La détention préventive du repris de justice en droit criminel canadien

La dMtention preventive du repris de

justice en droit criminel canadien

Jean-Guy Boilard *

INTRODUCTION

Les dispositions que nous retrouvons aujourd’hui aux articles 659
A 667 du code criminel ont fait leur apparition dans notre lgislation
p6nale le 17 juillet 1947 dans la <,
(11 Georges VI, chapitre 55, article 18.) Ce premier texte fut suivi
d’importants amendements qui donn~rent naissance aux dispositions
actuelles.

C’est en Angleterre qu’il nous faut rechercher les origines de la
l6gislation canadienne. La consommation abusive des boissons alcoo-
liques semble avoir incit6 le parlement anglais A adopter en 1898
The Inebriates Act (61 et 62 Victoria, ch. 60) qui cr6ait des centres de
r~forme oi l’on gardait durant une p~riode de trois (3) ans les alcoo-
liques inv~t6r~s.

L’auteur de Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law.’ mentionne le cas
de Jane Cakebread, morte en 1898, avec, A son palmarfs, 281 condam-
nations d’ivresse; Eleanor Larkin qui, en 1920, en 6tait h sa 2286me
condamnation, et le cas d’une autre femme qui brisa tous les records,
en r~ussissant A amasger 404 emprisonnements distincts pour ivresse.
Cette premiere forme de dMtention preventive se solda par un

6chec.

Malgr6 cet insuccs, le lgislateur anglais adoptait en 1908 < (8 Edw. VII, ch. 59) qui permettait d’im-
poser, A une personne condamn~e d’un crime par un jury qui le
d6clarait 6galement criminel d’habitude, une sentence de dMtention
preventive pour une p~riode de cinq A dix ans. Le l6gislateur canadien
s’inspira de cette loi pour promulguer en 1947 le premier texte cana-
dien de dMtention preventive.

Toutefois, la legislation anglaise de 1908 semble avoir W l’objet
de plusieurs critiques. On lui reprochait entre autres la courte p6riode
d’incarcration qui s’av~rait insuffisante pour les criminels endurcis;

Avocat au Barreau de Montr6al, ancien substitut permanent du procureur

gdndral.

1 18th Ed. 1962, page 620.

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[Val. 13

d’autre part, les tribunaux 6taient A quelques occasions r6ticents A
condamner doublement le pr~venu qui se pr~sentait devant eux. De
la sorte, lev pouvoirs que conf6rait cette loi furent rarement utilis6s
et, encore une fois, les protagonistes de cette l6gislation furent frus-
tr~s. La loi de 1908 fut abrog6e en 1948 et remplace par <>, art. 21-3. Ce nouveau texte pr6voit une incar-
c6ration de cinq (5) A quatorze (14) ans; il est A remarquer que
]a legislation canadienne ne d6termine pas la dur6e de l’incarc-
ration, mais en fait une dMtention de dur6e ind6termin6e revis6e
chaque ann6e par le ministre de la Justice (art. 666), et la Commis-
sion deg Lib6rations Conditionnelles, suivant 1958, 7 Eliz. II, ch. 38,
article 24 (5).

Les lgislations instituant la dMtention preventive, qu’elles soient
anglaises ou canadiennes, r~pondent toutes A un mgme besoin et
visent 6galement un m6me objet. Le criminel qui, par ses condamna-
tions r6p6t6es d6montre qu’il est un 8tre anti-gocial et une menace
constante pour le public, ne peut plus s’attendre A b~n6ficier de la
cl6mence des tribunaux ou des organismes para-judiciaires; les cri-
t~res classiques qui pr6sident A l’imposition d’une sentence tels que
repris rcemment par la Cour d’Appel d’Ontario dans la cause de
R. v. Wilmot 2 … ne peuvent plus s’appliquer dans son cas. Une seule
chose importe A ce moment, c’est de le mettre hors d’6tat de nuire A
la 5oci6t6 par ses d6pradations multiples, en l’incarc6rant pour une
p6riode de temps ind6finie. C’est en ces termes que s’exprime l’auteur
de Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law:3

The great object of criminal law is to prevent crime; hence, if any particular
offender has been convicted so frequently as to make it clear that he
cannot be kept from crime through the medium of either reformation or
deterrence, it remains only to effect that prevention in a direct way, by
placing him in a seclusion where it will be impossible for him to repeat his
offences. Unless so secluded, he
,ill not only continue his offences, but will
also train others to offend, and will moreover transmit his aptitudes to a
tainted posterity.
La Cour d’Appel anglaise par la voix de son juge en chef exposait

la m~me opinion en 1952 dans la cause de R. v. Churchill:4

The object of preventive detention is to protect the public from men or women
who have shown by their previous history that they are a menace to society
while they are at large. There comes a time when it
is not a question of
punishment, for that has been shown to be of no use, but of a necessity to
put these offenders in confinement so that they can no longer prey upon
the public. Parliament, therefore, obviously intended that in the case of

2 [1967] 1 C.C.C. 171.
3 Supra, p. 620, no 786.
4 36 C.A.R. 107 A ]a p. 110.

No. 4] DRTENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 559

such persons a court should be empowered to pass a longer sentence than
it otherwise would have done, for the protection of the public, and should
also be able to send a prisoner to preventive detention for a longer term
than would otherwise have been lawful under the statute against which he
had offended.
Cette 16gislation r6pond donc h un besoin et est de nature 6gale-
ment A inciter plusieurs criminels A se chercher un nouveau travail.
D’aucuns ont dout6 dans le pass6 et en particulier lors de discussions
sur la retention ou l’abolition de la peine de mort, du caract~re dissua-
sif, ou de l’exemplarit6 des sentences. Sans pour autant entrer dans
cette pol6mique, je crois que l’utilisation fr6quente de la 16gislation
de dMtention pr6ventive ne peut avoir qu’un effet salutaire aupr~s
de la population criminelle; il est probable que les sentences usuelles
impos6es par nos tribunaux, consid6rablement abr6g6es par suite des
remises statutaires de peine suivant bonne conduite, et l’intervention
de la Commission des Lib6rations! Conditionnelles, ne parviennent pas
toujours A convaincre les criminels de changer de m6tier. Cependant,
l’6ventualit6 de procedures de dMtention pr6ventive est, A mon sens,
salutaire et de nature A faire r6fl6chir sinon A dissuader compl~tement
plusieurs personnages dont le patrimoine criminel egt devenu fort
important.

Le recours aux dispositions des articles 659 et suivants du code
criminel ne s’est pas encore g6n6ralis6 au Canada, bien que cette
l6gislation existe depuis quelques ann6es d6jA. Seule la Colombie
Britannique et, en particulier, la ville de Vancouver, a fait un usage
consid6rable et, je dirais, avec succ~s, de ces proc6dures; le tableau
qui suit le d~montre fort 6loquemment.

L’on n’a 6galement qu’A consulter les diff6rents r6pertoires de
jurisprudence en droit penal pour s’apercevoir imm6diatement que la
Colombie Britannique fait pratiquement cavalier seul dans ce domaine.
Tout r6cemment, le Procureur G6n6ral de la Province de Qu6bec
d6cidait, de concert avec le Directeur de la sfiret municipale de
Montr6al et de la sfiret6 provinciale du Qu6bec, d’avoir recours A ces
proc6dures beaucoup plus fr6quemment que par le pass6 et, A date,
une requite de dMtention pr6ventive est d6jA inscrite A lMontr6al.

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Report on Habitual Criminal Cases –

1967

1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

Totals

(to
date)

140

168

* Number of cases concluded

(a) Magistrates’ Court
(b) County Court
(c) TOTAL:

* Number sentenced

to preventive
detention as habitual
criminals:

* Number adjudged
habitual criminals
but not so sentenced:

* Number not adjudged

habitual criminals
by trial court:

* Number considered

but not proceeded with:

* Number pending

in the courts
at: April 30, 1967:

* Number under

consideration but
no application made
by: April 30, 1967:

* Total cases concluded

by judgment or decision
not to prosecute
(1) & (5):

* Total cases pending

(6) & (7):

* Results in Court of
Appeal (all appeals
by accused) Dismissed:

Allowed:

Abandoned:

* Abandoned by prosecution

–

1″

–

8
2

20
9
3

2
4
0
on primary

after service (appeal
conviction allowed)
service not effected (accused
escaped –

time ran out)

” Abated – Austin Tarleck (suicide) –
* Stayed – Maureen Gilbert, Joseph Bryan

Joseph Bernier (suicide)

TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES TO DATE –

329

R. vs. McGrath –
SCC in 1962.

allowed in B.C. C of A in 1961 –

restored by

2
2
2

No. 4] DISTENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 561

Nature des procedures de dMtention preventive

Avant de consulter l’interpr~tation jurisprudentielle donn6e A
cette nouvelle l6gislation, il serait sans doute opportun d’examiner
les termes m~mes de l’article 660. En effet, cette disposition se lit
comme suit:

660. (1) Lorsqu’un accus6 a 60 d~clar6 coupable d’un acte criminel, la cour
peut, sur demande, imposer une sentence de dMtention preventive au lieu
de toute autre sentence qui pourrait 6tre inflig~e pour l’infraction dont il
td ddclar6 coupable ou qui a Rd impos~e pour une telle infraction, ou en
a
sus de toute sentence qui a 6t6 imposde pour cette infraction au cas oil la
sentence aurait pris fin, (art. 33(1), ch. 43, 9-10 Eliz. II, 1961) si
a) l’accus6 est reconnu repris de justice, et
b) La cour estime que, l’accus6 6tant un repris de justice, il est opportun
pour la protection du public de le condamner A la d6tention prdventive.

(2) Aux fins du paragraphe (1), un accus6 est repris de justice,

a) si, depuis qu’il a atteint l’ge de dix-huit ans, il a antdrieurement, dans
t6 ddclar6 coupable
au moims trois occasions distinctes et ind6pendantes,
d’un acte criminel pour lequel il 6tait passible d’un emprisonnement de cinq
ans ou plus et qu’il m~ne continfiment une vie criminelle; ou
t6 condamn6 h la ddtention prdventive.

b) s’il a antdrieurement

(3) L’accus6 a droit d’etre prdsent h l’audition d’une demande prdvue

par le paragraphe (1) (art. 33(2), ch. 43, 9-10 Eliz. II, 1961).
A la lecture du premier paragraphe Pon remarque imm6diatement
que la Cour, sur demande faite par le Procureur G6n6ral, > Cependant, l’alin6a b) du
paragraphe (1) de l’article 660, du moins dans sa version frangaise,
peut causer une difficult6 d’interpr6tation. En effet, on y lit que la
Cour peut << condamner A la dMtention preventive >>. Cependant, si
‘on r~f~re au texte anglais, l’on se rendra vite compte que la signi-
fication de > est bien de sentencer; en effet, le texte
anglais mentionne >.

Comme nous le voyons, les textes sont suffisamment clairs pour
nous justifier de dire que la technique de d6tention preventive n’est
pas une nouvelle offense cr6e par le l6gislateur, mais bien un nou-
veau mode de dMtention. Toutefoig, avant de quitter ce sujet, il serait
sans doute int6ressant d’examiner Popinion 6mise par les tribunaux
canadiens sur ces dispositions.

Dans R. v. Gordon5 la Cour d’Appel d’0ntario d~cidait que les
proc6dures privues aux articles 659 et suivantg du code criminel ne
constituaient pas un proc~s oii devait 6tre d6termin6e l’innocence ou
la culpabilit6 de l’accus6, mais bien plut~t une enquite pour d6cider

G [19641 3 C.C.C. 180.

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si l’intim6 est un repris de justice et, dans l’affirmative, s’il est
opportun de le sentencer A la dMtention pr6ventive:

The proceedings being in effect an inquiry rather than a trial where the
guilt or innocence of an accused is in issue, the various sections of the Code
relating to the strict rules of procedure which should be followed at trials
would not be applicable.

The proceedings in this case might be of a less formal kind, so long as

the accused is given a fair hearing.
La Cour Supreme du Canada confirmant cette d6cision unanime
de la Cour d’Appel de l’Ontario,0 d6clarait, danv un jugement majo-
ritaire, que l’avis de motion pr6sent6 dans cette cause requ6rant une
sentence de dMtention pr6ventive en plus de la sentence impos~e
pour l’offense initiale, alors qu’il aurait fallu lire au lieu de la sentence
initiale, ne constituait pas un vice de forme suffisant pour justifier
la cassation de ces procedures’. I1 est int6ressant, cependant, de noter
la dissidence de
‘honorable juge Cartwright qui, se r6f6rant A une
d6cision ant6rieure de la m~me cour dans Parkes v. La Reine,7 6met
l’avis que les proc6dures de dMtention pr6ventive doivent 6tre suivies
scrupuleusement, de telle sorte que la moindre erreur peut devenir
fatale et justifier la cassation de ]a requ~te.

Cependant, si nous relisons cette d6cision de la Cour Suprame dans
Parkes, nous constaterons que ce jugement fut rendu A l’6poque oii
‘article 662(2) du code criminel sp6cifiait que l’audition de la requate
de dMtention pr6ventive devait pr~c6der l’imposition de la sentence
pour ‘offense donnant ouverture A une telle requite. Or, dang cette
affaire, le juge de premiere instance s’6tait vu remettre un rapport
pr6sentenciel contenant les condamnations ant6rieures de
‘accus6
ainsi qu’une preuve de reputation. Et c’est apr~s avoir eu en main
ce rapport et pos6 des questions h
‘accus6 que s’instruisit ‘audition
sur la requ~te de dMtention pr6ventive A proprement parler. Les juges
de la Cour Supreme ont unanimement cass6 le verdict de premiere
instance qui avait 6t6 maintenu par la Cour d’Appel d’Ontario pour
le motif que l’on avait contrevenu aux dispositions expresseg de
l’article 662 et que l’accus6 n’avait pu recevoir A ce moment-lh une
audition juste et 6quitable de sa cause. C’est en ces termes d’ailleurs
que s’exprimait l’honorable juge Fauteux aux pages 96 et 97:

Whether or not an accused is a habitual criminal and, by reason of this fact
should, for the protection of the public, be sentenced to detention in a
penitentiary for an indeterminate period, involves an important issue of
fact which must be heard and determined according to law. Under the
imperative provisions of s. 662(2) of the Code, the hearing and determination

6 (1965) 4 C.C.C. 1.
7 116 C.C.C. 86; 24 C.R. 279; [1956] S.C.R. 768.

No. 4] DETENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 563

of this issue must take place before sentence is passed for the offences of
which the accused is convicted. The reason for this order of precedence
established in the procedure is to assure the effective operation of all the
safeguards which, both by the method of inquiry and by the rules of evidence,
attend the trial of any issue and, more particularly, to exclude definitely
any possibility that the Judge entrusted with the matter be, until it is
finally determined, adversely influenced in any degree by facts or repre-
sentations of which, once an accused is convicted, he may, without the same
safeguards, be apprised for passing a sentence.

