoption of the Declaration as a whole at the plenary session. Finally the delegates
were to clearly explain the Canadian constitutional difficulties, possibly making refer-
ence to the view that the whole Declaration might well be referred for further study to

‘See “Letter to John Hackett, November 13, 1948” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40.
66 “Memorandum from Escott Reid to UN Division, November 15, 1948″ NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701,

File 5475-DR-40.

‘” Ibid. [Italics in the original].
‘ Ibid.
“‘ See Official Records of the Third Committee, supra note 94.

‘7.”Memorandum

to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from George Ignatieff,

November 16, 1948” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40.

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[Vol. 43

the I.L.C.”‘ On 18 November, Claxton cabled Pearson with the Cabinet decision and
some comments on the meeting. It was noted that Canada had already predicted con-
stitutional problems with the economic and social clauses, but referred to the prospect
of other clauses causing similar difficulties –
specifically those dealing with the right
to property and the fundamental freedoms of religion, expression, association and
peaceful assembly. Claxton asked Pearson to “plant a seed which would bear fruit””
by hinting at the reference of the Declaration to the I.L.C. –
an approach whose fu-
tility Pearson had previously warned against. He concluded:

As to the draft Declaration as a whole, it is our feeling that, having made suffi-
ciently clear our position in respect of the federal-provincial problem in the
field of human rights, and having also taken the position recommended by the
Canadian Bar Association about the advisability of referring the whole Decla-
ration to the International Law Commission for further study, we should, in the
final vote on the draft Declaration in plenary meeting, abstain (repeat ab-
stain).’ 7

In a final paragraph, Claxton noted that he refrained from writing to Hackett until
having received Pearson’s reaction to the Cabinet decision.”

Pearson was unhappy with what Cabinet had ruled on 17 November, and replied
promptly in the hope that the matter could be reviewed at the next Cabinet meeting.
Pearson was now attuned to the dangers of abstaining, even if this represented a
change in his earlier views, and warned Ottawa accordingly:

As you point out, there are strong arguments in favour of our abstaining, but I
wonder if our position would not be equally clear if we voted in favour of the
Declaration as a whole, while making the reservations referred to…. Whether
we abstained or voted for the Declaration our reservations would be on the re-
cord in either case. Yet by abstaining we might find ourselves in a rather unde-
sirable minority –
including principally the Soviet bloc and South Africa (for
different reasons). It is clear from the discussion in Committee IllI up to date
that the great majority of other delegations wish to see the Declaration ap-
proved at this session of the Assembly, and there is every indication at present
that, although almost every delegation regards the Declaration as unsatisfactory
in certain features, it will be approved by a large vote.
I realize that I suggested that we abstain on the final vote. It was not possible at
that time, however, to foresee that in abstaining we would be associated only
with the minority group I have mentioned above. You may, therefore, wish to
consider whether or not it would be more desirable for us to vote in favour of
the Declaration, at the same time explaining our reservations.”‘

,7 See “Cabinet Conclusions, November 17, 1948” NAC RG 2, A5A, Vol. 2642; see also: “Memo-

randum of Cabinet Decision, November 17, 1948” NAc RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40.

‘7-(18 November 1948) NAc RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 267.
173 ibiL
‘”See ibid
‘.(23 November 1948) NAc RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 461. See also: “Memorandum
of Escott Reid to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 23, 1948” NAC
RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

433

Cabinet reviewed the matter at its 24 November meeting. Claxton explained Pear-
son’s observations to the Cabinet, which then reversed itself and agreed that the Ca-
nadian delegation be instructed to vote in favour of the Declaration. According to the
Cabinet minutes, Pearson was to:

stat[e] clearly in the Assembly that, while the government [was] generally fa-
vourable to the objectives set out in the Declaration, the subject matter thereof
was largely outside the jurisdiction of the Government of Canada. Furthermore,
in supporting the resolution, the Government relied upon the provisions of arti-
cle 28 [the limitations clause, which became article 292 in the final version] as
a safeguard against any unacceptable interpretation of certain other articles of
the Declaration. tT

the

176

However, Claxton’s subsequent telegramme to Pearson, explaining the Cabinet deci-
sion, suggests that it was not “generally favourable” to the objectives of the Declara-
tion. Claxton said that Cabinet did not believe the Declaration “would have any great
political usefulness either internationally or internally in any country.”‘” Many Cabi-
net colleagues felt that “the language and scope of the Declaration [were] thoroughly
objectionable for numerous reasons and that the adoption of the Declaration in any-
thing like the present form may do more harm to the cause of the United Nations and
of freedom than if no (repeat no) Declaration were adopted at all:”” Cabinet was evi-
dently sensitive about some of the major human rights issues of the day –
namely the
persecution of Communists and Jehovah’s Witnesses. For example, it was said that:

