Canadian Board of Railway Commissioners: Regulation, Policy and Legal Process at the Turn-of-the-Century, The

The Canadian Board of Railway Commissioners: Regulation,

Policy and Legal Process at the Turn-of-the-Century

Jamie Benidickson*

The Canadian Board of Railway Commission-
ers (B.R.C.), created in 1903, was the first
Canadian national regulatory agency. It
assumed responsibility for railway freight tar-
iffs, at the time the subject of important con-
flicts both on the economic and political
fronts. The B.R.C. confronted fundamental
issues such as independence and accountabil-
ity of administrative tribunals, while exerci-
sing responsibilities that could be character-
ized as judicial, administrative and legislative.
The author traces the early history of the
B.R.C. and its members, and examines its
choice as the mechanism for dealing with rate
conflicts, while considering the problems it
faced in justifying its existence in a parliamen-
tary and federal system. Doing so, the author
analyzes the relationship between the B.R.C.
and the judiciary, Parliament, the executive,
and the legal and business communities and
the place of the B.R.C. in the wider context of
administrative law.

Le Commission des chemins de fer pour le
Canada (C.C.F.), cr6 en 1903, fut Ia premiere
commission
rdglementaire nationale au
Canada. Elle 6tait responsable de la d~termina-
tion de tariffs de transport ferroviaire, un sujet
qui, .i l’6poque, 6tait l’objet de nombreux
drbats 6conomiques et politiques. Le C.C.F.
exercait des fonctions judiciaires, administrati-
yes et l6gislatives tout en faisant face A des
questions fondamentales d’ind~pendance et de
responsabilit6 institutionnelle. L’auteur retrace
‘histoire du C.C.E et de ses membres, exa-
mine la decision d’octroyer A une commission
le pouvoir de r~gler les conflits tarifaires et
analyse les probl~mes de 16gitimit6 d’une telle
commission dans un syst~me frdral et parle-
mentaire. Pour ce faire, l’auteur examine les
diverses relations entre ]a commission et le
Parlement, l’exdcutif, ]a magistrature, les com-
munaut6s juridiques et des affaires ainsi que le
r8le du C.C.F. dans le contexte plus grnrral du
droit administratif.

* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dick Risk who in 1981 supervised a directed
research program for which this paper was originally written and to David Flaherty, Hudson
Janisch and David Kettler for comments and advice on later versions of the text.
McGill Law Journal 1991
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Synopsis

Introduction
Background: Railways, Rates and Reform Proposals, 1880-1898
I.
II. The McLean Reports and the Creation of the Board, 1899-1904
m. Reaction to Regulation: The Reception of the Railway Board
IV. Policy Dimensions of the Rate Cases

A. Fair Return and the Railway Industry
B. Reasonable Rates and Industrial Policy
C. The Public Interest
Structuring Independence and Acceptability
A. Composition of the Board of Railway Commissioners
B. External Supervision and Review

V.

1.
2.

Supreme Court Appeals
The Function and Practice of Cabinet Review

C. The Administrative Process, Participation and Procedure

Conclusion

Introduction

For an earlier generation of Canadians, railway rate-making was a vital and
contested process. Railway freight tariffs (and to a lesser extent passenger char-
ges) dramatically presented the conflict of one city against another, farmer
against manufacturer, shippers against consumers, large investors against small,
Canada against the world, and of course everyone against the railways, includ-
ing each other. Managing these conflicts between major economic enterprises
and various sectors of the national community became an increasingly sensitive
challenge for policy-makers as the nineteenth century drew to a close.

The choice of a regulatory commission to assume primary decision-making
responsibility was not sudden; nor, however, was it a choice whose detailed con-
sequences were fully appreciated at the outset. Initially the designers of the
Board of Railway Commissioners (B.R.C.), and then those charged with making

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it operational, confronted such fundamental issues as independence and
accountability. By describing the formation and implementation of the B.R.C.
this paper tells that story in the context of the early twentieth century legal
environment.

Established in 1904, the B.R.C. was a significant response –

if not nec-
essarily a final solution –
to widespread concern about the distributive impact
of railway rates in late nineteenth century Canada and to the limitations of pub-
lic supervision of railway operations and activities.’ One consequence of what
came to be known as “not only the oldest but by far the most important admin-
istrative board in Canada”2 was the creation of a new forum for rate-related con-
flicts as well as persistent grievances between shippers and carriers, between
other competing social interests and indeed between regions. Courts as well as
the long-established Railway Committee of the Privy Council (both more or less
equally discredited and maligned as forums for public recourse) were displaced
by an institution largely unknown in Canada: the independent regulatory com-
mission. Thus, at the same time that it assumed extensive decision-making
authority (including powers over railway rates and later telephone and telegraph
communications) the B.R.C. embarked on an uncharted course and faced the
possibility of a potentially controversial debate about constitutional legitimacy.’
In the United States, railway regulation by commission had been introduced ear-
lier at the state and, with the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(I.C.C.) in 1887, at the federal levels.4 The importance of the debate which
accompanied the regulatory initiative is widely acknowledged.5 Morton Horwitz
accounts for the intensity of the reaction in his description of the conception of
public or regulatory law in the late nineteenth century –
something fundamen-
tally different from the common law. Regulatory law, he writes, was seen as

‘Various aspects of the B.R.C.’s development and significance have been described elsewhere.
See K. Cruikshank, “The Transportation Revolution and Its Consequences: The Railway Freight
Controversy of the Late Nineteenth Century” (1987) Canadian Historical Association Historical
Papers 112 [hereinafter “Transportation”]; A.W. Currie, “The Board of Transport Commissioners
as an Administrative Body” (1945) 11 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 342, reprinted in J.E. Hodgetts &
D.C. Corbett, eds, Canadian Public Administration (Toronto: MacMillan, 1960) 222 [hereinafter
cited to Hodgetts & Corbett, eds]; H. Darling, The Politics of Freight Rates: The Railway Freight
Rate Issue in Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1980); H.N. Janisch, “The Role of the
Independent Regulatory Agency in Canada” (1978) 27 U.N.B. L.J. 83 [hereinafter “Independent
Regulatory Agency”]; A.V. Wright, “An Examination of the Role of the Board of Transport Com-
missioners For Canada as a Regulatory Tribunal” (1963) Can. Public Admin. 349.

2Currie, ibid at 223.
3See R.C.B. Risk, “Lawyers, Courts, and the Rise of the Regulatory State” (1984) 9 Dalhousie
4R.L. Rabin, “Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective” (1986) 38 Stanford L. Rev. 1189 at
1207.5H. Hovenkamp, “Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem”
(1988) 97 Yale L.J. 1017; R. Maidment, “Law and Economic Policy in the United States: The Judi-
cial Response to Governmental Regulation of the Economy” (1986) 7 J. Legal History 196.

L.J. 31.

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“not only coercive,” but was generally regarded as “expressing the illegitimate
desires of popular legislatures to interfere with a natural and neutral economic
system.”6

The underlying validity of regulatory control over matters of public interest
was acknowledged as a general principle in Munn v. Illinois7 (a case actually
concerned with grain elevator storage charges) where it was assumed that rate
regulation was a traditional function of the legislature. Critics of regulation,
however, soon shifted the focus of their concerns to “the competing claims of
legislature, agency, and court in enunciating regulatory policy.”‘ Legislative
supremacy over rate-making – notwithstanding the English experience – was
foreign to the American tradition of judicial review. Gradually both legislative
and agency claims were circumscribed by the judiciary on two basic grounds.
First, it was an inherently judicial function to determine the ultimate reasonable-
ness of rates according to standards that protected property rights from arbitrary
interference. Secondly, regulatory commissions –
at least in their earliest man-
ifestations –
failed to satisfy due process considerations. By 1898 the U.S.
Supreme Court was prepared to endorse de novo judicial review of rate sched-
ules to ascertain that railways were receiving their entitlement: a “fair return”
on the “fair value” of their property.9

The potential conflict even in Canada where English traditions were stron-
ger, is apparent in descriptions of regulatory agencies such as the B.R.C. as
“governments in miniature” or as “primary instruments of social, economic and
political control.”‘” Basically they placed in the hands of non-elected and non-
judicial officials power not fully accountable in any conventional manner.
Indeed stress is often placed on the independence of tribunals as a major factor
contributing to their effectiveness. Whether tolerance or enthusiasm greeted the
creation of the independent regulatory agency, it is aptly described as a “struc-
tural heretic”” in the parliamentary model: there has been persistent tension
between independence as a key element in the effectiveness of an agency, on the
one hand, and the importance of control or supervision, on the other.

6M.J. Horwitz, “The Changing Common Law” (1984) 9 Dalhousie L.J. 55 at 59.
794 U.S. 113 (1877) at 126.
SRabin, supra, note 4 at 1210.
9Snyth v. Ames 169 U.S. 466 (1898) at 480.
‘OR. Schultz, “Regulatory Agencies and the Canadian Administrative System” in K. Kernaghan,
ed. Public Administration in Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1977) 333 at 334; J. Willis,
“Administrative Decision and the Law: The Views of a Lawyer” (1958) 24 Can. J. Econ. & Pol.
Sci. 502.

“J.E. Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of Government, 1867-1970
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973) at 138; H.N. Janisch, “Independence of Administra-
tive Tribunals: In Praise of Structural Heretics” (1987-1988) 1 Can. J. Admin. L. & P. 1 [hereinafter
“Independence”].

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The diversity of tribunals in Canada is notorious, but the B.R.C. is of par-
ticular interest both because it was the institutional forerunner of so many sim-
ilar bodies and because of what it did. The Board’s responsibilities were wide-
ranging, but regulating rates was an assignment of primary importance because
of the perceived consequences of rates decisions. Rates were controversial in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Disputes arose about the rela-
tionship of rates to distance, weight or volume when similar or identical items
were being shipped, and about the relationship between different types of items
shipped over the same or comparable routes. The solutions offered included
public ownership, specific legislative controls and regulatory supervision. 2

For turn-of-the-century observers, the precise nature of rate regulation
appeared to be a matter of uncertainty. From various perspectives, legal, polit-
ical or technical economic questions were involved. To some observers the
essence of rate-making was to be found in the lawful rights of transporters to
establish charges for the use of their property and facilities. To others, rate-
setting was a more or less scientific undertaking best left in the hands of spe-
cialists who possessed an appropriate understanding of the relevant data and its
implications. Alternatively, because of the implications of rates for the well-
being of competing industries and communities, and because railways could not
operate without legislative authorization, the determination of rates was also
seen as an act of political choice.

In legal circles these differing views of the nature of rate-making were
assumed to involve different formal requirements for decision-making. Accord-
ingly, the characteristics, qualifications and attributes of acceptable decision-
makers would differ, and acceptable decision-making would differ too in terms
of opportunities created for the representation of interests, for formal mecha-
nisms of accountability and for the influence of expertise. Had it been agreed
upon, a definitive or exclusive classification of the rate-making function as
either legal, technical or political in nature would have signalled more clearly
the characteristics of the forum most suited to decision-making about rates. But
an inter-mixture of administrative, legislative and judicial considerations seem-
ed inescapable. As Chris Armstrong and Viv Nelles have shown for several
Canadian utilities, 3 the political, economic and ethical markets of the commu-
nity are in constant tension. “Each of these economies,” they write “has insti-
tutional and behaviourial norms that demarcate the shifting bounds of expected
and acceptable conduct.”‘ 4 From this perspective, public regulation “was the
means whereby powerful economic institutions participated in a legitimizing
process and rendered themselves accountable to some judgment other than that

dian Utilities, 1830-1930 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986).

12C. Armstrong & H.V. Nelles, Monopoly’s Moment: The Organization and Regulation of Cana-
131bid.
“lbid. at 323.

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of their owners.”‘” It is worth noting that public regulation is not a uniform proc-
ess, but one that is characterized by a good deal of diversity. Moreover, as pow-
erful public institutions themselves, regulatory authorities are subject to
on-going assessment within the community. The B.R.C., as the first and pre-
eminent national regulator in a parliamentary and federal system, faced the chal-
lenge of promoting public and parliamentary acceptance of its operations and
authority as it exercised responsibilities variously perceived to be judicial,
administrative and legislative in nature. As a new institution, the B.R.C. faced
the challenge of reconciling the political, economic and ethical or legal perspec-
tives, in a manner that would consistently placate, if it could never fully satisfy,
the range of constituencies who greeted its creation with divergent expectations.

I. Background: Railways, Rates and Reform Proposals, 1880-1898

In the final quarter of the nineteenth century, expansion and consolidation
of the transportation system, together with technological changes and a growing
sense of regional diversity, particularly in western Canada, prompted expres-
sions of dissatisfaction about shipping rates and the power of the railways to
determine them. 6

In 1895, addressing one of a series of public inquiries into railway rates,
Manitoba’s Provincial Secretary articulated the underlying concern of western-
ers seeking rate relief:

the prosperity of the province depends in a large measure upon their being charged
the lowest possible rates on the carriage of products, Iproduce and merchandise,
into, out of, and from point to point in the province.

Yet on the basis of comparisons of rates in Canada and the United States, the
Commissioners rejected complaints of exorbitant and excessive rates.'” Instead,
reasoning offered in evidence by C.P.R. Vice President Shaughnessy was
adopted to establish that the Railway and the western community had compat-
ible interests:

In view of the fact that the Canadian Pacific Railway Company hold about
18,000,000 acres of unsold lands and own upwards of three thousand miles of rail-
way in the province of Manitoba and the North-west [sic] Territories it is obvious
that their interests must be identical with those of their patrons, and it occurs to

I51bid. at 322.
16See C.D. Baggaley, The Emergence of the Regulatory State in Canada, 1867-1939 (Ottawa:
Economic Council of Canada, 1981); K. Cruikshank, “‘Law’ versus ‘Common Sense’: Railways,
Shippers and Judicial Regulation, 1850-1903” Canadian Law in History Conference, June 8-10,
1987, Carlton University, vol. II at 76 [unpublished] [hereinafter “‘Law’ versus ‘Common
Sense’], and “Transportation,” supra, note 1.

7Canada, Parliament, “Report of the Railway Rates Commission” No. 39 in Sessional Papers

(1895) at 3.

18lbid.

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your commissioners that selfish motives alone would be ample and efficient safe-
guards on the action of the company in regulating its general policy.19

This was a period of particularly disruptive economic and technological change
which had profound repercussions for the well-being of communities and indus-
tries across the country. To suggest that the authority of private railways to make
rate and service decisions affecting the general interest might continue without
serious challenge greatly under-estimated the strength and determination of
numerous sectoral and regional interests. Yet the persistence of widespread
unease and dissatisfaction with the apparent impact of railway rate policies by
no means implied the existence –
let alone the acceptability – of an obvious
alternative.

In principle, rate grievances could be taken for review to the courts or to
the Railway Committee of the Privy Council, a cabinet committee whose
responsibilities had evolved from the time of its creation in the mid-century.20
Neither institution was regarded as a satisfactory forum in which to redress
shippers’ complaints or to control the railways.

Judicial resolution of railway rate grievances through the assessment of
charter powers, and the application of a common law test of reasonableness
were subject to several procedural and doctrinal limitations. Unreasonableness
and discrimination were both uncertain concepts and difficult to establish, and
the railways, if they chose to do so, had the capacity to expose litigants to
increased costs and delays through the processes of appeal. Individual com-
plainants may well have despaired of their prospects in court, for the litigated
cases were in fact rare in relation to the volume of complaints.2′

The Railway Committee of the Privy Council, despite an expansion of its
jurisdiction in 1888, was equally devoid of supporters. As the 1890s drew to a
close the committee had failed in its mandate over rate review.22 The Railway

’91bid. at 15.
20Baggaley, supra, note 16 at 71 & 74.
21See, e.g., A.G. v. Ontario, Simcoe and Huron Railway (1858), 6 Grant’s Chancery 446; Scott
v. Midland Railway (1873), 33 U.C.Q.B. 580. For discussion see “‘Law’ versus ‘Common Sense,”‘
supra, note 16 and B.J. Hibbitts, “A Change of Mind: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Board
of Railway Commissioners, 1903-1939” (LL.M. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1986) at 91-93.
The deficiencies of the common law process were fully acknowledged in a public inquiry during
the mid-1880s. See Canada, Sessional Papers, 1888 No. 8A, “Report of the Royal Commission on
Railways” at 16 [hereinafter “Royal Commission”].

22W.T. Jackman, Economic Principles of Transportation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1935) at 647 states: “The few cases which came before the Railway Committee – 408 cases in
the years 1889 to 1896 inclusive –
attest to the fact that the committee did not command the con-
fidence of the public.” Only seven of these cases were related to rates. See, Canada, Sessional
Papers, 1902, No. 20a, “Reports upon Railway Commissions, Railway Rate Grievances and Reg-
ulative Legislation” by S.J. McLean (Ottawa: S.E. Dawson, King’s Printer, 1902). The 1902 Ses-

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Committee was condemned absolutely by J.S. Willison in 1897. Following a
tour of western Canada, he stated that

in regulating rates, in preventing discriminations, in protecting the individual ship-
per, or the individual community against the calculated injustice or the insidious
aggression of railway managers it is inert and impotent, a farce and a failure.23

Willison was shocked by the contrast between the massive investment of “pub-
lic money” in the railways and toleration of “discriminations in favour of Amer-
ican shippers that operate very seriously against Canadian industries,”’24 perhaps
even offsetting any advantages given domestic producers by tariff duties.

