McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 2
LACROIX v. THE QUEEN’
EXTENT OF PROPRIETARY RIGHTS OF, LANDOWNER –
FLIGHTWAYS – Cijus
414, 450 C.C. –
552, 672, 682 C:N. –
(1952) R.S.C.
est Solum –
CHs. 2, 106, 302 – P.C. 1955 – 268; P.C. 1955 –
1578.
An important problem in the law of Quebec is the extent of the proprietary
rights comprised in ownership of the soil. In the present case, the question was
raised whether ownership of land carried with it ownership of the airspace
above it to an unlimited height. The suppliant owned some vacant land close
to the Dorval airport and used it intermittently for agricultural purposes.
In 1942, the Crown in right of Canada expropriated a servitude over it for
an underground cable and poles for a lighting system in connection with the
airport. In his petition of right brought in the Exchequer Court of Canada,
suppliant claimed not only for the value of the land but also for the value of
the airspace through which planes flew above his land, i.e. for the establish-
ment of “what he called or described as a flightway”. 3 The Court rejected
this claim, holding that airspace is res omnium communis and not susceptible
of private ownership. Consequently, it was impossible to expropriate what the
landowner could not own. Thus the issue raised in the case was in effect:
Does the dominium of a landowner extend upwards indefinitely?
The learned judge considered that the governing provision is Article 414
C.C., which provides that ownership of the soil carries with it ownership of
what is above and what is below it. In interpreting this principle and applying it
to the dispute at bar, he relied upon the conclusions reached in two studies of
proprietary rights in airspace, one by Jack E. Richardson,4 which considers
1[1954] Ex. C.R. 69; [1954] 4 D.L.R. 470; [1954] U.S. & C. Av. R. 259.
2 The report uses the common-law term, “easement”.
3 This uncommon term is not defined. Possibly suppliant’s counsel had in mind the
definition given in Regulation 2(ii) of The Airport Zoning Regulations, 1939: “that
area at the end of each landing strip extending outward in horizontal direction from the
boundary of the airport and having a width equal to the width of such landing strip plus
six hundred feet measured at right angles to and bisected in equal parts by the projection
of the centre line of such landing strip; and “Airport” shall mean airport as defined in
the Air Regulations 1938 and/or any airport constructed for military purposes”. It is
not clear whether “flightway” is used by counsel in this precise sense or whether it is
used as a synonynm for the term “clearway”, as defined in Part I, Chap. I, of Annex 14
(Aerodromes) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: “a defined rectangular
area at the end of a strip or channel in the direction of take-off selected or prepared as a
suitable area over which an aircraft may make its initial climb to a specified height.”
4″Private Property Rights in the Air Space at Common Law”, (1953), 31 Can. Bar
Rev. 117.
No. 2]
the jurisprudence in common law jurisdictions, the other by Nicolas Mateesco, 5
which discusses French jurisprudence and doctrine.6
CASE AND COMMENT
French legal thought on the problem is interesting, especially as Article
552 of the French Code is verbally identical with Article 414 of the Quebec
Code except for the heading of the title on servitudes. A certain caution is
however in order, since the ideal of libre recherche scientifique has tended to
lead to a somewhat freer handling of the text that is generally considered
permissible in Quebec. The original spirit of the law of Quebec7 and its
different social and economic milieu make necessary an independent attitude
towards French jurisprudence and doctrine, even where they treat of articles
identical in the two codes.
From this point of view one may venture a few comments on the possible
relevance of French jurisprudence and doctrine on the problem of flightways
as it arises under Quebec law. French thought on the question of proprietary
rights over airspace is divided into two periods. Until the advent of aviation,
French legal thought gave Article 552 its plain meaning. It was concluded,
however, that aviation would be thwarted if the surface owner’s proprietary
rights extended upwards without limit. Consequently, a distinction was read
into 552 CN.: part of the airspace was owned or possessed by the owner of
the soil, but the upper space was not.
The text itself seems to preclude any distinction whatever:
La proprit6 du sol emporte la propri~t6 du dessus et du dessous.
Le propri~taire peut faire au-dessus toutes les plantations et constructions qu’il
juge A propos, sauf les exceptions 6tablies an titre des Servitudes ou Services fonciers.
II peut faire au-dessous toutes les constructions et fouilles qu’il juge 5 propos et
tirer de ces fouilles tous les produits qu’elles peuvent fournir, sauf les modifications
resultant des lois et r~glements relatifs aux mines, et des lois et r~glements de police.
