Legal and Judicial Reform through
Development Assistance: Some Lessons
Stephen J. Toope*
Lea and judicial reform plays an inpint role within te broater
ftamework of international development assistance: stable ant just legal
systems upport the ptomotion of somrity, equity, and prosperity. The author’s
goal is to assist those who are interested in designing or working on justice
initiatives by contributing to the academic reflection on the sangfths and
weaknesses of legal and judicial reformt initiatives.
Tem is a need for comprehensive and early analyses of the condition,
status, and mquirements of the govenance system where intervention is being
considered Of critical importance in any soch analyses is the need for
pecision, first, in describing the elements that constitute legal systems, and,
second, in poiting uef markcrs for specific goals. The aunor proposes
indicators of systemic health, while stessing that each indicator will vary in
relevance in each country’s situation.
The author goes on to set out the principles for sound legal and judicial
reform progtming. First, sound reform initiarves should plan fo long-erna
engagement bemuse of the need for local connminent to the processes and
goals of reform endeavors. second, ptngram designers cannot affod to ignore
the question of indigenotus social, economic, and cultual values because a lack
of sensitivity to these values can lend to resistance, unustdanity, and
ultimately falue. Finally, major projects should only be considered and
undermaken once experience has been gained on tm modest initiatives.
Based on these principles, the author presents diverse programming
options, focussing on issues telating to sequencing, the recognition and seizure
of opportunties with respect to the development of reform corstimencies. as
Well as issues relating to regional initiatives and donor coonlination. Sona of
the potential risks inherent in various forms of justice prsgramming are also
highlighted in the hepe of asssting pujec designrs and implm
ers to ask
the right questions at the oaet of legal and judicial reform initiatives,
The author co cludes by discussing issues relating to the evaluation of
the results of judicial reform progranms emphssizing that the means and ends
of such prograns are in constant interaction. Performnce assessment schems
must include a complex combination of quantitative ard qualitative results
indicators ad maust also include risk assessment and reassessment mecbanisms
because risks can change, multiply, and abate iuring project iplenentanon
An example of how the auther’s analytical fmntesork was ensployed
in assessing Viemam’s legal system and in recommending posgeanming
options is p vided in the appendix.
La n iarejursiqueetjdiciaiejoue n rf
lnpoata anu sn (in caftb
les systtOms
phis large de l’assistane a
Jisidtues stables esjuste sourenent Ia pmtin de
a s6cumi, de r-4i, et
de Ia pspintd Le but de ranmcr eat d’assister ceunx qui snt inusess h
conceptutiser o 6 wtvailter & auckndre des ititiatives de justice en conailant h
In ifexion acatiemique conremut les irianves de
fomnes jtikditus et
dveloppemeat internainml:
I
II existe an besoin de faire des analyses compidiemives aussi tt qua
possible de Ia condition, du stams et des besoins du systarme de gouvernance
intervention est considithd. D’impornce capitale est un besoin de
odi un
trioision quam 6 la description des 616itents qua contituent
hdgaux en premier, et puis afin de positionnur des rplems utiles pour arriver
aux buts spdeifiques. On propose des indices pour ivalner ‘nta syst f tne
de salubrit6 du systna, en soulignant que chaque indice scm plus on moms
peninent tan dormE Ia situation dn pays conce=
syst6m
l
tiaant
L’anmeur continue en
les pincipes nacessaires pour an
programme de rfonne l6gal et juliciaire sam. Pnemihenent. ces initiatives
devraient prdvoir on engagement A long teeme paree qu’il ena niossaire
d’avoir an engagement local des pneessus et des buts des efforts de ifiame.
Deuxitmeemt, cux qui conceptualisem le progtamn ane soul pas en mesure
d’ignorla question des valenes italigitnes docales. kiononiques et cnltsaelles
pare qu’tm mtuaeue de sensiblitM envems ces valeurs pent mencr A I
tdsistary le non-soutenabilitM, et ultaement 1’tihec. FumalemeonL des projets
enuris une fois que
majemn devastet sealenment &e consi
‘expnpence stcessaire a t acquise d’initiatives plus modestes.
t
A hI tutie de cs principes,
‘auteur pridunte divers options de
programmation en concentrant sur hI stqumvoe, I recanissance ct I saisie
d’opportunitts en relation an cieloppernent des citonscriptiona de rifnne,
aimi que les initiatives r6gionales et It a coordination de
,onateur.
Qulques
risques ponntiels inhrents des formes varie de programmation de justice
sont mis en dvidence dans lespoir d’assister ox qui conceptualismt les
pmjets ainsi que ceux qui les impleinent et de poser les bonnes questions.
tout en souligant que Ins inoyens ct
En conclusion. on discute Idvolution des rftltats des progree de
les fins des
rWforne judiciaire,
tfif oe judiciaire soat en interaction manates. Les pmjeis
pogramms de
d’tvaluation de performance doivent inclutc ue combinaison complene
tre quantiatifs et qualitatifs amii que des
d’indices de rtsultats qui divent
rmcanismes d’dvaluation des risques et de rd-valuation pace que tes risques
peuvent changer, se multiplier et dninuer pendant rexdanion dun pejet
Dans
‘appendice. Ic cadre analytique de l’aneur eni uti afin
d’&aluer le systme juridique du Vieusam et afir de recommrarcler des options
de pmgrammation.
“President, Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation and Professor, Faculty of Law and Institute of
Comparative Law, McGill University (on leave). E-mail: stephen.toope@mcgill.ca. This article is a
revised version of a paper written for the Policy Branch of the Canadian International Development
Agency (“CIDA”), which was greatly facilitated by the research of Vronique Lamontagne. I thank
CIDA for the opportunity to reflect upon my experiences and Jutta Brunne, John Lobsinger, and Rod
Macdonald for their perceptive comments. The views expressed in this article are personal and should
not be attributed to the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation.
McGill Law Journal 2003
Revue de droit de McGill 2003
To be cited as: (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 357
Mode de tifdrence : (2003) 48 R.D. McGill 357
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 48
Introduction
1. Assessing the Health of Legal Systems: An Analytical
Framework
A. The Rule of Law
B. The Interrelated Elements of a Legal System
C. Indicators of Legal System Health
II. Principles for Sound Legal and Judicial Reform
Programming
A. Objectives and Commitment over Time
1. A Step-by-Step Approach
2. Political Will and Reform Constituencies
3. Legal Values and Cultural Difference
B. Justice Programming Options
1. Sequencing
2. Seizing Opportunities
3. Regional Initiatives
4. Donor Coordination
Ill. Lessons Learned in Managing Risks
A. Risks Specific to Particular Types of Programming
B. Establishing Appropriate Partnerships
C. Other General Risks in Legal and Judicial Reform
Initiatives
IV. Assessing Results in the Justice Sector
Conclusion
Appendix: A Vietnamese Case Study
359
366
367
370
374
379
380
381
383
387
390
392
393
394
395
397
398
402
404
406
410
412
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SJ. TOOPE – LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM
359
Introduction
In the spring of 1996, the Policy Branch of the Canadian International Development
Agency (“CIDA”) convened a national round table on legal and judicial reform.’ The
round table reflected the growing engagement of CIDA, along with many other bilateral
and multilateral donors, in justice programming in many parts of the globe. Flowing
from the round table, at CIDAs request, I prepared an “instrument” or “framework” that
encapsulated the lessons learned by Canadians and foreign partners through their justice
initiatives, and was designed to help decision makers within CIDA assess the utility and
viability of legal and judicial reform programs! Using that framework, CIDA
commissioned an analysis of its projects and programs in the justice area, produced in
1999.1
Meanwhile, in 1998, the Federal Department of Justice, along with the Canadian
Bar Association and the Canadian Council of Law Deans, organized a delegation to visit
the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to discuss legal and judicial
reform initiatives. They then jointly convened a second national workshop on
international justice reform in 1999,’ again drawing a wide-ranging group of participants
active in the design and delivery of international legal and judicial reform projects. Since
1999, the collective experience of Canadians in general, and of CIDA in particular, has
grown significantly. CIDA has launched a series of legal and judicial reform projects and
programs in all of its geographic branches, the Department of Justice and other federal
‘ The terminology for such programming has undergone several permutations in the development
community. Various agencies have referred to “rule of law”, “administration of justice”, “legal technical
assistance”, and “legal reform” programs. I prefer the term “legal and judicial reform programs”,
because it separates out the court elements that often come to overwhelm thinking about the justice
sector as a whole. It also downplays the “technical” aspect of work in the justice area. In most
developing countries and countries in transition, the fundamental legal problems relate to the very
understanding of law and its role in a well-ordered society. This implies the need for significant social
and attitudinal shifts, not merely technical change. For the sake of brevity and variety, I also use the
compendium term “justice programming”. The central point is that reform in legal systems should be
broadly conceived to include work with the governmental legal bureaucracy, the police and prison
systems, public prosecutors, the courts and other adjudicative agencies, legal professional associations,
law faculties and training institutes, and non-governmental organizations promoting legal education and
reform.
2 Canada, CIDA, Policy Branch, Programming in Legal and Judicial Reform: An Analytical Framework
for CIDA Engagement by Stephen J. Toope (September 1997), online: CIDA
‘ Canada, CIDA, Policy Branch, CIDA’s Programming in Legal and Judicial Reform: Indicative List
of CIDA Projects Related to Legal and Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and Central and
Eastern Europe, 1990-1997 by V&onique Lamontagne (March 1999), online: CIDA
‘ Canada, Department of Justice, Report of the Workshop on International Legal Assistance Held in
Edmonton 22 August 1999 [unpublished].
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and provincial ministries and agencies have served as project designers and
implementers, and many Canadian private sector and civil society actors have been
engaged in justice reform work around the globe. Canadians have continued to share
their experiences in workshops held at a succession of Canadian Bar Association
summer meetings. Moreover, the experience of other bilateral and multilateral aid
agencies with legal and judicial reform has grown exponentially in only a few years, and
a wide range of studies and discussions has been published. The time is ripe for a
detailed reflection on the experience with legal and judicial reform initiatives around the
world. My principal goal is to assist those who are interested in designing or working on
justice initiatives to do so with their eyes open and their minds attuned to opportunities
and risks. A subsidiary goal is to contribute to academic reflection on the strengths and
limitations of legal and judicial reform efforts. In this article, I propose a framework for
assessing the health of a domestic legal system (Part I), set out principles for sound legal
and judicial reform programming (Part I), assess the lessons learned from current
projects concerning the management of risks (Part IH), and offer reflections on the
measurement of project and program results (Part IV).
A preliminary, but important, conceptual issue must be addressed before launching
into an assessment of experience in legal and judicial reform to date: How do such
efforts fit within the broader framework of international development assistance? In
in pursuing a
other words, why might legal and judicial reform be necessary
development agenda? It must be acknowledged that empirical studies on the effects of
justice programming are few. Studies that are available are largely impressionistic and
tend to focus upon performance measures internal to legal systems without much
attention being paid to extra-system effects. Although this is not surprising, given the
inherent problems in assessing causality that will be discussed immediately below, we
are left with remarkably little concrete evidence on the question how legal and judicial
reform contributes to the broader development agenda. The methodology of this article
reflects the paucity of empirical studies, relying instead on a survey of donor experience
involvement in justice
and reflections gleaned from over a decade of personal
programming. With the evidentiary problem acknowledged, one can still proffer a brief,
and inevitably superficial, answer to the question why legal and judicial reform matters:
stable and just legal systems support the promotion of security, equity, and prosperity, if
“security” is broadly defined to include the protection and enhancement of the quality of
life of citizens, “equity” is viewed as the substantively equal and predictable treatment of
all citizens, and “prosperity” is seen to be rooted in part in institutions and processes that
favour investment, initiative, and economic growth. More specifically, reform of legal
institutions and processes is integral to the promotion of human rights, democratic
development, and good governance. Furthermore, it facilitates private economic activity
by establishing a secure basis for contractual relations.! Justice reform can also assist in
See Bernard Rudden, “Civil Law, Civil Society, and the Russian Constitution” (1994) 110 Law Q.
Rev. 56 (on the importance of private law, infused with public values, in the process of legal change).
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S.J TOOPE – LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM
promoting the participation of women in sustainable development, though it is fair to say
that this is an area that remains weakly explored in concrete programming. Legal reform
is also necessary to establish a framework for environmental protection. In other words,
legal and judicial reform is both a worthy end in itself and is most probably a means to
facilitate other developmental objectives.
The main challenge in articulating the value of legal reform for social and
economic development lies in the core commitment of most development agencies,
including CIDA, to the provision of basic needs and poverty alleviation. Can one
really posit a causal link between reform of legal systems and improvement in the
plight of the poorest of the poor?’ This question raises three separate problems. The
first problem is the very notion of causal connection, a central concern of mainstream
social science methodology. Briefly stated, the conundrum is whether or not it is
possible, with integrity, to assert a causal link between programs designed to improve
governance, which are almost always focussed upon elites and are invariably
hierarchical, and the amelioration of the conditions of the poorest in society.7 One can
certainly imagine such a linkage, but it is inevitably so attenuated that causal
connection tests are hard to sustain. Yet instinct and experience with the results of a
failure to attend to legal (and other governance) frameworks suggest that law matters
even for the poor. Some would argue that law matters more for the poor than for the
rich, who often find alternative means to protect and pursue their interests.! Because
causal effects are so hard to prove in “soft” areas of governance programming such as
justice reform, it is easier to focus upon effects of reform within the legal system,
leaving downstream effects largely to hope and speculation. More research is required
to specify extra-systemic effects of justice reform initiatives.
6 CIDA’s policy focus upon the achievement of results assumes that all activities should contribute
to the “Agency’s overall goals of poverty reduction and sustainable development … ” (Canada, CIDA,
Performance Review Branch, Framework of Results and Key Success Factors (July 1999) at 1).
‘ The American pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty has suggested that social change requires the
“sentimental education” of elites, conditioning respect for others and the social value of human rights
for all. But he recognizes that this is an unpalatable prescription for many people who would rather
see social change as resulting from popular movements invoking natural rights or materialistic class-
based claims: “[lit is revolting to think that our only hope for a decent society consists in softening the
self-satisfied hearts [through sentimental education] of a leisure class” (Richard Rorty, “Human
Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality” in Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley, eds., On Human Rights:
The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, 1993 (New York. Basic Books, Harper Collins, 1993) 111 at 130).
Some development professionals, rightly committed to popular participation and participatory
approaches to community development, are constitutionally uncomfortable with legal reform because
of its elitist connotations.
‘This claim underlies much critical and feminist legal scholarship that treats doubts about the social
value of rights-based discourse as the privilege of white, middle class intellectuals who have not had
to use rights claims to fight for respect and economic advancement. See e.g. Patricia Wiliams, The
Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991) c. 6 & 9.
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A second fundamental problem is also closely related to difficulties with social
science causality. It is the continually unresolved question of law’s influence as an
instrument of social change. Again briefly put, the question is whether law follows or
leads. Can legal norms and institutions evolve only within contexts of shared
understanding that are socially generated, or can law be used instrumentally to foment
change in the absence of underlying social consensus? Empirical evidence supports
both conclusions in different situations. This points to the beginnings of an answer to
the question of law’s influence: legal change is deeply contextual, often culturally
specific, and inherently political.9 So while in most circumstances legal initiatives will
be largely responsive, they may at times be employed strategically, and with great
effect, to further other agendas. But generations of scholars and theorists have not
managed to produce a comprehensive theory of normative change that can tell us in
advance exactly how effective law arises and how it shapes the identity and behaviour
of actors and the evolution of structures in society.'”
The third issue is of a different order. It is the longstanding argument typically
pitting liberal economists against liberal lawyers. The issue is whether the notion of
rights (which unfortunately often subsumes the entire concept of law)” is prior to,
dependent upon, or coequal with the notion of “basic needs”. One can immediately
see why this issue is complicated in today’s development context. For a generation at
least, most development workers, historically shaped much more by economic than
legal thinking, have relied upon the concept of providing for basic needs as a central
justification for everything they do. Then along came the lawyers, claiming that it is
not enough to think about human “needs”, because such an approach is too
materialistic and fails to account for the aspirations of the human spirit, which can
only be guaranteed through the recognition of a diversity of human rights.’2 With the
growing acceptance of a role for law in sustainable development, we have simply
squared the circle without resolving the analytical tension. In CIDXs mandate, for
example, both basic needs and rights are said to be priorities. No effort is made to
relate the two. Yet many development old-timers are reluctant to grant law a priority
close to that of basic needs. And the problem is that it is not possible to prove them
right or wrong-once again, the issue of causality rears its head.
9 Cheryl W. Gray, “Reforming Legal Systems in Developing and Transition Countries” Finance and
Development 34:3 (September 1997) 14 at 14.
” For my own recent attempt, see Jutta Brunne & Stephen J. Toope, “International Law and
Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law” (2000) 39 Colum. J.
Transnat’l L. 19.
“See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977).
2 For a fascinating discussion of the unresolved professional conflict between economists and
lawyers on the question of basic needs and rights, see R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) at 83-88.
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S.J. TOOPE – LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM
in 2000, Amartya Sen argued
But it is not particularly helpful to development workers, or to people calling for
legal and judicial reform in the developing world, to respond that social scientists
continue to argue over causality, that there is no universally accepted theoretical
explanation of the role of law in society, and that we cannot definitively explain the
social relationship between rights and needs. In a helpful paper presented at a World
Bank conference
the various aspects of
development-economic, social, political, and legal-must be pursued in an integrated
fashion; that single-track initiatives are likely to result in failure. Rather than worrying
about whether or not one type of development serves as a precondition for another, Sen
suggests that development is shorthand for a complex set of ideas and processes, and
that we should be striving to achieve “conceptual integrity” and to recognize causal
interdependence.” He eschews the search for linear causal connections. In Sen’s view,
conceptual integrity in development programming reflects the idea that “development is
a functional relation that amalgamates distinct developmental concerns … [l]t involves a
constitutive connection in the concept of development as a whole.”” Legal and judicial
reform has a supporting role to play in a comprehensive development framework.
that
It is therefore useful to extrapolate from practical experience in development, and
to ask the pragmatic question: Can sustainable social and economic development take
place at the macro level in the absence of functioning legal systems? Increasingly, the
answer, backed up with some tentative empirical work, is “no”.” In Sen’s terms, legal
reform is both causally interdependent with other development
initiatives and
conceptually necessary in any comprehensive approach to development. Over the last
few years a number of major players in international development have undertaken
studies on the role of legal and judicial reform in supporting social and economic
development. These studies lay the groundwork for my analysis, and their varied
understandings of the potential gains from investment in legal and judicial reform are
worth highlighting.