In the present instance, the sentence for the offence of which the appellant
was convicted was actually pronounced after the hearing and determination
of the issue related to preventive detention. However, prior to such hearing,
the Judge, for the purpose of determining what sentence he should impose,
received from the prosecution and exacted from the defence, in a most
exhaustive manner, information of a character highly damaging to the
accused. In the result, when the subsequent hearing of the issue related to
preventive detention commenced, his mind was no longer free, in the measure
it should have been, had the provisions of s. 662(2) been complied with, and
the effective exercise of the right which the appellant had, on the hearing
of such issue, to remain silent and hold the prosecution strictly to its
obligation to prove its case according to rules of procedure and rules of
evidence, was henceforward jeopardized.
C’est done dans cette perspective que doit 6tre lue et interpr6t6e
la dissidence de l’honorable juge Cartwright dans la cause de Gordon.

Quelques ann6es auparavant, le m6me tribunal confirmait ce qui
d’ailleurs apparaissait clairement dans les textes de loi, que les pro-
c6dures de dMtention preventive n’6taient pas une nouvelle offense
criminelle cr~6e par le l6gislateur, mais bien un nouveau mode de
sentence.

Brush V. R. 8
La Cour Supreme du Canada fut saisie du probl6me suivant: la
personne qui 6tait l’objet de procedures de dMtention preventive
pouvait-elle, it l’instar d’un accus6 inculp6 d’une offense criminelle,
faire option pour voir la requite entendue devant un juge seul ou
un juge avec jury. La Cour Supreme majoritairement d6cida que le
l6gislateur canadien n’avait pas cr,66 une nouvelle offense criminelle,
mais que plut6t il avait cr66 une nouvelle forme de dMtention. C’esA
d’ailleurs en ces termes que l’honorable juge en chef Rinfret concluait,
apr~s avoir r6f6r,6 A la cause anglaise de R. v. Hunter.9

P. 342. Adopting the language of the Earl of Reading, the sections of the
Criminal Code referred to were “not creating a new offence”, but just
enabling the Court to pass a further sentence if the accused was found to
be an habitual criminal.

8105 C.C.C. 340.
9 [1921J 1 K.B. 555.

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Malgr6 sa dissidence dans ]a cause de Brush, l’honorable juge
Cartwright devait quelque trois ans plus tard se rallier A la majorit6
et d6clarer que le fait de d6clarer quelqu’un criminel d’habitude
n’6tait pas le condamner pour un crime:

It is true that a finding that a person is an habitual criminal is not a
conviction of a crime.1 0
Plus r6cemment, deg tribunaux d’appel canadiens ont reconnu ce

caract~re particulier des proc6dures de d6tention prfventive. 11

Par ailleurs, si ‘on compare le texte du troisi~me paragraphe de
l’article 660 permettant A 1accus6 d’etre pr6sent lors d’une demande
de dMtention preventive, avec l’article 557 qui requiert la pr6sence
d’un accus6 en Cour durant tout son proc&s, l’on sera A m~me de
constater imm6diatement que les proc6dures de dMtention pr6ventive
ne constituent pas un proc6s A proprement parler, mais bien plut6t
l’imposition d’une sentence particulire justifi6e par un 6tat de faits
judiciairement constat6 chez un individu; c’est la conclusion A la-
quelle arriva la Cour d’Appel de Colombie Britannique dans ]a cause de
R. v. Hadden.i12

Elments A dcider lors de telles procedures

Lors d’une demande de dMtention pr6ventive, quels sont les 61-
ments que le tribunal doit d6terminer avant d’imposer une telle
sentence? L’article 660 en mentionne deux, A savoir: reconnaitre
l’intim6 comme repris de justice et estimer qu’il est opportun pour
la protection du public de lui imposer une sentence de dtention
preventive.

Ces deux facteurg, comme nous le verrons plus tard, doivent 6tre
6tablis par la poursuite au-delh d’un doute raisonnable et font partie
d’une seule et m~me procedure; par consequent, il est inexact de
soutenir que la d6termination du caract~re de repris de justice doit
faire l’objet d’une audition et, par la suite, il devrait y en avoir
une autre o& l’on consid6rerait l’opportunit6 d’imposer A l’intim6 une
sentence de detention pr6ventive. Ces deux pr6liminaires sont des
conditions sine qua non A rimposition d’une sentence de dMtention

10 Kirkland v. R. 117 C.C.C. 1; 25 C.R. pp. 101 h 107.
11 R. v. Jones (Cour d’appel de Colombie Britannique) [1966] 2 C.C.C., p. 370;
R. v. MacNeill (Cour d’appel de Colombie Britannique) [1966] 2 C.C.C., p. 268;
R. v. Wilson (Cour d’appel de Colombie Britannique) [1965] 1 C.C.C., p. 255;
R. v. Gordon (Cour d’appel d’Ontario) [1964] 3 C.C.C., p. 180; R. v. Henderson
(Cour d’appel de Colombie Britannique) [1964] 3 C.C.C., p. 99; R. V. MacKnight
(Cour Supreme de Colombie Britannique) 124 C.C.C., pp. 296 i 299.

12 [1966] 1 C.C.C. 133.

No. 4] DBTENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 565

preventive; elles doivent 6tre l’objet de ddcision judiciaire et, ce, au
cours d’une m~me audition. C’egt d’ailleurs l’opinion formulae par la
Cour d’Appel de Colombie Britannique dans la cause de R. v. Wilson.13
Bien que les procddures de dtention pr6ventive ne constituent
pas A proprement parler un proc~s oil devrait 6tre d6cid6 la culpabilitM
d’une personne comme nous l’avons vu plus haut, il reste, cependant,
que la poursuite, lors de telles procedures, doit se d6charger du
fardeau de prouver chacun de ces 6l6ments hors de tout doute rai-
sonnable.

Kirkland v. R., Cartwright, J.: 14
Bearing in mind that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of every
reasonable doubt it is my opinion that there is not sufficient evidence to
support the finding of the learned County Court Judge that the appellant
was an habitual criminal.
La Cour d’Appel de Colombie Britannique reprenait cet 4nonc6
dans R. v. Jeffries,15 R. V. Morgan,’16 R. v. MarcouX 17 et R. v. Buc-
kingha ,.’ s

R~f~rant A la decision de la Cour Supreme dans Kirkland, la Cour
d’Appel de Colombie Britannique mentionne clairement que ces deux
pr6liminaires A une sentence de detention preventive devaient 6tre
prouvdes au-delh de tout doute raisonnable:

R. v. Channing:19
Likewise, it is undesirable for us to lay down detailed tests of the sufficiency
of evidence to prove either that an accused is an habitual criminal or that
it is expedient for the protection of the public that he be sentenced to pre-
ventive detention. All that is required is that the evidence be sufficient to
prove both’these essential matters beyond a reasonable doubt to the satis-
faction of the Magistrate or trial Judge. Where the principal evidence relied
upon by the Crown consists of an accused’s record, the commission of the
substantive offence, and the circumstances surrounding it, a small but signifi-
cant circumstance not included in those mentioned by Cartwright, J., in
Kirkland v. The Queen may be sufficient properly to satisfy the trial Judge
that both those points have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, subject
of course to an appeal upon a question of fact.
Le mgme tribunal r~itdrait ces principes dans R. v. Sparrow,20
I1 peut arriver dans certains cas que l’on 6tablisse hors de tout
doute raigonnable que l’intim6 est un repris de justice, sans pour

13 [1965] 1 C.C.C. 255.
14 25 C.R. 101 A 110.
15 [1965) 1 C.C.C. 247.
16 [1966] 2 C.C.C. 390.
17 [1966) 1 C.C.C. 389.
18 [1965) 2 C.C.C. 229.
19 [1966) 1 C.C.C. 97, aux pages 100 et 101.
20 [1966] 4 C.C.C. 137.

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autant se d6charger du fardeau de d6montrer le second 6l6ment, A
savoir qu’il est opportun d’imposer une sentence de dMtention proven-
tive. Ce fut le cas dans les causes suivantes: R. v. Mulcahy 21 et
Mac Neill.2

Nous venons de voir que pour r6ussir dans 5a demande, ]a pour-
suite devait prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’intim6 6tait
une repris de justice et qu’il 6tait opportun pour la protection de la
soci6t6 de lui imposer une sentence de d6tention pr6ventive. Qu’est-ce
donc qu’un repris de justice au sens de ces dispositions? Le 16gis-
lateur d6finit au paragraphe 2 de Particle 660 le repris de justice
comme 6tant celui qui, depuis qu’il a atteint l’Age de dix-huit ans a
ant6rieurement, dans au moins trois occasions distinctes et ind6pen-
dantes, 6t6 trouv6 coupable d’actes criminels punis’sables d’un em-
prisonnement de cinq ans ou plus et qui m~ne continfiment une vie
criminelle; ou encore, ce sera celui qui aura 6t6 ant6rieurement
condamn6 A une sentence de d6tention pr6ventive. Cette derni6re
partie de la d6finition ne pr6sente aucune difficult6. En effet, si
l’intim6 a d~jA 6t6 l’objet d’une sentence de d6tention pr6ventive et
que, par suite d’une d6cision du ministre de ]a Justice ou, plus exac-
tement, de la Commission des Libfrations Conditionnelles,
il est
remis en libert6, la poursuite sera dispens6e de reprendre toute ]a
preuve qu’elle avait offerte A cette occasion ant6rieure et l’intim6 est
A ce moment consid6r6 comme un repris de justice.

A la lecture de Particle 660, l’on se rend compte qu’avant d’ins-
tituer de telles proc6dures, il faut avoir au moins quatre (4) offenses
criminelles, soit: ]a condamnation pour l’offense substantive ou l’of-
fense primaire, qui conf6re A la cour juridiction pour entendre ]a
requite de d6tention preventive, et les trois offenses ant6rieures
distinctes et ind6pendantes punigsables par cinq (5) ans ou plus
d’emprisonnement. La Cour d’Appel de Colombie Britannique recon-
naissait d’ailleurs ce qui apparait clairement A Particle 660 dans
la cause de: R. v. Dilon.23

… to permit a sentence of preventive detention, s. 660(1) (as amended by
1960-61, c. 43, s. 33(1) requires that the accused be “convicted of an indictable
offence”, and s. 660(2) (a) requires that “he has previously.., on at least
three separate and independent occasions been convicted of an indictable
offence”, etc. Therefore Code s. 660 requires a conviction on at least four
indictable offences, namely, the substantive offence under Code s. 660(1)
and, previously, three offences under Code s. 660(2).

21 Confirm6 par la Cour Supreme du Canada, 42 C.R. 1 aux pages 7 et 8.
22 [1966J 2 C.C.C. 268.
23 44 C.R. 244.

No. 4] DITENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 567

Une opinion semblable 6tait exprim6e par la m me cour dans

R. v. Ball.2

La Cour Supreme du Canada pour sa part, dans la cause de
‘article

Harnish v. R.25 avait d6jh reconnu cette interpretation de
660 en ces termes:

It is to be remembered, however, that an accused must have been convicted
of the substantive offence before the Court can hear the application to which
the notice relates (see s. 660(1)). Such conviction is, therefore, not one of
“the previous convictions” referred to in s. 662(1)(a)(ii) but the conviction
upon which the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the application is founded.
The object of the notice is to prevent the accused from being taken by
surprise as to the circumstances upon which the prosecution intends to rely,
but as the statute itself makes consideration of the substantive conviction
a prerequisite to the hearing of the application, the Court is also entitled
to treat it as a material circumstance in reaching its conclusion on the merits
of the application whether such conviction is specifically mentioned in the
notice or not.
Puisque la notion de repris de justice d6pend en partie de l’exis-
tence de trois (3) condamnations ant6rieures distinctes et ind~pen-
dantes passibles d’au moins cinq (5) ans d’emprisonnement, faut-il
conclure que l’offense substantive qui permet A la cour d’6tre saisie
de telles procedures doit 6galement 6tre une offense passible de cinq
(5) ans d’emprisonnement ou plus? Si l’on r6f~re au premier para-
graphe de Particle 660 dans sa version frangaise, nous constatong
qu’il est suffisant que l’intim6 ait 6t6 trouv6 coupable d’un acte
criminel pour conf~rer A la cour juridiction. La version anglaise men-
tionne indictable offence>>; done, d’apr6s les textes, il ressort que
la condamnation sur une offense << indictable >> ou poursuivable par
voie de mise en accusation serait suffisante pour permettre A la cour
d’entendre une requite de detention pr6ventive. La Cour d’Appel de
Colombie Britannique soutient la m~me interpr6tation de l’article 660
dans R. v. Sneddon: 26

It was contented that the sentence of preventive detention is in error in
that Code, s. 660(1) (am. 1960-61, c. 43, s. 33(1) should be read as requiring
the substantive offence to be “an indictable offence for which he was liable
to imprisonment for five years or more”, and consequently this accused is
not liable to preventive detention as the substantive offence was theft not
exceeding $50 (s. 280(b)) for which he was liable to imprisonment for two
years only. It was argued that unless this construction be adopted, an accused
convicted of three armed robberies and a theft not exceeding $50 would be
liable to preventive detention, whereas if he had committed a theft not
exceeding $50 and thereafter three armed robberies he could not be an
habitual criminal under Code, s. 660(2) and therefore could not be liable

24 [1966] 4 C.C.C. 352.
25 130 C.C.C. 97; 35 C.R. 1; [1961] S.C.R. 511.
26 [1966] 1 C.C.C. 397 h la page 402.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

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to preventive detention under Code, s. 660(1). The contended construction
should not succeed. It is sufficient that the substantive offence be any
indictable offence; the literal meaning of Code, s. 660(1) requires only that
the accused be convicted “of an indictable offence”. Further the contended
construction would impliedly add to Code, s. 660(1) the words “for which
he was liable to imprisonment for five years or more”. But the express
addition of those words to Code, s. 660(2) and their omission from Code,
s. 660(1) are against their being read into s. 660(1) so as to qualify “indica-
ble offence”. The literal meaning of s. 660(1) is to be preferred. It follows
that s. 660(1) only requires (a) that the accused be found to be an habitual
criminal within Code s. 660(1)(b); (b) that he has been convicted “of an
indictable offence”;
(c)
that preventive detention be expedient for the
protection of the public.

R. v. MarcouX. 27

I1 s’agissait d’un recel ne d~passant pas $50, donc punissable d’un

emprisonnement maximum de deux (2) ans.