The practical examples given in paragraphs two and three are for greater
certainty and in no way limit the generality of the fundamental principle laid
down in the first paragraph.
Because the distinction was arbitrary, different authors drew the line at
height of the Eiffel Tower,
different heights. Some drew it at 330 metres –
others at 600 metres.9 Some
300 metres, plus a 30 metre radio antenna8 –
gave the surface owner rights in the air as far as he actually occupied it by
buildings and plantations; others, as far as the air is occupiable.’
5Nicolas Mateesco, “A qui appartient le milieu arien?”, (1952), 12 R. du B. 232.
6 For some of the relevant references not considered by the learned author, see (1930),
1 Air Law Review 232 and 376, at pp. 255-7. 383-5, 389-90, 397-8, 400; and A. Henry-
Cofiannier, Eliments criateurs du droit airicn, Paris, 1929, ch. 3.
7Louis Baudouin, “Originalit du droit de Quebec”, 10 R. du B. 121, especially at p. 214,
and “Mvfthode d’interpritation judiciaire du Code civil du Quebec”, 10 R. du B. 397, at
pp. 398-9.
81Mrighnac.
9Lemoine.
1OCf. A. Henry-Coiiannier, Eliments criateurs du droit agrien, Nos. 38-39.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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These various attempts to limit 552 C.N. are with difficulty reconcilable
with French jurisprudence and doctrine before 1910. The traditional view of
in a literal sense
the article was that it expressed the maxim cujus est solumn”
for example, the view taken by Dumoulin in his 1665 edition of the
–
Coutume de Paris in commenting on Article 187, the source of 552 C.N. and
414 C.C. Under the old law, according to a standard work, the maxim was
admitted; and the Code Napoleon confirmed it.12 Even if it could be shown
that the maxim was based on an erroneous view of the Roman law, neverthe-
less what the Coutume de Paris expressed was the misunderstanding, not the
real Roman law.
The juridical basis for the maxim given in the following argument by the
same authority appears incompatible with the occupation or occupiability
theory later read into the article: If it were contended that the owner of the
soil has only a right of taking possession of airspace by occupation, what
would be the basis of that exclusive right? Unless the owner of the soil is also
ipso facto owner of the superjacent airspace, his neighbour could take pos-
session of the airspace above his land by occupying it before he does. But the
possibility of this is explicitly ruled out by articles 552 and 672 C..N. Nor can
it be argued that the subjacent proprietor’s right to the airst~ace derives from
accession to the soil. For were this so, his neighbour could acquire his air-
space by prior accession.13
Two decisions mark the contrast between this old view of the law and the
new view. The first,’ 4 representative of the old jurisprudence, was rendered by
the Tribunal civil deBordeaux, in 1908:
11In full, Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum (or ad astra) et ad inferos:
“Ownership extends indefinitely upwards and downwards from the surface”. For the
origin and history of the maxim, see J. C. Cooper, “Roman Law and the Maxim “Cujus
Est Solum” in International Air Law”, (1952-55), 1 McGill L. J. 23, and McNair, The
Law of the Air, 2nd ed., London, 1953, Appendix I.
The present case comment does not discuss the relevance of the maxim to the question
of the Sovereignty of States over the airspace above their territory, but only its bearing on
the question of the proprietary rights of private landowners over superjacent airspace.
12Dalloz, Jur. gn., suppl., Propri&, no. 166. See also note to Amiens, 19 fevr., 1896,
S. 1896.2.129, at p. 130, col. 2-3: “L’art. 552 n’est que la cons6cration de l’ancienne maxime:
dominus soli, dominus coeli. I1 faut done reconnaitre que le propri~taire du sol est 6gale-
ment proprintaire de l’espace arien qui se trouve au-dessus du sol et dans les limites de
ce sol.”
13 Dalloz, Jur. gin., suppL, Propri&6, no. 166.
1427 nov. 1908, D. P. 1910.2.18. Affirmed, on appeal, Cour d’appel de Bordeaux, 24
oct. 1910.2.336. To the same effect: Trib. de paix de Lille, 15 nov. 1899, D. P. 1900.2.361.
