Collective Bargaining for Professional Workers:
The Case of the Engineers
Donald Fraser * and Shirley B. Goldenberg **
The number of white-collar workers in proportion to the total
North American labour force has grown rapidly over the past few
decades, with the most marked growth in the professional-technical
category comprised mainly of scientists and engineers. With the
increase in the number of these professionals employed as wage
earners, the traditional independence of the white-collar worker
has been eroded by bureaucratic corporate management. This has
fragmented his job, reduced his power of independent decision,
engendered conflict between his professional ethics and the pe-
cuniary values of the corporation, and generally produced a decline
in his status and the overall satisfaction which would normally
arise out of his professionalism if he were self-employed.
Collective negotiations in various forms have sought to remedy
these problems, with mixed success, since many professional work-
ers see an inherent conflict between the ethics of their profession
and the occasionally rough-and-tumble application of economic sanc-
tions found in union activities. Professional engineers, in particular,
have been concerned with this conflict, since a majority are em-
ployed as supervisors or at some more senior level of management,
with a consequent growing identification with hierarchical goals
as their careers progress. As a result of this conflict, some pro-
fessional groups are developing new types of collective negotiations
which depend more on joint consultation, final offer selection,
and compulsory arbitration than on the more severe sanctions of
the picket and the strike. Others, including groups of engineers
in Quebec, have chosen traditional unionism with a marked degree
of success.
* Associate Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University. Professor
Fraser wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the supervisor of his
thesis for the degree of Master of Laws, Dean H.W. Arthurs, who provided
i number of insights from which aspects of this study were developed.
** Assistant Professor of Industrial Relations, Faculty of Management, McGill
University.
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
457
Professional Engineers under Labour Legislation
At present, provincial labour relations acts in five provinces
(Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Prince
Edward Island) exclude professional engineers from collective bar-
gaining in the private sector.’
In Alberta, the exclusion clause
refers to a “member of the engineering.., profession… qualified
to practise under the laws of the province and employed in his
professional capacity”. 2 In the four other provinces the exclusion
refers simply to a “member of the engineering.., profession”.3
In Manitoba, New Brunswick and Ontario professional engineers
may bargain in separate units. However, in each province they may
bargain in a unit with other employees if a majority so wishes.4
In Quebec an engineer may bargain collectively under the pro-
visions of the Quebec Labour Code if he is an “employee” as
defined by the Code 5 and is in a group comprised only of mem-
bers of his profession.6 There are no other restrictions on him
arising out of his professionalism. He may also join a Professional
the Professional Syndicates Act,7
Syndicate incorporated under
which qualifies as an “association of employees” under the pro-
vision of the Labour Code,8 and receive the same benefits he would
obtain in a union. Finally, he may join a professional syndicate
which either does not qualify as an “association of employees”
under section 1(a) and 1(m)(1) of the Labour Code because it
includes members with managerial status, or which is not entitled
to be certified under the provisions of section 20 of the Code
because it includes members who are not professional engineers,
such as technicians.
In Saskatchewan engineers are neither excluded from the defi-
nition of “employee”, 9 nor given any special protection in bargaining
‘The Alberta Labour Act, S.A. 1973, c.33, s.49(1)(h)(ii); Labour Code of
British Columbia Act, S.B.C. 1973 c.122 s.1(1)(i)(ii); The Labour Relations Act,
R.S.N. 1952, c.258, s2(1)(i)(ii); Trade Union Act, S.N.S. 1972, c.19, s.1(2)(b);
Prince Edward Island Labour Act, S.P.E.I. 1971, c.35, s.7(2)(a).
2 The Alberta Labour Act, supra, f.n.1.
3Labour Code of British Columbia Act; The Labour Relations Act (N.);
Trade Union Act (N.S.); Prince Edward Island Labour Act: supra, f.n.1.
1969, c.20, s.10; S.Q. 1969, c.47, s.2.
4The Labour Relations Act, S.M. 1972, c.75, s29(3); Industrial Relations Act,
S.N.B. 1971, c.9, s.2(5)(b); The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.232, s.6(3).
5 Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1964, c.141, s.1(m) as am. by S.Q. 1969, c.14, s.18; S.Q.
6 Ibld., s.20.
7 Professional Syndicates Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c.146.
8 Supra, f.n.5, s.1(a).
9 The Trade Union Act, S.S. 1972, c.137, s,2(f).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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in a separate unit. Indeed, the Saskatchewan Act is unique in that
it permits the board to designate a person as an employee even
if he may be held to be an independent contractor for the pur-
pose of vicarious liability in tort.10
On the federal scene, recent extensive amendments
to the
Canada Labour Code 1 have removed professional exclusions, in-
cluding that of engineers.1 2 The definition of professional employee
under the Code requires not only the “application of specialized
knowledge” but also membership in or eligibility for membership in
a “professional organization that is authorized by statute to establish
the qualifications for membership”. 3 The Code has a separate
provision with respect to professional bargaining units.’4 Such
units may only be comprised of professional employees and may,
in such units, include “employees performing the functions, but
lacking the qualifications of a professional employee”.’ 5
Before leaving the federal scene, it should be noted that col-
lective bargaining is provided for professional employees, including
engineers, of the Canadian government under the provisions of
the Public Service Staff Relations Act.’ That Act has several unique
features, including the concept of a “designated employee”y,7 who
is so-named because the performance of his duties “is or will be
necessary in the interest of the safety or security of the public”,’8
and who is accordingly forbidden to strike;’ 9 and the concept of
a pre-bargaining choice between arbitration and a conciliation/
strike for the settlement of interest disputes. 20
As for the provinces, only Ontario and Manitoba still exclude
the members of engineering and other professional associations
from the bargaining rights accorded to other civil servants.2′ Public
service legislation in Quebec and New Brunswick, like the Public
Service Staff Relations Act at the federal level, provides for sepa-
rate professional bargaining units (though not necessarily confined
10 Ibid., s.2(f)(iii).
“Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.L-1, as am. by S.C. 1972, c.18.
12Ibid., s.107(1).
13 Ibid.
141Ibid., s.125(3).
15 Ibid.
16 Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.P-35.
17 Ibid., s2(k).
18 Ibid., s.79.
10 Ibid., s.101(1)(c).
20 Ibid., ss.2 and 36.
21An Act to Provide for Collective Bargaining for Crown Employees, S.O.
