THE MEANING OF NEUTRALITY IN PEACETIME
Dr. Dr. Wilhelm WengIer*
In recent years, governments of various countries have aimed
at the establishment of a legal status of their “neutrality” in the
case of a war, but, chiefly in a time of peace. In the case of two States,
viz., Austria 1 and Laos 2, such a neutrality has already been laid
down in international instruments. The question may therefore be
asked, what can be the significance in international law of such a
duty to neutrality in peacetime, and whether in general it is now
legally possible to establish such a neutrality in peacetime, as an
institution of international law.
The fact that in traditional international law neutrality is linked
with war, and that rights and duties of neutral states in time of war
are governed in detail by numerous legal rules of international law,
may be the reason why lawyers seldom take the trouble to examine
the intrinsic meaning of the word “neutrality”. Equally unsatisfac-
torily has political science dealt with the meaning of “non-alignment”.
On closer examination, one discovers that the word “neutrality” is
not absolutely unequivocal.3 Firstly, we associate with it the idea
that when individuals or groups with colliding interests oppose each
other and seek to realize their interests by armed conflict those
individuals, groups, or States which do not support one of the
opponents in the conflict are called “neutrals”.
But already the question, when does non-neutral (unilateral)
support arise is not quite definite. One can hold the view that the
* Professor of International and Comparative Law, Faculty of Law, Freie
Universitat Berlin.
‘By a constitutional enactment dated 26.10.1955, Austria declared her per-
manent neutrality and communicated the text of this Act to most of the other
states. The other states, through diplomatic notes, have either. expressly
recognized the Austrian neutrality or taken note of the Austrian communication.
2 By the Geneva Conference Laotian neutrality has been made the subject of
an international treaty in the form of a declaration dated 23.7.62.
3 Modelski is correct, vide. International Conference on the Settlement of the
Laotian question 1961-62, Canberra 1962, p. 25. The “decision” of the 7th Con-
gress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (Aspects Juridiques
de la neutraliti, Brussels, 1961) cannot be regarded as the valid expression of a
law on the content of peacetime
generally accepted view of international
neutrality.
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neutral has to abstain from any action by which one or other of the
conflicting parties would be favoured; by way of example, it must
deliver supplies to neither of the conflicting parties, if the delivery
would influence the outcome of the struggle. But if the neutral has
already delivered specific supplies before the outbreak of hostilities
to only one of the adversaries (perhaps because the other had bought
the supplies in question from another place), it may be argued equally
well that it favours one party when the neutral after the outbreak
of hostilities ceases to make customary delivery. According to this
interpretation, the actual status quo ante bellum must be maintained
by the neutral.4
According to another view, it is fundamentally compatible with
neutrality for the neutral to maintain or enter into trade and other
relations with the disputing parties; it need only manifest its
neutrality so that when these relations affect the strength of both
adversaries the support be equal.5 This requirement of equal treat-
ment of the parties in dispute by the neutral causes new difficulties:
does “equal” mean for example, that the supplies to each of the
states at war must be absolutely identical in quantity? Or, that the
supplies to allies are always to be reckoned together? A further
question is whether a state, which wishes to be neutral, accords
equal treatment to belligerent states when it gives its citizens an
opportunity to deliver supplies to one or other, or to both of the
belligerent parties; or whether equality of treatment of belligerents
by the neutral state requires that the state must exercise care that
its citizens supply all belligerent states equally.
Some authors contend that the neutral must either not support
the combattants or else do so equally, although it is not forbidden
to hold or to express an opinion with regard to the legal or moral justi-
fication of one or the other cause. According to this conception the
neutral state does not violate its neutrality if it makes up its mind,
in an impartial manner, for example whether the war was rightly
or wrongly begun by one of the belligerents. Others believe that
neutrality also includes the obligation not to express oneself on the
divergent claims of the belligerents; for them neutrality comprises
4 That any later change in the regulations which a state has drawn up for the
defence of its neutrality is prima facie suspect as aiding and abetting one of the
belligerents is obviously the intent of art. 13 of the Hague Convention of 1907;
vide penultimate paragraph of the preamble.
r, Art. 9 of the Hague Convention (No. V), 1907 decided that the restriction
on economic relations of a neutral state with belligerent states “devraient 6tre
uniform4ment appliqu~es”. The preamble of the Convention (No. XIII) speaks
of “impartial” application of regulations published by a neutral state.