If the deficiencies of the available alternatives were generally recognized,
agreement was nevertheless lacking as to appropriate modifications or a
replacement. The proposal most frequently advanced after 1880 was regulation
by commission. In 1882, D’Alton McCarthy introduced legislation to establish
a “Court of Railway Commissioners” with authority over railway matters.’
Later commentators assumed that McCarthy’s initial suggestion was modelled
on an English measure of 1873.26 This and similar proposals in the succeeding
years failed to attract widespread support, although by 1889, following the cre-
ation of the I.C.C., some measure of enthusiasm was apparent within the legal
community. The Canada Law Journal described the American initiative as
embodying “the only true way of settling such disputes.”’27 But, other observers
remained unpersuaded.

In 1888, an inquiry under the chairmanship of A.T. Gait had reported
against the tribunal model, recommending instead an enlargement of the powers
of the Railway Committee. Galt and his associates reviewed the alternatives
fully. While acknowledging the need for public scrutiny of railways, the com-
missioners were ultimately unwilling to countenance an arrangement that would
undermine ministerial responsibility by establishing a regulatory authority
“beyond the direct criticism and control of Parliament.”‘

With a change of government and accelerating western expansion after
1896, tensions between railways and shippers were re-kindled. The concept of
regulation by commission was revived in several settings, including Parliament
where western M.P.s, bolstering their demands with favourable references to

sional Paper includes McLean’s Reports of 10 February 1899 (supra at 3) and 17 January 1902
(supra at 41) [hereinafter McLean, 1899 and McLean, 1902] at 37.

7.

23J.S. Willison, The Railway Question in Canada (Toronto: Warwick Bros. & Rutter, 1897) at

24Ibid. at 65.
2Hibbitts, supra, note 21 at 15-17.
26S.J. McLean, “The Work of the Board of Transport Commissioners for Canada” in J. Willis,

ed., Canadian Boards at Work (Toronto: MacMillan, 1941) 8.
27″Railway Commissions” (1889) 25 Can. L.J. 419 at 420.
2″Royal Commission,” supra, note 21 at 20.

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railway commissions in the United States, began to press for some basic
reforms, and at a minimum the transfer to a commission of the existing juris-
diction of the Railway Committee of the Privy Council. A.G. Blair, a former
premier of New Brunswick and then Laurier’s Minister of Railways and Canals,
expressed some sympathy for change. But Blair cautiously emphasized that the
transportation question was not “one susceptible of easy treatment, or that a
complete, or even a large, remedy is capable of being applied.”29 A few months
later, the Prime Minister himself acknowledged that the issue of railway regu-
lation “cannot be deferred much longer” although he still considered the idea of
legislation to be “altogether premature.”3 Public feeling, though, continued to
shift towards a new institution.3′

All this discussion left two problems unresolved. The nature of rate-
making remained in dispute and, as a consequence, there was no agreement on
the second issue, that is, the institution that should be used to determine rates.
The courts’ historic experience in rate review provided some foundation for the
view that the supervision of railway rates was a judicial function in which the
legal community had a well-established interest and claim for continued
involvement. Apprehension about a regulatory tribunal had emerged from the
Galt inquiry and even early reactions to the original McCarthy proposals had
provoked the Monetary imes to observe that “it would absorb many of the
powers of the legislature and the judiciary and would certainly prove dangerous
in the exercise and lead to evils far greater than the proposed commission could
possibly remove.”3 Nevertheless, the existing arrangements –
in part because
they were thought to be overly judicialized – were unsatisfactory, and the
search for a viable alternative was renewed.

I. The McLean Reports and the Creation of the Railway Board,

1899-1904

Simon J. McLean, an ambitious Canadian political economist at the Uni-
versity of Arkansas, provided Blair and Laurier with a suitable means of pursu-
ing the regulatory initiative without deepening their commitment. With a letter
of endorsement from Willison, McLean applied to work on the preparation of
a railway bill but was commissioned instead to report upon railway regulation
in other jurisdictions, and the applicability of their experience to Canada.33 The
Commission model had found a new champion.

29Canada, H.C., Debates: Board of Railway Commissioners at 1789 (14 March 1898).
30P.A.C., Laurier Papiers, Laurier to J.S. Willison, 2 November 1898.
3 1″Transportation,” supra, note 1.
3 2Monetary 7mes (27 February 1880) quoted in Hibbitts, supra, note 21 at 15.
33P.A.C., Laurier Papers, J.S. Willison to Laurier, 31 October 1898. McLean’s efforts to return
to Canada also included correspondence with Professor James Mavor at the University of Toronto
where McLean had previously studied (University of Toronto, Thomas Fisher Library, Mayor

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Between the late fall of 1898 and early February 1899, McLean industri-
ously produced his first response to the assignment. This survey of railway reg-
ulation in England and at the state and federal levels in the United States was
based on McLean’s accumulated knowledge: a consultant’s document rather
than the result of a public inquiry process. It was notable though, for a direct
assault on the legacy of the 1895 parliamentary study which had, following
Vice-President Shaughnessy of the C.P.R., affirmed the unity of interest
between railways and the communities they served. McLean was adamant that
“in practice some limitation must be made” on this theoretical “identity of inter-
est.”‘ As he explained and illustrated with examples,

[a] railway may consider it advantageous to build up one community or one indi-
vidual at the expense of another. What the railway wants is traffic. If it can obtain
this in bulk amount from one community or one individual instead of from a
number of scattered communities or individuals, then its interests are better
advanced because it obtains the traffic and at the same time the cost of manage-
ment and handling is lessened; the net profit is under such conditions greater.35

The initial effort was enough to produce a further assignment for McLean to
prepare a more wide-ranging examination of rate grievances on Canadian rail-
ways accompanied by a critique of the current situation and an elaboration of
proposals for legislation.

McLean’s analysis of the Railway Committee’s defects as a regulatory
body largely ignored the policy dimension, stressing instead the technical
dimension of the decision-making process. His list of the Railway Committee’s
deficiencies included the combination of political and administrative functions,
the lack of continuity of tenure, the lack of the necessary technical training, and
costs and travel distances which restricted complainants’ access to justice.36
These factors, particularly the first two, precluded efficient solutions to rate
grievances:

The attempt to regulate such matter through politically organized bodies has not
succeeded. The regulation is essentially an administrative function; an intermin-
gling of this with political duties leads to lack of harmony and efficiency. The reg-
ulation of the railroad question, in the public interest, demands technical training.
It demands all the time of those engaged in such matters. They should be con-
cemed, not only with the settlement of grievances when they arise, but also with

Papers, McLean to Mayor, 22 October 1899). McLean was also influenced by Frank J. Goodnow,
author of a pioneering work Comparative Administrative Law (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1897),
and Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of Chicago. For commentary on
Goodnow’s contribution, see W.C. Chase, The American Law School and the Rise of Administra-
tive Govermnent (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982) at 48-50.

34McLean, 1899, supra, note 22 at 4.
35lbid.
36McLean, 1902, supra, note 22 at 75.

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an attempt to prevent grievances. The duties of political officials prevent the exer-
cise of such functions.37

A further limitation of the old Railway Committee (and a factor which was seen
to undermine its legitimacy) had actually been recognized when it was estab-
lished. The Railway Committee’s members could “scarcely be regarded by the
public as absolutely removed from personal or political bias as independent
members of a permanent tribunal.”3

McLean interpreted the decision to remove regulation from Parliament to
the control of a smaller body as reflecting “an appreciation of the necessity of
a unified and coherent policy.”39 He evidently assumed the existence of such
policy and that it could be reconciled with the “deliberative procedure”4 of the
commission he recommended. The separation of policy formation from applica-
tion was desirable because “experience” had shown “that it is unwise to confuse
political and administrative duties.”‘”

McLean associated the concept of “administrative” duties with the idea of
relevant expertise in any tribunal, the importance of full-time personnel, conti-
nuity and consistency. These attributes of the proposed commission are also in
part the basis of his rejection of both the judicial and political processes as
mechanisms for railway regulation. The criteria of expertise, time commitment
and so on, seem more closely related to the effective working of what McLean
regarded as an administrative process, rather than to an overwhelming prefer-
ence for a technical response to railway supervision.

To explain what McLean intended when he described railway regulation as
an administrative function, perhaps it is necessary to examine his perception of
solutions to railway problems –
especially rates – which might embody
administrative characteristics. He emphasized the concepts of compromise,
arbitration, and mediation as descriptions of the result of a rate grievance set-
tlement. McLean’s idea of compromise recognized the need to achieve work-
able, mutually acceptable results in the context of ongoing relationships
between carriers and shippers. To produce such solutions, the decision-making
authority itself must be flexible and adaptable in its approach, able to contem-
plate a range of possible outcomes in any given grievance situation and willing
to make adjustments in the light of experience. Courts were understood to prod-
uce more rigid outcomes without regard (or at least without great sensitivity) to
an on-going balance of diverse interests; and the political process, however

37McLean, 1899, supra, note 22 at 5.
38McLean, 1902, supra, note 22 at 75.
391bid.
40Ibid.
41ibid.

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BOARD OF RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS

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accommodating it might be to the importance of compromise, was possibly too
susceptible to the influence of special interests.42

McLean did not expect a commission to be immune from the influence of
evolving debate and policy on railway regulation, but he seems to have assumed
a sufficient degree of policy agreement at any given moment to avoid the need
for extensive policy development in the context of particular grievances. If this
was optimism, it soon proved to be unfounded. The problems of continuing rela-
tions between the new railway commission, the government, public policy, and
affected parties became crucial issues in the development of the B.R.C. Accord-
ingly, public acceptance of its authority was a continuing challenge for the
board.

Under The Railway Act, 1903,43 the Board of Railway Commissioners for
Canada assumed the functions of its predecessor, the Railway Committee of the
Privy Council, in a number of areas together with several additional responsi-
bilities. The powers conferred on the three member board by the Railway Act
included jurisdiction over a wide range of matters relating to most railways in
Canada.’ The authority of the Board not only included the power to make indi-
vidual orders concerning particular disputes, but also to formulate regulations
regarding a number of specified matters, including rates.45 In addition, it was
explicitly given the power to review, rescind, or alter its orders and regula-
tions.46 The B.R.C.’s findings of fact were “binding and conclusive.”47 The var-
ious mechanisms for appeal to the Supreme Court were relatively circum-
scribed, but in principle the Cabinet had an extensive power of independent
review.

4s

In the supervision of rates, according to the Railway Act the Board had
extensive influence and authority respecting the approval of traffic charges and
a range of associated considerations. The Board, for example, in fulfilling its
responsibility regarding the statutory prohibition against discriminatory rates
“under substantially similar circumstances and conditions” (s. 25(4)) was
empowered to declare by regulation what was meant by “substantially similar

42Ibid. at 76-79.
43S.C. 1903, c. 58 [hereinafter Railway Act]. The fourth Annual Report of the Board of Railway
Commissioners indicates that the drafting was done by A.S. White, K.C., a former Attorney Gen-
eral for New Brunswick with McLean’s assistance. See Canada, Parliament, “Fourth Report of the
Board of Railway Commissioners for Canada” No. 20c in Sessional Papers (1910) (at 40 of the
paper). In correspondence with Laurier, however, Blair gives the impression that he was personally
responsible for much of the statute’s development. P.A.C. Laurier Papers, Blair to Laurier, 31
December 1903.

44Railway Act, ibid., ss 3-7 & 23-25.
451bid., s. 25. See also ss 253(2), 262(4), 275(2) & 284(2).
461bid., s. 25(4).
471bid., s. 42(3).
4Slbid., s. 44.

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circumstances and conditions” and other relevant standards (s. 254(2)). The leg-
islation often conferred responsibility on the board using such phrases as “in the
interests of the public” (s. 254(2)), or “as to it may seem expedient” (s. 255(2))
or “having due regard to all proper interests” (s. 255(2)).

Blair –

still Minister of Railways and Canals and shortly to become

Chairman of the B.R.C. –

expressed the government’s intention to create
a railway commission composed of members independent of the government,
independent of parliament in a practical sense, though not in the broadest sense,
and capable … by experience and ability, of making thoroughly effective the leg-
islation we are now proposing to place on the statute book ….

We are investing it with larger powers, we are giving it more executive
authority, and we have in this respect perhaps gone beyond any legislation which
has been passed in any country up to the present day.50

Ill. Reaction to Regulation: The Reception of the Railway Board

In announcing Blair’s appointment as the first Chief Commissioner, the
Canada Law Journal described this office as one of the most important public
positions in the gift of the Dominion Government,5 and remarked for the ben-
efit of an appreciative audience, that the requirement that it be filled by a lawyer
was “very properly”5 made. Blair was described as “eminently fitted” 3 for the
assignment, and in reference to his recent resignation from the cabinet because
of a disagreement over federal railway policy, the Journal observed that this
“indicate[d] an independence of thought and action which augurs well for his
future usefulness in a position where such characteristics are so essential.” 4
The Board was explicitly described by law journals as a court whose mem-
bers have “responsibility as holding a judicial position charged with very impor-
tant duties.”55 By 1908 the Railway Board was even thought to be “perhaps, the
most important Court, and possesses wider powers than any court in Canada,
and that it is not a political shelf., 56 At the same time, the need to balance com-
peting social forces was acknowledged in a manner that is difficult to reconcile
with a purely judicial characterization of the Board. For example, the Canada
Law Journal insisted that the commissioners

will also have to stand between these gigantic and influential companies and the
public, and will see the necessity of protecting the latter, and the individuals

49Canada, H.C., Debates: The Railway Commission (20 March 1903) at 245.
50Ibid. at 247.
51″The Board of Railway Commissioners” (1904) 40 Can. L.J. 449 at 449-50.
52Ibid.
531bid.
4Ibid.
551bid.
56″The Board of Railway Commissioners” (1908) 44 Canada L.J. 169 at 171; and ibid. See also

(1904) Industrial Can. 369.

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therein, from the greed and overbearance too often characteristic of rich and pow-
erful corporations.

57

The railways were presented as “largely monopolies,” “transparently alive to
their own interests,” and it was remembered that “those who deal with them
have the greater need of protection.””8 The B.R.C. then, whose claim to indepen-
dence was reinforced in the minds of some by a judicial aura, was simultane-
ously expected to assert its influence fairly systematically as a counterweight to
concentrations of private power.

Louis A. Pouliot later took issue with the choice of a regulatory commis-
sion as the response to railway rate grievances.59 Acknowledging that the public
need for relief from oppression at the hands of the railways had been legitimate,
he concluded “that our legislators have given a remedy too much in haste, with-
out having taken time to consider it fully.”‘ Concerned by the Board’s “most
extended and extraordinary powers,”‘” he objected to the combination of judi-
cial and legislative authority and to what he regarded as “undue jurisdiction”’62
over purely civil matters. The Board’s procedure, however, received his sharpest
attack. By leaving “to the absolute discretion of the Board ’63 such issues as costs
and legal advice for the parties, the Commission operated in a manner that was
“vague, lax, and indefinite.”‘ Pouliot conceded that as an advisor to parliament
on Railway matters the B.R.C. could have contributed usefully, but he was ulti-
mately unwilling to accept the basic legitimacy of independent regulatory
authority: “Working as it is now, we humbly submit, that it disturbs, at least, the
whole economy of our judicial system.”‘6

Pouliot’s criticism of the Railway Board was not universally accepted.
Indeed, favourable commentaries urged the relevance of the B.R.C. as a model
which might be more widely adopted:

Why should not the simplicity in proceedings, the facilities for early hearing of
cases, the absence of technicalities and formalities, the desire for fairness in reach-
ing a decision and the practical finality of that decision, characteristic of the pro-
ceedings of the Board of Railway Commissioners, be equally characteristic of the
Court of Law.66

57Supra, note 51 at 449.
58fbid.
59L.A. Pouliot, “The Federal Railway Commission” (1911) 31 Can. L.T. 493.
60Pouliot, ibid. at 496.
61Ibid.
62Ibid.
631bid.
61Ibid.
651bid.
66A.T. Drummond, “Can Legal Practice be Remodelled?” (1912) 32 Can. L.T. 694 at 696.

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The same author buttressed his sentiments with reference to fairness, “a leading
principle which increasingly appeals to our better natures,” 67 and advocated the
pattern of everyday life where “the methods we prefer to employ include the
shortest and the least expensive road, and the constant application of common
sense.”

68

One of the most substantial pre-World War I contributions to the Canadian
debate on regulation and administrative tribunals was W.F. Chipman’s analysis
of “Government by Commission. 69 The writer, echoing the Monetary Times’
earlier reservations,” regarded commissions in the regulatory field as “amphib-
ious – half legislature, half court,”‘” and an essential distrust of the new form
of decision-making was evident throughout the analysis. Citing the United
States Supreme Court decision in Munn v. Illinois,72 he considered the proposi-
tion that

[o]ne who devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest … in
effect grants to the public an interest in that use and must submit to be controlled
by thepublic for the common good to the extent of the interest he has thus cre-
ated.

,,7:

Chipman formulated the problem of the limits of regulatory authority in a man-
ner reflecting the intense arguments about the legitimacy of regulation which
had been common in the United States:

But where and by what rule the limit is to be drawn beyond which regulation
amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the law, or to the taking of property
without due process –

it seems impossible to say.74

With parliamentary sovereignty, recent Canadian experience concerning “con-
fiscatory” legislation, the Magna Carta and a brief reference to A.V. Dicey,
Chipman then set the framework for a concluding review of the relationship
between commissions and the courts.

The new commissions, both in Canada and the United States, were
endowed with what Chipman regarded as a “judicial element,’ 75 and some of
them operated as courts of record. Had they been fully assimilated to the courts,
Chipman would apparently have waived his objections. The case was otherwise,
however:

67 Ibid
681bid.
69(1911) 31 Can. L.T. 446. Warwick Fielding Chipman, who graduated from McGill in 1906,

practised law in Montreal and taught civil law at McGill.

