THE MCGIL
LAW. JOURNAL
VOLUME 1
SPRING 1953.
NUMBER 2
INTERPRETATION OF VERDICTS
IN CIVIL JURY CASES*
W. C. J. Mereditht
The r6le of judge in a civil jury trial is not an easy one. His knowledge of
the laws of procedure and evidence should be such as to enable him to render
immediate rulings on motions and objections instead of following the easier
course of postponing decisions and accepting evidence under reserve;’ he must
constantly be on guard to prevent the making of remarks or gestures likely to
prejudice the jury; and in delivering his charge he must be careful to give
adequate instructions, at the same time avoiding any direction or comment
that might result in the verdict being set aside.2 In many cases, however, his
most difficult task lies in deciding whether or not the verdict should be
confirmed.
For the purpose of this article it is assumed that there has been an assign-
ment of facts (arts. 424 and 427 C.P.) and that the verdict must accordingly
be “special, explicit and articulated upon each fact submitted” (art. 483 C.P.).
The first matter for consideration, therefore, is the interpretation of article
483.
*In 1952, a Committee of which, this writer’ was a member, was formed by the General
Council of the Provincial Bar to study and report on the avant-projet of the proposed
new Code of Civil Procedure. The avant-projet contains no provision for jury trials,
but the Committee recommended (by a majority) that the right to such trials should be
retained in certain classes of cases, subject to important amendments to simplify the
presently complicated and unsatisfactory pre-trial procedure –
13 R. du B.
pp. 45 et seq.
see (1953)
tW. C. J. Meredith,.Q.C., Dean of the Faculty of Law, McGill University.
1See art. 498(2) C.P.: Boileau v. Boileau et at (1940)
69 K.B. 308, Hall J. at p.
311. This follows from the general rule that questions of law relating to evidence should
be decided in advance in order to prevent illegal evidence going before the jury.- eg.. see
Graham v. Graham (1935) 62 K.B. 381, 382.
2See art. 498(3) C.P.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. I
I
INTERPRETATION op ARTICLE 483 C.P.
As a general rule it is not sufficient for a jury to give a general expression
of opinion; they must indicate in their verdict the fact or facts constituting
the fault or omission alleged. 3 The difficulties experienced by juries in
answering the standard form of questions and in being sufficiently explicit
have freqfiently been subjects of judicial comment.4 In most instances these
difficulties and the serious complications to which they give rise are due to
inadequate instructions on the part of the judge. It is submitted that in all
cases the judge should: (a) di w the jury’s attention to the principal allega-
tions in the pleadings, (b) read and explain the questions, and (c)
stress
the necessity for specific findings based on one or more of the allegatidns in
the pleadings, as distinct from general expressions of opinion. If, notwith-
standing those precautions, the jury should return a verdict not in conformity
with article 483, the instructions should be repeated and the jurors should be
ordered to retire again and to return with specific answers. In the event of
the judge not giving that order suo nwtu, he should be requested to give it
by the attorney whose client’s interests are likely to suffer through the illegality
of the verdict. In one case in the writer’s experience neither attorney was
satisfied with the form of answers and the jury was sent back twice to
reconsider them.5
It is not right, however, to construe article 483 so strictly as to require a
jury to make known its decision in any ‘”sacramental form”. 6 The jurors are
not as a rule versed in legal phraseology and it is for the Court to give an
intelligent effect to their findings and not to apply too meticulous a criticism. T
As E. McDougall J. observed: “A jury must not be held too rigorously to the
niceties (perhaps subtleties) of judicial expression and it is not fair to
submit their verdict to the meticulous and exact scrutiny which would be
accorded to statements delivered by men versed in the law”.8
SDavis v. Julien (1915) 25 K.B. 35; McGivren v. Chars Urbains de Montreal 19 R.L.n.s.
356 (K.B. 1913) ; Colonial Coach Lines Ltd. v. Davies (1937) 64 K.B. 118.
4E.g. in Blair v. Berry (1937) 76 S.C. 189 at p. 191, E. McDougall J. expressed the
opinion that the standard questions put to juries are “unsatisfactory and lead to confusion
and inexactitude”. Rivard J. has suggested that the source of these difficulties might be
avoided by limiting the questions put to the jury to facts purely and simply, as distinct
from questions of mixed fact and law. – Manuel de la Cour d’Appel (1941), p. 75.