1972, c.67, s.1(1)(g)(iv); Civil Service Act, R.S.M. 1970, c.C-110, s.47(4).
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
459
to members of a single profession), as does the recent Public
Service Labour Relations Act in British Columbia 2 The remaining
provinces have no professional exclusions in their public service
legislation, but while government engineers in these provinces may
thus bargain collectively, there is no provision for separate pro-
fessional bargaining units.23
The changing status of the professional employee and the
implications of that change with respect to some approaches to
collective bargaining will now be considered.
Professionalism and Unionism
(a) Growth and Professional Values
The white-collar sector (and in particular the professional-tech-
nical category of that sector) has shown a remarkable growth for
a period of decades. As early as 1954 in the United States, Gold-
stein, in examining census figures in the professional and technical
category, noted a tremendous growth in the number of profes-
sionals in salaried positions. In summarising the effect of that
growth, he stated that such employees were attaining more and
more “the status of members of a large anonymous staff”. More
recent studies involving a projection to 1975 indicate clearly that
this growth and resultant shift in the working force in the United
States will continue2 5
Peter Drucker, in an article entitled “Managing the Educated”,
reviews this growth and points out: first, that managerial, profes-
sional and technical employees are now the largest group in the
United States work force; and secondly, that, as a consequence,
people with a high degree of education comprise more than one-
half of the work force.2 6 He notes that managing such people has
22 Civil Service Act, S.Q. 1965, c.14, ss.71, 72; Public Service Labour Relations
Act, S.N.B. 1968, c.88, s24(5); Public Service Staff Relations Act, supra, f.n.16,
s.32(3); Public Service Labour Relations Act,, S.B.C. 1973 (2d session), c.144,
s.4(b).
23 Public Service Act, R.S.A. 1970, c.298, amended 1971, c.89 and 1972, c.80;
Civil Service Joint Council Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c.35; The Public Service (Col-
lective Bargaining Act), S.N. 1973 (not yet proclaimed); P.E.I. O/C 958, 1972;
Amendment to Regulations under authority of Civil Service Act, S.P.E.I. 1962,
c.5, s.8(1). In Saskatchewan, The Trade Union Act, supra, f.n.9, applies to
government employees on the same basis as to employees in the private
sector.
24 Goldstein, Unions and the Professional Employee, (1954) 27 J.Bus. 276, 283.
25 Woodworth and Peterson (eds.), Collective Negotiation for Public and
26 Drucker, “Managing the Educated”, in People and Productivity (1969), 164.
Professional Employees (1969), 3.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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become a major problem of the corporate bureaucracy, and sug-
gests that one difficulty is that one cannot command the specialist,
since he is responsible to his professional judgment and knowledge
rather than to a superior officer.2 7 Drucker concludes that:
For the new organization of highly educated people, authority and re-
sponsibility may well be the wrong principles of organization. It may
well be that we will have to learn to organize not a system of authority
and responsibility –
a system of command – but an information and
a system of judgment, knowledge and expectations. 28
decision system –
The same tocsin is sounded in Britain. Kahn-Freund has warned
of “far-reaching consequences” arising out of the “very rapid
growth” of white-collar workers there.29 Prandy, in reviewing the
problem of professionalism and unionism in Britain in some detail,
has noted the reluctance of professional associations, particularly
of engineers and scientists, to indulge in union activities. He sug-
gests that a principal reason is their upward mobility into man-
agement and a consequent sympathy for it. He proposes the ques-
tion:
… whether these developments are likely to lead to union activity by
professional bodies, to professional activity by unions, or to the develop-
ment of a new form of intermediate organization combining elements
of both.30
In Canada the same occupational trend is evident. Ostry, in
analysing occupational shifts in the Canadian labour market, has
noted “a decisive movement toward white-collar jobs” 31 and re-
marks that this is attributable to “a sustained growth in the
professional and technical group”.3 2 Further, a recent study of the
Canada Department of Manpower and Immigration reports that
“[i]n all regions the projected growth is greatest for professional
and technical occupations: here requirements are projected to
more than double by 1975”. 3 3
The growth noted in all three jurisdictions resulted in the
phenomenon of size, which, in its turn, results in a division of
labour into small, functionally-defined fragments. This process of
27 Ibid., 165.
28 Ibid., 172.
2 0 Kahn-Freund, Labour Law: Old Traditions and New Developments (1968),
14.
30 Prandy, Professional Organization in Britain (1965), 67.
31 Ostry, “The Canadian Labour Market”, in Miller & Isbester (eds.), Cana-
dian Labour in Transition (1971), 31.
32 Ibid.
33 Ahamad, A Projection of Manpower Requirements by Occupation in 1975;
Canada and its Regions (1969, Department of Manpower and Immigration,
Canada), 134.
19741 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
461
fragmentation or over-functionalization produces an “assembly-line”
syndrome, where loss of control and an almost total disappearance
of any creative or novel aspect to the job causes a loss of identity
and a sense of alienation. Such fragmentation has long been
apparent in industry, but it is noteworthy that it now affects the
salaried professional and produces new conflicts.
Wilensky, in discussing the clash of complex organization with
professionalism in the United States, first considers the problem
of non-professional supervision:
The salaried professional often has neither exclusive nor final respon-
sibility for his work; he must accept the ultimate authority of non-
professionals in the assessment of both process and product.3 4
And he comments that this bureaucratic control is aided by frag-
mentation, giving the following example:
[This is] epitomized… by the scores of engineering specialties in the
Soviet Union where the regime finds it easy to train and control its
technicians by continual narrowing and redivision of traditional engi-
neering curriculums.35
The same problem arises in Canada. Muir, in a speech to the
Western Congress of Engineers on May 21, 1970, commented that
almost 90% of the engineering profession were now in paid em-
ployment. 36 He said in conclusion that:
…the development of specialization within the engineering profession
has led to mass training of engineers and the utilization of engineers
on almost a production line basis. As a result, many salaried P. Engs.
are dissatisfied with being a faceless mass of engineers with little oppor-
tunity of self-actualization or reason for incentive. They are thus turning
to collective bargaining as a means for asserting themselves 3 7
The sequence of problems resulting from growth (i.e., frag-
mentation, loss of control, loss of identity, and an inability to
communicate in order to resolve the problems) are particularly
severe for the professional employee, since his professional train-
ing and values have tended to emphasize his independence.
