McGILL LAW JOURNAL
Number 1
Volume 19
Montreal
1973
Is There a Right Against Self-Incrimination in Canada?*
Ed Ratushny**
Introduction
One of the leading Canadian scholars in the area of criminal
procedure and evidence recently said of the “privilege against self-
incrimination”: 1
Like all legal clichds, this, too, tends to be highly misleading… Perhaps
no phrase has been bandied about with more imprecision and with more
unawareness of its legal and social significance … unless perhaps it be
the phrase that everyone is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty.2
The presumption of innocence is at least expressly included in our
Criminal Code.3 But nowhere is there statutory recognition of
* This article is based on research and writing submitted in partial satis-
faction of the doctoral degree requirements at the University of Michigan.
The writer wishes to express his gratitude to his supervisor, Professor Paul
G. Kauper, and to Professors Kamisar and Estep for their comments and
suggestions in connection with the general research and writing.
** B.A., LL.B. (Sask), LL.M. (London), LL.M. (Michigan); of the Faculty of
Law, University of Windsor.
I The term “self-incrimination” seems to have been the earliest form used
at common law and thrust into prominence in the United States. More recently
in Canada, “self-crimination” seems to be more widely used, probably because
of the form adopted by the Canadian Bill of Rights, 8-9 Eliz. II, S.C. 1960, c.
44; R.S.C. 1970, App. III, which is discussed infra, at pp. 67 et seq. The terms
are used interchangeably throughout this article.
2 Alan W. Mewett, Law Enforcement and the Conflict of Values, (1970) 16
McGiU LJ. 1, at pp. 6-7. Reprinted: (1969-70) 12 Crim. L.Q. 179, at pp. 185-86.
3 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34:
Section 5(1):
Where an enactment creates an offence and authorizes a punishment to
be imposed in respect thereof,
(a) a person shall be deemed not to be guilty until he is convicted
thereof;
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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any general right or privilege against self-incrimination as such.4
Yet, there are countless references to such a right or privilege
not only in the Canadian journals and law reviews but also in the
cases. In its broad study of criminal procedure and corrections,
the Ouimet Commission said of it simply that:
… it appears to the Committee that the privilege against self-incrimination
is deeply involved in the feeling of justice or fairness with which contem-
porary Canadian society reacts to our criminal process.5
That reference is in many ways typical.
There is a suggestion that great consequences flow from the
privilege, yet its precise significance is not explained. Rather, that
significance is assumed. Such assumptions seem to have been made
so often that the refeiences take on the character of generalities
spoken without understanding, but without fear of contradiction
because of the absence of any clearer understanding on the part
of the audience. With every reference and tacit concurrence the
difficulty of challenging the assumptions increases.
What does the right or privilege against self-incrimination mean
in Canada today? Does such a right really exist at all? In other
words, is there any general principle in Canadian law which says
that a man need not incriminate himself? 6
There are certainly a number of specific rules both at the trial
and pre-trial stages which seem to reflect such a principle. For
example, there is the rule that an admission of a suspect or an
4The Canadian Bill of Rights, op. cit., is not considered here because it is
not a statute comme les autres. The effect of the Bill is discussed infra, at pp.
67 et seq. Generally speaking, its effect has been limited and depends upon
the nature of the so-called “right” or “privilege”, as accepted by the cases
prior to its enactment.
5Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections. Toward Unity: Criminal
Justice and Corrections, (Queen’s Printer, Ottawa: 1969), at p. 54.
6 The inquiry here does not extend to the consequences of the common law
principle in civil proceedings. It may still be applicable in a limited number
of situations, but has largely been replaced by statutory provisions. For
example, Professor Julien D. Payne has pointed out:
It seems that the right to be protected against questions tending to show
adultery exists independently of statutes or rules of court, but it is now
governed and limited by express enactment in all of the Canadian common-
law provinces:
(1968) 2 Ottawa L.R. 461, at p. 461.
The courts have also considered whether the Evidence Acts apply to a party
being examined for discovery or whether the common law position prevails.
In this regard, see: Bell v. Montreal Trust Co., (1957) 6 D.L.R. (2d) 589
(B.C.C.A.); Klein v. Bell, [1955] S.C.R. 309; Bank of Nova Scotia v. MacBrien,
[1953] O.W.N. 406 (Ont. H.C.).
1973]
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
accused to a person in authority may not be introduced in evidence
unless it has been shown to have been made voluntarily on the
part of the accused. Another example is the rule that an accused
person may not be called by the Crown as a witness at his own trial.
The totality of these and other rules could be said to constitute
a general principle or right against self-incrimination. But the
usefulness of such an observation is very .limited. If the general
principle is merely a way of describing a collection of specific
rules with a variety of independent origins it has no functional
capacity in itself. In other words, the law is to be found in the
specific rule of evidence or procedure and cannot be deduced
directly from the general principle.
The important question, then, is whether there is any general
principle against self-incrimination which is functional rather than
merely descriptive. If it is functional, then it is possible to have
a situation where no specific rule of evidence or criminal procedure
is applicable, yet where the general principle could be applied to
achieve a particular result. In other words, legal consequences
would flow from the principle itself. It would be something more
than the collectivity of previously existing rules.
The effect of such a result would, of course, be to create a new
rule or extend an existing one. However, the rule or extension thus
born would have been deduced directly from the general principle,
so that the approach would be in contrast to the usual common
law approach within a framework of stare decisis.
It is not possible or even appropriate to attempt to describe
the latter process here. Whatever is involved, the approach is clearly
not to say, for example: “There is a principle that a man need
not incriminate himself. To allow this procedure would offend that
principle. Therefore this procedure is not allowed.”
It may also be argued that while the principle may not be
applied as such, it is so strong an underlying policy basis as to
bring about the same result in the clothing of stare decisis. For the
purposes of this inquiry, such a result would be treated as an
application of the general principle.
Finally, it might be said that the existence of the principle is to
be found not in its functional operation today, but in the fact that
it was the driving force which resulted in the creation of the
statutory provisions and the now crystallized common law rules of
which examples were given earlier. It is submitted that such a
suggestion recognizes that a general right once existed but no
longer does. The inquiry here is limited to the present state of the
law in Canada.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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To put the matter another way, where there is no specific
statutory provision or established common law rule, can defense
counsel ever invoke a general principle that a man need not incri-
minate himself and thereby achieve a specific result for his client
in a particular case? 7
In the course of the inquiry as to the functional operation of the
concept, there should also emerge incidentally an impression as to
the extent to which the concept is an accurate description of our
system. In other words, quite apart from any operational effect,
can we say that the specific laws and procedures which in fact exist
in Canada consistently protect individuals against self-incrimination?
If they do that to a considerable extent, it may be useful to use
the concept of a right against self-incrimination as descriptive of
our system. On the other hand, the extent to which examples of
such laws and procedures might be found to be incompatible with
the concept would, to that degree, derogate from and eventually
eliminate the usefulness of the concept even as descriptive of the
collectivity of existing procedures.
1. Physical Evidence and Pre-Trial Statements
In recent years, there have been a number of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada dealing with questions related to state-
ments made by an accused prior to trial. Some of the judgments
clearly seem to treat the self-incrimination concept as having a
functional aspect of its own. At the very least, the concept seems to
be recognized as having a cybernetic nature in the sense of being
something more than the specific rules, if not independent of them.
It is submitted, however, that such suggestions in no way form the
ratio decidendi of the decisions. Rather, the decisions must be taken
to have finally obliterated any optimism which may have previously
existed about the application of a general principle against self-
incrimination in the area of pre-trial statements made by an accused.
In R. v. Wray,’ the accused confessed to the police after a lengthy
interrogation. He then led them to a swamp and showed them
7In addition to “right against self-incrimination” and “privilege against
self-incrimination”, other phrases that have been used include “the right to
remain silent”, “nemo tenetur seipsum prodere”, and “nemo tenetur seipsurn
accusare”. For the purposes of this article, they will be used interchangeably.
In R. v. Corning Glass Works of Canada, (1970) 16 C.R.N.S. 329 (Ont. C.A.),
Arnup, JA., delivering the judgment of the Court, pointed out (at p. 331) that
the distinction between nemo … prodere and nemo … accusare has “ceased
to have any real significance”.
8 [1971] S.C.R. 272.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
exactly where the murder weapon was hidden. The confession was
held to be inadmissible under the voluntariness rule, but the facts
leading to the discovery of the rifle, and such parts of the confession
as were confirmed to be true by the discovery, were held to be
admissible in evidence.
If the voluntariness rule which excludes certain evidence at trial
is based on a more general principle or policy against self-incrimi-
nation, one would have expected a rather different result in Wray.
The admissible portions of the statement were incriminating as was
the evidence discovered as the result of it. All of these incriminating
pieces of evidence were revealed directly as the result of pressures
brought to bear upon the accused for that very purpose.
However, the decision of the majority clearly indicates that the
overriding consideration was the relevance and reliability of the
evidence. In the two majority judgments, 9 there is no reference,
either express or implied, to “self-incrimination”.
Mr. Justice Spence dissented on the basis that the trial judge has
a discretion to exclude relevant and reliable evidence if it would
bring “the administration of justice into disrepute”. In the latter
phrase, he seems to be referring to the potential disrespect for the
system which would result from admitting the evidence and thereby
failing to express disapproval of improper police behaviour. He
added:
… it would not only have brought the administration of justice into
disrepute but it would have been a startling disregard of the principle of
British criminal law, nemo tenetur seipsum accusare. Surely no authority
need be stated to establish that as the most basic principle in our criminal
law.10
The majority was obviously not at all startled.
Mr. Justice Cartwright, another dissenter,” was not so sure.
Early in his judgment he pointed out that if a principle against
self-incrimination forms part of the basis of the voluntariness rule,
9 Martland, J. (Fauteux, Abbott, Ritchie and Pigeon, JI. concurring) and
Judson, J. (Fauteux and Abbott, J., also concurring with him).
10 [1971] S.C.R. 272, at p. 305.
“The
third dissenter was Mr. Justice Hall who held that a trial judge did
have a discretion to reject admissible evidence in certain circumstances. He
relates the discretion to the accused’s “constitutional right to a fair trial”. It
is difficult to disagree with the majority that the admissibility of such evidence
has very little to do with fairness at trial. Rather, it involves the fairness of
police methods of obtaining evidence at the pre-trial stage. Hall, J. may be
suggesting that pre-trial procedures cannot be separated from fairness at trial,
since generally they are ultimately directed to that stage. However, the
authorities discussed infra, at pp. 7 et seq., indicate that the majority was
more correct in law.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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then mere relevance or reliability is not sufficient to determine
admissibility. He said:
If .. the exclusion of an involuntary confession is based also on the
maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare the truth or falsity of the con-
fession does become logically irrelevant. It would indeed be a strange
result if, it being the law that no accused is bound to incriminate himself
and that he is to be protected from having to testify at an inquest, a
preliminary hearing or a trial, be could none the less be forced by the
police or others in authority to make a statement which could then be
given in evidence against him. The result which would seem to follow
if the exclusion is based on the maxim would be that the involuntary
confession even if verified by subsequently discovered evidence could not
be referred to in any way.’2
The Chief Justice went on to decide that the portions of the con-
fession which were verified were admissible, but that the trial judge
had a discretion to exclude them, along the lines suggested by Spence,
J., and that an appeal court should not interfere with an exercise of
that discretion.
On the basis of the last sentence of the quoted passage and his
conclusion that verified portions of the confession were admissible,
it seems clear that Cartwright, C.J. rejected the suggestion that any
principle against self-incrimination applied to statements made by
an accused prior to trial.
The Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in
Pichg v. The Queen 3 on the same day as the Wray decision. In
Pich, the Court decided that the voluntariness requirements had to
be satisfied to establish the admissibility of any admission by an
accused, even if it might generally be described as exculpatory rather
than inculpatory. Both types of statements could be said to be “in-
criminating” in the general sense of being harmful to the accused.
Thus, one might have expected at least some reference to a general
principle against self-incrimination if it had any relevance at all to
pre-trial statements.
However, the majority 14 dealt with the matter simply by pointing
out that the distinction between exculpatory and inculpatory state-
ments was not supportable on the early authorities which formulated
the voluntariness rule. Chief Justice Cartwright (Spence, 3. con-
curring) agreed with the majority and stressed the illogicity of the
“exculpatory-inculpatory” distinction. However, he also added:
If, on the other hand, one regards the rule against the admission of an
involuntary statement as being based in part on the maxim, nemo tenetur
12 [1971] S.C.R. 272, at p. 280.
‘3 [1971] S.C.R. 23.
‘ 4 Hall, J. (Abbott, Martland, Ritchie, Spence, and Pigeon, JJ. concurring).
19731
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
seipsum accusare, the right of an accused to remain silent is equally
violated whether, when he is coerced into making a statement against his
will, what he says is on its face inculpatory or exculpatory.15
He does not offer any support for the suggestion that the rule in
Pichg should be based on the maxim. In view of his judgment in
Wray and the alternative manner in which he makes the reference,
it is difficult to take it very seriously.
Another of the judgments worth considering in this context is the
dissenting opinion of Laskin, J.A., as he then was, in the decision
in DeClercq v. The Queen,16 since he is now, of course, a member of
the Supreme Court of Canada. In considering the nature of the vol-
untariness rule with regard to pre-trial statements made by an
accused, he said:
Although the basis of the exclusion of confessions improperly extracted
from an accused has not hitherto been regarded, at least in our cases,
as based on the privilege against self-crimination, there is the respected
opinion of Dixon, I., as he then was, of the High Court of Australia in
McDermott v. The King (1948) 76 C.L.R. 501 at p. 513, that the rules
respecting confessions and the privilege against self-crimination are
related.’ 7
Thus, he clearly recognizes that in Canada the voluntariness require-
ments for the admissibility of confessions are not based on any
policy against self-incrimination.’ 8 The Australian judgment has had
no effect in Canada and it is difficult to envision it as having any
future influence.
There is no reference in Wray, Pichg or DeClercq to the earlier
Supreme Court of Canada decision in A.-G. Que. v. Begin.9 The issue
in that case was the admissibility of a blood test which was taken
without compliance with the voluntariness rule. The Court was
unanimous in holding that the factor governing the admissibility
of the blood samples in question was simply their relevance and not
the manner in which they were obtained. Thus, blood samples taken
from an accused would be admissible even though they had been
15 [1971] S.C.R. 23, at p. 26.
16 [1966] 2 C.C.C. 190 (Ont. C.A.).
17 Ibid., at p. 194.
18The weight of authority in Canada indicates that the underlying policy
concern of the voluntariness rule is the reliability of the evidence in question.
See: E. J. Ratushny, Unravelling Confessions, (1970-71) 13 Crim. L.Q. 453, at
pp. 474-79.
1′ [1955] S.C.R. 593. Followed in: Validity of Section 92(4) of the Vehicles
Act, 1957 (Sask.), [1958] S.C.R. 608. See also the comment by Barry L. Strayer,
(1958) 36 Can. Bar Rev. 265.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 19, No. I
taken by force without the consent of the accused.20 The ratio
decidendi was, therefore, that physical evidence taken from an
accused’s person was to be treated as any other physical evidence.2′
However, all of the judges sitting also agreed that the privilege
against self-incrimination had no application to statements made by
an accused prior to trial. Kerwin, C.J. pointed out that
… a confusion has arisen between the rules as to the admissibility of
statements, or admissions, and those relating to self-incrimination. 2
Fauteux, J. stated:
La source du conflit, dans la jurisprudence canadienne, parait procdder
d’une m6prise… sur la raison et l’objet de la r~gle excluant les aveux
extrajudiciaires de l’accus6 et la raison et l’objet de la maxime nemo
tenetur seipsum accusare, assurant h une personne contrainte par la loi
de repondre h des questions, le privilege de faire l’objection qui aura pour
effet d’emp~cher que la rdponse donnde ne soit utilis6e contre elle.23
He went on to include in the second category not only the privilege
of a witness to prevent his testimony being used against him in
future proceedings 2 but also the privilege of an accused not to
testify at all25
20 Furthermore in light of the Wray case, there would not exist any discre-
tion to exclude the evidence on the basis of the methods used to obtain it:
supra, at p. 5.
21 One would have expected that if the concept of self-incrimination had any
existence at all, it would at the very least operate to prevent the courts from
recognizing, in any way, evidence obtained through a personal assault. Yet,
as Kerwin, CJ. put it:
It was stated in that case [Kuruma v. The Queen, [1955] A.C. 197, at p.
203 (P.C.)] and, I repeat, ‘we are not now concerned with whether an
action for assault would lie against the police officers…’:
[1955] S.C.R.
593, at p. 596.
Thus, no matter how undignified or repulsive police methods might be in
taking samples of breath, blood, hair, fingerprints or even stomach contents,
the evidence obtained would be admissible. See also: R. v. Johnston, [1965]
3 C.C.C. 42, where the Manitoba Court of Appeal held that psychiatric evidence
obtained through interviews fell within the scope of Begin rather than the
voluntariness rule.
22 [1955] S.C.R. 593, at p. 596. Kerwin, C.7. gave judgment for himself and for
Abbott, J. On this point, see also: R. v. Mazerall, [1946] 4 D.L.R. 336 (Ont.
H.C.) and [1946] 4 D.L.R. 791 (C.A.); R. v. Lunan, (1947)
3 C.R. 56 (Ont.
C.A.); Boyer v. The King, (1948) 7 C.R. 165 (Que. C.A.).
23 [1955] S.C.R. 593, at p. 600. Fauteux, J. gave judgment for himself and
Taschereau, J. Cartwright, J., as he then was, agreed with the conclusions and
the reasons given in this judgment.
24 Embodied in the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10, and discussed
infra, at pp. 50 et seq.
“privilege-rule”:
25 [1955] S.C.R. 593, at p. 601, speaking of the “confession-rule” and the
Et par application de ces rlgles, les aveux extra-judiciaires de l’accus6,
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
In the light of these straightforward statements representing all
five members of the Supreme Court, it is difficult to see the basis
upon which judges can continue to suggest that the concept of self-
incrimination has any application at all to pre-trial statements made
to persons in authority.26 We also saw earlier that the references in
recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions tend to be sporadic, unex-
plained and by dissenters. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that
they are no more than rhetorical and emotive appeals delivered
without any precise object or expectation. It is, perhaps, likely that
they were advanced by counsel in the same way in the hope of
strengthening other arguments in some vague, supportive way.
Thus, the concept of self-incrimination is not applicable at all
to the pre-trial stage. The Wray case is conclusive authority that it
does not apply to physical evidence and the Begin case also clearly
decides that samples of blood taken from an accused are in the
same category as other physical evidence. Nor does it apply to pre-
trial statements unless it is simply another way of describing the
voluntariness rule, no more and no less. But if that is the case, why
faits h des personnes en autorit6, ne sont admissibles que lorsqu’ils sont
volontaires; l’accusd ne peutt
tre contraint a rendre tdmoignage dans son
proc~s, et la personne qui est contrainte par la loi ht r6pondre peut, en
faisant objection, se prot6ger contre l’usage futur de la r6ponse qu’elle
donne. [Emphasis added].
This aspect is discussed infra, at pp. 28 et seq.
26Nor do the earlier leading Supreme Court of Canada decisions in this
area contain any serious suggestion that the voluntariness rule is related in
any way to a principle against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Monette v. The
Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 400; R. v. Fitton, [1956] S.C.R. 958; Boudreau v. The King,
[1949] S.C.R. 262; Gach v. The King, [1943] S.C.R. 250; Sankey v. The King,
[1927] S.C.R. 436. It has already been suggested that the voluntariness rule is
based on considerations related primarily to the reliability of the evidence:
supra, n. 18. Yet, there are still occasional examples of lower courts relating
the voluntariness rule to a general principle against self-incrimination. E.g.,
in R. v. Bird, [1967] 1 C.C.C. 33 (Sask. Q.1.), Disbery, J. found a statement to
be involuntary and said:
To admit it would, in the words of Mackenzie, J.A., in R. v. Scory, (1945)
83 C.C.C. 306, at p. 315 … constitute: t… a violation of the historical
common law principle embodied in the maxim nemo tenetur seipsurn
accusare, unless shown to have been voluntarily and freely made…’:
[1967] 1 C.C.C. 33, at p. 43.
In the Scory case, no authority was cited in support of the association of the
voluntariness rule with the maxim and in neither case was the maxim of
any relevance to the decision reached. With respect to the learned trial judge,
he erred in adopting the Scory dicta, particularly in light of the intervening
and more authoritative comments in R. v. Begin.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 19, No. I
not simply use the phrase “voluntariness rule”? To do otherwise is
simply to increase the potential for misunderstanding.
27The inclination to apply the concept of self-incrimination to pre-trial
statements might have received some impetus from the U.S. decision
in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, a survey of the Canadian
decisions indicates that it has had no effect upon our case law. It is difficult
to see how it could, in view of the very different constitutional frameworks
of Canada and the United States. The earliest reported Canadian decision
referring to Miranda seems to be R. v. Birza, (1969) 7 C.R.N.S. 13 (B.C.Co.Ct.).
The relevant portion of the judgment of Shultz, Co.CtJ. is as follows:
The evidence sought to be introduced here would not be admissible in
the United States of America by reason of the judgments of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The evidence sought to be intro-
duced here was obtained in violation of the ‘Judges’ Rules’ of England…
Neither the law of the United States, nor the ‘Judges’ Rules’ of England,
is law in Canada and this judgment is not based upon either. This judg-
ment is based upon an evaluation of ‘all the surrounding circumstances’
(1969) 7 C.R.N.S. 13, at pp.
as disclosed by the whole of the evidence…
18, 19.
In R. v. Frank, (1969) 8 C.R.N.S. 108 (B.C.C.A.), counsel for the accused argued
that a promise on the part of the person in authority
… negated the force of that part of the Miranda warning that a statement
made by the prisoner would be used against him, and rendered the
warning nugatory.
Davey, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court, gave short shrift to that
submission. He simply said:
That argument might be valid in the United States, where such warning
is required by the Miranda judgment of the Supreme Court of the United
States, but it cannot apply in Canada where no warning, still less any
particular form of warning, is required by law, and the presence of a
warning, and its form, or its absence, are only circumstances that ought to
be considered in determining whether the Crown has proved the alleged
statement to have been made voluntarily: Boudreau v. The King, and
Regina v. Fitton.: (1969) 8 C.R.N.S. 108, at p. 115.