5Friend v. C.P.R. S.C. No. 255084 Feb. 1950, Casgrain J. (unreported). The jury
returned a verdict of common fault but in the first two instances the findings were insuf-
ficiently explicit as to the faults found against each of the parties.
6Temple v. Montreal Tramways Co. (1915) 47 S.C. 121.
7Montreal Tramways Co. v. Ycrvant [1936] 3 D.L.R. 241 (S.C.C.); Grinnell Co. of
Can. et al v. Warren [1937] S.C.R. 353; Toronto Transportation Commission v. Rosenbcrg
[1950] 4 D.L.R. 449, 454 (S.C.C.).
SBlair v. Berry op. cit. at p. 191.
19531
INTERPRETATION OF VERDICTS
Moreover, the rule that the verdict must be special, explicit and articul-
ated may be subject to an important exception in cases where a legal
presumption is applicable. For example, in a running-down case9 in which
an injured pedestrian claimed damages from the driver of an automobile.
the jury, in answer to the usual question as to common fault, replied: “Yes.
the plaintiff did not pay proper attention to the traffic, and the defendant
showed lack of judgment and care when he first observed the plaintiff”.
Although such an answer (insofar as it related to the defendant) probably
was insufficiently explicit within the meaning of article 483, the trial judge
maintained the verdict, holding that it was clear from the finding of common
fault that the jury had not exonerated the defendant and, therefore, that
the presumption under section 53(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act had not
been rebutted-.10 In another somewhat similar case a jury found that an
accident was “not due exclusively to the fault of the defendant” but was
“due exclusively to the fault of the plaintiff” without stating it what that
fault consisted. Greenshields C.J. held that such a finding did not satisfy the
requirements of article 483, but -his judgment was reversed on appeal.
Barclay J. expressed the opinion that all the jury had to do was “to decide
whether the defendant had rebutted the presumption”, and that it was clear
from their answers that they had exonerated him from any fault.”
II
VERDICTS FAILING TO ESTABLISH FAULT IN LAW
Juries sometimes return verdicts by which they find a party responsible
because of some act or omission which is not a fault in law, or, if a fault in
law, is not relevant to the case. In neither event should the verdict be
confirmed.12 For example, when a jury found a defendant partly responsible
for an automobile accident for having with him in his car “two infants of
tender years who must have required some of the attention he would other-
wise have been able to give to his driving”, it was held that this was “not
in law a fault at all, and is not proved to have in any degree caused the
accident.”’13
9Blair v. Berry op. cit.
IoRS.Q. 1941, c. 142.
“1Sloan v. Fraid [1943] K.B. 91, reversing (1941) 79 S.C. 346.
12Here it is assumed that (as usually happens) the case has been allowed to go to the
jury. As to motions for non-suit see footnote No 19 infra. The omission of a defendant
to make such a motion at the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence does not preclude him from
later attacking the verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence.
“3Darling v. Emery 60 S.C. 509 (C.R. 1921) ; see also Bouillon v. Poir (1937) 63
K.B. 1; Grand Trunk Rly v. Labreche (1922) 64 SC.R. 15; Decarie v. Patenaude (1927)
30 Q.P.R. 188; Littley et a! v. Brooks et at [1920] S.C.R. 416, 421.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. I
In C.N.R. v. Lancia14 respondent’s son, aged nine (who admittedly
was a trespasser) boarded a freight train. The train started to move and
while the boy was still holding on to one of the cars the appellant’s employee
in the caboose of the train shouted to him to get off. The boy jumped and was
injured. In an action for damages against the railway company, the jury
found that the accident was due both to the fault of the boy because he had
no business on the train, and to the fault of the appellant’s employee for
shouting, ‘and returned a verdict holding each 50% at fault. The appellant
moved to set aside that verdict on the ground that the fault against the
appellant as determined by the jury was not a fault in law in the circum-
stances of the case. 15 The trial judge dismissed that motion and his judgment
confirming the verdict was affirmed by a four to one majority in the,Court
of King’s Bench. The Company then successfully appealed to the Supreme
Court which held that the trial judge should have rejected the verdict and
dismissed the action with costs. Rinfret CJ. stated in part (at pp. 186487) :
.
It is clear .