70Supra, note 32.
71Supra, note 69 at 447.
72Supra, note 7.
73Supra, note 69 at 448.
74 1bid.
751bid.

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The trouble is that these bodies do more than try issues. They create the issues to
be tried, and the rules by which they shall be tried are entirely arbitrary, discretion-
ary and exceptional. It is impossible not to recognize that neither one of the two
characters of these bodies, judicial or executory, can be made complete without
necessarily interfering with the other.76

Chipman reminded his readers that “[n]o such Boards can sit without modifying
rights of property, rights of contract and freedom of trade”77 and that the inter-
ests not only of monopolies but of the public as well would be affected. He
articulated, in conclusion, the nature of the institutional trade-off at its most
basic level and was more willing than most tribunal critics to acknowledge the
potential costs in terms of functional efficiency that defenders of the rule of law
must be prepared to accept:

If efficiency in executive control be the highest good of a state, then undoubtedly
it is stupid to maintain that the executory body is or should be a Court of law. But
if liberty be more important than good management … then it becomes of the
utmost importance to insist upon the assimilation to courts of the public bodies we
are examining, and upon their adherence or subjection to the ordinary laws of the
land.78

As Chipman indicated, opinion basically divided between those favouring a
formal judicial model and those favouring an administrative model of decision-
making, with commissioners themselves often left to formulate acceptable pro-
cedural means of accommodating the tension.

Not all commissioners appreciated the possible significance of a balanced
and moderate tone, while their new organizations settled into the changing land-
scape of public decision-making. For example, the Chairman of the Quebec
Utilities Commission, who regarded his tribunal as comparable to the Ontario
Railway and Municipal Board and the Board of Railway Commissioners, some-
what tactlessly remarked to a Toronto audience that to allow appeals from a
commission decision on a question of fact would turn it into “a mere court of
Justice.”79 The commissioner resented the prospect of having to gather material
“in a precise, accurate and legal form which can be submitted to a court of
Appeal. 80

Chipman’s 1911 critique of commission government had ended with the
confident reflection, “[p]erhaps the law is secure enough, and sufficiently fun-
In striking contrast to
damental, to await serenely the return of the prodigals.’
the impatience expressed by the Quebec Utilities Commission Chair with the

76Ibid.
77Ibid.
781bid.
791bid. at 461.
8OIbid.
81Ibid.

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judicial process, as constituting a serious hindrance to effective decision-
making, is Viscount Finlay’s later observation that “[t]he Railway Board is not
a mere administrative body. It is a Court of Record …”82 Somewhere in the insti-
tutional landscape between “a mere court of Justice” and mere administrative
bodies, early twentieth century Canadian regulators had to secure the founda-
tions of their legitimacy, for, W.F. Chipman notwithstanding, the prodigal com-
missions were not anxious to return to the judicial fold.

Early twentieth century Canadian observers were not unfamiliar with a
conceptual framework that distinguished between administrative, judicial and
legislative functions. Indeed, Chief Justice Harrison had endorsed the separation
of powers in 1876, one year after the creation by federal statute of the Supreme
Court of Canada:

In the reading of the British North America Act one cannot fail to observe the dis-
tribution of powers into the three great divisions of executive, legislative and judi-
cial. To avoid conflict, the functions of each must, as far as practicable, be kept
separate and distinct within its own sphere.8 3

Explanations for the influence of the separation of powers doctrine have
included the suggestion that it is “an essential element in efficient govern-
ment,”.4 “a necessary safeguard to the liberty of the citizen”85 and “a practical
differentiation of organs or of functions.”86

The comparative subordination of the separation of powers in Canada was
consistent with parliamentary government and legislative supremacy. Certain
central assumptions of this tradition, as expressed by prominent early twentieth
century Canadian commentator Adam Shortt, were important features of the
environment in which the B.R.C. would seek to establish its credentials and
authority:

mhe Canadian system of government belongs to the British type of responsible
parliamentary government in which there is the most intimate connection between
the legislative and executive functions, and in which also the constitution is a flex-
ible combination of laws and usages, many of the latter more binding, and in some
cases even more unalterable than the laws. 7

“[T]he chief factor of success in the Canadian system of parliamentary govern-
ment,” he continued, “is the concentration of power and responsibility.”88 The

at 319.

82Toronto Railway v. Toronto, [1920] A.C. 426 at 434.
83Re Hamilton and Nonh-Western Railway (1876), 39 U.C.R. 93 at 112.
44J. Finkleman, “Separation of Powers: A Study in Administrative Law” (1936) 1 U.T.L.J. 313
85Ibid.
861bid.
87A. Shortt, “The Relation between the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Canadian
88 bid.

Government” (1913) 7 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 181 at 181.

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substitution of concentration for separation, and of usages for constitutional
rights, presented early twentieth century Canadian regulators with a somewhat
different set of norms to satisfy in establishing and maintaining their authority
as decision-makers. The B.R.C., in particular, as the pre-eminent national reg-
ulator in a parliamentary and federal system, faced the challenge of promoting
public acceptance of an integrated exercise of judicial, administrative and leg-
islative responsibilities. If that combination was often welcomed by casual
observers and the public, it was clear that within legal circles there would be
scrutiny of the B.R.C.’s performance, especially where the exercise of discretion
might occur. For, in the mind of some critics such powers were “repugnant to
the responsibility of Parliament.” 9

Before examining the manner in which the legitimacy of the B.R.C. was
confirmed, it is helpful to sample the decisions of the Board. This will establish
a clear appreciation of the range and importance of the matters with which the
new tribunal dealt, and will illustrate their policy implications.

IV. Policy Dimensions of the Rate Cases

The Board’s decision-making authority regularly required the exercise of
discretion, as its members were occasionally willing to acknowledge. Blair, for
example, said that the rate-making power invests the commission “with a dis-
cretionary power, without appeal, of determining whether tolls for the carriage
of merchandise are just, reasonable and free from discrimination.”9 The breadth
of discretion provided opportunities for policy development, although, as
Janisch has noted, this further consequence of the discretion was generally
downplayed or denied:

[A]s long as it was felt that the Board was not making policy decisions, there
would not be awkward questions about the legitimacy of a non-elected body’s
making such decisions. Should the perception change and it be realized that reg-
ulatory agencies are not simply “judicial” bodies mechanically applying a clearcut
policy mandate given them by parliament then the issue of political irresponsibil-
ity has to be confronted.9′

In fact, during debate on a 1905 Railway Act amendment,9′ opposition spokes-
men, W.F. McLean, emphasized the Board’s legislative functions and their
implications for accountability:

Where you have legislative powers conferred on anybody [sic], ought not that
body to be responsible? If this Railway Commission is vested with legislative
powers and functions, it should be responsible to parliament. 93

89Ibid.
90Scobell v. The Kingston & Pembroke R.W. Co. (1904), 3 C.R.C. 412 at 414 [hereinafter Cedar

Lumber Products].

9’Janisch, “Independent Regulatory Agency,” supra, note 1.
92Ibid. at 91.
93Canada, H.C., Debates: Railway Act Amendment (23 February 1905) at 1599.

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To minimize criticism of the B.R.C.’s legislative role, commission officials
spoke in terms of applying the policy of the Railway Act to cases before it,94 and
emphasized jurisdictional limitations:

Being a statutory tribunal, this Board must find in the Act constituting it, either
in express terms or by necessary implication, the power to do what is being asked,
otherwise the authority to do so is lacking.95

The Board was also prepared to re-direct the parties back to Parliament to rem-
edy complaints outside its mandate:

As I read the Railway Act, it does not fall within the scope of the Board’s
powers to reduce a rate because a removal of customs duty has created a keen
competition. If the removal of duty creates the situation complained of, it is to
another body that application must be made for relief. 96

Despite these signals, matters brought before the Board and arguments
made at its proceedings repeatedly demonstrated a public perception that the
agency’s authority to consider policy issues was very extensive. Chief Commis-
sioner Drayton97 was forced in the International Paper case to respond to this
impression:

Arguments have been advanced, practically on the line of conservation of the
country’s resources, on the proposition that it is much better for Canada that this
pulpwood should be used in it, and the like. In my view, this Board has nothing
to do with such considerations at all, and is not and should not be moved by any
ulterior consideration or motive. If the rate is an improper rate, there is not reason
in the world why it should be allowed to stand because an American mill absorbs
the increase instead of the Canadian producer.98

Nevertheless the B.R.C. was regularly required to consider the public interest in
the course of its deliberations. In the absence of policy guidelines, inquiries into
the public interest became very wide ranging.

Only rarely, however, did the Board itself acknowledge the legislative
nature of its activities; 99 Board members were generally inclined to downplay
the significance of their powers. McLean, for example, after years of experience

94See In Re Joint Freight and Passenger Tariffs (1909), 10 C.R.C. 343 at 345.
95Niagara, St. Catherines and Toronto Railway Company v. The Grand Trunk Railway Company
96Canadian Oil Cos. v. Grand Trunk, Canadian Pacific and Canadian Northern Ry. Cos. (1911),

(1904), 3 C.R.C. 263 at 270 [hereinafter Stamford Junction].

12 C.R.C. 350 at 357, McLean.

97Drayton, a former Crown Attorney, had been counsel for the City of Toronto, and a member
of Ontario’s Hydro Electric Power Commission before his appointment to the B.R.C. See “The
Railway Commission” (1912) 48 Canada L.J. 473 at 474 and “The Chairman of the Dominion
Railway Board” (1913) 49 Can. L.J. 318.

98lnternational Paper Co. v. Grand Trunk (1913), 15 C.R.C. 111 at 116 [hereinafter Iterna-

tional Paper].

99See In re Daylight Savings Act (1919), 24 C.R.C. 199 at 206.

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BOARD OF RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS

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with the B.R.C., seemed to express some puzzlement about the existence of
law-making powers when he spoke to the Toronto Lawyer’s Club:

When you come across such a phrase as this, “The provisions of the Railway Act
in so far as applicable and not inconsistent with the present Act shall apply,” what
is the answer? It looks as if you were putting the regulative tribunal very close to
law-making functions.””
As the following section of the paper illustrates, the B.R.C.’s early rate-
making decisions had important consequences for the well-being of industries
and communities throughout Canada. These frequently involved policy choices
of a legislative nature. Earnings, the Board’s position regarding return on cap-
ital, and its elaboration of the public interest provide some indication of the
B.R.C.’s attitude to the railway industry. The Board’s discussion of these mat-
ters also illustrates the intimate relationship between policy choices and rate
review in individual cases.

A. Fair Return and the Railway Industry

“Railway companies,” stated Chief Commissioner J.P. Mabee in 1911, “are
entitled to enjoy fair and remunerative rates” subject, of course, to the reason-
ableness of tolls.”‘ If the agency regarded its rate-making powers as limited by
these considerations, there was nevertheless a good deal of sensitivity to the
position of investors. “No controlling commission has got, it seems to us, the
right or the jurisdiction to make an order that would have the effect of destroy-
ing the earning power of the capital that honestly went into the facility.””1 2 Pre-
war critics of commissions and of legislatures who feared arbitrary confiscation
or expropriation should have found relief in such sentiments. Even more so
when the Board concluded in a rate-reduction case that “sufficient has been said
to make it clear that the reduction in rates then directed would be an outrage
upon the stockholders in these railways.”‘ 3 Some years later these sentiments
were elevated into “the duty of the Board to allow fair and just rates to carriers
for the service they perform.””‘ 4

Acknowledgement of the shareholder interest had important implications
for the manner in which the commissioners would participate in the rate-setting
process. In Winnipeg Jobbers’ Association v. Canadian Pacific, the Chief Com-
missioner reminded participants that the statute gives the railway company
rather than the Board or the public the right to frame tariffs. “The legislation,”

345.

“‘S.J. McLean, ‘The Railway Act of Canada” (1928) 6 Can. Bar Rev. 415 at 427.
“”Canadian Oil Co. v. Grand Trunk and Canadian Pacific Ry. Cos. (1911), 12 C.R.C. 334 at

102Dawson Board of Trade v. White Pass and Yukon Ry. Co. (1912), 13 C.R.C. 527 at 532.
“‘3bid. at 533.
141h re Increase in Passenger and Freight Tolls (1917), 22 C.R.C. 49 at 63.

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he continued, “does not by any means put the Board in the position of being able
to in all cases control the carrier in the fixing of his tolls.”‘”

Even where challenged tariffs were disallowed, the Board was reluctant to
substitute new rates because of the detailed inquiry that would be required.”
Actual practice thus confirms the observation that “a regulatory body operating
still within the economic philosophy of laissez-faire would be given and would
assume very modest powers to intervene in the business of operating a rail-
way-, ,107

The B.R.C.’s reluctance to intervene reflected some sensitivity about the
limits of its own competence and perhaps some measure of confidence in the
railways’ responsiveness to market conditions and competition. On the one
hand, Blair remarked in 1904 that “when properly influenced by unobjection-
able motives,” the railways “should be better able to judge than this Board can
be, as to what course will tend to best promote the common interest of carrier
and shipper.” 08 This echo of the 1894-95 parliamentary inquiry” 9 does not seem
to have been so candidly expressed in future cases but presumptions applied to
rates in conditions of competition contribute to a similar result:

Where a railway chooses to meet water competition it is to be presumed, unless
the contrary is established, that it does so because there is effective competition
in regard to traffic important in amount.” 0

That analysis protected railways from shippers’ claims that rates in competitive
circumstances were relevant to the determination of reasonableness or the exis-
tence of undue discrimination in other situations where competition did not
operate. The Board’s willingness to leave the basic rate-setting function to the
judgment of railway management could be explained by this assumption of
effective competition and acceptance of the need for profitable routes to support
other lines. Thus, it asserted “when competition is less effective the railway may
bring its rates up more closely to its normal basis,” ”
and “if the whole line of
the Canadian Pacific produced no better results than the Pacific division, it
would become insolvent.””.2 Accordingly, after offering low rates to the Pacific
coast in order to compete successfully for traffic, the company may “recoup its
losses by means of the rates it may impose to the interior points.””‘ Overall, a

105(1908), 8 C.R.C. 175 at 178 [hereinafter Winnipeg Jobbers’ Association].
’61bid. at 183.
’07Darling, supra, note 1 at 33.
08The United Factories v. Grand Trunk (1904), 3 C.R.C. 424 at 426.
1
1i9Supra, note 17.
“0PIain and Company v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (1909), 9 C.R.C. 222 at 223.
“‘Dominion Millers’ Association v. Grand Trunk (1911), 12 C.R.C. 363 at 368.
” 2British Columbia Pacific Coast Cities v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (1906), 7 C.R.C. 125 at
113 bid.

130 [hereinafter B.C. Pacific].

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BOARD OF RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS

1243

loosely-defined fair return was expected to result from the full range of mana-
gerial decisions whose inter-relationships the Board considered itself unsuited
to assess.'” 4

Assumptions about risk and uncertainty also inhibited more active interfer-
ence by the commissioners. In Dawson Board of Trade v. White Pass and Yukon
Ry. Co.,” the applicants urged that lower rates would actually assist the railway
business by attracting additional traffic to the route, developing the surrounding
country and inducing investments. The Board considered these predictions seri-
ously but weighed them against the consequences if traffic failed to develop
from lower rates: “the Board would have wrecked the capital invested, forced
the companies into receiverships, and probably done the country and people
irreparable harm.”” 6 The Chief Commissioner was unwilling to accept respon-
sibility for the risk and decided against intervention by saying “it is much easier
to advance arguments of this kind than to take the responsibility of putting these
claims in the form of a concrete order.””.7

Protection of the railway investment was evidently a significant concern
for the regulators, although the range of protectable interests did vary. For
example, in an early application by the Grand Trunk for exemption from the
Lord’s Day Act,”‘ the Board heard evidence about the likelihood of shippers
seeking continuous service on American carriers if the interruption of Canadian
grain carriage on Sundays was not eliminated. The judgment carefully intro-
duces a wide range of public considerations, but its primary consequence is to
maintain the competitive position of the Canadian rail line:

While the mere money loss to a corporation not allowed to work its employees on
the Sabbath may be of no moment, it seems to me the pecuniary loss to the Grand
Trunk by not being able to carry this grain is not the only thing for consideration.
If it were, I should regard the evidence as of little value. If this grain cannot be
carried by Canadian lines it will go through American channels, and others will
benefit at the expense of the country whose every effort has been put forth to
acquire and hold this carrying trade; and so, instead of merely the Grand Trunk
interests being involved, it is the larger question of the commerce of the country
being at stake, and while I am not at all of the opinion that this is a reason for mak-
ing a week-day of the Sabbath, I do think that some modification of the Act may
be made so that this traffic may be retained, and yet that the minimum of Sunday
work be permitted.” 9

“4”Transportation,” supra, note 1 at 119-20. Cruikshank describes the imprecise nature of rate-

setting and observes:

With one eye on regular year-over-year comparisons of revenues and expenses, freight
agents and traffic officials relied on instinct, precedent and experience in setting rates,
responding as best they could to commercial and competitive pressures (supra at 120).

“5Supra, note 102.
“6lbid. at 540.
“Tlbid.
“8Re Lord’s Day Act and Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1908), 8 C.R.C. 23.
119 Ibid. at 28-29.