For the World Bank, legal and judicial reform has been viewed in largely
instrumental terms: “The Bank recognizes the significant role that law can play in
fostering economic development .”
The focus has been upon the establishment of
“Amartya Sen, What is the Role of Legal and Judicial Reform in the Development Process?
(Lecture presented to the World Bank Legal Conference, Washington, D.C., 5 June 2000) at 1, 5-7
[unpublished, archived online: The World Bank
‘4 Ibid. at 8.
” Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobat6n, Governance Matters Policy Research
Working Paper No. 2196 (Washington: World Bank, 1999) at 3, 15; Richard A. Posner, “Creating a
Legal Framework for Economic Development” (1998) 13:1 World Bank Research Observer I at 3.
‘6 World Bank, Legal Department, The World Bank and Legal Technical Assistance: Initial Lessons,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1414, Doc. No. WPS1414 (Washington: World Bank, 1995) at 1
[World Bank, Legal Technical Assistance]. The same assumptions guide the work of the Asian
Development Bank although, once again, precise causality is difficult to establish. Asian
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to facilitate
frameworks”
effective “legal
investment and a stable economic
environment.” These “frameworks” include corporate law reform, the creation of stock
exchanges, the drafting of market-friendly property and contract law, and of effective
mechanisms for the registration of property rights. More recent World Bank studies have
gone one step further, to suggest that as economic development begins to take off, this
creates even “greater demand for a consistent legal framework and reliable legal tools”‘”
These legal-economic initiatives are obviously important, but they do not exhaust
the justifications for justice reform. The World Bank has been constrained in its
declared understanding of the role of legal and judicial reform by the limitations of its
mandate that does not allow the Bank to be engaged with “political” issues. So justice
programming must be cast in purely economic terms. In practice, however, the World
Bank’s work in legal and judicial reform has become more and more attuned to the
broader social and political aspects of legal reform, extending even to programs in
support of legal aid in South American barrios.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) has
adopted a more expansive view of legal and judicial reform, suggesting that “there is a
vital connection between open, democratic and accountable systems of governance …
and the ability to achieve sustained economic and social development.”‘ In an even
more explicit statement, the Development Assistance Committee (“DAC”) of the
OECD has argued:
The rule of law is essential to the effective functioning of society and the
economy. As stated in the DAC Orientations, a predictable legal environment,
with an objective, reliable and independent judiciary, is an essential factor for
democratisation, good governance and human rights.”
Development Bank, Office of the General Counsel, Law and Development at the Asian Development
Bank 1999 (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1999), online: Asian Development Bank
facilitating economic development, particularly when governments pursued economic policies which
fostered free markets and reduced the role of government as a primary decision-maker in the
economy” at 2).
World Bank, Legal Technical Assistance, ibid. at 7-8.
‘ World Bank, Legal Department, Legal and Judicial Reform Unit, Initiatives in Legal and Judicial
Reform by Maria Dakolias [unpublished] at 9 [World Bank, Initiatives].
‘9OECD, DAC Orientations on Participatory Development and Good Governance 2:2 (Paris:
OECD, 1993) at 7 [OECD, DAC Orientations].
” OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Participatory Development and Good Governance: Part I (Paris: OECD, 1997) at 10, online: OECD
Washington Post Foreign Service (9 September 1999) A01 (discussing post-Soviet legal reform needs
in Russia, and relating a healthy legal system to the attainment of both economic and democratic
development).
2003]
S.J. TOOPE – LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM
The linkage between democracy, human rights, legal reform, and development
was also advanced in the Plan du Caire of the Agence de coopdration culturelle et
technique, now known as the Agence intergouvemementale de la Francophonie”
Similarly, the German Foundation for International Development has stated that
reform in the justice sector is required “to strengthen the democratic and political
culture and extend civil rights’ 2.
In my view, the most comprehensive and helpful justification for legal and
judicial reform has been offered by the Overseas Development Administration
(“ODA”) of the U.K., now known as the Department for International Development,
echoing the approach advocated by Amartya Sen:
Law is a crucial element of both good government and the wider development
agenda. A sound and well-enforced legal framework provides benefits which are
often desirable ends in themselves but also help provide a framework within
which economic and social development may be achieved.
Law is more than lawyers—to be of value in society it must provide
guiding principles that allow for regularity and rationality in the way in which
disputes are settled and the way in which relationships are governed.”
This approach recognizes both the intrinsic and instrumental value of a well-
functioning legal system, and emphasizes its support for (and dependence upon)
economic, social, and political development. Law is seen not only in its guise as a
facilitator of dispute resolution, but also as a set of structuring principles and institutions
helping to shape diverse social relationships. In more concrete terms, law is a set of
actors, a set of institutions, and a set of norms. Relevant actors include the public,
lawyers and legal aid workers, professional association officials, mediators and
arbitrators, members of administrative tribunals, judges, police, prison officials,
prosecutors, ministry of justice officials, parliamentarians, and law professors and
students. Legal institutions include professional associations, legal non-governmental
organizations, legal aid clinics, federal and provincial legal bureaucracies, administrative
tribunals, courts, constitutional conventions, parliaments and their committees, the
” Agence de coopdration culturelle et technique, Le Ddclaration du Caire et plan d’action
francophone en faveur de Ia justice, de l’ttat de droit, des droits de l’Homme et du d6veloppement,
1996-2000. Conffrence des Ministres de la Justice des pays ayant le frarnais en partage Held in Paris
30 October – I November 1995 (Paris: Agence de coopdration culturelle et technique, 1995) [Plan du
Caire].
” German Foundation for International Development, Rule of Law, Legal Certainty and Judicial
Reforms in Latin America. Report of Findings and Recommendations from the International Round
Table Held in Berlin 28 November – 1 December 1995 (Bonn: German Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 1995) at 16.
” U.K., ODA, Government and Institutions Department, Law, Good Government and Development
(Guidance Paper) (January 1996) at 1, 12.
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security services including the prisons, and law faculties. Legal norms are international
(shaping and constraining state law in important ways), constitutional (guiding the
functioning of the political state, and sub-state actors), procedural (setting the parameters
and modes of operation of legal and to some extent political institutions), and
substantive (attempting to guide and constrain the behaviour of subjects of the law).
Every legal system is constituted by a variety of actors, institutions, and norms that is
markedly or subtly different from other systems. Moreover, law reform interacts with
other forms of economic, social, and political reform, producing mixed effects and
feedback that requires constant readjustment.
Because of justice reform’s potential but mainly unspecified downstream effects,
one cannot treat legal and judicial reform initiatives as politically or socially neutral.
Unless pursued with great sensitivity, justice reform can easily amount to cultural
imperialism, where the great benefits of Western liberalism are to be transferred to the
ignorant. Anyone seeking to work in the field would be well advised to consider the
rise and fall of the law and development movement of the 1960sY. In that era,
seemingly noble intentions were betrayed by cultural arrogance and hubris. Witness
the plethora of American-style constitutions implanted in Africa that completely
failed to engender any sense of democratic accountability. The only effective transfer
seemed to be the ethos of “Hail to the Chief’.
As will be discussed below,’ useful justice reform initiatives are most likely
where there is true indigenous demand. This reality does not, however, preclude
efforts to foster demand through support for education and the nurturing of reform
constituencies. Moreover, because much legal and judicial reform ultimately depends
upon engagement with and change in formal institutions, justice programming will
often require difficult negotiations with host states.
I. Assessing the Health of Legal Systems: An Analytical Framework
If there is any lesson that every aid agency and independent commentator seem to
agree upon in considering prospective justice reform or other governance programs, it is
the need for comprehensive and early analysis of the condition, status, and requirements
of the governance systems where intervention is being considered.’ This conclusion
24 For a set of thoughtful reflections on the legacy of the law and development movement, see
Anthony Carty, ed., Law and Development (New York: New York University Press, 1992). See also
Francis N. Botchway, “Good Governance: The Old, the New, the Principle, the Elements” (2001) 13
Fla. J. Int’l L. 159.
23See Part II.A.2, below.
See e.g. World Bank, Legal Technical Assistance, supra note 16 at 4; Canada, CIDA, SEAFILD,
What Works?: A Case Study of Successful Canadian Governance Programming in Thailand and
Cambodia by Greg Armstrong (Ottawa: CIDA, Southewast Asia Fund for Institutional and Legal
Development, 1998) at 44 [CIDA, What Works?]; Canada, CIDA, Africa and Middle East Branch,
The Horn of Africa Program and the Policies, Planning and Management Directorate, Ethiopia
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implies recognition of the need to accept relatively heavy project development costs
before any concrete programming is undertaken. A second and related lesson is that the
justice sector analysis must include an assessment of the broader social, economic, and
In particular,
political context in which justice reform initiatives might be undertaken.’
an assessment must consider the wider issues of governance that will shape any possible
legal and judicial initiatives. Given its political and public aspects, effective justice
reform depends upon an interplay of factors, many of which lie outside the legal system
itself. Some of these factors will be canvassed in Part II. For present purposes, the more
immediate questions are: How does one go about “assessing” a legal system? What are
the indicators of a well-functioning system of justice? These seemingly simple questions
mask a morass of conflicting legal and political theories.
A. The Rule of Law
Very often the concept of a sound or healthy legal system, aligned with a
democratic political system, is described through the shorthand of the “rule of law”
(or “l’ttat de droi’). I have previously argued that this shorthand is not analytically
useful, that it tends to mask more than it reveals, and that “[t]here is no simple, all-
inclusive, definition of the rule of law any more than there is an inclusively supported
‘ I admit that I have lost the battle. Every aid agency whose
definition of ‘law’
documents I reviewed continues to employ the term “rule of law” either as the
category into which all legal and judicial reform programming must fit, or as the
central underlying goal that such programming is meant to support. A literature on the
rule of law in development is also emerging.”
Because of its constant invocation, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider
what might be meant by the “rule of law”. For the nineteenth-century English legal
historian, Dicey, whose name is most closely associated with the concept, the
supremacy of parliament was the defining feature of a legal system, for it epitomized
Governance Study: Final Report by Philip Rawkins (April 1999) at 20, 37, online: CIDA
” See e.g. U.K., Department for International Development (formerly the ODA), Good Government
Assessment Framework (January 1997) at 2.
CIDA, Analytical Framework, supra note 2 at 7-9. See also World Bank, “The Rule of Law as a
Goal of Development Policy” by Matthew Stephenson, online: World Bank
rule of law has no fixed meaning); Gianmaria Ajani, “By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in
Russia and Eastern Europe” (1995) 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 93 (arguing that the supposed distinction
between “the rule or supremacy of law and systems based on the droit administratif’ is outmoded and
unhelpful at 117).
“See Thomas Carothers, “The Rule of Law Revival” Foreign Affairs 77:2 (March 1998) 95.
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the ordered hierarchy of authority which, for him, characterized law.” Thus, the rule
of law could be defined simply as the need to follow the law as set down by
constituted authority. The only important issues, then, would be procedural and
largely value-neutral: Was the law validly enacted, internally consistent, and equally
applicable to all?”
This supposed neutrality caused many twentieth-century commentators to challenge
Dicey’s version of the rule of law, and to argue that the rule of law is only relevant if it
possesses a substantive content-that is, if it expresses certain values that a legal system
should uphold. These values could include, depending upon the commentator, equality
(especially substantive equality), fairness, transparency, accountability, consistency, and
predictability.2 It is commonly argued that, absent its capacity to promote substantive
values, the rule of law becomes nothing more than a legitimation of de facto political
power. Yet there is no universally accepted manner in which the substantive content of
the rule of law can be defined; the content will inevitably depend upon cultural
constructs and value preferences. For example, in a recent U.S. Agency for International
Development (“USAID”) publication, the rule of law was said to include a commitment
to the promotion of market-based activity through the guarantee of the sanctity of
contracts? Equating the rule of law with neo-liberalism is clearly ideologically driven,
and would by no means receive universal approbation even from liberal-minded Western
lawyers.’
Because of the inherent uncertainty of the concept, the rule of law continues to be
defined in diverse, sometimes conflicting ways within the development community.
For some agencies, the rule of law is best defined by reference to the existence of
binding adjudicatory mechanisms, primarily national courts. For the World Bank,
“lain essential element of the rule of law concept is the existence of an independent
dispute resolution body that resolves conflicts in the application of the rules or
‘ A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1960).
“‘ British Institute for International and Comparative Law, Good Governance Project: The Rule of
Law (Draft of Discussion Summary, 27 February 1996) [unpublished] at 7.
” See e.g. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969);
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Alasdair MacIntyre,
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988);
Martha Minow, “Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover” (1987) 96 Yale L.J. 1860; Thomas
M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
” U.S., USAID, Center for Democracy and Governance, Handbook of Democracy and Governance
Performance Indicators (Technical Publications Series) (August 1998) at 19-20, online: USAID
See e.g. Brigitte Stem, “How to Regulate Globalization?” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of Law
in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford
Univerity Press, 2000) 247.
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addresses instances of non-compliance with the rules:” A similar approach is adopted
by the USAID,’ and by the Council of Europe.’
The OECD also emphasizes the importance of an independent judiciary to the
rule of law, but employs an even more specific analysis. On this view, the rule of law
is fulfilled when human rights are protected by a legal system that controls the
exercise of power by government through court supervision of executive and
administrative powers. What is odd about this supposed requirement
is that
substantive judicial review of administrative action is not even firmly entrenched in
some stable Western democracies, such as France (where the review power of courts
is a current political preoccupation) and the U.K. (with its largely unwritten
constitution that makes it complicated for courts to review state action against
constitutional standards). In the OECD definition, the rule of law also requires an
absence of arbitrary conduct on the part of state authorities, equality of access to
redress grievances, and equality of treatment, whatever one’s social status.”
The development agency of the U.K. adopted a guidance paper on law, good
governance, and development in which the rule of law is defined succinctly:
The Rule of Law emphasises the fact that government should be conducted
in accordance with known and objective legal principles, should be able to
point to lawful authority when exercising power and, furthermore, that law
exists to protect and guide all elements of society?
Implicit in this definition is an unspecified substantive content for the rule of law. Not
only is “lawful authority” relevant, so too is the protection and guidance of “all
elements of society.” One might read in a notion of equality, and either human rights
or paternalistic protection. ‘
Finally, the rule of law, and the values it contains, can be viewed from a different
instrumental perspective. The Good Governance Project of the British Institute for
International and Comparative Law has stressed the importance of the rule of law in
strengthening “social peace and stability.” On this view, “[r]ule of law mechanisms
World Bank, Legal Technical Assistance, supra note 16 at 15.
36U.S., USAID, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, Center for Development Information
and Evaluation, Weighing In on the Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Rule
of Law Programs (USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 7) by Harry Blair & Gary
Hansen (Febraury 1994) at 6, online: USAID
” Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges,
Recommendation R(94) 12 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1995) at 7 (adopted 13
October 1994).
38 OECD, DAC Orientations, supra note 19 at 14; OECD, Final Report, supra note 20.
‘9 ODA, supra note 23 at 3.
,’ For a detailed list of the possible substantive commitments of “the rule of law,” see Carothers,
supra note 29.
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provide a stable and non-violent means of structuring individual and group
relationships within society in which disputes are settled on the merits of the positions
rather than by force.'”‘ Although controlling resort to force is an important goal, the
British Institute itself notes that an emphasis upon “stability” and “social peace” will
not necessarily lead to the promotion of other equally important goals such as public
participation and democratization.
This brief excursion into the development literature on the rule of law underscores
the conclusion that there is no single definition of the term acceptable to all. Of more
immediate concern is the tendency to employ the phrase in policy statements, and
even in project planning documents, as if it contained a stable meaning that answered
the “why” question of justice reform fully and comprehensibly. If development
workers are going to continue to use the short hand of “rule of law”, they should
specify what they mean. More pointedly, the phrase should not be invoked to mask an
absence of underlying analysis.”2 If one wants to employ the concept of the rule of law
to help define a project goal, it is probably best to think of the concept in broad terms,
as signalling the desire to manage by rule rather than fiat, and as reflecting the priority
of publicly known laws over individual or sectoral interests. Any understanding of the
rule of law would also include equality of treatment for all subjects of the law, without
favours to political, economic, or social elites. But this is only a beginning, and for
each project the general concept of the rule of law must be broken down into much
more specific project purposes. If legal and judicial reform initiatives are to have any
hope of influence, precision is required first in describing the elements that constitute
legal systems, and second in positing useful markers toward the specific goals that are
sought to be achieved. I undertake these two steps in the next sections of the paper.
B. The Interrelated Elements of a Legal System
As suggested by the lucid work of the ODA, there are four distinct but interrelated
elements that make up a formal legal system, each of which encompasses a range of
institutions and processes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
the articulation, formulation, and drafting of rules (including the creation of
formal institutions);
the application and interpretation of rules;
the provision of legal representation and advice; and
the promotion of public access and understanding.’
4 British Institute for International and Comparative Law, supra note 31 at 12.
4 See World Bank, “Goal of Development Policy”, supra note 28.
43ODA, supra note 23 at 7.
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Underlying each of these elements is a further component crucial to the health of any
legal system: basic legal education and professional training. If one is to assess the
relative soundness of a legal system, one must engage with each of these elements
separately and try to penetrate their interrelationships as well. These elements are
conceived broadly, as will soon be apparent, and are meant to include not only
structural aspects, but processes and actor attitudes as well.