The only other reported Canadian case which refers to Miranda, is another
decision of Shultz, Co.CtJ. In R. v. Lavoie, (1971) 2 C.C.C. (2d) 185, it was
argued that Miranda could be used to interpret the Canadian Bill of Rights.
Judge Shultz distinguished the applicability of the U.S. case from the problem
at hand (related to statements made under compulsion of statute). But he
also added that our law with regard to the admissibility of statements is
quite different:
It is apparent … that the Miranda case, being an opinion of the Supreme
Court of the U.S.A., is of binding authority in that country, but not in
Canada, where the ‘procedural safeguards’ formulated in the Miranda
case are not conditions precedent to admissibility.: (1971) 2 C.C.C. (2d)
185, at pp. 194-95.
No doubt defense counsel, operating under the restriction of the voluntari-
ness rule, will continue to invoke Miranda from time to time. However, at
this time at least, they cannot do so with a great deal of optimism.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
II. Evidential Consequences of Pre-Trial Silence
It might be argued, however, that the concept is present at the
pre-trial stage in manifestations other than exclusionary rules of
evidence. It could be pointed out, for example, that a person is not
required to say anything to the police. He is entitled to remain
silent in the face of police questioning. There is no legal sanction
if he fails to respond. Does not that indicate a “right to remain
silent” or a “right against self-incrimination”?
It does, perhaps, but only in the same general sense that people
are entitled not to do a lot of other things as well. There is no
penalty in Canada for not participating in Dominion Day celebra-
tions, for example, but no one speaks of a general right against
compelled celebration.
It is submitted that the general absence of sanctions for pre-
trial silence does not flow from any concept of self-incrimination.
Rather, it is a consequence of the principle of Rule of Law which
is fundamental to our constitution. More particularly, it means that
all acts or omissions are legal unless they are specifically made
illegal. The idea has been expressed in the phrase nulla poena sine
lege. Thus, silence when questioned by a police officer is no more
illegal than silence when questioned by one’s wife, although in
both situations one might have other reasons for wanting to answer.
Furthermore, there are a number of exceptions to the so-called
“right to remain silent” prior to trial. In other words, there are
situations where adverse consequences recognized in law will accrue
to an accused who maintains silence.
The very existence of these exceptions lends support to the
proposition advanced above. However, there have been regular
suggestions that these exceptions should be limited by a general
principle that an accused is entitled to remain silent. It is there-
fore useful to examine some of these suggestions and the manner
in which the courts have treated them. The object is, again, to
determine whether there is any such principle in the sense of it
having a functional aspect, rather than as merely descriptive of
the normal consequences of nulla poena sine lege.
One situation where adverse consequences may be suffered by
an accused, due to his silence, involves the well-recognized rule
of evidence related to “adoptive admissions” or “statements made
in the presence of a party”. A consequence of this rule is to
treat the silence of an accused in the face of a statement by an-
other as an acknowledgment by the accused of the truth of that
statement. But for that to occur the circumstances must have been
such
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… that the ordinary person in the party’s position would reasonably be
expected to deny the statement if it were untrue. In other words, the
only reasonable inference to be drawn from the party’s silence must
be that he believed the statement to be true.28
It is obvious that the rule pays no obeisance to silence. To the
contrary, it recognizes silence in certain circumstances as an in-
dication of guilt.
Thus, where a person who was ultimately murdered had earlier
seen the accused about 6 feet away and exclaimed: “Don’t let him
knife me”, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the statement
was admissible. The circumstances were such that the accused
.. might have been reasonably expected to make some answer or remark
in reply thereto or explaining that his proximity to deceased did not
involve any such danger as he seemed to feel 2 9
Certainly, such a result is incompatible with a right against
self-incrimination since it compels one to speak or suffer adverse
consequences from a failure to speak.
What is the nature of the rule? It
is submitted that it is no
more than common human experience determining the probative
effect to be given to certain types of evidence. A person who has
no intention of stabbing anyone ordinarily does not remain silent
when the suggestion is made that he is, in fact, about to commit
a stabbing. Therefore, in the absence of some explanation for his
silence, one would ordinarily infer that he did have such an inten-
tion. On the other hand, if a general right against self-incrimination
existed, one would expect the evidence to be excluded in spite of
its probative value, simply out of deference to the right itself.
Complications arise, however, in situations where a police officer
is investigating an offence or where a person is informed that he
is a suspect or when he is arrested and charged. Ordinarily, one
would expect a denial from an innocent person who is told that
he is suspected of having committed an offence, particularly if it
is a serious one. Nevertheless, in these situations the accused’s silence
is ignored, i.e., it cannot be used as evidence against him. Is the
limitation upon the evidentiary rule, then, the result of the oper-
ation of a transcending “right against self-incrimination”?
28A.F. Sheppard, R. v. Eden, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 280 (Note), (1970-71) 13 Crim,
L.Q. 299, at p. 302. See also the classic statement in R. v. Christie, [1914] A.C.
545 (H.L.E.), esp. Lord Atkinson, at p. 554.
29 Gilbert v. The King, (1907) 38 S.C.R. 284, per Fitzpatrick, C.I., at p. 300.
Quoted by Sheppard, op. cit., at p. 301. The person making the statement need
not be the victim. The relationship to the accused of the person making the
statement is immaterial: R. v. Hammond, (1969) 9 C.R.N.S. 123 (Ont. C.A.).
1973]
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It is submitted that it is not. First of all, if a right against
self-incrimination were operative, one might expect that the same
considerations would apply with respect to statements made by
other persons as well as by police officers. There would appear
to be no basis for a distinction within the concept of self-incrimi-
nation itself.
However, a more conclusive reason is to be found in a consid-
eration of the common law evidentiary rule with respect to adoptive
admissions together with another common law evidentiary rule,
i.e., the voluntariness rule. Because the latter rule seeks to avoid
inducements or threats, it encourages warnings to be given to an
accused that he need not make a statement and has nothing to
gain by doing so. Furthermore, since in fact he usually has nothing
to gain, the first advice by defence counsel will inevitably be not
to say anything to anyone.
In these circumstances, it can hardly be said that “the only
reasonable inference to be drawn from the party’s silence must
be” that he acknowledged the suggestion, allegation or accusation
to be true. Thus, the reason why silence in this situation should
not bring the rule into operation is not because of the existence
of a general right against self-incrimination. Rather, it is because
the prerequisites of the rule do not exist. Due to the operation of
the voluntariness rule, the circumstances are not such that silence
is probative of guilt.
Thus, for example, in R. v. Eden, it was said:
When the appellant was seated in the back seat of the police cruiser
alongside his two co-accused he was undoubtedly under arrest; notwith-
standing the fact that the customary warning had not been given to him
he was entirely within his rights in remaining silent and no imputation
unfavourable to him should be placed upon his exercise of that right.
To assume from his silence that he had conceded the accuracy of the
statement would be in effect to place upon a prisoner under arrest the
obligation of making exculpatory statements. For these reasons the fact
that the appellant failed to contest the statement made in his presence
was not evidence from which an inference of guilt could be drawn.30
It is true that the italicized portion could be interpreted on
its face as a reference to some general right. But the entire passage
can hardly be taken to say anything more than that in all of the
30R. v. Eden, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 280 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 283, per Gale, CJ.O.,
delivering the judgment of the Court.
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circumstances referred to above, no adverse inference should be
drawn from silence.31
Thus, the use of the word “right” is probably not significant
in this context. It is merely a way of describing what one is entitled
to do because it has not been specifically prohibited in law.
Similarly, the Crown need not disclose, prior to the preliminary
inquiry, the evidence it has against a particular accused. There is
a right not to disclose that evidence in the sense that the accused
has no legal remedy by which he can compel disclosure. However,
there is little value in speaking of the Crown’s “right of non-dis-
closure” or suggesting that immunity from compulsion to disclose
indicates a “right to remain silent” on the part of the Crown. The
point is simply that it is perfectly natural to say that one has a
right to do something or not to do it. But such usage should not
be interpreted as having any greater significance.32
There is another evidentiary rule which might impose pressure
upon a suspect or an accused to break his silence at the pre-trial
stage. It is the rule that an alibi may be given less weight if it is
31 This conclusion is even more apparent from the paragraph in the judgment
which immediately precedes the one quoted above. It reads:
The right of a trial Court to conclude that an accused adopted an incul-
patory statement made in his presence rests upon the assumption that
the natural reaction of one falsely accused is promptly to deny or assert
his innocence. It follows that before such an assumption can be acted
upon the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement must
be such that it would be normal conduct for the person involved by the
statement to deny it. When the circumstances are such that the failure
to protest can be attributed to some circumstances justifying such failure,
the probative value of the failure to protest is lessened and may be
entirely negatived: [1970] 3 C.C.C. 280 (Ont. CA.), at p. 283.
32See also: R. v. Cripps, (1968) 3 C.R.N.S. 367 (B.C.C.A.); and, R. v. Itwaru,
(1969) 10 C.R.N.S. 184 (N.S.CA.), both of which review the English authorities
and quote the following passage from R. v. Ryan, (1964) 50 Cr. App. Rep. 144
(Ct.CrA.), at p. 148, per Melford Stevenson, J.:
… it is wrong to say to a jury ‘Because the accused exercised what is
undoubtedly his right, the privilege of remaining silent, you may draw
an inference of guilt’…
In the most recent English decision in this area, Lord Diplock, delivering
the advice of the Board said:
It is a clear and widely known principle of the common law in Jamaica,
as in England, that a person is entitled to refrain from answering a ques-
tion put to him for the purpose of discovering whether he has committed
a criminal offence: Hall v. The Queen, (1970) 55 Cr. App. Rep. 108 (P.C.),
at pp. 111-12.
It is submitted that all of the above comments are equally applicable to
these cases.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
not put forward at the first reasonable opportunity. 3 While the
rule seems to have originally applied to preliminary inquiries,
it probably extends to the time of police investigation. The rule
raises a number of problems when considered in relation to other
procedural provisions but is practical in recognizing the difficulty
of police officers “checking out” an alibi if it is raised for the
first time at the trial. The existence of this rule also suggests an
absence of any overriding principle against self-incrimination at
the pre-trial stage.3 4
III. Penal Consequences of PreTrial Silence
In R. v. Patrick,35 it was alleged that the accused’s refusal to
respond to police questioning amounted to the offence of obstruction
of a police officer in the course of his duty, contrary to section 110
of the Criminal Code. An automobile collision had occurred at an
intersection. One of the vehicles involved sped off and disappeared
from view. The investigating police officer subsequently discovered
a damaged car, which was linked with the collision by strong circum-
stantial evidence.
The owner agreed to attend at the police station and was accom-
panied by his solicitor. Upon request, he produced his motor vehicle
permit. However, when asked by the constable when he had last
seen his motor vehicle, his solicitor replied: “We are not prepared
to discuss that.” His solicitor answered in a similar manner to
further questions. The owner was charged and convicted of “ob-
struction”.
The conviction was reversed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.
In delivering the judgment of the Court, Mr. Justice Schroeder said:
In short, it is urged that his refusal to incriminate himself constituted
a wilful obstruction of a peace officer in the execution of his duty. I
am bound to say that in my view the proposition upon which the convic-
tion against the appellant is based possesses all the elements of a novelty.
Striking as it does at the very root of a fundamental and characteristic
principle of our law embodied in the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum
accusare, the proposition is calculated to fill one with amazement. 30 6
33 R. v. Howarth, (1970-71) 13 Crim. L.Q. 109 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 110. The rule
seems to have developed in England. See: R. v. Hoare, (1966) 50 Crim. App.
Rep. 166 (Ct. Cr. A.); R. v. Littleboy, (1934) 24 Crim. App. Rep. 192 (Ct.Cr.A.).
The English position is now governed by statute: Criminal Justice Act 1967,
c. 80, s. 11.
34 See: J. de N. Kennedy, Alibi Evidence, (1967) 15 Chitty’s LJ. 193.
35 (1960) 128 C.C.C. 263 (Ont. CA.).
36Ibid., at p. 266. No authority is cited on this aspect.
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The passage is merely another illustration of the references to
the maxim already described. Another portion of his judgment
comes closer to the “Rule of Law” 37 argument made earlier. In the
penultimate paragraph, he says:
Counsel for the appellant submitted that to sustain a charge of obstructing
a peace officer in the execution of his duty, it was necessary for the
Crown to prove either a positive act of interference, or a refusal to
perform some act required to be done by a statute …
It not having
been shown that the appellant was under any duty or obligation to com-
municate to the peace officer the information required of him under the
provisions of either s. 221(2) of the Criminal Code, or s. 110(1) of the
Highway Traffic Act, the Crown has failed to bring home to the appellant
the commission of a criminal offence. This is sufficient to dispose of the
appeal .. 38
Thus, the reference to nemo tenetur… really adds nothing.
However, another decision which refers to the maxim cannot be
dealt with so summarily. In R. v. Balsdon,39 police officers attempted
to execute a warrant of committal for failure to pay a fine. When
they called at the bookstore where the accused was known to work,
he repeatedly and successfully told them that the person named in
the warrants (in fact, himself), was not present. He was charged
with wilfully attempting to obstruct the course of justice.
Waisberg, Co. Ct. J. acquitted the accused and made it clear that
a right against self-incrimination formed the basis of his decision.
He bluntly stated: “Were it not for the principle of nemo tenetur
seipsum accusare, I would have no difficulty in finding the accused
guilty as charged.” 40
The relevant Criminal Code section (now section 127(1)) was
as follows:
Section 119(1): Everyone who wilfully attempts in any manner to obstruct,
pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an indictable offence…
After reviewing a number of decisions, Judge Waisberg concluded:
The principle to be gleaned from the cases is that while a third party
may commit an offence by lying on behalf of an offender, the offender
himself has no obligation to be truthful about his own criminal conduct.
no man can be com-
The doctrines nemo tenetur seipsum accusare –
pelled to criminate himself –
no
and nemo tenetur prodere seipsum –
37 Or nulla poena sine lege, if you prefer Latin phrases (as so many judges
apparently do). Nulla crimen sine lege might also be used.
38 (1960) 128 C.C.C. 263, at p. 267. The sections referred to are discussed
infra, at pp. 20 et seq.
39 [1968] 2 C.C.C. 164 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
40 Ibid., at p. 167.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
one is bound to betray himself –
preserved. 41
have been carefully safeguarded and
The Code section obviously makes no distinction between an accused
and “a third party”, so that we have a clear example of a general
common law principle against self-incrimination being invoked and
applied, in effect, to overrule a statutory provision.
None of the authorities cited in the decision dealt with a
situation where an offender lied to a police officer.4 2 The reasoning
of the judgment is that in a number of analogous situations the
conduct was not punishable. As a result, the conclusion is drawn
that there is an operative general principle against self-incrimination.
The principle is then applied to the case under consideration to
achieve the same result. With greatest respect, the treatment of the
authorities cited is less than satisfactory.
The three most recent cases are illustrations of the “Rule of Law”
concept discussed earlier. In R. v. Semeniuk,43 the refusal of the
accused to open his glove compartment during a lawful search for
liquor was held not to constitute obstruction of a police officer.
Nor was the accused’s refusal to identify himself in R. v. Carroll.”
In Koechlin v. Waugh and Hamilton,4 5 the accused’s refusal to
identify himself did not justify the use of force by police officers.
The basis upon which these cases were decided is perhaps best
summarized in the following passage from Semeniuk:
… the accused should not be convicted of obstructing simply because
he had refused to carry out the command of an officer who had no legal
right to insist upon it being obeyed. I have never understood that, in
the absence of statutory provisions, there was any legal duty on the
part of citizens generally, let alone suspected persons, to assist police
officers …46
The strongest authority in support of the Balsdon decision is the
Australian decision of R. v. Kataja.4 7 The accused had taken his
41 Ibid., at p. 169.
42 It might be argued that that situation did not even exist in the Balsdon
case. Balsdon was not an offender who did not wish to incriminate himself.
Rather, he had already been convicted. When the police officer called upon
him, he was not in any jeopardy of being accused of a different offence unless
he engaged in further conduct, e.g., lying to a police officer. However, my analy-
sis of Balsdon proceeds on the basis that the Balsdon situation is identical to
one where a person has committed an offence and lies to a police officer
who is investigating that offence in order to avoid detection.
43 (1955) 111 C.C.C. 370 (Alta. Dist. Ct.).
44 (1959) 126 C.C.C. 19 (Ont. CA.).
45 (1957) 118 C.C.C. 24 (Ont. CA.).
46 (1955) 111 C.C.C. 370, at p. 373, per Edwards, D.C.J.
47 [1943] V.L.R. 145 (Sup. Ct.).
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employer’s truck without permission and had been involved in an
accident damaging it. He told both the employer and the police
that the truck had been stolen by some unknown person, thus
causing the time of police officers to be expended and suspicion
to fall on other people. He was charged and acquitted of the common
law offence of doing public mischief.
The basis of the decision seems to have been that the accused’s
story was not a mischievous fabrication, but was substantially true.
The judgment also pays heed to English authority warning against
the grave danger of enlarging the ambit of such common law offences
as “public mischief”. The decision should be distinguished on the
basis of the much narrower offence involved there.48
In only two of the decisions O cited in Balsdon is any reference
made to the concept of self-incrimination. They both deal with the
issue of privilege with regard to compulsory statements under the
Ontario Highway Traffic Act, and are referred to merely as being
“in the same spirit” as the Kataja decision. They provide little more
than an opportunity to cite the nemo tenetur… maxim from case
authority. The reference to R. v. Hoggarth ” is equally unsatisfactory.
One might well ask whether the concept of a right against
self-incrimination can be related at all to the facts of the Balsdon
case. It is usually thought of as a right to remain silent. Both the
Turner and Newcastle cases speak of it as “the common law right
of a subject to remain silent lest he incriminate himself”. What
application can it have to misleading a police officer by lying to him?
4 8 Indeed, the facts of the Kataja case would fall squarely within section
128(b) of our Criminal Code, headed “Public Mischief”:
Section 128: Every one who, with intent to mislead, causes a peace officer
to enter upon an investigation by …
(b) doing anything that is intended to cause some other person to be
suspected of having committed an offence that he has not committed, or
[doing anything] to divert suspicion from himself… [Emphasis added].
49 Peters v. Turner, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 591, [1948] 1 W.W.R. 412 (Alta. Sup. Ct.,
App. Div.); and Greathead and Stait v. Village of Newcastle, [1954] O.W.N. 160,
107 C.C.C. 363 (Ont. H.C.); discussed infra, at pp. 25 et seq.
50 (1956) 119 C.C.C. 234, 25 C.R. 174 (B.C.CA.). The learned judge in Balsdon
found it “significant … that the accused there was able to tell police that
the car had burned as the result of an accident whereas he himself had
deliberately set fire and yet was not guilty of an offence: [1968] 2 C.C.C. 164,
at p. 167. However, the reports of the Hoggarth case in both the Criminal
Reports and the Canadian Criminal Cases indicate that it was the owner of
the car, and not the accused (a female companion of the owner), who had
set fire to the car.
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The Balsdon decision does not deal with that issue. It does,
however, quote without comment, a lengthy passage from R. v.
Robinson,51 which includes the following rather questionable sug-
gestion:
If the accused were not bound to answer, then it followed they were
not under a duty to tell the truth if they were asked questions.
It is submitted that a more recent statement by the Lord Chief
Justice of England is preferable.
In Rice v. Connolly,52 the accused was questioned in highly
suspicious circumstances by police officers investigating “breaking”
offences. When questioned, the accused refused to give his full
name and address and was charged with obstructing a police officer
in the execution of his duty. Lord Parker clearly distinguished
between the two situations:
In my judgment there is all the difference in the world between deliber-
ately telling a false story, something which on no view a citizen has a
right to do, and preserving silence or refusing to answer, something
which he has every right to do.53
[he accused was found to have fallen within the second situation
and was acquitted.
Indeed, the Balsdon decision seems to accept the distinction
between silence and positive conduct (i.e., lies, if lying can be
called “positive” conduct), where a person other than an offender
wishing to escape punishment is involved.” The key issue then,
is why lying to a police officer by an offender should be treated
differently under the Criminal Code provision5r than the lies of a
“third party”. The reason, it is said, is nemo tenetur seipsum prodere.
But that involves citing the maxim as authority for extending it.
The suggestion is untenable. 5
51 (1938) 2 J. Crim. L. 62, at pp. 64-65.
52 [1966] 2 All E.R. 649 (Q.B.D.).
53Ibid., at p. 652. Adopted in: R. v. Martin, (1969-70) 12 Crim. L.Q. 201 (B.C.
Prov. Ct., Dec. 5, 1969, per Ostler, Prov. Ct. J.).
54See the passage cited supra, n. 41.
55 The policy reasons for differential treatment are discussed below.
56 All sorts of practical complications are imaginable as well. Suppose the
accused in the Rice case had lied rather than merely refusing to answer. If
the police had decided that he had in fact committed the “breakings”, could
they merely delay charging him with the breakings to charge him first with
obstructing justice under section 127(1)? If he is convicted under section
127(1) and subsequently convicted of “breaking”, are there inconsistent verdicts
in law? If the police, on the other hand, decided that he was a “third party”
and charged him under section 127(1), could he take the protection of the
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The following passage from Glanville Williams is also quoted in
Balsdon:
It would accord better with the spirit of the law to hold that nothing
said by the accused in answer to the charge is regarded as public mis-
chief, obstructing the police or delaying justice.5 7
However, it is clear from examining the context of that statement
that Williams is speaking of the propriety of the law and not its
actual state. While he cites nemo tenetur… in justification of silence,
he does not suggest that it extends to protect a person who actually
lies to the police, even if he is an offender.ri
It is submitted that what is really involved is a strong policy
basis for not punishing a suspect or an accused person for lying
to the police. Strong elements of (perhaps instinctive) self-preserva-
tion are involved. It does not accord with our sense of fairness to
punish a person once for committing an offence and then once more
for denying to the police that he had done it. The unfairness is
accentuated against the backdrop of a process where a person is
entitled to make a general denial of guilt and thereby require the
State to prove every element of its allegation against him.
However, section 127 of the Criminal Code does not embody
that policy. It draws no distinction between a suspect or an accused
and other persons. The Balsdon decision involves a creative attempt
Canada Evidence Act and admit the “breaking”, thereby escaping conviction
on the charge of obstructing justice?