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The Board’s policy on traffic diversion in Great Northern v. Canadian North-
ern120 also reflected a sensitivity to the capital commitments of the railway com-
panies in Canada, in the absence of some overriding public interest. The Great
Northern, with track from Duluth, Minnesota, to Emerson, Manitoba, sought to
reduce its existing joint tariff with the Canadian Northern on coal on the Duluth-
Emerson-Winnipeg route from $3.00 to $2.50, the same rate that the Canadian
Northern charged for the all-Canadian shipment of coal from the Lakehead to
Winnipeg. This would have resulted in some diversion of traffic to the southern
route with the Canadian Northern then earning its 75 portion of the joint tariff
instead of the full $2.50 for performing the delivery entirely on its own line. The
Canadian Northern was joined in opposition to the application by the cities of
Fort William and Port Arthur which discussed the coal handling facilities of the
port:

Large sums in wages are paid at both these points to workmen engaged in this
work; and it was clearly demonstrated that if this trade was taken away from these
cities, it would seriously injure them. 12 1

Ambiguously observing that these considerations “may or may not have any
bearing upon the case,”‘”
the Board denied the application on the grounds that
it could find no benefit to shippers or consumers in the arrangement proposed
by the Great Northern. In a similar case involving passenger traffic, the Board
again found no public benefit in a proposed diversion and asked:

Is it fair that the applicant should be permitted to make use of the Act to divert
from the lines of the Grand Trunk and Canadian Pacific Railways at Toronto the
tourist traffic that the last mentioned railways have spent years in developing?’2

Promotional effort and investment were evidently worthy of some protection.

Despite some limitations on the protection of railway capital where an
important public interest was seen to arise, and despite restrictions on the man-
ner in which railway companies might earn their profits, the foundations of the
system rested on policy judgments about the long-term nature of national
development:

Railway construction in Canada depends entirely upon outside capital; thousands
of millions must be borrowed within the next generation or two. We have in Can-
ada less than thirty thousand miles of railway as against more than 235,000 miles
in the United States. Within fifty years Canada will require a greater railway mile-
age than now exists in the United States; the money for the construction of this
must, for many years at least, largely come from abroad, and how long would

120(1907), 11 C.R.C. 424.
121Ibid. at 428.
122Ibid.
123Canadian Northern Ontario Ry. Co. v. Grand Trunk and Canadian Pacific Ry. Cos. (1908),

7 C.R.C. 289 at 293 (the Muskoka Rates case).

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these investments continue if it were known that their earning power might, at any
moment, be terminated by the intervention of this Board? While our duty to inter-
fere and reduce rates in all proper cases is plain, surely it is equally clear that we
should not require a reduction where the effect would be to prevent the investment
earning a fair return.1 24

The background debate about arbitrary government, agency interference or
confiscation reinforced the sensitivity to rights of property. This sensitivity
helped to sustain, if it did not create, an aversion to managerial involvement by
commissions in railway operations with regard to service level controls, systems
development, investment decisions and rate setting. The B.R.C.’s initial reluc-
tance to substitute its judgment for managerial decisions contributed to a bias
against examining cost control measures and other internal operations and in
favour of profit control which was more easily understood and apparently
judged to be of greater significance to the public.

B. Reasonable Rates and Industrial Policy

The Board was regularly confronted with claims from shippers who were
anxious to establish or to restore some competitive advantage or to generally
promote industrial development. A few examples seem to illustrate a distinction
between the treatment given these cases by Blair, the former politician, and the
treatment of similar problems by his successors. The first Chief Commissioner’s
willingness to seek industrial benefits for Canada through rate regulation
appears to contrast with his successors’ unwillingness to consider the compet-
itive position of Canadian shippers as a factor affecting the reasonableness of
railway rates.

The Sydenham Glass Company Case,” decided within months of the
B.R.C.’s creation, is typical of the first cluster of cases. Special arrangements
between the Canadian glass company and the C.P.R. prior to the Railway Act
had provided some assistance in meeting competition from the United States
and Germany. Following the 1903 legislation, the railway expressed doubt
about the legality of the established rates and introduced an increase from which
the manufacturer sought relief. Chief Commissioner Blair noted the advantage
enjoyed by American industry with regard to raw materials, and ordered lower
rates with only the thought that “the Board ha[d] to be reasonable.””26 The
reported result was explained on the basis that “at the present rates the Syden-
ham Glass Company cannot maintain its position in the home market with the
goods it manufactures, in competition with importations from abroad.”‘2
In

124Supra, note 102 at 534-35.
121(1904), 3 C.R.C. 409.
1261bid. at 411.
127Ibid.

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another early decision a rate reduction order was related to “the fact that the
export of cooperage has materially fallen off since the increased rates have pre-
vailed.”’28 The full extent to which Blair was prepared to exert the Board’s
authority so as to restrict the railways’ managerial discretion in the interests of
industrial development was shown later in the year, when the Pea Millers’ Asso-
ciation complained about the loss of the British market and that producers were
operating below capacity as a result of a rate advance introduced by the railways
late in 1902. Blair concluded that higher export freight rates were probably “the
finishing and not the sole cause” of the lost markets. 9 Nevertheless he restored
the former rates as follows:

Perhaps the Railways have compared the value of the business to them at the
higher basis of rate, and at the former lower one, and may possibly prefer the pres-
ent restricted volume of traffic in this product to the augmented output which the
millers predict would follow a restoration of the old basis. If this be the case, it
is doubtful whether they should be permitted to continue a policy which, while
financially preferable to them, does an injury to an important Canadian industry. 30

These early cases, however, are isolated evidence of the original potential of the
B.R.C. to channel the behaviour of railway management in the interests of the
domestic economy generally.

An unmistakable indication that outcomes would differ after Blair resigned
from the B.R.C. is given in Chief Commissioner Killam’s approach to Brant
Milling Co. v. Grand Trunk Railway Co.’ Here, a family milling operation in
the Brantford area grew up and expanded, at least in part, with the support of
a cartage allowance provided by the railway. The allowance, which permitted
a company distant from the railway to escape the cost of cartage to the rail line,
had not been given for any particular time period, and was withdrawn by the
Grand Trunk which believed it to be contrary to the Railway Act. The milling
company gave evidence to show that the withdrawal of the cartage allowance
would render its business unprofitable and destroy the value of the investment.
On the basis of a comparative review of the English, American and Canadian
legislation, and reference to cases from British courts and the I.C.C., Killam,
who had left the Supreme Court of Canada for the Railway Board, found it
entirely unnecessary to deal with these consequences. The general rule dealing
with the “equality” clause in the Railway Act and the Board’s response to the
use of rates to provide industrial assistance came from Commissioner McLean
in 1909. He confined the notion of “similar circumstances and conditions”

128The Sutherland-Innes Company and the Wallaceburg Cooperage Co. v. Pre Marquette Ry

Co. (1904), 3 C.R.C. 421 at 423.

129Pea Millers’ Association v. Canadian Railvay Companies (1904), 3 C.R.C. 433 at 434.
130Ibid. at 436-37.
131(1905), 4 C.R.C. 259.

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(s. 25(4)), which was the basis for determining whether discrimination in rates
was or was not unjust, to the realm of traffic conditions:

[A]llegations regarding “similar factories” are of no value unless the “similar fac-
tories” are, under similar circumstances and conditions of traffic, accorded more
favourable treatment. 132

He further stated, in the sentence which came to represent Board doctrine on the
subject, that “[i]t is no part of the obligations of the Railways, under the Railway
Act, to equalize costs of production through lowered rates so that all may com-
pete on an even keel in the same market.”‘ 33 Yet, it was precisely this sort of
contribution to regional development in Canada that sectoral interests fre-
quently expected railways to make.

In later cases the Board sought to avoid responsibility for matters of this
kind, asserting, for example, that “[i]t is not for the Board to attempt to direct
trade development ‘ or that the commission “is nowhere authorized by Parlia-
ment to be an arbiter of industrial policy.”’35 In so far as the international com-
petitive position of Canadian industry was concerned, although Board members
often indicated sympathy for the “territorial sectarianism which desires indus-
tries to be established in one’s own country in preference to a foreign coun-
try,’ 36 they tried to separate their personal views from their official powers:

While members of the Board may and do, as Canadians, sympathize with policies
of economic development which may through increasing diversity lead to greater
economic solidarity, it is not their general opinions but the powers conferred on
them by the Railway Act which determine what they can do.137

The contrast between this statement minimizing the Board’s obligation to indus-
try, and its previously remarks on the need for railway development and expan-
sion, 31 is an indication of the different sympathy level or reaction that manufac-
turing and railway interests might expect from the regulators.

C. The Public Interest

In a number of rate-making decisions the “public interest” actually
appeared as the determining factor. On occasion, for example, the Board

Co. (1909), 10 C.R.C. 161 at 168 [hereinafter Kemp Manufacturing].

132Canadian Portland Cement Co. v. Grand Trunk (1909), 9 C.R.C. 209 at 210-11.
133Ibid at 211.
134Kemnp Manufacturing & Metal and Winnipeg Ceiling & Roofing Cos. v. Canadian Pacific Ry.
135National Dairy Council v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. & Canadian National Rys. (1922), 28
136Canadian Oil Cos. v. Grand Trunk, supra, note 96 at 358; see also Canadian China Clay Co.
137Supra, note 135 at 83.
’38Supra, notes 125-30 and accompanying text.

C.R.C. 75 at 82.

v. Grand Trunk (1915), 18 C.R.C. 347.

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expressed outrage at the prospect of railway actions distorting normal market
operations and thus defeating the reasonable commercial expectations of busi-
ness interests dependant on the railways. This subordination of certain railway
interests to the general needs of commerce was illustrated in the Cedar Lumber
Products case,139 where Blair condemned the railway’s attitude as

oppression in the severest form. It is an interference with the freedom and personal
rights of the individual. It denies to a man the privilege of selling his goods when,
where, and to whom he wishes. 140

Equally fundamental concerns seemed to arise in British American Oil Co. v.
Grand Trunk Ry. Co.,’4′ where a Canadian carrier disputed an international joint
tariff arrangement with an American railway and attempted to charge the ship-
per above the published rate. The Chief Commissioner forcefully rejected the
railway’s claims:

These tariffs are intended for the guidance of shippers, and they are supposed to
be able to ascertain from them what the lawful tolls are. Here we have a case of
the applicant company making expenditures and entering into contracts upon the
faith of the interpretation put upon the tariff by the initial carrier, traffic moving
under the tariff as construed, and such construction adopted by the participating
carrier, and then an attempt by the latter to set up an entirely different interpreta-
tion at the expense and possible ruination of the industry that attempted to use the
tariff promulgated by these carriers. 142

Stability of rates or proper notice had been regarded as an important component
of the public interest since at least the time of McLean’s reports,’43 and as com-
missioner he re-stated the position in 1909 with reference to the unfair advan-
tages large shippers might gain from better information.” 4

A series of rate cases involving consumer products illustrates the willing-
ness of Commissioners Mills and McLean to offer assessments of the actual
results that might be expected from proposed tariff changes. In Cut Glassware
Importers v. Canadian Freight Association, 45 the plaintiff sought a tariff reduc-
tion from “double first class” to “first class” rate charged on china-ware on the
grounds of cost savings to the consumer. McLean was unconvinced. He
concluded:

It is hardly to be expected that the self-interest of the producer would cause him
to share the reduction with the consumer, since the demand for cut glass is rela-
tively inelastic, i.e. the demand for it is independent of fractional variations in
price. 146

139Supra, note 90.
14Ibid. at 414-15.
141(1909), 9 C.R.C. 178.
1421bid. at 189.
143See McLean, 1902, supra, note 22 at 66.
144Supra, note 94 at 346.
145(1911), 12 C.R.C. 10.
1461bid. at 11.

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In Canadian Freight Association v. Tobacco Merchants,147 after examining the
distribution network, McLean rejected the Canadian Freight Association’s
application to raise rates on cut and plug tobacco. The re-classification of
tobacco would apparently have produced disruption in the wholesale grocery
trade, where mixed carloads of grocery items including tobacco were common.
“In view of the dislocation in the established method of distribution which the
proposed increased ratings would cause, it would be necessary for the railways
to make out a strong affirmative case.”‘ 48 Mills later remarked that the consumer
interest was regularly invoked in shipper applications for freight rate revisions,
and he declared that consumers –
“the end of the distributive process, and the
silent partner”‘ 49 –
should share any benefits resulting from a lowering of
unreasonable rates. He was doubtful, however, that this result was actually
achieved.

Consumer protection also appeared as a factor in Great Northern Ry. Co.
v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co.,50 an application proposing the diversion of coal
traffic from one railway to the other at the existing rate. The Board asked: “In
whose interests would all this be? … How would the Winnipeg coal consumer
be benefited? Would he be getting coal by a shorter route or at a lower freight
rate?”” The significance of these reflections was emphasized when Chief Com-
missioner Mabee continued:

This case is not to be considered as if the application came from the people of
Winnipeg, supported by satisfactory evidence that the railways were defaulting in
furnishing a sufficient coal supply via Fort William and Port Arthur.152

The B.R.C.’s decisions did not reflect a uniformly applied policy to require
a demonstrated consumer benefit. They did, though, provide notice to the trans-
portation sector through the Canadian Freight Association that the public inter-
est could involve a wider range of considerations than the parties alone were
usually able to demonstrate. This expression of independent concern for the dis-
tributive impact of rate decisions of the unrepresented consumer was notewor-
thy, for it introduced decision-making criteria that would not ordinarily have
appeared in formally adjudicative proceedings.

The B.R.C.’s most explicit invocation of the concept of a public interest is
found in a series of decisions on interswitching arrangements, that is, the service
which permitted a carrier located on the tracks of one railway to transfer locally
to the tracks of another in order to send or receive goods. In the London Inter-

147(1911), 12 C.R.C. 299.
148 Ibid. at 302-303.
149Berliner Gramophone Co. v. Canadian Freight Association (1912), 14 C.R.C. 175 at 181.
150(1911), 11 C.R.C. 424.
151Ibid. at 428-29.
152Ibid. at 429.

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change Case,’53 the B.R.C. declared emphatically that the Railway Act’s provi-
sions regarding interchange at connecting points were intended “not for the pur-
pose of benefitting one railway company at the expense of another, but solely
in the interest of the public.”’54 Accordingly, Chief Commissioner Killam
ordered the Grand Trunk to provide interchange services to the Canadian
Pacific, and rejected the former railway’s claim to compensation for loss of
good will and payment on the basis of its comparative loss relative to the
C.P.R.’s gain. Instead, the joint rates for interchanging were to be divided on the
principle of reasonable compensation for services and facilities utilized by the
particular traffic interchanged. The decision is more remarkable, though, for
Killam’s ruminations on the law and economic development:

With the progress of invention, new enterprises are continually supplanting or
injuring old ones to the ruin or loss of those interested in the former. Railways
have not only directly affected in this way former modes of transportation, but
they have also been instrumental in building up particular localities or enterprises
at the expense of others. It has never been the policy of the law to afford compen-
sation for losses thus occasioned. When the legislature authorizes the construction
of new lines of railway in competition with those formerly existing, this is not
done with a view to benefit the promoters of the new lines or to injure those inter-
ested in the old ones, but solely for the public good.155

When this decision reached the Supreme Court, a jurisdictional challenge had
already been resolved by Parliament in favour of the Railway Board. Justice
Idington, the only judge to discuss the appeal, recognized the Grand Trunk’s
protests about partial expropriation and unfair competition, but he saw no stat-
utory basis to ameliorate the result:

The purpose of the Act is that the public must be served. The whole purpose of
the Act is to give effect to that purpose. Both contending railway companies are
but the creation for a like purpose. Beneficent as each has been in a wide sense,
some hamlets and towns have decayed as the result of the creation of either.

The suffering in this case or any other of the like kind, is but an incident like

the growing pains of the boy. 56
A comparison between the Railway Board’s fairly broad conception of the
public interest and the attitudes of Canadian courts to the same matter is of con-
siderable interest. At this stage, only fragmentary documentation is available to
support the view that the approaches taken in the two institutions differed sig-
nificantly.’57 In G.T.R. v. Perrault, Davies J. remarked on the apparent differ-
ences and offered a tentative explanation:

153Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. and City of London (1905), 6

C.R.C. 327.
‘-41bid. at 331.
155lbid.
‘156 bia. at 342-43.
’57See Hibbitts, supra, note 21.

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Many considerations have to be weighed in reaching a conclusion under this sec-
tion, [Railvay Act, s. 198] and some of them relating to the “public interest” may
be quite apart from the immediate surroundings. What weight, if an ordinary court
was considering the question, would they give or have a right to give to the “public
interest”? The special Board of Commissioners is enjoined to consider what would
be safe in the public interest. The ordinary court is not so enjoined, and I know
not on what ground but one of statutory injunction they would be justified in such
a matter as farm crossings in considering the safety of the general public. These
considerations on which alone its judgment would be based would, I should imag-
ine, be limited to the rights and interests of the land-owner on the one side and the
railway company on the other. 58

Market maintenance, consumer benefits and economic progress, merely illus-
trate the range of values the Railway Commission was prepared to invoke in
support of rulings made under the rubric of the public interest. To identify the
public interest, the Board in these cases made reference to what it considered
to be fundamental principles, the rules of macroeconomics and the policy of the
law. In other cases, the public interest was considered in light of English and
American precedents discussing the same concept. 159

To summarize the analysis to this point, it will be recalled that at the time
of its creation, observers of the B.R.C. were far from unanimous in their under-
standing of the nature of regulation and its relationship to familiar institutional
norms in Canada. It is clear from the immediately preceding discussion, how-
ever, that in the course of its operations the B.R.C. was frequently called upon
to exercise a measure of independent discretion, and that it engaged in some
forms of political and economic calculus for this purpose. Simultaneously, the
board sought to perform technical and administrative services, and to offer a
judicial atmosphere for the resolution of disputes. Before surveying the institu-
tional design of the board, it is important to consider why the search for agency
legitimacy involved a continuing need to promote acceptability for a workable
synthesis of legislative, administrative and judicial responsibilities. The
as first explained by McLean – was to build legitimacy
B.R.C.’s objective –
for regulation in an environment where the constitutional position of the com-
mission was somewhat doubtful and where the nature of its assignment was not
the subject of consensus.”6

V. Structuring Independence and Acceptability

A. Composition of the Board of Railway Commissioners

The selection of B.R.C. commissioners was important because of three
simultaneous objectives of the federal regulatory process in Canada: political

’55The Grand Trunk R.W. Co. v. Perrault (1904), 5 C.R.C. 293 at 299.
159AIgoma Central & Hudson Bay Ry. Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1908), 8 C.R.C. 46; Grand

Trunk Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. and City of London, supra, note 153.