Les trois condamnations ant~rieures mentionn6es au deuxi~me
paragraphe de l’article 660 pourraient-elles inclure le plaidoyer de
culpabilit6 ou le verdict de culpabilit6 enregistr6 sur un acte d’accu-
sation contenant trois (3) chefs? A premiere vue, cette interpr6tation
semble aller A l’encontre de la r6daction m6me du paragraphe 2; en
effet, le l6gislateur, tant dans la version frangaise qu’anglaise, men-
tionne << trois occasions distinctes et ind6pendantes >>, << three separate and independent occasions >. Ceci signifierait done que
‘on doit atre
en pr6sence v6ritablement de trois condamnations ant6rieures << dis- tinctes et ind~pendantes >>, et le fait pour un accus6 de s’ tre avou6
coupable ou d’avoir 6t, trouv6 coupable par un tribunal competent
sur un acte d’accusation comportant trois chefs, par exemple: vol
qualifi6, possession d’armes dans un dessein dangereux et port de
cagoule, ne justifierait pas un tribunal de d6clarer cet individu repris
de justice, car suivant la r6daction de l’article 660, il manquerait
alors un 6l6ment essentiel, A savoir: les troig condamnations ant6-
rieures distinctes et ind6pendantes. Le m6me argument vaudrait pour
l’accus6 s’avouant coupable A ]a mgme occasion de plusieurs actes
criminels contenus dans des actes d’accusation diff6rents. Ainsi, celui
qui s’avouerait coupable sur cinquante actes d’accusation l’inculpant
de vol d’automobile, ne pourrait pas satisfaire du seul fait de ces
condamnations aux exigences du deuxi~me paragraphe de l’article
660. Cette interpr6tation regoit un certain appui de deux decisions:
l’une de la Cour d’Appel anglaise et l’autre de la Cour du Bane du Roi
du Manitoba. Dans R. v. Rcybould, 2
la Cour d’Appel anglaige dans
un obiter dictum mentionnait que le fait pour un individu d’etre

27 (C.A. B.C.) [1966] 1 C.C.C. 389.
28 2 C.A.R. 184.

No. 4] DBTENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 569

condamn6 une fois sur trois actes d’accusation ne rencontrait pas
les exigences du <> de 1908:

A habitual criminal is defined by the Act as being a person who has been
three times previously convicted, and who is leading a life of dishonesty.
Appellant was once before convicted on three indictments, but it is not at
all clear to us that that amounts to three convictions within the meaning
of the section.
Dans R. v. Cindler,29 le probl6me soulev6 avait 6t

le suivant:
1’accus6 contre qui avait 6t6 pr6sent6e une requite de d6tention pr6-
ventive avait, A une occasion, plaid coupable A un acte d’accusation
contenant huit (8) chefs relatifs A des contraventions A la loi sur
les stup6fiants, chaque chef rendant l’accus6 passible d’un emprison-
nement de cinq ans. L’on pr6tendait A ce moment que ces huit chefs
d’accusation contenus dans un seul acte d’accusation permettaient
d’instituer des proc6dures de d6tention pr6ventive. L’honorable juge
Kelly r~suma ainsi ; la page 307 la question:

la page 308:

The question for determination was, of course, the meaning to be attributed
to the words, “three times previously … been convicted”. The word “pre-
viously” is adverbial to the phrase “to the conviction charged in the indict-
ment”, i.e., the primary charge. Is it sufficient that the accused be convicted
of at least three indictable offences at one time or must he be convicted
thereof at different times ? If the former, it was only necessary to provide
by the statute that the accused be previously convicted of three indictable
offences. However, those are not the words used in the statute and, conse-
quently, one must give some other meaning to the words “three times”.
I1 concluait
One must also bear in mind that the statute deals with habitual crimi-
nality –
criminality extending over the period of time since the accused
was 18 years of age. In result, it seems to me that the criminality must not
be of an isolated period in the accused’s life but, rather, was intended to
cover the longer period of time commencing at 18 years of age. I cannot but
think that the use of the words, “three times”, was intended to refer to the
longer period of time. This purpose would be defeated it (sic) it were only
necessary to prove convictions –
of a number of
indictable offences in one indictment.
A tout 6vnement, les difficult6s d’interpr~tation qui pourraient
exister semblent, A mon avis, avoir W r6solues par suite du texte
clair et non 6quivoque de
‘article 660 sp6cifiant trois occasions dis-
tinctes et ind6pendantes.

perhaps by one jury –

I1 est 6galement A ce chapitre une autre question qui peut soulever
des difficult6s d’interpr6tation. Lorsque le 16gislateur, dans la version
frangaise, indique << passible d'un emprisonnement de cinq ans et plus >>
et, dans le texte anglais << Liable to imprisonment for five years or more >>, veut-il mentionner par IA l’existence d’une sentence obli-

29 98 C.0.C. 303.

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[Vol. 13

gatoire de cinq ans ou plus ou ]a p6riode permissible d’emprisonnement
pour une offense donn6e? La Cour Supreme du Canada a tranch6
cette question dans R. V. Robinson et al,30 oii l’honorable juge Cart-
wright optant pour l’interpr~tation de la sentence permissible et non
mandatoire, s’exprimait ainsi aux pages 13 et 14:

The solution of the question depends upon the meaning to be given to the
words “liable to”. Their ordinary and natural meaning is, I think, “exposed
to”. The intention of Parliament as disclosed in the words of the section
seems to me to be to describe a class of indictable offences, and to require
as one of the conditions of a person being found to be a habitual criminal
that he shall at least three times have been convicted of an offence comprised
in such class. The offences of which the class is composed are described by
reference to the penalty which the law permits to be inflicted on a person
convicted thereof, that is to say, the penalty to which he is exposed, which
he runs the risk of suffering, which he is subject to the possibility of under-
going, not the penalty which he must suffer. Every indictable offence on
conviction of which a person may lawfully be sentenced to five years’ im-
prisonment or more is, I think, included in the class described and every
indictable offence on conviction of which a person may not lawfully be
sentenced to so long a term of imprisonment as five years is, I think,
excluded.

Expressing my view in different words, I think that the question an
affirmative answer to which will determine that a particular
indictable
offence falls within the class described is: – Does the law permit (not does
the law require) the imposition on a person guilty of such offence of a
term of imprisonment of as much as or more than five years ?
Pour qualifier quelqu’un de repris de justice, la poursuite doit
en plus des trois condamnations ant6rieures distinctes et ind6pen-
dantes, 6tablir et, ce, hors de tout doute raisonnable, que l’intim6
mane continfiment une vie criminelle, << is leading persistently a crimi- al life >.

Ce dernier 6l6ment a 6t

l’objet de plusieurs critiques venant
principalement des forces polici~res et des divers repr6sentants des
procureurs gdn6raux provinciaux qui reprochaient au l6gislateur le
caract~re vague et incertain de cette exigence. D’autre part, les tri-
bunaux canadiens semblent s’6tre pench6s tout sp6cialement sur ce
second caract~re du repris de justice. En effet, si l’on fait une brave
revision de ]a jurisprudence canadienne existante A l’heure actuelle
au sujet de ]a dMtention preventive, l’on constatera rapidement le
nombre consid6rable de decisions A ce sujet. Bien qu’en fait il faille
admettre que ce deuxi&me crit~re 6dict6 par le ldgislateur canadien
est impr6cis, nous pouvons je crois tirer de l’interpr6tation jurispru-
dentielle qui en a 6t6 faite, certains 616ments qui nous serviront de
guides dans l’appr~ciation de cet 6l6ment.

30 100 C.C.C. 1.

No. 4] DETENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 571

Au d6part, A quel moment l’intim6 doit-il mener continfiment
une vie criminelle? La poursuite doit-elle faire la preuve d’une telle
continuit6 tout au cours des ann6es pendant lesquelles l’intim6 a
commis des crimes, ou son obligation se limite-t-elle A d6montrer
cette continuit6 A l’6poque de l’offense substantive ou primaire qui
conf~re au tribunal la juridiction d’entendre la requite de d6tention
pr6ventive?

Tel que mentionn6 plus haut, c’est A la couronne qu’il appartient
de d6montrer hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’intim6 m~ne conti-
nfiment une vie criminelle et ce dernier n’a pas A faire la preuve
qu’il mbne ou qu’il a men6 une vie honn~te: 31

Le poids de la jurisprudence milite en faveur de l’interpr6tation
suivante A l’effet que la vie criminelle continue doit exister au moment
oti A l’6poque de l’offense substantive ou primaire qui confhre au tri-
bunal juridiction pour entendre la requite de dMtention preventive.
Afin de dissiper toute incertitude ou h6sitation A ce sujet, sont repro-
duits ci-apr~s les extraits des autorit6s qui nous ont sembl6 les plus
s6rieuseg.

Kirkland v. R.3 2
In my opinion it is established by these decisions, and I would so hold on
the wording of s. 575C(1) if the matter were devoid of authority, that before
an accused can be found to be an habitual criminal the Crown, in addition
to proving the prescribed number of previous convictions, must satisfy the
onus of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time when he com-
mitted the indictable offence referred to in s. 575B the accused was leading
persistently a criminal life.
Edgecombe 33
The fact that he was working during the intervals since the time he was
released from the prison in 1945 and the last conviction is by no means
conclusive proof that he was not a habitual criminal. The point is whether
at the time he commits the offence then being dealt with he is
leading
persistently a criminal life. The verb is in the present tense. If he has done
some honest work but has given it up and committed another crime, it may
well be that he has returned to a life of crime, and is then a habitual
criminal; and the nature of the most recent crime may itself be evidence
that at the time he commits it he is persistently leading a dishonest and
criminal life: see R. V. Lavender (1927), 20 Cr. App. Rt. 10.

But the work and activities of the accused during the interval must be
drawn to the attention of the jury: R. v. Kelly (1909), 3 Cr. App. R. 248 at
p. 252; R. V. Wells (1910), 5 Cr. App. 33.

31 R. v. Dawley, 119 C.C.C., p. 321; R. v. Young, 1913, 9 Criminal Appeal Reports,

p. 185; R. v. Driscoll, 1915, 18 C.A.R. 184.

32 25 C.R. 101 aux pages 106 et 107; 117 C.C.C. 1; Voir R. V. Keen & Rothson,

8 C.A.R. 12 h la p. 14; R. V. McKenzie, 128 C.C.C. b la p. 92.

33 96 C.C.C. 93 aux pages 95 et 96.

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[Vol. 13

L’opinion de la Cour Supreme exprim~e dans la cause de Kirkland
fut r~cemment re-affirm6e par le mgme tribunal qui maintenait
l’opinion dissidente de l’honorable juge MacQuarrie de la Cour Su-
pr~me de Nouvelle-Ecosse quant A l’6poque oii
‘on devait consid6rer
si l’accus6 menait continfiment une vie criminelle et de l’utilit6 de
consid6rer les circonstances qui ont entour6 ]a commission de l’offense
gubstantive. 34

R. v. Channing 5
In my respectful opinion, there is sufficient evidence to support the finding
that the appellant was a habitual criminal when he committed the substantive
offence…
R. v. Jeffries 3 6
The onus is on the Crown to prove that at the time of the commission of
the substantive offence, the appellant was leading persistently a criminal
life: Iirkland V. The Queen, 117 C.C.C. 1, 25 C.R. 101, (1957) S.C.R. 3.

A ]a page 255:

With respect, however, I must find that the Crown failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the appellant, at the time of the commission of the
primary offence, was leading persistently a criminal life.
R. V. Morgan: 37
To prove the accused to be an habitual criminal the Crown must assume
the onus of proving that the accused was ‘leading persistently a Criminal
life’ (Code, s. 660(2)(a)) at the time of committing the substantive offence
(August 28, 1963).
Nous avons tent6 de pr~ciser I’6poque oit cette vie criminelle con-
tinue devait exister chez un intim6 pour justifier son caract~re de
repris de justice. C’6tait, disons, la partie la plus facile du problhme.
I1 faudra maintenant determiner ce qu’est << mener continfiment une vie criminelle >.

11 a t6 fait mention plus haut du silence du l~gislateur relative-
ment A ce second 616ment de la notion de repris de justice. Le geul
moyen que poss~de le juriste de connaitre l’tat actuel du droit quant
A cette seconde composante de la notion de criminel d’habitude, est d’en
rechercher l’interpr~tation et l’analyse fournies par la jurisprudence.

Vie criminelle continue

I1 est exact de soutenir que le l6gislateur n’a pas voulu que l’on
qualifie quelqu’un de repris de justice uniquement parce qu’il avait

34 Mulcahy v. R. 42 C.R., pages 1 et 8.
85 (1965) 52 W.W.R. 99 A la page 103.
86 [1965] 1 C.C.C. 247 i la page 252.
37 [1966] 2 C.C.C. 390 A la page 392. Voir aussi R. v. Buckingham [1965] 2
C.C.C. 229 aux pages 232 et 233; R. v. Sparrow, 1966 4 C.C.C. 137 i la page 138.

No. 4] DETENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 573

A son actif un easier judiciaire. Cependant, il peut arriver des cas oti
la Cour, consid6rant la nature de l’offense substantive A la lumi~re du
dossier criminel ant~rieur de l’intim6, aura devant elle la preuve que
cet intim6 mane continfiment une vie criminelle.

Kirkland v. La R.eine:3s
There have however been cases in which the Court of Criminal Appeal has
upheld a finding that a prisoner was an habitual criminal on the ground
that the nature of the substantive offence viewed in the light of his previous
record was in itself evidence that he was leading persistently a criminal
life. For example in Rex v. Keane and Watson (1912), 8 Cr. App. R., 12 at
14, Channell J. in giving the judgment of the court said:

“The point is whether, at the time when he commits the offence then being
dealt with, he is leading persistently a dishonest or criminal life. The verb
is in the present tense. If he has done some honest work but has given it
up and committed another crime, it may well be that he has returned to a
life of crime and is then a habitual criminal, and the nature of the most
recent crime may itself be evidence that at the time he commits it he is
persistently leading a dishonest or criminal life. In Baggott’s case, which
was relied on for the appellants but is really an authority against them,
the offence of coining was given as an illustration of such a crime. But the
present case is another illustration which will do equally well. The appellants,
who must have planned the crime together, broke into this dwelling-house
by means of a jemmy and stole bracelets and rings and other property from
the bedrooms. We think that when they were committing this offence, they
must then have been leading persistently a dishonest and criminal life. In
our opinion, therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdicts
of the jury.”

I have examined all the cases of this class to which we were referred by
counsel and find that in each of them the substantive offence was of such
a nature as to show premeditation and careful preparation. I shall refer to
only one example. In Rex v. Heard (1911), 7 Cr. App. R. 80, Hamilton J.,
speaking for the Court, said at p. 83:

“Where the interval between the last known fact against the prisoner
and the commission of the substantive crime is considerable –
and six or
nine months are a considerable interval –
there should be additional evidence.
In this case there was such evidence, for the crime was carefully planned,
was committed in association with another habitual criminal, and was carried
out with skill, so the jury, with the facts before them, were justified in
convicting.”
L’on retrouve les m~mes considerations dans R. v. Ashton.39
D’autre part, le fait pour l’intim6 d’avoir fait quelque travail dans
sa p6riode de libert6 n’est d’aucune fagon une preuve irr6futable qu’il
n’est pas un repris de justice, bien que ce travail doive faire l’objet
d’une consideration de la part du tribunal.