. that when the jury was asked to decide the fault that caused the
accident that was putting a question of mixed law and fact. Notwithstanding the form
of the question, it cannot detract from the principle laid down in article 475 of the
Code of civil procedure, nor from the well-established principle that the jury’s verdict
must be limited to the finding of facts and that the law is exclusively the domain of
the courts.
With respect, it was, therefore, the duty of the presiding judge and of the learned
judges forming the majority in the Court of King’s Bench (Appeal Side) to accept
the verdict of the jury in the present case as a finding of fact that Tremblay had
shouted and perhaps also that such shouting was one of the causes of the accident,
the other cause being, as found by the jury, that “the boy had no business on the
train”. The result of the jury finding was that the boy was a trespasser and, in its
opinion, the shouting at the boy was a contributory cause of the accident.
It remained, however, for the Courts to decide whether, in the circumstances,
the mere shouting, as found by the jury, amounted to a fault in law, or, in the
language of the Civil Code (article 1053) amounted to a fault or “offence” within
the four corners of that section of the law.
It can be seen, from the review I have made of all the judgments of the learned
judges both in the Superior Court and in the Court of King’s Bench, that not only
was the shouting of Tremblay not an offence or fault in the circumstances, but,
moreover, it was not a contributory cause of the accident of which the boy, Lancia,
was a victim.
III
VERDICTS “AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EvIDENCE”
Although a jury’s findings may conform with article 483, and although they
may specify a fault in law, a trial judge may be confronted with a difficult
situation when the verdict appears to him to be against the weight of evidence.
14[1949] S.C.R. 177, reversing [1948] K.B. 156.
25i.e. by motion for judgment von obstante veredicto under art. 491 C.P.
1953]
INTERPRETATION OF VERDICTS
In such cases it is submitted that he should place himself in the position of a
court of appeal, bearing in mind that a verdict should be read with arid
construed in the light of the issues presented by the pleadings, the evidence
and his charge to the jury, 6 and applying the rules set out in articles 498(4).
501 and 508(3) C.P.
Article 498(4) provides for a new trial when the verdict is clearly against
the weight of evidence, but to be so construed it must be one which the jury,
viewing the whole of the evidence, could not reasonably find.’ 7 Article 508
makes provision for a different judgment, in whole or in part, when “it is
absolutely clear from all the evidence that no jury would be justified in finding
any verdict other than one in favour of the appellant”. These rules have been
the source of a good deal of jurisprudence, the general principles of which
may be summarized briefly as follows:
In the first place, a judge should never lose sight of the basic rule that while
he is master of the law, the jurors are masters of the facts’ (a rule which
applies not only in considering the verdict but throughout the trial). 19 It
follows that it is for the jury to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and
when there are conflicting versions to decide which version is the right one,
and neither the trial judge nor the court of appeal should substitute their
opinion on such matters for that of a jury.20 The test to be applied is not
‘6Montreal Tramways Co. v. Yervant op. cit. at p. 243; Grand Trunk Rly. v. Mayne
(1917) 56 S.C.R. 95, 97; Montreal Tramways Co. v. Lindner [1939] S.C.R. 405, 407:
B. C. Electric Co. v. Dunphy [1920] 50 D.L.R. 264, 268 (S-C.C.)
17Art. 501 C.P.
18Arts. 474, 475, C.P.
19Art. 469 C.P. provides that whenever the trial judge is of the opinion that the
plaintiff has given no evidence upon which the jury could find a verdict, he may dismiss
the action on a motion for non-suit, e.g. Volkert v. Diamond Truck Co. (1939) 66 K.B.
385. However, the trial judge should not maintain such a motion except in very clear
cases, remembering always that it would be a serious inroad on the province of the jury if,
in a case where there are facts from which negligence may reasonably be inferred, the
judge were to withdraw the case from the jury because in his opinion negligence ought
not to be inferred. On the other hand, if a jury were at liberty to hold that negligence
might be inferred from any state of facts, it would place in their hands “a power which
might be exercised in the most arbitrary manner” – Metropolitan Rly Co. v. Jackson
[1877] 3 A.C. 193, 197 cited by Rinfret J. (now C.J.) in Littley et al v. Brooks ct al
op. cit. at p. 421.