16McLean’s views on the mediatorial role of the commission are set out in McLean, 1899, supra

note 22 at 39.

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responsiveness, efficient results and respect for rights. McLean (and others
before him) had advocated a three member commission consisting of a railway
man, a businessman and a lawyer –
a common pattern on the United States
commissions. The Railway Act simply provided for three members to be
appointed by Governor in Council,’61 a process which resulted in the submission
of a good deal of political advice to the Prime Minister. The Board was soon
expanded to six members.

Without always fully articulating their rationale in terms of the representa-
tion of affected interests, numerous commentators ventured opinions about the
proper composition of the Board. Which interests would be officially involved
in the determinations of the new commission was of concern because represen-
tation had implications for the manner in which interest groups would regard the
Board, and perhaps for the quality and substance of the results as well. These
issues were intimately associated with the authority or legitimacy of the new
decision-making forum. That authority and stature, in turn, would influence the
extent and manner of participation in the regulatory process, the acceptability
of B.R.C. decisions, and the likelihood that rate-regulation would continue to
trouble politicians.

One correspondent, who replied to a report that Blair as Minister of Rail-
ways opposed the selection of a farmer for the commission, protested that he
was

not in agreement with the Minister of Railways when he intimates that no farmers
need apply and that merchants, manufacturers and professional men only are to be
chosen to fill all the positions of honour and trust in the gift of governments. 62

The repeated claims of farmers bore fruit in the appointment of James Mills, a
former president of the Ontario Agricultural College. Mills himself later urged
the Prime Minister “to select some bright, fairly well educated, farmer of middle
‘ Mills supported this advice with the argument that
age and good standing ……
“the country has a right to have a man who understands farm life, farm work,
the problems which arise in connection with grain elevators, farm crossings
over railways, etc., and the rights of the shippers viewed from the farmer’s
standpoint.”‘”

Perhaps Mills was also concerned about the credibility of the B.R.C. in the
eyes of an important section of the national community. There was apparently
good reason for such a concern, for in 1908 Manitoba Grain Growers asked that
in new appointments “preference be given to western men, farmers or business

161Railvay Act, s. 8.
162 .A.C., Laurier Papers, J. Lockie Wilson to Laurier, 17 March 1903.
63 bid.
’14P.A.C., Laurier Papers, James Mills to Laurier, 31 October 1908.

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men conversant with conditions in this country.” ‘165 In considering the appoint-
ment of former Manitoba Premier Thomas Greenway, Laurier noted that he was
strongly supported in the West and that “the farmers would feel in him an abso-
lute sense of security,”‘” while the Canada Law Journal somewhat churlishly
remarked that “[i]f it is necessary that the farmers should be represented, Mr.
Greenway will no doubt fulfill the expectations of his friends.”’67 Greenway,
appointed in 1908, died suddenly a few months later.

Mixed with the claims of farm groups were the general demands of western
Canada for representation. It was rumoured during a debate about a possible
membership increase in 1908 that Clifford Sifton would propose division of the
Commission so that one half would sit in the West. 6′ In 1909 the House of
Commons expressed support for the appointment of one “who is acquainted
with western railway conditions.”’69 Claims for appointments were also made on
behalf of the Irish Catholic community and by provinces which felt unfavorably
treated in the general distribution of patronage.’
Pressures of this kind con-
cerning the composition of the tribunal illustrate some of the constraints affect-
ing the judgments of those responsible for appointments. Possibly they are also
early evidence of an approach to regulation that attempts somehow to enhance
agency acceptability through a rudimentary form of constituency or interest
group accountability.’

Despite the frequency with which claims were made for one or another
approach to representation on the commission, the comments offer little indica-
tion of the impact of appointments on either the B.R.C.’s process or the
expected results of its work. The different patterns of selection available may
have had implications for the style of decision-making or the general function
of the regulatory process, but early observers rarely recognized this explicitly.
Even Dawson, who thought it was “very necessary”‘7 z for two members to have
legal training, gave no reasons when he argued that “it is also advisable to have
a business man and a railway man on the Board.”’73 He seems to have recog-
nized exceptional conditions as the basis for special representation but denied
that western Canada satisfied the standard: “All restrictions upon the choice of

16’P.A.C., Laurier Papers, John R. Dutton to Laurier, 11 March 1908.
166P.A.C., Laurier Papers, to Sir Richard Cartwright, 9 September 1908.
167(1908) 44 Can. L.J. 600.
168.A.C., Laurier Papers, G.P. Graham to Laurier, 20 March 1908.
169R.M. Dawson, The Principle of Official Independence with Particular Reference to Political

History of Canada (London: P.S. King, 1922) at 120.

170P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Charles Murphy to Laurier, 1 March 1908; William Pugsley to Lau-

ier, 28 April 1908 and Laurier’s reply of 1 May; E.L. Cash et al. to Laurier, 1 May 1909.

Rev. 1667 at 1760 discusses an interest group representation model of administrative law.

171R.B. Stewart, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law” (1975) 88 Harvard L.
172Supra, note 169.
173IbidJ

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personnel are prima facie bad, and they should be avoided except where some
very material advantage is to be gained.””

The status and contribution of lawyers aroused strong expressions of opin-
ion. Though he wanted a lawyer on the Canadian Board, McLean regarded the
over-representation of lawyers as an “essential defect” in the organization of the
I.C.C.: “While questions of legal interpretation arise, the matters to be deter-
mined require technical knowledge of railway administration.”’75 Predictably,
the Canada Law Journal regretted an early shortage of legally-trained board
members.’76 Lawyers did become more prominently represented on the B.R.C.
quite early in the agency’s history when Justice Killam of the Supreme Court
of Canada, a person of respectable western credentials, was appointed as Chief
Commissioner in 1905.’ Subsequently, with an expansion of the board to six
members, legal representation increased. Prime Minister Laurier acknowledged
Killam’s influence when he responded to one critic of the growing legal strength
on the Railway Board by saying:

I was of the same opinion as yourself that one lawyer on the Commission was
enough, but the late Chairman, Mr. Killam, whose competency was beyond ques-
tion, had different views, and for my part I agreed with him. I think you should
do the same. 178
Justice Killam’s appointment to the B.R.C. was even more significant in
fundamental constitutional terms, for the Supreme Court Justice’s nomination
occasioned the sharpest parliamentary clash of principle on the issue of agency
independence when the government introduced legislation to alter the tenure
provisions applicable to his service as chief commissioner. Although the
McLean reports had recommended that commissioners should have the same
tenure regime as judges, this suggestion was rejected. The Railway Act, s. 8 pro-
vided for ten year renewable appointments subject to removal for cause on the
decision of the Governor in Council.

The Killam amendment involved special provision to maintain the tenure
and pension entitlement of any judge who was appointed chief commissioner.
Justice Minister Fitzpatrick valiantly insisted that the innovation was a limited
one and that the general tenure regime would remain unaltered. But parliamen-
tary critics were not deterred.’79 Opposition spokesmen saw the thin edge of the

1741Ibid.
175McLean, 1902, supra, note 22 at 77.
176Supra, note 167.
177″Hon. Mr. Justice Killam” (1908) 44 Can. L.J. 129.
178P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Laurier to D. Gordon, 3 March 1908. The Canada Law Journal
expressed its enthusiasm for more legally-trained commissioners in “The Board of Railway Com-
missioners” (1908) 44 Canada L.J. 169 at 169ff.

179The amended tenure and pension provisions associated with Killam’s appointment are in S.C.
1905, c. 35. Strong criticisms were voiced in the House of Commons Debates for 23 February

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wedge, representing an explicit erosion of Parliament’s ability to control the tri-
bunal and a threat to responsible government. Several considered the amend-
ment to be a fundamental departure from the understanding of 1903, and they
predicted that in time either the appointment of more judges or an extension of
judicial tenure to commissioners generally would insulate the B.R.C. from leg-
islative supervision. The Prime Minister forthrightly acknowledged the impor-
tance of Killam’s new status as Chief Commissioner. He will be, Laurier
explained “more secure, more independent of the government, more independ-
ent of everybody, and more directly liable only to his own conscience than
before.”‘ After 1919 no commissioner could be removed without a joint
address of the Senate and House of Commons and the tenure provisions on
which tribunal independence rested were in place. The amendment passed vir-
tually without comment.

B. External Supervision and Review

The Railway Act has been characterized as an attempt to “judicialize” rail-
way rate regulation. 8′ Various court-like attributes of the B.R.C., its designation
as a Court of Record, and the eventual appointment of judges and lawyers to sit
on it, appear to support this view. Although he bears considerable responsibility
for the judicial view of the B.R.C., as Minister of Railways and Canals, Blair
cautioned against over-emphasizing the significance of the formal designation
and powers:

The fact that we are constituting this commission a court of record is not tanta-
mount to setting up a judicial tribunal in the ordinary sense. We are simply giving
authority to the decrees they may pass.18 2

On the other hand, shortly after he replaced Blair, Chief Commissioner Killam
remarked that in making the B.R.C. a court of record,

Parliament probably intended both to render more effective the exercise of its
powers and to mark the transfer of the authority formerly exercised by the Railway
Committee to a judicial body.18 3

The Board’s judicial attributes, as Blair was fully aware, enhanced its claims for
independence and autonomy while the policy-oriented implications of rate reg-
ulation and more explicit law-making responsibilities confirmed for many

1905, supra, note 93, by Lennox at 1603, Haggart and MacLean-at 1612. Justice Minister Fitzpa-
trick argued that the changes applied only to judges serving as chief commissioners and that gen-
eral tenure provisions for other commissioners were unmodified. He also expressed the view that
the independence of the Board of Railway Commissioners was established by the original legis-
lation in 1903.

18Canada, H.C., Debates: Board of Railway Commissioners (3 February 1905) at 515.
181″Independent Regulatory Agency,” supra, note 1 at 90.
’82Supra, note 49 at 263.
183Duthie v. Grand Trunk Railway Co. (1905), 4 C.R.C. 304 at 312 [hereinafter Duthie].

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observers the need for political accountability. In the end, several supervisory
mechanisms were included in the Railway Act.

1.

Supreme Court Appeals

Although the Railway Act conferred a comprehensive authority regarding
matters of law and fact upon the B.R.C., including conclusive authority to deter-
mine any question of fact within its jurisdiction,”s the legislation did provide
several possible avenues of recourse to the Supreme Court of Canada. Jurisdic-
tional questions were subject to appeal with leave of a Supreme Court judge,
while on questions of law so classified by the B.R.C., an appeal to the Supreme
Court required leave from the Board itself.” The Board was also authorized,
either on its own motion or upon application by a party, to seek the opinion of
the court by means of a stated case on a question of law.’86 The incorporation
of these various mechanisms for judicial supervision of the new railway com-
mission into the 1903 legislation was a victory of sorts for railway interests
which wanted wide access to the courts despite vigourous contemporary criti-
cism of the influence of judges on regulatory matters.

McLean had criticized the reaction of English and American courts to rail-
way tribunals. He reported that in these jurisdictions courts looking at rate reg-
ulations on appeal “have dealt with the matter from the standpoint of technical
legal interpretation,” and “have for the most part been oblivious” to the policy
questions involved.”8 The Canadian practice of appeals from the Railway Com-
mittee to the Governor in Council was felt to provide sufficient review and pre-
vent “the matter [from] being looked at from a purely legal standpoint.”’88 Blair,
as Minister, echoed this view with reference to “the lack of hearty co-operation
on the part of the judiciary” in the United States and England.’89 It was also
observed that the appeals to the courts in the United States undermined the
administrative process from the outset. Railways withheld evidence from the
regulatory process in order to hamper the effectiveness of tribunals and to
inhibit applicants who would be apprehensive about the financial burden of pro-
ceeding through several forums.”9

With the drift of political momentum towards regulation, outright hostility
to the creation of a commission had become an unrealistic stance for Canadian
railways by the time of the legislative debate on the Railway Act. However, they
actively resisted limitations on access to the courts, as had their English coun-

1S4Railvay Act, s. 42(3).
1851bid., s. 44(3).
1861bid., s. 43.
187McLean, 1902, supra, note 22 at 77.
]”I1bid.
189Supra, note 49 at 246.
190Currie, supra, note I at 227.

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terparts,’ 9′ and were successful in promoting a Senate amendment which would
have allowed appeals on questions of law with leave of the court as well as
leave of the Board. In the course of further proceedings leading to the passage
of the legislation, this particular provision was abandoned.’ 92

2.

The Function and Practice of Cabinet Review

On the assumption that courts might lack sympathy for the work of admin-
istrative agencies, particularly when threats to the interests of property holders
and investors were involved, railway interests pressed for wider rights of judi-
cial appeal. Others were more inclined towards alternative supervisory mecha-
nisms such as the Cabinet. The possibility of review by the Governor in Council
might also serve to alleviate the concerns of those who could view the creation
of an independent regulatory commission as a questionable departure from the
traditions of parliamentary control. In 1888, for example, the Royal Commis-
sion on Railways presented an analysis focused on parliamentary tradition:

The political constitution of Canada recognizes direct ministerial responsibility to
Parliament, much more than in the United States, and, therefore, as a Railway Tri-
bunal is necessarily tentative, it seems … undesirable to remove its operation, in
its inception, beyond the direct criticism and control of Parliament. I
McLean echoed these sentiments in his second report, quoting the 1888
Royal Commission and adding that “It]he caution here expressed is essen-
tial.”‘ McLean claimed to find a precedent in English railway regulation,
where the Board of Trade was given supervisory control over the commission.
He felt the principle of responsibility would be satisfied in Canada by providing
for review by the Governor in Council on appeal, or on its own motion. In 1905,
during an exchange in the House of Commons, Justice Minister Fitzpatrick was
hard-pressed to satisfy traditional critics. He argued on the one hand, that you
could “realize at a glance that the whole principle of the Railway Act under

19

191H.W. Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-

Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 134, n. 11.

192Speaking in favour of the broader right of appeal on questions of law, Senator Scott stated:

There is only one court in the empire, from which there is no appeal, the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council in England. From all other courts in the empire there are
appeals, and therefore it did not seem quite proper that this arbitrary power should be
placed in the hands of the board (Canada, Senate, Debates at 1679 (20 October 1903)).

In fairly short order, however, the Supreme Court circumscribed its own powers of jurisdictional
review:

a judge of this court should be satisfied, not only that
In granting leave to appeal –
a question of jurisdiction of the Railway Board is involved, but also there is some rea-
sonable doubt as to the soundness of the decision which it is sought to impugn (Halifax
Board of Trade v. G.TR., [1911] 44 S.C.R. 298 at 299, Anglin J.)

193″Royal Commission,” supra, note 21 at 20.
194McLean, 1902, supra, note 22 at 78.

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which the board was created is a departure from that principle” (ministerial
responsibility), and simultaneously asserted that “the best control you have over
any ruling or any decision given by the board is the fact that the same Governor
in Council can, on appeal, set any one of these rulings aside.”’95

As a supervisory body, Cabinet had several attractive features, including
the experience accumulated while the Governor in Council functioned as an
appeal body for decisions of the Railway Committee. In this regard, a remark
from the B.R.C.’s decision in Duthie9 6 on the operation of the old Railway
Committee is noteworthy for the confidence it suggests in the committee’s
capacity to set aside political concerns as the occasion required:

In discharging its functions, that body had frequently to decide between conflict-
ing rights or interests, in doing which it was naturally its duty to act in a judicial
spirit; but it was at the same time a branch of the Executive. 97

There is little evidence of concern in 1903 for the procedure selected for
the cabinet appeal apart from a brief exchange between Robert Borden and the
Minister. In reply to Borden’s question, “[i]s it to be in the nature of an appeal
pure and simple or in the nature of a re-hearing?” the Minister stated that the
Governor in Council would have complete authority to revise any decision of
the Board. He addressed the process question by recounting the previous
experience:

We have hitherto had, I think, only one instance in which an appeal was carried
to the Governor in Council, and in that instance we forwarded from the Railway
Committee of the Privy Council the shorthand notes, which contained a statement
of everything that had been said, the arguments addressed to the committee and
the evidence taken; and I think some of the gentlemen wished to supplement that
evidence, and they were permitted to do so. The same thing would be done in the
case of an appeal from a decision of this board. 98

A further indication of cabinet appeal procedure, and one that is consistent
with the perception of this supervisory function as judicial, is found in reported
judgments of the Governor in Council.’ 99 Practice reflects considerable defer-
ence to the expertise and experience of the B.R.C. For example, a 1923 Order
in Council cited earlier decisions on cabinet appeals to the effect that

the intent of the legislation is to invest His Excellency in Council with judicial
powers by which he may in his discretion aid in securing and enforcing the pro-
visions of the Railway Act, having due regard to the method of railway rate reg-
ulation by an independent commission which was the outstanding innovation in

195Supra, note 93 at 1606.
’96Supra, note 183.
’97Ibid. at 312.
198Supra, note 49 at 259.
199Manitoba and Saskatchewan v. Railway Association of Canada (1920), 26 C.R.C. 147.