[q]uite apart from the question of provincial jurisdiction, the Cabinet holds
strongly to the view that the language is sometimes so lacking in precision as to
make some articles incapable of application. Article No. 19 [subsequently 21],
conferring the right to public employment irrespective of political creed, must
be read as requiring the employment of Communists in the government serv-
ice, while Article 16 [subsequently 18] would permit the unrestricted activities
of sects like Jehovah’s Witnesses.”

Claxton also insisted on the issue of provincial jurisdiction, noting that “[a]lleged en-
croachments by the federal government on the jurisdiction of the provinces were
matters of major issue in the provincial elections in Ontario and Quebec””‘ Although
provincial jurisdiction was not a real issue from a legal standpoint (because the Decla-
ration was not a source of binding norms), there were apparent fears that it might be
misunderstood as a federal encroachment. Claxton continued: “[w]e must, therefore,
make it abundantly clear in every statement that any attitude taken will not (repeat
not) constitute any interference whatever with the jurisdiction of the provinces.””‘ He
expressed the fears of Cabinet members that “some private member” might introduce
a resolution in Parliament incorporating the text of the Declaration, and that this

‘ “Cabinet Conclusions, November 24, 1948” NAc RG 2, A5A, VoL 2642; see also: “Memoran-

dum of Cabinet Decision, November 24, 1948″ NAc RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40.

‘ (25 November 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 294.
7 Ibid.
179Ibid.
” Ibid.
1″‘ Ibid.

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would put every member in the position of having to take a stand on individual human
rights. Claxton said that many members of Cabinet still stuck to the original strategy
of abstention, but that they had been swayed by Pearson’s caution about the inherent
danger of such an approach. He then provided Pearson with a detailed draft statement,
to be delivered in the General Assembly in explanation of Canada’s vote in favour of
the Declaration. This text essentially referred to the familiar issues of provincial ju-
risdiction and to concern about the scope of the limitation clause with respect to the
allegedly vague and very general substantive provisions of the text. Lastly, Claxton
urged Pearson to make a final attempt to postpone the vote until the next year.”‘

Pearson’s sensible advice on the futility of an abstention in the final vote carried
the day in Cabinet. Pearson, of course, was considering the problem from a diplo-
matic perspective and was concerned about the consequences of an abstention for
Canada’s image within the United Nations. Ottawa, on the other hand, seemed fo-
cussed on domestic reactions, especially attempts within Parliament to enact enabling
legislation, and consequences upon the pending provincial elections. Astonishingly,
after convincing the Cabinet to change its mind, Pearson reversed his position and
proposed to abstain within the Third Committee while voting in favour of the Decla-
ration within the General Assembly. It could be said that Pearson was trying to please
the abstentionists with some theatrics in the Third Committee, while carrying through
with his general strategy of a favourable vote in the General Assembly. Rather than
scoring points in both constituencies, however, the strategy only embarrassed Canada
internationally and left a blemish that fifty years have not erased.

On 2 December, Pearson cabled Claxton and informed him that the Canadian rep-
resentative would abstain from the vote in the Third Committee, but that he would
cast a positive vote in the General Assembly. Pearson said that he greatly appreciated
the danger of giving the impression that Canada was infringing, or even ignoring,
provincial jurisdiction in the field of human rights. But he wisely raised an argument
against too strong an insistence upon the issue. Pearson said: “[a]t the same time, you
will agree, I am sure, that it would be unwise to do anything to confirm the extreme
view that the Federal Government can never accept any international obligation or
sign any international agreement that may deal with matters which under our consti-
tution require provincial action for implementation?”” Pearson’s approach was closely
noted in Ottawa.”