An earlier decision is, if possible, still more emphatic: “Que le droit du propri6taire en
ce qui concerne le dessus, ne regoit dans cet article [552 c. civ.] aucune limite sauf les
exceptions 6tablies au titre des servitudes; … Que rien dans notre legislation ne limitant
et ne r~glementant le droit du propritaire sur le dessus de sa proprit6, on doit en infrer
que son droit peut s’&endre a une hauteur inditermhzie et suivant sa volonh4: Trib. civ.
de Tours, 19 janv. 1887, cited in note (a) to ibid.; italics added. To the same effect,
Amiens, 19 fiv. 1896, S. 1896.2.129, and cf. note thereto.
No. 2]
CASE AND COMMENT
Attendu que Faction de Das est fond~e; qu’en effet, aux termes de l’art. 552 c.
civ., la propri6t6 du sol entraine celle du dessus et du dessous; – Attendu que, dans
ce texte, le 16gislateur n’6tablit aucune distinction entre ces trois parties de 1’espace
et qu’il les soumet 6galement, d’une manib.re exclusive et absolue, A la volont6 et A
l’action du propri6taire; qu’en ce qui concerne le dessus, l’art. 552 n’indique d’autres
restrictions que celles qui sont port6es au titre des servitudes.
Soon, however, a change in the jurisprudence and the doctrine occured.
It was held, in 1914, in the Heurtebise Case,15 that proprietary rights ex-
tend only to the height usable for constructions and plantations. The Court,
while awarding the landowner compensation for proved damages resulting
from three neighbouring flying schools, explicitly rejected his contention
that he had a claim on the sole basis of violation of his airspace. In view of
the categorical and broad terms of the decision cited above, it is difficult to
agree with the opinion of a commentator 16 that the two decisions can be
reconciled. Rather the direction of French jurisprudence was reversed, with
the approval of the doctrine.
It is this later French jurisprudence and doctrine, as summarized by
Mateesco, which the Exchequer Court followed in the instant case. Apparently
the Court was .influenced by the belief that if the surface proprietor was
granted an absolute right over the superjacent air space to an unlimited
height, this right would frustrate the right of flight. Yet it might be possible
to allow a right of passage without doing violence to what seems, juridically
speaking, the better view of the law. For the right of the surface owner over
the airspace is made, by paragraph two of Article 414 C.C,. subject to the ex-
ceptions established in the title Of Real Servitudes. Accordingly, by Article
540 C.C., a proprietor must allow his enclaved neighbour a right of way across
the land in order to reach the public road. In its terms, this article gives a
right of passage on and not over land. Nonetheless, the Cour de Cassation has
held that the similar article in the French Code gives the owner of a fonds
enclavg (a farm) the right to operate a cable railway above a neighbour’s
land, provided that this mode of using the servitude appears to be, according
to local practices, best suited to the exploitation of the enclaved property and
also least damaging to the servient property.’ 7 Besson considered this solu-
tion to be an harmonious development of a tradition going back to the law of
Rome.18 From this, it is not too large a step to argue that planes have a right
15Trib. civ. de la Seine, 10 juin 1914, D.P. 1914.2.193.
16Lalou, note to ibid., col. 2.
17Civ. 24 f~vr. 1930, D.P. 1932.1.9, with Besson’s note approving of the decision, and
S. 1930.1.297, with Mme. B~guignon-Lagarde’s note. See also in the same sense: Solus,
Rev. trimestr., f930, p. 416; Planiol, Ripert and Picard, Traiti Pratique de Droit Civil,
vol. 3, no. 933; Josserand, Cours de Drot Civil Positif Franfais, vol. 1, no. 1983.