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the Railway Act of 1903 and which has been preserved throughout succeeding
revisions of the Act to the present time.2

00

The cabinet appeal process was formal in nature, and not simply “political.”
Written presentations were prepared as a basis for oral argument by counsel
before a cabinet committee:

Counsel and representatives of the various petitioners have been heard and, as
well, counsel for the railways affected. Consideration has been given to the var-
ious cases cited and exhibits filed. 20 1

All this supported a contemporary impression that in exercising supervisory
responsibilities Cabinet might be expected to satisfy existing procedural norms.
The initial period of experience with cabinet appeals bears out that expectation.
Only “for extraordinary cause” was it considered appropriate for the Gov-
ernor in Council to review a B.R.C. decision by substituting its judgment for
that of the Board on a question of fact in issue. To do so “would defeat the pur-
pose for which the Board of Railway Commissioners was created and would in
the end be highly prejudicial to the public interest.”2” Arthur Meighen, not yet
Prime Minister, but already an experienced member of Cabinet, described the
Cabinet’s general approach to appeals from B.R.C. decisions in 1919:

The Governor in Council has followed about this rule … they would not interfere
with a judgment of the Railway Commission unless it appeared that certain ele-
mental and relevant facts had not been taken into consideration; in which case –
so far as I am aware, always, but I know, very generally –
they referred the case
back for the renewed consideration of the Railway Commission.203
The mere existence of appeal to Cabinet rather than its actual use was
intended to satisfy the requirements for political supervision of the new agency.
Or, as Dawson later put the matter, “[tihe chief power of political responsibility
lies in its imminence rather than its actual use.”2″4 Appeals to Cabinet were
never expected to be regular occurrences. Twenty-three cabinet appeals arose
between 1904 and December 1918. Of these, fourteen were dismissed, one was
withdrawn, two were referred back to the Board and one allowed. 25 This was
hardly a record to encourage further business. Five were pending at the time of
Dawson’s writing. Even where Cabinet returned a question to the B.R.C. with
strong guidance, the agency retained considerable independence of judgment.
Thus, in National Dairy Council of Canada v. Express Traffic Association, 6
Chief Commissioner Carvell stated that the Order in Council “expressed a very

200Quoted in Re Railway Freight Rates in Canada (1933), 40 C.R.C. 97 at 100.
20 Supra, note 199 at 148.
2021bid. at 150.
’23Canada, H.C., Debates: Board of Commerce Act, 1919 (4 July 1919) at 4563.
204Sapra, note 169 at 4.
2051bid. at 123.
206(1921), 27 C.R.C. 209.

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strong desire that the rates on cream as well as the other commodities therein
mentioned should be reduced, if possible, in view ‘of the material fall off in the
market value.”‘ 2

Carvell argued, however, that if the principle in the Order in Council were
adopted, then “every time the value of a commodity increased or decreased,
there would have to be a corresponding increase or decrease in the freight or
express rate.””2 This notion of the shipper’s needs determining the reasonable-
ness of rates had never been an overriding principle in the Board’s decisions; it
would have to be weighed alongside “the cost to the transportation company for
adequately performing the service.”2” Referring directly to the cream rate which
was under review, the Chief Commissioner finessed the Order in Council:

It would be physically impossible to carry cream absolutely free, but I cannot
imagine His Excellency wished to convey any such idea, and, therefore, I must
construe that sentence [“and the Committee of the Privy Council is of opinion that
in view of the material fall off in the market value of cream a corresponding reduc-
tion, if possible, should be made in the express freight rates”] to mean if possible
following any well recognized principle of rate regulation …210

Applied in this way, the Order did not alter the Board’s original decision.

This brief account of the perception and use of the Cabinet’s supervisory
power in this area does not conclusively reveal it to be either a political or a
judicial safeguard. It seems though, that greater weight should be given to the
possibility that the power was seen to be judicial in nature, at least where it was
invoked for appeal purposes rather than for review. Alternatively, one might see
s. 44 as conferring on the Governor in Council two unique functions — judicial
and political –
each of which might have its own distinctive procedural expec-
tations. To distance itself from ongoing responsibility for rate grievances, Cab-
inet, in practice, circumscribed its own authority in favour of the B.R.C.

C. The Administrative Process, Participation and Procedure

Improved access to justice was one expectation when the B.R.C. was
formed, and the new commissioners were authorized to conduct their sittings
“in such manner as may seem to them most convenient for the speedy dispatch
of business”2” subject to the requirement that any party to a complaint might
apply for the matter to be heard and determined in open court.212 Rules of prac-

27Ibid. at 213.
2Slbid. at 214.
2Oglbid.
210Mbid. at 218.
21 Railway Act, s. 40.
2121bid.

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tice and procedure not inconsistent with this and other express provisions of the
Railway Act were in the Board’s hands.

The B.R.C. explicitly encouraged disputants to resolve their differences
informally by negotiation, or if this was not possible, then with a minimum of
administrative cost and inconvenience. The Board emphasized in Galbraith
Coal v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.:

Where complaints arise it stands to reason that in common fairness they should
first be brought to the attention of the railway and not precipitated on the Board
without a preliminary attempt having been made by the parties to settle the mat-
ter.

213

As Currie observed, the Railway Board “can deal quickly and cheaply with
small complaints which may be critical to one person but too insignificant
socially to justify the elaborate machinery of the courts.” ‘214 File hearings and
delayed decisions were other ways of reaching acceptable solutions without
consuming excessive regulatory effort and in effect making railways and ship-
pers institutionally dependent on the Commission to resolve all their conflicts.

Delayed decisions may not always have been a deliberate technique to pro-
mote settlement, but where the Commission declined to judge a rate grievance
promptly, the result was to compel parties in an ongoing shipper-carier relation-
ship to renew or continue negotiations on their own. On occasion, Board judg-
ments merely acknowledged agreements worked out by the parties after a hear-
ing or file evidence. Much of this activity was consistent with the McLean
Reports’ expectations that the Board’s functions would often be mediatorial.

The Board also appeared reluctant to exercise its full authority in formu-
lating solutions. Sometimes if the Board felt a hearing had clarified the issues,
it was prepared to see the railways themselves offer appropriate remedial action.
In one case where railway ownership had recently changed hands, the Board left
a complaint about deficient car service and passenger facilities in abeyance “so
that an opportunity may be given for improvement by the management.”2 5
Then, if the complaints were renewed, one of the Board’s operating officials
would be dispatched to direct reasonable changes and improvements. In Winni-
peg Jobbers’ Association no formal order was issued on the first complaint
although the Board did indicate its views to the railway. On rehearing, the Board
again declined to specify the rates to be substituted, but expressed a willingness
to hear further complaints if they arose.216

213(1910), 10 C.R.C. 325 at 332.
214Supra, note 1 at 225.
215Cardston Board of Trade v. Alberta Railvay and Irrigation Co. (1908), 9 C.R.C. 214 at
216Supra, note 105 at 183.

219-20.

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Initially, compliance procedures were not well developed, so a considera-
ble burden fell upon aggrieved shippers to renew their complaints if a railway
failed to respond appropriately to orders of the Board. Producers’ organizations
with some administrative continuity and monitoring capacity were best suited
for this sort of ongoing involvement in rate regulation. But when the Canadian
Lumbermen’s Association complained that export tariffs filed by the railways
did not conform to the B.R.C.’s earlier order that the railways should set rates
on lumber sent to Montreal for export “which in general shall be lower than the
rates on lumber to Montreal,” the Assistant Chief Commissioner replied that the
words “in general” had been deliberately used to preserve flexibility. The
B.R.C. stressed the need for flexibility and so “could not fairly require the rail-
ways to have the export rate so many points lower than the domestic rate in
every case.” ‘2 17 The apparent setback for the lumber interests did not prevent Cox
and Co. from applying successfully for a rate reduction using the general prin-
ciple in its own particular case.218 The Board retained its discretion over partic-
ular results, but channeled the parties’ behaviour and expectations using general
guidelines.

The B.R.C. felt that premature tinkering, as much as rigidity, was a hazard
to effective regulation. Shortly after the Canadian car service rules on demur-
rage were put into effect, a proposal for alterations was put forward by the Wal-
laceburg Sugar Co. on behalf of Canadian sugar refiners.19 The Board did con-
sider the merits and principles of the application, but as an additional basis for
denial, the Assistant Chief Commissioner expressed the view that it would not
be advisable “at this early date to start making exception to the general princi-
ples laid down in the car service order, which has not yet been in effect for three
years.”
In another application dealing with classifications, it was admitted that
the aspect of the current arrangements which was in question was a compromise
and possibly “a somewhat illogical one.”22 Yet, the Board declined to authorize
any alterations because there was “less dislocation of business and discontent
among shippers than would arise from an attempt to follow a rigid principle.” 222
This ruling did not preclude change entirely: “The existing arrangement should
not be disturbed, except on a wider basis of fact than is at present before the
Board.”‘2’ In other contexts as well, an apparently desirable suggestion was not
implemented where it was “of the nature of a rapid fire solution to create other
and more important difficulties.”” 4

2 17Canadian Lumbermen’s Association v. Grand Trunk (1910), 11 C.R.C. 344 at 346.
2 18Cox & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (1911), 13 C.R.C. 20.
2 19See Wallaceburg Sugar Co. v. Canadian Car Service Bureau (1909), 8 C.R.C. 332,
22 Ibid. at 336.
221Lamontagne v. Canadian Freight Association (1911), 12 C.R.C. 291 at 292.
2221bid.
223 1bid.
224Supra, note 94 at 344-45.

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All of these decisions reflect an appreciation of the dynamic nature of a
decision-making process in which there was some workable but evolving mix
between generally applicable arrangements and exceptions. But it was not
always clear that the Board was sufficiently responsive to new concerns that
came before it. The B.R.C.’s basic commitment to stability might be seen as a
means to enhance the authority of its decisions with an aura of at least semi-
permanence, but it can also be viewed as a preference for passivity with con-
servative implications.

Concern about premature intervention may be seen as evidence of a tension
between adjudication and rule-making with which the B.R.C. was confronted in
its early years, though not necessarily by that name. The location of responsi-
bility for initiating issues was an important concern for the new agency. Would
the Board actively define its own program and exercise its regulation-making
power, or would it be largely responsive to complaints and applications from
railways and the public? The Board’s attitude seems to have varied according
to the particular issue to be addressed; though it took a good deal of initiative
in formulating speed and safety standards, it appears to have relied more heavily
on individual applications to guide its approach to rate questions. A partial
explanation may lie in the widespread perception that the Railway Committee
of the Privy Council had not been sufficiently accessible to complaints in rate
cases, and that one of the new agency’s primary functions was to provide a
forum for these.

Another major issue faced by the Board was whether rulings would apply
to the parties alone or have some precedential weight for future decisions. In its
first years of operation the Board envisaged a distinction between general and
specific orders. It was often unclear, however, whether a particular ruling enun-
ciated a general principle. In the Cedar Lumber Products case a claim was made
against the railway for discriminating against cedar through the use of special
contracts fixing prohibitory rates. The railway acknowledged the practice but
attempted to justify its behaviour on the grounds that

all railways had raised their rates upon certain products in order to retard the ship-
ment thereof, that the companies require these commodities largely for their own
use, and that the object of the companies is to restrict the output so as to make sure
that their future needs and requirements may be supplied .2

2

Chief Commissioner Blair, after specifically condemning the Kingston and
Pembroke line, broadened the impact of his ruling to include other railways:
“Inasmuch as we are led to believe that on other railways a system of varying
rates and discrimination as against cedar and cedar products is in operation,” he
said, the Order should be made a General Order to all railways under the juris
diction of the B.R.C.” 6 Extension of the decision to cover like parties engaged

225Supra, note 90 at 413-14.
226Ibid. at 416.

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in similar practices could be understood from the perspective of consistency,
although proof that the offending practice was widespread had not really
involved industry participation. On the other hand, when shippers later sought
to rely on a major decision, the Interswitching Rates case,227 Commissioner
McLean rejected the suggestion that the case was of any relevance. The law on
interswitching was in an “inchoate condition;”‘
the previous case was confined
to its specific facts. The Board, according to McLean, “refused to deal in a gen-
eral way with the question of interswitching rates in reference to all the points
in Canada where the railways of the two companies concerned connected.” ‘229
The Board was reluctant in this instance to acknowledge the reliance of
applicants on its previous decisions. Nevertheless, shipping interests often
pressed for generalization, greater certainty and increased predictability. In a
case about commuter rates between Toronto and Brampton, the applicants
wanted the B.R.C. to decide upon a radius within which commuter rates should
be reviewed. As evidence of unjust discrimination against them, they pointed to
the fact that some communities located near Montreal and Ottawa enjoyed the
advantages of commuter fares. The Board’s impatient response was delivered in
a sarcastic tone:

We are not of the opinion that because a railway company or railway companies
operating into and out of Montreal give commutation rates, therefore they are
compelled to give them into and out of Toronto. Why particularly Toronto? Why
not Hamilton, why not London, why not Kingston, why not Winnipeg and every
other city throughout the whole Dominion? And why stop at cities? Why let the
cities discriminate against the towns? … And why, forsooth, stop at towns? Why
not the villages? … It must get back to what is fair or what is unfair; what is just
or what is unjust.2

Ample grounds for frustration of future applicants are found in the concluding
remarks of the decision. In regard to the B.R.C.’s powers to make general reg-
ulations concerning the meaning of “substantially similar circumstances and
conditions” 23’ for the purpose of identifying unjust discrimination, the Chief
Commissioner allowed that:

It will probably be our duty, not so much in connection with this application, but
as a matter of general policy, if we are able, to try and define what Parliament
means by ‘substantially similar circumstances and conditions.’ 232

Then, in a few lines, the B.R.C. excused itself from the difficult task, identi-
fied the precise policy issue the towns were concerned about, expressed a
227Canadian Manufacturers’Association v. Canadian Freight Association (1907), 7 C.R.C. 302.
2281bid. at 318.
229Laidlaiv Lumber Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1909), 8 C.R.C. 192 at 193.
2 0City of Toronto and Town of Brampton v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1910), 11 C.R.C. 370 at 377.
23Ibid. at 379.
2321bid.

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preference for the outcome, and abdicated all control to the management of the
railways:

I suppose that commutation rates are the forerunner of a suburban service. It is
eminently in the interests of cities and their people that there should be suburban
services and that people should have an opportunity of getting into the rural dis-
tricts adjacent to cities expeditiously and economically. But after all it must be left
largely to the good sense of those who are in the control of the railway facilities
as to what services can be afforded and, within reason, what the tolls shall be.233

There is no evidence that a policy-oriented inquiry was considered at this
time to deal with the commutation rates question, although future proceedings
demonstrated how useful this might have been. In the more traditional aspects
of rate regulation, though, the Board had already introduced investigative pro-
cedures and was prepared to recognize their effect on both particularized adju-
dication and rule-making. Accordingly, when the British Columbia Sugar Refin-
ing Company approached the Board concerning rate reductions, the Board
chose not to deal with the matter on the grounds that it was subsumed in the then
pending Western Rate Investigation.’ 4 This was at the very least an indication
of the B.R.C.’s desire to achieve some degree of consistency in its decisions.

In another judgment later in the same year, the scope and function of gen-
eral investigations was extensively discussed. Using its own previous investiga-
tion of express rates as an example, the Board emphasized that the general prin-
ciples laid down in the inquiry “do not exhaust the scope of regulative
power.”‘ As the express companies had come under regulation more recently
than the railways, the general investigation was “of necessity concerned with
the blocking out of general reforms” and the regulator’s work, “instead of hav-
ing been completed by the Express judgment was simply begun by it.’23’ Further
complaints were certainly expected, whether they arose from new conditions
not apparent at the time of the investigation, or “from conditions which were
imperfectly set before us.”” 7 The Board then indicated that

some time must elapse before a complete body of regulative experience in regard
to express rates in Canada is developed, and this will be developed when dealing
from time to time with complaints, both general and special, as they arise. 3

This remark suggests a tendency to prefer the elaboration of principles through
adjudication.

2131bid.
234British Columbia Sugar Refining Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (1913), 14 C.R.C. 354.
235Manitoba Dairymen’s Association v. Dominion and Canadian Northern Express Cos. (1913),
236Ibid.
2371bid.
23 1bid.

14 C.R.C. 142 at 173.

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There were, nevertheless, also important examples of what we would now
recognize as notice and comment rule-making. This process was adopted in
1914 in connection with the revision of the Canadian freight classification
system:

Committees, composed of the shippers and of the railways, were appointed for
western Canada and for eastern Canada. Approximately 150 days were taken up
in meetings. A large number of shippers’ representatives attended these meetings
and discussed matters in which they were interested. Through the use of round-
table methods of discussion, satisfactory conclusions were arrived at in many
cases. After these discussions had taken place, the proposed classification was
filed with the Board. Copies were mailed to a representative list of trade interests.
Thereafter the matter was set down to be discussed in respect to matters on which
agreements had not been obtained in conference. Eventually the record was con-
sidered and decision rendered2 39

Some Board decisions were circulated to affected parties.4 0 On one occasion
Commissioner Mills, in dissent, urged the Board to decide on the basis of evi-
dence then available, send the result to other interests, and make the result a
general rule unless objections were received in which case an investigation
should be undertaken.24′

Despite this kind of initiative obviously intended to open up debate and
participation in decision-making, some groups were unwilling to recognize the
Board as a suitable forum for a general inquiry. In 1915, for example, Industrial
Canada argued that solution of “the transportation situation”242 was hampered
by inadequate information and a misunderstanding of the issues. The Canadian
Manufacturer’s Association wanted a comprehensive investigation leading to
reports and recommendations, but for this purpose preferred a specially
appointed commission rather than the B.R.C. as the latter was “a judicial body
rather than an investigating board.”243

The Railway Act provided for the appointment by the Governor in Council
of “one or more experts, or persons having technical or special knowledge” con-
cerning matters before the Board in order to “assist in an advisory capacity” (s.
21). At the outset, Blair took the view that expertise in the tariff field could be
acquired by appointing an experienced traffic officer to the Board with the two-
fold advantage of saving the salary of an additional employee and gaining the
increased sense of responsibility that would flow from Board membership. The

239J. Willis, ed., Canadian Boards at Work (Toronto: Macmillan, 1941) at 20.
240Galbraith Coal v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., supra, note 213. In the Cedar Lumber Products
case, supra, note 90, Blair was willing to make a General Order on the basis of assumptions in a
specific dispute. In later cases, commissioners were more inclined to call for “a wider basis of fact”
before altering existing arrangements: Lamontagne, supra, note 221 at 292.