No. 4] MEANING OF NEUTRALITY IN PEACETIME
371
the attitude of refraining from taking sides.6 Occasionally, one even
encounters the view that it is part of neutrality for the neutral to
say nothing concerning alleged violations of the rules of warfare by
a belligerent.7
As for the rights and obligations of neutral states in time of war,
positive international law has sometimes decided in favour of one or
the other of the possible interpretations of neutrality outlined above.
Any direct supply of arms on the part of a neutral government to a
belligerent state is forbidden, and this holds good even if the neutral
state before the beginning of the war was regularly supplying arms
to one or other of the belligerent states. On the other hand, there
is no fundamental objection to the supply, for example, of foodstuffs
by a neutral government, but this may certainly not be done with
the intention of supporting one belligerent unilaterally. Positive law
does not consider it to be a violation of neutrality in time of war,
if a state refuses to break off close economic ties of its citizens,
which existed before the outbreak of hostilities, with citizens of one
of the belligerents because its economy is dependent on trade with
that belligerent.8
But what does neutrality mean in international law when there
is absolutely no state of war ? In connexion with the so-called
permanent neutrality of several European states, the question has
already been raised whether the obligation contained in permanent
neutrality, not to begin a war and on the outbreak of a war between
other states, to remain neutral, does not produce certain anticipatory
legal effects in time of peace. It has been held as inconsistent with
the permanent neutrality of a state that during peacetime it concludes
treaties of alliance with another state, or that it supports another
6 If a neutral state is obliged not to make, through members of its government,
such statements on the justification in international law or in ethics of a point
of view of the belligerents, which represent moral support for one of the parties
to the conflict, this does not include the obligation to prevent expressions by
its citizens especially in its press, which side morally with one or other of the
belligerent states. During the 2nd World War Switzerland in particular rejected
such an obligation of “ideological neutrality”.
7 There is also the related question of whether a neutral state which is a party
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 has the right to punish for breach of the
Convention a subject of a belligerent state, when the alleged violator of the
Convention is arrested on the territory of the neutral state. The right of a
“non-affected” state to punish for violations of the Convention is a controversial
question.
s However, not all the controversial questions on the obligations of neutrality
are answered by the Hague Conventions (Nos. V and XIII) of 1907; these
Conventions are themselves in part not clear.
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state in its war preparations, even if war has not yet been declared
and it is still not certain who the aggressor will be. There has also
been a tendency to deduce from the obligation of permanent neutrality
that the state, permanently neutralized, ought not to be allowed to
enter, in peacetime, into close relationships with other states, which
could not be dissolved in case of war without jeopardizing the
existence of the neutral state; this is still the explanation to-day
of Swiss and Austrian hesitation to join the European Supernational
Communities.9 On the one hand, governments of permanently neutral
states have frequently been appointed as arbitrators or mediators
for settling disputes between other states in order to prevent a war,
provided always that both disputing parties agreed thereto. On the
other hand, when this was not the case, governments of permanent
neutral states have been very reluctant to express their opinion
as to the merits of the dispute.
A peacetime declaration by a state against its participation in
war under similar reserves to a permanent neutral state only has
real meaning in international law if the latter sanctions war under
circumstances other than those reserves. But, in modern international
law, no state is permitted to initiate war under any conditions. Such
an undertaking by a permanent neutral state, or any other, has
become superfluous since this obligation already exists under the
law of nations. The position of the permanent neutral state in modern
international law is further confused by its membership obligations
to the United Nations and similar organizations to co-operate in the
imposition of sanctions upon a delinquent state pursuing a policy
contrary to the Charter of the organization.’0 One may even ask
whether membership itself is compatible with its neutral status,
since it is thereby called upon to take sides on a controversial issue,
either by voting or by abstaining from casting its ballot.
The obligation to participate in sanctions within the scope of a
world organization may not only hamper the permanent neutrality
of a state but may produce as well similar anticipatory effects as per-
manent neutrality did in classical international law. When belligerent
activity is permitted in the exercise of the right of collective security
it seems at first sight permissible for several member states of the
UN, before it comes to a war, to join in a defence alliance for the
eventuality of an attack by a third state. But within the organization
9 Vide Haug, Neutralitat und Volkergemeinschaft, Zurich 1962, p. 145 et seq.;
Baltl, Probleme der Neutralitat, Graz 1962, p. 39 et seq.
10 The participation of Switzerland in the sanctions of the League of Nations
was the subject of resolutions of the Council dated 13.12.1920 and 14.5.1938.