A subsequent telegramme from Paris indicated that the abstention in the Third
Committee would be made “without comment””‘ St. Laurent was consulted on these
developments,”” and on 4 December, a new telegramme was sent to Pearson stating

2 See ibid
“3(2 December 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 525.
” “Memorandum, December 2, 1948” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40.
‘3(3 December 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 534 [hereinafter “Telegram

“6 See “Memorandum from Escott Reid to Brooke Claxton, December 3, 1948″ NAC RG 25, Vol.

from Pearson about the Abstention”].

3701, File 5475-DR-40.

435

19981 WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
cwe agree generally with the line you propose to take.”‘” St. Laurent had also made a
few suggestions with respect to the speech that Pearson proposed to deliver, “[h]aving
regard to the strongly worded resolution of the Canadian Bar Association and to the
text of the letter which you sent to Mr. Hackett,”‘” which were later passed on to Pear-
son. During this time, Hackett was in personal contact with St. Laurent on the issue,
and kept the Prime Minister informed of the last-ditch efforts of the A.B.A. to defer
adoption of the Declaration to 1949. ‘
‘ Undoubtedly influenced by Hackett, St.
Laurent still wanted Pearson to state Canada’s original hope that the matter be re-
ferred to the I.L.C. for further study.”

Early in the morning on 7 December 1948, the text that had been adopted article
by article over the previous two months, came to a vote in the Third Committee. Al-
though no member states voted against the Declaration, there were seven abstentions

Canada and the Soviet Union and its allies.”‘ Pearson promptly cabled Ottawa:

There was considerable surprise at the association of Canada with the Slavs. It
certainly is regrettable that it had to occur but in view of the messages from
Ottawa, we felt that we had no alternative. I hope that no misunderstanding
arises in Canada over the situation. We will, however, make an explanatory
statement at the plenary session and as agreed, change our vote in favour of the
resolution.” –

Later that day, Pearson sent another telegramme:

All members present voted for the Declaration, none against, and the seven ab-
stentions consisted of Canada and the Soviet Six. Chang (China), Malik (Leba-
non) and Humphrey of Secretariat are at a loss as to why we should have taken
this stand. I shall probably make a statement in the plenary to put this matter
into proper perspective, though it will probably appear that the Canadian repre-
sentative on Committee III is the sacrificial goat. 9’

Pearson subsequently informed Ottawa that the delegation had been urgently ap-
proached by the United Kingdom and the United States. It was stressed to the Cana-
dian delegation that “the propaganda importance of getting on record some statement
of the rights which were being denied to people daily within the Soviet bloc was so
great that they were prepared to accept the Declaration in its present form. They re-
garded our abstention as a serious weakening of the propaganda position which they

‘” (4 December 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 337 [hereinafter “Telegram
from St. Laurent to Pearson”]; (6 December 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DN-40, No. 551:
“in General Assembly, we will be guided by your telegram no. 337 of December 4th:’

“Telegram from St. Laurent to Pearson”, ibid.

“” “Memorandum for Prime Minister from Guy Sylvestre, Private Secretary, December 7, 1948”

NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40.

“Telegram from St. Laurent to Pearson”, supra note 187.

”See Official Records of the Third Committee, supra note 94 at 880.
29_(7 December 1948) NAG RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 560.

“Daily Reports of Delegation Meetings, December 7, 1948” NAc RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-
DN-40, No. 562. Earlier in the day, a laconic telegramme to Ottawa from the Canadian delegation had
announced: “Convention [sic] adopted December 6th [sic] with no contrary votes, 7 abstentions (in-
cluding Canada)” (7 December 1948) NAc RG 25, Vol. 3699, File 5475-DG-2-40, No. 566.