Peter Drucker, writing in 1952 on the relationship between
management and the professional, indicated some clear differences
between the basic attitudes of professional employees, and the
rest of the business organization. He pointed out the difference
between the managerial attitude, which in essence wants to see
a job get done, and “professionality”, which comes from the pro-
fessional man’s “objectivity, his standards, his refusal to accept
34 Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, (1964) 70 AmJ.Sociol. 146.
35 Ibid., 157.
36 Muir, A Trade Union for P. Engs.?, (1970) 9 Eng.Dig. 39.
37 Ibid., 42.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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uncritically management’s definition of a problem, or manage-
ment’s idea of what the result should be” 8 He also noted the
need for professional recognition, and suggested that management
should encourage such activities as participation in professional
societies and part-time teaching.3 9
Gellerman has noted the same desire for independence and
control among professionals in discussing what is known as the
“Pittsburgh Studies”. This was a study of work motivation of some
200 engineers and accountants who worked for eleven different
firms in the Pittsburgh area. The principal reasons for the study
were the likelihood of professional workers responding to different
motivating forces than clerical or blue-collar workers, and a search
generally for “clues to what kind of motives we can expect to appear
among other workers as we move toward a more technologically-
based economy and a more professionalized labour force”.40 Geller-
man sums up the result of the studies in the following way:
… both the traditional bread and-butter motivators and the more sophisti-
cated “human relations” motivators didn’t motivate.., control of their
own work, rather than the tangible rewards of work, was the motivator.41
The same professional values have been discussed in The McGill
Report, a recent, exhaustive study of the professional employee in
the Public Service of Canada. The report describes these values as
including “autonomy in the work situations, respect, esteem, real
participation in decision-making, satisfactory economic situation,
etc.”, 42 against all of which the phenomena of growth and fragmenta-
tion tend to prevail.
Finally, it should be noted that there is a countervailing force,
more apparent for salaried engineers than other professionals, which
tends to restrain the conflict between professional values and the
values of the corporate hierarchy. This is the upward mobility of
engineers into supervisory positions which, as has been described by
Lipset, makes for “identification with management, and support of
the status quo”.43 This mobility is quite extensive. A major survey of
38 Drucker, Management and the Professional Employee, (1952) 30(3) Harv.
Bus. Rev. 84.
30 Ibid., 86-87.
40 Gellerman, Motivation and Productivity (1963), 48.
4′ Ibid., 50.
42 The Professional Employee in the Public Service of Canada, (1973) 52(2)
J.Prof.Inst. 8.
43 Lipset, “White Collar Workers and Professionals – Their Attitudes and
Behaviour towards Unions”, in Faunce (ed.), Readings in Industrial Sociology
(1967), 540.
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
463
the Engineers Joint Council in the United States, representing nearly
forty-five thousand fully qualified engineers, showed that engineers
were indeed largely managers or supervisors, with 64% providing
supervision over components ranging from small teams to major
organizations.”
In summary, a conflict results from the desire of the professional
employee, on one hand, to retain some control over his work in order
to preserve his professional values and approach; and the tendency
of the firm, on the other hand, to close the gap between its treatment
of him and of blue-collar workers because of the rapid growth in
numbers of professional employees.
(b) Some Particular Benefits
There are several ways in which collective bargaining in its usual
form in the private sector may directly benefit the professional
engineer. The agreement might provide for economic gains and for
certain professional benefits, such as the right to sign or to refuse
to sign an engineering report. Engineers might also gain from the
regularization and support of economic benefits by a collective
bargaining process. Engineers are highly vulnerable to the pheno-
menon of professional obsolescence, which appears approximately
in mid-career for those who have not moved into administrative or
at least substantial supervisory functions. This type of obsolescence
has been considered by Kuhn, who has observed that as the length of
company tenure increases, salaries level, promotion opportunities
diminish and a functional obsolescence appears, all of which lower
individual bargaining power.45 Walton considers that unions in the
United States have had some palliative effect on this process, noting
that they have reversed the narrowing trend in engineers’ salary
increases, and have tried to offset the situation where the level of
hiring rates for incoming engineers rises faster than the general
increases in salaries for engineers already in the firm.”
The same levelling tendency has been observed in Ontario. The
1970 Membership Salary Survey of the Association of Professional
Engineers of Ontario shows a median annual salary increase peaking
for an engineer of about thirteen years experience and diminishing
44 A Profile of the Engineering Profession (Report from the 1969 National
Engineers Register), 11.
45Kuh, Success and Failure in Organizing Professional Engineers (paper
presented at the Industrial Relations Research Association Meeting, December
27, 1963), 9.
46Walton, The Impact of the Professional Engineering Union (1961), 118-119.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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rapidly thereafter to a low for an engineer of about twenty-two years
experience.
In analysing the data, Hastings suggests that:
This may indicate that larger industries are continuing to assiduously
follow the iniquitous practice of penalizing older engineers who do not
have the mobility of younger engineers, or that a large number of engi-
neers are working at a subprofessional level or both.4
It might accordingly be expected that collective bargaining might
alleviate this problem among professional engineers in Ontario, as
it has in the United States.
However, while the question of economic benefits will usually
appear as a substantial issue in any consideration of large-group
unionization, professional or not, the question of professional bene-
fits is by definition of peculiar interest to professional groups. One
may therefore expect issues to arise in this area which are relatively
new to collective bargaining. Walton has indicated that unionization
in the United States has secured some professional benefits for
engineers, such as an entitlement as inventor to patent rights, and
the right to add one’s name as author to engineering reports cir-
culated outside the company. s Other closely related professional
rights, such as the right to sign one’s own work and to refuse to
sign a report that one disagrees with for professional reasons,
have been incorporated in contracts in Quebec which will be con-
sidered later. A somewhat broader view of such rights has been
taken by Marc Lapointe, the newly-appointed Chairman of the Cana-
da Labour Relations Board and a lawyer with experience in bargain-
ing for professional engineers in Quebec, in his suggestion that
engineers should insist on protection for the “inviolability of a pro-
fessional decision” being incorporated in a negotiated agreement
9
Whatever rights are brought to the bargaining table in the future
in this area, it may be expected that management’s inherent resis-
tance to change and to erosion of its own rights will severely limit
developments in this area. Professional benefits may become the
most contentious area of bargaining, as a consequence, and may
develop into one of the principal foci of professional unionism.
