Embodied Diversity and
the Challenges to Law
Jennifer Nedelsky*
The author provokes a re-evaluation of the notion
of diversity, critically examining its conceptual impli-
cations for such traditional notions of Western political
and legal thought as impartiality, neutrality and the rule
of law.
The author begins with a discussion of three
feminist theorists, namely, Iris Young, Elizabeth Spel-
man and Carol Gilligan, each of whom presents a
challenge to traditional legal concepts by calling into
question the soundness of certain assumptions underly-
ing them. The author then explores the work of Anto-
nio Damasio, a neurologist who demonstrates the im-
portance of body and emotion in the process of reason
and judgment; the author uses his findings to support
the feminist call for an “embodied diversity” that em-
braces the often excluded characteristics of desire, af-
fectivity and the body.
This introductory framework provides a basis
from which the author explores ways in which embod-
ied diversity can help us rethink judgment and impar-
tiality. Beginning with the premise that certain failures
of judicial judgment can be linked to failures of affec-
tive response, the author argues that exposure to di-
versity facilitates not only the acceptance of different
perspectives and experiences, that is, the “enlargement
of the mind”, but also the transformation of one’s own
affective responses. It is through diversity that we can
influence the process of judicial deliberation, and begin
to develop a new conception of impartiality that is
based on a commitment to equality. The author ends
this piece by revisiting the notion of universalism, ar-
ticulating the need for a universal claim of equal moral
worth as a necessary starting point from which we must
proceed to the context of our diverse embodied selves.
L’auteure propose une r66valuation de la notion
de diversit6, examinant de fagon critique ses implica-
tions conceptuelles en ce qui concerne les notions tra-
la pens e politique et 16gale de
ditionnelles de
‘occident telles que l’impartialit6, la neutralit6 et la
r~gle de droit.
L’auteure d6bute par l’analyse des travaux de trois
thoriciennes f6ministes: Iris Young, Elizabeth Spel-
man et Carol Gilligan, qui toutes trois remettent en
question les concepts juridiques traditionnels en ques-
tionnant le bien-fond6 de certaines prdmisses. L’auteure
explore ensuite les travaux d’Antonio Damasio, un
neurologue qui tente de d6montrer l’importance du
corps et des dmotions dans le processus de raisonne-
ment et de jugement; ‘auteure s’appuie sur ces recher-
ches pour supporter les revendications des f6ministes
pour une
t6ristiques trop souvent exclues du d6sir, de l’affectivit6
et du corps.
Le cadre
sert de
introductif
fondation A
‘exploration des diff6rentes fa~ons par lesquelles la di-
versit6 incame peut nous aider
repenser notre juge-
ment et notre impartialit6. En partant de la prmisse
voulant que certaines failles du jugement juridique
peuvent 8tre lides a des manquements de la rponse af-
fective, l’auteure soutient que ‘exposition A Ia diversit6
facilite non seulement ‘acceptation de diffrentes ex-
p6riences et perspectives, c’est-A-dire