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[Vol. 43

were hoping to achieve:”” Pearson also informed them that Canada would change its
vote in the plenary General Assembly –
something which must have become an
open secret in Paris.”‘ In his memoirs, published in 1984, Humphrey wrote that the
day after the vote in the Committee he met Dana Wilgress, a senior career diplomat
who was on the Canadian delegation. Wilgress told Humphrey that “it had just been
decided that Canada would vote for the Declaration in the plenary Assembly.”‘ This
decision, however, had actually been taken weeks earlier. Humphrey wrote: “I had no
doubt whatsoever that this quick change in position was dictated solely by the fact
that the government did not relish the company in which it found itself.’ His diaries
which were published in 1994, on the other hand, reported the matter a little differ-
ently:

The Canadian vote came as a great surprise but I learned today that it will be
changed when the declaration comes before the plenary. I am afraid that I ex-
ceeded my prerogatives as an international servant when afterwards I expressed
my indignation to the Canadian representative. This has apparently caused
some talk, because today I had the visit of a representative of the Canadian
Press, sent to me strangely enough by the Canadian Delegation, who wanted
me to say for publication in Canadian newspapers that I had been shocked by
the Canadian vote. I had to give him a lecture on the status of an international
official!”

Pearson was sufficiently embarrassed by his association with the Soviet Union
that he declined to support Moscow’s resolution which was proposed in the Third
Committee to postpone adoption of the Declaration.”‘ Considering that the Soviet
Union had also espoused the cause of the conservative A.B.A., this was yet another
case of strange bedfellows.

According to Robert Spencer, Canada’s abstention was an “embarrassing asso-

ciation with the Soviet group” that “caused a mild sensation”.-” Humphrey wrote:

‘ (9 December 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3700, File 5475-DN-40, No. 579. According to the ar-
chives, the Canadian delegation had already “told certain press representatives here privately that we
will vote for the resolution in the plenary session”.

, 5See ibid.
‘Human Rights, A GreatAdventure, supra note 120.
197Ibid.
“‘ AJ. Hobbins, ed., On the Edge of Greatness, The Diaries of John Humphrey, First Director of
the United Nations Division of Hwnan Rights, vol. 1 (1948-1949) (Montreal: McGill University Li-
braries, 1994) at 89 [hereinafter On the Edge of Greatness].

“9 See (8 December 1948) NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 577. After the Declaration
was adopted, Pearson wrote to the C.B.A.’s Hackett explaining Canada’s approach (“Lester B. Pear-
son to John Hackett, December 18, 1948” RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40). Hackett replied on
January 8, 1949 indicating: “It is apparent that you did everything that could be done to obtain further
delay in which to consider the Declaration” (“John Hackett to Lester B. Pearson, January 8, 1949”
RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40).

2w R.A. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs, 1946-1949 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959) at
162-63. The sentence: “The Dominion’s action was a surprise and no immediate explanation was
forthcoming” was used in the Canadian Press wire story: “World News Sumary” The Globe and Mail
(8 December 1948) 1.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

437

It was the Canadian abstention which shocked everyone, including me. The
Canadians had given me no warning, and I was quite unprepared for what hap-
pened. Although I knew that the international promotion of human rights had
no priority in Canadian foreign policy, it had never occurred to me that the
government would carry its indifference to the point of abstaining in such an
important vote. I could hardly have prevented the scandal even if the delegation
had taken me into their confidence, but I could at least have warned them of the
company in which they would probably find themselves. ‘

The following day, a Canadian representative offered a brief explanation to the as-
tounded delegates:

Mr Thurrott (Canada) stated that the abstention of the Canadian delegation did
not indicate a light approach to so important a document. Canada had given
and would continue to give sober consideration to the Declaration and its im-
plementation.

The Canadian delegation reserved the right to clarify its position in [the] ple-
nary meeting of the General Assembly.’

On account that Pearson had abstained in the Third Committee without making
there is a suggestion in the National Archives of some
any explanatory comment,’
in Ottawa. Whether this was an intelligent approach, Pearson had
consternation
clearly informed Ottawa that he would follow such a course.” Cabinet was immedi-
ately notified of the developments and of Pearson’s intention to vote in favour of the
Declaration in the plenary General Assembly. Cabinet again endorsed Pearson’s ac-
tions.” Pearson and Claxton, moreover, exchanged cables over the next few days, per-
fecting the speech that was to be delivered in the General Assembly.”

On 10 December 1948, the Declaration was adopted by forty-eight votes to none
– with Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Soviet Union and five of its allies abstaining.
A separate vote by a show of hands was held on article 26, concerning the right to
education, and on article 27, protecting the right to cultural life. Canada abstained on
both provisions, as it had done in the Third Committee.”‘

Prior to the vote on the Declaration as a whole, Pearson addressed the Assembly
and explained the Canadian concerns and reservations.” He said that Canada re-
garded the document as one inspired by the highest ideals, and that the great goal of

Human Rights, A Great Adventure, supra note 120.