(c) The Development of a New Type of Collective Relationship
In general, studies of organizational approaches to the manage-
ment/union/worker relationship tend to suggest that a more har-
47 Hastings, Membership Salary Survey 1970, (1971) 4 Eng.Dig. 38, 40.
4sSupra, f.n.46, 100.
49 Lapointe, in a speech to SOHPEA, in Ryan, Engineers Must Demand Share
of Pie, (1970) Eng.Dig. 11.
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
465
monious and possibly more productive work relationship develops
out of a “supportive relationship” which “builds and maintains [a]
sense of personal worth” and which preserves distinctive identities,
interests, and values. Such a relationship, however, is probably val-
uable in most industrial milieus, whether or not professionals are
involved. The essential problem is to see whether there is a sufficient
difference in kind between the identity, interests and values of the
professional and other workers to suggest a new type of collective
relationship. What are the characteristics that might aid in determin-
ing that relationship? First, consideration must be given to Drucker’s
analysis of a new kind of organization for highly educated people,
in which a “system of authority and responsibility” is replaced by a
“system of judgment, knowledge and expectation”.50 A second char-
acteristic has been identified in the “Pittsburgh Studies” by Geller-
man, who noted that the “traditional bread-and-butter motivators”
did not work and that the professionals wanted independence in
their work.51 A third characteristic (particularly in the case of en-
gineers) is their identification with management arising from their
upward mobility into supervisory and managerial roles, which may
produce a distaste for direct economic conflict with management in
the form of picketing and striking. A final characteristic is the need
for protection of professional benefits. In such areas as control over
professional reports and responsibility to professional ethics, this
characteristic is close to the second one mentioned above. These
characteristics do not lend themselves clearly to a definition of a
new type of collective relationship. However, the need for judgment
and knowledge rather than authority, the identification with man-
agement and the need for more control over work to be yielded up
by management tend to suggest that a consultative form of collective
relationship may be more beneficial in the long run than the tra-
ditional adversary form.
What sort of association is then appropriate for professionals?
Kruger, in considering the direction of unionism in Canada, discusses
the trend away from self-employment to salaried employment among
professional employees, and predicts that where white-collar workers
do not have professional organizations that are suitable for collective
bargaining:
It seems unlikely that many Canadian white-collar workers will join
existing unions. More likely is the development of associations of white-
collar workers at the level of the firm which then may spread to industrial,
50 Supra, f.n.26.
51 Supra, f.n.40.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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regional and national groupings similar to what is already common among
blue-collar workers.5 2
In a similar vein, Wilensky has urged the development of an associa-
tion separate from both the trade union and the professional
association:
The occupational group of the future will combine elements from both
the professional and bureaucratic models; the average professional man
will combine professional and non-professional orientations; the typical
occupational associations may be neither a trade union nor a professional
association.53
Although these are both predictions for the future, a development
of this nature occurred last year in Ontario, where the Society of
Ontario Hydro Professional Engineers and Associates, which was
expected to become the first certified engineering union under the
amended Ontario legislation, signed a voluntary Master Agreement
and Redress Procedure with Ontario Hydro. The agreement will be
reviewed below.
There are, of course, a number of other possible kinds of pro-
fessional negotiations. The Federation of Engineering and Scientific
Associations (F.E.S.A.) has recently published a study entitled
“Negotiating Options for Professional Staff”’54 which lists five cate-
gories of negotiating processes. They are:
1. Individual Negotiation, where the engineer puts his own case
to the supervisor.
2. (a) Group Representation, where group representatives will
simply submit the engineer’s case to management.
(b) Informal Group Negotiation, where the group repre-
sentative will, in addition to submitting the case, negotiate
informally with management.
3. (a) Regularized Informal Negotiation, where the system of
informal group negotiation is regularized by mutual accord
by the settlement of such things as regular dates of
meeting.
(b) Negotiation under Voluntary Agreement, where the parties
develop regularized informal negotiation to the point
where a substantial set of agreed procedures is defined
and accepted by both parties in writing.
4. Collective Bargaining as a Certified Group, where a group of
engineers obtains certification independently of a trade union
and bargains under the terms of pertinent labour legislation.
52 Kruger, “The Direction of Unionism in Canada”, in Miller & Isbester,
supra, f.n.31, 106.
53 Supra, f.n34.
54 Negotiating Options for Professional Staff (1973, F.E.S.A.).
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
467
5. Group Bargains as Local of an Existing Union, where a trade
union obtains certification as representative of the group under
the terms of pertinent labour legislation. 55
The Federation rejects the first category as ineffective, and suggests
that the fifth category would entail such conflict between professional
aspirations and “the inevitable associations, policies, precedents and
tactics of trade unions, that it is rated unacceptable to employee
professionals”.” The Federation accordingly views categories 2(a),
2(b), 3(a), 3(b) and 4 as the only suitable formats for professional
staff.
A consideration of developments in Ontario and Quebec will show
varying degrees of experience and success in the more organized
categories noted above.
The Quebec Experience: Engineers at the
City of Montreal and Hydro-Quebec
Quebec engineers acquired full collective bargaining rights under
the Labour Code in 1964.17 Prior to this, they had been specifically
excluded, from the coverage of labour legislation, along with the
members of other incorporated professions. 58 The engineers’ pro-
fessional association, la Corporation des Ing6nieurs du Qudbec (CIQ),
had consistently opposed the idea of collective bargaining for its
employee members and made strong representations against removal
of the professional exclusions when amendments to the labour
legislation were being considered in 1963.” 9 A few years earlier (1959),
it had passed the following amendment to its Code of Ethics to block
attempts by engineers’ groups to engage in collective bargaining:
ARTICLE 3.5. The Engineer shall not be a member of a trade union
nor participate as such in any form of trade union activities, since he
would then uphold a philosophy and certain methods of negotiation in-
compatible with true professionalism, such as the use of strikes and
the like.