Again, if being an offender is a defence to lying under section 127(1), is it
also a defence under section 128(b) (supra, n. 47)? If so, what does the second
part of section 128(b) mean? Finally, what other conduct might an accused
indulge in to avoid being convicted? May he offer remuneration to a police
officer? No, according to R. v. Morin, (1968) 5 C.R.N.S. 297 (Que. C.A.) over-
ruling Robitaille v. The Queen, (1965) 48 C.R. 7 (Que. C.A.). The latter decision
was based entirely upon a narrow interpretation of “course of justice” in
section 126(1).
57 Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed., at p. 417.
5sWilliams points out that the report of the Robinson case (supra, n. 51)
is not altogether clear, but that it seems that the driver was himself convicted
for his false statement.
The more recent decision of R. v. Field, (1964) 48 Cr. App. Rep. 335 (Ct. Cr.
App.) might also be of interest here. The accused, Leonard Field, had partici-
pated in the “Great Train Robbery”. He had also purchased the farm which
was the robbers’ lair. He, along with the other defendants, were convicted
of conspiracy to obstruct the course of justice, because of false state-
ments by the others to conceal Leonard Field’s identity as owner of the
property. The inferences to be drawn from the case are perhaps complicated
by the element of conspiracy, but it does seem that the lies by suspects to
the police were treated as acts which were unlawful as obstructing the course
of justice.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
to achieve a wise policy decision through the resurrection of a
“dead horse”, in a form it did not even possess when it lived, if it
ever did. While section 127 can be criticized as having been drawn
too broadly and should be amended, the Balsdon decision is, with
greatest respect, bad law in our legal tradition. It is difficult to see
it being accepted by a higher court.5 9
There are also a number of explicit statutory provisions which
impose a duty upon a person to speak in certain situations at the
pre-trial stage. For example, the Criminal Code provides:
Section 233(2): Every one who, having the care, charge or control of a
vehicle that is involved in an accident with a person, vehicle or cattle
in the charge of a person, with intent to escape civil or criminal liability
fails to stop his vehicle, give his name and address and, where any person
has been injured, offer assistance, is guilty… [of an offence].
The section has been applied numerous times since its origin. 60
However, R. v. Patrick 61 appears to be the only reported decision
which deals with an attempt to limit the operation of the italicized
portion by invoking a right against self-incrimination. 2
In essence, the Ontario Court of Appeal there held that the
statutory duty in question only applied to a person who had the
care, charge or control of a vehicle “a fact of which there is a
complete lack of proof in the present case”.6 That interpretation of
the statutory provision seems reasonably clear from a reading of it.
It hardly seems necessary to invoke extrinsic limitations to achieve
the result. It has already been argued that the reference to nemo
tentetur… in the decision is entirely gratuitous. 4
Section 233(2) imposes a duty upon the accused to speak or
to suffer penal consequences. The requirement of making a statement
is clear. But what is the extent of the harm the accused will suffer
from complying with the duty?
If the accused identifies himself in accordance with the duty
imposed upon him by section 233(2) of the Criminal Code, can his
statement be used against him, for example, on a charge of “criminal
59 It is also difficult to envision the Crown charging in those “unfair” situa-
tions.
60 Emphasis added. Substantially the same offence was first created by
S.C. 1910, c. 13, s. 2.
61 (1960) 128 C.C.C. 263 (Ont. CA.).
2 A challenge to the constitutional validity of a similar section was recently
6
decided by the United States Supreme Court. In California v. Byers, 91 S. Ct.
1535 (1971), the majority of the Court held the legislation not to violate the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
63 (1960) 128 C.C.C. 263, at p. 267.
U4Supra, at p. 16.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 19, No. I
negligence”? Or is the statement simply required to assist the
police in their investigation of the accident, or for some other
purpose?
The Supreme Court of Canada in Walker v. The King 5 held
that a statement made in accordance with the statutory requirement
was to be treated as any other statement:
–
there is no rule of law that statements made by an accused under
compulsion of statute are, because of such compulsion alone, inadmissible
against him in criminal proceedings. Generally speaking, such statements
are admissible unless they fall within the scope of some specific enact-
ment or rule excluding them…66
If there were an operative principle against self-incrimination at
this stage, one might have expected the opposite. In other words,
the approach in that context should be that such statements are
inadmissible unless there is some specific authorization for ad-
missibility. 7
Moreover, there is authority that to the extent a statement is
compelled by statute even the voluntariness requirements need not
be satisfied 8
65 [1939] S.C.R. 214.
66 Ibid., at p. 217, per Duff, C.1. (Rinfret, Kerwin, and Hudson, JY. concurring,
and Crocket, I. delivering a concurring judgment).
67 Duff, CJ. later spoke of
… the rule of law by which, in the absence of some provision to the
contrary, statements made in execution of the duty imposed by this section
would (as explained above) be admissible in evidence against the person
making them: Ibid., at p. 219.
However, he also added:
It seems clear enough that the enactment is a measure for securing in-
formation which may be employed for the purposes of legal proceedings,
instituted either privately or ad vindicatum publicam: Ibid., at p. 219.
The latter approach is more in accord with the recent decision of the House
of Lords in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz, [1967] 1 All E.R.
177, at p. 181.
68R. v. Barnett, [1963] 3 C.C.C. 51 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Pedersen, (1956)
114 C.C.C. 366 (Ont. H.C.); R. v. Keen, [1967] 2 C.C.C. 261 (B.C. Sup. Ct.). See
also: R. v. Oldham, (1970) 11 C.R.N.S. 204 (B.C.C.A., overruling Keen, but not
on this point) and the “Annotation” to the lower court decision: Statements
Under Statutory Compulsion and Under the Influence of Alcohol, 10 C.R.N.S.
135. It is submitted that the better view is that it would take specific language
to eliminate the voluntariness rule. See: R. v. Cleaveley, (1966) 49 C.R. 326
(Sask. Q.B.), at p. 329, per Johnson, J.:
I am of the opinion a statement given by an accused under the compul-
sion of statute is admissible in evidence in a proceeding under the Criminal
Code of Canada unless specifically excluded by proper enactment or ex-
clusionary rule. But before being admitted such statement must otherwise
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
Most of the provinces have very similar provisions 6o and, in
addition, provisions which go considerably further. An example of
the latter is section 139 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act t which
provides:
(1) Every person in charge of a motor vehicle who is directly involved
in an accident shall, if the accident results in personal injuries or in
damage to property apparently exceeding $200, report the accident forth-
with to the nearest… police officer and furnish him with such informa-
tion concerning the accident as may be required by the officer under
subsection (3).
(3) A police officer receiving a report of an accident, as required by this
section, shall secure from the person making the report … such par-
ticulars of the accident, the persons involved, the extent of the personal
injuries or property damage, if any, and such other information as may
be necessary to complete a written report concerning the accident and
shall forward such report to the Registrar within ten days of the accident.
It has been said that the primary purpose of such a provision was
“… manifestly, to make provision for procuring information for
record with the Registrar which may be useful for statistical and
rating purposes and other purposes of general public interest in
relation to motor traffic”. 71 That view received some support from
the existence of accompanying provisions, which purported to render
such statements privileged, in the sense of being inadmissible in
civil or criminal proceedings arising out of a motor vehicle accident. 2
In Marshall v. The Queen,73 it was held that the privilege did not
extend to criminal proceedings. Indeed a provincial legislature does
be shown to have been made voluntarily in the sense in which that term
is used in connection with admissions, confessions and statements of
accused persons.
(1 E.g., Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 202, s. 140.
70 R.S.O. 1970, c. 202.
71 Walker v. The King, [1939] S.C.R. 214, at p. 220, per Duff, Ci.
72 E.g., Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1937, c. 288:
Section 94(5): Any written reports or statements made or furnished
under this section shall be without prejudice, shall be for the information
of the Registrar, and shall not be open to public inspection, and the fact
that such reports and statements have been so made or furnished shall
be admissible in evidence solely to prove compliance with this section,
and no such reports or statements, or any parts thereof or statement
contained therein, shall be admissible in evidence for any other purpose
in any trial, civil or criminal arising out of a motor vehicle accident.
The words “civil or criminal” in the last line were removed by S.O. 1938,
c. 17, s. 20. The privilege was repealed completely in Ontario by S.O. 1968-69,
c. 45, s. 69(2).
73 [1961] S.C.R. 123.
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not have the authority, under the British North America Act, to
legislate with respect to criminal law and procedure. That authority
is expressly given to the Parliament of Canada. 74
Is a statement given under a provision such as section 139 of
the Ontario Highway Traffic Act admissible in criminal proceedings
on the same basis as a statement under section 233(2) was treated
to be admissible in R. v. Walker? There is a significant difference
between the two situations. In Walker, it could be said that it seemed
clear that section 233(2) was intended to provide information to be
used in either private or public legal proceedings.75 In other words,
the admissibility of the statement in evidence was implicit in the
section itself. That can hardly be said of section 139 of the Ontario
statute, in view of the purpose ascribed to it. It is even more difficult
to suggest, where the legislature clearly expressed its wish that it
not be admissible, even though that expression might be ultra vires.
However, the Supreme Court of Canada in Marshall adopted the
more prominent statement in Walker with respect to statements
made under statutory compulsion that: “Generally speaking, such
statements are admissible unless they fall within the scope of some
specific enactment or rule excluding them…” 7
In other words, although the Supreme Court in Marshall might
have had even more scope than it did in Walker to limit the
adverse consequences which might befall an accused who com-
plied with the statute, it did nothing to limit those consequences.
The judgment of Cartwright, I. (Judson and Locke, JJ. concur-
ring) contains the only reference to a concept of self-incrimination.
He said:
If a person in charge of a motor vehicle is involved in an accident causing
personal injuries under such circumstances that he may well be guilty
of criminal negligence and is confronted immediately thereafter by a
police officer he is entitled, under the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum
accusare, to remain silent.., on the other hand it is his duty under…
[s. 139 supra] … to furnish the officer with such information concerning
the accident as the officer may require, and the information which he
gives in fulfilment of this duty can be used against him if he is tried
for criminal negligence. If it is thought undesirable that such anomalies
should exist, they can be removed only by legislative action.71
Thus, the maxim is used only in the passive sense of describing
the situation as it existed prior to the statutory provision. It des-
74 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(27); R.S.C. 1970, App. II.
75 Supra, n. 67.
76 Supra, n. 66.
77 [1961] S.C.R. 123, at p. 131.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
cribes no more than the right to do or not to do anything, unless
there is a valid law to the contrary.
In R. v. Marshall, Cartwright, J. also said that the words in the
section granting the evidentiary privilege 78 limit it to trials in
which the legislature has jurisdiction. Thus, it clearly applies to
render a statutory statement inadmissible in a trial, on a charge
of driving without due care and attention, under the province’s
vehicles act. 79 It also applies to civil actions arising out of the
accident which resulted in the statement. Two decisions which fall
into this latter category might be interpreted as providing some
evidence of a principle against self-incrimination having an influence
upon the interpretation of the statutory provisions under discussion.
In Peters v. Turner,80 the issue was whether the privilege 8 1
extended to verbal statements made to a constable or answers to
questions asked by him in the course of the preparation of his report.
The Alberta Appellate Division held that the verbal statements were
privileged even though the section spoke of a “written statement”.
However, while the reasons given do include a reference to “the
common law right of the subject to remain silent”, it is not stated
to have any effect upon the decision. Furthermore, a number of
other reasons are given for the decision, which are related to the
general policy of the provision and anomalies which would otherwise
result.8 2
The decision in Greathead and Stait v. Village of Newcastle 13
is very similar except that it contains a more dramatic reference to
the concept.
78Supra, n. 72.
79 R. ex rel. Lyall v. Tunall, (1964) 44 C.R. 300 (Sask. Q.B.).
80 [1948] 2 D.L.R. 591 (Alta. Sup. Ct., App. Div.).
81 Similar to section 94(5), supra, n. 72.
8 2 0’Connor, S.A., delivering the judgment of the Court, gave the following
reasons:
… s. 58 which requires a driver to make a written statement is an invasion
of the common law right of the subject to remain silent lest he incriminate
himself. The purpose of s.-s. (3a) [which contains the privilege referred
to in n. 81, supra] is to induce the driver to make a frank written state-
ment of the cause of the accident and this purpose would be defeated
if verbal statements made in preparing the written statement are admis-
sible. If the privilege does not include words dictated to an investigating
constable then an illiterate driver would be at a disadvantage since he
must make a verbal statement. If counsel can elicit the verbal statements
made in preparing the written statement this would destroy the privilege
of the written statement and the Legislature cannot be taken to have
intended this: [1948] 2 D.L.R. 591, at p. 594.
83 (1954) 107 C.C.C. 363 (Ont. H.C.).
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There, the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident
remained at the scene giving assistance. A police officer arrived and
asked the driver what had happened. He gave the police officer all
the information requested. The issue was whether the driver could
rely upon the privilege in view of the following circumstances: he did
not claim the privilege; he gave the information upon solicitation; he
did not seek out the nearest police officer, but came in contact
with him when the latter arrived at the scene.
Mr. Justice Stewart, of the Ontario High Court, cited the Turner
case for the proposition that: “Section 110 is clearly an invasion
of the common law right of a subject to remain silent lest he
incriminate himself.” 11 However, in spite of the additional tributes
paid to the “right” by Stewart, J., the basis of the judgment
is the same as that in the Turner case. It is based upon statutory
interpretation,8 5 and invokes the usual techniques of examining the
general purpose of the statutory provision,” the anomalous results
which would flow from a different approach 8 or the impossibility
of compliance with a different interpretation.,8
Nevertheless, in the last paragraph of the judgment, the candles
are lit and the incense is burned once more:
84 Ibid., at p. 366. Section 110 contains the equivalent of the present section
139: supra, at p. 23.
85 (1954) 107 C.C.C. 363, at p. 365:
In interpreting a dynamic statute such as the Highway Traffic Act, while
the canons of interpretation must, of course, be strictly followed, yet it
is to be remembered that we are dealing with circumstances subject to
change and that the immediate realities of the situation should always
be considered.
86 Ibid., at pp. 366-67:
Most persons involved refuse to discuss the accident between themselves
but make full disclosure of the facts to the investigating officer, knowing
the duties imposed and the protection afforded by s. 110. Thus is ful-
filled the intent of the enactment ‘that the apprehension of people of
whom such information must be obtained should be allayed and that
frank statements of even incriminating facts should be freely given for
the purpose of the Registrar’.
87 Ibid., at p. 365:
… if a person involved in an accident suffers a concussion and wakens
in a hospital with a constable beside his bed seeking information, it seems
to me that to hold admissible any statement then given for the Registrar
would be to flout the clear intention of s-s. (5) …
88 Ibid., at p. 365:
… if a party must not await a police officer but seek him out without
delay, it would be difficult to comply with s. 48…
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
Section 110 is, I repeat, an invasion of a common law right, and the
maxim of our law nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, as has been said, is
as settled, as important and as wise as any other in it. It should not
be lightly disturbed, nor should the privilege given by s-s. (5), so necessary
for its preservation, be denied anyone unless he has, by his own deliberate
act, placed himself beyond the pale of its protection89
While the reference might be taken as indicating that the maxim
was influential in the interpretation reached, it is submitted that the
better view is, once more, that it is obiter and adds nothing of
substance.
Prior to its partial repeal, the “vagrancy” section of the Criminal
Code contained further examples of situations where one was re-
quired to speak or suffer penal consequences. Section 175(1) made
guilty of the offence of vagrancy everyone who:
(a) not having any apparent means of support is found wandering abroad
or trespassing and does not, when required, justify his presence in the
place where he is found;
(c) being a common prostitute or night walker is found in a public place
and does not, when required, give a good account of herself;
Numerous decisions have considered the interpretation and scope of
the phrases “justify his presence” and “give a good account of
herself”. The concept of a principle against self-incrimination does
not seem to have ever been mentioned 0
Perhaps sufficient examples have been given to suggest that there
cannot be said to exist in Canada a functional principle against
self-incrimination at the pre-trial stage. It does not form the basis
of the voluntariness rule. Nor has it limited the adverse consequences
which may result from an accused’s silence, whether through the
89 Ibid., at p. 368.
90 See, e.g.: R. v. Hefer, (1969) 10 C.R.N.S. 103 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Petryshen,
(1969) 8 C.R.N.S. 224 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Shrimpton, (1961) 37 C.R. 18 (Van.
Mag. Ct.); R. v. Archibald, (1956) 24 C.R. 50 (Que. Super. Ct.); R. v. Dubois,
(1953) 17 C.R. 56 (Tor. Mag. Ct.); R. v. Konkin, [1949] 2 W.W.R. 1225 (B.C.C.A.);
R. v. Levine, (1919) 30 C.C.C. 305 (Alta. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Jackson, (1917) 29
C.C.C. 352; R. v. Campbell, (1916) 26 C.C.C. 196
(B.C. Sup. Ct.); R. v.
Brady, (1913) 21 C.C.C. 123 (Alta. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Pepper, (1909) 15 C.C.C. 314
(Man. Q.B.); R. v. Regan, (1908) 14 C.C.C. 106 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Harris,
(1908) 13 C.C.C. 393 (Yuk. Terr. Ct.). The annotation to R. v. Petryshen, 8
C.R.N.S. 229, by Kenneth Chasse, does raise the suggestion that a “right to
remain silent” is involved. But Mr. Chasse obviously does not subscribe to
the suggestion he raises. Indeed, such an interpretation involves “drawing a
rather long bow”. If the Petryshen decision is correct, it is best explained
as recognizing the voluntariness rule coming into play after arrest.
See also The Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-40, s. 239.
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operation of evidentiary principles, or general or specific statutory
provisions.
Thus, the cases support the statement of the Supreme Court of
Canada in A.-G. Que. v. Begin that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion does not apply to pre-trial statements. However, the Court there
also suggested that such a privilege did apply to allow an accused
not to testify at all and to allow a witness to render his testimony
inadmissible against him in future proceedings.0 1 In other words,
the suggestion is that a general principle against self-incrimination
is related to the giving of testimony.
IV. Self-incrimination by the Accused at his Trial Generally:
Non-compellability
The Canada Evidence Act 2 contains a number of sections which
are related to the concept of self-incrimination. The Act applies to all
criminal proceedings, civil proceedings and other matters over which
the federal government has jurisdiction 3 The provisions are gener-
ally applicable, and have not been specifically displaced by other
federal legislation, although there have been subtle legislative en-
croachments. 4
The constitutional validity of the Canada Evidence Act has not
been questioned. As a result, our examination will be concerned
with the extent to which the provisions in question, taken together,
represent a general right against self-incrimination and the extent to
which such a right is operative in addition to the specific Evidence
Act provisions.
At common law, two separate principles seem to have been
related to the failure of the accused to testify. The rather unusual
factual situation in Worrall v. Jones5 provides a good illustration
of these principles, even though it involved a civil action. There, the
plaintiff sought to call one of the defendants to prove a tenancy. His
testimony was objected to by the other defendants, on the basis
that he was a party to the action.
Tindal, C. J. pointed out:
The exclusion on the ground of interest is a known principle of the law
of evidence.06
91 Supra, at p. 8.
92R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10.
93 Ibid., s. 2.
94 Infra, n. 201, at p. 49.
95 (1831) 7 Bing. 395, 131 E.R. 153.
06 (1831) 7 Bing. 395, at p. 398; 131 E.R. 153, at p. 154.
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He also referred to an early textbook on evidence which stated the
rationale for the rule:
… the plaintiff or defendant cannot be a witness in his own cause; for
these are the persons who have a most immediate interest, and it is not
to be presumed that a man who complains without cause, or defends
without justice, should have honesty enough to confess it.97
Since the real danger was thought to be not the fact of being a party,
but of having an interest, the Chief Justice held that the defendant
could testify in this case. Here, he was being called against his own
interest.
However, before the defendant’s testimony could be accepted a
further hurdle had to be met. The second principle involved was that
a party could not be compelled to testify:
That a party to the record should not be compelled against his consent
to become a witness in a court of law, is a rule founded in good sense
and sound policy.98
In this case, the defendant had consented so that his testimony
was accepted.
Similarly, in criminal proceedings, an accused was not competent
to testify for the defence because his self-interest was thought to
render his testimony untrustworthy. Nor could he be required to
testify for the Crown. The second principle clearly reflects a privilege
against self-incrimination.
The Canada Evidence Act of 189319 modified the situation by
providing:
Every person charged with an offence, and the wife or husband, as the
case may be, of the person so charged, shall be a competent witness,
whether the person so charged is charged solely or jointly with any other
person.
The intention of the section seemed to be to modify the first principle
(with respect to competence), but not the second (with respect to
compellability).
However, in Gosselin v. The King,100 the Supreme Court of Cana-
da held that the effect of section 4 was to render such persons not
only competent, but also compellable. One might well have expected
at least the suggestion that if the legislature were to be interpreted
Law of Evidence, 4th ed., at p. 130.
97 (1831) 7 Bing. 395, at p. 399; 131 E.R. 153, at pp. 154-55, quoting Gilbert’s
98 (1831) 7 Bing. 395, at p. 399; 131 E.R. 153, at p. 155, citing on this point
R. v. Wooburn, (1823) 10 East. 395, 103 E.R. 825. (Ed. note: The correct name
and spelling of the case is R. v. Inhabitants of Woburn).
99 The common law position was embodied in the Criminal Procedure: Act,
R.S.C. 1886, c. 174, s. 217, which was repealed by 56 Vict., S.C. 1893, c. 31, s. 4.
100 (1903) 33 S.C.R. 255.
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as having eliminated the common law right not to testify against one-
self, it would have to do so specifically rather than obliquely. How-
ever, no reference is made to a right against self-incrimination by
either the majority 101 or the dissenters. 10 2
The majority seemed to be greatly influenced by the correspond-
ing section of the English Act of 1898,103 which provided that the
accused and the spouse of the accused were competent witnesses
“for the defence”. The absence from the Canadian statute of those
limiting words was said to be conspicuous. 0 4 In 1906, the Canada
Evidence Act was amended 05 to insert those words. The result is
that, since 1906, the accused has been competent but not compellable
as a witness.0 6
Thus, while it may sound contradictory, it can properly be said
that the non-compellability of an accused was specifically adopted in
Canada by the implied incorporation of a common law principle.