“‘- Official Records of the Third Committee, supra note 94 at 886.
“”See “Memo from Escott Reid to Brooke Claxton, December 8, 1948” NAC RG 25, Vol. 3701, File

5475-DR-40.

See “Telegram from Pearson about the Abstention”, supra note 185.
See “Cabinet Conclusions, December 8, 1948” NAC RG 2, A5A, VOL. 2642.

“”See “Brooke Claxton to Lester B. Pearson” (9 December 1948) NAc RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-
DR-40, No. 366; “Lester B. Pearson to Brooke Claxton” (9 December 1948) NAc RG 25, Vol. 3701,
File 5475-DR-40, No. 596.

“‘ See (13 December 1948) NAc RG 25, Vol. 3701, File 5475-DR-40, No. 611.
“‘See Verbatim Record of the One Hundred and Eighty Second Meeting, GA, 1948, UN Doe.
A/PV.182, 81-91. The speech can also be found in R.A. Mackay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy: Se-
lected Speedies and Documents, 1945-1954 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1971) at 163-65.

MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL

[Vol. 43

the United Nations must be to move towards full and universal application of the prin-
ciples set out in the Declaration. He continued:

The Draft Declaration, because it is a statement of general principles, is unfor-
tunately, though no doubt unavoidably, often worded in vague and imprecise
language. We do not believe in Canada that legislation should be placed on our
statute books unless that legislation can indicate in precise terms the obligations
which are demanded of our citizens, and unless those obligations can be inter-
preted clearly and definitively in the courts. Obviously many of the clauses of
this Draft Declaration lack the precision required in the definition of positive
obligations and the establishment of enforceable rights. For example, Article 22
[article 21 in the final version] which gives the right to public employment to
people irrespective of political creed might, unless it is taken in conjunction
with Article 31 [article 29 in the final version], be interpreted as implying an
obligation to employ persons in public service even if it was their stated and
open desire and intention to destroy all the free institutions which this Declara-
tion of Rights is intended to preserve and extend.”

Pearson said that “some of the difficulties and ambiguities” in the Declaration might
have been avoided had it been reviewed by a body of international jurists –
such as
the I.L.C. He added: “we regret that the general desire to expedite this important mat-
ter has made such a reference impossible ‘ “” Then, no doubt because the Soviets were
proposing a delay, Pearson distanced himself from them with a bit of Cold War rheto-
ric. He explained that human rights were protected in Canada by a combination of
statute law and judicial decisions, and that “[w]hile we now subscribe to a general
statement of principles, such as that contained in this Declaration, in doing so we
should not wish to suggest that we intend to depart from the procedures by which we
have built up our own code under our own federal constitution for the protection of
human rights.”‘ Pearson sought to clarify the issue of provincial jurisdiction, noting
that Canada had abstained on certain articles adopted in the Committee because these
were not within federal government powers. Ottawa was not seeking to invade areas
of provincial authority. He concluded:

Because of these various reservations on details in the Draft Declaration, the
Canadian Delegation abstained when the Declaration as a whole was put to the
vote in committee. The Canadian Delegation, however, approves and supports
the general principles contained in the Declaration and would not wish to do
anything which might appear to discourage the effort, which it embodies, to de-
fine the rights of men and women. Canadians believe in these rights and prac-
tice them in their communities. In order that there may be no misinterpretation
of our position on this subject therefore, the Canadian delegation, having made
its position clear in the committee, will, in accordance with the understanding I
have expressed, now vote in favour of the resolution, in the hope that it will
mark a milestone in humanity’s upward march.”