No legal system, or for that matter no social system, can function on the basis of
its formal structures alone. To understand a system, one must come to grips with the
way in which structures and agents (participants in the system) interact. Both the
structures and the agents are shaped and modified by that interaction.” A relatively
straightforward case is the perennial issue of the proper relationship between the
judiciary and executive authorities. In Jamaica, the court system receives its budget
allocations in specific budgetary envelopes directly from the Ministry of Justice, and
chief justices and court administrators must often apply directly to the Ministry for
funding for even minor initiatives. Although this financial relationship would send up
a red flag in any standard analysis of judicial independence, the Jamaican judiciary is
in fact strongly independent. This independence flows in part from other structural
elements, such as the difficulty of removing judges from office, but also from
inherited traditions of independence that are cherished and sustained by strong-willed
individuals, acting out a well-established social role. To understand the issue of
independence of judges in Jamaica, one needs to look carefully at both structures and
actors. If the social role were to be undermined, hypothetically, by a series of highly
unpopular judgments matched with out-and-out attacks from the executive upon the
judiciary, the structures might not prove strong enough to guarantee continuing
independence.
In addition, formal legal systems, at least in their Western varieties, are predicated
upon certain animating concepts that must inform concrete programming decisions.
These include a commitment to non-violence, support for the ethic of promising,
upholding rights of possession, and a grounding in what might be called a “liberal
education” in law.”
So in conducting an assessment of a legal system where intervention is being
considered, the assessor should look at the four elements of the system, describe how
they relate to each other, and attempt to understand how and why actors in the system
behave as they do. Part of the answer to the behavioural questions is found in the
education and training of legal professionals, and this should be the subject of specific
‘ My understanding of social action and change is informed by the sociological theory of
structuration. See Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of
Structuration (Cambrdige, U.K.: Polity Press, 1984) especially at 2-3, 16-19, 22-28, 36, 83-87, 132-
39, 162-65, and 179-80. Giddens provides a helpful review of “basic concepts” at 281-84.
‘ I thank Rod Macdonald for a helpful conversation that clarified these predicates.
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analysis. In addition, the inherited traditions and “mystique” of professionals within
the system should be explored, as should the commitment to the animating concepts
of Western law noted immediately above.”
Within each of the four legal system elements, the following institutions and
processes should be considered:
associations,
constitutional
and professional
Articulation, Formulation, and Drafting of Rules: This element of a formal legal
system encompasses such processes as public and professional demands for legal
reform and the modification of institutional structures, as well as the work of legal
advocacy groups
assemblies,
parliamentary
committees, ministerial working groups, drafting committees,
legislative drafting groups, and parliaments. Options for engagement include working
with: (a) legal advocacy groups to promote sectoral interests within the legal system
(urban poor, landless peasants, women, children, labour, etc.); (b) professional
associations (of lawyers, notaries, judges) and advocacy groups
to promote
substantive law reform and drafting, and reform of institutions charged with the
formulation and drafting of rules; (c) drafting committees and public consultation
processes of constitutional assemblies or similar bodies, if constitutional reform is
being considered; (d) law reform commissions and policy units in the civil service,
including inter-ministerial committees or legislative drafting units
in ministries
charged with the preparation of study papers or draft legislation; (e) parliamentary or
congressional committees charged with the drafting or review of legislation; (f) civil
servants in ministries or executive and administrative agencies responsible for the
drafting and promulgation of subsidiary regulations (e.g., in labour law, human rights,
taxation, etc.); and (g) parliaments or congresses as they re-tool legislative processes
or consider specific legislative initiatives.
Application and Interpretation of Rules: This element is accomplished through
public response to rules (i.e., ignoring or abiding by the rules in most circumstances),
decision making in governmental bureaucracies,
the work of law enforcement
officials, writings of legal commentators, pronouncements of administrative agencies
and tribunals, and decisions of courts. Options for engagement include working with:
(a) organizations interested in explaining and promoting justice reform initiatives to
the relevant publics
include government agencies, professional
associations, legal advocacy groups, news media, law faculties); (b) entities charged
with training governmental officers and workers, and other professional actors within
the legal system, in the new legal processes and new substantive rules (these entities
may
include government agencies, professional associations, non-governmental
training organizations, legal advocacy groups, law faculties); (c) police and other
(these may
‘ On the importance of professional “mystique” see U.S., USAID, Bureau for Policy and Program
Coordination, Center for Democracy and Governance, Institutional Strengthening and Justice Reform
by Linn Hammergren (August 1998) at 32 [USAID, Institutional Strengthening].
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security forces, including customs and excise officers, both in terms of their work in
effectively enforcing the law, and in addressing internal organizational problems and
issues of corruption; (d) prison authorities seeking to reform prison conditions and to
address issues of corruption; (e) law faculties in reforming their teaching methods and
curriculum and in addressing corruption (buying places and good grades, for
example); (t) ombudsman offices, administrative agencies and tribunals (dealing with
labour issues, housing, human rights, land reform, etc.), seeking to improve their
processes and substantive decisions; (g) court administrative authorities trying to
timely decision making (including caseload
improve processes
management, registry processes, the use of court-annexed methods of alternative
institutes, and professional
dispute resolution);
organizations seeking to bolster judicial independence, or the broader independence
of the justice system from executive or legislative interference; (i) courts, judicial
training institutes, and professional organizations addressing corruption; and (f)
judges who need to learn new substantive and procedural skills (through court
continuing education programs and judicial training institutes).
(h) courts, judicial
that support
training
Legal Representation and Advice: This aspect of a formal legal system may be
offered by individual lawyers, law practices, trade unions, women’s organizations,
community groups, legal aid clinics, law faculties, bureaucrats in administrative
agencies and ministries, and professional organizations. Options for engagement
include working with: (a) professional organizations, such as bar societies and
notarial associations, seeking to foster an ethic of professionalism, independence, and
public service; (b) professional organizations establishing free or low-cost legal aid
schemes; (c) non-governmental organizations, or membership associations such as
trade unions, providing legal advice to specific sectors (women, the urban poor,
landless peasants, students, workers, etc.); (d) law faculties establishing legal advice
or information centres; (e) public service units of administrative agencies or ministries
charged with advising the public on how to access governmental services or decision-
making processes; and (t) human rights commissions.
Public Access and Understanding: This element may be promoted by many of the
actors referred to above, including various organs of civil society, professional
associations, courts, governmental agencies, and the media. Options for engagement
include working with: (a) non-governmental organizations, schools, community
organizations, and legal advocacy groups; (b) legal aid organizations, both private and
public; (c) professional organizations interested in public outreach; (d) public affairs
bureaus of ministries and administrative agencies (particularly ministries of justice
and human rights commissions); and (e) the media, both private and state-controlled.
It must be emphasized that the elements of a legal system that I have described
are often overlapping, and various groups and institutions may be involved in a
variety of processes. For example, simply penetrating a legislative process may be
extraordinarily difficult, as anyone who has tried to comprehend the progress of draft
Vietnamese laws can attest. For any piece of proposed legislation in Vietnam, one
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may have to consider the potential impact of various Communist Party of Vietnam
(“Party”) structures, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Justice, a
number of line ministries, drafting groups outside the government (such as those
sponsored by the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association), the National Assembly Legal
Committee, other National Assembly committees, and the National Assembly itself.
The list is not exhaustive.
So far, all that has been identified are the places and processes that should be
subject to analysis. Precisely what is to be assessed has yet to be determined in detail:
What factors collectively constitute the “rule of law”, or in my preferred vocabulary,
reflect a sound and effective legal system?
C. Indicators of Legal System Health
For three years, an ad hoc working group of the DAC struggled to agree upon “a
common framework for assessing performance” in participatory development and good
governance. They failed. 7 The problem was to agree on a limited set of indicators that
could be used to assess improvement
in governance. So many indicators were
considered that no reasonable list could be arrived at by consensus. As one participant in
a later expert group suggested, it was doubtful that a small number of indicators “could
capture all the dimensions and complexity of democratic governance.”‘ Instead, it was
suggested that “[a] relatively large number of overlapping indicators linked to strategic
national goals is therefore necessary to obtain a more accurate picture of a country
situation”
Although assessing the soundness of a legal system is less complex than assessing
the entirety of governance structures and systems in a given country, similar problems
arise. Legal systems are made up of a myriad of formal and informal institutions.
There are scores of interrelated processes, and as many or more actors. Many distinct,
and sometimes conflicting, values are promoted through law. To identify only a few
indicators that provide a relatively accurate portrayal of systemic health is at least
difficult, and is perhaps impossible. In addition, because of law’s strong cultural and
political aspects, positing only a few indicators that are likely to be equally relevant in
all contexts is spurious. It is preferable to identify a series of overlapping indicators of
See OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Participatory Development and Good Governance: Part 2: Lessons from Experience in Selected
Areas of Supportfor Participatory Development and Good Governance (Paris: OECD, 1997), online:
OECD
Aid Evaluation, Evaluation of Programs Promoting Participatory Development and Good
Governance: Synthesis Report (Paris: OECD, 1997), online: OECD
[OECD, Evaluation of Programs].
” OECD, Evaluation of Programs, ibid. at 10.
“Ibid.
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375
systemic soundness, and to admit that each will be of greater or lesser relevance in
given country situations. Once indicators are chosen for the purposes of initial
assessment, however, it is essential to continue to track them for the purposes of
project management, an issue to which we will return in Part IV.
The following indicators are intended to help construct a “motion picture” of the
legal system, using the analytical equivalent of a hand-held video camera, admitting
that the picture will change, sometimes in surprising and disturbing ways, with
political, economic, and social changes, and as a result of interventions of legal and
judicial reformers. It is not helpful to imagine a thorough and nuanced assessment as
a “snapshot”, for that metaphor is misleading, suggesting stasis and an ability to focus
and to define the edges of the photograph.
Accountability; Subjection to External Evaluation and Criticism: This category
includes, most importantly, freedom of the media. Contempt of court or libel
procedures that can be abused by governments and captive judiciaries should also be
included. Open activity of legal advocacy groups must be permitted. Excessive use of
force by law enforcement and corrections officials should be subject to public scrutiny
and sanction.
Anti-corruption: The legal system itself should be free from corruption and
should be seen as an instrument to inhibit or control corruption in other institutions of
government and the private sector. In particular, law enforcement agencies must be
free to investigate and prosecute all elements of society. They should be motivated by
the public good, not by personal, family, or clan advantage.
Efficacy:-‘ Governments are responsible for the wise use of resources. This should
include an ability to shape and remake legal processes when necessary. One must
assess the competence of key actors, such as governmental justice officials, lawyers,
and members of the judiciary.
Equality before and under the Law: The legal system must treat various actors in
a fair and equal manner, applying standards of justification that are relevant to the
context of diverse elements of society, especially the poor, women, and civil society.
Differential positioning in society should be considered relevant to equality analysis.
One asks not only whether “equality of opportunity” is present, but whether a level
playing field has been created. This attribute of law is often referred to, especially in
Canada, as substantive equality.
Equality of Access: This consideration relates to comprehension of the legal
system by citizens and access to basic advice. Specific concerns of “disenfranchised”
groups such as women, the poor, rural communities, and indigenous peoples should
” The term “efficacy” is chosen in preference to “efficiency”, which is often used as shorthand for a
clumsy cost-benefit analysis that pays no attention to the substantive quality of decision making and
that focusses only on numeric outputs, such as the number of cases decided.
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be addressed. Access must be viewed not only as a question of process, but of
substantive legal reform; the content of law and how it is interpreted are often more
important barriers to justice than are cumbersome and expensive procedures.
Independent Actors (Judiciary, Quasi-judiciary, the Legal Profession, and Law
Enforcement Officials): One must question whether or not judges have the capacity to
exercise truly independent judgment; so too, members of administrative tribunals. Are
they protected from governmental or other pressures to conform? Members of the
legal profession exercise “professional” judgment in giving advice; they are not
merely instruments of a dominant elite. Law enforcement officials should make
decisions on investigation and prosecution free from the political interference of
government.
Internal Values within the Legal System such as Transparency and Openness,
Fairness, Consistency, and Predictability: Within the legal system, and its decision-
making processes, certain central “legal” values must be upheld. These values shape
rule making, rule interpreting and rule enforcing, and help to buttress the perceived
legitimacy of the system.
Legitimacy and Indigenous Support: This criterion relates to respect for the legal
system, in part as a function of the values it upholds, and to the perceived objectivity
of key actors, as well as to an acceptance that the rules of the system are broadly fair,
equally enforced and possible of individual compliance. The existence of legal
pluralism, where indigenous solutions are encouraged, not the mere importation of
unmediated foreign models, should be valued.
No Retroactive Rules: It should be possible for the citizen to know in advance
what legal constraints affect his or her choices and preferences (especially in criminal
law). Rules would be applied retroactively only in rare circumstances and with clear
public justification.
Stability yet Flexibility: The system as a whole is stable, but with the possibility to
accommodate changing situations and perceptions.
limeliness: Delays of process must be reasonable. Achieving concrete legal
remedies must be possible.
Understandable and Reasonable Parameters for the Legal System: The citizenry
must sense that the application of law is constrained, that not every policy preference
legal system must allow space for political debate and
becomes “law”. The
disagreement, and for the evolution of local solutions to political and legal challenges.
No doubt some readers will have noted that I have not included ‘justice” as an
indicator of systemic health. This may seem strange, for one would hope that the
pursuit of justice is the primary goal of legal systems. The problem is that “justice” is
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377
highly charged political concept, and is closely related to the substantive policy ends
pursued by governments and actors in civil society. Again and again, in studies of
legal and judicial reform programming around the world, the observation is made that
justice reform is closely related to the essentials of state independence.” I prefer to
conceptualize the tension somewhat differently. Once development agencies are in the
business of promoting fundamental reforms in legal systems, they are involved in the
“internal affairs” of host states. The issue is not whether or not to “intervene”, for that
choice has already been made. The question is how to do so respectfully and
sensitively. One way of ensuring due deference is to focus upon processes and
systemic values in justice work 2 and to avoid, as far as possible, substantive
judgements on the policy goals of governments, or of critics of government in civil
society. Internal political processes must be allowed to play out. It is not the job of any
external actor to dictate the “quality of justice” in other states, unless, and it is an
important caveat, the external intervenor could be contributing to actions or decisions
that offend important values discussed below in Part II.A.3.
Again, a Jamaican example may help to clarify the point. In recent years, a major
political storm has erupted throughout the Commonwealth Caribbean over the
imposition of the death penalty. In 1993, the U.K. Privy Council issued a landmark
ruling in Pratt v. Jamaica (A.G.), 3 where it decided that holding two prisoners on
death row for some fourteen years constituted a violation of the guarantee against
inhuman and degrading punishment in section 17(1) of the Jamaican constitution.”
This decision prompted renewed cries for the severing of the judicial link to the Privy
Council and for the creation of a Caribbean Court of Appeal.-5 It seems also to have
been the reason underlying Jamaica’s decision in 1997 to withdraw its ratification of
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.6
Under the Optional Protocol, individuals from a ratifying state can lodge a petition
” See e.g. United Nations Development Programme, Management Development and Governance
Division, UNDP and Governance: Experiences and Lessons Learned, Lessons-Leamed Series No. 1
(New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1998) at s. 4.6, online: United Nations
Development Programme
52 These values are what Lon Fuller described so evocatively as the “inner morality of law” (supra
note 32 at 42).
“(1993), [199412 A.C. 1, [1993] 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C.).
SJamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1962 (U.K), S.I. 1962-1550, sch. 2, s. 17(1) reprinted in
Albert P Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World, vol. 9
(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Oceana Publications, 1983).
” Roget V. Bryan,
‘Toward the Development of a Caribbean Jurisprudence: The Case for
Establishing a Caribbean Court of Appeal” (1998) 7:2 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 181 at 187ff.
56 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 (entered into force 23 March 1976,
accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [Optional Protocol].
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with the Human Rights Committee in Geneva alleging that their own state has
violated their rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”
One of the justifications for efforts to increase the speed with which Jamaican
courts deal with cases is to prevent any claim from future death penalty prisoners that
their rights have been denied under Jamaican constitutional provisions. Such a claim
might be heard by a Caribbean Court of Appeal, if not by the Privy Council. Given
the commitment of many Canadians to the abolition of the death penalty, and a high
degree of support for the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, one should be careful not
to assist in enhancing the efficiency of the Jamaican disposition of court cases for
reasons which might prove inimical to other values, and hence prove embarrassing in
a broader political context.
I recognize that I have not provided legal and judicial project designers with a
short and handy checklist of what to look for in assessing the soundness of a legal
system. Instead, I have suggested that there are four interrelated elements in a legal
system, each containing numerous institutions and diverse processes, and that
affecting each of these elements is the quality of legal education. I have gone on to
identify no less than twelve indicators of systemic health that could be mapped
against each of the four elements of a legal system in more or less useful ways,
depending upon the social, political, and economic context. I have also cautioned that
any assessment should consider not only structural (or institutional) elements of the
legal system, but relationships and social roles. One could fairly object that this
approach, while comprehensive and perhaps even thoughtful,
too
cumbersome to be of concrete assistance to decision makers and project planners. I do
not think so. Indeed, I argue that understanding the complexity of the legal system is
crucial to any potentially successful intervention. Moreover, the process of assessment
is not as difficult as it may at first appear. Rather than searching for an illusionary and
misleading set of “core” indicators, a disparate yet structured set of assessment tools,
employed with flexibility in given contexts, can shape our investigations and sharpen
our analysis.
is simply
To demonstrate this approach more concretely, I outline in the appendix how the
analytical framework that I have proposed was employed in assessing the legal system
of Vietnam and in recommending programming options. I have chosen to profile
Vietnam for a number of reasons. First, its legal system needs are complex and
therefore fascinating. Second, important questions of value are presented in a pointed
fashion. Third, my assessment of the Vietnamese justice system is relatively recent,
and I had the opportunity to apply various lessons that I had learned in other
countries. I cannot rehearse the full analysis of the Vietnamese legal system within the
confines of this article. Instead, the appendix outlines what I believe are the requisite
‘ 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 (entered into force 23 March 1976,
accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICCPRI.