38 25 C.R. 101 A la page 108; 117 C.C.C. 1.
39 44 C.R. 85 h la page 95.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

Kirkland v. R.: 40
I agree with the view expressed in a number of cases in the Court of Criminal
Appeal that the mere fact that the prisoner has done some honest work
since his last release is by no means conclusive proof that he is not an
habitual criminal; see, for example, Rex v. Lavender (1927), 20 Cr. App. R.,
10; although the fact of his having done such work is an important consider-
ation.
Harnish V. R.: 41
There can be no doubt that the learned trial Judge was fully justified in
considering the conviction for the substantive offence and the circumstances
surrounding it in light of the appellant’s past record in reaching his con-
clusion.

Although the evidence taken at the trial for the substantive offence was
not before this Court, I accept Mr. Justice Currie’s statement that it shows
“a system, a deliberate planning, a careful preliminary examination of the
premises where the safe was blown open at night and money stolen there-
from”. As Mr. Justice Doull says, “This was no crime on the spur of the
moment, but a carefully planned crime”.

Consideration must, of course, be given to the fact that the appellant
had not been convicted of any offence since his release from prison in
October, 1957, that there is some evidence of his having made a little money
selling beer bottles and that the police evidence as to his criminal character
and reputation was largely based on past experience, but these circum-
stances which were primarily for the consideration of the learned trial
Judge are not sufficient in my view to counteract the effect of the substantive
crime which was not only carefully planned but was similar in nature to
four other crimes for which the appellant had been previously convicted.

In the case of Kirkland v. The Queen, 117 Can. C.C. 1, (1957) S.C.R. 3,
the accused had been out of prison for 6 months before the commission of
the substantive offence, the circumstances of which were consistent with the
view that he yielded to a sudden temptation, and in the course of his decision
allowing the appeal from a sentence of preventive detention Mr. Justice
Cartwright said (p. 8 Can. C.C., p. 9 S.C.R.):

It was argued on behalf of the respondent that the appellant’s criminal
record coupled with the conviction of the substantive offence formed a suf-
ficient basis for the finding that he was an habitual criminal. As to this
I agree with the view expressed by Reading L.C.J. giving the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Jones (1920) 15 Cr. App. R. 20 at
p. 21:

‘The legislature never intended that a man should be convicted of being
a habitual criminal merely because he had a number of previous con-
victions against him.’
There have however been cases in which the Court of Criminal Appeal
has upheld a finding that a prisoner was an habitual criminal on the ground
that the nature of the substantive offence viewed in the light of his previous
record was in itself evidence that he was leading persistently a criminal life.

40 Supra, p. 107.
41 130 C.C.C. 97, aux pages 105 et seq.

No. 4] DETENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 575

In my view the present case comes within the latter category and the
the evidence of the appellant selling beer bottles and perhaps doing other
odd jobs between convictions is subject to the consideration referred to by
Darling J. (as he then was) in R. v. Jennings (1910), 4 Or. App. R. 120 ast
p. 122, when he said: “If a man occupies a day or two of his time in doing
work, that does not prevent him from being a habitual criminal. The word
‘habitual’ is used in other collocations than in the phrase ‘habitual criminal’.
For instance, it is applied to drunkards, but a habitual drunkard does
not mean a person who is never sober. Drunkenness is not continuous, nor
are the acts of committing crimes.42
Par ailleurs, il n’est pas n6cessaire pour justifier la d6termination
du caract~re de repris de justice de l’intim6 de prouver que l’offense
substantive a 6t6 le r6sultat d’une longue pr6m6ditation et pr6paration
comme certaing sembleraient vouloir interpreter la d6cision de la
Cour Supreme dans Kirkland. C’6tait d’ailleurs l’opinion du juge
Davey de la Cour d’Appel de Colombie Britannique dans R. V.
Channing.43

Kirkland v. Reg. (1957) S.C.R. 3, 25 C.R. 101, 117 C.C.C. 1: As I have read
it, does not lay down a proposition that the substantive offence must have
been premeditated and planned in order to prove that an accused is a habitual
criminal where the evidence relied upon consists only of the accused’s record,
his conviction for the substantive offence, and the circumstances under which
it was committed. Cartwright, J. pointed out that element had been present
in all cases he had noted where such a finding had been made on that kind
of evidence, but he did not say that it was an essential element. He did
find that the circumstances in which the substantive offence in that case
had been committed were consistent with a yielding to sudden temptation,
and were not such as to warrant the inference that the appellant was
persistently leading a criminal life at that time. In fact, at p. 11 the learned
judge was careful to point out that his decision was a finding of fact upon
the sufficiency of the evidence, and not a decision of law on the question
of whether there was any evidence on which that finding could have been
made, although as then advised he thought there was none.

Likewise it

is undesirable for us to lay down detailed tests of the
sufficiency of evidence to prove either than an accused is a habitual criminal
or that it is expedient for the protection of the public that he be sentenced
to preventive detention. All that is required is that the evidence be sufficient
to prove both these essential matters beyond a reasonable doubt to the
satisfaction of the magistrate or trial judge. Where the principal evidence
relied upon by the crown consists of an accused’s record, the commission
of the substantive offence and the circumstances surrounding it, a small
but significant circumstance not included in those mentioned by Cartwright, J.
in Kirkland v. Reg., supra, may be sufficient properly to satisfy the trial
judge that both those points have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
subject of course to an appeal upon a question of fact.

42R. v. Swontek (Cour d’appel de Colombie Britannique)

[1965] 1 C.C.C.,

p. 242 A ]a page 244; R. v. Jeffries (Cour d’appel de Colombie Britannique) [1965]
1 C.C.C., p. 247, aux pages 249 et 250; R. v. Morgan (Cour d’appel de Colombie
Britannique) [1966] 2 C.C.C., p. 390, h la page 392.

43 52 W.W.R. 99 aux pages 101 et 102.

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La preuve non seulement de l’association avec des criminels re-
connus mais 6galement de la possession d’argent en montant trop
consid6rable pour provenir du travail de l’accus6 ou de la charit6
d’autrui, le caract~re du crime commis semblable au pr6cedent et
rdali56 apr~s une pr6paration soign6e peut 6tre suffisante pour con-
clure A une vie criminelle continue. 44 Ces vues furent adopt6es par la
Cour d’Appel de Saskatchewan dans la cause de R. v. McKenzie.45

Le silence conserv6 par 1intim6 sur ses occupations pendant sa
p6riode de libert6 peut constituer un 6l6ment servant au juge A d6-
terminer si oui ou non il menait au moment de l’offense substantive
une vie criminelle continue. 46

L’une des fagons de faire cette preuve est d’6tablir P’association
de l’intim6 avec des crimniels reconnus et il ne semble pas n~cessaire
de prouver que ces criminels ont eux-mgmes commig des offenses ‘
1’occasion ou pendant ]a dur6e de cette association. La Cour peut,
apr~s avoir tir6 des infdrences de faits prouv6s, d6terminer si oui ou
non l’accus6 menait continfiment une vie criminelle A 1’6poque de
l’offense substantive.
R. v. MacKnight:47
The concluding words of s. 660(2) (a) are: ‘And is leading persistently a
criminal life.’ These are important words, and the Crown must prove that
the accused has been leading persistently a criminal life. One of the most
frequent ways in which this is done is by the proof of the association of the
accused with known criminals. It is not necessary to prove particular criminal
offences on the part of the accused other than those specified by the statute,
nor is it necessary to prove particular criminal offences by those with whom
the accused has been associating. The Court may draw an inference from the
facts as proved as to whether or not the accused has been leading per-
sistently a criminal life.
D’aufre part, la Cour peut noter le silence conserv6 par l’intim6
apr~v que la poursuite eut fait ]a preuve requise au soutien de sa
requite (A ]a page 301):

I cannot escape nothing that the accused did not take the witness-box to
explain his association with the individuals mentioned, nor to answer any
of the case put forward by the Crown.
Le code criminel n’exige pas, A part 6videmment les trois condam-
nations ant6rieures n6cessaires aux fins d’6tablir que l’intim6 est un
repris de justice, que toutes les autres offenses commiseg par lPaccuse
et dont ]a Couronne peut se servir pour d6montrer qu’il m6ne continfi-
ment une vie criminelle doivent 6tre du m~me caract~re; en effet,

44 R. v. Heard, 7 C.A.R. 80 h la page 82.
45 128 C.C.C. 92 aux pages 101 et 102.
46 R. v. Wright & Sheldon, 20 C.A.R. 61.
47 124 C.C.C. 296.

No. 4] DETENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 577

l’on peut faire la preuve de la commission par l’intim6 d’offenses
mineures, mais qui, n~anmoins, 6tablisgent que ce dernier vit toujours
en marge de la soci~t6 et des lois qui la gouvernent Channing, p. 109:
The Code does not expressly require that the accused lead persistently a
criminal life of offences for which he is liable to imprisonment for five years
or more. It is sufficient if he has been convicted on three occasions for three
such offences and thereafter persistently led a criminal life, which may be
of lesser crimes. However, the Code does require that preventive detention
is expedient for the protection of the public and Reg. v. Rose (1964) 49
W.W.R. 184, (1965) 1 C.C.0. 320, should be so understood. But in determining
what is expedient for the protection of the public because of the accused
being a habitual criminal, the court may consider the essential requirement
of three such offences with a liability to imprisonment for five years or
more, that the accused has been guilty of three such offences, and the
possibility of such offences being repeated, but the weight to be attached
thereto in terms of what is expedient for the protection of the public is a
question of fact in each case for the court hearing the application. Moreover,
as the sentence for the substantive offence will have considered the protection
of the public as one of the elements, it would follow that preventive detention
should not be imposed unless the crown has proven that the protection of
the public is not sufficiently safeguarded by sentence for the substantive
offence, but does require some additional protection involved in a sentence
of preventive detention: Mulcany v. Reg., supra; Reg. v. Rose, supra, to the
extent of making that sentence expedient for the protection of the public.
Des offenses mineures r6p6t6es peuvent, A la lumi~re des circons-
tances particulihres d’une cause donn6e, 8tre suffisantes pour per-
mettre au Tribunal de conclure que l’intim6 est un repris de justice
et qu’il est opportun de d6cerner une sentence de dMtention pr6ventive.
Cependant, si dans un cas donn6 l’on se rend compte que les offenses
commises par l’intim6 sont mineures et commises A l’occasion de
beuveries, le r6sultat d’un 6tat psycho-pathologique et que les possibi-
lit6s d’une cure sont existanteg, l’on d6cidera A ce moment, surtout
s’il n’a pas
t6 6tabli que l’accus6 6tait en presence de criminels re-
connus ou que ses crimes ne sont pas pr~m~dit6s ou accompagn~s de
violence, que ces offenses ne constituent pas une preuve hors de tout
doute raisonnable, que l’intim6, A l’6poque de l’offense substantive,
menait continfiment une vie criminelle.

R. v. Sparrow:48
Repeated offences of a comparatively petty nature may, of course, having
regard to the circumstances of each case, form a proper basis for finding
the offender to be an habitual criminal and for the opinion that preventive
detention is expedient for the public as explained by Davey, J.A., in R. v.
Channing, (1966) 1 0.0.C. 97, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 223, 52 W.W.R. 99, referring
to the dictum of Goddard, L.C.J., in R. v. Churchill, (1952) 2 Q.B. 637, 36

[1966] 4 C.C.C. 137 A la page 142.

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Cr. App. R. 107. The distinguishing feature of this case is, I think as indi-
cated, the circumstance that this appellant has committed crimes only while
engaged in drinking bouts considered in the light of the evidence regarding
the possibility of a cure to which I have referred.

Although not, of course, conclusive it must be observed that there is
here no association with criminals, no tendency to crimes of violence and
no record of premeditated planned crimes.
Dans R. v. Seibe149 la Cour d’Appel de Saskatchewan refusa d’im-
poser une sentence de dMtention preventive A l’intim6 parce que ce
dernier n’avait pas commis d’offense similaire A l’offense primaire, A
savoir: une offense contrairement A la Loi sur les stup6fiants.

Lorsque entre l’offense substantive et la derni~re offense statu-
taire il y a eu un intervalle substantiel ajout6 au fait qu’au cours de
cet intervalle l’accus6 a fait quelque travail, le juge doit attirer son
attention sur ces faits,50 et, ce, m6me si l’intim6 6tait ill6galement en
libert6 A la suite d’une 6vasion. 5 ‘

R. v. Jeffiies:52
As to the accused being an habitual criminal within Cr. Code, s. 660(2),
the accused contended that at the time of the substantive offence, that is
on June 27, 1963, he had been at large for 8 months, from October of 1962
until June 27, 1963, and that during that period he had worked 2 months for
each of two employers. It is therefore contended that the lapse of 8 months
without a conviction and his working for 4 months during that period is
against his “leading persistently a criminal life”. Those facts are incon-
clusive. Some honest work is not conclusive proof against his being an
habitual criminal: Kirkland v. The Queen, 117 C.C.C. 1 at p. 7, 25 C.R. 101
at p. 107, (1957) S.C.R. 3 at p. 8. There is other evidence against the accused.
In determining that issue, the Court has adopted tests of whether the
substantive offence was similar to the accused’s former crimes: R. V. Heard
(1911), 7 Cr. App. R. 80 at p. 82; whether the substantive offence denotes
premeditation or preparation: Kirkland v. The Queen, at p. 8 C.C.C. p. 108
C.R.; p. 9 S.C.R.; or whether the substantive offence was possible only after
careful preparation: R. v. Heard.
Les quelques d6cisions cit6ev ci-haut nous permettent peut-atre
de d6gager certains dl6ments pouvant nous guider dans l’appr6ciation
de cette <> mentionn6e A l’article 660.

II semble qu’il y ait une telle continuit6 si l’offense substantive
est le r~sultat d’une preparation longue et soign6e, qu’elle est du
m~me genre que l’offense statutaire ant6rieure dont elle n’est s6par~e
que par un court laps de temps.

49 114 C.C.C. 68 h la page 72.
5O R. v. Wells, 1910, 5 C.A.R. 33 h la p. 35; R. v. Kelly, 3 C.A.R. 248 aux pages

251 et 252.

51 R. V. Dawley, 119 C.C.C. 321.
52 [1965] 1 C.C.C. 247 aux pages 249 et 250.

No. 4] D.TENTION PRRVENTIVE D U REPRIS DE JUSTICE 579

Si A ces faits s’ajoutent la compagnie fr~quente de criminels re-
connus et l’absence de moyens de subsistance l6gitime, dans la plupart
des cas, la poursuite aura r~ussi A 6tablir que l’intim6 est un repris
de justice.

I faut remarquer, cependant, que la preuve de ces faits n’est pas
mandatoire. Le fait par exemple que l’intim6 ait effectu6 de menus
travaux d’une fagon sporadique, ou que l’offense substantive soit
diff6rente des autres crimes ant6rieureg, ou qu’aucune association
criminelle ne soit prouv6e, n’emp~cherait pas un tribunal de le d6cla-
rer repris de justice. Disons tout au plus que l’exemple donn6 ci-haut
est une preuve idale vers laquelle devrait tendre la poursuite dans
ce genre d’instruction.