20The accepted rule was well summarized by Rivard J. in Kearns v. Montreal
“Le jury est le maitre des
Tramways Co. (1931) 50 K.B. 340 at pp. 344-5 as follows: –
faits; il est libre de juger comme il l’entend, non seulement de la crgdibilit6 des timoins,
mais aussi de la foi qu’il convient d’accorder .telle partie de leur d6position ou A telle
autre. Quand il s’agit, comme dans l’esplce, de croire un tgmoin plut6t qu’un autre, de
juger des circonstance.s et d’apprgeier divers 6lments de preuve qui tous mgritent consi-
dgration, le juge prgsidant au proc~s ne peut pas plus qu’une cour d’appel modifier le
le
verdict et substituer sa propre opinion A celle des jurgs. Ii en serait autrement si
verdict n’6tait pas fond6 en droit ou si vraiment il ne pouvait raisonnablement s’appuyer sur
aucune preuve lgale.”
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. I
whether the verdict appears to the Court to be right, but whether the jury as
reasonable men could have reached such a conclusion.2 ‘
The difficulty of applying this test in practice and of knowing when and
where to draw the line is apparent from the many judgments that have been
reversed in appeal..2 2 An important ruling on the point was laid down by the
Supreme Court in Laporte v. C.P.R.*23 a level crossing accident case in
which the principal question for decision was whether a signal given by the
locomotive engineer was the usual signal given at the whistling post or
whether it was an alarm signal given only at the moment of. impact. The
jury’s verdict, accepting the latter version and finding the railway company
responsible, was confirmed by the trial judge, but was set aside by the Court
of King’s Bench. The plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court which
restored the original judgment and reiterated the rule that unless a’jury’s
findings are “clearly such that no reasonable men could reach, they are final
and conclusive and should not be interfered with by any court of appeal”.
Referring to that rule Idington J. said (p. 279) :
A jury has not only a perfect right but an absolute duty to believe and accept one
part of a witness’s statement and discard anuther part thereof which it does not
believe.
The effect of that ruling is evident from subsequent trial court decisions
in which it has been cited as the reason for confirming verdicts with which
the judges personally disagreed. A typical example is Landry v. Montreal
Tramwa.ys Co.2 4 in which the only point in issue was whether the jury was
justified in awarding the plaintiff $1,500 for permanent disability in addition
to other damages which the defendant did not contest. Four doctors, two of
them appearing for plaintiff, testified that there would be no disability. A
fifth doctor, called by the plaintiff, while expressing no definite opinion, said
that he thought the plaintiff’s condition “might perhaps improve”, but nowhere
in the record was there any evidence that the plaintiff would suffer future
a fact commented upon by the trial, judge in his address to the
incapacity –
21E.g. McConnell v. McLean [1937] 2 D.L.R. 639 (S.C.C.); C.N.R. v. Muller [1934]
1 D.L.R. 768 (S.C.C.); Winnipeg Electric Co. v. Geel [1932] A.C. 690; Valile v. The
Shedden Forwarding Co., 40 S.C. 454 (C.R. 1911) ; Hutcheon v. Storey [1935] S.C.R.
677.
22E.g. Thibodeau v. Provincial Transport Co. et al [1947] K.B. 116, in which Tyndale J.
(later A.C.J.) set aside the verdict on the ground that is was “absolutely clear from all
the evidence that no jury would be justified in finding any verdict other than one in
favour ‘of the said defendants!’. This decision was reversed by a majority judgment in
appeal which held that while the evidence was conflicting it could reasonably justify the
62 K.B. 402; Kearns v.
verdict. See also McGillivray v. City of Montreal (1937)
Montreal Tramways Co. op. cit., and other cases referred to in this article.
2311924] S.C.R. 278.
24S.C. No. 231360 Tyndale A.C.J. 23rd May 1945; K.B. No. 2922, 26th June 1946,
affirmed by S.C.C. 18th November 1946 (unreported).
INTERPR2TATION OF VERDICTS
1953]
jury. Notwithstanding this, nine of the twelve jurors apparently seized upon
the inconclusive evidence of the fifth doctor as a ground for awarding the
damages above mentioned.24 a In confirming the verdict the trial judge stated
that while it was against the weight of evidence “in the ordinary sense” he was
“not prepared in view of the principle laid down in Laporte v. C.P.R. to
declare that it was one which the jury, viewing the whole evidence; could not
reasonably find”. His decision was upheld by a majority judgment of the
Court of King’s Bench and later-uiianim6usly by ‘the Supreme Court, both
appellate tribunals holding that the jurors were entitled to form their own
conclusioris on the medical evidence.