What then is the scope of the principle as defined by the other
‘ 01 Davies, J. (Sedgewick, J. concurring) and Taschereau, CJ. delivering a
separate concurring judgment.
102 Girouard and Mills, J1. Mills, J. does comment that:
Our legislation has gone a long way in many things, but it has not yet
gone so far as to compel the prisoner to testify against himself…: (1903)
33 S.C.R. 255, at p. 289.
103 Criminal Evidence Act, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, s. 1 (Imp.).
104 (1903) 33 S.C.R. 255, at p. 273, per Davies, J.
105 An Act further to amend the Canada Evidence Act, 6 Edw. VII, S.C. 1906,
c. 10, s. 6. The present section 4 is almost identical:
Section 4(1): Every person charged with an offence, and, except as other-
wise provided in this section, the wife or husband, as the case may be,
of the person so charged, is a competent witness for the defence, whether
the person so charged is charged solely or jointly with any other person:
R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10.
106 The following discussion focuses on the accused rather than on spouses.
There have been a number of recent decisions on the definition of “wife”
under section 4: Ex parte CotM, (1972) 5 C.C.C.
(2d) 49 (Sask. C.A.);
R. v. Mann, [1971] 5 W.W.R. 84 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Amar, (1969) 7 C.R.N.S.
258 (B.C.CA.); R. v. Kanester, (1966) 48 C.R. 352 (B.C.C.A.), rev’d (1966) 49
C.R. 402 (S.C.C.). There have also been a number of recent decisions dealing
with the issue of whether an officer of a corporation is to be considered as
an accused for the purposes of section 4 of the Canada Evidence Act, or
whether he is compellable to give evidence against the corporation. The most
recent and authoritative decision seems to be R. v. Corning Glass Works of
Can. Ltd., [1971] 2 O.R. 3, (1970) 16 C.R.N.S. 329 (Ont. CA.), where it was
held that such officers were compellable. Leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada was refused on January 26, 1971: [1971] S.C.R. viii.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
provisions in the Canada Evidence Act, and the cases interpreting
them?
An important feature of the approach which was taken to make
an accused competent was that, if he decided to take the stand on his
own behalf, he could also be required to testify against himself. No
attempt was made in the Act to protect him against cross-examina-
tion which might incriminate him at the trial at which he testified.
Thus, an accused who testifies is treated much like any other witness:
When a person on trial claims the right to give evidence on his own
behalf, he comes under the ordinary rule as to cross-examination
in
criminal cases. He may be asked all questions pertinent to the issue, and
cannot refuse to answer those which may implicate him… he may be
convicted out of his own mouth. He cannot be compelled to testify, but
when he offers and gives his evidence he has to take the consequences. 0 7
Another consequence is that he is subject to cross-examination as to
previous convictions on the issue of credibility. 08
What relevance, then, does the principle against self-incrimination
have for an accused with respect to the charge which he faces at
his trial? Does it mean no more than that he cannot be called as a
witness by the Crown?
The opportunity to give the rule against non-compellability a
scope consistent with a more general principle against self-incrimi-
nation arose in DeClercq v. The Queen.09 The only issue was whether
107R. v. Connors, (1893) 5 C.C.C. 70, at p. 72, per Wurtele, 1. (Que. C.A.). See
also: R. v. Whittaker, [1924] 3 D.L.R. 63, 42 C.C.C. 162 (Alta. Sup. Ct.), per
Walsh, J., at p. 68 (D.L.R.) and pp. 167-68 (C.C.C.); Maxwell v. D.P.P., (1934)
24 Cr. App. Rep. 152 (HJL.).
108R. v. D’Aoust, (1902) 5 C.C.C. 407 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Mulvihill, (1914) 22
C.C.C. 354 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Cipola, (1928) 49 C.C.C. 129 (Ont. S.C.); R. v.
Dalton, (1935) 64 C.C.C. 140 (N.B.S.C.); R. v. Miller, (1940) 74 C.C.C. 270
(B.C.C.A.).
The Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10, section 12(1) provides:
A witness may be questioned as to whether he has been convicted of any
offence, and upon being so questioned, if he either denies the fact or
refuses to answer, the opposite party may prove such conviction.
But the accused may not be questioned about past criminal conduct for
which he has not been convicted. See: EJ. Ratushny, Unravelling Confessions,
(1970-71) 13 Crim. L.Q. 453, at pp. 485-487. The consequences of section 12(1)
upon the accused have been discussed by Professor M.L. Friedland in a recent
note: Criminal Law – Evidence – Cross-Examination on Previous Convictions
in Canada – Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act, (1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev.
656. Professor Friedland also refers to some of the other issues discussed
below. A similar view was presented in a paper prepared for the Criminal
Justice Section of the Canadian Bar Association, by Eric L. Teed, (August,
1970).
109 [1968] S.C.R. 902.
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or not an accused, who chose to testify on a voir dire to determine
the voluntariness of his confession, could be asked whether his
confession was true. It was argued that to allow such a question
might compel him to admit guilt, even though he may have decided
not to testify on the trial. Even though evidence on the voir dire
is not evidence on the trial,'” the submission was that the accused
would be prejudiced on his trial by the admission, so that his pri-
vilege of not testifying would be violated.
The majority ” of the Supreme Court of Canada decided that the
question was quite proper, without any consideration of the concept
of self-incrimination. The majority judgment seems to hold 112 that
the question was relevant to the issue of credibility and, ergo, was
permissible.
Chief Justice Cartwright agreed in the result, although he thought
that if he had been the trial judge, he would have exercised his discre-
tion to exclude the question because of its prejudicial nature.”13 Mr.
Justice Spence dissented on the basis that the question was not
relevant to the issue of credibility. Neither referred to any general
principle against self-incrimination.
However, Mr. Justice Pigeon, who also dissented, did refer specif-
ically to “self-incrimination”. His view was that the question was not
relevant to credibility, but really went to the main issue of guilt or
innocence. He said:
Because the rule against compulsory self-incrimination is the root of the
objection, I cannot agree that this is a matter of judicial discretion
respecting the extent of cross-examination on credibility.114
It is difficult to determine from his judgment exactly what he means
by “the rule against compulsory self-incrimination”. However, he
also expressed his agreement with what his brother Hall had said.
Mr. Justice Hall pointed out that the very purpose of the voir dire
was to allow an accused to testify on the issue of voluntariness,
without requiring him to testify on the issue of guilt. He argued that
the truth of the incriminating statement was “but theoretically
distinguishable from his guilt”, and added:
If an accused cannot testify on the voir dire without being liable to be
asked questions bearing directly on his guilt or innocence, he is put in
13o Cf. R. v. Oldham, (1970) 11 C.R.N.S. 204 (B.C.C.A.).
“‘ Martland, J. (Fauteux, Abbott, Judson, and Ritchie, JJ. concurring).
112 Wrongly, it is submitted. For a detailed analysis, see: E.J. Ratushny,
Unravelling Confessions, (1970-71) 13 Crim. L.Q. 453, at pp. 479496.
“3 [1958] S.C.R. 902, at p. 909.
“4 Ibid., at p. 930.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
a situation where he cannot do so without in effect being deprived from
the benefit of the rule against compulsory self-incrimination.115
He also quoted extensively from the judgment of Laskin, J.A., as
he then was, in the Court below,11
including the following passage:
If an accused must expose himself on a voir dire to an incriminating
inquiry when he finds it necessary to give evidence to resist the reception
of an inculpatory statement, the relation with the privilege against self-
crimination is more pronounced and the privilege is prejudiced, especially
on a trial by a Judge alone. Indeed, on such a trial, the distinction, between
a voir dire and the trial proper becomes blurred if the accused, who
is not then testifying in defense, may be compelled on the voir dire to
answer an incriminating question. Moreover there is prejudice to the
principle that an accused is not a compellable witness.117
Thus, both Hall 118 and Pigeon, JJ. as well as Laskin, J.A., viewed
the non-compellability of an accused as something more than merely
a prohibition against the Crown calling him as a witness. In their
view, it would be a reflection of a more dynamic principle which
valued and protected an accused’s right not to give evidence which
would be prejudicial to him. That approach was clearly not accepted
by the majority.
The privilege of not testifying is not very helpful to an accused,
of course, if his failure to testify would result in his conviction. If
the privilege were truly to reflect a general principle against self-
incrimination, then it should also prohibit adverse inferences being
drawn from an accused’s decision not to testify. A corollary of that
result would be a prohibition against counsel suggesting to a judge
or jury, or a judge suggesting to a jury, that an accused’s failure to
testify should be considered in determining guilt. The Canada Evid-
ence Act ” 9 says nothing about the drawing of inferences but does
provide as follows:
Section 4(5): The failure of the person charged, or of the wife or husband
of such person, to testify, shall not be the subject of comment by the
judge, or by counsel for the prosecution.
Our courts have not only given their blessings to the drawing of
adverse inferences from an accused’s failure to testify but have also
treated rather loosely the express statutory prohibition against
comment.
115 Ibid., at p. 923.
116 Supra, n. 16, at p. 7.
117 [1958] S.C.R. 902, at p. 917.
118 Hall, J. also relied upon Batary v. A.-G. Sask., [1965] S.C.R. 465, [1966]
3 C.C.C. 152. That decision is discussed infra, at pp. 56 et seq.
19 Supra, n. 92, at p. 28.
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In R. v. Binder,12 the Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted section
4(5) as being applicable only to jury trials. 121 Although the section
on the face of it does not support such an interpretation, Roach, l.A.,
delivering the judgment of the Court, examined its legislative history
and “the evil aimed at in the section”. He concluded that the purpose
of the section was to avoid the double-barrelled consequences an
accused might otherwise suffer, of giving up his right to testify in
order to avoid cross-examination on previous convictions, and then
being berated for not testifying.
He added: “It is impossible to think of any other reason or
purpose for prohibiting such a comment than its improper effect
upon a jury.”’22 Presumably, a judge sitting alone will be cognizant
of the possibility that the accused has not testified because of his
past convictions, so that the “improper effect” is diminished. Per-
haps, in addition, a judge is presumed not to weigh those convictions
against him as a jury would. In any event, the decision does not
recognize the section as being related to a general principle against
self-incrimination. The Binder case was recently followed by the
Courts of Appeal of Quebec 12 3 and New Brunswick. 24
The word “comment” in section 4(5) was at first given a broad
meaning by the Supreme Court of Canada. In Bigaouette v. The
King,125 Duff, J., delivering the judgment of the Court, adopted the
following passage as a correct statement of the law:
… Even if the matter were evenly balanced, which I think it is not, and
the language used were merely just as capable of the one meaning as
the other, the position would be that the jury would be as likely to take
the words in the sense in which it was forbidden to use them as in the
innocuous sense and in such circumstances I think the error would be
fatal. 26
However, in Wright v. The King,1
17 the Supreme Court of Canada
considered a jury charge which included a statement that the com-
plainant’s evidence “was not denied”. It also spoke of “the only
120 (1948) 6 C.R. 83 (Ont. CA.).
121 By analogy to R. v. Binder, the section should not apply to a voir dire,
even on a jury trial. See also the obiter statement in R. v. McDonald, (1948)
5 C.R. 375, at p. 382 (Alta. Sup. Ct.).
122 (1948) 6 C.R. 83, at p. 88.
123 Pratte v. Maher and the Queen, (1963) 43 C.R. 214, at p. 225.
124R. v. Bouchard, [1970] 5 C.C.C. 95, at pp. 106, 107 (N.B.S.C.).
125 [1927] S.C.R. 112.
1261bid., at p. 114, adopting the statement of Mr. Justice Stuart in R. v.
Gallagher, (1922) 37 C.C.C. 83, at p. 84 (Alta. Sup. Ct.). Applied in R. v. Arneson,
(1930) 54 C.C.C. 330 (Alta. Sup. Ct.).
127 [1945] S.C.R. 319.
19733
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
evidence we have”. The Court 28 held that the phrases did not cons-
titute a “comment” under section 4(5) and added that “… the
Bigaouette case certainly goes as far on that subject as this Court
would care to go”.
The Wright decision was soon applied by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal. In R. v. Dawley, 2 9 the Crown called a witness who
swore that the accused had made a statement to him. The defence
called two witnesses to show that no conversation took place bet-
ween the Crown witness and the accused. In his address to the jury,
Crown counsel said that if the jury members did not believe the
defence witnesses, they had “the uncontradicted evidence of [the
Crown witness] that the conversation between him and Dawley took
place.., and what that conversation was stands uncontradicted”.
The comment was held not to be a breach of section 4(5).
In McConnell and Beer v. The Queen,130 the Supreme Court of
Canada considered another kind of comment. There, the trial Judge
told the jury:
There is no such onus on these or any accused persons in any criminal
trial of proving their innocence by going into the witness box and
testifying in their own defence. You are not to be influenced in your
decision by either of the accused not going into the witness box and
testifying.. 131
Mr. Justice Ritchie, delivering the judgment of the majority, 3- held
that the comment was not a breach of section 4(5):
Here the language used by the trial judge to which objection is taken
was not so much a “comment” on the failure of the persons charged to
testify as a statement of their right to refrain from doing so … 1
He also quoted at length from the judgment of Evans, J.A., in the
Ontario Court of Appeal, who would have read “possibly prejudicial”
into the word “comment” in section 4(5).
Mr. Justice Hall, dissenting, pointed out that the wording of the
section was clear and unambiguous. He rejected the notion that the
purpose of the section was to protect an accused and that if a
comment, such as the one in question, were made for that purpose,
it would be acceptable. He said:
128Rinfret, CJ. (Kerwin and Hudson, JI. concurring); Rand, J. concurring
in the result; and Taschereau, J. dissenting.
129 (1946) 89 C.C.C. 134. R. v. Bigaouette was applied by the Ontario Court
of Appeal in the later case of R. v. Groulx and Nevers, (1953) 16 C.R. 145.
However, Wright v. The King is not mentioned in the judgment and was
likely not brought to the attention of the Court.
130 [1968] S.C.R. 802.
1’1 Ibid., at p. 806, as quoted by Ritchie, J.
1 2Fauteux and Judson, JJ. concurring.
183 [1968] S.C.R. 802, at p. 809.
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The protection which an accused is entitled to under s. 4(5) is compliance
with the positive injunction not to comment imposed upon the judge and
counsel for the prosecution, in other words, no comment on the subject
from either of them. 3 4
Furthermore, it seems completely unrealistic to draw to the jury’s
attention the accused’s right not to testify and then to expect them
to ignore it. In most cases, this type of comment will, in fact, have
a prejudicial effect in spite of the actual words used. 35
There is another important aspect of the majority suggestion that
the trial judge should not be hampered in commenting in this way
to the jury “in order to protect the rights of the accused”. It ignores
the role of defence counsel in our adversary system. Section 4(5)
applies only to the judge and the Crown. There is nothing to prevent
defence counsel from commenting on the accused’s right to stay out
of the witness box if he thinks it necessary to protect the accused.
As Professor Molot has put it:
It is with some irony that one perceives that with an apparent disregard
for the function of the accused’s own counsel to decide how to conduct
the defence and, more specifically, whether or not to refer to this right,
the Supreme Court has turned the “fight” theory or adversary system on
its head.13 6
Surely, within the framework of our system, and in view of the clear
wording of section 4(5), the comment in McConnell and Beer is un-
supportable.
A similar comment was considered by the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada in the more recent case of Avon v. The Queen.3 7 There, the trial
judge combined a comment that the accused need not testify with
a comment that the only evidence before the jury was that of the
Crown. Chief Justice Fauteux, delivering the judgment of the major-
ity, 38 adopted “the concise and accurate distinction made by Ritchie,
J. in McConnell and Beer”, and said that the trial judge’s comment
was “a ‘statement’ of an accused’s right not to testify, rather than
a ‘comment’ on his failure to do so”.139 Both Hall and Spence, JJ.
dissented once more.
A further limitation upon section 4(5) was established by the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the former section 592(1)(b)
34Ibid., at p. 818.
13 5 See also: Clare E. Lewis, Annotation, (1968) 4 C.R.N.S. 288, pointing out
the likely harmful consequences of telling the jury that an accused need not
testify.
136H.L. Molot, Non-Disclosure of Evidence, Adverse Inferences and the
Court’s Search for Truth, (1972) 10 Alta. L.R. 45, at p. 66.
’37 [19713 S.C.R. 650.
1381Martland, Judson, Ritchie and Pigeon, JJ. concurring.
’39 [19713 S.C.R. 650, at p. 655.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
(iii) of the Criminal Code.140 The provision allows a court of
appeal to dismiss an appeal, even though there has been an error
of law, provided “it is of the opinion that no substantial wrong or
miscarriage of justice has occurred”.
In McConnell and Beer, the Court also considered the question
of whether section 592(1)(b)(iii) could be invoked, even if the
comment had been found to be in breach of section 4(5) of the
Canada Evidence Act. Mr. Justice Ritchie pointed out that the Onta-
rio Court of Appeal’ 4′ had decided that the provisions of section
4(5) were absolute so that any breach of the section would be fatal
to the proceedings. On the other hand he pointed out that the pro-
vinces of British Columbia,’ 42 New Brunswick 43 and Quebec1 44 had
all adopted the contrary view. Ritchie, J. preferred the latter view
and stated that if the trial judge’s comments in McConnell and Beer
could have been construed as a comment under section 4(5), section
592(1) (b) (iii) could have applied to them.
In Avon v. The Queen,145 the majority judgment did not treat Mr.
Justice Ritchie’s remarks with respect to section 592(1) (b) (iii) as
obiter dicta. Rather, the appeal was interpreted as having been
dismissed on both grounds.’ 4 Thus, in an approach similar to that
followed by Ritchie, J. in McConnell and Beer, Chief Justice Fau-
teux in the Avon case added:
Even if the remarks complained of by appellant may be construed in a
manner contrary to the provisions of section 4(5) of the Canada Evidence
Act, I would say that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice
occurred, and that the verdict would necessarily have been the same had
the judge not made them.147
Thus, it is conceivable now to have a situation where a comment
will be ignored, even if it criticizes the accused for not testifying and
invites adverse inferences to be drawn from his failure to testify,
140 Am., 17-18 Eliz. II, S.C. 1968-69, c. 38, s. 60(1); now: R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34,
s. 613(1) (b) (iii).
141R. v. MeNulty and Courtney, [1948] O.W.N. 827 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Groulx
and Nevers, (1953) 16 C.R. 145 (Ont. CA.); R. v. Lizotte and Durham, [1955]
O.W.N. 593 (Ont. CA.).
142 R. v. Darlyn (No. 2), (1947) 4 C.R. 366 (B.C.C.A.).
143R v. MacDonald, (1948) 8 C.R. 182 (N.B.C.A.); Ayles v. The Queen, (1956)
119 C.C.C. 38 (N.B. Sup. Ct.).
144 Molleur v. The King, (1948) 6 C.R. 375 (Que. Q.B.).
145 [1971] S.C.R. 650.
146Ibid., at p. 656, per Fauteux, C.J.C.
147 Ibid., at pp. 655-66.
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provided the court of appeal considers the other evidence to be
overwhelming. 14 8
In sum, neither the rationale ascribed to section 4(5), nor the
manner in which it has been interpreted, indicates any relation to
a general principle against self-incrimination. Except for the dissent-
ers in DeClercq, not one of the cases discussed in this section makes
reference to such a concept. The absence of any relationship between
the non-compellability rule and a general principle against self-
incrimination is also evident from the adverse consequences an
accused faces if he chooses to exercise his privilege of not testifying.
It has been stated on numerous occasions that where a prima
facie case has been made out against an accused, his failure to
testify may be considered as a factor sufficient to convert that prima
facie case into proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 It is said to
affect the weight to be given to the Crown’s evidence, but not to be
a substitute for such evidence. Thus, it can have no effect where there
is no prima facie case.
The principle was recently applied by the Quebec Court of Appeal
in R. v. Vezeau. 50 The accused had not testified and the trial judge,
in his address to the jury, said that it could not “draw from this fact
any conclusion unfavourable to the accused”. Chief Justice Tremblay,
delivering the judgment of the Court, said that the direction consti-
tuted an error of law:
148R v. Lee, [1970] 5 C.C.C. 183 (Ont. CA.), is a recent example of a com-
ment which clearly contravened section 4(5) and which was not saved by the
“no substantial miscarriage of justice” provision.
249 See e.g.: Cross on Evidence, 3rd ed., (Butterworth & Co., London: 1967),
at pp. 40-41; A.E. Popple, Annotation: Failure to Testify, (1947-1948) 4 C.R. 374;
RJ. Carter, Annotation: The Evidentiary Effect of the Silence of an Accused,
(1970) 10 C.R.N.S. 223, at pp. 226-28; H.L. Molot, Non-Disclosure of Evidence,
Adverse Inferences and the Court’s Search for Truth, (1972) 10 Alta. L.R. 45,
at pp. 66-67. See also: R. v. Kavanagh, (Ont. CA.), unreported but summarized
at: [1972] 2 O.R. 236 (blue pages). In R. v. McConnell and Beer, [1968] S.C.R.
802, Ritchie, J. agreed that it would be most naive to ignore the fact that
many jurors will draw adverse inferences from an accused’s failure to testify.
In his Annotation, Mr. Carter interprets acknowledgment of that fact as
approval of it. It is submitted, to the contrary, that disapproval of that
eventuality was the basis upon which the trial judge’s comments in that case
were justified.
It also seems to be clearly established that the defence of alibi is not to
be given much weight if the accused does not go into the witness box: R. v.
Reeves, (1954) 20 C.R. 192 (Sask. CA.); Catellier v. The King, (1948) 6 C.R.
466 (Que. CA.); R. v. Cancilla, [1928] 1 W.W.R. 852 (Man. CA.); R. v. Hutton,
(1953) 7 W.W.R. 702 (B.C. Sup. Ct.). The comments below are equally appli-
cable to this rule.
150 (1971) 15 C.R.N.S. 336 (Que. C.A.).