In 1963 the legal counsel of the CNTU, Jean-Paul Geoffroy, advised
a pro-union group of engineers at the City of Montreal that Article
3.5 was illegal. The Corporation also received a legal opinion from
Guy Favreau, Q.C. that the article would be ultra vires the powers of
the CIQ if extended to apply to professional syndicates. The CIQ did
55 Ibid., 3.
56 Ibid., 5.
57 Supra, f.n.5.
58 See Labour Relations Act, S.Q. 1944, c.30, s2(a) (3).
59 CIQ Brief to Industrial Relations Committee of the Legislature (1963).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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not act on this advice when it was received. However it repealed
Article 3.5 in August 1964, after the Labour Code had granted
bargaining rights to professional engineers. There could be no doubt
at that point that the article was illegal.
We have already noted that the Quebec Labour Code requires
professional bargaining units to be limited to members of the same
profession and that there are no other restrictions with respect to
professional employees0 0 However, professional engineers have been
reluctant to use the Code as an instrument for determining their
bargaining units, fearing that a disproportionate number of man-
agerial exclusions would result. This problem is illustrated by the
experience of the engineers at the City of Montreal and Hydro-
Qu6bec. Incorporated under the Professional Syndicates Act,0′ and
affiliated with the CNTU, they chose to rely on power relationships
to define their bargaining units rather than submit to the provisions
of the Code and risk a narrow interpretation of employee status
(and consequently, a high proportion of managerial exclusions) by
the Labour Relations Board.
(a) The City of Montreal
Le Syndicat professionnel des ingdnieurs de la Ville de Montr6al
(SPIVM) was formed on October 9, 1963. Having succeeded in
enrolling 225 out of a possible 290 City engineers, SPIVM applied to
the Provincial Secretary for incorporation under the Professional
Syndicates Act. Strong opposition from the CIQ resulted in the
application being put in abeyance. But the City insisted that it would
not negotiate until the Syndicate was legally incorporated. Impatient
with the delay, SPIVM decided to side-step the incorporation issue
and force the City to recognize it. On July 15, 1964 the members voted
for a work stoppage within 36 hours if the Syndicate was not re-
cognized. The City administration capitulated the next day, recogniz-
ing the Syndicate and agreeing to bargain with it. Official incorpora-
tion came in the fall of 1964.
After protracted negotiations and conciliation, it took a strike
threat to produce the first collective agreement, signed on May 26,
1965. There had been two principal issues in the negotiations: union
jurisdiction (the area of the bargaining unit) and salary levels. In
addition, the engineers were determined to achieve certain “pro-
fessional guarantees”. The agreement embodied the recommendations
of the conciliator in the key matter of the jurisdiction of the syn-
dicate, which recommendations were virtually identical to the orig-
00 Supra, f.n.5.
01 Supra, f.n.7.
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
469
inal union position. The bargaining unit, as finally defined, did not
conform to the requirement of the Labour Code to exclude all persons
exercising supervisory authority. Instead it excluded only those
engineers exercising hiring and firing authority over other engineers
or employed in a confidential capacity. The contract also contained
substantial salary increases and some innovative “professional”
clauses. These included Article 16.01, providing the right for an
engineer to sign his own reports and plans; article 16.02, providing
the right to refuse to sign a report as a matter of professional
conscience; and article 22.03, which provided that engineers would
be assigned “to positions whose nature demands the technical
knowledge of an engineer”.
(b) Hydro-Quebec
The professional engineers at Hydro-Quebec also decided to force
“voluntary” recognition on their employer. However, it took two
recognition strikes before their first collective agreement was signed.
Only one matter was settled more easily at Hydro than at the City
of Montreal. As a result of the precedent established by SPIVM, le
Syndicat professionnel des ing6nieurs de l’Hydro-Qudbec (SPIHQ)
had no problem in being incorporated.
SPIHQ approached the Hydro Commission for recognition on
January 22, 1965, demanding a broad “professional” bargaining unit
on the pattern established by SPIVM. Hydro, on the other hand,
insisted that the bargaining unit be based on the provisions of the
Labour Code and wanted the Labour Relations Board to determine
the managerial exclusions.
The first recognition strike began on May 10, 1965 and lasted for
five weeks. A noted expert on professional bargaining has commented
on the results as follows:
Of the 555 engineers employed at Quebec Hydro, 440 were finally recognized
as being acceptable for representation through the syndicate, whereas, if
certification under the Code had been required, only about 280 would
have been in fact covered by the eventual agreement. This was a true
victory for “cadre” (supervisory) unionism.62
A letter of agreement defining the bargaining unit (June 14, 1965)
was followed by contract negotiations. But the bargaining broke
down when Hydro implemented administrative changes that had the
effect of increasing the number of managerial exclusions from the
bargaining unit. This led to a second recognition strike beginning
082 Jean-Real Cardin, “Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee
in Quebec”, in Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee (Confer-
ence Proceedings, Centre for Industrial Relations, Dec. 15-17, 1965), 81, 92.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 20
on April 15, 1966 and lasting for eleven weeks. This strike resulted
in a new settlement which respected the principle established in the
first agreement, namely the exclusion from the bargaining unit of any
engineer whose position carried authority over the career of other
engineers or professionals. In the case of positions established or
filled after June 15, 1966, the following criteria for managerial ex-
clusions would apply:
(1) Authority of a superior over an engineer or other profes-
sional. An engineer is considered in authority if he has
influence on the career of another engineer or professional
in all the following respects; promotion, salary, report on his
work and recommendations on disciplinary matters
and/or
(2) Responsibility of directing the activities of a district as prin-
cipal representative of Hydro Qu6bec.63
The Hydro engineers achieved substantial salary increases and
professional benefits in their first collective agreement. In addition
to clauses on signing rights, on the pattern of the Montreal agree-
ment, Hydro engineers established the principle of professional
seniority, rather than company seniority, as the basis for length of
vacation; the number of weeks allowed for vacation were to be
related to the number of years since graduation. The agreement also
provided for a committee of five (two union and three management
representatives)
to make recommendations for vacant positions.
Questions of merit could at least be raised in this committee although
the ultimate decision on promotion remained the prerogative of the
employer.
Subsequent collective agreements have increased the financial
and professional benefits for City and Hydro engineers. However,
their first round of bargaining was clearly the most significant.
Firstly, the agreement established that all engineers exercising man-
agement functions need not be excluded from the bargaining unit.