The problem of deciding whether the quantum of an award is sufficient
or otherwise,2 5 is complicated by the fact that a jury may determine the total
amount of damages sustained by a plaintiff and is not as i- rule required to
specify the amounts- awarded on each item of damage?8 The Code of Procedure
contains special rules on this question; article 502 providing for a new trial
when the amount awarded is “so grossly excessive or insufficient that it is
evident that the jurors have been influenced by improper motives or led into
error”. The next two articles, 503 and 504, do not go so far and make no
mention of improper motives or error 7 They provide that if the amount
awarded is either grossly excessive or grossly insufficient, the court may refuse
a new trial, provided that the plaintiff agrees in the one case that it be reduced
to an amount which the court considers not excessive, and in the other case
that the defendant agrees to its being increased to an amount which the court
considers not insufficient. While these provisions have been applied in numer-
ous cases,2 8 they necessarily involve setting aside the verdict and are therefore
subject to the general rule as to interference with a jury’s conclusions.29
24aThe agreement of nine of the twelve jurors is sufficient to return a verdict (art. 480
C.P.).
25This difficulty was discussed by Gallipeault J. (now C.J.)
in City of Montreal v.
Michaels (1930) 49 KB. 481 at pp. 486-7.
26Merry v. Montreal Tramways Co. 53 S.C. 226 (C.R. 1917). In the Londry case,
however, (since the defendant had admitted certain items of damage) it was possible by
simple process of elimination to determine the amount awarded for permanent disability.
27See Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin (1917) 26 K.B. 467 at p. 475.
Unlike art. 502, arts. 503 and 504 C.P. are not to be found in the old Code of Procedure.
Art. 503 was taken from the rule laid down by the English Court of Appeal in Belt v.
Lawes, L.R. [1884] 12 Q.B.D. 356.
28E.g. Laurin v. Noil [1952] K-B. 161 –
$4,939.40 award reduced to $2,755.61;
$12,000 award reduced to
Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin, op. cit. –
$6,000; City of Montreal v. Michaels, op. cit. $12,950 award reduced. to $6,770.73;
$8,000 award increased to $24,508.68;
Sevigny v. Bourdon, (1932) 40 R.L. n.s. 925 –
Marquis v. Fortin (1933) 36 Q.P.R. 196 and Patenaude v. Newsam (1934) 38 Q.P.R.
143 in-both of which cases awards were increased because it was evident that the jury had
not taken all the items of damage into consideration.
29E.g. Warren v. Gray Goose Stage Ltd. [1938] 1 D.L.R. 104 (S.C.C.); C.P.R. v.
Lachance (1909) 42 S.C.R. 205, and see cases cited under footnote No. 21 supra. The
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. I
But obviously there are limits beyond which no trial judge or appeal court
should go in confirming a jury’s findings. Otherwise the relevant articles
of the code would be meaningless and a jury’s verdict would be final. Thus
Rivard J. in his Manuel de la Cour d’Appel,30 wrote:
Le respect dfi au verdict ne va donc pas jusqu’i exiger qu’on maintienne celui qui
ne trouve pas d’appui dans le dossier, qui ne pourrait s’expliquer que par ]a constata-
tion de faits qui ne sont pas rivl6s, ou qui serait le risultat d’une erreur de principe
ou de logique.
There is no doubt that in their efforts to comply with the ruling in Laporte
v. C.P.R. some judges have exceeded reasonable limits and have confirmed
verdicts which should have been rejected. In Vineberg v. Larocque et. al,31
for instance, the jury found the defendants 65.5% to blame for a fatal accident
to the plaintiff’s husband and fixed the total damages sustained by her and
her four children at $23,581.05. In confirming the verdict the trial judge
stated:
f
In the present case, it may be possible to find some evidence in the record upon
which twelve reasonable men might, without improper motives, reach the decision
which the jury did in this case; although the undersigned has not been able to dis-
cover any such evidence.
In these circumstances, although the undersigned considers that the confirmation
of the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice, he is not prepared to take the
responsibility, as one judge alone, of setting aside the unanimous decision of twelve
jurors.