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
It is clear that the jury had the right to consider the failure of the
accused to testify and to draw therefrom any logical conclusion.151
Perhaps the proposition is stated too broadly in this passage, but
even applying the principle as stated earlier, the trial judge’s direc-
tion would constitute an error in law. A number of other cases have
taken a similar approach. 15 2
It is submitted that the better view is that the accused’s failure
to testify should not be consideredY53 Many of the cases deal with
situations of circumstantial evidence where the courts speak of
conviction in the absence of an explanation by the accused. That,
of course, is a proper application of the circumstantial evidence
rule, if the evidence, apart from an explanation, points to no other
reasonable conclusion. But “reasonable conclusion” does not mean
conjecture.’ 54 Thus, if the reasonable conclusion from the facts is
guilt, then the accused obviously must offer an explanation, if he is
to be acquitted. However, his failure to explain should add nothing
to the case against him. He is being convicted because the proper
conclusion on the circumstantial evidence alone is that he is guilty.
It also seems clearly established that a court of appeal may take
into account the accused’s failure to testify in determining whether
or not there has been “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”.
That proposition seems to have been established by two independent
lines of development.
In British Columbia, the key case was R. v. Schwartzenhauer 55
There, Martin, S.A., of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, said:
… the fact that the accused “did not avail himself of the opportunity
which the law affords him of going into the witness-box” (Reg. v. Woods
(1897), 5 B.C.R. 585, at p. 588-9) has always been a circumstance that the
Courts of Criminal Appeal of this Province have properly taken into con-
’51 Ibid., at p. 338.
152 See also: R. v. MacLeod, (1967) 2 C.R.N.S. 342 (P.E.I. Sup. Ct.); Re A.-G.
Ont. and Clark; Tilco Plastics Ltd. v. Skurjat, (1966) 49 C.R. 99 (Ont. H.C.);
Pratte v. Maher and the Queen, (1963) 43 C.R. 214 (Que. CA.); Coffin v. The
Queen, (1955) 21 C.R. 333 (Que. CA.); R. v. Comba, (1938) 70 C.C.C. 205 (Ont.
CA.) and 237 (S.C.C.); R. v. Steinberg, (1931) 56 C.C.C. 9 (Ont. C.A.) and 45
(S.C.C.).
153 It is submitted that that view forms part of the ratio decidendi of the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kolnberger v. The Queen, [1969]
S.C.R. 213.
154 Wild V. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 101; The Queen v. Mitchell, [1964] S.C.R.
471; R. v. Gardiner, [1971] 2 W.W.R. 728 (Alta. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Coote, [1970]
3 C.C.C. 248 (Sask. CA.); Boucher v. The Queen, (1963) 42 C.R. 101 (Que. C.A.);
R. v. Jacquard, (1950) 10 C.R. 155 (N.S. Sup. Ct.).
155 (1935) 63 C.C.C. 269 (B.C.C.A.).
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sideration in deciding the… question.., as to whether or not a “subs-
tantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has actually occurred”…15 0
An examination of R. v. Woods indicates that no reference is made
to the propriety of an appeal court considering an accused’s failure
to give evidence. The passage quoted merely appears in the statement
of facts at the beginning of one of the judgments (in
the Woods
case).
Thus, unless that mere statement is considered as authority for
the proposition (which would be drawing a rather long bow), it must
be considered as merely acknowledgment of the choice of words
used in Woods to describe an accused’s failure to testify. We are
left, then, with the unsupported suggestion that it is proper because
it has always been done by the British Columbia Court of Appeal.
None of the other three justices sitting made any reference to the
accused’s failure to testify.
However, a few years later in R. v. Bush,157 the British Columbia
Court of Appeal had an opportunity to reconsider the matter. The
judgment of the Court was delivered by the same Martin, J.A., who
had since become Martin, C.S.B.C. The learned Chief Justice took
the opportunity to “adopt what was said by myself in R. v. Schwartz-
enhauer…” and quoted the passage above. 58 The case has since
been adopted without question on numerous occasions, either
directly or indirectly (by citing more recent cases which adopted it),
for the proposition that an accused’s failure to testify may be
weighed against him on appeal. 5
The second line of development appears to have originated with
the following statement of Middleton, J.A. in Steinberg v. The
King.
The accused gave no evidence; and, while this cannot be commented upon
to the jury, it is a factor which must be considered by the Appellate Court.
His failure to testify does not prove his guilt, but when the Court is by
‘156Ibid., at p. 277.
157 (1938) 71 C.C.C. 269 (B.C.C.A.).
158 Ibid., at p. 271.
159 See, e.g.: R. v. Hall (No. 1), (1943) 81 C.C.C. 31 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Dawley,
(1946) 89 C.C.C. 134 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Pavlukoff, (1953) 17 C.R. 215 (B.C.C.A.);
R. v. Hoodley, (1955) 21 C.R. 281 (B.C.CA.); R. v. Tremblay, (1956) 115 C.C.C.
281 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Boucher, (1962) 39 C.R. 242 (B.C.C.A.).
See also: R. v. Zamal, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 12 (Ont. CA.); R. v. Cipolla, (1965) 46
C.R. 78 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Rosik, (1970) 13 C.R.N.S. 129 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Green-
law (No. 1), [1968] 3 C.C.C. 200 (N.B.CA.); R. v. Joseph, (1939) 72 C.C.C. 28 (Alta.
CA.). See also: R. v. McCallum, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 391 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 391, where
McFarlane, JA., delivering the judgment of the Court, says:
The failure of an accused to testify in support of his alibi, while not
conclusive, is a very important factor to be considered by an appellate
court which is asked to set aside a verdict of the jury.
No authority is cited.
19731
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
the statute required to dismiss an appeal unless it is satisfied that there
was a miscarriage of justice, the failure of the accused to explain in any
way facts which place a very heavy onus upon him cannot be ignored.160
It might be argued that this statement is properly interpreted along
the lines suggested above, with respect to inferences to be drawn
from circumstantial evidence, whether the accused testifies or not.16
However, in view of the numerous decisions adopting R. v. Bush, our
courts of appeal are likely to continue to weigh a failure to testify
against an accused.
Thus, there is a clear tendency on the part of the courts to “chip
away” at the non-compellability of the accused. That tendency is,
perhaps, significant enough in the light of the weakness of the
authority from which it proceeds. However, it is even more signi-
ficant in view of the more fundamental principles it overrides.
The case of R. v. Burns 162 provides a useful contrast. There, the
accused refused to provide a blood sample to the police and the
Crown sought to introduce evidence of his refusal. Chief Justice
Gale of the Ontario High Court, as he then was, held that the eviden-
ce should be excluded:
The accused was acting within his common law legal rights in refusing
to provide a sample of his blood to the police. To admit evidence at this
stage that he declined to do so would, in my view, be most unfair. The
only purpose for which this evidence is put forward is to suggest the
inference that the accused felt he had something to hide. The accused
had a right to refuse, and I do not think that the jury should be invited
to draw an inference prejudicial to him because of his exercise of that
right.163
160 (1931) 56 C.C.C. 9 (Ont. CA.), at p. 36. A similar statement was made
by Middleton, l.A., in the earlier case of R. v. Hamilton, (1931) 55 C.C.C. 85
(Ont. C.A.), at pp. 97-98. See also: R. v. Starr, (1972) 7 C.C.C. (2d) 519 (N.B.C.A.).
101 See, e.g.: MacLeod v. The Queen, (1968) 2 C.R.N.S. 342, at pp. 345-46, where
Campbell, C.S, Prince Edward Island Supreme Court en banco, adopted the
above statement from Steinberg v. The King, and said:
I cannot conceive the possibility of an innocent man failing to explain the
circumstances under which this fire broke out in his presence, and in
his presence alone. I consider that the learned trial Judge rightly excluded
all other hypotheses as not leading to a rational conclusion, and properly
arrived at the inference of the appellant’s guilt. [Emphasis added].
102 [1965] 4 C.C.C. 298 (Ont. H.C.). See also: R. v. Shaw, [1965] 1 C.C.C. 130
(B.C.C.A.).
103 Ibid., at pp. 299, 300. Cf. the specific statutory provision now embodied
in section 237(3) of the Criminal Code with respect to breath samples:
… evidence that the accused, without reasonable excuse, failed or refused
to comply with a demand made to him by a peace officer.., is admissible
and the court may draw an inference therefrom adverse to the accused.
Such a provision does not modify the principle. However, in the application
of the principle where such a provision exists, one can no longer say that
the accused has an unqualified “right to refuse”.
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If one is not required to testify by law, then those general principles
related to Rule of Law should, in themselves, be sufficient to pre-
clude comment upon a failure to testify, or adverse inferences being
drawn therefrom.
Thus, in spite of obvious opportunities for the invocation of a
general principle against self-incrimination in this area, one has not
been applied by our courts. Of all the cases discussed in this section,
references to such a concept are only to be found amongst the
dissenters in the DeClercq case.
It is submitted that the only conclusion to be drawn from these
authorities is that an accused does not have the protection of any
general principle against self-incrimination in relation to his trial.
The rule that he is not a compellable witness must be interpreted
literally. It prevents the accused from being called as a witness, but
goes no further in protecting him. In fact, he may incriminate him-
self by taking advantage of that rule. Even the express statutory
attempt to limit the adverse consequences of a failure to testify has
been applied more narrowly than its wording warrants.
The non-compellability of an accused cannot properly be said
in
to reflect a more general principle against self-incrimination
Canada.
V. Non-compellability with Respect to Provincial Offences
A consequence of the limited jurisdiction of the Parliament of
Canada with respect to the law of evidence”
is that the provincial
legislatures have the power to regulate procedure in prosecutions for
offences against provincial statutes. This area is significant, since
often conviction can result in consequences as severe as those provid-
ed for many offences under the Criminal Code. A variety of approa-
ches has been taken by the provinces to the question of the compel-
lability of the accused.
Quebec has specifically incorporated the provisions of the Canada
Evidence Act. The Quebec Summary Convictions Act provides:
Section 41. Part 1 of the Canada Evidence Act (R.S.C., 1952, Chap. 307)
shall apply to every proceeding under this act relating to the prosecution
of any offence upon information. 165
Thus, the common law principle of the non-compellability of the
accused is adopted, either as an integral part of the federal statute,
or as directly applicable to provincial prosecutions as suggested
below with respect to British Columbia.
164 Expressly acknowledged by the Canada Evidence Act, supra, n. 92.
165 R.S.Q. 1970, c. 35.
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The British Columbia Evidence Act provides:
Section 8(1). The parties to any action, suit, petition, or other matter of
a civil nature in any of the Courts of the Province, and their wives or
husbands, are, except as hereinafter excepted, competent as witnesses,
and compellable to attend and give evidence in like manner as they
would be if not parties to the proceedings …166
The immediate question that arises is whether a prosecution under
a provincial statute is “of a civil nature”. It is submitted that in the
light of the early Ontario cases discussed below,1 7 provincial offences
are essentially criminal in nature. As a result, section 8(1) would not
apply to them. Since they are essentially criminal, and in the absence
of an express statutory provision, the non-compellability of the
defendant is operative in the same manner as with respect to Crimin-
al Code offences.
A number of provinces have express references to the non-com-
pellability of the defendant in their legislation. Some are expressed
negatively, to provide that the Act is not to be interpreted as render-
ing the defendant compellable.18 As a result, the common law
provision is also still in force in Alberta, Nova Scotia and New-
foundland. The New Brunswick Evidence Act more specifically pro-
vides with respect to a defendant that ” … neither such person nor
the wife or husband of such person shall be compellable
to
testify.. .169
However, a number of other jurisdictions have expressly departed
from the common law position. The Evidence Acts of Manitoba, On-
tario and Prince Edward Island, provide,170 in effect, that a defendant
may be called as a witness to testify against himself in a prosecution
under a provincial statute. The Ontario provisions have received
the most judicial attention.
166 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 134. The “except as hereinafter excepted” provision is
found in most of the provincial legislation, and usually refers to provisions
dealing with communications during marriage and evidence of adultery.
16 Infra, at p. 44. See also: Re Maddess, [1967] 3 C.C.C. 284; also reported
as Re Nelson and Jacobson, (1967) 1 C.R.N.S. 235.
168 E.g., the Alberta Evidence Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 127, s. 5(3):
Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to make the defendant in a
prosecution under an Act of Alberta compellable to give evidence for or
against himself.
See also, the Nova Scotia Evidence Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 94, s. 45.
169 R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 74, s. 5. See also, the Newfoundland (Amendment) Act, S.
Nfld. 1971, No. 48, s. 3. The Saskatchewan Evidence Act, which contains a
similar provision, is discussed infra, at p. 48.
170R.S.M. 1970, c. El50, s. 5; R.S.O. 1970, c. 151, s. 8(1); R.S.P.E.I. 1951,
c. 52, s. 4.
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The original attempt in Ontario to alter the common law position
seems to have been the 1873 Evidence Act 171 which provided:
Section 4. On the trial of any proceeding, matter or question, under
any of the Acts of the Province of Ontario … or on the trial of any
proceeding, matter or question, before any justice or justices of the peace,
mayor, or police magistrate, in any matter cognizable by such justice or
justices, mayor, or police magistrate, not being a crime, the party
opposing or defending … shall be competent and compellable to give
evidence in such proceeding, matter or question.
The issue was soon tested as to whether the phrase “not being a
crime” merely referred to those offences over which only the Parlia-
ment of Canada had jurisdiction, or whether it was intended to apply
to offences under provincial statutes as well.
In R. v. Roddy,7″ the defendant was charged with selling intoxic-
ating liquors on Sunday, contrary to the Ontario Tavern and Shop
Licenses Act. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the offence was
a “crime” for the purposes of section 4. Section 4 did not, therefore,
apply to provincial prosecutions and the common law principle
of non-compellability still applied.”3
However, the consequences of that approach were not only to
render an accused non-compellable, but also to make him incompe-
17136 Vict., S.O. 1873, c. 10. (emphasis added). The Evidence Act of 1869
had expressly provided:
5(d.). Nothing herein contained shall render any person compellable
to answer any question tending to criminate himself or to subject him
to prosecution for any penalty: 33 Vict., S.O. 1869, c. 13.
This provision was not repealed until 1896, but was not interpreted as
being a restriction on section 4 or its successors. By 59 Vict., S.O. 1896, c. 18,
s. 6, it was repealed and replaced by a similar provision, but which was
expressly stated to be “subject to” the successor of section 4.
172 (1877) 41 U.C.Q.B. 291. Applied in R. v. Lackie, (1885) 7 O.R. 431. See
also: R. v. McNicol, (1886) 11 O.R. 659, where Wilson, C.J. simply states:
The defendant should not have been obliged to give evidence against
himself: (1886) 11 O.R. 659, at p. 664.
173 Chief Justice Harrison, with whom the other two members of the Court
concurred, referred to the common law position in the following manner:
The general policy of the law is, that no man can be compelled to criminate
himself, nemo tenetur seipsum accusare: Consol. Stat. U.C., ch. 32, sec.
18; 33 Vict., ch. 13, sec. 5, sub-sec. 4, 0.; Taylor on Evidence, sec. 1223;
Powell’s Principles of Evidence, 4th ed., at p. 40; Paley on Summary Convic-
tions, 5th ed., at p. 109. An individual charged with the commission of a
criminal act cannot conformably to the course of justice in our tribunals
be interrogated by the Court with a view to eliciting the truth, nor is he a
competent witness in the case: Broom’s Legal Maxims, 4th ed., at p. 931:
(1877) 41 U.C.Q.B. 291, at p. 295.
1973]
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
tent. A number of decisions so held.174 In 1892, the Evidence Act
was amended to remove the words, “not being a crime”.17 5
The new provision was considered in The Queen v. Nurse.176 The
accused, a hotelkeeper, was charged with selling liquor during the
hours prohibited under the Liquor License Act of Ontario. The
witness for the prosecution was unable to establish any sale of
liquor. The accused was then called as a witness. The magistrate
overruled objections by defence counsel, and permitted the defendant
to be asked whether he had sold any liquor on the day in question.
He admitted that he had and was convicted.
The conviction was upheld by McDougall, Co. Ct. J., who said:
The Evidence Act (Ont.), as framed, making a person charged a competent
and compellable witness, regardless of the criminating effect of answering,
has no doubt invaded a most vital principle of procedure in the trial of
criminal cases. The Legislature has, however, chosen to sweep away the
ancient and supposed sacred right of a British defendant to remain silent
and to demand that the charge should be proven against him. He may
now be both a witness and a defendant, and in the former capacity is
liable to be interrogated to the same extent as any other witness called,
and if he admits facts which establish the offence charged, may be duly
convicted upon his own admissions. 177
The decision was approved by Falconbridge, J., of the Ontario High
Court, in Re Askwith.17 8
The provision in the Ontario Evidence Act has been carried
through to the most recent Act.179 However, rather surprisingly, the
section is seldom invoked to compel the accused to testify, as was
done in the Nurse case. There are few examples of it in the cases, and
it is clearly not the general practice of Crown Attorneys in Ontario.
Nevertheless, the decision in the Nurse case has recently been affirm-
174R. v. Hart, (1891) 20 O.R. 611; R. v. Bittle, (1892) 21 O.R. 605; R. v. Fear-
man, (1892) 22 O.R. 456.
175 55 Vict., S.O. 1892, c. 14, s. 1.
176 (1898) 2 C.C.C. 57.
1771 Ibid., at p. 62.
178 (1900) 31 O.R. 150.
179 R.S.O. 1970, c. 151, s. 8(1):
The parties to an action and the persons on whose behalf it is brought,
instituted, opposed or defended are, except as hereinafter otherwise pro-
vided, competent and compellable to give evidence on behalf of them-
selves or of any of the parties, and the husbands and wives of such
parties and person are, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, competent
and compellable to give evidence on behalf of any of the parties. Section
1.(a) of the Act defines “action” as including “a prosecution for an offence
committed against a statute of Ontario …”
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ed by the Ontario High Court, in R. v. Greenspoon Bros. Ltd.8 0 It
seems clearly open to the Crown, in Ontario, to compel the defendant
to testify in a prosecution under a provincial statute.
The provision rendering the accused compellable also seems to
have fallen into disuse in Manitoba. In R. v. Ettenhofer Painting &
Decorating Ltd.,’ 81 the defendant company was charged with failing
to pay wages to an employee, contrary to the Construction Industry
Wages Act of Manitoba. The Police Magistrate allowed the Crown to
call the president of the company as a witness. The Manitoba Court
of Appeal quashed the conviction, and held that the common law
principle of non-compellability extended to companies and to their
officers. As the Editorial Note to the report indicates, the judgment
makes absolutely no reference to the provision in the Manitoba
Evidence Act expressly rendering the defendant compellable.
It may be significant that in both the Ettenhofer and Greenspoon
cases, the compellability issue arose with respect to officers of
corporations. It is difficult to find a recent example of its invocation
with respect to natural persons, in either of these provinces.18 If
one discards the highly implausible suggestion that the Crown is not
using the full extent of its powers out of a sense of fairness towards
the defendant, one might be forgiven for wondering whether most
Crown Attorneys are aware of the provision.’
The Saskatchewan experience has been particularly interesting.
A provision similar to that of Ontario was introduced in 1907,184
and considered in the Saskatchewan Court of King’s Bench in R.
v. Saunderson18 5 The defendant was convicted of making an illegal
sale of intoxicating liquor, contrary to the Saskatchewan Temper-
ance Act. He was called as a witness. Taylor, I. commented:
I have never before seen counsel for a prosecutor avail himself of this
statutory rule and compel an accused person to take the witness stand to
180 [1967] 3 C.C.C. 308, at p. 311, per Stark, J.:
… the common law rule has been clearly abrogated by the Ontario
Evidence Act in so far as offences under provincial statutes are concerned.
181 [19673 1 C.C.C. 386.
18 2 Nor do there appear to be examples of its application in Prince Edward
Island. On the issue of whether an officer of a corporation is an accused for
the purpose of section 4 of the Canada Evidence Act, see supra, n. 106, at
p. 30.
183 There are other possible considerations, of course. For example, if the
Crown calls the defendant, he probably gives up his right to impeach his
credibility, unless the defendant can be shown to be adverse: R.S.O. 1970,
c. 151, s. 24. Furthermore, in Ontario at least, most provincial offences are
prosecuted by police officers rather than Crown Attorneys.
184 S.S. 1907, c. 12, s. 24.
185 (1920) 24 C.C.C. 81.
1973]
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
be questioned as to the facts shewing his guilt, and where this course is
followed I feel that I ought to hold the prosecution strictly to the usual
procedure and grant no indulgences by way of amendment.186
An amendment was refused and the conviction was quashed.
Some forty years later, in Ayotte v. Wachowicz and Killam,’8 7
a defendant was called as a witness by the Crown and convicted.
Both Brownridge, J., in the Court of Queen’s Bench, and the Saskat-
chewan Court of Appeal,’ 88 agreed as to the right of counsel for the
Crown to call a defendant as a witness against himself. However
Culliton, S.A. added:
Nevertheless, the exercise of that right in a prosecution is most unusual
and, fortunately, one which is very rarely used. Where, however, the
prosecution insists upon the exercise of this right, it should be held
strictly to the provisions of the legislation under which such an unusual
course is taken. The calling of the accused to give evidence is, in my
opinion, an exceptional circumstance… 89
The appellant was, therefore, allowed to use certiorari to attack the
conviction, in spite of the strong authority holding that certiorari
should not be granted where there is a right of appeal.190
Perhaps the strong judicial attitude expressed in the Saskatche-
wan Court of Appeal in the Ayotte case, provides some insight into
the tendency of the Crown not to invoke their power to call the defen-
dant. The Saskatchewan Legislature also seems to have responded.
In 1964, the Saskatchewan Evidence Act was amended to provide
that “… no person is compellable, in a prosecution against him
under any Act, to give evidence against himself…”.191
The compellability of the accused in some of the provinces raises
a very interesting possibility with respect to offences under the
Criminal Code as well. Let us use the Ontario provision by way of
example.
The Ontario Evidence Act provides that “parties to an action and
the persons on whose behalf it is brought, instituted, opposed or
186 Ibid., at p. 86.
187 (1961) 35 C.R. 357.
188 (1961) 37 C.R. 13.
189 Ibid., at p. 17.
190 The conviction was quashed on another ground. The Saskatchewan pro-
vision with respect to compellability was coupled with another provision,
prohibiting the imposition of a term of imprisonment following a conviction,
where the accused had been compelled: R.S.S. 1953, c. 73, s. 31(3). Since the
Magistrate had imposed a fine, or, in default, a term of imprisonment, the
conviction was held to contain an error of law on its face and was quashed.