24 1Lamontagne, ibid.
242″The Transportation Commission” (1915) 16 Ind. Can. 471.
2431bid.

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first Chief Commissioner’s objective in the tariff area was that the Board
“should be as competent to pass judgment upon them as the officials of the
roads were to adopt them.”2′ But such an appointment might well have aroused
the suspicion of shipping interests while proceeding too far in the direction of
endowing the B.R.C. with a rate-setting, rather than a rate-review capacity.

When it became necessary to appoint a traffic officer, a brief struggle
ensued among members of the Board concerning the nature of the position.
Commissioner Mills expected railways to present their side of the case to “the
best possible advantage.”245 As a counterweight, the Board’s traffic officer
should be “a public counsel to present to us the public side of every case, that,
having heard both sides, we may reach wise conclusions on the cases submitted
from day to day.” ‘246 If this suggestion was intended to enhance the image of the
B.R.C. as a diligent advocate of a public view different from the interests of rail-
ways, and simultaneously to reinforce the judicial aura of the agency’s proceed-
ings, it was nevertheless not adopted.

The traffic officer, as expert and first hand observer, might be expected to
exert a considerable influence on decisions, despite the statutory description of
his role as an “advisory capacity.”‘247 The Railway Board seems to have sensed
this risk and to have responded to it in some circumstances, perhaps as a matter
of regular practice. On several occasions in rate-related cases, full or extensive
quotation of the staff report is provided in the judgment or discussion is offered
of the investigation that the traffic officer was instructed by the Board to con-
duct.2” In two early decisions based upon hearings and supplementary investi-
gations by the Traffic Officer, his reports and recommendations were circulated
to the parties for written comment prior to judgment by the Board.249 The con-
tribution of this procedure to the fairness of the regulatory process is easily rec-
ognized in light of the following excerpt from Hardwell’s report in the B.C.
Pacific case:

My sympathies are with the Coast merchants who are restricted to the very limited
markets of British Columbia, as, geographically, I look upon the Calgary and
Edmonton road as the national (natural) dividing line. The evidence, submitted,
however, is against it; yet, if my views are approved, the Coast shippers will have
much more favourable rates than heretofore.

244 .A.C., Laurier Papers, Andrew Blair to Laurier, 31 December 1903.
2451bid.
246 .A.C., Laurier Papers, James Mills to Laurier, 18 May 1904.
2471bid.
248See Cardston Board of Trade v. Alberta Railway and Irrigation Co., supra, note 215; Davy
v. Niagara, St. Catherines and Toronto and Michigan Central Ry. Cos. (1911), 12 C.R.C. 61 [here-
inafter Davy].

249See supra, note 112; Canadian Manufacturers’ Association v. Canadian Freight Association,

supra, note 227.

20 B.C. Pacific, ibid. at 137.

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Despite fairly open procedures, suspicion existed that railway personnel on the
staff (including Hardwell) exercised an important influence through the prepa-
ration of reports, “and judging by some of the reports at times an unfair influ-
ence in the sense that the appellants have no opportunity to controvert their
statements … “z’

Even if its investigative initiatives were not appreciated by all observers,
the Board’s increasingly conscious attention to iterative and incremental
decision-making should have been welcomed by critics of administrative discre-
tion. In addition to the inquiry format and the notice and comment procedures,
the Railway Commissioners explicitly addressed the function of precedent as a
guide to consistency and predictability. McLean was now among the first to
articulate a view of relevant principles and to elaborate their consequences:

mhe Board being concerned with the correction not primarily with the initiation
of rates must carefully consider in regulating rates in one section of Canada what
it has done in another section in Canada. 25

The precise evolution of the B.R.C.’s attitude towards the use of precedent as
a self-imposed limitation on its own discretionary authority is unclear. However,
a later commissioner explicitly articulated an obligation to “follow the practise
so long established” when dealing with a matter that was “not one of law but
of a reasonable exercise of discretion.” 3

From time to time commissioners also expressed views on the relevance of
decisions of the United States I.C.C. to their own proceedings. McLean indica-
ted that differences between the Railway Act and the I.C.C.’s governing statute
made it inappropriate to apply the American findings “in their entirety.” 4 Yet
he noted that when the I.C.C. had considered identical problems, “the findings
and experience of that Commission demand most careful attention.””5 A col-
league later acknowledged that the I.C.C.’s regulatory work was appreciated
and held in esteem by the B.R.C. He emphasized, however, the importance and
the obligation of independent assessments:

the Board in holding that the decisions of that Commission are applicable in their
entirety here only in cases where circumstances in Canada are on all fours with the
circumstances upon which the aforesaid decisions depended has recognized the
burden placed upon it by Parliament of investigating the special circumstances of
the cases coming before it. 56

251P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Dominion Millers’ Association (Charles B. Watts) to Laurier, 10

252Manitoba Dairymen’s Association v. Dominion and Canadian Northern Express Cos. (1912),

March 1908.

14 C.R.C. 142 at 149.

253C.N.R. v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada (1932), 40 C.R.C. 29 at 42, Fullerton.
254Supra, note 94 at 344.
2551bid.
256Supra, note 252 at 148.

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Such an observation may have provided some re-assurance to those who were
concerned about arbitrary decision-making, as well as to parties appearing
before the Board. Nevertheless, there was persistent suspicion that on certain
broad rate matters the conclusions of the I.C.C. might exert an inordinate influ-
ence. Thus, through Industrial Canada, the Canadian Manufacturing Associa-
tion reminded regulators of their duty to review railway applications in the
national context, and not to adopt automatically the American results of similar
petitions. 7

Participation in the rate regulation process and other aspects of the
B.R.C.’s operations was controlled through the “binding and conclusive” power
to determine who was a “party interested.”” 8 Although the Commission might
have resisted a broad or inclusive reading in order to “protect itself against
being flooded with irresponsible complaints,” 9 in practice this does not appear
to have been the case. Chief Commissioner Killam provided insight into the
Board’s treatment of a “party interested” in Duthie where he rejected a “narrow
or technical view””r of this criterion. Parties, he suggested, might be interested
in rate issues regarding certain types of traffic or demurrage charges “without
being directly interested in particular transactions giving rise to a complaint,
even, perhaps, without being engaged in that kind of traffic.” ’61

Boards of Trade, numerous other organizations, and a variety of producer
groups appeared from the outset in the B.R.C. proceedings. For example, the
Canadian Manufacturers’ Association appeared as an applicant in several early
cases and the agricultural interests represented included the Fruit Growers, the
Dominion Cattle Dealers and the Ontario Bee Keepers Association.262

There is evidence, as well, that the Board welcomed intervenors. The
Grand Trunk Lord’s Day application of 1908 involved several railways, the
Lord’s Day Alliance, the Rational Sunday League and representatives of the
Department of Railways and Canals, the Department of Labour and the Attor-
ney General of Ontario.263 While this case may have been unusual, multi-party
proceedings were a frequent occurrence, and were from time to time actively
encouraged. In the Winnipeg Jobbers’ Association decision, for example, Chief
Commissioner Killam stated that,

[n]otice of the taking of this evidence was given to the Winnipeg Board of
Trade, that those representing the commercial interests of Winnipeg affected by or
interested in the tariffs might have an opportunity of taking part in the pro-

257″The Railway Board and Freight Rates” (1914) Ind. Can. 713 at 713.
258Railway Act, s. 23(2).
2 9Duthie, supra, note 183 at 314-15.
260Ibid. at 314.
2611bid.
262Board of Railway Commissions, First Annual Report, Appendix C.
263Supra, note 118.

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ceedings and of taking action which they might desire in support of the tariffs
objected to.264

It was apparent from several of the early cases that broadened participation did
not simply involve the multiplication of representatives from either of two
opposing sides, although the extent to which “polycentricity”26 consciously
concerned the B.R.C. is uncertain. John S. Ewart represented both Winnipeg
and Calgary in B.C. Pacific when he told the Board:

Calgary contends that the trade of Alberta belongs to it and does not think that a
quarrel between Winnipeg and Vancouver traders as to rates should have the effect
of injuring Calgary merchants in the distributing trade of Alberta.2

Despite interventions of this kind, the early Board in B.C. Pacific and other
cases appeared more comfortable in either/or situations than in balancing a
range of interests.

The extent of intervenors’ participation varied from active involvement
throughout some proceedings to a clearly supplemental role in others. The judg-
ment in Kemp Manufacturing records that subsequent to the application made
in Winnipeg, and the submission of statements by the Canadian Pacific Railway,
a number of Ontario manufacturers in the same industry as the applicant asked
to intervene. The Board agreed to receive only written submissions on the
ground that these same manufacturers had participated fully at an earlier hear-
ing. Participation in the regulatory process was also influenced by evidentiary
considerations. For example, perhaps only a trade organization rather than a sin-
gle manufacturer could meet a test involving “carload” ratings like the one laid
down for the cigar industry in Ledoux Company v. Canadian Freight
Association:

[U]ntil the Board is satisfied that the establishment of a carload rating on cigars
would result in a substantial percentage of the traffic moving that way [by car-
load], and that it would be taken advantage of by a reasonable number of those in
the trade, the application should be refused.267

Generally, the Board seemed willing to listen to anyone prepared to appear
before it, subject to the possibility that a grievance might be treated informally
and settled without a hearing. It appears that the Board’s interpretation of “party
interested” had the effect and may even have had the purpose of enhancing the
acceptability of decisions in the rate regulation area where imprecise legislative
standards were in constant need of interpretation involving discretionary rulings
with policy implications.

26 4Supra, note 105 at 181.
265L.L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harvard L. Rev. 353.
266Supra, note 112 at 141.
267Ledoux Company v. Canadian Freight Association (1911), 12 C.R.C. 3 at 5.

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Whether participants were actually seen as representative, and especially
as representative of the public interest where this criteria was seen to be rele-
vant, was a different matter altogether. Chief Commissioner Blair referred in
Stamford Junction to “deeper and broader, though at the moment less vocal,
interests of the greater portion of the public.”26 Additional remarks on the “pub-
lic interest” during the same year suggest further limitations on the effect of par-
ticipation on commission decision-making:

The general public have [sic] theoretically a right to complain if the people in one
or more sections of country served by a particular railway are given a better ser-
vice than the people of other sections; but with every desire on the part of the rail-
way company to accord equally fair treatment to-all patrons over its entire system,
circumstances and conditions are too controlling often times, to be resisted or
overcome. The argument most strongly urged in support of the present application
affords an illustration in point. Give us, say the applicants an opportunity to bring
pressure to bear upon the railway such as can spring only from competition, and
we may hope to succeed in obtaining more favourable treatment than we now
received, and it might be added, or than other sections receive, which have not and
cannot enjoy the advantages which competition affords. My doubts arise as to
whether we can justly regard an application founded upon such a ground as
involving the public interest. Does it not follow that the interest is a particular
rather than a general interest which we are asked to serve, and may it not be true
that the larger the results which the applicants hope may flow to them when this
competition is secured, the more essentially particular is the interest involved, and
the more may the interest of the general public be injuriously affected.269

In early proceedings applicants were frequently individuals appearing on
their own behalf, or lay representatives of small companies and partnerships.
This tendency became less evident as the Board’s deliberations more regularly
involved reference to previous cases and I.C.C. rulings. The Canada Law Jour-
nal reacted critically to a suggestion in 1908 that counsel be made available –
presumably as a procedural right –
to those opposed to the railways: “The lat-
ter suggestion would seem to lead to multiform complications and savours of
a form of democracy which does not at the moment appeal to us.””27 Several
years later, in negotiations leading up to the important Western Freight Rates
Case,27 ‘ the Winnipeg Board of Trade requested “that counsel resident in the
City and free from all railway corporation control, be appointed to act with this
Board [the Board of Trade] and other public interests in establishing the facts

26 Supra, note 95 at 270.
2691bid.
270″The Board of Railway Commissioners” (1908) 44 Can. L.J. 169 at 171. The possibility that
the B.R.C., upon application to the Minister of Justice, might be authorized to employ counsel “on
behalf of the public interest as opposed to any conflicting interests that may be represented before
the board” had been actively debated in the House of Commons. Canada, H.C. Debates (23 April
1907) at 7410-36.

271n re Western Tolls (1914), 17 C.R.C. 123 [hereinafter Western Freight Rates].

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complained of.”272 The government complied with this request, appointing Isaac
Pitblado, among others, to represent the western complainants.

Apart from the distinctive circumstances of the Western Freight Rates pro-
ceedings, provision had been made in 1907 for the Minister of Justice –
by
application of the B.R.C. or of his own motion –
to appoint counsel “to con-
duct or argue the case … as to any public interest which is or may be effective
thereby … “273 In debate on this amendment to the Railway Act, parliamentarians
recognized a significant distinction between the public interest and what the
Minister of Justice described as “any conflicting interests” otherwise repre-
sented in the proceedings.274

Aside from questions of participation and counsel, several evidentiary mat-
ters could affect the parties’ prospects in rate review. Because railways them-
selves set rates, subject to the approval of the Board, complaints typically arose
when existing rates were revised upwards. With reasonableness as the test for
approval, it was necessary to devise arrangements to determine whether reason-
ableness or unreasonableness had been shown. “Undue discrimination”275 pro-
duced similar difficulties. Some general principles served as a point of depar-
ture. For example:

A toll has been established upon which it is presumed a reasonable profit arose to
the carrier, and if, without any change in the conditions, the carrier makes up his
mind that he will increase the toll, it is only reasonable the carrier should show
why the toll should be increased.27 6

at least in principle –

Thus railways –
appeared to be institutionally account-
able. The option of requiring some change of conditions to justify a rate increase
compelled the Board to consider what changes would satisfy the principle and
what evidence would establish that those changes had occurred. Changes in
operating costs were of considerable importance, yet these are complex and rail-
ways would regard much of the relevant information as confidential. If pro-
posed rate changes were assessed from the perspective of profitability, the ten-
sion about disclosure might be equally acute. Although the kinds of
considerations arising from these circumstances are now considered to be cen-
tral problems in rate regulation, the Railway Board’s appreciation of their sig-
nificance in its first decade seems incomplete and its response inconsistent.

One of the clearest early examples of the need for reliable disclosure is
found in the case of Cardston Board of Trade v. Alberta Railway and Irrigation

2721bid. at 131.
2731bid.
274S.C. 6-7 Ed. VII, c. 38, s. 1; Canada, H.C., Debates: Railway Act Amendment (23 April 1907)

at 7410-35.
275Supra, note 105 at 177.
2761bid.

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Co.277 The respondent railway company had emerged from the amalgamation of
four corporations active in irrigation and development, land speculation and
transport. The statistics presented by the railway to account for a proposed rate
increase failed to satisfy the Chief Commissioner as they “in no way present,
with any minute detail, the financial history of this organization.”27 The capital
structure, for example, he regarded as “something that could be so easily proved
and is of so much importance that we take the liberty of thinking should not
have been left open to question.”279 Unusual, but evidently not fraudulent, book-
keeping practices confused the railway’s earning position by allocating
switching charges on coal cars sometimes to the colliery division and sometimes
to the railway. The Board was sensitive to confidentiality claims involving the
sources of earnings although in this case the absence of information was deci-
sive against the railway:

Now in one aspect of the situation this is an entirely domestic matter and some-
thing that the public have [sic] no business to inquire about, but as it arises here,
it ceases to be a private booking matter of the company and becomes one that the
public is largely concerned in.2s

Standards of disclosure were referred to by the Board on several occasions,
though not always enforced. In Cardston, the Board declared itself unable to
make a finding of fact that would have sustained the railway’s claim without “an
intimate knowledge of capitalization acquired.”28 In Cardwell Sand and Gravel
Co. v. Canadian Freight Association the general principle was stated that,
“where a business has been built up relying upon a particular rate adjustment,
an increase in this rate adjustment should not be made without amply sufficient
reasons.”2 2 During the course of lengthy proceedings in Davy, the railway was
instructed to produce “definite positive evidence” to show why a long-
established rate should be increased:

If the company desired … to make a point out of the question of the cost of oper-
ation, it should have submitted details of the expense of operation when the two
cent rate was in effect and details of its operation under the three cent rate for com-
parison.

2

3

8

In two early dissents, Commissioner Mills focussed on weaknesses or
potential risks in the Board’s acceptance of evidence. In the B.C. Pacific case
he was content merely to alert his colleagues to “evidence into which the ele-
ment of interest enters largely and there is clear ground for difference of opinion

277Supra, note 215.
278lbid. at 215.
2791bid.
2 8 Ibid. at 217.
28’Ibid. at 218.
282(1913), 14 C.R.C. 172.
283Supra, note 248 at 496.