The experience of these engineers’ unions shows that a workable
policy of exclusion need only affect those with authority over
engineers or other professionals with respect to promotion, salary,
work assessment and disciplinary matters. It is interesting to note
that the bargaining units that were established on this basis by
“voluntary” recognition were subsequently recognized in the law.
Special amendments to the Labour Code recognized as certified
03Translation from Convention collective de travail entre la Commission
Hydro-dlectrique de Qudbec et le Syndicat professionel des ingdnieurs de
l’Hydro-Qudbec (CSN), 25 juillet 1966 – 31 d6cembre 1967, Annexe A, 32-33.
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
471
associations the unions that signed the engineers’ agreements at
the City of Montreal and Hydro-Qu6bec. 64 Secondly, it was shown
that professional status may be advanced rather than harmed by
collective bargaining, since such things as protection of professional
rights, professional seniority and advancement by merit may be
specifically provided for in the collective agreement. Finally, the
Quebec experience proved that some engineers could become mili-
tant enough to engage in fairly protracted and effective strikes,
without any apparent lasting harm to their professional status.
The Situation in Ontario
The Ontario Labour Relations Act of 1948 specifically excluded
engineers from its coverage, along with members of other profes-
sional associations. By 1971, an amended Act gave bargaining rights
to the engineers while retaining the other professional exclusions 6
This ended a protracted struggle between employee engineers who
were demanding legal bargaining rights and the Association of
Professional Engineers of Ontario (APEO), which, like the CIQ in
Quebec, was adamantly –
opposed to such rights.
The Society of Ontario Hydro Professional Engineers and Associates
(SOHPEA) took the lead in the battle for bargaining rights, sup-
ported in due course by other groups of employee engineers. While
space restrictions preclude a detailed historical account of the
struggle, some of its highlights will be described in the next few
pages.
and actively –
(a) Controversy over Bargaining Rights
In 1956 APEO established an Employee Members’ Committee
(EMC),
formed of representatives of Company groups, for the
purpose of “maintaining communications” with employers rather
than bargaining collectively. SOHPEA presented in 1958 the first of
a series of briefs to the government, as well as to APEO, in favour
of including professional engineers in the coverage of the Labour
Relations Act. APEO reacted with a counter-brief supporting the
retention of the exclusion clause on the ground that compulsory
bargaining under labour legislation was against the best interests
of the profession.
6 R.S.Q. 1964, s.20; replaced by S.Q. 1969, c.47, s.9; as amended by S.Q.
1969, c.48, s.9; S.Q. 1970, c.33, s.1; S.Q. 1971, c.44, s.1.
65R.S.O. 1960, c.202, s.1(3)(a)(b).
U6 Supra, f.n.4 (proclaimed 1971).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 20
After a number of unsuccessful attempts to influence the govern-
ment and the professional association on its own, SOHPEA decided
that it should broaden the base of support for its position. Early in
1960 it formed a Committee for the Advancement of Professional
Engineers (CAPE) with representatives of a number of company
groups outside Ontario Hydro. In April 1960 CAPE tried a new
approach, suggesting to the Council of APEO that the Professional
Engineers’ Act 7 be amended to provide for the certification of
engineers’ units for the purpose of collective bargaining. The Council
turned down the proposal. Further attempts to amend the Labour
Relations Act or the Professional Engineers’ Act were all to no avail.
Finally, in 1963 the proponents of legalized bargaining rights decided
that separate legislation for professional negotiations might be the
only answer.
In August 1963 SOHPEA (whose membership included engineers
and scientists) presented a submission for “New Legislation for the
Professional Engineer and Scientist in Ontario” to the Premier and
the leaders of the Opposition parties. Less than a year later,
SOHPEA’s horizons took in all the professions. In April 1964 it
addressed a draft brief to all major professional associations in
Ontario on the “Need for a Professional Employees Act”. By July
1964 the Steering Committee on Negotiation Rights for Professional
Staffs was formed at a special EMC group conference. By November
1964 the Steering ‘Committee, supported by seven EMC groups, sent
a brief on “Negotiation Rights for Professional Staffs” to the major
professional associations as well as to the Ontario government. This
brief proposed special legislation for professional negotiations.
APEO’s position did not change at this point but Premier Robarts
acknowledged the problem raised in the brief in his answer to the
Chairman of the Steering Committee. He even hinted at an eventual
review of the Labour Relations Act:
It may be necessary for the government to examine in some more formal
way the question of actual need and the best means for individual pro-
fessional persons to be able to combine to represent their interests to
employers in a way which is not inconsistent with individual professional
status and responsibility. This in time may require some review of the
Labour Relations Act and other statutes. It is too serious a subject,
however, to be considered without a thorough examination of the public
interest as well as the interests of the many professional groups.68
07 The Professional Engineers Act, R.S.O. 1960, c.309, later replaced by the
Professional Engineers Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.366.
08 Letter to E.G. Phillips, Chairman of the Steering Committee on Negotia-
tion Rights for Professional Staffs, February 5, 1965.
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
473
In April 1966 the Steering Committee submitted a Draft Profes-
sional Negotiations Act to the government. The proposed Act incor-
porated the main premises of the earlier brief on Negotiation Rights
for Professional Staffs. However, this time the submission was
endorsed by an impressive list of 18 professional groups and associa-
tions, including administrators, nurses, librarians and municipal
recreation directors. Still, the majority of the sponsoring bodies were
groups of engineers, and SOHPEA was clearly the driving force
behind them.
The Steering Committee argued that existing labour legislation,
even with modifications, would be inappropriate as a vehicle for
professional bargaining. It noted, for example, that:
6 9
The definition of employee which is used by the certification boards is
so restrictive that if it were applied to professional employee bargaining
groups, their membership would be held down to an unworkable mini-
mum.
The proposed Professional Negotiations Act, on the other hand,
would provide a sufficiently flexible definition of employee status
to take into account the responsible nature of professional functions
and duties. Salaried professionals exercising supervisory authority
over other categories of workers (i.e., non-professionals) would be
eligible for professional bargaining units.