2MIbid

211 Ibid

2’ Ibid

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

439

In his diaries, Humphrey described this statement as “[o]ne of the worst contribu-
tions'” and “a niggardly acceptance of the Declaration because it appeared from Mr.
Pearson’s speech, the Canadian government did not relish the thought of remaining in
the company of those who, by abstaining in the vote, rejected it.” 3 Pearson’s speech,
however, met with approval in the Canadian press. The Montreal Star noted, errone-
ously, that “the whole issue has been examined in this country and found to lie in the
provincial, rather than the federal, field.”-‘ The newspaper also congratulated Pearson
for the reservations he formulated in the General Assembly. Comments in Le Devoir,
on the other hand, reflected the ambivalence of the Canadian Government’s position,
and complained that the text was incomplete and provided insufficient protection for
confessional schools.’ Others were more positive. Within a few weeks of the adop-
tion of the Declaration, Northrop Frye editorialized prophetically in the Canadian
Forum that “it is a magnificent declaration of faith, which may in the long run do
much to force statesmen to examine their conscience (and public opinion) before they
undertake to suppress the basic freedoms and rights of their peoples.” ‘

Conclusion

Pearson’s 10 December speech to the Assembly addressed a number of Canadian
reservations concerning the Declaration, but clearly implied that there were no seri-
ous problems with the substance of the instrument. Yet the documents in the National
Archives reveal a different story. Prime Minister St. Laurent himself had expressed
major concerns about freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of associa-
tion, and the right to employment in the public service, because of their potential in-
vocation by Communists. Unnamed members of the Cabinet also complained about
protecting freedom of religion as the provision might provide support to Jehovah’s
Witnesses. Even the opposition to recognition of economic and social rights, pre-
sented as nothing more than a federal-provincial dispute, clearly cut deeper. The Par-
liamentary Committee had already indicated that it felt such provisions, which im-
posed duties on states rather than granting rights to individuals, had no place in the
Declaration. Lurking in the background was the reactionary Hackett, an unashamed
adversary of human rights, who had the attentive ear of both Pearson and St. Laurent.
In the years following adoption of the Declaration, Canada joined other Western
powers in contesting the legitimacy of economic and social rights.”‘ Eventually a
compromise was reached and two international covenants –
one for civil and politi-

2″13 On the Edge of Greatness, supra note 198 at 90-91.
2″ See “Canada and Human Rights” Montreal Star (13 December 1948) 14.
215 See “Bloc-notes : un droit viol6″ Le Devoir (11 December 1948) 1.
2’6 (1949) 18:336 Canadian Forum at 219.
217 See Commission on Human Rights, Observations of Member States on the Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation, as Drafted at the Sixth Session of the
Commission on Human Rights, Received by the Secretary-General Under General Assembly Reso-
lution 421H(V) and Economic and Social Council Resolution 303 I(XI), ESC, UN Dc.
E/CN.4/515/Add.13 (1951). See also F.H. Soward & E. Mclnnis, Canada and the United Nations
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1956) at 201-02.

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[Vol. 43

cal rights’ and the other for economic and social rights”‘ – were created. In the early
1950s, as the debate raged in the Assembly, Canada sided with the United States and
United Kingdom in arguing that the Covenant should be restricted to civil and politi-
cal rights. Such a view was endorsed in Cabinet memoranda and formed the basis of
instructions to Canadian diplomats.” ‘ Much later, Canadian policy-makers came to
appreciate the significance of economic and social rights, at least on an international
level, although there is continued resistance to their recognition in Canadian constitu-
tional law. Not only is Canada a party to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, its diplomats have given an interpretation to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by which certain economic and social
rights are read in. For example, in its latest report to the Human Rights Committee,
pursuant to article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Canada explains that its respect for the right to life (article 6) includes measures
aimed at reducing infant mortality and at increasing life expectancy through the
elimination of malnutrition and epidemics.2’

On the subject of federal-provincial relations, Canada has adopted a co-operative
approach requiring structured and systematic consultations with provincial and terri-
torial officials on human rights matters that trench upon their areas of jurisdiction.
The Covenants were only ratified in 1976, after approval had been obtained by this
mechanism from the provincial governments. Since then, the consultation mechanism
has been used regularly prior to ratification of international treaties, as well as in the
preparation of periodic reports to the treaty bodies and the filing of submissions in re-
sponse to individual petitions or communications.”‘ The 1948 debates suggest that
provincial jurisdiction was little more than a pretext for federal politicians who
wanted to avoid international human rights undertakings and commitments. Clearly

21 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4.
2’9 See the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 4.
‘See

“Draft International Covenant on Human Rights, 12 October 1951″ in G. Donaghy, ed.,
Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 17 (1951) (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade, 1996) at 305.