The trial court judgment was reversed unanimously by the Court of King’s
Bench which found no evidence of fault on the part of either defendant and
dismissed the action with costs. Pratte J., after referring to the general rule
in McCannell v. McLean,32 commented (page 6):
Mais le respect dfi au verdict ne va pas jusqu’a rendre celui-ci intangible; il ne
commande pas au juge du procs, non plus qu’A ceux d’appel, de confirmer ce qui leur
apparait clairement ktre un dini de justice.
In the same case Bissonnette J. stated (page 12):
Dans la prisente esplce, convaincu comme il l’6tait qu’tn jugement, autre que celui
que les d6fendeurs devaient obtenir, serait un d~ni de justice, il lui appartenait, et
je le dis avec le plus grand respect, d’exercer ce pouvoir de casser le verdict et de re-
jeter ‘action. Et toute r gle traditionnelle ou jurisprudentielle ne peut recevoir un
sens &endu au point de rendre inefficaces comme inexistantes des dispositions expres-
ses du Code.
rule is of particular importance in a second court of appeal (S.C.C.) when the first court
of appeal (K.B.) has affirmed the judgment confirming the verdict – Montreal Train-
ways Co. v. Lindner, op. cit. at p. 407.
30(1941) No. 142, p. 81; see also Curley v. Latreille (1920) 60 S.C.R. 131, 178.
31[1950] K.B. 1.
32op. cit.
1953]
INTERPRETATION OF VERDICTS
Bordeleau v. Bouchard et a133 is a recent example of the setting aside of a
verdict by a trial judge because, in his opinion, it was clearly against the weight
of evidence. The jury had found the defendants jointly and severally respons-
ible for the death of the plaintiff’s husband in an automobile accident and had
assessed the damages at $6,000. Brossard J. held that the husband should also
have been found at fault to the extent of 25% and rendered judgment for
$4,500.
In Laurin v. Noel3 4 the Court of King’s Bench set aside a verdict on the
ground that the damages assessed by the jury were grossly excessive. The
trial judge had confirmed a verdict awarding the plaintiff, a widow, $4,939.40
as damages for the death of her 18-year-old son. The plaintiff was 61 years
of age and had six other children, four of whom were gainfully employed and
able to contribute to her support. The appeal court concluded that the jury
had overlooked the fact that the deceased was only one of seven children and
ordered a new trial failing agreement by the plaintiff to accept $2,755.61. 35
When it is recalled that the presence or absence of evidence sufficient to
support the finding of a jury as reasonable men is a matter on which different
minds may well come to opposite conclusions, the difficulty facing a trial judge
is obvious. It is submitted, however, that he should never lose sight of the
provisions of the Code which exist for a definite purpose, and that the ruling
in the Laporte case should not be interpreted as meaning that a jury’s verdict
must stand no matter how unreasonable it may appear in the light of the
evidence. The situation was summed up by Lord Atkinson in the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in C.P.R. v. Fr&hette36 when he referred to
the general reluctance of the Board to disturb a jury’s findings. At the same
time he pointed out that if, after careful consideration of the evidence, the
Board “comes to the conclusion that the verdict of a jury cannot be sustained,
no course is open to it but to set that verdict aside”., 7 And he concluded that
“any other course would amount to a judicial wrong, the punishment of a
litigant for something for which he has not been proved to be answerable”.
Unfortunately the latter part of Lord Atkinson’s statement is sometimes
overlooked.
3ss.c. No. 292289, 27th February 1953 (unreported at date of writing).
34op. cit. The appeal was solely on the question of quantum. The jury found that the
deceased was 35% responsible for the accident and fixed the damages at $7,000 et les frais.
The judge gave judgment for 65% of $7,000 plus 389.40 representing disbursements,
making a total of $4,939.40. A jury has no business with the costs, but has a right to de-
clare that disbursements will form part of the daniages. The Appeal Court held that frais
must be taken to mean the disbursements, but pointed out that the judge was wrong in
awarding 100% of those disbursements since the jury had found the victim partly to blame
for the accident.
S5Art. 503 C.P.
36[1915] A.C. 871, 881.
37See also Mechanical & Gen. Inventions Co. Ltd. et a[ v. Austin et at, [1935] A.C.
346, 347; Banbury v. Bank of Montreal [1918] A.C. 626.