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analytical steps, given the framework outlined above, and investigates two potential
points of engagement to show how the framework leads to concrete programming
recommendations.’
II. Principles for Sound Legal and Judicial Reform Programming
When one starts to consider specific program components in legal and judicial
reform, it is soon apparent that justice reform programming typically lies at the
intersection of technical assistance, capacity development, and
institutional
development. Each of these aspects of development work has generated its own
literature, even though in practice they often overlap. The common denominator in all
of the studies is the conclusion that “this kind of project is hard.” Technical assistance
is often difficult because it is commonly seen to be “donor driven”, it usually relies
upon expatriate expertise so is not always well rooted in national priorities, and it
generally proves to be hard to sustain impact. 9 Moreover, “technical” advice may
simply be inappropriate where highly charged political questions are at stake, such as
the relationship between a judiciary and executive authorities.’ Finally, technical
assistance initiatives are often most needed by the states that are the least equipped to
accept and make good use of them. For all these reasons, “overall the efficacy and
cost-effectiveness of [technical assistance] has been disappointing …
Capacity development work is similarly challenging. A thoughtful commentator
on capacity development projects has noted that “[w]e are slowly realizing the need to
come to grips with the challenges and dilemmas of intervening in complex human-
and open-systems.” Capacity development is about “the self-organization of a
society” and it must consider not only technical and organizational abilities and
structures, but also “the more human, personal characteristics that allow people to
38For the detailed presentation of the case, see Canada, CIDA, Asia Branch, Indo-China/
Thailand/Malaysia Programme, Programming in Legal and Judicial Reform: Potential CIDA
Engagement in Wetnam (Diagnostic study) by Stephen J. Toope (August 1999). My work in Vietnam
was undertaken with Dr. Philip Rawkins, a governance expert, and his contribution to the study was
invaluable. However, the work was structured so that I presented my “legal analysis” to Dr. Rawkins
who then incorporated that report into a broader governance framework, which is why the legal
component is authored by me alone. I want to be clear that my involvement with a potential CIDA
project on legal and judicial reform in Vietnam ended with the production of a “diagnostic” study, and
none of my comments necessarily reflect the final approach adopted by the CIDA Vietnam Program.
9 See e.g. United Nations Development Programme, supra note 51 at s. 1.2.
USAID, Institutional Strengthening, supra note 46 at 67.
61 World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department, Technical Assistance, Lessons & Practices Series,
No. 7 (Washington: World Bank 1996) at 4 [World Bank, TechnicalAssistance].
6 Canada, CIDA, Policy Branch, “An Update On The Performance Monitoring of Capacity
Development Programs: What Are We Learning?” (Paper presented to the DAC Informal Network on
Institutional and Capacity Development) by Peter Morgan (May 1999) at 18, online: CIDA
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make progress.” ‘ For these reasons, capacity development is often as much about
processes such as planning, learning, and institutionalizing, as it is about concrete
outputs.’
Institutional development is perhaps even more complex, involving both technical
in most cases. Moreover,
assistance and capacity development components
institutions have their own ways of operating that are often impenetrable to outsiders.
Legal institutions have proven to be particularly resistant to change,’ no doubt in part
because they are subject to social, political, and cultural factors beyond the control of
project implementers.’
A. Objectives and Commitment over Time
It is no surprise that justice reform, often seeking to combine many individually
difficult program elements, is itself supremely challenging. Adding to the complexity
is the innately political aspect of justice systems, alluded to throughout this article. By
this I mean that legal reform often touches upon deep-seated interests of a range of
groups, and can call upon governing elites to reconsider their methods of governing. It
can even threaten to displace elites.’ A simple example is the manner in which the
decision to learn about foreign legal “models” can be directly affected by strategic
political considerations.” Cuba might not wish to be seen to be interested in learning
from U.S. experience, even if that experience is rich and directly applicable. How
much more sensitive is any reform initiative touching upon the reallocation of
governmental power, or the dismantling or major restructuring of national and
regional institutions?
Another reason that justice reform is so difficult is that consistent donor
experience tells us that, ultimately, only comprehensive reform efforts will produce
sustainable results.’ A recent World Bank study has emphasized that a piecemeal
approach to justice reform leads only to incoherence. Real reform requires attention to
substantive law, to legal institutions, and to the processes that shape relationships
“3 Ibid. at 6, 14.
“Ibid. at 13. See also United Nations Development Programme, supra note 51 at s. 3.7.
63 Asian Development Bank, supra note 16 at 2.
66World Bank, Technical Assistance, supra note 61 at 2.
70ECD, Evaluation of Pmgrams, supra note 47 at 29; U.S., USAID, Bureau for Policy and
Program Coordination, Center for Democracy and Governance, Political Will, Constituency Building,
and Public Support in Rule of Law Programs by Linn Hammergren (August 1998) at 46 [USAID,
Political Will.
6″Ajani, supra note 28 at 97.
69 See Department of Justice, supra note 4 at 5 (comments of Omar Sherif Hassan, Acting General
Counsel, Operations, World Bank). See also USAID, Institutional Strengthening, supra note 46
(arguing that reform is always multi-institutional, and that one must adopt a broad perspective “with
an eye to the longer term issues of balance and countervailing powers” at 11).
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among various actors within the legal system, and those actors with the citizenry.”0
The Asian Development Bank has also emphasized the need for a “systemic”
approach to legal and judicial reform, stressing the role not only of state legal
institutions, but of law faculties and professional associations as well.” A recent
United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) evaluation of legal reform
initiatives supported by that agency makes the point forcefully:
The legal system of any country is a vast web of interdependent entities
comprising institutions (courts, police, prisons), norms and procedures, and the
societal linkages to the goals and responsibilities of the civil society. If any one
of these parts fails, the whole legal system is rendered dysfunctional. Therefore,
it is necessary to approach judicial reform in a comprehensive manner,
recognising the interdependent linkages of its components.”
With its high degree of politicization and programmatic complexity, one can only
expect significant results in justice reform over the long term. The issue of results will
be discussed further in Part IV, but it is important to note here that for anyone
contemplating major programming in the justice sector, it is wise to plan for
engagement over a period of at least five to ten years.’ Fundamental change may take
a generation or more to accomplish. As the UNDP has discovered, any type of public
sector reform is likely to require long-term commitment, often because it requires not
only a financial expenditure, but the dissipation of “political capital” as well.’
Moreover, independent studies confirm that whenever a project has significant
institutional development components, as is often the case with justice reform,
success is dependent upon the integration of the components into a long-term
strategy.75
1. A Step-by-Step Approach
Because successful engagement in legal and judicial reform requires time, one
should only consider major projects after experience is gained working on modest
initiatives in the sector.’6 A recent CIDA study of governance programming in
Ethiopia confirms the validity of this approach. Governance programming as a whole,
70 World Bank, Initiatives, supra note 18 at 12.
“Asian Development Bank, supra note 16 at 3.
“United Nations Development Programme, supra note 51 at s. 4.6.
“See e.g. World Bank, Initiatives, supra note 18 at 8; USAID, Institutional Strengthening, supra
note 46 at 12.
4 United Nations Development Programme, supra note 51 at s. 3.7.
” European Centre for Development Policy Management, International Experience with Institutional
Development and Administrative Reform: Some Pointers for Success by Joan Corkery, ECDPM
Working Paper No. 15 (Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, 1997) at
para. 15, online: European Centre for Development Policy Management (Archive)
6 USAID, Institutional Strengthening, supra note 46 at 31.
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and justice programming in particular, is strongly context-specific. Donors have high
information needs, which are often hard to fulfill simply through standard staffing at
the post mixed with a short-term “design mission”.” In my experience, perhaps
because justice reform is a relatively new area of work, in-country diplomatic and
development aid staff are not well connected in the legal community. It is extremely
difficult to learn all that one needs to learn by relying on existing contacts. Obviously,
the same is even more true for a design team in place for a matter of weeks. For that
reason, a step-by-step approach to justice programming is essential. I concur entirely
with Phillip Rawkins’ recommendation flowing from his Ethiopian review:
[B]est results are obtained through a careful, iterative approach. This is likely to
involve constructing a base of information and analysis through a joint needs
analysis, conducted with the host-country partner organization, followed by a
trust and mutual
sequence of small, highly focused projects, building
understanding and working towards major project intervention,”
The only caveat I would add is that it is often difficult to restrain the expectations
of host country partners, especially those in the legal sector. Justice programming is a
recent phenomenon, and there is a great deal of pent up demand for assistance.
Moreover, most justice ministries, courts, law faculties, and other legal institutions are
in dealing with donors. They are often surprised and
not very experienced
disappointed at the time it takes to build programs that are likely to succeed. Reining
in desires requires great tact. It is often necessary to try to build in relatively quick and
inexpensive initiatives, sometimes paid for out of existing regional or thematic funds,
so as to retain the attention and interest of overworked partners. For example, much of
CIDA’s initial legal work in Vietnam was funded by the Southeast Asia Fund for
Institutional and Legal Development (“SEAFILD”), which had a project budget limit
of 100,000 Canadian dollars. Similarly, early Canadian contacts with the Ethiopian
” ODA, supra note 23 at 2-3; CIDA, Ethiopia Governance Study, supra note 26 at iv, 18-20;
USAID, Political Will, supra note 67 at 45. Rawkins and Qualman point out that gaining accurate
information for governance programming is particularly difficult because the environment changes
quickly, governmental priorities may be different depending upon to whom one speaks and at what
level of the political or bureaucratic hierarchy he or she is found, the very common reluctance to
speak frankly about governance problems, and the unwillingness of many people to forego sectoral
interests in information sharing. Canada, CIDA, Africa and Middle East Branch, Policies, Strategic
Planning and Management Division Democracy and Governance Programming Lessons for CIDA:
Ethiopia Case Study by Phillip Rawkins & Ann Qualman (March 2000) at 2 [CIDA, Ethiopia Case
Study]. Schacter adds that development agencies often fail to penetrate much beyond the sources of
the capital cities in designing governance programming. World Bank, Operations Evaluation
Department, Monitoring and Evaluation Capacity Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from
Governance Programming by Mark Schacter, Evaluation Capacity Development Working Paper
Series, No. 7 (Washington: World Bank, 2000) at 9 [World Bank, Monitoring and Evaluation
Capacity Development].
7 CIDA, Ethiopia Governance Study, ibid. at 38-39.
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383
legal community were facilitated by small “Canada Fund” projects, falling within the
control of the embassy.
The ideal situation may be the creation of an in-country position of “senior
governance advisor”. Such a person can work to develop the needed local contacts,
and build up a store of information useful to all governance project planning,
including in the justice sector. I saw this work very effectively for a number of years
in CIDA’s Sri Lanka Programme (where the focus was solely upon human rights); the
Ethiopia Governance Study also highlights the utility of such a position.”9 Another
useful approach in dealing with the need for local information is the creation of teams
whenever technical assistance is a significant component of a justice reform project.
World Bank experience suggests that the team should fuse foreign specialist expertise
with both local legal and broader governance expertise.’ Having worked with locally
engaged governance experts while assessing the needs of the Jamaican and
Philippines justice systems, I strongly endorse this approach.
2. Political Will and Reform Constituencies
Donor experience reveals a further, and very important, consideration in setting
objectives for legal and judicial reform projects: the degree of local commitment to both
the processes and goals of reform endeavours. Reform that is entirely or even largely
externally driven is unlikely to be sustainable. This is because such reform efforts will
commonly be viewed as illegitimate. Healthy and effective social structures are built up
through interactional processes that allow for public participation.” Even if initial stages
of legal and judicial reform are led by elites, indigenous elites must be involved. In the
long term, broader participation, or at least the tacit support of the population, is
required. In some settings, and here the example of Quebec is obvious, the legal system
is also seen as a constellation of significant cultural artefacts, helping to define a
“people”. Fundamental change can only occur when it is desired, at some level, by the
supposed beneficiaries. 2 This statement, however, only prompts a further set of complex
questions: Within a given state, who must “want” reform? The government? The legal-
professional community? The people? And what is it that the “beneficiary” must want?
Is a desire for fundamental change needed before reform projects are undertaken, or is it
79 Ibid. at 17.
80 World Bank, Initiatives, supra note 18 at 11.
“For a detailed account of structuration theory, from which this understanding of social structure is
derived, see Giddens, supra note 44. See also Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A
Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities
Press, 1979); Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”
(1987) 41 Int’l Org. 335.
82 See Department of Justice, supra note 4 at 5 (comments of Omar Sherif Hassan, Acting General
Counsel, Operations, World Bank); World Bank, Initiatives, supra note 18 at 8; World Bank,
Monitoring and Evaluation Capacity Development, supra note 77 at 10.
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enough for mere tinkering to be contemplated, which might lead to deeper and more
sustained reform efforts?
The answer to the question who must want reform depends upon specific
contexts. It is not enough to glibly invoke the need for “political will”. In a
provocative paper for USAID, Linn Hammergren argues that political will is a much
abused and generally unhelpful concept, for at least two reasons. First, it tends to
reflect a static understanding of political processes–either a country has a will to
reform or it does not. In reality, achieving commitment to reform processes requires
constant renegotiation with the key actors: “The political calculus changes over the
course of a reform; what is needed to get approval[,J get ownership, get passage, and
work implementation are all different.” ” Secondly, political will is not something that
either exists or does not. The key point is that it can be built, employing processes that
engage extra-governmental forces as pressure points, and intra-govemmental forces
who are already inclined to favour reform (so-called champions) or who are
convinced after the initial steps that reform is beneficial. This second point is critical,
for it emphasizes the need to consider program elements that promote the building of
“reform constituencies” and “alliances”.”
Indeed, the USAD experience, which
seemed to gain a wide consensus as to its general applicability during discussions in
the DAC, supports the conclusion that one should not start any justice reform program
without an explicit constituency and coalition-building strategy.”
The membership in reform constituencies is varied. In the first generation of legal
and judicial reform projects, donors displayed a strong tendency to favour work with
civil society organizations such as community legal aid clinics or women’s legal
advocacy non-governmental organizations. These groups were assumed to “embody
the counter-hegemonic principles needed to accomplish real reform.”‘ Reform would
be pushed from the bottom up. It remains the case that engagement with civil society
organizations can be a useful way of pressuring for change from outside state power
structures. At the 1996 Canadian Round Table on Legal and Judicial Reform, the vast
majority of the participants expressed a preference for supporting justice work
undertaken by civil society actors. Such a strategy made a great deal of sense in
apartheid South Africa, to cite but one example.
Successful justice reform will typically begin by engaging and supporting reform
constituencies and key actors. Recent experience suggests, however, that because of
the need for comprehensive programming strategies that involve institutional change
“. USAID, Political Will, supra note 67 at 46. Hammergren’s analysis runs counter to an earlier
USAID study that emphasized an unspecified “political will” as a key to success in justice reform
projects. See USAID, Weighing In, supra note 36 at 28.
83 OECD, Evaluation of Programs, supra note 47 at 37; OECD, DAC Orientations, supra note 19 at
USAID, Political Will, ibid. at 14.
10. See also USAID, Political Will, ibid. at 13-14.
6USAID, Political Will, ibid. at 31.
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and capacity development, sustainable justice reform can only
government structures are ultimately targeted.” Hammergren argues:
take place
if
Planners must remember that justice reform is not a revolution. Public
discontent is a good incentive, but realistically, support must be sought among
those who already have power, and thus represent some version of their
interests. Those interests can be educated, but absent a broader political
revolution, a reform which pits mass interests against those of elites will not
succeed.88
This argument returns us to the point made at the outset about legal reform often
being an elitist activity. It is important to remember, however, that political and legal
elites are not monolithic. Nor are they necessarily coextensive.” While there are
certainly cases where powerful figures within the legal community are dead set
against change, there are other circumstances where it is those who work within the
system who see the need for change most clearly. In Jamaica, the impetus toward
reform is found primarily within the leadership of the legal community itself ‘ In a
fortuitous constellation of promising circumstances, when CIDA launched its
comprehensive justice program in Jamaica, people who occupied key positions, from
the minister of justice to the chief justice, from the head of the private bar to the chief
of correctional services, all seemed to be convinced of the need for change. The drive
for reform existed even though the general public would not likely have ranked
change in the justice system as a top national priority. It remains unclear whether the
political or business elites will take up the cause of justice reform.” In Cuba, on the
other hand, key leaders in the justice sector seem entirely comfortable with the status
quo. In Vietnam, the situation is more complicated. There are reformist elements
within the legal elite, but it is unclear whether they are also powerful politically. Given
the almost complete absence of civil society organizations, one is forced to do nothing
or to risk modest support for those elements within the state system that seem most
open to change, and to seek out the few alternative, non-state locations of influence
that are emerging, such as small university-based legal aid centres.
7 ODA, supra note 23 (noting the inevitable tension in all governance progranmes between a
society-centred and a state-centred approach, and suggesting correctly that neither should be ignored
at 3). On the need to work within state structures, see Yves Dandurand & Rodrigo Parfs-Steffens,
Beyond Wishful Thinking: Canadian/Latin American Cooperation in Criminal Law Reform and
Criminal Justice, The FOCAL Papers (Ottawa: Canadian Foundation for the Americas, 1997) at 9.
“USAID, Political Will, supra note 67 at 48-49.
“Ibid. (distinguishing between political elites and institutional leaders at 30).
Hammergren emphasizes that reform constituencies within the public service may be the most
important allies one can hope for. In any event, their engagement will ultimately be necessary for any
structural or institutional reform to take place. Ibid. at 14.
9 Although early efforts at justice reform in many countries were justified on the need for the legal
system to support economic reform, business elites almost never serve as core elements of a justice
reform constituency. See OECD, Evaluation of Programs, supra note 47 at 32. My experience in
Jamaica and Indonesia fully supports this conclusion of the OECD expert group.