Le 16gislateur, en toute probabilit6, ne voudra pas cat6goriser la
notion de repris de justice en indiquant dans un texte les caract6risti-
ques l’on doit trouver dans une vie criminelle continue. Les tribunaux
en feront sans doute de m~me.

Cependant, sauf peut-6tre quelques d6cisions isol6es, l’interpr6ta-
tion jurisprudentielle semble Atre suffisamment constante pour nous
permettre de dire qu’il existe A l’heure actuelle certains crit~reg. II
est vrai que chaque cas consid6r6 par les tribunaux est un cas d’esp~ce
au niveau des faits mis en preuve; il reste n~anmoins que ces faits, une
fois classifi6s, peuvent mettre en lumi~re des constantes.

Une fois prouv6 le caract~re de repris de justice et, ce, hors de
tout doute raisonnable, la poursuite doit alors d6montrer <>. (art. 660).

Encore lh, il n’existe pas de r~gles l6gales ou m~me jurispruden-
tielles nous permettant d’affirmer A l’instar d’un civiliste que le r6sul-
tat A sera obtenu si les facteurs B et C coexistent.

Le meilleur moyen, et d’ailleurs le seul, de d6couvrir certains ja-
Ions qui permettraient tant au praticien qu’au th6oricien d’appr&cier
l’6tat actuel du droit, est de r~f~rer A la jurisprudence, aussi fastidieux
que cela puisse 8tre pour le lecteur et… l’auteur de ces lignes.

OpportunitW de la dMtention preventive

La consid6ration de l’opportunitM d’imposer une sentence de d6-
tention pr6ventive, est un corollaire A la d6cision que 1intimd est un
repris de justice.r3

I ne semble pas 6tre suffisant pour justifier une sentence de
dMtention preventive que l’intim6 soit anti-social ou constitue une

53 1. V. Marcou, [1966] 1 C.C.C. 389 aux pages 396 et 397.

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nuisance ou qu’il serait utile pour les autorit~s polici~res de le voir
incarc6r6 inddfiniment. Par ailleurs, il ne faut pas non plus verser
dans l’abus contraire et soutenir que des offenses mineures ne peuvent
pas suffire A justifier un tribunal de prononcer une sentence de d6-
l’opinion de l’honorable juge
tention preventive. C’est d’ailleurs
Davey de la Cour d’Appel de Colombie Britannique qui s’exprime dans
R. v. Chcnning.54

Commentant le jugement de la Cour Supreme du Canada dana

Mulcahy V. R.: 55

In my opinion, neither the Supreme Court of Canada nor MacQuarrie, J.,
intended to disagree with the dictum of Lord Goddard, C.J. and the court
of criminal appeal in Reg. v. Churchill (1952) 2 Q.B. 637, (1952) 1 T.L.R.
1615, 36 Cr. App. R. 107, at p. 112:

“It has become a matter of putting a man where he can no longer prey
upon society even though his depredations may be of a comparatively
small character, as in the case of habitual sneak thieves.”
But that does not mean that it ds enough that the accused be merely anti-
social or is a nuisance, or that it is convenient to the police to have him
locked up for life, subject to the discretion of the parole board, as Currie, J.
pointed out in Harnish v. Reg. (1960) 34 C.R. 21, at 31, 45 M.P.R. 141,
affirmed (1961) S.C.R. 511, 35 C.R. 1, 46 M.P.R. 66, 130 C.C.C. 97 (N.S. C.A.).
Relatively minor offences may, as a class, cause substantial damage or
losses to the community, and so may make it expedient for the protection
of the public that incorrigible offenders be sentenced to preventive detention,
I do not understand Mulcahy v. Reg., supra, to lay down any proposition
to the contrary. That case was a decision on the facts. The finding that
preventive detention was not shown to be expedient for the protection of
the public is understandable, when it is noted that, out of the 20 convictions
since 1941, 10 of them involved shop-lifting, respectively, of single shirts,
a windbreaker, one and two ladies’ slips, amounting to no more than $7.95,
and one, two and six pairs of ladies’ hose, the value of the six being $4.14,
and the theft of an unspecified article valued at $6.95.
I1 semble que l’un des facteurs A 8tre consid~r~s pour decider de ce
second 616ment, est le caract~re dangereux de l’intim6 pour la collec-
tivit6 en g6n6ral, danger caus6, non seulement par la gravit6 objective
du crime commis ou susceptible de l’tre, mais encore par la multipli-
cit6 d’offenses mineures:

R. V. Powell:i6
Preventive detention ought to be kept for prisoners who have shown by their
conduct and previous history that they cannot be trusted to abstain from
crime, though they may do spells of honest work between convictions.

G4 [1965] 52 W.W.R. 99.
5542 C.R. 1 aux pages 1 et 8.
us (1953) 37 C.A.R. 185 h ]a p. 187.

No. 4] DETENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 581

R. v. Sneddon:57
Preventive detention is permitted where ‘… it is expedient for the protection
of the public’; that would imply that there is some danger to the public
through the accused being at large, and such danger is so great that the
sentence for the substantive offence is not sufficient protection and it -is
expedient to impose preventive detention. That has not been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. This accused’s record is, except in respect of the number
of offences, similar to that in Mulcahy v. The Queen, supra. There appears
nothing in his conduct which would warrant the inference that he would
commit any serious offence or would associate with criminals.
D’autre part, pour d~montrer que la dMtention pr6ventive s’impose
dang ce cas, en plus de faire une preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable,
la Cour peut s’enqu6rir du type de personne qu’est l’intim6 et, 6gale-
ment si sa conduite d6montre qu’il a t6 un r~cidiviste.

R. V. Morgan:58
The further question is whether the Crown has established that preventive
detention is expedient for the protection of the public as required by s.
660(1) (b), that is, that the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt
that it is so expedient: Parkes v. The Queen (1956), 116 C.C.C. 86, 24 C.R.
279, 6 D.L.R. (2d) 449; Kirkland v. The Queen, supra. On such issue the
Crown may consider what type of person is the accused: Mulcahy V. The
Queen (1964), 42 C.R. 8, and whether or not his conduct shows him to have
been a recidivist: R. V. Powell (1953), 37 Cr. App. R. 185, at p. 187.
Le fait de d6terminer s’il est opportun ou non d’imposer une
sentence de dMtention pr6ventive est une question de faits A 6tre d6-
termin6e par le tribunal de premiere instance, R. v. Morgan:5 9

It is for the tribunal of first instance to determine whether or not the
relevant evidence provides beyond reasonable doubt that it is expedient for
the protection of the public within s. 660(1)(b) that preventive detention
be imposed. That finding is essentially a question of fact in each instance
within the limits set by legal principles in defining the issues and the
evidence relevant in proof thereof.
La Cour saisie d’une requite de dMtention pr6ventive peut en arriver
A la conclusion qu’une telle sentence soit opportune, m~me si la preuve
ne r~v~le pas que l’intim6 ait 6t6 en compagnie de criminels reconnus,
ou encore qu’il ait fait avec eux certaines affaires et, ce, m~me si
pendant ses p6riodes de libert6 il effectua certains travaux.

R. v. Smith: 0
While the Magistrate has found that it was not proven that the accused
had been trafficking nor associating with criminals or addicts, nevertheless
there is evidence upon which the Magistrate could find that preventive

57 [19661 1 C.C.C. 397 aux pages 403 et 404.
s 1966 2 C.C.C. 390 A la p. 393.
59 Supra, p. 395.
60 [1966] 2 C.C.C. 135 A la page 136.

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detention was expedient for the protection of the public and the sentence of
preventive detention should be affirmed.
Une sentence de d6tention pr6ventive peut 8tre impos6e m6me si
la sentence de l’offense substantive ou primaire a 6t6 purg6e et que
l’intim6 a recouvr6 sa libert6. Ce sont les termes mgmes de l’article
660, par. 1, et ce fait a t judiciairement constat6 par ]a Cour d’Appel
de Colombie Britannique dans R. v. Rose.61

Cependant, pour d~montrer qu’il est opportun pour la protection
du public d’imposer une sentence de detention pr6ventive, il faut entre
autrev choses faire la preuve que la soci6t6 ne sera pas suffisamment
prot6gee par suite de l’imposition de la sentence de l’offense substan-
tive. Si cette preuve n’est pas faite, ]a Couronne ne s’est pas d6charg~e
de son fardeau de prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable qu’une telle
sentence est requise pour prot6ger la soci6t6.

R. v. Rose:62
This accused has a considerable record of offences but that does not
distinguish it from Mulcahy v. The Queen (1962), 42 C.R. 1 and 8. There
appears no evidence that the protection of the public requires a sentence
of preventive detention as something over and above the sentence of 9 months
for the substantive offence, and in the absence of such evidence, the sentence
of preventive detention should be set aside.
Ayant A d6cider s’il 6tait opportun pour la protection de la soci6t6
d’imposer A Ashton une sentence de dMtention preventive, Schultz, C.J.
appliquant le crit~re de l’incorrigibilit6, concluait en ces termes dans
R. v. Ashton.03

Ashton has engaged in the commission of crime over a period of a quarter
of a century, during which he has devoted his brains and brawn in conducting
war against his fellow men, classified as the public. The public is patient
and long-suffering. The punishment imposed upon Ashton has protected the
public from Ashton only during his confinement, has not discouraged Ashton
from further onslaughts, during periods of freedom and has not reformed
Ashton. Ashton is the authour of his own injury and responsible for the
plight in which he now finds himself. Ashton has had a long run in crime,
at the expense of the public. The public is entitled to protect itself against
criminals who are not deterred and persist in waging war against the public.
The evidence of this hearing establishes that Ashton is a menace to the
community, when at large.

For the reasons which have been given, this Court is of the opinion that
because Ashton is an habitual criminal, it is expedient for the protection
of the public to sentence him to preventive detention.
Le fait qu’aucun avertissement s6rieux n’avait 6t6 auparavant
donn6 A l’intim6 en lui imposant une sentence pour les offenses qu’il

61 [1965] 1 C.C.C. 320.
62 Ibid., pp. 322 et 323.
6344 C.R. 85 aux pages 95 et 96.

No. 4] DRTENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 583

avait commises ne suffit pas pour repousser une preuve de l’oppor-
tunit6 d’une dMtention pr6ventive. Tout au plus, ceci peut-il constituer
un facteur que le juge devra consid6rer au moment d’exercer sa dis-
cr6tion judiciaire. Ordinairement, l’une des fagons de d~montrer qu’il
est opportun pour la protection du public d’imposer une telle sentence,
est de constater, h mgme le dossier judiciaire de l’intim6, que ce
dernier est incorrigible.

R. v. Chcnning:64
While it may be proper and desirable to give such a warning in some cases,
I do not think it is a legal requirement to a sentence of preventive detention;
the presence or absence of a previous warning is merely a factor to which
the presiding judge may give consideration. Ordinarily, I would think one
step towards proving that a sentence of preventive detention is expedient
for the protection of the public would be to show from the accused’s record
that he is incorrigible. Indeed, a presiding judge, depending on the circum-
stances, might be satisfied that an accused is incorrigible by proof of a
steady and persistent life of crime even though he has not been subjected
to severe punishment. Whether preventive detention is expedient is primarily
a question of fact, and it would not be proper to lay down dicta as to how
that fact must be proved, except to say that the sentences ought not to be
imposed unless, among other things, the trial judge is satisfied that an
accused would not be deterred from a life of crime by conventional punish-
ment.
Puisque la sentence de dMtention preventive est une question laiss~e
A ]a discr6tion du juge, celui-ci exercera cette discr6tion en regard
de la preuve faite devant lui. Par consequent, lorsqu’il faut 6tablir
hors de tout doute raigonnable qu’il est important pour la protection
du public d’imposer une telle sentence, la Couronne devra d~montrer
que la protection du public n’est pas suffisamment effectu~e par suite
des sentences impos6es pour les offenses ant6rieures.

R. V. Jeffries:65
The sentence of preventive detention is a discretionary matter for the Court.
Criminal Code, s. 660(1) states that the Court ‘may’ impose such sentence,
and word ‘may’ has been held to denote a discretion in imposing that sen-
tence: R. v. Stanley, supra, at p. 241. In this instance there is no sufficient
evidence that the sentence of preventive detention is ‘expedient for the
protection of the public’. On the evidence this accused is not the type of
person of whom that can be said, and that was a ground of appeal applied
in Mulcahy v. The Queen, supra. It does not appear on the evidence that the
protection of the public requires anything more than detention for the
offences as they may occur…

et aux pages 253 et 254:

Drug addiction is not in itself a crime. Possession of drugs is an offence,
whether the possessor is or is not an addict; but it is an offence which must

64 Supra, p. 104.
65 Supra, A la page 251.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

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be prosecuted to conviction, like any other offence. And until conviction,
the presumption of innocence applies as in the case of any other offence.
Where, as here, there has been a considerable crimefree interval between
the release from prison and the commission of the primary offence, the fact
that the person involved, during such interval was a user of drugs, in the
absence of other evidence of criminal activity, is not sufficient, in my
opinion, to support a finding that such person is an habitual criminal. To
remove a person from society permanently simply because he is a drug
addict would be to deny the possibility of a cure either through the addict’s
own efforts, or with the assistance of any public agency set up to alleviate
the problem. This, I feel sure, was not the intention of Parliament in enacting
the habitual criminal provisions of the Code.

Procedure A suivre lors de telle requite

I1 est A remarquer imm6diatement qu’une requite de dMtention
preventive peut 6tre pr6sent6e m6me si l’intim6 en a appel6 de ]a
sentence qui a W impos~e et que la Cour d’Appel ait confirm6 cette
sentence; il serait alors fallacieux de soutenir que l’on ne pourrait
au moyen d’une requite de dMtention preventive modifier quoi que ce
soit au jugement rendu par la Cour d’Appel qui maintenait la sentence
impos6e par le tribunal de premire instance. C’est en substance l’opi-
nion 6mise par la Cour Supreme du Canada dans la cause de Gordon
V. R.:66

The fifth ground is that there could not be an application for preventive
detention because the original conviction and sentence had been appealed
to the Court of Appeal and confirmed by that Court. Therefore, no County
Court Judge sitting in the County Court Judges’ Criminal Court could do any-
thing which would in any way modify what the Court of Appeal had done.
This argument is contrary to the express provisions of s. 600. The fact that an
accused may have unsuccessfully appealed against the sentence imposed
upon him for the substantive offence cannot operate as a bar to proceeding
against him as an habitual criminal.
Je croiv que le m~me raisonnement pourrait valoir m~me si la
Cour d’Appel ne s’est pas encore prononce A la suite de l’appel log6
par l’accus6 au sujet de la sentence qui lui a
t6 impos6e. En effet,
la Cour Supreme semble, dans la cause de Gordon, avoir bien distingu6

No. 4] DRTENTION PREVENTIVE D U REPRIS DE JUSTICE 585

l’offense substantive. Dans les causes d’importance, le praticien sait
d’exp~rience qu’A cause de diverses raisons, raudition de l’appel n’aura
lieu que trois, quatre ou mgme parfois six mois aprbs la condamnation,
et qu’il faudra parfois attendre un, deux ou m6me trois mois avant
d’obtenir le jugement de la Cour d’Appel. Or, qu’arrive-t-il A ce mo-
ment du d6lai de trois mois apr~s le prononc6 de la sentence, au cours
duquel suivant les dispositions de l’article 662, le poursuivant doit
signifier A l’accus6 l’avis de sept (7) jours francs pour la pr6sentation
d’une requite pour d6tention pr6ventive. Pos6 diff6remment, le pro-
blame pourrait s’6noncer ainsi: le d~lai de trois mois pr6vu h l’article
662 est-il suspendu par suite de l’inscription en appel par l’accus6
du verdict de culpabilit6 sur l’offense substantive qui permet l’institu-
tion des proc6dures de dMtention pr6ventive?