18Cf. Besson’s remarks on the corresponding article of the Code Napol~on in his note
cited supra; he cites in support Colin et Capitant, Cours Elimentaire de Droit Civil
Franfais, 7th ed., vol. 1, no. 736. He observes: “La loi, en visant le passage sur le fonds
d’autrui, n’exige nullement que la servitude s’exerce A la surface du sol; les noots “sur
le fonds” peuvent aussi bien s’entendre dun passage pratiqu& dans les airs que dun pas-
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 2
to fly from an airport over the land which surrounds it, subject to (as with a
surface passage) the payment of an indemnity for damages caused, as provided
by Article 540 C.C. A right of passage, whether on, near, or high above, the
surface has the same justification, viz. utility, and this idea underlies the
particular provisions of 540 C.C. These do not favour the interests of the
individual enclaved landowner as such, but are designed to foster the interests
of the national economy. 19 If this is so, the article should be applied in order to
serve a great national interest such as aviation. This line of reasoning, it is
submitted, gives a result in the case at bar as practical as that reached by
the Court; that is, it reconciles landholding and aviation interests, and does
so on the plain meaning of Article 414 as read with relevant articles of the
Code.20
In the instant case, suppliant’s claim was for expropriation of airspace
and it is impossible to say what view the Court would have taken of the
proprietary rights of the landowner had the claim been formulated as a claim for
damages for trespass of airspace. It might be suggested that perhaps the air
servitude principle gives the maximum protection to the surface owner con-
sistent with the legitimate interests of aviation. This is especially so in the
matter of trespass by helicopters. The air servitude principle grants a right
of way across the subjacent owner’s airspace, not a right to hover over his home
in a helicopter or to descend near the surface to photograph the owner for the
press or news reels. It is not entirely clear that the theory of upper airspace as
lying outside the dominiunm of the landowner will give the surface proprietor
as effective protection against such abuses. A recent French author 21 suggests
that the increasing use of helicopters makes desirable a more restricted right
of flight than seemed desirable in the days of horizontal flight. Perhaps French
legal thought will once more find it necessary to give the older interpretation
to Article 540.
sage A la surface. Le mot “fonds” est d’ailleurs employ6 g~niralement d’une fagon absolue,
comme synonyme de proprit6 (art. 522, 524, 555, 640 c. civ.), et, par IA m~me, d~signe
le sol, le dessus et le dessous (art. 552 c. civ.).” In an earlier case, a similar decision
was given: trib. civ. de Saint-Jean de Maurienne, 24 nov. 1905, D.P. 1906.2.37. The
facts were similar except that the enclaved property was a quarry. The author of the
case note called the decision in question on the ground that the giving of a right of passage
was de drot strict (column 1).
19Column 3 of Besson’s note.
20The air servitude theory is not quite the same as the theory that the surface owner,
although having proprietary rights in the airspace to an unlimited height, would be guilty
of an abus de droit if he were to prevent the passage of aircraft by exerting his rights
(as to this line of argument see A. Henry-Coiiannier, Eliments criateurs du droit abrien,
the
no. 44). There are some differences of opinion as to what extent –
theory of abus de drot is part of the law of Quebec. Cf. Baudouin, Le Droit Civil de la
Prozince de Quebec, Montreal, 1953, Livre XIII, ch. 3, and references cited there.
if at all –
21R Saint-Alary, Le Droit Airien, Paris, 1955, pp. 81-2.
No. 2]
CASE AND COMMENT
Because of the amendments to the Aeronautics Act,2 2 it would be necessary,
in future claims such as the one presented in the case at bar, to consider, in
addition to the rules of the Civil Code, the new provisions of this Act and the
regulations made pursuant to it. The present federal legislation on aeronautics
appears to imply a concept of servitude somewhat similar to that found in
the law of Quebec. Section 4 of the Aeronautics Act, as amended, grants to
the Minister of Transport (or such other Minister as the Governor in Council
may from time to time, designate) and, in any matter relating to defence,
to the Minister of National Defence, the power, subject to the approval of the
Governor in Council, to make regulations to control and regulate air navigation
over Canada and the territorial waters of Canada. It is provided by paragraph
(j) of section 4, sub-section (1) that, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, the Minister may make regulations with respect to:
the height, use and location of buildings, structures and objects, including objects
of natural growth, situated on lands adjacent to or in the vicinity of airports, for
the purposes relating to navigation of aircraft and use and operation of airports,
and including, for such purposes, regulations restricting, regulating or prohibiting the
doing of anything or the suffering of anything to be done on such lands, or the con-
struction or use of any such building, structure or object.