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One can conclude that a reform coalition or constituency can emerge in a number
of ways. It may sometimes coalesce around a small group of convinced insiders. In
USAID’s Latin American justice programs, “[t]he most important constituencies were
not formal organizations, but rather individual lawyers, judges and concerned jurists,
in both the private and public sector”‘9” I have encountered a similar process prompting
and guiding judicial reform in the Philippines. But in other cases, civil society
organizations may be the principal element promoting reform, as is the case in
Malaysia, where the Bar Council and various non-governmental organizations have
been at the forefront of demands to address judicial corruption. In yet other settings,
the drive for change may come from the top, led by a reformist justice minister, as
was for a time true in Russia and Ukraine. What matters is knowing where the
alliance for reform is centred in any given country, and strategizing about how it can
be expanded when more support is needed to implement projects effectively. Reform
coalitions need not only be built; they must be held together and expanded as the
effects of reform efforts come to be felt. Even committed reformers can lose faith or
confidence as implications of reform that they perceive to be negative manifest
themselves.”9
If the step-by-step approach recommended here is adopted, widespread public
engagement with legal and judicial reform may not be needed for quite some time.
Indeed, starting small and building carefully helps reform alliances to grow in
manageable ways.’ This may make a great deal of sense as most projects have been
small scale, and have only begun to engage the various reform constituencies
ultimately needed to implement fundamental change. But as longer-term projects are
developed, with more ambitious and far-reaching goals, one might expect more
attention to be paid to the engagement of the public with legal reform efforts. If public
institutions are ultimately an object for major legal and judicial reform efforts, as they
typically must be, the citizenry should have some knowledge about what is planned,
and an opportunity to influence decision makers within their own country. Donors
should not willingly undermine such legitimate expectations. In any event, it seems
doubtful that significant reform of public institutions of any kind can be sustainable if
not at least tacitly supported by the citizenry.
Both USAID and the DAC have argued that in seeking to nurture a broader
reform constituency, especially in attempts to promote greater access to justice,
support for legal advocacy groups in civil society represents the most “promising”
92 USAID, Political Will, supra note 67 at 32.
9′ Ibid. at 16.
“Hammergren cautions that there are “many publics” with differing ends and strategic calculations.
Getting “everyone involved” immediately may simply produce paralysis. Ibid. at 15. Yet, for
fundamental change to take place, at some point the reform coalitions will likely have to be broadened.
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387
strategy.” Legal advocacy groups typically employ legal tools to assist disadvantaged
groups, but they also engage in advocacy and lobbying that helps to build a broader
constituency for reform. Of course, there are some states, such as Vietnam and China,
in which such groups do not exist, or are at most nascent. In such cases, reform
constituencies are more likely to be found within government structures, if at all.
3. Legal Values and Cultural Difference
One of the hardest puzzles in legal and judicial reform programming is finding a
balance between the promotion of legal values and the recognition of cultural
difference. In any development programming, a lack of sensitivity to indigenous
social, economic, and cultural values can lead to resistance, unsustainability, and
failure.’ Nonetheless, the engagement of Western development agencies in legal and
judicial reform programming is usually rooted in values that their home countries
into their foreign policy generally, and their aid policy
strive to incorporate
specifically. In this regard, it is worth recalling that the mission statement of the
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade calls upon the
Department to promote not only Canadian interests, but Canadian values as well. In
highly political initiatives such as justice reform, it is neither possible nor wise to
to bring to their international
ignore the value base that Canadians profess
engagements. In the case of CIDA, many of those values are stated explicitly in the
1995 programming priorities. ‘ Fortuitously,
inclusively
supported values of Canadians active in justice reform, as my 1997 survey of attitudes
and priorities revealed.”
they also derive from
For present purposes, the relevant Canadian legal values can be stated simply, and
summarized in five categories. First is a commitment to the promotion and protection
of equal human rights for all, including the rights of individuals and communities. It
must be emphasized that Canadian legal values concerning human rights are rooted
directly in international standards, articulated both in formal treaties and in various
” USAID, Weighing In, supra note 36 at 35; OECD, Evaluation of Programs, supra note 47 at 35.
Legal advocacy groups are distinguished from legal aid providers and paralegal activists that tend to
focus upon individual cases or issues, without a broader strategy for reform.
See Part II.A.2, above.
9’It is incontrovertible that priorities such as promotion of the full participation of women in
development, increased respect for human rights, a strengthened civil society, and private sector
development are grounded in specific values. These are not universally recognized priorities. So the
decision has already been taken that Canadian aid promotes Canadian values. The question is how to
effectively pursue that approach in the light of cultural and social diversity, acknowledging that mere
imposition of values is not likely to be successful in any development programming.
” See the consultation report included in CIDA, Analytical Framework, supra note 2 at 6, App. II.
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plans of action adopted to promote the implementation of treaty rights.” But in
addition, Canadians have taken a leadership role in the articulation of principles of
substantive equality within the legal system.”‘ Second is an attachment to democratic
processes of government based upon such principles as transparency, accountability,
and public participation; these principles are viewed as central to the legitimacy of
any governing regime. They include a strong reluctance to support governmental
structures that are perceived to be corrupt or oppressive. Third is a belief in the
essential role of organs of civil society in the furtherance of human rights and
democracy. Fourth is a faith that legal institutions and processes can and should be
employed in an equitable fashion to provide remedies for breaches of rights and to
help organize effective governance structures. Fifth is an acknowledgement of the
mutually supportive roles that can be played by public and private sector institutions
in the promotion of the other values identified above; Canadians are loathe to
demonize the state or private interests. ‘ ‘
In my experience, these values are highly salient in concrete programming
decisions. Two examples will suffice. In attempting to identify potential elements for
a CIDA-funded justice reform initiative in Cuba, it became apparent that the regime
had no particular interest in furthering human rights (at least in their civil and political
incarnation) or democratic accountability. The Cuban government insisted upon what
can only be described as purely technical assistance, focussing upon the provision of
computers and access to legal information databanks for the Ministry of Justice. But
this assistance was highly unlikely to lead to any greater openness in the justice
system, which is routinely used as a mechanism to suppress dissent. The question
arose whether or not Canada should assist a ministry that might be viewed as a part of
the problem in Cuba, and where no indications of reform-mindedness had been
offered. Despite Canada’s strong desire at the time to carve out an independent
foreign policy vis-A-vis Cuba, and a wish to act forcefully to repudiate American
” See e.g. ICCPR, supra note 57; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
993 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46 (entered into force 3 January 1976, accession by Canada 19
May 1976); Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S.
1992 No. 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990, ratification by Canada 13 December 1991) and the
resulting Action Plan on Child Protection: Promoting the Rights of Children Who Need Special
Protection Measures (CIDA (June 2001), online: CIDA
‘0 The Supreme Court of Canada has decided that the equality guarantee contained in section 15 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11) relates not only to “formal” or “procedural” equality, but
also to “substantive” equality. This implies that an evaluation whether a given individual or group is
being treated unequally requires a close analysis of context. Substantive equality demands the
accommodation of differences within the legal system, not a static test of “equal treatment” or “equal
opportunity”. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1
(“for the accommodation of differences, which is the essence of true equality, it will frequently be
necessary to make distinctions” at 169).
… See consultation report cited at note 98.
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attempts at extra-territorial legislation, it was difficult to use justice programming to
accomplish these ends because it could run counter to important legal values upheld
by most informed Canadians.
Similar issues arose with potential legal and judicial reform programming in
Indonesia in the early days of the post-Suharto era, when President Habibi and his
cronies remained in power. Despite the presence of an acknowledged reformer as
minister of justice, it was very difficult to identify any justice programming with
Indonesian executive agencies that would not be subject to valid criticisms on the
grounds of support for corrupt (or at the very least, grossly inefficient) institutions.
The Supreme Court of Indonesia was even more problematic, for it was a bastion of
old-style thinking and extreme corruption. If legal values were not to be ignored in
Indonesia, it emerged that the best form of engagement would be with the National
that had already displayed strong evidence of
Human Rights Commission,
independence, and a modest and targeted initiative with the relatively reformist
minister of justice.
In deciding whether or not to engage in legal and judicial reform work, Western
aid workers and legal experts would be well-advised to consider not only the express
policy framework for such work, but the values that underlie that framework. In
practice, these assessments are difficult for a number of reasons. First, legal values are
neither uniform nor entirely congruent. Encouraging a legal framework that supports
private sector initiatives promotes one set of values, but this may conflict with values
promoting democratization, for example. This is certainly the case in Vietnam, where
greater economic openness is not yet matched by significant political reform. The
question then becomes one of seizing opportunities to promote new ways of thinking
where they emerge in the system, but being careful not to sacrifice important values in
the process. Second, programming in the legal and judicial area may be shaped by
foreign policy decisions that are not entirely attuned to developmental problems and
issues. Extensive Canadian involvement with justice programming in Haiti is a prime
example of heavily politically driven programming decisions.'” Third, legal values
cannot be expressed abstractly. They are relevant in relation to specific cultural, social,
and political contexts where an aid agency seeks to undertake work. In arguing for the
salience of values in justice programming decisions, it remains true that overseas
development assistance initiatives are typically negotiated with host governments.
Cultural arrogance will never succeed in promoting change, especially in politically
sensitive areas such as law. Canadians, and other donors, bring their values to the
’02 It is fascinating to contemplate that between 1990 and 1997, of the total CIDA disbursements on
legal and judicial reform programming, between a quarter and a third “was spent exclusively in providing
support to the National Haitian Police” (21.4 million dollars out of a total disbursement of 71 million
dollars) (CIDA, Indicative List, supra note 3 at 9). 1 take no position as to whether or not this
investment was appropriate, but it was certainly skewed in relation to the extensive needs evident in
many countries where CIDA is engaged in justice reform programs.
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table, but they are not trump cards.”3 It may be best to cast the issue in terms of
expressing values that are based on our own experience, an experience that we are
sharing, not seeking to impose. Yet, if there is simply no congruence between the
legal and judicial reform expectations of a host government and the values that a
development agency brings to such work, I suggest that engagement is, at most,
inappropriate, and at least, risky.
Program designers cannot afford to ignore the values question, for it will
ultimately rear its head. Naive assumptions of congruence are often overthrown in
project implementation, causing immense frustration. Moreover, assistance to justice
systems that turn out not to be amenable to reform because of deep-seated
incommensurable values can sometimes lead to embarrassing questions about support
for corrupt and repressive regimes. The saga of public hearings concerning Canadian
government deference to the dying Suharto administration in Indonesia provides a
telling cautionary note.
B. Justice Programming Options
To promote the policies discussed in the first part of this article in a way that is
respectful of the values just discussed, diverse programming options may be pursued.
These options may range from modest financing to support the stable provision of
day-to-day legal services (such as legal aid), to a comprehensive program designed to
encourage and facilitate large-scale social, political, and economic reform. Between
these two extremes lie other points of possible engagement, including targeted
programming aimed at building the sustainability of existing levels of legal services
(such as police training or court administration improvements), or support for legal
reform initiatives, such as the creation of administrative tribunals, the design of
independent or court-annexed
resolution systems, prison
reorganization, or programs designed to facilitate equal access to justice (usually
public legal education, legal aid, or advocacy initiatives).” In most cases, as noted
above, any significant engagement with the legal system will ultimately lead to efforts
at capacity development and institutional reform within a diverse set of public and
quasi-public bureaucracies,
including ministries of justice, courts, administrative
tribunals, ombudsman’s offices, law reform commissions, human rights commissions,
prosecutorial services, the police, prisons, professional organizations, law faculties,
judicial training centres, and community dispute resolution centres.
alternative dispute
,03 For a helpful way of conceiving how one can relate deeply held values to work in culturally
diverse legal and political systems, see Jeremy Webber, “Multiculturalism and the Limits to
Toleration” in Andrd Lapierre, Patricia Smart & Pierre Savard, eds., Language, Culture and Values in
Canada at the Dawn of the 21’ Century (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996) 269.
0″ In this listing of levels of engagement, I am tracking work already undertaken by the ODA. See
ODA, supra note 23 at 5-6.
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In
the light of the step-by-step approach
to justice reform programming
recommended here, another way of framing possible programming options, focussing
upon specific elements of the legal system, is as follows:
1. support for the
systems, quasi-judicial
tribunals,
improvement of legal
infrastructure, such as court
administrative
service
administering justice, the police, or policy units within ministries of justice or
other governmental departments;
the public
2. capacity building within existing
legal structures such as the courts,
legislative drafting units, or the professional bar to perform established
functions more effectively;
3. capacity building, primarily through training initiatives designed to promote
attitudinal and behavioural change for justice personnel, including judges,
members of the bar, and public servants;
4. normative reform, including the drafting of new laws and regulations, and
efforts at improved implementation;
5. regulatory reform through the establishment of independent quasi-judicial
in cases of widespread
tribunals and regulatory agencies (especially
privatization of previously governmental activity);
6. change to fundamental structures of the public realm, usually through
assistance to constitutional reform processes;
7. democratic development initiatives related to legal reform of electoral
systems;
8. support for the promotion of substantive equality in the law and legal aid or
rights claims of dispossessed populations
counselling, focussing on
(including the poor, women, and indigenous peoples); and
9. assistance to non-governmental organizations (primarily legal advocacy
groups) seeking to deliver programs to encourage substantive legal reform
and rights claims by dispossessed populations, or by the general public.
All of these potential reform initiatives fall within the framework set out in Part I.B, as
they relate to the articulation, formulation, and drafting of rules; the application and
interpretation of rules; the provision of legal representation and advice; and the
promotion of public access and education. However, it is obvious that specific
initiatives often involve the interplay of more than one function. Moreover, they reveal
that one should think of a legal system in dynamic terms, for many initiatives are
about process and learning, not about pumping out specific legal products.
The listing of program options moves from essentially formal, institutionally
oriented reform processes, to processes that are more open and largely based upon
attitudinal and behavioural change both within the legal system and within society at
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large. Each element may overlap, and none are mutually exclusive. Given the almost
infinite range of precise program elements, and their strong context dependency, I will
not seek to provide a checklist of specific points of engagement. Rather, I will
highlight the pros and cons of some widely employed program options in the context
of risk assessment in Part IV. Before turning to a discussion of risk, however, I want to
say a few words about more general issues relating to the design of a justice reform
program.
1. Sequencing
institutions,” and concluding with
There is no ideal sequence for the implementation of elements of a justice reform
program. Everything is dependent upon the specific context in which reform is sought
or promoted. Cheryl Gray posits a three-step approach to her ultimate goal of market
friendly legal reform, starting with a set of written laws, continuing with the reform of
“supporting
the creation of incentives for
“individual market participants” to take advantage of their legal rights.” I believe that
this approach is overly schematic and rigid. I also doubt that beginning with a new
normative framework of laws and regulations makes sense in most cases without an
assurance of some genuine desire for change, as discussed above. Too much of the
first generation of justice reform programming was devoted to rather abstract efforts
in support of legislative drafting of bills that would never see the light of day, or for
which no thought had been given to the challenges of implementation. Most
commentators emphasize the importance of proper sequencing, but eschew any
standard formula,”‘ arguing instead that flexibility in all governance project design is
crucial. ”
Although fundamental structural reform and institutional strengthening are
usually both required to promote the factors associated with a sound legal system
enumerated in Part I, it may not be possible to start with such reforms in the absence
of some evidence of governmental commitment (though, as we have seen, a key
aspect of early justice reform efforts is fostering that commitment). One important
implication of the need for governmental engagement
that “institutional
strengthening” will not be an appropriate reform strategy unless the institutions to be
strengthened are tested against relevant criteria for sound legal systems apart from
efficacy (or efficiency) alone. For example, improving the administrative functioning
of a court system working comfortably within the constraints of a repressive regime is
not likely to prompt legal reform, as the Cuban example demonstrates so clearly.
is
“‘ Supra note 9 at 15-16.
See e.g. OECD, Evaluation of Programs, supra note 47 at 29.
,7 See e.g. World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department, Designing Technical Assistance
Projects: Lessons from Ghana and Uganda, Precis & Briefs, No. 95 (Washington: World Bank,
1995).
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393
Similarly, enhancing the administrative capacity of a justice ministry riddled with
corruption may only lead to the more efficient exploitation of corrupt practices. On
the other hand, attempting to promote reform through the elaboration of new
normative frameworks, in the absence of a strategy for institutional change, may
simply prompt “frustration and cynicism” as new laws are seen to have no effect.”
There is simply no template for programming in this complex area of governance.
Rather than seeing sequencing as a chain of cause and effect, it is better to imagine a
web of interconnections, drawing once again from Amartya Sen’s arguments
concerning the need for both conceptual integrity and causal interdependence in
comprehensive development programs.” The one “precondition” that seems to exist
in almost all cases is indigenous demand for legal and judicial reform, be it driven by
an elite (the common pattern) or by broad popular sentiment. Yet even this assertion
requires nuance, for part of the goal of justice programming may be to help relevant
actors to see what is possible. The nurturing of legitimate aspirations for reform is a
central element in the building-up of reform constituencies.
Once an indigenous constituency for legal and judicial reform has been identified,
that constituency can, however, be nurtured through support to civil society activities
and governmental initiatives as appropriate. A strong will to reform is not something
that must predate all justice activities; the will can be built up. Ultimately, institutional
strengthening may become appropriate, but this will depend upon the evolving desire
to change, the possibility of influence from external critics such as legal advocacy
groups and the media, and a basic structural capacity to engage in reform. The latter
point relates principally to the human resources present within the system capable of
guiding the institutional strengthening. Being “committed” to change is not enough,
even for the political and legal leadership: capacity to change is required and will
almost certainly have to be strengthened.”‘ It may be appropriate to engage in a
parallel strategy to build capacity for reform within governmental justice systems
while encouraging and supporting demands for change in civil society. The central
point is to avoid premature engagement with the existing formal justice structures for,
at best, such engagement is likely to be ineffective, and at worst it could actually
strengthen systems resistant to significant reform.