L’article 662 ne semble pas donner d’autre interpr6tation que celle
que l’on retrouve au sous-alin6a ii) de ]’alin6a a) du pargraphe 1. La
p6riode ultime au cours de laquelle doit tre signifiM cet avis de motion
est trois (3) mois A compter du prononc6 de la sentence; le 16gislateur
ne fait aucune distinction quant A I’appel possible de la sentence ou
de Ia condamnation. Je crois qu’il y aurait 1h mati~re A amendement
et que l’on devrait pr6voir la suspension de ces d6lais jusqu’A ce que
l’appel sur la condamnation ait 6t d~cid6 ou, A tout le moins, que les
d~lais d’appel ou A la Cour d’Appel provinciale ou la Cour Supreme
du Canada soient expires. En d’autres termes, les d6lais au cours
desquels l’avis doit 6tre signifi6 A l’intim6 devraient commencer A
courir A l’expiration des d6lais d’appel de la condamnation ou, dans
le cas d’un appel, dans les trois (3) mois qui suivent le jugement de
la Cour d’Appel ou de la Cour Supreme. De cette fagon, nous pourrions
6viter l’imbroglio d’une requite de dMtention pr6ventive produite de-
vant les tribunaux entendue et adjug6e en faveur de la poursuite, et
dont il faudrait appeler par suite de la cassation en appel de la con-
damnation pour l’offense substantive.

A l’origine de toute procedure de d6tention pr6ventive, il faut ob-
tenir suivant les dispositions m~mes de l’article 662, le consentement
du Procureur G6nral. I1 est A noter en pagsant que suivant le para-
graphe 5 de l’article 662, une fois la production faite de ce consente-
ment, ce dernier fait preuve prima facie qu’il a 6t
sign6 par le
Procureur Gn6ral et fait preuve de son contenu. Ce consentement
du Procureur G6n6ral n’a pas i r6f6rer aux offenses criminelles in-
voqu6es par la poursuite au soutien de sa requite.

R. V. Cappello:67

07 123 C.C.C. 391 A la page 393.

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The consent of the Attorney-General is a prerequisite to the application for
preventive detention but that does not imply any need of the consent re-
ferring to specific offences.

In conclusion, the Code does not expressly require the consent to refer
to any offence and there is no sufficient reason for implying that require-
ment. It would follow that the consent is valid and the appeal should be
dismissed.
La Cour d’Appel d’Alberta dans R. v. Toner, 8 6mit l’opinion que
m~me le Procureur G6n6ral int6rimaire (Acting Attorney-General)
pouvait donner un consentement valide aux fins de ces proc6dureg.

Le consentement du Procureur G6n6ral et l’avis de motion doivent
6tre produits avant laudition. En outre, preuve de la signification
doit 6tre faite A l’audition mgme.0 9

Une fois le consentement du Procureur G6n~ral obtenu, avis de
motion ou de requite doit 6tre signifi6 A l’intim6 avec un d6lai de
sept (7) jours francs entre la signification de 1’avis et la presentation
de la requite elle-m~me. L’article 662 mentionne ce que doit contenir
l’avis. I1 doit mentionner les condamnations ant6rieures de l’intim6
et les autres facteurs sur lesquels la poursuite entend se reposer pour
appuyer va demande. Traitant de la mention des condamnations ant6-
rieures, Aylesworth J.A., de ]a Cour d’Appel d’Ontario, mentionnait
dans R. V. Btackstock:Th

If previous convictions are to be relied upon in a trial upon the charge of
being a habitual criminal, then such convictions ought to be set out in the
notice, and in the words of Frank Ford, J.A. in R. v. Luft, (1948) 3 D.L.R.
680 at p. 690, 91 Can. C.C. 294 at p. 305: “There is no reason why there
should not be accuracy in giving dates of convictions, describing the offences
and specifying the Court of trial. How much looseness will be countenanced
may well vary in particular cases. Indeed, the omission of the sentences
imposed, as in the present case, may be a factor in determining the suf-
ficiency of the notice especially in relation to the question of whether an
accused is persistently leading a criminal life.
Traitant des autres circonstances sur lesquelles s’appuyait la re-

quote de la Couronne, il mentionnait . la page 204:

It is manifestly absurd to leave an accused person under the necessity of
preparing for an attack upon any one or more of the incidents of his life-
time with no intimation whatsoever of which incident or incidents might be
relied upon to support the charge. In the leading case of R. v. Turner,
(1910) 1 K.B. 346, Channel, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court,
laid down the principle, repeatedly affirmed since, upon which the sufficiency
or insufficiency of a notice of trial in these cases is to be determined. At
pp. 360-1 he says:

6s 97 C.C.C. 171.
69 R. v. Seibel 114 C.C.C. 68 A la page 72; R. v. Delaney (1964) 42 C.R. 299.
70 97 C.C.C. 201 h la page 206.

No. 4] DETENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 587

The Court is of opinion that there is no obligation to state in the notice
to the prisoner the evidence which is to be given to prove that he is leading
persistently a dishonest or criminal life. But the grounds upon which it is
intended to found the charge must be stated in a real and substantial form.
It would not be sufficient to say in the notice that it is proposed to prove
that the prisoner is leading persistently a dishonest life or that he is
leading persistently a criminal life … The grounds upon which it is intended
to prove that the prisoner is leading persistently a dishonest or criminal
life must be stated in a general way as grounds of proof, but not as
evidence: e.g., it would be sufficient to state that the prisoner is a habitual
associate of thieves, or that he is doing no work and has no visible means
by which he is earning an honest livelihood, or that he is now doing the
very same thing that he did years ago and for which he was convicted. If a
person committed an offence immediately after he obtained his discharge from
prison it would, I think, be sufficient for the prosecution to insert in the
notice a statement to the effect that ‘You are charged with being a persistent
criminal because the very moment you came out of gaol you committed the
fresh offence that you are now charged with’. The grounds upon which it is
intended to rely must be stated in a general way, and it is not sufficient
merely to state in the words of the statute that the prosecution intends to
prove that which the statute says must be proved.
Mgme si l’article 662 mentionne que l’avis doit indiquer les condam-
nations ant~rieures de l’intim6 et les autres circonstanceg
sur lesquelles s’appuiera la requite de la Couronne, il ne faut pas
conclure que la d6termination du fait de mener continfiment une vie
criminelle doit 6tre restreinte h ces autres circonstances; ‘on pourrait
en arriver A la m~me conclusion A partir des seules condamnations
ant6rieures et sans autres circonstances. D’ailleurs, la presence des
mots cs’il en est > justifie cette interpretation:

is “leading persistently a criminal life..,

Re Harney.71
I do not, particularly in view of the presence of the words “if any”, read
these provisions as limiting the proof of the issue as to whether or not
the accused
to the “other
circumstances”. Such an inference could be drawn in an appropriate case
from previous convictions without any other circumstances: See Kirkland
v. The Queen 117 C.C.C. 1 at p. 8, 25 C.R. 101, (1957) S.C.R. 3 and Mulcahy
V. The Queen (1963), 42 C.R. 1 at pp. 5, 8.
Bien qu’il ne goit pas n~cessaire de mentionner dans l’avis la preuve
que la Couronne entend faire pour d6montrer que l’intim6 m6ne conti-
nfiment une vie criminelle, il reste n6anmoins que cet avis doit men-
tionner avec suffisamment de pr6cision les motifs sur lesquels la
poursuite entend faire reposer sa preuve.

Re Paulk 72
It is, however, submitted by counsel for the accused that in order to introduce
evidence as to the convictions for the offences committed by the accused

71 [1965] 4 C.0.C. 246 A aa page 250. Voir aussi R. v. Kerr, [1954] O.W.N. 902.
72 111 0.0.0. 933; 21 0.R. 40 A la page 44.

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while on bail, in an effort to prove that he is leading persistently a criminal
life, notice of such intention should have been given in the notice served
upon the accused. There is no intimation in the notice that the convictions
while on bail awaiting trial on the drug charge would be relied on. Authorities
are to the effect that while there is no obligation to state in the notice
to the accused the evidence which is to be given to prove that he is leading
persistently a criminal life the grounds upon which it is intended to found
the charge must be stated in real and substantial form: Rex v. Turner, (1910)
1 K.B. 346, 3 Or. A-pp. R. 103, per Channell J.; Rex V. Blackstock, 10 C.R.
175, (1950) O.R. 561, 97 C.0.C. 201, 1950 Can. Abr. 193, 195; Rex v. Walter,
(1910) 1 K.B. 364, 3 Or. App. R. 213; Rex v. Moran (1910), 5,Cr. App. R. 219;
Rex v. Marshall (1910), 5 Cr. App. R. 25. The notice was therefore defective.
I semble 6galement que lorsqu’une condamnation n’esb pas men-
tionn6e dans l’avis de presentation de motion, l’on ne peut A l’audience
en faire 6tat.73

I1 a de plus 6t6 d~cid6 par ]a Cour d’Appel de Colombie Britannique
que ]a mention dans l’avis de motion de ]a condamnation pour l’offense
substantive qui donna naissance aux proc6dures de dMtention pr6ven-
tive, ne constituait pas une irr6gulariti de nature b rendre nul ledit
avis. Tout au plus, gerait-ce une mention inutile impropre A induire
l’intim6 en erreur ou A cr6er chez lui de la confusion :14

De plus, dans cette cause, la suffisance de l’avis pr6vu A ‘article
662 constitue une question de droit, donnant ainsi au Procureur G6n6-
ral un droit d’appel:

(rep. & sub. 1960-61, c. 43, s. 40)

The respondent’s counsel submitted also that this Court lacked jurisdiction
to hear -the appeal since the Tight of appeal given to the Attorney-General
by Code, z. 667(2)
is restricted to a
ground of law. It was suggested that the sufficiency of the notice is a
question of fact. I think the interpretation and adequacy of such a notice
axe clearly matters of law.
La description fautive de l’une des offenses ant6rieures n’est pa.
suffisante pour invalider l’avis pour autant que cette description erro-
n6e n’induise pas l’intim6 en erreur.

Levy V. R.7
The only other ground of appeal urged before this Court was that the
appellant’s conviction on December 18, 1957 on a charge that he did in the
City of Halifax unlawfully break and enter a store “with intent to commit
an indictable offence therein contrary to Section 292 of the Criminal Code”
was wrongly described
in the notice of application as a conviction of
break, enter and theft contrary to Section 292 of the Criminal Code.

I agree with MacQuarrie J. of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia en
banc that the appellant was not in any way misled by this error which

73R. v. Buckingham [1965] 2 C.C.C. 229, notes de Sheppard, J.A. et

Whittaker, J.A.

74R. v. Ball 1966 4 C.C.C. 352 h la page 355.
75 130 C.C.C. 156 4 la page 157.

No. 4] D.TENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 589

in no way invalidated the notice of the application to impose on him a
sentence of preventive detention.
Nous avons vu ce que devait contenir cet avis; une fois compl6t6,
il doit 6tre signifi6 A l’intim6 avec un d6lai de sept (7) jours francs
entre la signification et le rapport. Si le d6lai 6tait de moins de sept
jours, ceci serait suffisant pour invalider les proc6dures7 6

Les articles 659 et suivants ne mentionnent pas par qui la signifi-
cation de l’avis doit 6tre faite; toutefois, si
‘on r6f~re A l’6conomie
de notre Droit P6nal et, en particulier, par analogie, A l’article 441 qui
traite de la signification d’une sommation, l’on peut affirmer sans
risque d’erreur que l’avis doit 6tre signifi6 par un agent de la paix, tel
que d6fini au paragraphe 3 de l’article 2 du code criminel; l’agent de
la paix, en plus 6videmment d’inclure le policier, comprend 6galement
l’huissier auquel on peut avoir recours pour la signification ou l’ex6cu-
tion des actes judiciaires en mati6re civile. D’autre part, cette signi-
fication ou, pour employer les termes m~mes de
‘article 662, le fait
de donner A l’accus6 l’avis de sept jours ne doit pas 6tre une simple
formalit6 technique. I faut donner cet avis A l’intim6 de telle sorte
que ce dernier soit en mesure d’appr6cier le fait qu’il regoit une proc6-
dure criminelle de nature A affecter ga libert6. M~me s’il peut exister
une pr6somption de faits quant A la signification de proc6dures judi-
ciaires, il peut toujours 6tre fait une preuve du contraire. C’est d’ail-
leurs ce qui s’est pr6sent6 dans la cause de R. v. Morris.77

Morris, apr~s avoir

t6 condamn6 pour l’offense substantive, fut
intern6 dans un asile d’alin6s par suite d’une ordonnance du Lieute-
nant-Gouverneur en Conseil de la Colombie Britannique; au cours de
sa p6riode d’internement, deux officiers de police se pr6sent~rent A lui
et touch~rent sa personne avec la proc6dure de d6tention prdventive
que l’on se proposait de lui remettre. A ce moment, Morris leur dit
qu’il ne voulait pas leur parler car il 6tait sous l’impression que ces
policiers venaient pour le tuer. La Cour d’Appel en vint A la conclusion
que cette pr~somption de faits ci-haut mentionn6e avait 6t6 r6fut6e
par suite de l’ordonnance du Lieutenant-Gouverneur en Conseil et du
langage que tint Morris aux policiers qui 6taient venus lui porter cette
proc6dure. Nous r6f6rons A un extrait des notes de Bird, C.J.B.C., A
la page 117:

Matters leading up to a sentence of preventive detention are strictissimi
juris: see Parkes v. The Queen, 116 C.C.C. 86 at pp. 91-2, 24 C.R. 279, 6
D.L.R. (2d) 449, (1956) S.C.R. 768, per Rand, J. The two Orders in Council
indicated that the appellant was mentally ill, at least from February 18,
1964, to April 20, 1964, and the Magistrate also had before him the evidence

76R. v. Bryon, [1966] 3 C.C.C. 182.
77 [19661 3 C.C.C. 112.