Sub-section (5) of section 4 provides that a copy of every regulation made
under the authority of said paragraph (j) –
called in section 4 a “zoning
regulation” –
shall in addition to any other mode of publication prescribed
by law be published in two successive issues of at least two newspapers serving
the area wherein the airport in relation to which the regulation was made is
situated. By sub-section (6), a plan and description of the lands affected by a
zoning regulation shall be signed and deposited in the same manner as a plan
and description is by sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Expropriation Act23
required to be signed and deposited; a copy of the regulation must be deposited
with the plan and description, and also, by sub-section (7), a copy of any
subsequent amendment. Does the signing and deposit have the same effect
under both Acts? In the case of land, “such land, by such deposit, shall
thereupon become and remain vested in Her Majesty”; and the reference in
the Aeronautics Act to this sub-section and the requirement of the use of the
same procedure as that used for the expropriation of land might perhaps be
interpreted by some as indicating the intention of the legislator to expropriate
airspace and perhaps even to make the Expropriation Act apply mutatis
mnutandis whenever relevant. Sub-section
(8) gives every person whose
property is injuriously affected by the operation of a zoning regulation the
right to recover from Her Majesty, as compensation, the amount, if any, by
which the propefty was decreased in value by the enactment of the regulation,
minus an amount equal to any increase in the value of the property that
occurred after the claimant became owner thereof and is attributable to the
airport. By sub-section (9), no proceedings to recover any compensation to
22(1952) R.S.C., ch. 2, amended by (1952) R.S.C., ch. 302.
23(1952) R.S.C., ch. 106.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 2
which a person may be entitled under sub-section (8) by reason of the oper-
ation of a zoning regulation shall be brought except within two years after a
copy of the regulation was deposited pursuant to sub-section (6) or (7).
Although these enactments do not use the term “servitude”, that notion
seems to be implied. In effect, a servitude of passage through the airspace of
the subjacent landowner is granted to aviators, subject to payment by the
Crown of compensation for damages which the establishment of the servitude
causes. The establishment of such a servitude by the Crown is a species of
expropriation, for which Parliament authorizes the payment of compensation
to the extent of any real damage, as determined by the Courts. The legislator
might appear to be thinking along the lines of an expropriation of an air
servitude. This is particularly suggested by sub-section (1), of section 4,
providing for the signing and depositing of a plan and description of the
lands affected by a zoning regulation, “in the same manner as a plan and de-
scription is [required to be signed and deposited] by section 9 of the Ex-
propriation Act”.
The Montreal Airport, Dorval, Zoning Regulations (amended),24 made
pursuant to the Aeronautics Act (amended), might also perhaps be understood
as in effect creating servitudes in the vicinity of the Dorval airport. The
regulations provide, first, that no person shall erect or construct, on land to
which these regulations apply, any building, structure or object or any addition
thereto, the highest point of which exceeds in elevation the elevation of that
point of such of the surfaces hereinafter described as projects immediately
over and above the surface of the land upon which such building, structure
or object is located (Reg. 4(1) ). These “surfaces” are of three kinds: sub-
sections (a), (b) and (c) of Reg. 4(1). The first, a “horizontal surface”,25
is defined by Reg. 2(d) as “an imaginary horizontal plane centering on and
150 feet above the assigned elevation of the airport reference point”. The
outer limits of this imaginary horizontal plane are described in Reg. 4(1) (a),
and extend for several miles around the airport. The second type of surface
is the “approach surface” (defined by Reg. 2(c) ) at each end of every
“strip” (see Reg. 2(f). ). The third type is the “transitional surface” (Reg.
2(g) ), rising at a specified angle from each outer lateral limit of the strips
and the approach surface abutting each end of the landing strips.
It appears, therefore, that there is harmony between the federal law and
the law of Quebec, provided that the Code is interpreted as granting an air
24P.C. 1955-268, Feb. 23, 1955 (SOR/55-60, Mar. 9, 1955), amended by P.C. 1955-1578,
Oct. 19, 1955 (SOR/55-400; Nov. 9, 1955). Zoning regulations for other important air-
ports were promulgated in 1955.
2 5For diagrams, see Figs. A-2, A-3, A-4, pp. 46-7, Annex 14 (Aerodromes), Con-
vention on International Civil Aviation. Reference is made to these diagrams only for
the purpose of illustrating the terms. These surfaces, as actually applicable to the
Dorval airport, are shown on plan No. M-0655 A-B-C, dated November 19, 1954, on
record in the Department of Transport at Ottawa.
No. 2]
CASE AND COMMENT
161
servitude through the landowner’s airspace, subject to the payment of an
indemnity for damages; whereas there is a conflict if the Quebec law is in-
terpreted as not recognizing those proprietary rights recognized by the federal
law. If there should be doubts as to what is the law of Quebec relating to the
proprietary rights of landowners in airspace, it would appear to be better to
choose that interpretation which will produce harmony.
HUGH R. SmART*
*Third Year Student.