2. Seizing Opportunities
At the same time, one must be careful to avoid monochrome assessments of
institutions and groups. If one wants to begin helping to plant reform coalitions in
seemingly infertile ground, it will be necessary to seize opportunities when they
,s USAID, Institutional Strengthening, supra note 46 at 9.
“9 See Sen, supra note 13.
“” See e.g. European Centre for Development Policy Management, supra note 75 at pam. 34; CIDA,
Ethiopia Governance Study, supra note 26 at 7-8.
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the rationalism of human
present themselves. One should not overestimate
tie oneself into a straightjacket of pre-established
governance systems, nor
sequencing. Within the various groups and institutions of the justice system, one may
find that engagement will have to start at different places and move at different
speeds. Nor will the trajectory of reform be linear. Processes of change are likely to
circle back and effect other, related processes, some of which are internal to the legal
system, but many of which will be external and therefore hard to influence within the
framework of the justice program. In some circumstances it will be possible to work
with segments of governing structures, or with reform-minded individuals, in the hope
of encouraging ferment within an otherwise stagnant and repressive system. In the
final hours of the Habibi administration in Indonesia, it seemed possible to work with
the relatively reformist minister of justice, even though the broader context for justice
reform looked decidedly bleak. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, after the election of a new
government publicly committed to constitutional devolution of authority, a window
opened for work with another reformist, the minister of justice and constitutional
launching such opportunistic programming.
affairs. But caution is needed
Individuals are not necessarily capable of carrying the day; they may not be politically
powerful or astute enough to promote their reform agenda successfully. They may
also lose their jobs. “Champions” are important, but one must also assess their
capacity and their political clout. More broadly, the central point is that one should
seek to engage where the engagement is most likely to be effective. If an idealized,
comprehensive approach is not yet possible, one may still want to act, but in full
knowledge that the actions may not produce the desired results. Risks are often worth
taking, but they should be acknowledged as risks.
in
Modest attempts at structural or institutional change may be possible even if the
will to change is highly localized. One must then caution realism: modest and
localized attempts at structural change are likely to yield modest and localized results,
at least over the short and medium terms. The experience of legal and judicial reform
efforts in China supports this conclusion. Given resource limitations and the size of
the country, one cannot posit widespread impact from local reform efforts in China.
Worldwide experience with pilot projects suggests caution
the
replicability of results. Although a step-by-step approach suggests the need for pilots,
one must remember that pilot sites are typically chosen because of their particular
receptivity. Moreover, being singled out as “special” can prompt local commitment at
a level that cannot be expected in a more geographically widespread program.”‘
in assuming
3. Regional Initiatives
Programming in justice reform need not take place at the bilateral level. Indeed,
there are strong arguments to support a regional approach, at least in early efforts to
.. See USAID, Institutional Strengthening, supra note 46 at 12.
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S.J. TOOPE – LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM
395
encourage legal and judicial reform. First, given the posited connection between legal
the promotion of human rights and good governance, regional
reform and
programming may be viewed with less suspicion by target governments, allowing for
more forceful initiatives, particularly those directed to attitudinal change. Second,
regional programming can take advantage of regional resources. In Southeast Asia,
for example, the experience of non-governmental organizations in the Philippines
could prove most helpful in suggesting strategies for the development of civil society
within neighbouring countries. Regional meetings are one useful way to allow
activists and professionals to share experiences and to make contacts.”‘ Third,
regional justice programming can allow for the more efficient sharing of foreign
resources. Some of the problems faced within the legal systems of, for example,
Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya are common.”3 Common challenges are also presented
in many states of Central and Eastern Europe.”‘ Foreign expertise can be relevant
regionally, and a common strategy for engagement might usefully evolve. Fourth,
regional funds to support small governance projects, including justice work, can allow
innovation and some risk taking in the exploratory stages of program development.
They can help build up the knowledge base required for more extensive
engagement.”‘ This implies that regional funds should be encouraged to undertake
bilateral (single country) projects when there is a prospect of building contacts and
learning more about the local situation in the justice sector.
4. Donor Coordination
Legal and
judicial
reform programming
single-minded
bilateralism for another reason as well. A constant criticism of legal and judicial
reform initiatives is their tendency to isolation, marked by a lack of coordination
amongst members of the donor community. The Legal Department of the World Bank
has argued:
should eschew
Legal reforms in developing countries are often supported in a piecemeal
approach consisting of isolated interventions in a particular area of law. The
“2 Canada, CIDA, Asia Branch, Country-Specific Projects in a Regional Programme: A Results-
Based Management Assessment of Three SEAFILD Regional Governance Projects in Southeast Asia
(Consulting Report) by Greg Armstrong (January 2000) at 14-15 [CIDA, Country-Specific Projects].
“‘ Consider the potential role of multi-partyism in promoting legal pluralism (customary law within
national systems), or the independence of the judiciary.
“‘ See e.g. European Commission, Office of International Policy Services et aL, An Evaluation of
PHARE Public Administration Reform Programmes: Final Report (Brussels: European Commission,
1999) (discussing similar legal reform needs in Eastern Europe in European Union).
“‘ CIDA, Ethiopia Governance Study, supra note 26 (but he cautions that “learning is a planned
result of [fund] activities” at 19); CIDA, Country-Specific Projects, supra note 112 at 25.
396
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result is a lack of focus by donors and a lack of strategic thinking in financing
and providing legal technical assistance.” ‘
in highly
The first round of justice reform funding focussed primarily on either support for
modest civil society initiatives, such as community legal aid or targeted public
education, or on assistance to legislative drafting. In both cases, there was no
comprehensive reform strategy. Subsequent efforts have tended to promote isolated
reforms in specific institutions, notably courts. Various donors have established
areas, or have carved out
exclusive partnerships
that are typically completely uncoordinated with other donors’
“microprograms”
“microefforts”. A good example is the bevy of donors tripping over themselves to
provide advice to the drafting of new economic law and regulation in Vietnam. In recent
years, American, Australian, Canadian, French, and German advisors have provided
incommensurable, sometimes conflicting, advice on questions of land ownership,
registration of interests in real and moveable property, bankruptcy, contracts, and
commercial transactions. To their credit, key Vietnamese legal actors came to realize that
they had better improve their capacity in comparative legal analysis if they were not to
end up with an utterly incoherent “reformed” legal system.
circumscribed
I have seen little evidence of improvement in coordination in the decade since my
own involvement in justice reform programs began. A detailed exploration of the
psychology, politics, and economics of donor coordination is beyond the scope of this
article, but I continue to find it surprising that progress is so difficult. In some countries,
“governance groups” have been set up among like-minded donors, but I have never
worked in any setting where these groups led to an explicit division of labour, much less
to co-operative programming. When I made an informal suggestion for cost sharing on a
strong program for which the UNDP was looking for a partner, I was told by an officer
from a bilateral donor that the donor was looking for profile and cost sharing would not
achieve that objective. Whether or not that officer’s assessment was accurate in the
it reflects a more general problem: donors still hoard
particular circumstances,
information and seek an ill-defined influence at the expense of rational collaboration.
This occurs despite the fact that no donor, and certainly not Canada, has the in-country
to support complicated
staff to guarantee adequate contacts or local knowledge
governance programming.”
For a donor of modest means, such as the Nordic countries or Canada,
collaboration and joint planning with other donors would seem an attractive option,
and one likely to boost the impact of legal and judicial reform programming. At the
moment, one sees many examples of duplicated effort, especially in legislative
drafting and court reform projects. Succeeding generations of incompatible,
underutilized or broken down computer systems dot court offices in the Caribbean
16 World Bank, Legal TechnicalAssistance, supra note 16 at 21.
“7CIDA, Ethiopia Governance Study, supra note 26 at 11, 43.
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funds
that cannot be assimilated. Diverse and complicated
and Southeast Asia. One also confronts the spectre of donors overloading well
connected recipients (often because key actors in an organization speak English well)
with
reporting
requirements then come to overwhelm the administrative capacity of the organization.
This is a particular problem with legal reform groups in civil society headed by a
charismatic leader (often a displaced government minister). Moreover, if donors were
to coordinate their efforts and achieve an explicit division of labour, sustained
commitment should prove easier to plan for and justify. An interesting example of just
such an effort can be found in an ambitious court reform plan put forward by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, where the World Bank is trying to lead a coordinated
response from donors.
III. Lessons Learned in Managing Risks
As should already be apparent, legal and judicial reform programs are often high
risk, in large measure because they are so dependent upon political forces outside the
control of project officers and implementers. In my view, a large part of managing for
risks is realism in project goals and purposes, an issue to be discussed in Part IV. I
would simply emphasize here that the more far-reaching the claims of project impact,
the more likely that uncontrollable intervening variables will undermine the claims.
Legal and judicial reform projects will also require continuing political negotiations
and constant attention to the nurturing of reform constituencies, as discussed above. So
a second key aspect in managing political risk is devoting time and attention to these
efforts at negotiation and constituency building. This aspect of justice work can be
particularly frustrating, because one is often working on the details of reform with
“experts” who may be inclined to pursue initiatives that are essentially self-serving, or
at least focussed on the needs of the profession (lawyer, judge, ministry official),
rather than the wider society. Third, as already noted, managing political risk requires
good information on the general governance environment. If information sources are
unreliable or inadequate, project officers and implementers will be thrust into
distinctly uncomfortable situations. All of these elements can be summarized in a
fourth overarching aspect of risk management: justice project design should seek to
allow step-by-step engagement and minimize the disbursement pressure that forces
premature implementation. “s As has been emphasized throughout this article, justice
reform is as much about people and process as it is about the production of concrete
legal artefacts. Patience is required, and this can run up against the desire to
demonstrate results, an issue to which we will return in Part IV. It is generally
acknowledged that much legal and judicial reform programming will be undertaken
where optimal conditions for success are only “marginally present”” Some project
See e.g. ibid. at 29, 31, 39.
OECD, DAC Orientations, supra note 19.
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implementation will occur as one assesses the possibilities for deeper engagement;
that is the essence of step-by-step programming.
A. Risks Specific to Particular Types of Programming
It is not possible to address all of the potential risks in specific justice reform
initiatives. Instead, I will highlight some of the risks inherent in typical categories of
programming in the justice sector. I will then draw out some broader themes
concerning the effective management of risk in legal and judicial reform projects.
This risk assessment framework is derived largely from personal experience and from
a survey of qualitative evaluations undertaken at the request of various aid agencies.
Although empirical research would be helpful to validate my admittedly conclusory
claims, the purpose here is largely hortatory. It is hoped that by adverting to potential
risks, the minds of project designers and implementers will at least be focussed upon
the right questions.
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Alternative dispute resolution, or “ADR” as it is
colloquially known, includes a broad range of possible initiatives, ranging from
highly structured commercial arbitration, through relatively formal court-annexed
mediation schemes, to community-based conflict management systems. One common
risk is imprecision in what is being sought in invoking ADR, and the resulting
frustration that the outcomes do not match the goals. If one wants to focus upon
community engagement, for example, the type of mediation training required is
completely different from that which one might design to foster the settlement of
commercial disputes. ADR has become an
in North America, but
practitioners and trainers do not necessarily possess skills that cross over the divide
between community-based activities and business needs. ADR can be less expensive
and more expeditious than formal court adjudication, but will not necessarily be so,
especially in complex commercial matters. In family law disputes and community
conflicts, doubts have been raised about the ability of informal mediation processes to
address power imbalances between parties.”0 Although these doubts do not undermine
the advantages of community based ADR, they do caution against uncritical
assumptions that the community will always be fair.
industry
Anti-Corruption: The greatest risk for anti-corruption programs is in adopting a
narrow focus that looks at corruption simply as “the abuse of public office for private
gain.””2′ Such an approach fails to place public sector corruption in its broader social
‘” U.S., USAID, Center for Democracy and Governance, Alternative Dispute Resolution Practitioners’
Guide, (Technical Publications Series) (March 1998), online: USAID
2. U.S., USAID, Center for Democracy and Governance, A Handbook on Fighting Corruption,
Technical Publications Series (February, 1999) at 5, online: USAID
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S.J. TOOPE – LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM
context, thereby risking ineffectiveness. If private sector actors rely on corrupt
practices to gain contracts or favours, it is difficult to address the issue with projects
that look solely at bureaucrats and politicians. It is also hard to address corruption
in public sector reform, including addressing salary
without wider initiatives
differentials between the public and private sectors, and public sector working
conditions. But it is almost impossible for donors to treat these issues directly in
programming. They must form part of a continuing policy dialogue with the host
government. One must also be careful in supporting anti-corruption efforts that the
goal of the project is really to weed out corruption and not to use corruption as an
excuse to attack political opponents or the ideologically “impure”.’
Constitutional and Structural Reform: The political risks in constitutional and
structural reform are enormous. Passive and active resistance will be forthcoming
from those interests who perceive that they are likely to lose power or advantage.
Engaging in broad consultations and discussions will bring to light significant
differences of ideology and opinion that may be hard to shape and manage
productively. Ambitions can easily exceed capacities, both to deal with change
psychologically, and to manage change from a technical perspective.’2
Information Systems and Automation: Donors have displayed a tendency to focus
on issues of acquisition of hardware and software (often tied to the systems of
countries providing the resources, regardless of quality or appropriateness) without
first carefully assessing the actual information needs of the target institutions. Closely
related legal institutions may acquire different and incompatible computer systems.
Many actors in the legal system are blinded by the promise of technology without
really understanding its value, possibilities, and limitations. The prospective users are
not usually highly computer literate. The real need is often improved information
tracking and file management, which can be accomplished without massive
investments in computer systems. Basic training of administrative staff in courts,
ministries, et cetera, on office and personnel management, and on filing, can often
accomplish more than computerized information systems that remain mysterious and
unused. Even if new computers are used, they may simply be replicating bad
administrative systems in automated form. A special risk is that investments in
computer training will have no long-term impact because the trained staff will be
picked off by the private sector offering better salaries and working conditions.”4
” Compare the approach of USAID (ibid.), which emphasizes only the pathologies of the public
sector, with that of Transparency International, which pays regard to the interplay between public and
private sector corruption. See Jeremy Pope, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National
Integrity System, TI Source Book 2000 (Berlin: Transparency International (TI), 2000), online:
‘OECD, Evaluation of Programs, supra note 47 at 33-34.
2 See USAID, Institutional Strengthening, supra note 46 at 61-70; OECD, Evaluation of Programs,
ibid. at 33; Inter-American Development Bank, Regional Operations Department, Judicial Reform in
‘
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Judicial Reform and Court Administration: Judicial reform and court administration
efforts are often responsive to the perceived needs of institutional actors, particularly
judges, but are not attentive to the needs of the citizenry. These initiatives become a
“guild reform”, promoting the interests of insiders. One needs to think of judicial reform
in terms of institutional strengthening and reorientation. Anti-corruption measures are
sometimes just as important as reforms to promote independence. The judiciary in most
countries tends to be hierarchical and strongly rooted in tradition. Its perception of its
own importance can make communication difficult. “Judicial independence”, although
crucial, can sometimes be invoked to escape accountability. But independence means
that judges should not be viewed as bureaucrats, even when that is their own self-
conception (as in Vietnam and Cuba). If there is no independence, and if judicial and
court administrative appointments are not merit-based, improving systems will not
usually improve the quality or fairness of judicial decisions. The nature of judging
makes it difficult to define improved performance, as the central question is the
substantive quality of decisions rather than administrative measures of efficiency. Court
administrative structures are notoriously weak the world over, in part because of the
tradition of collegial governance that makes it hard for difficult administrative decisions
to be made. ”
Judicial Training: Judicial
training programs often tend to be “remedial”,
attempting to bring judges up to international standards in substantive areas of law.
One needs to more carefully target the attitudinal and behavioural changes that will
lead to sustainable systemic or structural improvements (though this can be difficult
while paying appropriate attention to judicial independence). Short-term training is
only useful if coordinated with broader reform initiatives, and linked to specific goals
for behavioural change. Training in itself is not likely to lead to institutional change,
and can actually serve to deflect pressures for more substantial reform. It will be
utterly ineffective unless the trainers have juridical as well as educational skills and
credibility. It is also important to assess what different groups of judges actually do.
Some are engaged in rather technical assessments, while others are asked to deal with
highly complex social issues. One must be careful not to imagine that all judges are
required to perform Herculean intellectual tasks. When judges plan their own training
programs, they are often self-interested and distant from challenges that would be posed
by the wider public.’2″
the Caribbean by William Charles, Carl Baar & Robert Hann (Washington: Inter-American
Development Bank, 1999) at 5, 17-18.
See USAID, Institutional Strengthening, ibid. at 9, 15-16, 56-58, 76-84.
See ibid. at 58-59; U.S., USAID, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, Center for
Democracy and Governance, Judicial Training and Justice Reform by Linn Hammergren (August
1998) at 17-18, 20, 26 [USAID, Justice Training] (with respect to France and the criticism that
“judicial ownership has produced a closed caste of judges” the author cites Herbert Jacob et al.
(Courts, Law, and Politics in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996)) at
18).
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Legal Education: The provision of basic legal education is expensive because it
involves engagement with a relatively large target group: professors and students. In
some countries, especially those in the civil law tradition, huge numbers of
undergraduate students are registered in law programs. Pilot projects seeking to
reform curriculum may be useful, but are also hard to replicate, given the limited
resources of most funding agencies. Legal education is rarely a national priority when
compared to technical, scientific, and medical education, so the experience of pilots is
is
rarely generalized through local action. In some countries, legal education
rigorously controlled by state agencies, and real reform is resisted. The education and
training of the existing professorial corps must be assessed to determine whether or
not professors are likely to be open to and capable of significant change in the legal
curriculum.