None of the other provinces which allow the accused to be compelled appear
to have a provision similar to the one referred to above.
191 S.S. 1964, c. 44, s. 3. Now R.S.S. 1965, c. 80, s. 33(2).
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[Vol. 19, No. I
defended are… compellable…,,.192 “Action” is defined to include
“… any other proceeding authorized or permitted to be tried, heard,
had or taken by or before a court under the law of Ontario”. 93 Thus,
if procedure in a criminal trial were within the legislative juris-
diction of the province of Ontario, the accused would be compellable.
But, of course, provincial governments do not have the power to
legislate with respect to criminal procedure. That lies with the
Parliament of Canada. 194
On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent the Parliament of
Canada from incorporating into its criminal procedure any provisions
in force in any of the provinces.’95 Does not, then, section 37 of the
Canada Evidence Act 19 6 operate to incorporate the compellability
provision into the criminal procedure to be followed in Ontario?
It provides:
37. In all proceedings over which the Parliament of Canada has legisla-
tive authority, the laws of evidence in force in the province in which such
proceedings are taken … subject to this and other Acts of the Parliament
of Canada, apply to such proceedings. [emphasis added]
It will be recalled that the non-compellability rule is applicable
federally, not because of any statutory provision, but because of
the operation of a common law principle which has never been
repealed.197 Clearly, the effect of section 37 is to make the provincial
law applicable in all situations (including those formerly covered by
the common law) except where there already exists a federal statu-
tory provision. Therefore, an accused should be compellable at his
criminal trial in Ontario. 9 ”
The proposition is, of course, rather shocking. In spite of the
clear wording of the sections, it is difficult to see our courts inter-
preting them as suggested above. The matter of inconsistency from
province to province should not be an inhibiting factor. There are
192R.S.O. 1970, c. 151, s. 8(1).
193Ibid., s. 1(a).
194The British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(27). R.S.C.
1970, App. II.
195 See, e.g., section 554 of the Criminal Code:
(1) A person who is qualified and summoned as a grand or petit juror
according to the laws in force for the time being in a province is qualified
to serve as a grand or petit juror, as the case may be, in criminal pro-
ceedings in that province.
196Supra, n. 92, at p. 28.
197Supra, at pp. 30-31.
198 The Prince Edward Island provisions are so similar that the same argu-
ment is applicable to them. The position in Manitoba could possibly be dis-
tinguished on the basis of the definition of “legal proceeding” in R.S.M. 1970,
c. El50, s. 2(f).
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
other examples of such variations in the Criminal Code. 19 The
“failure of comment” provision 2 00 might be interpreted as indicating
a clear intention not to make the accused compellable. However, it
could still operate where the Crown decided not to call the accused.
Nevertheless, if a Crown Attorney in Ontario is ever bold enough to
attempt to call an accused, he is likely to be met with an interpreta-
tion of the Canada Evidence Act, based upon the intention of the
legislators and maintaining the accused’s non-compellability.
The non-compellability of an accused at his trial has long been
considered basic to a fair trial in our system of criminal justice. In
the last section, it was suggested that it is a narrow procedural rule,
rather than a reflection of a more general right against self-incrimi-
nation operative in Canada. In this section, we have seen examples of
legislators in Canada eliminating the procedural rule as well 0′ Their
efforts have not been warmly received by the courts. But the courts
have accepted the validity of the accused’s compellability, as
they are bound to do where the legislators have spoken clearly.
Perhaps the approach of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, in
granting special indulgences to the appellant where he is the defen-
dant,20 2 or being more difficult where it is the Crown,2 03 reflects a
lingering functional self-incrimination principle. Or perhaps the
courts are merely expressing their opinion that, in balancing fairness,
the compellability of the defendant “tips the scales” too heavily in
favour of the Crown.
It is submitted that the issue of whether or not an accused should
be compellable as a witness really involves a value judgment as to the
kind of criminal justice system we want. The issue is the extent to
which we are prepared to allow individual freedom to be invaded, in
109 See, e.g., the provisions in Part XVII of the Criminal Code, particularly
with respect to grand juries.
200 Canada Evidence Act, s. 4(5), discussed supra, at pp. 33 et seq.
201 There have also been more subtle legislative encroachments upon the
rule, at both the federal and provincial levels, through the use of “reverse
onus” and statutory “presumption” clauses. While such an onus may be dis-
charged through cross-examination of Crown witnesses, or through calling
other defence witnesses, the practical consequence is usually to apply con-
siderable pressure upon the accused to testify. For references to such provi-
sions and a discussion of “quantum of persuasion”, see: Levy, Reverse Onus
Clauses in Canadian Criminal Law – An Overview, (1970-1971) 35 Sask. Law
Rev. 40. There appear to be no examples of the courts limiting such provisions
in any way through the application of a general principle against self-incrimi-
nation. See also: R. v. Appleway, (1922) 3 C.C.C. (2d) 354.
202 Ayotte v. Washowicz and Killam, supra, at p. 47.
2 03 R. v. Saunderson, supra, at p. 46.
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order to be more efficient in convicting offenders. To speak of every
man’s right against self-incrimination, or to repeat solemnly nemo
tenetur seipsum prodere, is merely to introduce an emotional “red
herring”.
VI. Self-incrimination by Witnesses
At common law, a witness other than the accused was required
to take the stand, but could refuse to answer a question when it
would, in the judge’s opinion, tend to expose him to a risk of a
criminal prosecution, a penalty or a forfeiture. 204 This rule reflects
the second aspect of the concept of self-incrimination as explained
by the Supreme Court of Canada in A.-G. Que. v. Begin.20
1
However, there is a significant difference between the common
law rule and the rule embodied in the Canada Evidence Act. At
common law, the witness could refuse to answer. Under the Canada
Evidence Act, the witness must answer but his testimony cannot
be used against him in future proceedings. 20 6
If an accused chooses to testify at his trial, he becomes a witness
for the purposes of section 5, so that he is entitled to the same pro-
tection as any other witness with respect to future proceedings.2 07
Perhaps the most important case interpreting the statutory pro-
vision is the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Tass v. The
204 See generally: Heydon, Statutory Restrictions on the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 87 L.Q.R. 214; the Ouimet Report, op. cit., at pp. 67-69.
205 Supra, at pp. 8-9.
200 R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10:
s. 5(1) No witness shall be excused from answering any question upon
the ground that the answer to such question may tend to criminate him,
or may tend to establish his liability to a civil proceeding at the instance
of the Crown or of any person.
(2) Where with respect to any question a witness objects to answer
upon the ground that his answer may tend to criminate him, or may tend
to establish his liability to a civil proceeding at the instance of the Crown
or of any person, and if but for this Act, or the Act of any provincial
legislature, the witness would therefore have been excused from answering
such question, then although the witness is by reason of this Act, or by
reason of such provincial Act, compelled to answer, the answer so given
shall not be used or receivable in evidence against him in any criminal
trial, or other criminal proceeding against him thereafter taking place,
other than a prosecution for perjury in the giving of such evidence.
Section 5(2) has been held not to extend to protect a witness who is com-
pelled to produce, under statutory compulsion, incriminating documents: R.
v. Simpson and Simmons, (1943) 79 C.C.C. 344 (B.C.C.A.).
2 07R. v. Mottola and Valee, (1959) 31 C.R. 4.
1973]
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
King.20 8 Tass appeared as a witness at a preliminary inquiry and
made certain admissions. In the course of his evidence, he raised no
objection nor claim for protection under section 5 of the Canada
Evidence Act. He was subsequently charged and convicted, largely
on the basis of those admissions made while he was merely a witness.
The Court upheld his conviction on the basis that he had failed to
claim the statutory privilege. Kerwin, J. pointed out that section 5:
… removes a safeguard a person had at common law to refuse to answer
any questions that might criminate him … objections have been raised
from time to time as to the possibility of the evidence acquired under the
Act being used to build up a case against a person who may be subsequent-
ly charged with an offence. However that may be, the matter seems quite
clear that if the person testifying does not claim the exemption, the
evidence so given may be later used against him, and this notwithstanding
the fact that he may not [have] known about his rights. 209
No mention was made of any more general operative principle
against self-incrimination.
The specific wording of section 5 makes it very difficult to have
excluded, at subsequent proceedings, testimony given without prior
invocation of the section 5 protection. Nevertheless, a variety of
attempts have been made.
In R. v. Mazerall,210 it was argued that such testimony was im-
properly admitted, because the voluntariness rule had not been
satisfied prior to its admission. In Boyer v. The King,211 an argument
was advanced that nemo tenetur… was operative, by virtue of its
adoption through the provincial laws of evidence. In R. v. Brown
(No. 2),212 the accused testified at his trial. A mistrial was subsequent-
ly declared, and he argued that to admit his testimony would violate
his privilege of non-compellability at his new trial.
In every case, the arguments were rejected and the plain words
of section 5 were applied. A number of references were made to nemo
tenetur…, but only to point out that section 5 had narrowed the
scope of the common law rule with respect to witnesses.
208 [1947] S.C.R. 103.
209 1bid., at p. 105, delivering the judgment of himself and Taschereau, I.
210 [1946] 4 D.L.R. 791 (Ont. CA.).
211 (1949) 7 C.R. 165 (Que. CA.).
212 (1963) 42 W.W.R. 448 (S.C.C.), adopting the reasons of Johnson, IA. in
(1963) 41 W.W.R. 129, at p. 138. Applied in: R. v. Bouffard, [1964] 3 C.C.C. 14
(Ont. CA); and R v. Dietrich, (1970) 11 C.R.N.S. 22 (Ont. C.A.). See also the
decision of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. McGregor, [1968]
1 Q.B. 371.
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In Re Regan,21 3 it was held that if a party to an offence (even a
conspiracy) is charged separately from other parties, he may be
compelled to testify against them:
A co-conspirator is in precisely the same position as any other accomplice
insofar as evidence is concerned. If they (co-conspirators) are proceeded
against separately, neither of them is a party to the proceedings instituted
against the other. Regan is not an accused person in the proceeding
against Tanner, and the provisions of the common law and statute ren-
dering an accused person on his trial not compellable as a witness for
the prosecution -gainst himself are therefore not applicable to him.
Insofar as any prosecution against Regan himself is concerned, he can
avail himself of the Provisions of s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act…214
The protection of section 5 in circumstances such as these is, thus,
considerably less than that available at common law.
The Ouimet Report commented on this limited protection:
A searching examination may … elicit facts or clues which enable the
case to be independently proved. Thus the abolition of the privilege of a
witness to refuse to answer on the ground that his answer may tend to
incriminate him places an additional and powerful weapon in the hands
of law enforcement.215
However, the Ouimet proposal in this area went no further than to
recommend that section 5(2) be amended to provide that any such
answers be inadmissible, unless the witness is advised of his right
to claim the exemption for future proceedings.
Even where the accused has not testified at an earlier trial, or
where there are no other parties to the offence, there still may be
ways for the Crown to take advantage of the “powerful weapon”
referred to above. The Mazerall and Boyer cases, for example, in-
volved testimony given prior to the criminal trial to a Royal Com-
mission established under the federal Inquiries Act.2 1 6 As the Mazerall
decision points out: “The Commissioners were expressly empowered
to summon before them any person or witness, and to require them
to give evidence on oath or affirmation…”. 21 7 The Ouimet Report 218
points out that other examples of federal statutes which authorize
the compulsory examination of witnesses are The Excise Act, The
Income Tax Act, The Combines Investigation Act and the Bankruptcy
Act.
213 [1939] 2 D.L.R. 135.
214 Ibid., at p. 144, per Archibald, J. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court
(Chisolm, CJ. and Doull and Smiley, JJ., concurring).
215 Op cit., at p. 68.
210 R.S.C. 1927, c. 99.
217 [1946] 4 D.L.R. 791, at p. 794.
2 18Op. cit.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
The Manitoba Court of Appeal considered the relevant provisions
of The Excise Act 219 in R. v. Demark.
‘ A large commercial still was
found on the farm of the accused. He and two others found sleeping
on the premises were charged separately with conspiracy to breach
the Excise Act. The Act provides, in part, that any officer designated
by the Minister may conduct:
… any inquiry or investigation in matters relating to the excise, and may
summon before him any person and may examine him and require him
to give evidence on oath … on any matter pertinent to such inquiry or
investigation.. 221
Prior to his trial, Demark was summoned:
… to testify the truth in -all matters within your knowledge relative to
the subject matters of a certain investigation or enquiry relative to the
Excise Act now pending before me concerning the dealings and affairs
of Paul Demark… [concerning] … violations of the Excise Act.222
The Court held by a majority of three to two that the accused could
not be compelled.
There are three different judgments, but it is submitted that the
best approach is that taken by Prendergast, CJ.M. He first considered
the decision in Re Regan, and concluded that the reason for holding
Regan a compellable witness was that the proceeding was not against
him. He then considered Demark’s position and concluded that
“…
the case here is altogether different. The proceeding in which
the accused was called upon to testify, is, as stated in the summons
itself, an investigation concerning his own violations of the Act.”2
Thus, the common law provision with respect to the non-compella-
bility of the accused was applicable to Demark.
It might be argued that the provisions of section 67, and in
particular the words “any person”, operate to override the common
law position and render an accused compellable in proceedings under
the Excise Act. However, that argument was rejected in R. v. Hicks. 4
Furthermore, the Criminal Code provisions dealing with the compell-
ability of witnesses also speak in general terms, 25 and they have
219 S.C. 1934, c. 52, s. 67; now R.S.C. 1970, c. E-12, s. 66.
220 [1939] 3 D.L.R. 386.
221 R.S.C. 1970, c. E-12, s. 66.
=s [1939] 3 D.L.R. 386, at p. 387.
223 Ibid., at p. 389.
224 [1946] 1 D.L.R. 796, esp. at pp. 807-808, per Taylor, I. (Sask. Q.B.).
225 Section 626(1):
Where a person is likely to give material evidence in a proceeding to which
this Act applies, a subpoena may be issued in accordance with this part
requiring that person to attend to give evidence.
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always been read as subject to the non-compellability of the accus-
ed.2 2 6
But what if Demark had been summoned for the purpose of
giving testimony with respect to the others, and not his own offence?
On the authority of Re Regan, he should be compellable. The dissent-
ing judgment 227 accepted that, in spite of the wording of the summ-
ons, that was what the Crown intended in summoning Demark, and
that, therefore, he was compellable. Chief Justice Prendergast
clearly indicated that he would take a similar approach in such
circumstances. He pointed out that his view did not in any way
curtail the powers of the Excise Officers under section 67:
… there should be no difficulty in drafting a summons in such form that
would compel one who is in all respects in the accused’s position to appear
and testify conformably with section 5 of the Evidence Act.228
Thus, the decision is consistent with the authorities referred to
above. 29
226 See: R. v. Bank of Montreal, (1962) 36 D.L.R. (2d) 45, at p. 49, per
Hutcheson, J. (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
2 2 7Robson, SA. (Dennistown, J.A., concurring). See also the somewhat
analagous approach taken in Re Sommervill, (1962) 37 C.R. 400 with respect
to s. 171 (now 183) of the Criminal Code which provides for the examination
before a justice of persons found in a gaming house, betting house,
common bawdy house … Disbery, J. of the Saskatchewan Queen’s Bench
said of the provision that its object and purpose “is to enable the Crown
to compel persons found in such premises at the time of the raid to give
information under oath with respect to two matters, and to two matters
only, namely, the purposes for which the premises were used, and any
matter relating to the execution of the warrant; for example, obstruction
or resistance offered to the police officers seeking to execute the warrant:
(1962) 37 C.R. 400, at p. 403.
228 [1939] 3 D.L.R. 386, at p. 389.
2 29 The remaining judgment is that of Trueman, S.A. He seems to proceed
on the basis that the accused was protected by the voluntariness rule with
respect to pre-trial police interrogation. That approach might find some sup-
port in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Guay v. Lafleur, [1965] S.C.R.
12, which held that a similar investigation under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 148, ss. 126(4),
(8), now R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-5, ss. 186 (4), (8), was “a
purely administrative matter which can neither decide nor adjudicate upon
anything… [It was]
… but a private investigation .. .”, per Abbott, J. at
p. 16, delivering the judgment of Taschereau, CJ. and Fauteux, Martland,
Judson and Ritchie, IS., as well as himself.
However, it seems clearly established that the confessions rule has no
application to the compellability of witnesses: supra, at pp. 9-10.
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The exclusion allowed by section 5(2) expressly extends to state-
ments made under the compulsion of provincial statutes. 30 There
are a great number of provincial statutes under which witnesses may
be compulsorily examined. 31 Although the federal government has
legislative jurisdiction over Criminal Law and Procedure,2 2 under
our distribution of powers, the legislatures have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the Administration of Justice2 m in their respective provin-
ces. As a result, the same persons are often involved in dealing with
both criminal matters and matters arising under provincial legisla-
tion. The opportunity therefore arises for a provincial statute author-
izing the examination of witnesses, to be used to advance an investi-
gation with respect to a criminal offence.
The incriminating consequences to an accused of such a procedure
are obvious, even if the testimony itself cannot be used at the crimi-
nal trial. The matter has received considerable judicial attention with
respect to coroners’ inquests.
=0 Supra, n. 206, at p. 50. The Evidence Acts of all of the common law
provinces have corresponding provisions: e.g., Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O.
1970, c. 151:
S. 9(1) A witness shall not be excused from answering any question upon
the ground that the answer may tend to criminate him or may tend to
establish his liability to a civil proceeding at the instance of the Crown
or of any person or to a prosecution under any Act of the Legislature.
(2) If, with respect to a question, a witness objects to answer upon
any of the grounds mentioned in subsection 1 and if, but for this section
or any Act of the Parliament of Canada, he would therefore be excused
from answering such question, then, although he is by reason of this
section or by reason of any Act of the Parliament of Canada compelled
to answer, the answer so given shall not be used or receivable in evidence
against him in any civil proceeding or in any proceeding under any Act
of the Legislature.
See -also: R.SA. 1970, c. 127, s. 7; R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 134, s. 5; R.S.M. 1970, c. 75,
s. 7; R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 74, s. 7; S.N. 1971, No. 48, s. 4; R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 94, s. 56;
S.P.E.I. 1955, c. 12, s. 1; R.S.S. 1965, c. 80, s. 35. The British Columbia, Manitoba
and Nova Scotia provisions contain specific references to documents. See
supra, n. 65, at p. 22. A similar position exists in Quebec, through the operation
of specific provisions such as section 11 of The Public Inquiry Commission
Act, R.S.Q. 1970, c. 11.
231 The McRuer Report (Royal Commission Inquiry Into Civil Rights), vol. 1,
(Ontario: 1968), chapters 32-36, exhaustively surveys
the relevant Ontario
statutory provisions, the powers by which such witnesses may be required
to attend to give evidence and the sanctions authorized for a refusal to be
sworn or to answer questions.
232British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(27).
233 Ibid., s. 92(14).
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The key case is Batary v. A.-G. Sask.2 4 There, the Crown sought
to compel Batary to testify at a coroner’s inquest, after he had been
charged with non-capital murder in connection with the same death.
The Supreme Court of Canada granted an order prohibiting any
coroner in Saskatchewan from requiring Batary to attend as a
witness, or give evidence at an inquest.
Mr. Justice Cartwright, delivering the judgment of the majority,2 3
held that at common law, a person charged with the murder of a
person into whose death an inquest was being held, could not be
compelled to testify at such inquest. The issue, therefore, was whet-
her the common law position had been competently altered.
On that question, he held that since the compellability of a person
charged with a crime was involved, the subject matter was criminal
law, within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal government.
Therefore, the Saskatchewan Coroner’s Act provision,238 which pur-
ported to alter the common law, was ultra vires the Saskatchewan
Legislature. In this connection he said:
Such legislation trenches upon the rule expressed in the maxim nemo
tenetur seipsum accusare which has been described (by Coleridge, J. in
R. v. Scott) as ‘a maxim of our law as settled, as important and as wise
as almost any other in it’.;3
It is interesting to note that even that often-quoted passage from
Coleridge, J. was taken from a dissenting judgment, and that the
maxim played no role whatsoever in the decision of the Court.
Finally, Cartwright, J. held that section 5 of the Canada Evidence
Act could not be interpreted to render such an accused person
compellable. The wording of the section was such that that interpre-
tation could only be reached by implication, and clear words would
be required to effect so fundamental a change.
The whole foundation of Mr. Justice Cartwright’s decision is the
assumption that because a person has been charged with murder,
his status as a witness at an inquest is altered. Fauteux, J., dissenting,
disagreed with that assumption and relied upon the rule “that the
competency and compellability of a person to be called as a witness
must be determined with reference to the particular proceeding in
which it is proposed to call the person as a witness, and not with
reference to some other proceeding… 2 38
=4 [1965] S.C.R. 465.
235 Taschereau, C.J.C., and Martland, Judson, Ritchie and Spence, J. con-
curring.
236 R.S.S. 1965, c. 106, s. 15; am. 1960, c. 14, ss. 2 and 3.
237 [1965] S.C.R. 465, at p. 478.
=8 Ibid., at p. 481.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
He cited as authority for that rule, Re Regan 2
9 (where persons
jointly indicted were tried separately and one was called as a witness
against the other). He pointed out that in such cases, “it is settled
law that neither one is regarded as an accused person or a party in
the trial against the others.” 240 In other words, the fact of having
been charged with an offence, even the same offence, is irrelevant
to a person’s status as a witness in proceedings against another.
8
Mr. Justice Cartwright made reference to the rule in Re Regan
as being clearly established. Yet, no attempt was made to distinguish
it. He does not seem to have considered it as any kind of impediment
to the opposite conclusion which he reached in Batary. It is sub-
mitted that the two decisions are incompatible, and that acceptance
of the Regan rule destroys the assumption upon which the majority
judgment in Batary is based.
In Batary, Cartwright, J. said:
It would be a strange inconsistency if the law which carefully protects
an accused from being compelled to make any statement at a preliminary
inquiry should permit that inquiry to be adjourned in order that the
prosecution be permitted to take the accused before a coroner and submit
him against his will to examination and cross-examination as to his sup-
posed guilt.241
Yet, the rule applied in Regan, and readily accepted by Cartwright,
J., permits that same accused, in the same circumstances, to be called
as a witness at the trial of his co-accused and, thus, to be submitted
against his will to questioning about his guilt.