No. 4] MEANING OF NEUTRALITY IN PEACETIME
373
of the UN, it can be said of no state that it would in future be an
aggressor, or be the victim of an aggression. The obvious question
is whether it is compatible with the obligations under the Charter
for a state – merely for the purpose of defence against third states
to bind itself so closely to another state that it is no longer
–
practicable for it to participate in sanctions if that very ally would
itself in future attack a third state.
It is undeniable that military defence alliances (which today
repeatedly lead to a more or less close “integration” between the
allied states) certainly impair the capability of the individual state
to participate in collective sanctions of the UN against one of its
allies. At the same time these alliances not only reduce the possibility
of wars between the allies themselves, but also promote world peace
in that they exercise a deterrent effect against a potential outside
aggressor. Inversely, there may be circumstances where the certainty
that a particular state would remain neutral in war diminishes the
danger of war between certain other states. In practice, the UN has
on the one hand, considered separate defence alliances against a
possible aggressor, in particular those in the form of regional
organizations, as not generally incompatible with the Charter;”
moreover, it has also regarded the permanent neutrality of a state,
for example of Austria or Laos, as not, ab initio, incompatible with
membership in the UN. 12 However time and again alliances, de-
clared by the allied states themselves as genuine defence alliances,
are criticized by others as being contrary to the Charter. Neither
do the wishes of individual states to declare themselves permanently
neutral always meet with the approval of other states; on the
contrary some powers try to entice other states into economic and
other ties which are so close that in the event of war the other
states could hardly be neutral even if they wished to be.
In view of this one might suppose that the United Nations has
to decide whether a specific defence alliance or the permanent
neutrality of a specific state is advantageous or harmful to world
peace, and consequently compatible or incompatible with the Charter.
But apart from the fact that the Charter provides for no competent
organ for such decisions, it is an illusion to believe that at this
moment the members of the UN would be prepared to give objectively
and without political motive a decision on such a question.
11 Vide Art. 52 of the UN Charter.
12 On this point see Verdross in: Symbolae Verzijl, The Hague (1958), p. 410 et
seq; Haug, op. cit. p 59 et seq. The compatibility of the permanent neutrality of
Austria etc. with the Charter is usually justified by saying that the Security
Council is not bound to impose participation in military measures against a
state which is declared to have committed a breach of the peace on all states.
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Consequently, in order for a declaration of neutrality to have
any practical effect, whether made during time of war or peace,
it must coincide with the interests of the great powers. Notwith-
standing this happy coincidence, the neutral state must be wary of
attracting accusations of compromise with its neutral status. It must
be emphasized that mere words in the form of a declaration of
neutrality convey no clear scope of the obligations thereby under-
taken. For purposes of clarification, it would be advisable to draw
up a list of those acts deemed by international law to be inconsistent
with the status of a neutral state in peacetime, which list would be
evidenced by an instrument recognized as expressing international
law.13
Among such acts, it is submitted that one would most certainly
find the following: the conclusion of treaties of alliance, the admission
of foreign troops on the territory of a state, 14 and the acquisition
of war materials, which either place the buyer in a position of
dependence upon the seller or which, on the contrary, represent an
incitement to aggression by a third state.15 The ultimate act constitut-
ing a violation of neutrality of course would be the loss of indepen-
dence in peacetime by merger with another state.
It thus follows that one of the principal duties of a neutral state
is to maintain the integrity of its entire territory without indulging
in cessions of its territory to other states, particularly when the
ceded portion is of strategic importance. This duty may conflict
with the acknowledged right of the majority of the inhabitants of
a state to determine its own destiny. Here one faces the basic problem
which remains unresolved even in the UN Charter – whether in
certain cases, it is in the interest of peace that self-determination
be denied to a people.
13 The declaration of the Government of Laos dated 9.7.1962 terms entry into
military alliances absolutely inadmissible; similarly, any other treaty with a
third state, “which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos”
ought to be inadmissible. This latter regulation is, in the writer’s view, too vague.
14 Vide Nos. 4 and 6 of the Laos declaration of 9.7.1962.
15 Vide art. 6 of the supplementary protocol on the declaration of neutrality
of Laos: “The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material
generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal govern-
ment of Laos may consider necessary for the national defence of Laos, is
prohibited.”
16 Vide No. 2 of the Laos declaration: “It is the will of the Laotian people to
protect and ensure respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity
and territorial integrity of Laos”. The maintenance of the independence of Austria
is the subject of an obligation of that state by art. 4 of the peace treaty of
15.5.1955, but it is independent of the maintenance of its neutrality.