Legal Literacy and Public Information: Legal literacy and public information
programs are often too general and their impact is limited by the weak literacy skills
of the target populations. Lawyers tend to focus on the written word, even when
people cannot read, producing pamphlets and other documents that are largely
irrelevant to the people who need information. These campaigns should relate to
specific objectives that are responsive to acknowledged needs of the target populations
(not simply “knowing your rights”). Some governments use such campaigns to “pass
messages” that are related to control, rather than liberation, and care must be taken to
assess the goals of public information campaigns. ‘
Legislative Drafting and Code Reform: The most serious risk with legislative
drafting and code reform programs is a failure to pay adequate attention to questions
of implementation, through the preparation of institutions and the relevant publics for
upcoming changes. Drafters focus upon ideological and logical consistency, but pay
less attention to the social settings into which legal texts are thrust. Failure to develop
an implementation plan and a transition plan can lead to chaos or irrelevance.
“Borrowing” external solutions without adequate attention to the social factors that
allow specific types of legislation and regulation to work effectively in some settings,
but not in others, is a second common problem. Drafting exercises often operate in
isolation from wider reform questions and problems, and have little systemic impact.
Failure to take into consideration the political priorities of key actors can result in
excellent drafts that sit on shelves. Finally, drafting exercises can take place in settings
where there is no real commitment to broader reform. The goal may be to create a
framework for a “socialist market economy”, for example, without any desire to alter
legal structures or the relationship between the citizenry and the state.”
12 See OECD, Evaluation of Progams, supra note 47 at 35.
… See USAID, Institutional Strengthening, supra note 46 at 60; U.S., USAID, Bureau for Policy
and Program Coordination, Center for Democracy and Governance, Code Reform and Law Revision
by Lina Hammergren (August 1998) at 15-19; Ajani, supra note 28. But see Posner, supra note 15
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Police, Prosecution, and Prison Reform: Political risks are particularly high in the
areas of police, prosecution, and prison reform programming. Donors can be justly
criticized for supporting the state apparatus of repression, unless great care is taken in
the precise selection of initiatives. On the other hand, there is increasing recognition
of the need for deep reform in these sectors if human rights values are to be upheld
and the legitimate security concerns of the citizenry of many states are to be
recognized and validated. A risk in this area is that inadequate attention will be paid to
security issues in an otherwise comprehensive reform package, thereby undercutting
the impact of the entire scheme.'”
Public Legal Aid Initiatives: Because public legal aid schemes are relatively easy
to structure, this prompts overly ambitious goals. The key risk is that levels of service
are promised that are utterly unsustainable. The tale is repeated around the globe:
China, Vietnam, Jamaica, Sri Lanka. Promises of widespread access are made, but no
money (or too little money) is available, and no plan is in place to subsidize the
service. In practice, the system collapses or comes to serve a more and more limited
clientele, thereby failing to meet its stated objectives. Even when they do operate,
legal aid schemes tend to focus on individual cases, without adequate attention to
broader systemic questions. One needs an overall reform strategy to which targeted
litigation can contribute.’ Legal aid initiatives, based on Western models, may also
neglect indigenous methods of dispute resolution, often found in traditional or
customary law.
B. Establishing Appropriate Partnerships
in
justice reform
Another difficult problem
is establishing appropriate
partnerships. The difficulties can arise at both ends of the relationship (namely donor
and host country or region). The first issue relates to programming goals, and the
appropriateness of various
types of partners. Judicial councils or professional
associations in donor countries are unlikely to possess the expertise required to assist
in the delivery of popular legal education campaigns or in the bolstering of indigenous
legal advocacy non-governmental organizations. Supernumerary judges are not likely,
(arguing that one should start reform efforts with relatively inexpensive drafting, rather than any
institutional initiatives, because getting the “structure” right will allow market efficiencies to affect
further reform at 3-5).
” See Dandurand & Paris-Steffens, supra note 87. I once recommended that a donor support
reformist leadership in a prison system within a democratic country only to be told that “our home
politicians don’t like us to help prisons.” The assessment may or may not be accurate, but it reveals a
dangerous myopia. Within any justice system, prisons are on the front line of conflict management.
They also serve as crucibles in testing commitment to human rights values. Donors cannot afford to
ignore prisons, or police and prosecution for that matter, if they want to address legal and judicial
reform in an appropriately comprehensive manner.
“” See USAID, Institutional Strengthening, supra note 46 at 15-16; OECD, Evaluation of
Programs, supra note 47 at 30, 35.
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in most cases, to be vigorous proponents of attitudinal change within legal systems.
Similarly, law professors may not be the most effective judicial trainers, for they may
be viewed as out of touch with the preoccupations of an embattled judiciary. In host
states, supreme courts operating without judicial independence may not be sensible
targets for training in the administration and processing of caseloads. Loosely
organized non-governmental organizations will not be able to deliver structural or
institutional legal reform. Again, if comprehensive reform is the goal, one must
ultimately engage with the state apparatus, even if at first a campaign of alliance
building focusses upon non-state actors. In assessing partners, one must consider the
values one seeks to promote through the proposed programming, the technical needs
of the program, the capacity of the partners both
in terms of analysis and
implementation (including an assessment of influence), and the compatibility of
“cultures” of Canadian and foreign partners.
Given the politicized nature of justice reform, there may emerge an institutional
tendency to choose seemingly safe host country partners. It is interesting to note, for
example, the large number of justice initiatives focussing upon judicial training.
Improving the capacity of judges to undertake their important role is hard to criticize,
but donors should try to seek out a range of partners, even when they are somewhat
more risky politically. I have emphasized the need for a comprehensive approach to
justice reform. Singling out only
institutions with which to work will not result in sustainable systemic reform. Once
again, this observation points to the need for good on-the-ground knowledge. A final
risk associated with local partners is that many donors will fix upon the same
organization, which will then lack the capacity to accomplish all the programs it has
undertaken.”
the relatively easy-and uncontroversial-
Another set of partnership issues concerns the strengths and weaknesses of
different types of executing agencies. The cost of legal and judicial reform initiatives
can vary enormously depending upon the chosen implementers. Many private sector
law firms in Western states are interested in expanding their foreign client base.
Engagement in publicly funded reform initiatives is one of the obvious strategies to
develop contacts. Even if these firms are willing to charge out their services at a
“development rate”, which they are generally willing to do, they will typically be
more expensive to support than public sector actors such as ministries of justice or
organizations in civil society. On the other hand, for certain types of programming,
particularly where substantive areas of law are to be reformed, private firms may be a
source of great expertise. For example, some of the most qualified legal experts who
deal with corporate structures, the creation of stock exchanges, natural resources law,
property law, and registration systems are members of private law firms.
“‘ CIDA, Ethiopia Governance Study, supra note 26 (discussing “donor overload” at 26).
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Given constraints upon resources, non-governmental organizations and some
public sector actors such as universities and ministries of justice face difficulties in
supporting core operations. Infrastructure support is often weak and the addition of
development programming may not be sustainable unless arrangements are made to
cover all flow-through costs and overhead. If this support is not available, program
delivery may not be possible, and alternative domestic partners may have to be sought
out. This issue underscores a particular problem for small donor countries. While
many potential project implementers are endowed with strong analytical skills in the
area of justice reform, matched with relevant experience, the organizational structures
available to deliver programming are neither numerous nor, generally speaking,
strong.
A pattern has already emerged whereby comprehensive legal reform projects are
executed by management consulting firms that hire specialized staff for given
projects. It remains to be seen whether these firms manifest a long-term commitment
to the justice sector. As it is, they are largely dependent upon the availability of a
small number of independent consultants and professors to deliver projects on an ad
hoc basis. This type of structure is flexible, but it may actually inflate project costs,
and it is not easy to develop broader capacity in the sector using this model of project
delivery. Moreover, unless an executing agency has a real interest in the subject matter
of a project, it may not follow through as effectively as one might hope in the face of
the challenges and risks of justice reform programming. This is not an area where the
financial rewards for consulting firms are
likely to be significant enough to
compensate for the psychic and material costs. ’32 To overcome these problems, donors
should consider facilitating the construction of consortia and alliances for the delivery
of justice programs. ‘ An interesting option might be having a project lead that would
be an organization with substantive legal knowledge and skill, and a management firm
serving as a technical resource.
C. Other General Risks in Legal and Judicial Reform Initiatives
A third central challenge for all types of legal and judicial reform programming is
sustainability. This is not an area where quick fixes can work, nor is it likely that
programming can be effective unless there is consistent engagement over a number of
years, usually extending beyond standard development program cycles. Implications
are numerous, including the need for longer-term financial planning to support
continuity of programming, careful iteration of programs, the usefulness of joint
planning with other donors, and the need to evaluate the long-term interest and
commitment of Canadian and foreign partners. Sustainability also relates to the
3 See CIDA, What Works?, supra note 26 at 45.
See also CIDA, Ethiopia Governance Study, supra note 26 (making the same argument vis-A-vis
all governance programs at 35).
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405
problem of unrealistic expectations. Sustainable programming is likely to demonstrate
some modesty in the identification of program goals.
A fourth challenge that has already been adverted to in the discussion of
priorities, sequencing, and donor coordination, is complementarity amongst specific
projects. This issue is highly salient to the overall effectiveness of programming.
Legal and judicial reform initiatives should be undertaken within a strategic
framework linked to the pursuit of program goals. Too often they are conceived rather
as ad hoc responses to particular problems within specific institutions. The U.K.’s
ODA has emphasized that any needs assessment for justice reform must look at the
legal system as a whole, and not only at component parts, be they ministries of justice,
courts, legal aid administrations, and so forth. It is likely to be the case that several
institutions or groups contribute to a particular legal process or service, and that
assistance may have to be directed to a number of these institutions or groups.'”
A fifth and final general risk associated with justice reform projects relates to the
broad problems associated with institutional development and capacity building
initiatives discussed above.” Justice reform typically requires substantial attitudinal
and behavioural change on the part of actors within the system. That is why so many
projects focus upon training initiatives. But all the capacity building in the world, all
the attempts at institutional strengthening, will falter if the surrounding political and
institutional culture does not support the behavioural changes that are sought. To take
a simple example, training a group of judges on the importance of judicial
independence will have little or no impact in a system that is still contaminated by
executive abuse of the judicial appointment process, and a cultural expectation that
judges will do the bidding of the executive authorities (sometimes called “telephone
justice”). Similarly, training court clerks in better file management will not improve
performance within a system that privileges the hierarchical power of judges to
physically control files, or that allows litigants’ lawyers unrestrained access to court
registries. Attitudinal and behavioural change must be promoted in conjunction with
the institutional changes that will buttress the behavioural goals. In addition, if newly
trained people are to be retained in the public sector, incentive structures often need to
“3 This linkage was also posited in the case of programming in human rights and democratic
development. Canada, CIDA, Policy Branch, Good Governance and Human Rights Policies Division,
Lessons Learned in Human Rights and Democratic Development: A Study of CIDA’s Bilateral
Programming Experience by Philip Rawkins & Monique Bergeron (December 1994) at 26
(recommendation A.4. L.a).
.35 ODA, supra note 23 at 8-9.
’36 See Part II.A.2, above.
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be reformed and innovative methods found to reward good performance, accepting
that public sector salaries are likely to lag behind those in the private sector.’37
IV. Assessing Results in the Justice Sector
For the last decade or so, Western governments have sought to improve strategic
management, prove the worth of their programs, and justify the expenditure of scarce
public resources by implementing performance measurement systems and program
evaluation mechanisms.”‘ Development agencies have embraced
the trend, and
although their terminology may be diverse, the impulse toward “managing for results”
is firmly established.'”
Managing for results cannot be a linear process. As one CIDA document puts it,
“Based on constant feedback of performance information, inputs and activities can be
modified and other implementation adjustments made.””‘ But it is not just the process
of implementation that is iterative and sometimes circular. If Amartya Sen is right in
seeing comprehensive development as a set of interacting economic, legal, political,
and social processes,”‘ it is the very concept of “result” itself that is iterative. There
can never be one, final “instrument choice” that will inevitably produce the desired
results. Instead, the means and ends of legal and judicial reform will be in constant
interaction. As various interventions are undertaken, they will affect each other’s
results, and require changes in the very results that are sought.
The selection of results indicators is difficult for justice projects. Within CIDA’s
current framework, for example, an indicator should ideally be valid, reliable
(constant over time), sensitive to change, simple, useful, and affordable.”‘2 Donors do
“‘ See e.g. World Bank, Monitoring and Evaluation Capacity Development, supra note 77 at 5-6;
United Nations Development Programme, supra note 51 at s. 1.2; USAID, Justice Training, supra
note 126 at 26.
.38 See e.g. Gerald E. Caiden & Naomi J. Caiden, “Approaches and Guidelines for Monitoring,
Measuring and Evaluating Performance in Public Sector Programmes” (1998) 4 International Journal
of Technical Cooperation 293. Note that the three goals may not always point in the same direction.
‘ For a detailed description of the efforts of Western aid agencies to implement programs of
monitoring for results, see OECD, Evaluation of Programs, supra note 47. For the US “results”
model, which is closely related to the approach adopted by CIDA, see USAID, Weighing In, supra
note 36.
” Canada, CIDA, Performance Review Branch, Results-Based Management in CIDA: An
Introductory Guide to the Concepts and Principles (Results-Based Management Guide) (January
1999) at 21, online: CIDA
141 Sen, supra note 13.
“‘ CIDA, Results, supra note 140 at 16. USAID suggests an even longer list of requirements for
good indicators, adding to the CIDA list appropriateness, direct relationship to result, ease with which
the indicator can be made operational, objectivity, sensitivity to magnitude of problem, and ease of
statistical disaggregation by gender or other relevant population group. USAID, Weighing In, supra
note 36 at 7.
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not typically insist upon the production of quantitative indicators. Indeed, in the area
of justice programming, such indicators are often difficult to track down, as justice
systems are notoriously weak in data collection. “‘ In any event, quantitative indicators
can be highly misleading unless tested against qualitative assessments. For example,
although the old maxim “justice delayed is justice denied” has validity, one would not
want to uphold a judicial system that managed to race through cases at the expense of
the fairness and legal soundness of judgments. Recent reforms to the judiciary in
Singapore have been criticized on exactly this ground. Similarly, a community
mediation scheme that managed to settle family law disputes quickly should still be
assessed on a qualitative basis, for example by investigating any systemic bias that
might appear in settlements, such as gender-based inequalities in property division. A
more far-reaching point must also be made: “Not all activities may be meaningfully
quantified'”” Examples of essentially qualitative activities include the negotiation,
drafting, and implementation of new constitutions, the design of legal institutions,
policy advice, and legal research.
The sheer complexity of indicator choice suggests that the process of selection
should itself be staged, with an initial list of proposed indicators being explored in
relation to existing sources of data and then refined as needed.” Project implementers
should be aware that the choice of indicators can skew project performance, for the
selection of a particular indicator is an incentive to make sure that the indicator is
covered off in programming decisions.” Care should be taken to seek out quantitative
indicators where possible, but the harder task will be to establish qualitative indicators
that are not purely impressionistic. 7 This is possible, especially if one selects
qualitative indicators that rely upon what is often called in the social science literature
“intersubjective meaning”. This rather cumbersome term simply suggests that by
working together, groups can build up a store of shared meanings as a result of their
‘4’ See e.g. the lament of Charles, Baar and Hann, who found it impossible to find reliable
in terms of case handling and delay. Inter-American
Caribbean data on court performance
Development Bank, supra note 124 at 5.
” Caiden & Caiden, supra note 138 at 304. See also Canada, CIDA, Policy Branch, Indicators for
Programming in Human Rights and Democratic Development: A Preliminary Study (Policy
Document) by lan Kapoor (July 1996), online: CIDA
principally qualitative nature of political change has tended to make analysts shy away from attempts to
measure or quantify it” at 1).
‘4 5USAID, Weighing In, supra note 36 at 6.
‘”See CIDA, “Update”, supra note 62 at 22.
“, Current CIDA policy goes no further than recommending a “pragmatic balance between the use
of qualitative and quantitative indicators” (Canada, CIDA, Performance Review Branch, Results-
Based Management Division, Results-Based Management in CIDA (Policy Statement) (March 1996),
online: CIDA
Branch, Results-Based Management in CIDA, Policy Statement (March 1996), online: CIDA
408
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interaction.'” In results measurement, this would imply the crafting of qualitative
measures that are convincing or persuasive to the various stakeholders who care about
the success of the project. In other words, the central question is: Would the indicators
chosen help to convince a knowledgeable person that the project was actually
achieving its aims? Some preliminary work on indicators has already been undertaken
by both the World Bank and USAID, but more research on qualitative indicators for
performance measurement in governance programming is needed. The work so far
suggests that qualitative assessments can move beyond simple narrative reporting
through the use of structured surveys of community leaders and outside experts,
especially when framed as quality scales and multi-component indices. Participant
surveys may be helpful in assessing attitudinal and behavioural change. In addition,
well-targeted and carefully written public surveys can provide useful qualitative
information.
In any performance assessment scheme, one of the essential goals is assessment
of risk. For many donors, the focus is upon risk assessment during program design,
but I suggest that risk assessment should also be conceived of as a continuous exercise
during the creation and life of any justice sector initiative. Because of the staging
required of most projects, risks can change, multiply, and abate during project
implementation. In my experience, assessment of risk is one of the weakest elements
of most project design and monitoring. Risks are either posited at too high a level of
abstraction (“political will to support the project may cease”), or are minimized,
presumably to facilitate project approval or the disbursement of funds.
An assessment of impact, as opposed to the measurement of specific outcomes,
can logically take place only at the level of an entire justice sector program, not at the
level of individual projects. This limitation exists largely because real impact for a
justice reform program generally requires more than one intervention, and a
commitment over the long term. At the project level, asking questions about results is
still useful because it requires implementers and officers to continuously assess what
they hope to achieve. Trying to assess results, not merely listing activities, forces
attention upon intermediate outcomes, and requires that implementers ask whether or
not project activities are contributing to posited outcomes and whether or not those
outcomes must be reconceived.”‘ In that sense, “managing for results” is actually a
constant reassessment of means.
The problem is that in practice, claims are made as to project goals that are overly
broad, and effort is wasted in attempting to find indicators for an impact that is
impossible to measure during the life of a project. For example, in a modest court
administration project in Africa, the project goal was stated as follows: “[T]o
48 See e.g. Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics” (2000) 54
International Organization 1; Brunn6e & Toope, supra note 10.