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by Lycette of the statement by the appellant at the time of the purported
service of the application on him at the mental hospital. Any presumption
that on March 12th, at the time of the service on him the appellant was
capable of appreciating the fact that he was being given a criminal proceeding
-affecting him is a presumption of fact: Sutton V. Sadler (1857), 3 C.B.
(N.S.) 87, 140 E.R. 671, capable of being rebutted. It is clear from the
learned Magistrate’s statement that in coming
to the conclusion that
notice had been given to the appellant under s. 662, he considered only
the physical act of handing the document to the appellant, combined with
a presumption that he would “be aware of its contents”, ignoring completely
the fact that such presumption could be rebutted, and ignoring the extent
of the effect in rebuttal of the Order in Council of February 18, 1964, and
the evidence of Lycette already quoted. In the result, the matter being
strictissimi juris, the Magistrate in the circumstances of this case did not
address his mind to the question as to whether or not the evidence in
rebuttal raised a reasonable doubt as to whether or not there had been
effective service upon the appellant, and consequently did not give him
the benefit of any such reasonable doubt.
Les proc6dures de dMtention preventive doivent suivant l’article
662 (2) 6tre entendues et d6cid6es par le juge sans jury. Par suite de
la d6finition de cours contenue A l’article 659 au Quebec, l’on peut
pr6senter cette requite indiff~remment A un juge des sessions de la
paix ou de la Cour du Banc de la Reine, juridiction criminelle de pre-
miere instance. Toutefois, si cette demande n’est pas pr6sent6e avant
que l’intim6 n’ait regu sa sentence pour l’offense substantive dont il
a 6t6 d6clar6 coupable, la requite doit 6tre pr6sent6e A un autre juge
que celui qui a impos6 la sentence h l’intim6. Le paragraphe 4 de
l’article 662 semble 6tre 6quivoque dans sa version frangaise. En effet,
l’on parle de condamnation: … <> Si l’on r6fTre au texte anglais, l’on se rendra
compte immdiatement que le terme frangais signi-
fie vraiment ]a sentence. En d’autres termes, le juge qui a trouv6
l’intim6 coupable de l’offense substantive pourrait entendre cette
requite si elle lui est pr6sent6e avant qu’il n’impose la sentence; si,
d’autre part, la requite suit l’imposition de la sentence, elle doit 6tre
entendue par un autre juge ou magistrat de la m~me Cour.

Lors de procedures de dMtention pr6ventive, l’article 660 (3) confhre
A l’accus6 le droit d’8tre pr6sent A l’audition de la demande; il egt
opportun imm6diatement de noter la difference de phras~ologie entre
ce troisi~me paragraphe et l’article 557 qui est imp6ratif en exigeant
la pr6sence de l’accus6, autre qu’une corporation, tout au cours de son
proc~s. Le texte m~me de l’article 660 (3) indique que ]a pr6sence de
l’accus6 est facultative et que ce dernier peut fort bien choisir de
s’absenter sans pour autant affecter la validit6 des procedures devant

No. 4] DA’TENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 591

la Cour. C’est d’ailleurs l’interpr6tation que la Cour d’Appel de Co-
lombie Britannique donnait h cette disposition dans la cause de R. V.
Hadden.7 8

Now, I should refer to the provisions of Code, s. 660, and as analysed by
counsel for the Crown I think I may safely say that the position taken
by Crown counsel has been found most convincing by the Court. Code,
s. 660 (3)
(enacted 1960-61), c. 43, s. 33 (2), as counsel contends, goes
no farther than to confer a right upon the appellant to be present at an
habitual criminal proceedings or hearing. It goes no farther. The appellant
has the right or privilege to be present, of which he can take advantage
or not as he wishes, and there is now power in the Court to compel his
attendance. Indeed,
in the present circumstances, the sentence for the
substantive offence having expired, counsel for the appellant succeeded in
having the appellant released on habeas corpus from custody when he
was held pending habitual criminal proceedings or hearing and, consequently,
on the date of the appellant’s appearances with his counsel, to which I
referred eazlier (I refer to the appearances in the police Court), the appellant
was free from custody with the exception of a few days when he had
become involved in another minor matter resulting in his being detained
for that particular offence, to which I make no further reference.
Cependant, mgme si l’accus6 a la facult6 de ne pas se pr6senter h
l’audition de la requite, il peut arriver toutefois que son absence soit
de nature A affecter la validit6 des proc6dures. L’on pourrait, par
exemple, imaginer le cas oii l’intim6 est incarc~r6 et, par suite d’une
erreur commise par le greffier, l’accus6 n’est pas amen6 devant la
Cour
l’audition de la requite de d6tention pr6ventive. Je ne crois
pas qu’A ce moment
‘on puisse assimiler cette absence caus6e par une
erreur cl6ricale A un choix libre et volontaire effectu6 par l’intim6
d’6tre absent. Dans ce cas, je doute fort que la Cour puisse avoir juri-
diction et proc6der en l’absence de l’intim6, A l’audition de la requite;
le remade serait alors, comme dans toute autre proc6dure criminelle,
de constater l’absence de l’intim6 et d’6mettre un mandat d’amener.
C’est d’ailleurs ce qui semble ressortir d’un obiter que l’on retrouve A
la cause de R. v. Hadden.79

Mly brother Bull recalls to me that there was no evidence whatever before
this Court that there was anything which prevented this appellant from
attending. Indeed, we have no evidence to explain why he did not appear,
and his counsel is apparently equally in the dark, but certainly there was
nothing to indicate that the appellant was detained or prevented for any
reason from attending the hearing. He appears to have absented himself
by choice.
Aux fins de d6cider si l’intim6 est un repris de justice, la poursuite
doit faire la preuve que depuis qu’il a atteint ‘Age de dix-huit ans,

78 1966 1 C.C.C. 133 aux pages 134 et 135.
79 Sufra, b la page 135.

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[Vol. 13

il a <>; il s’ensuit donc qu’avant
de faire la preuve A proprement parler des condamnations ant6rieures
de l’intimd, il faut en quelque sorte faire la preuve de son Age. Cette
preuve peut se faire par la production d’un extrait des rdgistres de
l’6tat civil et une preuve d’Widentification; elle peut encore se faire par
le t6moignage d’un parent ou d’un ami du prdvenu ayant une connais-
sance personnelle de ce fait ou, mme, au moyen d’une admission faite
par ce dernier lors d’un tdmoignage ant6rieur, ou m8me lors de la
confection de ]a fiche signal6tique par les autorit6s polici~res A la
suite d’une arrestation de l’inculp6. Ce dernier cas fut celui qui fut
consid6r6 par ]a Cour d’Appel de Colombie Britannique dans la cause
de R. v. Paton (No 2),50 oit ce tribunal rej eta les pr6tentions de l’accus6
en adoptant les vues soutenues par la Couronne qui 6tait intim~e:

Counsel for the appellant argued three points in this Court. His first point
was that appellant’s admission that he was over 18 years of age was an
inculpatory statement amounting
to a confession, and that the Crown
had put this statement in evidence without meeting the onus upon it that it
was made voluntarily. Counsel for the Crown pointed out that the statement
was 7nade as part of particulars regarding name, place of residence, age,
etc. obtained from appellant at the time he was arrested on a breaking
and entering charge, upon which he was subsequently convicted, many
months before appellant was charged with being an habitual criminal;
and was not inculpatory, if at all, when made. Crown counsel relied on
R. v. Mandzuk, 85 Can. C.C. 158 at pp. 161-2, (1946) 1 D.L.R. 521 at pp.
524-5, 62 B.C.R. 17 at p. 21, applied in R. v. Davidoff (1951), 101 Can.
C.C. 238 at p. 244. Moreover Crown counsel submitted that an age statement
of this character was held admissible in R. v. Turner (1909), 3 Cr. App.
R. 103 at pp. 161-2, which was followed by this Court in the unreported
decision of R. v. O’Brien which was delivered by our former brother
Robertson on March 15. 1954, (coram, Robertson, Sidney Smith and Bird
JJ.A.).
Voir 6galement R. v. Delaney.81
De quelle mani~re la poursuite doit-elle prouver les condamnations
ant6rieures de l’intimd qui forment ]a base des proc6dures de ddten-
tion prdventive? L’article 574 du code criminel pr~voit que cette
preuve peut se faire au moyen d’un certificat 6nongant avec suffisam-
ment de details la condamnation au Canada de l’intim6, lequel certificat
peut 6tre sign6 par la personne qui a prononc6 la condamnation, le
greffier de la Cour o-h cette condamnation a t prononc6e ou, encore,
le fonctionnaire responsable du Service d’Identification de la Gendar-

8o 119 C.C.C. 158. 159.
s1 [1964] 42 C.R. 299.

No. 4] DATENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 593

merie Royale du Canada. L’article 23 de la Loi de la Preuve mentionne
pour sa part que l’on peut faire la preuve de toute proc6dure ou dossier
devant une Cour canadienne en produisant une copie certifi6e du
dossier avec le sceau de la Cour ou la signature du juge, du magistrat
ou du coroner. Dans ces deux cas, il faut ajouter une preuve d’identi-
fication permettant de dire que l’individu dont le nom apparait A ces
procedures ou A ce certificat est bel et bien l’intim6 qui est aujourd’hui
devant la Cour. I1 semble que l’on puisse indiff6remment recourir A
l’une ou l’autre m6thode de preuve des condamnations ant6rieures, et
mgme innover en utilisant un autre moyen, pourvu qu’il soit juridi-
quement satisfaisant, tel l’admission de l’intim6 au cours d’un t6moi-
gnage ant6rieur.

R. v. Blackstock.8 2
Neither s. 23 of the Canada Evidence Act nor s. 982 (aujourd’hui 574) of
the Code provide in effect that proof of a previous conviction, or even
strict proof, may only be made as provided therein. Section 23 merely says
that evidence of a proceeding or record “may be made” as therein provided,
while s. 982 says merely that a certain certificate of a previous indictment
and conviction, or a certain copy of a summary conviction shall, upon
proof of the identity of the person of the offender, be sufficient evidence
of the conviction.

I think it quite clear, therefore, that even with respect to proof of the
three necessary previous convictions, in order to found the charge, any
method by which these three may be proved strictly is open to the prosecution.
The method of proof adopted by the Crown in this case with respect to
those convictions identified by exs. 3 to 8 inclusive, would appear to have
been in compliance with s. 982 of the Code, and in addition, evidence was
led within the provisions of that section identifying the person of the
appellant. As, in my view, a new trial should be directed, I consider it
unnecessary further to deal with the proof or attempted proof of the
various convictions referred to in the notice served upon the appellant.
Pour sa part, la Cour d’Appel d’Alberta dans R. v. Toner13 semble
avoir W satisfaite de la m6thode utilis6e pour prouver les trois con-
damnations ant6rieures. L’une fut prouv6e par la production du memo-
randum de sentence sign6 par deux juges de paix et le t6moignage de
ces magistrats; les deux autres condamnations furent prouv6es par
la production de copies certifi6es de la condamnation donn6es sous la
signature du greffier ayant la garde de ces dossiers.

L’opinion 6mise par ]a Cour d’Appel d’Ontario dans Blackstock
(supra) fut reprise par le mgme tribunal dans la cause de R. v. La-.
londe.84

82 97 C.C.C. 201 h la page 207.
83 97 C.C.C. 171.
84 98 C.C.C. 363.

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Dan cette d6cision, on est alI un peu plus loin en indiquant que la
Couronne n’dtait m~me pas lie dans la fagon de prouver les condam-
nations ant6rieures par l’article 982 (aujourd’hui 574) du code criminel
ou l’article 23 de la Loi de la Preuve. L’admission faite par l’intim6
constitue une preuve suffisante de ces condamnations ant6rieures.
C’est ce qui ressort des notes de Aylesworth J.A., A la page 365 dudit
arr~t:

Section 982 of the Code does not provide that proof of a previous conviction
may only be made as contemplated therein. The section says merely that a
certain certificate of a previous indictment and conviction or a certain
copy of a summary conviction shall, upon proof of the identity of the
person of the offender, be sufficient evidence of
the conviction. One
alternative method of proving a previous conviction is to be found in s. 23
of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 59, which in effect, provides
for the proof in any of our Courts of “any proceeding or record whatsoever”
of, in or before our own Courts or those of other countries. This section
of the Canada Evidence Act also is merely permissive; it says that evidence
of a proceeding or record “may be made” in the manner therein set forth,
not “shall be made”. The Crown is not restricted to any one particular
method of proof in adducing evidence of previous convictions: R. V.
Blackstock, 97 Can. C.C. 201,
(1950) O.R. 561. The material before us
demonstrates that the circumstances occasioning the failure to produce
respondent’s record at trial, a list of the previous convictions constituting
the record and also the fact that the Crown proposed to use the record
in support of its appeal against the sentences, were all fully and frankly
disclosed to the respondent. It also appears that the respondent was advised
in writing that he did not have to make any statement whatsoever in
connection with his alleged record and that if he did see fit to admit the
previous convictions, his admission would be used as evidence in the
prosecution of the appeal. The admission of the respondent,
the
circumstances I have described, constitutes clear and unequivocal proof
of the accuracy of the record alleged against him and of his identity as
the offender in each of the previous convictions listed therein.
La m~me opinion est 6mise par la Cour Supreme du Canada dans

R. v. McGrath, 5 et R. v. Jones.8 0

Relativement A la suffisance du certificat produit en vertu de
l’article 574 du code criminel, il suffit qu’il soit apparent que ce certi-
ficat r6f6re aux condamnations mentionn6es dans l’avis et il importe
peu qu’elles soient faites dans les mgmes termes.

R. V. McGrath:87
In any event, in my view, the provisions of s. 574 requiring that the conviction
be set out with “reasonable particularity” are saisfied by the form of
the certfficates above referred .to, and I am of opinion that the “reasonable

85 133 C.C.C. 57 aux pages 61 et 63.
s6 [1966] 2 C.C.C. 370 aux pages 371 et 372.
s7 Supra, p. 61.