The proposed Act departed from the Labour Relations Act in a
number of other important respects. For example, it provided for
purely voluntary participation in collective bargaining. No profes-
sional employee would be forced to join a professional association
or to be subject to the provisions of a collective agreement against
his will. But all professional employees who wished to bargain
collectively would be able to do so since majority representation was
not to be a prerequisite for recognition of a professional staff associa-
tion. The Act also provided for individual contracts to supplement a
collective agreement. This provision, unknown in general labour
legislation, was meant to assuage the fear of some professional
workers
individual
differences and discourage personal initiative. And finally, the
Steering Committee made it clear that it considered trade union
affiliation and strike action unacceptable for professional workers.
The draft Act provided for an innovative method of arbitration, final
that collective bargaining would submerge
69 Brief presented by the Steering Committee on Negotiation Rights for
Professional Staffs (1966), 3. It will be remembered that the Quebec engineers’
unions repudiated the Labour Code for the same reason.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 20
offer selection =a as the final step in the settlement of interest
disputes.
The Draft Professional Negotiations Act received cautious ap-
proval from APEO. A statement by the Council of APEO that it
would not actively oppose the Act marked a watershed in its posi-
tion.70 While still opposed in principle to the idea of collective
bargaining, the professional association admitted that a legal right to
bargain might eventually have to be made available to the employee
engineers who desired it. If this were to be the case, APEO preferred
the Draft Professional Negotiations Act, with some modifications, to
removal of the engineering exclusion from the Labour Relations Act.
It remained adamantly opposed to having professional engineers
subject to general labour legislation.
The issue came to a head three years later. In late 1969 the pro-
vincial Department of Labour was reviewing possible amendments
to the Labour Relations Act and queried APEO on its current attitude
toward collective bargaining. Convinced by this time that some form
of collective bargaining legislation for engineers had become inevit-
able, APEO decided to concentrate its efforts on the question of
professional safeguards: the protection against arbitrary absorption
into existing bargaining agencies; the homogeneity of the profes-
sional bargaining unit; the freedom for the professionals involved
to decide whether to engage in collective bargaining and to select
their bargaining agent by a majority vote; the inclusion of super-
visory employees
in professional bargaining units; and finally,
compulsory arbitration procedures for settling unresolved disputes.
APEO left no doubt that special legislation was the only way in
which these safeguards could be assured. 71 The Steering Committee,
on the other hand. though committed to its Draft Professional
Negotiations Act, seemed to prefer half a loaf to none at all. It did
not oppose the removal of the engineering exclusion from the Labour
Relations Act, once that seemed to be the only way collective
bargaining rights could be achieved.
(b) Amendments to the Ontario Labour Relations Act (1971)
The Ontario government clearly repudiated the principle of
separate legislation for professional negotiations when it removed
eila Under this system, the arbitrator would have to decide in favour of the
entire package of proposals by one side or the other with no discretion to
propose a compromise solution of his own, the purpose being to avoid
irresponsible proposals by either party.
7Association of Professional Engineers of the Province of Ontario, Council
Statement, December 8, 1966.
71Minutes of the APEO Council, January 23, 1970, 30.
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
475
the engineering exclusion from the Labour Relations Act. It also
showed that it was not ready to extend professional bargaining rights
beyond the engineering group, by not making any change in the other
professional exclusions. Moreover, while it had finally given in to the
pressure for bargaining rights for professional engineers, it did not
grant them the special professional clauses they desired. Section 6(3)
was the only clause in the amended Labour Relations Act which made
special provision for professional engineers; it permits them to be
certified in separate bargaining units although it also permits them
to be certified in a unit with other employees should this be the
wish of the majority of the engineers concerned.
There is some evidence that Ontario engineers, like the engineers
in Quebec, may be reluctant to use the labour legislation as a vehicle
for collective bargaining unless it is amended to provide minimum
guarantees for particular professional needs. The experience of
SOHPEA is a significant illustration of this point.
(c) The Master Agreement between SOHPEA and Ontario Hydro
SOHPEA was considered the group most likely to make the first
application for certification after the removal of the engineering
exclusion from the Labour Relations Act. But this did not occur. On
January 4, 1973 SOHPEA signed a voluntary Master Agreement and
Redress Procedure with its employer rather than ask the Labour
Relations Board for certification under the Act.
SOHPEA already had a form of voluntary collective agreement
with Ontario Hydro by virtue of a Letter of Understanding signed on
September 28, 1961. This Letter contained a recognition clause and
a system of joint consultation on working conditions through the
medium of a Joint Society-Management Committee. However, it
differed from a standard collective agreement in providing for
continuous negotiations and in lacking a termination date. It also
covered employees performing supervisory functions apart from
those employed in a confidential capacity.
Although SOHPEA had not been certified, it applied to the
Labour Relations Board under Section 13(3) of the Labour Rela-
tions Act for conciliation of a dispute arising out of the joint
consultation system. The Board refused to grant conciliation services,
noting that SOHPEA did not meet the definition of a trade union
because of its managerial members. SOHPEA then proceeded to
negotiate the Master Agreement and Redress Procedure noted above.
The Master Agreement, like the Letter of Understanding, is not a
collective labour agreement as the term is generally understood. In
effect it is a voluntary agreement on the procedure to be followed
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 20
in arriving at a form of collective agreement in the future. In addition
it deals with the composition of the bargaining unit, the recognition
of SOHPEA as the bargaining agent, union security, the term of the
agreement and a Redress Procedure for rights disputes culminating
in final and binding arbitration by a three-man board.
The Master Agreement satisfied two important desires of SOHPEA
that could not have been achieved through the provisions of the
Labour Relations Act. First, it was able to gain voluntary recognition
for a bargaining unit containing a large number of managerial
employees; second, it was able to substitute a mediation and arbitra-
tion mechanism for strikes and lockouts.
The inclusion of managerial employees was crucial for SOHPEA,
whose membership of some 1,400 is drawn from Ontario Hydro
management and professional grades, including about 75 on the
highest executive payroll. As the Act specifically excludes both those
exercising managerial functions and those employed in a confidential
capacity in labour matters, several hundred SOHPEA members could
have been deprived of bargaining rights under regular certification
procedures. 2 The Master Agreement only excluded those employed
in a confidential capacity;7 3 in practice this resulted in no exclusions
whatsoever. 74 The substitution of arbitration/mediation schemes for
strikes and lockouts reflected the position that SOHPEA had sup-
ported since it took the initiative in establishing the Steering Com-
mittee on Negotiation Rights for Professional Staff in 1964.