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as to its value …”2 However, in the Tan Bark Rates Case his dissent openly
exposed the possible dangers of making decisions without certain factual infor-
mation which would ordinarily be available only from the railway company.”‘

McLean considered the concept of “substantially similar circumstances
and conditions 2 6 in the context of a dispute over differential main and branch
line rates. He concluded that “each ton or passenger moving over such portion
(a branch line) must, if the traffic is light, contribute a proportionately higher
amount per unit ‘ 7 to the upkeep than where greater traffic density prevails, and
he found for the railway on the basis of evidence of lighter traffic on the branch
where the complainant was located. Mills analyzed the underlying economic
factors rather differently, and was sharply critical of the conclusion that branch
line traffic should be made to pay higher taxes:

Is it not a fact that the capital invested in branch lines is generally much less per
mile than that invested in the main line-less expensive bridges, comparatively
inferior road-beds with sharper curves -hade to save expense, lighter rails, less
expensive stations, lighter engines, and less valuable passenger cars? Is it not also
a fact that the service on branch lines is nearly always less frequent, less regular,
and worth less than that on the main line? Branch lines figured alone may not
make a very good showing, but they may nevertheless pay well as feeders to the
main line; and without such feeders the profits on many main lines would be
greatly reduced.2 8

McLean was subsequently more sensitive to the factual foundations of his
expert conclusions, as his discussion of reasonableness from In Re Joint Freight
and Passenger Tariffs shows:

When the reasonableness of a rate is at stake a question of fact is involved, and
it is not to be assumed that the Board would make a final decision as to unreason-
ableness on the basis of a mere presumption…. When it does appear that the joint
rate is in excess of the sum of the locals such higher joint rate is prima facie unrea-
sonable. But nothing conclusive as to its reasonableness or otherwise can be estab-
lished until the evidence is heard. There is no yard stick of reasonableness. 289
With this background in mind, the result in International Paper29 a few
years later is somewhat surprising (although the B.R.C. was by then under a
new chairman). In considering the claim of the Grand Trunk, Canadian Pacific
and Canadian Northern Railways that their rate increases could be justified on
the basis of rising costs, Chief Commissioner Drayton commented:

2-4Supra, note 112 at 148.
285Malkin and Sons v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1908), 8 C.R.C. 183 [hereinafter Tan Bark Rates].
2861bid. at 186.
271bid. at 187.
28Ilbid. at 188.
289Supra, note 94 at 347.
290Supra, note 98.

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It was stated on behalf of the carriers that their records were not so kept as to admit
of the segregation of the cost of handling this particular traffic; but notwithstand-
ing more efficient facilities it has been fairly established from time to time that the
expenses of conducting transportation, following the universal tendency, have
increased considerably during the past few years.291

Although Drayton also stated that another factor actually governed the case
“and makes unnecessary any minute consideration of operating costs, 292 the
willingness of the Chief Commissioner to assume as given one of the principal
bases on which railways could justify increasing long-established rates is
striking.

McLean’s dissent in International Paper reflects his view that the role of
rising costs was and should have been of prime importance notwithstanding
Drayton’s attempt to downplay it. McLean attempted to impose more rigorous
tests on the carrier seeking to defend a rate advance, and he called on the rail-
way to “adduce particular information as to the increase of the particular costs
affecting the traffic in question, if the increase of cost is to have any adequate
weight in justifying the reasonableness of the rate attacked.”293 If that involved
more elaborate bookkeeping, then so be it. This element of control of access to
information and its necessity for the reasonableness test is sufficiently central
to the rate-making process and to the legitimacy of the regulatory agency’s find-
ings that an argument firmly rooted in first principles might have been expected.
Instead, McLean supported his case only with reference to a comparable I.C.C.
decision, leaving the full implications of the evidence issue in abeyance.

Drayton’s use of official notice in International Paper to relieve the rail-
way from the burden of establishing cost increases seriously threatened to
undermine any claim that unreasonable rates were being charged by a railway.
Indeed, official notice even seemed to give an advantage to poor record-keepers,
hardly a result to enhance the status of the B.R.C. as an adjudicative forum.

Conclusion

In response to longstanding and controversial railway problems, turn-of-
the-century advocates and designers of a Board of Railway Commissioners
examined previous British and American experience with economic regulation.
The outcome, in the words of a recent assessor, was a grant to the new agency
of “almost unlimited power over freight rates.”294 Yet the decision to adopt reg-
ulation to replace the disappointing legacy of the courts and the Railway Com-

2911bid. at 114.
2921bid.
2931bid. at 118.
294″Transportation,” supra, note 1 at 136.

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mittee of the Privy Council had certainly not resolved difficult questions con-
cerning the independence of the B.R.C. and the Board’s relations with the judi-
ciary, Parliament, the executive and the community.

During the late nineteenth century several public inquiries into railway rate
controversies had exposed differing views about the choice of regulation as a
“governing instrument” which are effectively captured in Armstrong and Nel-
les’ conclusion that political, economic and ethical considerations were in con-
stant tension.295 It would be equally appropriate to speak of representational,
efficiency and accountability issues in public institutions in order to emphasize
the tensions within, and not only between, different forums of public decision-
making. However one describes the underlying tensions, the challenge of pro-
moting and maintaining acceptability was acute for the B.R.C. in light of its
simultaneous responsibilities for functions then regarded as judicial, administra-
tive and legislative in nature, and in light of intense regional concerns. The
response to that challenge involved both structural (or design) and operational
factors. It also involved some tentative accommodation on the part of existing
institutions. Reconciliation of parliamentary sovereignty with the new decision-
maker and the response of the legal community were particularly intriguing (and
enduring) dimensions of that process of accommodation. 296

Initially, and from the perspective of the basic design of the new institu-
tional arrangements, two forms of external scrutiny might have served the pur-
pose of subordinating the new agency to recognized and established sources of
authority. The possibility of appeals to the Supreme Court on questions of law
and jurisdiction offered some comfort to those who were apprehensive about the
scope of the new agency’s activity, while the more broadly worded cabinet
appeal and review powers appeared to provide assurance that on matters of pol-
icy some degree of ministerial responsibility and parliamentary scrutiny would
be maintained. These safeguards represented clear checks on the independence
of the fledgling agency.

If opportunity for review of agency action either by court or cabinet con-
finned the subordinate status of the B.R.C., the choice of two alternative super-
visory mechanisms simultaneously underlined constraints upon the legitimacy
and capacity of those reviewing bodies themselves. Since matters involving law
or jurisdiction were considered suitable questions for judicial examination by
the Supreme Court of Canada, similar issues coming before the cabinet on
appeal or review might seem to call for comparable treatment. On the other
hand, given the possibility that matters of policy or discretion were subject to
direct review by an executive body, an essential rationale for judicial interven-

295Armstrong & Nelles, supra, note 12.
296″Independence” supra, note 11. See also “Independent Regulatory Agency,” supra, note 1.

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tion, legislative intent,2 97 was eroded. Consequently, and as described above, the
cabinet was highly attentive to procedural considerations when reviewing Rail-
way Board matters, and the Supreme Court was circumspect in its dealings with
the Board.29

The B.R.C.’s independence emerged in this atmosphere of inter-
institutional deference. Serious disagreement and reservations about tribunal
independence remained strong at the time of the Killam amendment in 1905.
While one member insisted that “[w]hat we wanted when the Bill was passed
was to have legislative control over every action of that commission, and to
have them directly responsible to this House through ministerial responsibil-
ity, ‘ 299 Charles Fitzpatrick, Minister of Justice in 1905 and about to join the
Supreme Court himself) replied that “the whole principle of the Railway Act
under which the board was created, is a departure from that principle.”3” Within
two years, and despite Prime Minister Laurier’s clear account of Killam’s inde-
pendence and its significance,3″‘ a new Minister of Justice, A.B. Aylesworth,
was emphatic that the B.R.C. “is but the immediate successor of a subcommittee
of the council. … It is in a sense but a branch of the government of the coun-
try.””3 2 By 1919, however, when judicial tenure provisions were made applica-
ble to all commissioners, the amendment passed virtually without comment. Sir
James Lougheed, government leader in the Senate, informed Senate colleagues
almost casually that, “[t]his put the commissioners in the same position as
judges in this regard.”3 3 Thus, in a comparatively short period of time, consid-
erable awkwardness over the appointment of a senior judicial figure to the chief
commissionership had given way to a commonplace acceptance of the idea that
railway commissioners generally were to be regarded as decision-makers of
judicial stature.

The incorporation of judicial figures and judicial norms into the new reg-
ulatory regime was remarkable in several respects, for it will be recalled that
judges had been considered inappropriate in the rate-regulation context where
policy issues could arise, and that the court-like attributes of the Railway Com-
mittee were often regarded with hostility as an obstacle to participation. Other
aspects of the early evolution of the B.R.C. appeared to involve the incorpora-
tion of judicial norms into the structure and operations of a body which many

297p.p Craig, “Dicey: Unitary, Self-Correcting Democracy and Public Law” (1990) 106 L.Q.

Rev. 105.

29 8Supra, note 192.
299Debates: Railway Act Amendment, supra, note 93 at 1609 (Haggart).
3Ibid. at 1610.
30 1Supra, note 180.
302Canada, H.C., Debates: Exportation of Electric Power (13 March 1907) at 4645.
303Canada, Senate, Debates (27 February 1919) at 49.

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of its early supporters had hoped would be accessible to the public, highly prac-
tical and oriented towards common sense in its decision-making.

The changing composition of the Board reflected the multi-faceted nature
of the tribunal’s assignment. Early members included the first chairman,
Andrew Blair, a former minister of Railways, an advocate of public ownership
of railways, and a critic of the government which appointed him.3 Blair was
soon replaced by Justice Killam, recruited directly from the Supreme Court of
Canada to avert a premature collapse of the regulatory initiative. Nova Scotian
by birth, Ontario-trained in the law, and ultimately a practitioner whose career
was centred in Manitoba, Justice Killam simultaneously offered judicial stature
and regional recognition. James Pitt Mabee, who served as chief commissioner
from 1908 to 1912, extended the custom of appointing commissioners from the
bench, as he had previously been a judge of the Ontario High Court. Yet he was
also a pioneering appointment in the direction of a career commissioner in light
of his previous experience on the Inland Waterways Commission. Simon J.
McLean, political economist and commission technocrat, eventually joined the
board himself and was later joined by Henry L. Drayton, a utilities lawyer with
some railway policy-making experience as a Royal Commissioner. The contri-
butions of Blair, the politician, of judges Killam and Mabee, and of Drayton,
McLean and others as regulatory specialists, reflect a continuing effort to
enhance institutional acceptability in several constituencies.

As first chairman, Andrew Blair demonstrated enthusiasm for an interven-
tionist response to perceived railway abuses and a remarkable willingness to
offer opinionated judgments about the relationship between rate matters and the
well-being of the national community 5 He served, however briefly, in a man-
ner consistent with his earlier statement of the purposes of the new tribunal, “the
object which we have in view; that is, while not injuring the railway interests
of the country, to promote the interests of the country as a whole.”3″ An adju-
dicative emphasis became more-pronounced during the tenure of Killam, who
in his capacity as chief commissioner of the B.R.C. invoked the policy of the
law as understood by Mr. Justice Killam of the Supreme Court for the purpose
of excluding socio-economic impacts on communities from the ordinary consid-
erations of the regulatory board. 7

An adjudicative emphasis and the expansion of the number of lawyers on
the board reduced the likelihood that controversy might arise in relation to the
broadly distributive consequences of rate-making. In the minds of some observ-

1903, Amendment (14 March 1904).

34For Borden’s views on Blair’s unfitness for office, see Canada, H.C., Debates: Railway Act
305Supra, notes 125-30.
36Canada, H.C., Debates: The Railway Act, 1903 (7 May 1903) at 2587.
307Supra, note 131.

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ers at least, Killam’s thrust had been deliberate; a brief obituary in the commis-
sion’s annual report for 1909 stated:

Mr. Killam realized that the railway act was on trial, and that it was well to pro-
ceed carefully and cautiously. He felt that when action was taken by the Board,
there should be, as far as possible, no uncertainty in regard to the propriety and
correctness of such action.” 30 8

Killam may have intended to reduce the B.R.C.’s vulnerability to criticism from
within the legal community; the task may not have been all that difficult in light
of indications that the legal community was already inclined to regard the new
agency as a familiar court-like institution, rather than the disruptive innovation
it might have become.

The first volume of the reporter series Canadian Railway Cases actually
appeared shortly before the Board was established for the purpose of consolidat-
ing a record of court judgments affecting railway matters. Editors MacMurchy
and Denison incorporated decisions of the B.R.C. into the series alongside the
findings of the Supreme Court of Canada and the courts of the provinces. The
same authors, in 1905, produced an annotation to the Railway Act which no
doubt thoroughly familiarized at least regular participants in B.R.C. proceedings
with references to the leading principles of earlier cases, English, Canadian and
American. In commenting on the new agency’s powers, the authors’ emphasis
on the applicable limitations was unmistakable. S. 23 set out the Board’s powers
on an application, providing that the “Board shall have full jurisdiction to
inquire into, hear and determine any application by or on behalf of any party
interested …” Observing that the B.R.C.’s powers were “to a considerable extent
similar to the jurisdiction of the I.C.C.”, MacMurchy and Denison cited Amer-
ican authority for the proposition that the Board “has no power to construe,
interpret, or apply that Act in advance of an actual act or omission by a railway
company in contravention of the provisions of the Act.”3” This framework sup-
ported a focus on specific disputes arising from actual conduct and experience,
thus discouraging a more anticipatory or managerial approach independent of
individual cases. Royal Commissions continued to serve from time to time as
forums for considering particularly controversial inter-regional issues.310

In recognition of the judicial attributes of its decisions, the agency formu-
lated principles and procedures which were generally consistent with the stand-

30SCanada, Board of Railway Commissioners, 3rd Annual Report, Sessional Papers 1909 No.

309A. MacMurchy & S. Denison, The Canadian Railway Act, 1903 (Annotated) (Toronto: Can-

20C, 30.

ada Law Book, 1905) at 48.

31See, e.g., E.R. Forbes, The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A Study in Canadian

Regionalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1979).

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[Vol. 36

ards and expectations of an adjudicative process.31′ But other concerns or values
including access and participation were also important elements of the evolution
of the tribunal’s authority.312 Minor matters were processed expeditiously in
high volume, and on the other hand, the Board did attempt to be responsive to
major political or policy-oriented dimensions of its role through the use of fairly
extensive representation of affected interests. Public hearings, investigations,
and rule-making procedures involving the circulation of proposals for comment
and analysis, became part of the tribunal’s operational repertoire.3 3

As debates about interpretation of the term “party interested” and about the
availability of independent legal representation for the public interest in B.R.C.
proceedings indicate, there was a willingness to acknowledge that community
interests different from those of the immediate participants were entitled to con-
sideration.31 4 If the treatment of these matters in the context of the B.R.C. sig-
nificantly broadened the scope of proceedings, in comparison with a more
formal and traditional lis inter partes, it also had the effect of channelling the
participation of various dissenting interests into a less volatile forum than the
political arena, and it provided extensive opportunities for lawyers. In Re
Increase in Passenger and Freight Tolls, for example, five railways, several
Boards of Trade, the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the Government
of Manitoba were represented by counsel including seven King’s Counsel. “Var-
ious other interests were also represented.” ‘315

Some American commentators have recognized the broader participatory
initiatives as a later development of administrative practice. Stewart, for exam-
ple, speaks of “the provision of a surrogate political process to ensure the fair
representation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of administra-
tive decision,” 316 and regards this as a comparatively recent concern in admin-
istrative law, an emphasis that emerged after the decline of “transmission belt”
and “expertise” models as legitimating rationales for tribunal decision-
making.317 The B.R.C. experience suggests that these various rationales may
have co-existed at an earlier stage, though it is not clear that the expertise model

3 11″Rules and Regulations of the Board” ‘Appendix B’ in Canada, Sessional Papers 1907 No.
20C.312R.L. Smith, “The Work and Powers of the Board of Railway Commissioners for Canada”
(1908) 20 Green Bag 30.

313See text accompanying notes 240-42.
3 14 See D. Sugarman, “Law, Economy and the State in England, 1750-1914: Some Major Issues”
in D. Sugarman, ed., Legality, Ideology and the State (New York: Academic Press, 1983) 213 at
244 for discussion of agency responses to a public interest mandate.

315Supra, note 104 at 51.
316Supra, note 171 at 1760.
3 171bid.

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enjoyed much credence or support.31 In contentious matters, even the techno-
crat McLean hopefully presented his conclusions in the form of compromise (as
his Reports had originally urged):

The conclusions which have been arrived at represent what the Board consid-
ers a just and reasonable mean between the extremes; and it is of the opinion that
the results, having regard to the railway situation in the west, are fair not only to
the people but to the railway companies.”3 19

Substantive fairness may or may not have been the outcome of this or of other
individual B.R.C. decisions. What is clear however is that the B.R.C. experi-
ment significantly advanced the stature of the regulatory commission in Canada
as an institution capable of providing a divided and expanding population with
new mechanisms to resolve its differences. The actual characterization of those
mechanisms was often in doubt and their claim to authority was continually
being developed in the operations and procedures of the new tribunal as well as
in its basic structure and design. The challenging questions of relating a general
rise of regulation in Canada to the nature of the broader legal environment and
the evolution of a professional public service remain.

31SAs Doug Owram observed about commission government of urban affairs in this era, “the
very concept of expertise remained loosely defined and reform was still very much the property
of the eclectic generalist” (Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the
State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) 57).

319Supra, note 271 at 230.