No. 4] DITENTION PRVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 595

particularity” required by the sections is in no way controlled by the
the notice filed under
manner in which the offences are described
s. 662 provided that it is apparent that the certificates refer to convictions
described in that notice.
Le certificat du pr6pos6 au Service d’Identification de la Gendar-
merie Royale mentionn6 A l’article 574 du code criminel comporte
toujours les empreintes digitales pr~sum6es de l’intim6. Pourrait-on
alors prouver l’identit6 de la personne au moyen d’une comparaison
des empreintes digitales apparaissant sur ce certificat et celles prises
r6cemment de 1intim6? A prime abord l’on serait tent6 de r6pondre
dans l’affirmative quitte, 6videmment, A 1intim6 de faire une preuve
du contraire. Toutefois, la Cour d’Appel de Colombie Britannique dans
la cause de R. v. Dillon,88 s’est prononc6e dans un sens contraire en
retenant 1’objection soulev6e par 1’accus6 A l’effet que
‘article 574
permettait la certification des condamnationg antdrieures, mais non
des empreintes de la personne condamn6e:

to prove identity, adduced evidence that the
At the trial the Crown,
fingerprints so certified were the fingerprints of the accused at bar. The
objection is that s. 574 does not authorize the certifying of the fingerprints
of the person convicted. The section (Code, s. 574) does permit the certifying
of “the conviction in Canada of an accused for an indictable offence” but
does not authorize the certification of the fingerprints of the accused so
convicted, and therefore the purported certification of the fingerprints
is outside the section. However, that need not be considered, as the identity
of the accused was otherwise proven. The certificate proves, amongst
other things, convictions for nine narcotic offences, one theft and one
robbery with violence, and that the name of the accused was John Dillon
that the accused at bar is
or John Frederick Dillon. The evidence
known as John Dillon or John Frederick Dillon. Also an officer of the
Vancouver Police Force questioned the accused on May 25, 1962, about his
criminal record, when the accused said that he had six narcotic convictions,
one theft and one robbery with violence. This corresponds exactly with
the remaining
his record to that date as set forth
convictions mentioned in the certificate were made thereafter. The similarity
of the name, including the alias, and the further similarity of the record
of convictions for specified offences are sufficient evidence that the
convictions certified are those of the accused at bar. While the learned
Magistrate did not deal with that aspect, there is sufficient evidence that
the accused is the person so convicted,
in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, and we so hold.
Cette d6cision est 6videmment conforme A l’interpr6tation litt6rale
de l’Particle 574. Toutefois, vu les d6veloppements survenus dans la
prise des empreintes digitales et le fait qu’aujourd’hui cette preuve
est admise devant leg tribunaux, n’y aurait-il pas lieu pour le 16gisla-
teur f6d6ral de permettre par l’article 574, non seulement la certifica-

in the certificate:

88 [1964] 3 C.C.C. 96 aux pages 97 et 98.

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[Vol. 13

tion des condamnations ant6rieures, mais 6galement des empreintes
digitales, car il est 6vident que si le pr6pos6 au Service de l’Identit6
de la Gendarmerie Royale du Canada peut certifier les condamnations
ant~rieures de l’intim6, il le fait
l’aide des empreintes digitaleg qu’il
poss~de en fili~re attestant que telle condamnation est celle d’un
individu en particulier. Or, ne devrait-on pas l6galiser ce qui existe
d~jA en pratique? Voir A cet effet R. v. Delaney (supra).

Cette preuve d’identit n’a pas besoin d’6tre concluante, mais tout
au plus doit-elle 6tre de nature A permettre A la Cour de tirer l’inf&
rence que l’identification a 6t6 faite

Tremeear’s Annotated Criminal Code.80
The provision for proof of identity of the offender is declaratory of the
common law. Even the production of the original conviction cannot dispense
with proof of identity. Proof of identity does not mean conclusive proof,
but means such evidence as will entitle a Court to find that the identity is
proved: R. v. Streatch, supra.

It has been repeatedly laid down, in summary conviction proceedings,
generally arising under similar provisions in temperance statutes, that the
mere similarity of names between the person mentioned in the conviction
and the person now charged affords at least some evidence of identity,
and justifies the magistrate, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, in
inferring that the conviction refers to the same person who is now before
him: R. v. Leach; R. v. Fogarty; R. v. Warilow (1908) 17 O.L.R. 643, 14
C.C.C. 375 (where the earlier Ontario authorities are reviewed); Ex parte
Dugan (1893) 32 N.B.R. 98 (C.A.); R. v. Byron; Ex parte Batson (1906) 37
N.B.R. 383, 1 E.L.R. 364, 12 C.C.C. 62 (sub. nom. R. v. Batson) (C.A.); R. V.
Blackburn (1919) 53 N.S.R. 292, 32 C.C.C. 119, 49 D.L.R. 482 (C.A.); R. V.
Atkinson (1910) 44 N.S.R. 521, 9 E.L.R. 212, 18 C.C.C. 279 (C.A.); but see
contra, R. v. Herrell (1898) 12 Man. R. 198, 1 C.C.C. 510 (C.A.).

The rule is not limited to cases in which the second prosecution takes
place before the same magistrate who made the first conviction: R. v. Hoshem
(1928) 51 C.C.C. 26 (N.S.).
L’on retrouvait d’ailleurs le m~me commentaire de 1’auteur dans
la cinqui~me 6dition du code criminel A la page 1236 en regard de
l’article 982 qui, lors de la revision, donna naigsance A l’actuel article
574.

Une fois que les condamnations ant6rieures de l’intim6 auront 6t6
6tablies et que preuve sera faite qu’A l’6poque oti l’offense substantive
a t commise l’intim6 menait continfiment une vie criminelle, il im-
porte alors au juge d’exercer sa discr6tion judiciaire pour d6cider
s’il est opportun, en regard de toute la preuve faite, d’imposer une
sentence de dMtention preventive A l’intim.

89 Sixth Edition, 1964, page 1064.

No. 4] DBTENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 597

I1 est 6vident qu’A la suite de la preuve prdsentde par la Couronne,
l’intim6 a le droit de faire une defense ou d’offrir des t6moignages
quant A son caract~re de repris de justice ou quant & l’opportunit6
de lui imposer une sentence de d6tention preventive. Ce droit existe
dans la r6gislation actuelle, entre autres, A l’article 663 et dans les
diffdrentes causes qui sont rapport6es ot
‘on peut lire fr6quemment
des t6moignages d’experts, tr6s souvent des m6decins, qui viendront
relater les possibilit~s de cure qui peuvent exister chez tel accuse.
Mention expresse de ce droit de presenter une defense ou d’offrir
deg t6moignages se retrouve 6galement dans deux d6cisions de la
Cour d’Appel de Colombie Britannique, A savoir R. v. Gladu90 et
R. v. Paton.91

Lors de l’audition de procedures de d6tention preventive, le juge
ou le magistrat qui n’est pas celui qui a condamn6 l’intim6 pour l’of-
fense substantive, devrait entendre la preuve pertinente qui a permis
la condamnation de l’intim6 pour l’offense primaire.

R. V. Canning:92
In the new and additional procedure the Magistrate or Judge has not heard
the evidence given on the substantive offence and so it is not before him,
but most of the facts deposed to therein may still be just as relevant and
material to the new issue. Therefore, he shall hear any relevant evidence
as well as the medical evidence. He ought to hear such of the circumstances
deposed to on the trial of the substantive offence as are relevant if evidence
of them is properly adduced.
D’autre part, cette preuve ne peut 6tre faite par la production de
la transcription st6nographique des t6moignages recueillis lors du
proc~s de l’offenge substantive mais r6p6t6e viva voce par t~moignage
sous serment lors des procdures de d6tention preventive.

R. v. Canning:93
Therefore, I cannot avoid the conclusion that although the evidence given
on the substantive offence may be relevant and material evidence on the
hearing as to whether or not the appellant was a dangerous sexual offender,
those facts could only form part of the evidence at the hearing by intro-
duction of the sworm testimony of witnesses (and of course, admissible
certificates under statutory authority), and not by the filing of a transcript
of what was heard at the trial before another Judge or Magistrate. The
above decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada dealt only with the old
procedure where the evidence in question had been given before the Judge
and he had heard that evidence, and I cannot read into the language used
in those cases any authority to support a proposition that, without statutory
authority, facts can be proven in a hearing or trial by the production of a

0116 C.C.C. 286.
91 119 C.C.C. 158.
92 [1966] 4 C.C.C. 379 A la page 384.
93 Supra, p. 385.

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[Vol. 13

transcript of testimony given at another time and other place to another
tribunal. Accordingly, in my opinion the learned Magistrate erred in accepting
the transcript of the proceedings at the trial of the substantive offence
as proof of the facts therein contained.
Si l’on r6f~re aux d6cisions intervenues A 1’6poque oit les proc6dures
de dMtention pr6ventive s’instruisaient devant le juge ayant effectu6
la condamnation, mais avant la sentence, on pourra constater qu’il
6tait admis A ce moment que ce juge retienne une connaissance judi-
ciaire des faits mis en preuve lors du proc6s de l’offense substantive.

R. v. Robinson or Robertson:94
I am of the opinion the learned trial judge had the right to take judicial
notice of the conviction for the crime, and to communicate this to the jury
as a fact.
Voir 6galement R. v. McKennt

5 et R. V. McGrath.0

Appels

L’article 667 r6git les appels qui peuvent 8tre logos par l’intim6
ou le Procureur G6n6ral en mati~re de d6tention pr6ventive. Suivant
l’6conomie g6n6rale du code criminel, l’intim6 peut se pourvoir en
appel A la suite d’une sentence de d6tention pr6ventive sur tout motif
de droit ou mixte de droit et de faits ou de faits. I1 est int6regsant
de noter en passant que ce n’est que dans le cas oh une sentence de
dMtention pr6ventive est impos6e qu’iI y a ouverture A appel pour
l’intim6. Par cons6quent, si le tribunal de premiere instance arrive
A la conclusion que l’intim6 est un repris de justice maig qu’il n’est
pas opportun de lui imposer une sentence de d6tention pr6ventive, il
n’y aurait pas A ce moment d’appel possible pour ce dernier.9 7

Le Procureur G6n6ral pour sa part voit son droit d’appel limit6 A

une question de droit.

II est 6galement une autre caract6ristique int6ressante A noter A
1’article 667, c’est que la Cour d’Appel saisie d’un pourvoi par l’intim6
ou le Procureur G6n6ral ne peut ordonner une nouvelle audition. Elle
doit, si c’est 1intim6 qui interjette appel, casser la sentence de d6ten-
tion pr6ventive et imposer la sentence qui aurait pu 8tre inflig6e pour
1’offense connnise par ‘appelant ou rejeter l’appel; s’il s’agit du Pro-
cureur Gn6ral, la Cour d’Appel peut 6carter la sentence impos6e pour
l’offense substantive et infliger une sentence de d6tention pr6ventive
ou encore rejeter l’appel. L’on peut donc constater que les dispositions

94 102 C.C.C. 332 A la page 335.
95 102 C.C.C. 335.
96 133 C.C.C. 57 aux pages 61, 63, 64.
97 B. V. MacNeill [1966] 2 C.C.C. 268.

No. 4] DETENTION PREVENTIVE DU REPRIS DE JUSTICE 599

de l’article 667 diffirent beaucoup de celles que l’on retrouve A l’article
592 qui gouvernent les appels logds dans des proc6dures par acte d’ac-
cusation. Lors d’un appel log6 A la suite d’une sentence de dMtention
pr6ventive, il semble que le Procureur Gn6ral pourrait invoquer les
dispositions de l’article 592 (1) (b) (iii) A l’effet qu’il n’y a pas eu de
pr6judice grave caus6 & l’accus6.

Voir A cet effet R. v. Parkes,98 R. v. Gladu,99 R. V. Paton (No 2).100
L’accus6 peut se pourvoir devant la Cour Supreme du Canada du
jugement maintenant la sentence de dMtention pr6ventive rendue par
la Cour d’Appel de la province. 101

R. V. MacDonald:10 2
It is well settled that a person who had been sentenced to preventive detention
and whose appeal against that sentence has been dismissed by the Court of
Appeal may be granted leave to appeal to this Court under s. 41(1) (rep. &
sub. 1956, c. 48, s. 3) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259. On this
is sufficient to refer to the unanimous judgment of the Court in
point it
Parkes v. The Queen (1956) S.C.R. 134. As is pointed out by my brother
Ritchie, a number of such appeals have been allowed by this Court.
Dans cette cause, la Cour Supreme a r6pudi6 le jugement intervenu
en 1951 dans ]a cause de R. v. Robinson or Robertson 0 3 ott le Procureur
G6n6ral de la Colombie Britannique avait log6 un appel devant la
Cour Supreme qui l’avait maintenu i la suite de la cassation par la
Cour d’Appel d’une sentence de dMtention pr6ventive. La d6cision la
plus r6cente de la Cour Supreme, soit celle de MacDonald,104 est A
l’effet que le Procureur G6n6ral n’a pas un droit d’appel A la Cour
Supreme en matibre de dMtention pr6ventive:

My brother Ritchie points out that if we should uphold the Attorney-General’s
right of appeal in this case it would have the anomalous result which he
describes as follows (infra, p. 717):

… it would mean that although the Crown is restricted to ‘any ground
of law’ when appealing to the Court of Appeal of a Province against
the dismissal of an application for preventive detention by a trial
Judge, it can obtain access to this Court on unrestricted grounds when
appealing from a judgment of the Court of Appeal which has the same
effect.

The unlikelyhood of Parliament intending such a result appears to me to
be a sufficient reason for applying the maxim quoted above and holding that

08 116 C.C.C. pp. 86, 96, 97.
99 116 C.C.C. 286.
100 119 C.C.C. 158.
lo R. v. Parkes [1956] S.C.R. 134 h la page 135.
102 [1966] 2 C.C.C. 1 h la page 3.
103 100 C.C.C. 1; 12 C.R. 101; [1951] S.C.R. 522.
1o4 Supra, pp. 6 & 7.

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[Val. 13

power to grant the right of appeal sought by the Attorney-General in this
case is not conferred by the general words of s. 41(1) although on their
literal meaning they would appear wide enough to comprehend it.

CONCLUSION

L’6tude qui pr6c~de n’a pas la pr~tention d’6tre exhaustive et
d’apporter une solution aux diff6rents probl6mes que peut soulever
l’application des articles 660 et suivants du Code Criminel.

Tout au plus, au cours de ces quelques pages, ai-je r6f6r6 A. des
dcisions de nos tribunaux sup6rieurs pour tenter d’en d6gager les
principes susceptibles d’6clairer le th6oricien et de guider le praticien
lorsque tous deux sont mis en face de cette technique nouvelle de
dMtention.

I1 y aurait 6videmment lieu pour le l6gislateur d’am6liorer ce cha-
pitre de la dMtention preventive. Cependant, comme je d6sirais traiter
de l’6tat actuel de notre droit en mati~re criminelle, me suis-je tout
au plus content6 de signaler en passant certains amendements qui, A
mon sens, devraient intervenir pour pr6ciser certaines dispositions
comme le fait de mener continuellement une vie criminelle ou encore
de faciliter la preuve que doit presenter la poursuite en pareils cas
comme la certification des empreintes digitales suivant l’article 574.
I1 est 6vident qu’il y aurait sans doute lieu de scruter de plus pres
cette l6gislation de concert peut-6tre avec certains criminologues et
d’y apporter certaines modifications majeures; je ne me suis pas
arr~t6 A ce probl~me.

Au terme de cette recherche et analyse des autorit6s, je crois
qu’en toute honn6tet6 l’on peut affirmer, que bien qu’imparfaite, cette
l6gislation donne A l’heure actuelle les r6sultats que le l1giglateur en
attendait et j’en veux pour exemple les nombreuses sentences de
d6tention preventive que les tribunaux de la Colombie Britannique
t6 appel~s A consid6rer. C’est 1A, je pense, ]a
ont d~cern~es ou ont
preuve de l’efficacit6 de cette technique.

La détention préventive du repris de justice en droit criminel canadien

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