The Master Agreement has separate provisions for dealing with
disputes over salary schedule adjustments and “other matters in
dispute”. All bargaining is done through the medium of a joint so-
ciety-management committee. In the event of failure to reach agree-
ment on salary schedule adjustments, the Agreement provides for an
arbitration hearing on the application of either party, with the
arbitrator’s decision to be final and binding on both parties. In the
event of the failure of the Committee to agree on “other matters
in dispute”, the matter may be referred to a mediator who must
attempt to bring about a “voluntary” settlement. If the mediator fails
to resolve the dispute, he is required to recommend a settlement
which in turn must be considered by the parties. But Hydro retains
the power to impose a settlement in the case of disagreement over
the mediator’s recommendations. SOHPEA seems to have shown
72 Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.232, s.1(3).
73 Master Agreement and Redress Procedure between the Society of Ontario
Hydro Professional Engineers and Associates, and Ontario Hydro (signed
January 4, 1973), art. 1.
74 Interview with executive secretary of SOHPEA, August 21, 1973.
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
477
uncharacteristic weakness in agreeing to give the employer the final
decision over “other matters in dispute”. However, this was probably
the compromise it had to make to achieve the management inclusions
discussed above.
The redress procedure under the Master Agreement appears to
have a rather interesting potential. It has some similiarity to tradi-
tional grievance procedures for rights disputes in that there are a
number of steps in the procedure, culminating in binding arbitration
by a tripartite board. However, the redress procedure is not intended
to interpret or apply a collective agreement. Rather, it must deal
with “any complaint of a SOHPEA member who feels he has a
grievance which has not been resolved” as well as with “such matters
of interpretation, application and administration of policy and prac-
tice as are specifically referred to it”, with “power to settle or
decide such matters”. If the redress procedure is read together with
the mediation procedure for “other matters in dispute”, it would
appear that while SOHPEA relinquishes the final right to decide a
jointly-negotiated issue (other than salary) to Ontario Hydro, any
SOHPEA member, by way of complaint, may subject Ontario Hydro
to a binding arbitral decision on management policy and practice.
In other words, it is conceivable that SOHPEA may be better advised
to grieve (through a member) than to negotiate if it wishes to change
a working condition.
The Hydro engineers do not see any alternative to this voluntary
form of procedural agreement until there are further amendments to
the law to provide a more satisfactory basis for professional bargain-
ing. It is suggested that a more flexible definition of employee status
under the Labour Relations Act, corresponding to the realities of
professional employment, could do much to relieve the current
anxiety with respect to managerial exclusions. Such an amendment,
with some mechanism for the voluntary arbitration of interest
disputes as an alternative to a strike, might make collective bargain-
ing under the law realistically possible for Ontario engineers. The
question of an appropriate bargaining agent would then have to be
resolved.
(d) The Bargaining Agent for Professional Engineers
There seems to be general agreement that a professional associa-
tion such as APEO, with licensing and disciplinary powers, should not
act as a bargaining agent for its employee members. The major argu-
ments against using existing professional bodies as bargaining agents
have been summarized as follows by Arthurs. First, there is the
danger to the public that entry to the profession might be restricted,
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 20
not to maintain professional excellence, but “to enhance economic
opportunities for those in practice”. Second, problems might flow
from the ideological differences of opinion within the professional
body on the question of collective bargaining. Third, collective
bargaining assumes a measure of membership democracy and decen-
tralized decision-making which may not exist within a professional
body. Finally, existing professional associations do not meet the
definition of a “trade union” under labour legislation by virtue of
the fact that they include managerial personnel in their member-
ship.7 ‘5
It is interesting to note that the Task Force on Labour Relations
recommended that the bargaining agent for professionals be separate
from the licensing body “to avoid a temptation to employ licensing
as a restrictive device to reduce entry and control market supply”.76
So too did one of the authors of this article in a study commissioned
by the Task Force. 7
While APEO and its employee member groups seem to be in
agreement that a professional association will not act as a bargain-
ing agent, there has been much controversy between them on how
the “welfare function” should be handled. SOHPEA and other em-
ployee groups organized a Special Committee of Employee Engineers
(SCOPE) in 1968 with the primary purpose of forcing APEO to divest
itself of all interest in the “welfare” field, notably collective bargain-
ing. By 1970 they decided to set up a separate service organization,
the Federation of Engineers, Scientists, and Associates (FESA), in
anticipation of legal bargaining rights. FESA was formally esta-
blished on November 18, 1970 to implement the principle of the
separation of licensing and economic functions.
The APEO Council indicated its support for FESA at the outset
and laid the groundwork for financial assistance at a special meeting
on December 19, 1970. Within a month, however, it reversed its
position, after receiving considerable protest from other elements of
its membership. On January 29, 1971 the Council of APEO passed a
special resolution directing its officers to terminate its discussions
with SCOPE and FESA “in favour of discussions with other bodies”
more “in harmony with the overall aims of APEO”.
75 Arthurs, “Problems and Pitfalls from the Legal Point of View”, in Col-
76 Canadian Industrial Relations (1968, Report of the Task Force on Labour
lective Bargaining and the Professional Employee, supra, f.n.62, 101-102.
Relations), 139.
Study No. 2), 98.
77 Goldenberg, Professional Workers and Collective Bargaining (Task Force
1974] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
479
After withdrawing its support from FESA, APEO endorsed the
Canadian Council of Professional Engineers (CCPE) as a collective
bargaining advisory service and gave practical effect to this endorse-
ment by a fifty-cent per capita grant. The CCPE is a coordinating
body for provincial engineering licensing bodies. The SCOPE/FESA
supporters complain that APEO has become illegally involved in
membership self-interests in its relationship with CCPE but the
Association’s own solicitors have advised it that it is acting within
its legal powers.
As no professional bargaining units have yet applied for certifica-
tion, the question of the advisory service organization that will
eventually be used remains academic. However, the evidence to date
indicates that employee engineers in Ontario will not, and cannot,
bargain through their professional association as such. Nor are they
likely to follow the path of trade union affiliation on the pattern of
their French Canadian confreres. On the other hand, it is evident
that they are in full agreement with the Quebec engineers on the
need for amending the law. In both provinces the managerial exclu-
sions in labour legislation are seen as a serious restriction on
professional bargaining rights.