’49 Brunn6e & Toope, ibid. at 10-11.
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contribute to the stability and security of [State A] by promoting practices that will
help achieve and sustain the rule of law.””‘ Yet by the time the project was boiled
down to its more specific purpose, the objective was more modest: “[T]o build and
strengthen the administrative capacity of the Supreme Court ” ‘” A similar gap
between the over-statement of project goals and relatively limited concrete initiatives
is found in another African project in support of a non-governmental organization
constitutional litigation unit. The goal was stated as follows:
This project plans to constructively help dismantle the legacy of … inequality. It
is designed to help transform one of the world’s most oppressive societies into
a sustainable, functioning democracy where consciousness of basic rights is
integrated into daily lives and directly improves the social and economic
quality of life for millions of [citizens].’
Yet the specific project purpose was to assist in building up the capacity of an
important civil society organization by supporting its strategy to litigate questions of
fundamental rights.’ 3
My point is not to criticize these two projects. In fact, both were seen as
successful by the beneficiaries, by the project delivery team, and by the donor.
Moreover, the tendency to claim enormous impact for legal and judicial reform
projects is widespread.”‘ My concern is that by claiming too much, the benefits of the
project become extremely hard to assess.”‘ An exercise in results assessment either
produces inevitable failure (“we did not meet our goal”), or more commonly, the
they cannot possibly meet
process
expectations, and they finesse reports by avoiding any detailed analysis of indicators,
relying instead on sweeping statements of impact that match the sweeping claims of
the project designers.
is derailed as
implementers
realize
that
‘ Canada, CIDA, Africa and Middle East Branch, Internal Project Approval Document
[6onfidential: on file with the author].
“‘1 Ibid.
t’ Canada, CIDA, Africa and Middle East Branch, Internal Project Approval Document
[confidential: on file with the author].
“3 Ibid.
“‘ See also Canada, CIDA, Asia Branch, Internal Project Approval Document [confidential: on file
with the author]. The CIDA Results-Based Management policy calls upon officers to be attentive to
the realistic “reach” and “depth” of a project, but this warning is not invariably heeded. CIDA,
Results, supra note 140, at 8-9.
5 See e.g. USAID, Weighing In, supra note 36 (on the problems of implementing any performance
measurement scheme in the face of overly “high or bundled objectives” at 5); European Commission,
supra note 114 (on the difficulty of assessing project progress in the face of objectives that were too
ambitious at 4).
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My primary plea, then, is for modesty in crafting goal and impact statements.’
They should be aligned with overall program objectives, but need not foresee the
direct or immediate achievement of those objectives. Instead, project designers and
implementers should expend their efforts in pursuing outcomes that have some
possibility of achievement during the life of a project. Rather than seeing all
intermediate achievements as “results”, or end products, it might be more useful to
consider them as “benchmarks” toward the attainment of project purposes.”‘ The
clearer one can be in identifying the signals of progress and the warning signs of
failure during the life of a project, the more likely it is that reinforcing or corrective
measures can be adopted to make the project as strong as possible. The tension
remains that project implementers cannot simply ignore program level objectives.
Indeed, if it is true, as I firmly believe, that legal and judicial reform is most likely to
be effective in a context where the impact of economic, social, and political factors is
being assessed and factored into project design and implementation, big picture
objectives must be kept in view. A set of bifocals is required. Looking up over the
horizon is crucial to focussing vision, but reading the close texture of specific project
settings is also required. There is a conceptual link between the two optics, but it is
generally mistaken to posit detailed project level results that directly reshape the
vision. That reshaping can only emerge as a cumulative effect of a number of projects.
Conclusion
I end on a cautionary note, emphasizing once again the elitism and tendency to
legal and judicial reform
in government-to-government
inherent
centralization
initiatives. In the words of one of the world’s foremost comparative lawyers:
Not merely the state, but the legal order itself can sometimes be inimical to
civil society. Private relations can be tainted and our sense of obligation
weakened by being juridified. The law must know where to stop, where to keep
things from the court and leave them to the heart’
However much the world may need law to facilitate sustainable economic, social,
law will remain only a part of the equation.’ ” In
and political development,
“discovering” law, the development community must resist the temptation to legal
triumphalism so apparent in much Western, and particularly American, social and
13 Examples of well-crafted, appropriately modest, project goal statements can be found in all
branches of CIDA. I reviewed project documents from approximately thirty projects in preparing to
write this article.
157 See USAID, Institutional Strengthening, supra note 46 at 12; Caiden & Caiden, supra note 138
at 305.
“‘ Rudden, supra note 5 at 82.
159 See Sen, supra note 13. In her reflections on World Bank experience with legal and judicial
reform, Gray notes, “The best legal systems operate only at the margin, leaving most standards in a
society to be internalized and ‘self-enforced’ by society itself (supra note 9 at 15).
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theory.w Legal and judicial reform threatens
to become yet another
political
development fad. That fate can be resisted if justice reform is placed firmly in context,
as but one of the elements that helps to address the poverty and social division in our
world.
” Examples of the “juridification” Rudden bemoans can be found in the work of contemporary
theorists of great stature. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1986); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1971); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1999).
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Appendix: A Vietnamese Case Study
I. Contextual Factors
To offer any assessment of possibilities for legal and judicial reform, one must
first consider contextual factors affecting the justice system. In the case of Vietnam,
these economic, social, and cultural factors, as of 1999, included:
1. Vietnam’s extreme poverty, particularly acute in rural areas;
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
the priority the government has placed upon rural poverty reduction, which
strongly affects resources devoted to other program areas;
the high level of corruption among local officials, and the use by the Party of
corruption as a justification for various purification drives;
the practically impenetrable complexity of the Vietnamese political system
and the closed nature of the society;
the indigenous cultural drive towards consensus, exploited to great effect by
the Party, which “guides” consensus;
the fear of the Party elite prompted by the shocking economic and political
collapse of the Soviet Union;
the internal divisions in the Party between those who promote modest
attempts at greater political openness and those who argue for even stricter
ideological purity in a time of economic change;
the placement of the minister of justice in the “reformist” camp, but his
seeming lack of political clout;
Some of this contextual information is derived from background reading, but a great deal can only
be gleaned from conversations with informed observers and participants in governance structures,
especially the legal system in the host country. The process of information gathering is therefore not
linear: although the context informs the eventual analysis, the appreciation of context often arises
contemporaneously with the more specific programmatic information gained in the field. In my
experience, it is very useful to meet with high governmental officials who can sometimes provide a
good political and policy overview, before meeting with people directly involved in the justice system.
I have also found it invaluable to speak with a wide range of diplomatic representatives, officials of
various donors, and civil society actors (if they exist) before settling on specific structured interview
questions for participants in the legal system. Although all diplomats and donor representatives have
biases, they are often well informed and critical (even if entirely sympathetic). If one speaks to a
range of foreign and domestic observers, there is less chance of becoming too reliant on any single
“take” on the subject in question.
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the decline in foreign investment exacerbated by the so-called Asian
economic crisis, which caused the political leadership to waver on questions
of economic liberalization;
10. the lack of governmental responsiveness to external political pressures, and
11.
the desire always to find “a Vietnamese way forward”;
the lack of interest on the part of the Vietnamese political elite in any policy
dialogue on questions of human rights or democratization;
12. the total Party and government control of the media; and
13. the almost complete domination by the Party and government of all social
organizations.
In addition, one must consider more specific aspects of the legal system itself that
could affect possibilities for justice reform. In Vietnam, the legal system is grounded
in two fundamental ideological predispositions: state positivism and legal formalism.
The former treats law as rooted solely in the authority of the state. It rejects any notion
of natural law, the rights of man, or legal pluralism, and sees law as serving the
interests of the socialist state (which is assumed in Marxist thought to serve the
interests of the working classes). Of course, this statism is made much more complex
by the parallel operation of Party structures, but the fundamental point remains: law is
largely about command and, control. Vietnamese legal formalism is a by-product of
state positivism. Law is seen as a formal hierarchy of sources of authority, with the
state seeking to control all the actors in the system. The principal focus of attention is
the legal text, normative instruments, which are treated as if self-executing. Little
attention is devoted to questions of interpretation or implementation. The primary
goal of the system is to ensure that the sovereign authority is obeyed, through coercive
enforcement if necessary. The role of the judiciary is largely to “explain” the correct
meaning of legal texts to the population.
Vietnamese authorities like to stress that they are formally committed under the
1992 constitution to the creation of a “state ruled by law.”‘ But given the controlling
force of state positivism and legal formalism, it is crucial to understand that the role of
law in Vietnam is essentially constraining, not liberating or facilitative. The “state
ruled by law” is emphatically not the “rule of law” as envisioned, admittedly in
various permutations, in Western democracies. In Vietnam, an improved legal system
is sought to promote greater economic efficiency and more effective social control; in
2 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 15 April 1992,
l1th Sess., 8th National
Assembly, reprinted in Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of
the World, vol. 20 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1992).
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[Vol. 48
the words of a senior academic, “to perfect the legal system to encourage the
fulfilment of duty “‘3
A further defining aspect of the Vietnamese legal system is the significant gaps in
substantive knowledge of even the most influential actors. It is important to note that
faculties of law were closed for long periods during the most recent “war of
liberation” and law was generally devalued. The Ministry of Justice was only
refounded in the early 1990s. Fundamental conceptions of Western law, even those
that inspire the reformed “economic law” of Vietnam, are simply not understood. The
positive side to these fundamental knowledge gaps is an extraordinary openness to
learning about how law works in other countries. This openness extends from high
officials and judges to students in the law faculties, whose curriculum is still modelled
on the Soviet-era “state and law” principles. Indeed, Vietnam has engaged in a
process of learning about law with modest support from many Western donor
agencies over the last few years. Within specific subject areas, notably economic law,
various models have been explored, borrowed, and partially reconstituted in a search
for indigenous solutions. But this has left the legal system somewhat in a state of
incoherence, with civil law and common law approaches uncomfortably mixed. For
example, Vietnam has promulgated an entirely revised Civil Code, modelled in part
on the relatively new codes of Quebec and the Netherlands, but operating in
conjunction with a great deal of common law inspired commercial legislation, picked
up from American and Australian advisors in particular.
Another set of frames in this “motion picture” of the Vietnamese justice system
must be devoted to the attempt by the executive authorities, through the Ministry of
Justice, to exercise greater centralized control over all elements of the system. Again
and again, Ministry officials emphasized the “supervisory role” of the Ministry over
the courts, legal aid, public legal information, and legislative drafting. In practice, this
supervision is often ineffective, but the instinct to control is powerful, and is strongly
supported by the official ideology of the state.
II. Assessing the Four Elements of the Legal System
With these broad and system-specific contextual factors firmly in mind, one can
explore the current state and prospects for change of the four interrelated elements of
the legal system. In a series of structured
interviews with leaders of various
institutional components of the legal system, and with actors in civil society (if they
exist), the indicators of a healthy legal system can be invoked and discussed. For the
sake of brevity, I will simply note the types of people with whom I met in Vietnam,
within each element of the legal system, and indicate the categories of indicators
3 Private conversation with a leading Vietnamese academic. Notes on file with the author.
2003]
S.J. TOOPE – LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM
415
explored. I will then discuss two sets of program options in more detail and explain
how recommendations were elaborated.
Articulation, Formulation, and Drafting of Rules: I held meetings with in-country
representatives of donors involved in support of substantive legal reform and drafting,
young members of the “private” bar who specialize in working for foreign clients and
the senior leadership of the Vietnamese Lawyers’
for Vietnamese enterprises,
Association (a Party-based “professional” organization), academic members of
specific legislative drafting committees, the National Assembly Law Committee, the
minister of justice, and various departments and working groups within the Ministry
of Justice. The indicators that were explored related primarily to accountability,
efficacy, equality before and under the law, internal values (such as transparency,
fairness, and predictability), the retroactivity of rules, and understandable and
reasonable parameters of the legal system.
Application and Interpretation of Rules: I held meetings with legal and other
governance project implementers (on issues of public perceptions about law, and the
role of law in shaping behaviour), representatives of the Supreme People’s Procuracy
(having prosecutorial functions and general “supervisory” functions vis-a-vis the
public administration, including courts), the minister of justice, Ministry of Justice
officials, legal academics, and judges from various courts. Indicators that were
explored related primarily to accountability, anti-corruption, efficacy, equality before
and under the law, equality of access, independence of all actors, internal values (such
as transparency, fairness, and consistency), legitimacy, stability yet flexibility, and
timeliness.
Legal Representation and Advice: I held meetings with the Vietnam Lawyers’
Association, members of the “private” bar, the staff of a public interest law and legal
aid centre affiliated with a law faculty, project implementers on women’s rights issues,
the minister of justice, the Legal Aid Department of the Ministry of Justice, and legal
academics. The indicators that were explored related primarily to accountability, anti-
law, equality of access,
corruption, efficacy, equality before and under
independence of all actors, legitimacy, and timeliness.
the
Public Access and Understanding: I held meetings with various radio and
television journalists specializing in legal affairs programs, the Vietnam Lawyers’
Association, the minister of justice, the Legal Dissemination Department of the
Ministry of Justice, staff of a public interest law and legal aid centre, project
legal
implementers on women’s rights
dissemination. The indicators that were explored related primarily to efficacy, equality
of access, independence of all actors, legitimacy, and understandable and reasonable
parameters of the system.
issues, and project implementers on
II. Recommendations
Having considered each of these elements, and the complex interrelationships
among various actors, processes, institutions, and the elements as a whole, it was
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possible both to recommend a range of possible points for CIDA engagement in legal
and judicial reform programming in Vietnam, and to suggest where such engagement
would not be wise. I will take one example from each category to explore in more
detail.
A. Where to Work
A remarkable consensus emerged in meetings with both foreign and Vietnamese
commentators that one of the top priorities for the Vietnamese legal system is to build
capacity in sophisticated comparative law analysis. Given the yearning to learn from
other legal systems, and the existing incoherence of partially borrowed and partially
indigenous solutions to legal problems, a comparative approach had become essential.
Current comparative law capacity was weak, and the comparisons undertaken were
typically superficial. This relates in part to the legal formalism discussed above.
Foreign legislation was studied without regard to the social and political contexts that
support the legislative solutions adopted in other countries. The focus was the text,
and its logical coherence, rather than questions of implementation and social
legitimacy.! What was needed was a deeper understanding of comparative law
methodologies, which extend far beyond the comparison of specific legislative texts,
and assistance in the application of comparative law methods to concrete legal
problems.
In the long term, the greatest need for the Vietnamese justice system is change in
basic legal education. While no foreign donor has the right (or the financial ability for
that matter) to completely reimagine and reorganize the law faculties of Vietnam,
engagement with specific academic initiatives in comparative law could serve as a
catalyst for changing understandings of the role of law, and even of the relationship
between the state and the citizen. Working with young university lecturers, and
thereby influencing the education of generations of law students, had the potential to
promote significant change within the Vietnamese legal system. Such involvement
could positively influence such indicators of legal system health as accountability,
efficacy, independence of actors (in this case, especially the legal academy and the
bar), internal values such as transparency and consistency, and legitimacy.
It was suggested that support for initiatives in comparative law education be
provided to one influential law faculty that had previously only limited access to
foreign ideas and contacts. This faculty was currently working on the development of
a comparative
law curriculum, so had made its own decision concerning the
importance of this work. Furthermore, the faculty had hired a cohort of seemingly
‘ It is important to note, however, that foreign legislation seems to be tested against political
objectives of the Party, so in that sense is subjected to examination against an indigenous context. This
is especially true of issues concerning property rights and forms of commercial and corporate
organisation.
2003]
S.J. TOOPE – LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM
creative young lecturers who had already demonstrated commitment to change
through the creation of a legal aid and information centre. A CIDA regional fund for
human rights and legal reform promotion had worked with the centre, and the
experience had been strongly positive. Finally, this faculty was relatively independent
of the Ministry of Justice, and might serve as an alternative locus for the emergence of
new ideas! CIDA was encouraged to consider short term in-country training in
comparative law for lecturers, longer term Canadian graduate program scholarship
assistance for young lecturers, matched with language training, and the creation of a
continuing mechanism of support for those who had studied comparative law under
Canadian auspices. This support might include the creation of a network for Canadian
law alumni(ae), a seminar series where comparative law research could be presented,
and follow-up training sessions, as more experience was gained.
B. Where Not to Work
Every foreign observer and Vietnamese lawyer with whom I spoke agreed that,
ultimately, for the legal system in Vietnam to change fundamentally, judges would
have to be both better trained and more independent. Yet the time was simply not ripe
for Canadian engagement with the Vietnamese court system. It is crucial to remember
that there is no separation of governmental powers in Vietnam. The courts are utterly
reliant on the “guidance” of the Party, just as is every other governmental institution.
This results in a grossly impoverished view of the judicial role. Indeed, the judges
with whom I met clearly saw themselves as “government officials”, with no capacity
for independence. For example, in the area of criminal law, one senior justice official
told me that the role of the courts is “to explain to the people that if they violate the
law they will be punished.” To work with the courts at this stage in their development
would be simply to support a principal mechanism for the repression of dissent and
the imposition of authoritarian control. I did not meet any judge who sought a more
independent role, so no “window of opportunity” presented itself. Given the values
that inform CIDA’s engagement with legal and judicial reform, the prudent course
was to wait for signs of change and to seize the opportunity to assist internal forces
when they emerge. Attempts to facilitate a desire for change are more likely to be
effective in other, more open, institutions of the legal system, such as the law faculties.
Even the Ministry of Justice seemed to contain more reformist elements than the
courts.
‘Given
the strong centralizing force of the Vietnamese authorities, helping to create room for
intellectual and experiential diversity is an important goal. Yet at the same time, no significant legal
and judicial reform can take place without the engagement of the state, so direct work though the
Ministry of Justice (in highly targeted areas) was also recommended.