It could be argued that the trial of the co-accused does not deal
with the guilt of the witness. But nor does the coroner’s inquest. Mr.
Justice Fauteux made that clear in his adoption of the following
passage from the judgment of Chief Justice Culliton in the Saskat-
chewan Court of Appeal:
While the Coroner’s Court is a criminal Court of record, it is a court
of inquiry, not of accusation, and the verdict of a coroner’s jury does
not bind any person whose conduct may be involved in its findings and
does not, in any way, constitute any adjudication of rights affecting either
person or property. There is no accused and there are no parties. Wolfe
v. Robinson.. 242
Mr. Justice Cartwright made no attempt to argue otherwise. In fact,
he concedes that it does not, but draws an analogy to the preliminary
239 Supra, at pp. 51-52.
240 [1965] S.C.R. 465, at p. 481. He also cited the recent decision of the
English Court of Appeal in R. v. Boal, R. v. Cordrey, (1964) 48 Cr. App. Rep. 342,
to the same effect.
241 [1965] S.C.R. 465, at p. 476.
242 [1964] 2 C.C.C. 211, at pp. 215-216. Adopted by Fauteux, J., at p. 486.
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inquiry situation. His analogy is far from complete when it is consi-
dered against the above passage.
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the basic assumption of
Cartwright, J. is incorrect in law. There is no authority supporting
the view that because a person has been charged with murder, his
status as a witness at another proceeding is altered. There is strong
authority to the contrary.
It could be argued that Cartwright, J. really made no such
assumption. The judgment might be interpreted as having accepted
the Regan rule as being generally applicable. The situation at a
coroner’s inquest would merely be explained as an historical excep-
tion to it. The problem with this interpretation is that the historical
conclusion was only reached by making the assumption in the first
place. In other words, one is led to the historical exception only by
starting with an assumption contrary to the rule in Regan, i.e., by
assuming that there is some relevance to the fact that the witness
is also an accused.
On the historical aspect of the judgment, it is perhaps significant
that no authority was cited indicating that the accused could not be
called as a witness at an inquest. Rather, the negative approach was
taken, that no case had been cited in which that had happened. But
if the person’s status as an accused is irrelevant, there would be no
reason to mention it.
Perhaps what is more important in this context, is the state of
the law with respect to witnesses historically. It will be recalled that
at common law, a witness did not merely have protection against his
testimony being used at a future proceeding. He could refuse to
answer. 4 3 In these circumstances, there would be little point in
calling an accused, or even a suspect, as a witness. It is submitted
that this is the true significance of the passage quoted by Cart-
wright, J. from Jervis on Coroners,2″ to the effect that an order to
compel a person to attend before a coroner and jury:
… will generally be made if the prisoner is not the party under accusa-
tion; or, if he is accused or suspected, then when he is desirous of making
a statement, and perhaps also when his presence is requisite for the
purpose of identification.245
The passage recognizes that an accused can be compelled, but also
recognizes the futility of calling him, unless there is an indication
that he will waive his right to refuse to answer.
243 Supra, at p. 50.
2-4 4th ed. Adopted by Cartwright, J., at p. 474.
245 At p. 214, emphasis added.
1973]
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However, even if the conclusion were correct that at common
law an accused could not be compelled to testify at an inquest, still,
the elimination of the assumption destroys the constitutional argu-
ment. If the witness is not an accused at the proceeding in question,
i.e., the inquest, then the provincial legislation compelling him to
testify is compelling him qua witness rather than qua accused.
Therefore, the province has the same legislative power with respect
to him, as to any other witness at a coroner’s inquest, and cannot be
said to be purporting to legislate with respect to criminal procedure.
Finally, if the Canada Evidence Act were applicable, he would be
a witness within the terms of section 5(1), just as the co-accused
was in R. v. Regan. He would be required to testify, but would have
the privilege under section 5 (2) of rendering his testimony inadmiss-
ible against him at his own subsequent criminal trial.
What is the significance of the majority decision in Batary? Is
it the harbinger of a revitalized right against self-incrimination? Or
is it merely to be recognized as representing an incongruous rule,
based upon the historical practice with respect to coroners’ inquests?
Is it possible that on a future occasion the Supreme Court of Canada
will agree that it proceeded upon an erroneous assumption and
reverse it completely?
The comment by Cartwright, J. about the inconsistency that would
result from requiring an accused to testify at an inquest 48 suggests
the importance of the policy of non-compellability with respect to an
accused. The suggestion is that since he is protected against being
compelled at his preliminary inquiry, the same policy should be
extended to the coroner’s inquest.
If the significance of the decision is to be related to a general
policy against compellability (or self-incrimination, if you prefer)
rather than historical anomaly, a number of consequences should
follow. The Regan rule should be abolished, since the inconsistency
with respect to a co-accused’s trial is as great as (if not greater than)
the inconsistency would be at a coroner’s inquests 47 In addition, the
policy should be applied where the person has not yet been charged,
but is a suspect. Otherwise, the Crown could circumvent the policy
by the mere expedient of delaying the laying of charges.
That, of course, leads to complications in determining whether
or not a person is a suspect. What is the effect, for example, of
finding that a witness is not a suspect and compelling him to testify?
Is he then immune from being charged? Would his testimony be
24o Supra, n. 241, at p. 57.
247 Supra, at p. 57.
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excluded at his trial even if he had not taken the protection of
section 5(2)? The existing authority suggests otherwise, but if the
general policy is functional, it should override specific rules which
are inconsistent with it. Decisions such as Tass v. The King 248 and
R. v. Mazerall249 would also have to be reversed.
Two British Columbia decisions raised some early promise of a
re-birth of the self-incrimination concept as a result of the Batary
decision. In Re Nelson and Jacobson,250 it was held that a person
charged with an offence under the provincial Motor-vehicle Act,
could not be compelled to testify at an inquest arising out of the
same accident as did the alleged offence. McIntyre, J. of the British
Columbia Supreme Court interpreted Batary as being based upon
broad policy considerations. He said: “The maxim nemo tenetur
seipsum accusare is not confined to cases involving death and is
the basis for the immunity which Cartwright J. found. ‘2 1
1
A similar approach was taken in Re Wilson Inquest.2 2 There, the
same Court applied Re Nelson and Jacobson, and extended the Batary
prohibition to a witness who had not yet been charged of any offence,
but who might reasonably be charged. Munroe, 3. said:
I hold that where, as here, the evidence of witnesses given at an inquest
indicates to one having knowledge of the law that a person may reason-
-ably be charged with an offence under the Criminal Code or under the
Motor-vehicle Act arising out of such death, such person cannot be com-
pelled in British Columbia to testify at an inquest inquiring into the death.
I paraphrase the language of Cartwright, J…. when I say, it would be a
strange inconsistency…25
He also spoke of the “privilege against self-incrimination” as
including “an option not to disclose self-incriminating knowledge or
evidence”. He cites no authority for that proposition and clearly the
contrary is embodied in section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act.
He pointed out that to hold otherwise would allow the Crown to
defer the laying of a charge, and allow the Crown to obtain informa-
tion from a witness which would not otherwise be available to the
Crown authorities, and added:
248 Supra, at p. 50-51.
249 Supra, at p. 51.
250 (1967) 1 C.R.N.S. 235; reported also as Re Maddess, [1967] 3 C.C.C. 284.
253 (1967) 1 C.R.N.S. 235, at p. 238; [1967] 3 C.C.C. 284, at p. 286.
252 (1968) 63 W.W.R. 108; reported also as R. v. Coroner of Municipality of
Langley, Ex parte Whitelaw, [1968] 4 C.C.C. 49.
253 (1968) 63 W.W.R. 108, at p. 111; [1968] 4 C.C.C. 49, at p. 53.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
If that is the law, the well-established privilege against self-crimination
of a person suspected of a crime rests upon a tenuous foundation –
the
whim of a prosecutor. 254
Of course, the same could be said with respect to a prosecutor’s
decision to try a co-accused separately. Presumably, Mr. Justice
Munro considered Batary to have overruled Regan as well as Tass v.
The King and R. v. Mazerall.
The problem with the approach taken in these decisions is that
they draw a great deal more from Batary than is warranted by Mr.
Justice Cartwright’s judgment.2 55 The decision in Re Wilson Inquest
was soon reversed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal,256 and
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused.2 5″
The Court of Appeal did not analyse in any detail the reasoning of
Cartwright, 1. in Batary. Rather, the majority judgments simply
254 (1968) 63 W.W.R. 108, at p. 110; [1968] 4 C.C.C. 49, at p. 52.
255 Re Nelson and Jacobson also seems to wander astray in its handling of
the constitutional issue. The reasoning is that since the Motor vehicle Act
offence was a crime, therefore, the power to compel the accused to testify
belonged to the federal government. But, with respect, that fails to take ac-
count of the constitutional fact that there are crimes over which the federal
government has jurisdiction and essentially “crimes” over which the provinces
have jurisdiction. Otherwise, it would be ultra vires the provinces to create
offences under their Motor-vehicle Acts at all. If the provinces can create
offences, there is no basis upon which they can be prevented from creating
the procedure to be followed with respect to such offences. In other words,
the compellability of a person charged with a “criminal” offence is neither
a federal nor a provincial power absolutely. It depends upon whether the
offence in question is within the federal or provincial sphere. Batary does
not decide otherwise. The witness was not compellable at the provincial pro-
ceedings because he was accused of a federal crime, i.e., non-capital murder.
The assumption that that status was relevant at the inquest led to the con-
clusion that the inquest was compelling him to give evidence which would
help to convict him at his criminal trial. Thus, it was an interference with
his criminal trial. The same can hardly be said of the Nelson and Jacobson
situation, where only a provincial offence, albeit a provincial “crime”, was
involved. Sirois, 3. seems to have fallen into the same error in holding that
because the Coroner’s Court is a criminal Court, the Canada Evidence Act
applies to its proceedings: Re Wyshynski, [1966] 2 C.C.C. 199, at p. 204.
(Although it would, of course, apply to provide protection at a subsequent
trial under the Criminal Code).
If my submission is incorrect, the provincial Evidence Act provisions ren-
dering a defendant compellable (discussed in the previous section) would be
ultra vires the provinces as well. But see: R. v. Greenspoon Bros. Ltd., [1967]
3 C.C.C. 308 (Ont. H.C.). See also: Faber v. The Queen, (1969) 6 C.R.N.S. 388
(Que. C.A.).
256 Re Wilson Inquest, Whitelaw v. McDonald and A.-G. B.C., (1968) 66 W.W.R.
522.
257Memoranda, [1969] S.C.R. xii.
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accepted Re Regan as being a correct general statement of the law.
The general approach taken is reflected in the following passage
from the judgment of McFarlane, J.A.:
I can find no reason to hold that the law as decided in Re Regan and
approved in Batary v. Attorney-General for Saskatchewan, supra, is in-
applicable in British Columbia. No authority, binding or persuasive, has
been produced in which it has been decided judicially that the principle
expressed in the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare applies so as to
exempt a person not charged with any offence from being compellable
as a witness at a coroner’s inquest.25 8
Thus, Batary is restricted to its specific factual situation and is,
perhaps, explainable as an exception to the general rule based upon
a historical anomaly, rather than upon a general principle against
self-incrimination.
The illogic of that approach has already been suggested,2 0 but
Batary is a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, and it is likely
to be some time before the Court will be prepared to reverse itself.
In any event, if the historical exception is mentioned often enough,
it will eventually become “fact”, so that the erroneous assumption
that led to it can easily be ignored. After all, what is “the life of the
law”?
This narrow interpretation of Batary had also been taken in an
earlier decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench in
Re Wyshynski.2 10 The driver of a vehicle involved in a fatal accident
was called as a witness at the inquest. No charge had been laid.
However, from the course of the evidence which had been presented
prior to Wyshynski having been called, it was clear that he was the
driver of one of the vehicles and that the collision occurred as a
result of his vehicle leaving his right side of the road, crossing over
the centre line and coming into contact with the deceased’s vehicle
on the opposite side of the road. Mr. Justice Sirois distinguished the
Batary decision:
The applicant was not charged with any offence at any time since the
accident; he was summoned as were the other witnesses to come and
testify at the inquest for the purposes of that Court. His position is very
much different from that dealt with in the recent case of Batary v. A.-G.
Saskatchewan… 261
He held that the accused was compellable.
258 (1968) 66 W.W.R. 522, at pp. 537-38. Davey, C.J.B.C. and Bull, JA. agreed
with McFarlane, JA. on this point, and Branca, J.A. gave similar reasons.
Nemetz, IA. dissented.
259 Supra, at p. 58.
260 [1966] 2 C.C.C. 199.
261 Ibid., at p. 203.
1973]
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
A similar approach was also taken recently by the Quebec Court of
Appeal in R. v. Quebec Municipal Commission, Ex parte Longpre.262
The accused had been charged under the Criminal Code with being
involved in a system of bribes to members of municipal councils. He
was committed to trial following a preliminary inquiry. Subsequent-
ly, an inquiry was ordered under the Public Inquiry Commission
Act,21 and the accused was subpoenaed as a witness.
Brossard, J.A., delivering the deciding judgment,26 4 isolated the
issue as being whether:
… a person against whom criminal proceedings are pending [can] be
compelled to testify at any trial, inquiry, or proceeding other than one
whose outcome may involve his conviction, where such testimony concerns
facts relating to the criminal offences with which he has been charged,
and where the answer which he might give to the questions which might
be put to him for these purposes could, in his opinion, constitute a con-
fession of his guilt with respect to the offences with which he has been
charged2 65
He answered in the affirmative, and distinguished the majority
decision in Batary on the basis that, in Longpre, a coroner’s inquest
was not involved, and the preliminary inquiry had been completed.
Thus confining the majority judgment, he relied upon the dissenting
judgment in Batary (together with the Regan and Barnes decisions)
as a correct statement of the general rule.
Of course, if the earlier submissions are correct with respect to
the erroneous assumption upon which Batary may have proceeded,
the best approach simply would be to overrule Batary and adopt the
dissenting judgment of Mr. Justice Fauteux, now Fauteux, C.s. That
result may not be an impossibility in view of the changed constitu-
tion of the Court, the subsequent cases interpreting Batary and the
rather short shrift that has been given lately, by the Supreme Court
of Canada, to any suggestions of a general principle against self-
incrimination. Nevertheless, in the context of past experience, at
least, it would probably be considered more discrete simply to treat
the decision as a narrow historical exception.
No comment has yet been made with respect to policy conside-
rations in this area. Is it not, in fact, unfair to compel a person to
testify in the various circumstances just discussed, when he is
facing a criminal charge? But even if it is, isn’t that precisely the
effect of the specific wording of provisions such as section 5 of the
262 [1970] 4 C.C.C. 133.
263 R.S.Q. 1964, c. 11.
264 Montgomery and Rivard, JJ., concurring.
205 [1970] 4 C.C.C. 133, at p. 137.
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Canada Evidence Act? Even if it were never contemplated that such
sections would be used to advance a criminal investigation, under our
distribution of powers, isn’t that for the respective provincial ad-
ministrations to decide?
A number of these and related questions arose out of the recent
violence in Quebec. The Quebec Fire Investigations Act 20 was used
as an investigatory technique, following the rash of bombings which
occurred in Quebec in 1968. Considerable publicity also surrounded
the 6 month jail sentence for contempt of court which Lise Rose
received for her refusal to testify at the inquest into the death of
Pierre Laporte.07 At the time, her brothers Paul and Jacques Rose
were fugitive kidnapping suspects.
However, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss these
questions. The inquiry here is to determine whether there is a right
against self-incrimination in Canada, in any practical sense.
It is submitted that this examination of the authorities with res-
pect to the compellability of witnesses is consistent with the other
areas examined, in yielding little evidence of a general common law
right against self-incrimination operative in Canada today. Section 5
has eliminated the common law privilege of witnesses to refuse to
testify in certain circumstances. It also allows the Crown to compel
the accused to assist in advancing the prosecution against himself
in a number of situations. From the very introduction of these legis-
lative restrictions, our courts have tended almost uniformly to accept
them without any reservations based upon any general principle
against self-incrimination.
260See also: The Queen v. Coote, (1873) 4 L.R.P.CA. 599, an early Privy
Council decision interpreting the compellability powers of Fire Commissioners
under Quebec Statutes, 31 Vict., c. 31; and 32 Vict., c. 29.
267 See, e.g., Toronto Globe and Mail, Dec. 2, 1970, at p. 9.
More recently, the testimony of Giles Eccles at the Coroner’s Inquest into
the death of Linda Livingstone (arising out of the fire at Montreal’s Blue
Bird Club on Sept. 1, 1972) indicated that he could well be indicted in the
matter. See, e.g., the report in the Toronto Globe and Mail, Sept. 14, 1972. The
testimony of lean-Marc Boutin at the same Inquest amounted to a clear con-
fession of guilt: Toronto Globe and Mail, Sept. 21, 1972. [More recently, Boutin
and James O’Brien pleaded guilty to non-capital murder and Eccles pleaded
guilty to manslaughter charges arising out of the incident]. Finally, the Quebec
Police Commission hearings on organized crime and the Ontario royal com-
mission hearings investigating crime in the construction industry will un-
doubtedly raise the same questions.
1973]
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
VII Constitutional Questions and the Canadian Bill of Rights
Perhaps it is not surprising, in the context of our constitutional
framework, that any concept of a general right against self-incrimi-
nation which might be said to exist has had few practical conse-
quences. Specific consequences in our legal system tend to flow
from legislation rather than directly from constitutional principles.
It is true that in the area of criminal law, common law rules and
principles are expressly recognized 268 as being applicable in Canada.
But in practice, as we have seen, that has tended to mean well-
crystallized rules 26 9 rather than dynamic principles.
Because of the federal nature of our country the courts are
often in the position of limiting the legislative power of one level
of government in .a particular area. But that is in no way an
absolute limitation upon such a power. Rather it is, in effect, a
declaration that the other level of government has the power to
legislate in that area.
The other main approach which has been used by our courts
to limit legislative power has been a limitation upon the scope or
operation of legislation. As Dean Tarnopolsky recently stated:
The restrictive interpretation technique arises out of the relationship
between Parliament and the judiciary which we inherited from Great
Britain whereby, because of the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy,
the courts do not have the right to invalidate an Act of Parliament on
the ground of its arbitrariness, or its alleged contravention of civil
liberties. Nevertheless, the courts have used a principle of statutory inter-
pretation whereby the common law rights of the subject cannot be re-
stricted by ambiguous statutes. The presumption is against the imposition
of taxation, or the imposition of penal sanctions, or the taking away of
common law rights, unless the words of the statute are clear. Thus, if
the courts have any choice in interpreting a statute which is not clearly
and precisely drawn, the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation urge
them to protect civil liberties270
Of course, there is nothing legally to prevent a legislature from
subsequently enacting explicit legislation to override a restrictive
interpretation by the courts.
268 Criminal Code, section 7(3):
Every rule and principle of the common law that renders any circumstance
a justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge continues in force
and applies in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Act or any
other Act of the Parliament of Canada, except in so far as they are altered
by or are inconsistent with this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of
Canada.
269 E.g., the non-compellability of the accused: supra, at p. 42.
2 7 0 Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights from Diefenbaker to Drybones,
(1971) 17 McGill L.. 437, at pp. 438-39.
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There may be some question as to whether, in applying the “re-
strictive interpretation technique”, the courts have as yet reached
the stage at which they are governed by as broad a principle as
that stated by Dean Tarnopolsky. Certainly the common law de-
velopment has tended to be along the lines of specific “cubby-
holes”, such as the imposition of taxation or the imposition of
penal sanctions, as he has suggested. It may well be preferable for
the courts to be governed by a more general principle, 71 and it
may even be that they are so governed, albeit tacitly.
Nevertheless,
interpretation” approach has
achieved few practical consequences in maintaining a general
common law right against self-incrimination.
the “restrictive
It is true that there are clear examples of its application in
this area. For example, where statutes have purported to make
“any person” compellable, the courts have interpreted the phrase
as not including a person whose guilt is the subject matter of the
proceedings 72
But, in most cases, the courts have not presumed in favour of
a right against self-incrimination. There are significant examples
of a movement in the opposite direction. In Gosselin v. The King,
the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the non-compellability
of the accused as having been eliminated by implication. Parliament
had to enact specific legislation to re-institute the common law
protection which the courts had eliminated. 73 The courts have also
greatly weakened the protection offered by section 4(5) of the
Canada Evidence Act, again, indicating a tendency in the opposite
direction with respect to the common law right against self-in-
crimination.2 74
The performance of the English Courts has recently been as-
sessed with respect to situations where, in Canada, section 5(2)
271 Cf. Friedman, Statute Law and Its Interpretation in the Modern State,
(1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 1277, at p. 1298:
The presumption [with respect to penal statutes] is probably still appli-
cable in the case of common law crimes, whether consolidated by statute
or not, but it should be discarded in the case of modem statutory offences
which are a special type of ‘social purpose’ statute.
Thus, to take an extreme example, the presumption should not apply to
protect the rights of an individual against whom a complaint has been made
under the Ontario Human Rights Code: R.S.O. 1970, c. 318.
272 R. v. Hicks, supra, at pp. 53-54. There is also a reference to this approach
by Cartwright, J. in Batary v. A.-G. Sask, but it does not seem to be the basis
upon which the decision was made: supra, at p. 56.
27 3 Supra, at p. 30.
274 Supra, at pp. 30 et seq.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
of the Canada Evidence Act, or the corresponding provincial provi-
sions, would be applicable. 75 In the absence of such a general
provision in England, it has fallen to the courts to determine the
extent to which the testimony of a witness can be used against
him at a subsequent proceeding. As the author states:
Briefly, the problem is that the statutes which make compulsory the
giving of information are seldom precise as to the admissibility of the
information in subsequent proceedings.2 71
He concludes:
So whenever the courts have to consider the meaning of a vague statute
in connection with this problem, no general rule can be deduced from
the wording of the statutes which expressly save something of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination to prove that the privilege has been abro-
gated by the vague statute: there are examples on which converse reason-
ing could be based. And the examples are sufficiently numerous on either
side to prevent either view prevailing.2 7 7
The author cites section 5(2) of our Canada Evidence Act as
“a good example” of a situation in which “the express words of
the statute make the parliamentary intention quite plain”.278 Thus,
in this area at least, our courts have had considerably less room
within which to manoeuver than have the English Courts.