No. 4] MEANING OF NEUTRALITY IN PEACETIME
375
The biggest difficulties arise when one asks whether a state,
which is neutral in time of peace, should also undertake to exercise
care that neither its government nor its political parties allow
themselves to be influenced unilaterally by another state. If this
means that the state concerned ought to isolate itself from the rest
of the world, it is simply impracticable in modern conditions. If
other states are governed according to capitalist or socialist ideologies,
the neutral state cannot be obliged to exercise care that no political
forces with corresponding ideologies influence its country. On the
other hand, it would not be unrealistic to think of the establishment
of an international contractual obligation, in which the neutral state
is not allowed to tolerate direct intervention in its international
affairs by any state.17
All states positively interested in the neutrality of a state in
time of peace may have a common interest that the neutral state
has certain constitutional guarantees that it will not embark on a
policy equally undesirable to them. Such constitutional engagements
can only be of a very general nature.1 s They might invite the danger
that the domestic conditions of the neutral state frequently become
the object of criticism by other states; whereas an attempt to
guarantee the contractual tie in the constitution of the neutral state
by a right of intervention by other states 19 would obviously be
inconsistent with the inviolability which, as has been shown above,
itself forms part of the status of permanent neutrality.
That the neutral state in peacetime itself must not intervene in
the internal affairs of other states is obvious from the general
principles of international
law and needs no special contractual
verification.20 But it becomes important to determine whether, apart
from this obligation, the neutral state ought to bind itself to refrain
from giving moral support to one party in an internal conflict within
another state, and particularly to one state in case of an external
17 Vide No. 5 of the Laos declaration: “It will not allow any foreign interference
in the international affairs of the Kingdom of Laos in any form whatsoever”.
Is Austria is bound, by the peace treaty of 15.5.1955, “to have a democratic
government, based on elections by secret ballot and shall guarantee to all citizens
free, equal and universal suffrage.” At the Geneva Conference on Laos, in order
to secure the neutrality of Laos, the United States of America attempted to make
arrangements against the contingency that armed parties, supported from outside,
might menace the constitutional order of Laos.
19 Vide the “guarantee” of the Constitution of Cyprus by the United Kingdom,
Turkey and Greece.
20 However No. 3 of the declaration of Laos states: “It will not resort to the
use or threat of force in any way which might impair the peace of other countries,
and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries”.
376
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conflict between other states .2 An especially delicate question is
whether peacetime neutrality of a state ought to extend so far, and
can in fact, go so far, that it is bound even in its roll as a member
of an international organ not to take sides when the organ is concern-
ed with disputes the continuance of which might endanger inter-
national peace. A state undertaking such an obligation could hardly
be elected a member of the Security Council.
When the peacetime neutrality of a state is established by means
of an international instrument, precise answers to these questions
should be specified. Also the neutral state ought to insist on an
arrangement, whereby an independent agency will be able to give
binding rulings, if it is accused of having violated its neutrality.22
But it is no less important that certain peacetime obligations towards
the neutral state should be established for other states. Here also
it is insufficient that third states merely bind themselves “to res-
pect” the neutrality of the neutral state; the obligations thereby
undertaken must be accurately established. The fact that other
states are not allowed to attack a neutral state in peacetime or to
put it under pressure by threats of an attack, or to intervene in its
internal affairs, is evident from the general principles of international
law. Instead of emphasizing this it is more important that other
states be denied the right to exert pressure on the neutral state
by any other means which might endanger its neutrality. 3 Such
an obligation will be the keystone in a contractual system for the
maintenance of peacetime neutrality; it ensures that the neutral
state will be a “sphere of no-interest” for other states. Nevertheless
21 True, in recent years, various works advocate an “active neutrality” of a
permanent neutral state; it ought to show that the state stands “for law and
justice”, vide Toncic and Sorinj, Aupenpolitik Vol. 9
(1958) 146 et seq. But
opinions as to what is law and what (most of all) is justice differ between states
in dispute; such active neutrality is a dangerous thing for the neutral state while
no recognized agency exists for neutral and non-neutrals which could give a
binding ruling on who is right.
22The Commission set up “for supervision and control” has not so much to
supervise the Laotian Government’s observance of its obligations, as observance of
the obligations by other treaty-states. Where there exists an international agency
as the Security Council under chapter VII of the UN Charter, whose decisions
are binding on all states, it could also decide whether a state, in spite of its
declared neutrality, ought to take part in economic and similar sanctions.
23 In the declaration on Laos the States other than Laos promised in No. 1
“that they will recognize and will respect and observe in every way the sovereign-
ty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of
Laos”. In No. 2a they undertake that “they will not commit or participate in
any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty,
independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos”.