2” See “Canada’s Fourth Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (1
April 1997), online: Canadian Heritage at
para. 45 (date accessed: 30 July 1998). See also Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, 1979, UN Doc. CCPR/C/I/Add.43 at
19-23; Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States under Article 40 of
the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/I/Add.62 at 23-31; Human Rights Committee, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States under Article 40 of the Covenant, ESC, 1981, UN Doc. ESC, 1983,
CCPR/C/51/Add.1 at 5. Such a large interpretation of the right to life is consistent with that proposed
by the Human Rights Committee in its first general comment on article 6: Human Rights Committee,
General Comments Adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article 40, paragraph 4 of the
International Covenant on Civl and Political Rights (up to April 1989), ESC, 1981, 1989, UN Doe.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1, at General Comment 6(16) at para. 5. Also published as UN Doe. A/37/40, Annex
V, UN Doe. CCPR/3/Add.1 at 382-83.

See D. Turp, “Le Comit6 permanent f6dral-provincial territorial des fonctionnaires charg6s des
droits de la personne et sa participation
la mise en oeuvre des trait6s” (1984-85) 2 A.C.D.P. 77; D.
Turp, “La preparation des rapports p6riodiques du Canada en application des trait6s relatifs aux droits
et liberts” (1986) 24 A.C.D.I. 161.

1998] WA. SCHABAS – UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

441

that has changed, although federal officials may still be tempted from time to time to
invoke the provinces in this way. Despite federal pledges that this would be done in
1991, for example, Canada has yet to ratify the American Convention on Human
Rights.-‘ The standard and somewhat unconvincing explanation for this failing is that
the provinces are not yet in agreement.

The Canadian Government, and the Department of Foreign Affairs’- in particular,
misled both domestic and international public opinion by concealing its substantive
opposition to the Declaration behind procedural arguments. Aside from the outright
hostility to specific provisions of the Declaration, there was also a strong dose of in-
difference –
as Humphrey alluded to in his memoirs. Humphrey was an obvious
friend and ally to Canada. What would have been more natural than for Canadian di-
plomacy to provide a helpful counterpart to his important work in the Secretariat?
Humphrey’s name, however, is not even mentioned in any of the telegrammes and
memoranda of the Department of External Affairs during the autumn of 1948 that
deal with the Declaration! Humphrey himself appeared to have spent more time that
autumn in Paris meetings with former McGill law students –
J6r6me Choquette,
Ross Clarkson, D’Iberville Fortier –
than he did with members of the Canadian
delegation.’ The indifference to human rights clearly came from within the Depart-
ment. Parliament had quite plainly sent another message, indicating by means of the
Joint Committee that Members of Parliament and Senators viewed the Declaration as
a matter of considerable importance.

There was simply no “human rights culture” within the Department of External
Affairs. It is impossible to identify a single official among the many distinguished Ca-
nadian personalities who then worked for the Department –
including Pearson, Reid
and Ignatieff – who viewed the Declaration as being of real significance. None of
them even mentioned the subject in their memoirs. They seem to have been preoccu-
pied by other issues of the day, such as the Berlin airlift and the creation of NATO. To
the extent that Canadian diplomats, politicians and bureaucrats viewed the Declara-
tion as a troublesome impediment and a rather hollow gesture, they were grievously
mistaken. Perhaps more than anything else, the story of the Declaration in Canadian
policy-making, told fifty years after the adoption of the instrument, compels an appre-
ciation of the obstacles faced by those within Canada who urged the recognition of
human rights norms, both nationally and internationally: John Humphrey, John
Diefenbaker, Frank R. Scott, Pierre E. Trudeau, Jacques-Yvan Morin, Paul-Andr6
Cr~peau, Walter Tarnopolsky and others. They, of course, prevailed – which is the
happy ending to this rather sombre prelude to the story of Canada and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.

Supra note 5.

2, Prior to the Federal Liberal Party’s return to power in 1993, the Department of Foreign Affairs

and International Trade was called the Department of External Affairs.

2″ J.P. Humphrey’s diaries report a lunch with R.G. Riddell, chief of the UN Division at External

Affairs, on 24 September 1948. See On the Edge of Greatness, supra note 198 at 47, 53, 63, 85.