This leads us to a consideration of the extent to which the
Canadian Bill of Rights 2 9 has given our courts the power to apply
a general right against self-incrimination. At first there was some
debate on the question of whether or not a “mere statute” could
operate to override or restrict the operation of other legislation.
However, the “believers” seem to have been vindicated by the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Drybones.2 0
The section in the Bill of Rights which deals with self-incrimi-
nation provides:
s.2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act
of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the
Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate,
abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringe-
ment of any of the rights and freedoms herein recognized and declared,
275 Heydon, Statutory Restrictions on the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
(1971) 87 L.Q.R. 214.
276 Ibid., at p. 215.
217 Ibid., at pp. 227-28.
271bid., at p. 229.
279 8-9 Eliz. II, S.C. 1960, c. 44; now R.S.C. 1970, App. III.
280 [1970] S.C.R. 282. See generally, Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights,
(Toronto: 1966); and his more recent article, The Canadian Bill of Rights from
Diefenbaker to Drybones, (1971)
17 McGill L.I 437, in which most of the
Canadian articles dealing with Drybones are cited.
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and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as
to … (d) authorize a court, tribunal, commission, board or other authori-
ty to compel a person to give evidence if he is denied counsel, protection
against self-crimination or other constitutional safeguards.
It must, of course, be kept in mind that since the Canadian Bill
of Rights is a federal statute it can have no application to provin-
cial legislation.281
Prior to the “breathalyzer” cases, there had been numerous
attempts by counsel to have the courts apply section 2(d) in a
variety of situations.2 2 All were unsuccessful.
However, the only decision which in any way attempted to
analyze the section was R. v. Lavoie.28 In that case, Schultz, Co.
Ct. J. concluded that the words “or other authority” in section
2(d) were ejusdem generis “a court, tribunal, commission, board”
and, therefore, did not include a police officer. He also decided
that “evidence” might be defined “as the testimony of witnesses
for the purpose of proving or disproving facts in legal proceed-
ings” 28 so that statements made by an individual, to a detective
on a street, would not constitute “evidence” under the section. The
British Columbia Court of Appeal 28 5 agreed with his reasons and,
in particular, with his interpretation of the words “give evidence”.
The Supreme Court of Canada had its first real opportunity to
consider section 2(d) in Reference Re Proclamation of Section 16
of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69. 8 The constitutional
reference involved the new “breathalyzer” legislation under which
peace officers were given the right, in certain circumstances, to
demand that drivers submit to a breathalyzer test. It became an
offence to fail or refuse to comply with such a demand or to drive
or have the care or control of a motor vehicle, after having con-
sumed alcohol in such a quantity that the proportion of it in the
281 Canadian Bill of Rights, section 5(2); R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282,
at p. 297. Thus, it can have no application to the provincial Evidence Act
provisions discussed supra, at pp. 42 et seq.
2 82 R. v. Steinberg, [1967] 3 C.C.C. 48 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Pearson, (1968) 66
W.W.R. 380 (B.C.S.C.), re. “wiretap” evidence; R. v. Corning Glass Works of
Canada Ltd., (1972) 16 C.R.N.S. 329 (Ont. CA.), re. the compellability of an
officer of an accused corporation; R. v. Lavoie, (1972) 5 C.C.C. (2d) 368 (B.C.
CA.), re. the requirement to “give a good account” under section 175(1)(c) of
the Criminal Code. See generally, Tarnopolsky, op. cit., for decisions with
respect to related Bill of Rights provisions, such as 2(c) (ii) –
right to counsel,
2(e) –
right to fair hearing, and 2(f) – presumption of innocence.
283 (1971) 2 C.C.C. (2d) 185.
2 84 Ibid., at p. 195.
285 (1972) 5 C.C.C. (2d) 368.
286 [1970] 3 C.C.C. 320.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
blood exceeds a prescribed limit. A number of evidentiary presump-
tions were also created, including the presumption that, if certain
conditions were satisfied, evidence of the results of a chemical
analysis of a sample of the accused’s breath, taken with the breath-
alyzer, is proof of the proportion of alcohol in the accused’s blood
at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed.2 87
The main issue in the reference was whether or not the pro-
visions had been validly proclaimed. Argument with respect to
section 2(d) seems to have been limited to an objection to the
presumptive provisions. Only Mr. Justice Laskin referred to the
argument with respect to section 2(d), and said of it that:
… if it is not premature [it] suggests that a person accused under the
newly proclaimed ss. 222 or 224 of the Criminal Code may be compelled
to criminate himself. That is simply not so. There is no compellability of
an accused to self-crimination by reason only of the statutory prescrip-
tions for presumptive proof of facts in issue.288
In his detailed analysis of the decision, Phillip Stenning ex-
pressed some surprise that potential attacks upon the legislation
under section 2(d) were not considered more fully. He suggested
that:
Indeed, if a legal duty to provide a sample, which can be later used against
one in criminal proceedings, backed by the threat of a fine of up to one
thousand dollars or imprisonment for up to six months, or both, for
failure or refusal to provide such sample does not amount to compella-
bility, it is difficult to see what could. 8 9
With the increased application of the breathalyzer provisions
defence counsel increasingly resorted to the Canadian Bill of Rights
and section 2(d), in particular, was thrust into prominence. 90
Within a period of a few months in 1971 the Courts of Appeal
of at least four provinces handed down decisions in which section
2(d) was considered.29′ All of them rejected the arguments that the
287 Criminal Code, ss. 222 to 224 (now ss. 235-237). See generally, Stenning,
The Breathalyzer Reference, (1969-70) 12 Crim. L.Q. 394.
288 [1970] 3 C.C.C. 320, at p. 340.
289 (1969-70) 12 Crirn. L.Q. 394, at p. 412.
29 0 For more general comments upon section 2(d) in this context, see:
McIntosh, Self-Incrimination and the Breathalyzer, (1971-72) 36 Sask. Law
Rev. 22.
291R. v. Curr, (1971) 4 C.C.C. (2d) 24, per Fraser, I. (appeal to the Ontario
Court of Appeal dismissed without recorded reasons on May 21, 1971), whose
reasons were adopted by the latter court in R. v. Brownridge, (1971) 4 C.C.C.
(2d) 462, at p. 475; R. v. Ness, (1971) 4 C.C.C. (2d) 42 (Sask. CA.); R. v. McKay,
(1971) 4 C.C.C. (2d) 45 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Urchyshyn, (1971) 4 C.C.C. (2d) 481
(Alta. C.A.). The legislation was also considered in relation to other provisions
of the Bill of Rights in some of these decisions and in R. v. Russell, (1971)
4 C.C.C. (2d) 494 (N.S.C.A.) and R. v. Duke, (1971) 4 C.C.C. (2d) 504.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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section limited the operation of the legislation. Various reasons
were stated in the various judgments but the approach taken in
the Lavoie case was generally adopted with respect to the phrases
“other authority” and “give evidence”.
In addition to arguments based upon the specific wording of
section 2(d), argument was also advanced that at the time the Bill
of Rights was enacted, a person could not be compelled to give a
sample of his breath. Therefore, this non-compellability with respect
to breath samples was to be included in the definition of self-
incrimination under section 2(d) or was a right recognized and
protected by section 5(1) of the Bill. It provides:
5(1) Nothing in Part I shall be construed to abrogate or infringe any
human right or fundamental freedom not enumerated therein that may
have existed in Canada at the commencement of this Act.
But this argument was also rejected, on the basis that the effect
of the Bill is to protect the rights and freedoms enumerated and
specified therein. It does not purport to protect every statutory
right in existence at the time the Bill was passed, but which fell
outside those enumerated freedoms.292
Relying largely upon A.-G. Que. v. Begin,29 3 the conclusion was
reached that the taking of physical evidence did not fall within
the voluntariness rule. Nor did it fall within the definition of “self-
crimination” according to the Begin case which included only the
non-compellability of the accused and the Canada Evidence Act,
section 5(2), protection. Thus, it could not be elevated to the status
of a right protected under the Bill, merely because it was a statu-
tory rule in existence at the time the Bill was enacted.
The Curr decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada 9 which upheld the decision of the Ontario Court of
Appeal and refused to “sterilize” the breathalyzer legislation through
the application of section 2(d). The main judgment is that of
Laskin, J. whose reasons were concurred in by 6 of the other 8
justices who sat.295
Mr. Justice Laskin did not consider section 5(1) of the Bill of
Rights in any detail. His reference to it suggests that counsel did
292See generally, R. v. Curt, (1971) 4 C.C.C. (2d) 24, on this argument.
293 Supra, at p. 7.
294 [1972] 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181.
295 The Chief Justice adopted the narrower approach taken by Ritchie, J.,
while Abbott, Martland, Hall, Spence and Pigeon, JJ. concurred with Laskin, J.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
not press argument on this aspect very strenuously.29 6 However,
he does make it clear that the Bill “did not freeze the federal
statute book as of its effective date.. .,,297 so that the fact that
some protection was embodied in a statute prior to the enact-
ment of the Bill would not, of itself, render that protection a right
which was also protected by the Bill.
It was argued before the Supreme Court that the legislation
was rendered inoperative by virtue of the “due process” clause in
section 1(a) of the Bill. However, after a brief romp through the
more prominent U.S. decisions dealing with the “due process” pro-
visions in its constitution, Mr. Justice Laskin concluded that sec-
tion 1(a) could not “be taken to include in its protection an
extension of the privilege beyond what is found in section 2(d)”.2
It was also argued that the legislation was a denial of the
“protection of the law” provision in section 1(b). But Laskin, 1.
found no merit in this position, “based as it is on the ‘frozen
statute book’ theory”. 99
Focusing upon the specific wording of section 2(d), he concluded
that the words “other authority” could not be interpreted to in-
00 In the course of another excursion through
elude a peace officer
the U.S. cases, this time with respect to the Fifth Amendment, he
mentions that the protection in our section 2(d) relates to “the
giving of evidence at the behest of a court or like tribunal” by
the person entitled to the protection.30 1 In effect, he has, thus,
adopted the position taken by the provincial Courts of Appeal
which dealt with these phrases and which, in turn, had adopted
the decision of Schultz, Co. Ct. J. in the Lavoie case.
Either of those two conclusions with respect to the interpreta-
tion of section 2(d) would have been sufficient to dispose of the
206 [1972] 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181, at p. 188:
The reference by counsel for the appellant to s. 5(1) was not amplified by
any indication of a tenable ground thereunder for questioning the operative
effect of ss. 223 and 224A(3) of the Criminal Code.
297 Ibid., at p. 187.
298 Ibid., at p. 202.
299 Ibid., at p. 194.
300 Ibid., at p. 197.
301 Ibid., at pp. 199-200. Later he comments:
I leave for future consideration the scope of the term ‘evidence’ since thig
is not a matter that arises in the present case.
It is not clear what he is referring to here but from the passage quoted
above and his reference to Rand, J. in Reference re Validity of section 92(4)
of the Vehicles Act, 1957 (Sask.), [1958] S.C.R. 608, at p. 618, he presumably
accepts that “evidence” must at least bear a “testimonial character”.
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matter. However, Mr. Justice Laskin, very laudably, goes on to
offer an explanation as to the scope of the provision:
I cannot read s. 2(d) as going any farther than to render inoperative any
statutory or non-statutory rule of federal law that would compel a person
to criminate himself before a court or like tribunal through the giving
of evidence, without concurrently protecting him against its use against
him… This view of s. 2(d) means, in the case of an accused person, that
he cannot be made a compellable witness unless the Canadian Bill of
Rights is expressly by-passed for that purpose as provided in the opening
words of s. 2 thereof.;02
Thus, in effect, he ascribes to section 2(d) exactly the same meaning
given to the privilege against self-incrimination in A.-G. Que. v.
Begin.30 3 In other words, it includes, first, the privilege of an ordinary
witness not to have his testimony used against him at a future
proceeding; and, secondly, the privilege of a person, whose guilt is
being considered at a particular proceeding, not to be required to
testify at that proceeding.
However, in giving that interpretation to section 2(d), a problem
arises which is not discussed by Laskin, J.. It is that the wording of
the section seems to be drawn more narrowly than the definition of
self-incrimination in Begin. There is no problem with respect to the
first aspect, i.e., the protection given by section 5(2) of the Canada
Evidence Act. But can section 2(d) be interpreted as limiting legisla-
tion which would purport to render an accused compellable? The
phrase “self-crimination” in section 2(d) cannot be considered in
isolation but the questioned provision must be read “as a whole. 80 4
In other words, can “protection against self-incrimination” in
section 2(d) be interpreted as meaning “protection against being
compelled to give evidence”? If so, one has the following provision
that:
…no law… shall… authorize a court..,
to compel a person to give
evidence if he is denied.. protection against being compelled to give
evidence…
It is submitted that such an interpretation is not only awkward but
is self-contradictory to the extent that a meaning cannot be placed
on it. The better view must be that the section in no way restricts
legislation compelling any person (including an accused) to testify
provided he is not “denied counsel, protection against self-crimina-
tion [i.e., provided the Canada Evidence Act, section 5(2) protection
is not eliminated] or other constitutional safeguards”.
302 Ibid., -at p. 201. The words of section 2 to which he refers are:
… unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada
that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights …
303 Supra, at pp. 7-9.
304 R. v. Curr, [1972] 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181, at p. 195, per Laskin, 3.
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SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
It might be argued that it would be meaningless from a policy
viewpoint to give a person protection with respect to future proceed-
ings but not with respect to the very proceedings at which he is
testifying. But that is not necessarily the case, since the provision
compelling him to testify could then only be used for the specific
purpose authorized by the legislation embodying the compulsion,
and not for any future purpose.
It might be possible that the non-compellability aspect could be
protected through the “due process” provision in section 1(a) of
the Bill. However, the comments of Laskin, J. with respect to section
1(a) suggest that it could not be used for that purpose. He said:
I do not think that s. 1(a), where there is no reference to thif privilege
and whose words provide no historical warrant for embracing it can be
taken to include in its protection an extension of the privilege beyond
what is found in s. 2(d).305
While that statement was made on the basis that the non-compella-
bility provision was contained in section 2(d), still, it is a comment
upon the scope of the “due process” provision and it is difficult to
see how that scope can be expanded, simply because another provi-
sion might turn out to be more narrow than might have originally
been expected.
Perhaps section 5(1) 316 is more promising in this respect. Cer-
tainly the non-compellability of the accused has historical warrant
to be classified as a fundamental right. But the survey in this article
of its treatment by the courts and, indeed, some of the provincial
legislatures, clearly suggests that its current status is somewhat less
than the lip service paid to it.
Furthermore, section 5(1) refers to fundamental freedoms “not
enumerated” in Part I. Since “self-crimination” is enumerated, that
would seem to preclude it being incorporated through section 5(1).
Moreover section 5(1) might be interpreted as merely preventing the
Part I provisions from narrowing existing law rather than actually
expanding those Part I provisions. On this interpretation, together
with the one just suggested, section 5 (1) would, for example, prevent
section 2(d) of the Bill from being interpreted as actually abrogating
the accused’s privilege of not giving evidence.
If the non-compellability provision were incorporated through
section 5(1), one might ask what other provisions would also be
incorporated. Certainly the voluntariness rule with respect to ad-
missions by an accused is a well established privilege historically. It
305 [1972] 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181, at p. 202.
3 0 Supra, at pp. 70-71.
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is true that it has not been considered as an aspect of the self-
incrimination concept in Canada 3O but, under section 5(1), that is
unnecessary. There are, in addition, many other well-established rules
of criminal procedure that perhaps should also be incorporated
through section 5(1) if the non-compellability of the accused is to
receive such treatment.
Of course, it is always possible for the courts to interpret section
2(d) as protecting non-compellability in spite of the more specific
language which appears in the section. Indeed, Laskin, J. might have
been suggesting a broader scope for a more creative interpretation
of section 2(d) at the trial or “proceedings” stage when he said:
The point in the criminal process at which the privilege can be asserted
is one thing; what the privilege embraces at that point is something else.
It is my conclusion that the point of assertion has been fixed in s.
2(d) …08
However, even if Mr. Justice Laskin were to be prepared to broaden
section 2(d) in this manner, it might be doubtful that a majority of
the Court would agree.
Assuming, then, that the non-compellability of the accused is
neither included in section 2(d) nor incorporated through another
section of the Bill of Rights, what scope of operation can the provi-
sion have? Obviously, it can have no application where Parliament
passes legislation which is expressly declared to “operate notwith-
standing the Canadian Bill of Rights” 809
A clear example of the section’s application might be with respect
to legislation which authorized the compelling of witnesses to give
evidence at certain proceedings and provided that such evidence
could be used for any purpose at any future proceedings. Such
legislation would, in effect, override section 5(2) of the Canada
Evidence Act with respect to the proceeding at which the evidence
was taken. But section 2(d) of the Bill of Rights should render such
legislation inoperative.
The remedy flowing to such a witness would likely depend upon
whether or not the compellability provision were severable from the
provision respecting use at future proceedings. If it were not
severable, presumably, the witness could simply refuse to testify.
If it were severable, presumably, he would have to testify but could
simply claim the protection of section 5(2), in the usual manner, in
spite of the provision with respect to use at future proceedings.
307 A.-G. Que. v. Begin, supra, at pp. 7-9.
308 [1972] 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181, at p. 203.
309 Section 2, supra, n. 302. The references to legislation in the examples
below assume that the legislation does not have “notwithstanding” provisions.
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What if a witness were simply to testify in accordance with such
legislation without claiming section 5(2)? Could his testimony be
used against him in future proceedings? In ordinary circumstances
section 5(2) must be invoked if its protection is to be obtained and
there is no requirement on the part of the court to bring it to the
witness’ attention 10 But perhaps here it could be said that the
testimony was compelled “unlawfully” so as to render it inadmissible
under R. v. Scott.311
All of the same considerations should apply where the legislation
compelled a witness and stated that he was not entitled to counsel
at the proceeding in which the evidence was taken.
Does the protection of section 2(d) only apply to future legisla-
tion? Suppose for example that a witness is compelled under existing
legislation to testify but nothing is said in the legislation about
counsel. At the proceedings in question the witness appears with
counsel but the judge or other person conducting the proceedings
refuses to permit counsel to be present.P Perhaps this denial could
also be considered to be an unlawful compulsion so as to permit
the witness to refuse to testify or to render any testimony given
inadmissible in future proceedings.
The same considerations probably do not apply to a situation
where, under existing legislation, the person conducting the proceed-
ing purports to refuse to grant the witness the protection of section
5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act. What that person does, or does not
do, is irrelevant. The protection flows directly from section 5(2)
and is operative if it is invoked. The bestowal of its protection does
not depend upon the actions of the person conducting the proceed-
ings.3 13
310 Supra, at pp. 50-51.
311 (1856) Dears & Bell 47, at p. 59; 169 E.R. 909, at p. 914, per Lord Campbell,
C.J.:
If the party has been unlawfully compelled to answer the question, he
shall be protected against any prejudice from the answer thus illegally
extorted; but a similar protection cannot be demanded where the question
was lawful and the party examined was bound by law to answer it.
Of course, the second part of that statement is not applicable in Canada
because of the express provisions of section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.
312See the similar factual situation in Re Sommervill, (1962) 37 C.R. 400
(Sask. Q.B.). The use of the word “denied” suggests that there must be a
request and a refusal rather than a mere absence of counsel for the section
to be applicable.
313 Baxter v. The King, (1952) 15 C.R. 265 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Prestyro, (1950)
9 C.R. 276 (B.C.C.A.). Cf. R. v. Hicks, [1946] 1 D.L.R. 796 (Sask. K.B.).
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The phrase “other constitutional safeguards” in section 2(d) is
so broad that it would be futile to offer, here, a suggestion as to its
meaning. It may be doubtful that any real meaning can be given
to it at all, but that question must await judicial consideration.
Thus, it does not appear that the Canadian Bill of Rights will have
the effect of creating a general right against self-incrimination in
Canada. Its operation in this area seems generally limited to inhi-
biting future legislative encroachments upon section 5(2) of the
Canada Evidence Act. It might also, through a stretched interpreta-
tion, have the same effect with respect to the compellability of an
accused. But it does little to broaden the operation of those rules,
as discussed earlier in this article. The one example given of section
2(d), having an operative effect other than with respect to future
legislation, reflects more a right to counsel than a right against self-
incrimination.
Conclusion
It is difficult to say that there exists in Canada today, a general
right against self-incrimination in any functional sense. We do have a
number of specific rules such as the voluntariness rule with respect
to confessions, the non-compellability rule with respect to the accus-
ed and the rule embodied in section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence
Act. But the courts have treated these as specific rules rather than
as reflections of a more vigorous principle. Indeed, the courts seem
to have bent over backwards in some situations to allow encroach-
ments upon the rules.
R. v. Balsdon is an exception. Perhaps there are other similar
decisions but, if so, they are rare. It is difficult to treat Balsdon as
being very significant when it is considered in the context of the
total performance of the courts in this whole area.
The actual decisions seem so overwhelmingly
to reject any
dynamic principle against self-incrimination in Canada that one
might have thought it unnecessary to bother even considering whet-
her it did exist. But we have seen enough examples of judicial tribute
to the concept to make the inquiry necessary. Indeed, the conclusion
that there is no such “right” in Canada may come as a surprise
to some.
What, then, is the significance of these judicial references? Are
they merely thrown in by counsel to “shore up” an argument in some
vague way and then repeated in judgments for similar reasons?
Perhaps it is useful to use the phrase, “right against self-incrimina-
tion”, or the maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, as descriptive
1973]
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
77
of the totality of specific rules in this area. Perhaps they could be
said, when taken together, to indicate a view which our system as
a whole takes against self-incrimination. But if there is such a view,
it is speckled to an extent that, to refer to it, is more likely to create
confusion than to assist in any way. Furthermore, the phrases carry
with them a high level of emotional content that can only con-
fuse issues. It would be better to speak only in terms of the specific
rules. The general description in section 2(d) of the Bill of Rights
and the limited scope of operation which it represents warrants
particular caution.
All of this is not to say that a general right against self-incrimi-
nation is not desirable. It may well be, but that is another question.
For the time being, it is sufficient to submit that there is little point
in speaking of an existing general right against self-incrimination in
Canada.