No. 4] MEANING OF NEUTRALITY IN PEACETIME
377
the scope of such an obligation cannot be precise since it might
itself become the cause of recurring disputes. At the same time
scrupulous observance of this obligation brings with it the threat
of economic and cultural isolation, such an isolation being especially
dangerous for economically underdeveloped states.
Another unresolved
issue is whether some states may make
arrangements for the protection of the peacetime neutrality of a
certain state, when not all the other states participate in these
arrangements. This leads to the further question of whether the
neutral state should refuse to “recognize” this protection when it is
extended by only a restricted number of other states.2 4
One last question remains, namely whether peacetime neutrality
the scope of which needs precise definition – may be established
–
by means of a unilateral declaration by the state concerned or
whether such a neutrality must be founded on a treaty with other
states. In present-day international law it is not impossible for a
state to establish duties for itself by unilateral acts;25 then it can
certainly revoke such a unilateral act unilaterally.26 But in no case
can a state which itself wishes to become a permanent neutral state
invoke by a unilateral act obligations for others to respect that
neutrality, which obligations exceed those the UN charter has
24 No. 4 of the declaration on Laos directs that the government of Laos “will
not recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including
SEATO”. A collective guarantee of Austria’s inviolability (which is also a part
of its permanent neutrality) was contemplated in the Moscow memorandum
dated 15.4.1955; however it did not result in the conclusion of such a treaty by
the great powers.
25 Vide the “unilateral” declaration of Egypt about the Suez Canal dated 24th
April, 1957, which has been registered with the Secretary General of the United
Nations in accordance with art. 102 of the UN Charter as a valid obligation of
Egypt under international law.
26 Vide Wengler, Volkerrecht, Berlin 1964, p. 308. – Verdross, Die immer-
wahrende Neutralitat der Republik Osterreich, Wien 1958, o.12, contends, that
the declaration of Austria regarding
its neutrality could not be revoked
unilaterally by that State. Verdross is probably correct on condition that the
Austrian communication to other States has been “accepted” by them (which
means more than merely taking note). This writer is of the opinion that
communication of the declaration of neutrality and its acceptance constitutes
the conclusion of a treaty in international law. Such a treaty can be revoked
by later treaties; it is known that after the first World War the permanent
neutrality of Belgium, created by treaty in 1839, was abolished by the peace
treaties of 1919. Baltl, op. cit., maintains that the Austrian declaration of neu-
trality could not be set aside either by a unilateral act of Austria or with the
consent of those states which have recognized the Austrian neutrality; this view
is untenable.
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prescribed for all states.27 Obligations exceeding those contained
in general international law and in the Charter must be embodied
in a treaty, or perhaps in unilateral (revocable) binding instruments
issued by each of the other states.
The recent attempts to establish a neutral status for a country
in peace time, recognized and guaranteed by international law, are
serving to construct this neutrality on the principles applicable
during a hypothetical armed international conflict. Although in
practice it is chiefly the status in peacetime that one has in mind,
neutrality in war is not only a sine qua non of peacetime neutrality,
but also fixes its content. Nevertheless, effective operation of
neutrality of smaller countries in an armed conflict between World
Powers is doubtful. For this reason the linking of peacetime neutrality
to neutrality in the event of war appears unfortunate.
Does the possibility exist today to attribute a meaning
to
neutrality in peacetime without linking with neutrality in war?
Recent treaties contain little help in this respect. Even the agreement
over Laos as indicated in most of its regulations is concerned with
questions of a military nature, whereas dispositions relating to
territorial integrity of Laos and to non-intervention are chiefly
rules which are valid for all states as general principles of inter-
national law. However one substantially new element which may be
typical of a genuinely new conception of neutrality in peacetime can
be seen in the regulations of the Laotian treaty, whereby other
states giving economic or financial assistance to Laos are not allowed
to attach any conditions of a political nature; obviously Laos is also
prevented from introducing such a condition. This provision is more
than an undertaking by other states not to apply pressure on Laos
in order to cause it to conclude treaties which for Laos are incom-
patible with its above mentioned military obligations. Developing
the idea underlying the regulations concerning unconditional assist-
ance, one can understand neutrality in peacetime as a condition in
which a neutral state is precluded from all ties with states which
are unfriendly among themselves, which could be regarded as a com-
mitment to one of those states, or as an effective support of its
27 Baltl, op. cit, p. 26, assumes that a State could unilaterally, by its declaration
of neutrality, impose obligations on other States; but this view is unfounded.
He reasons as follows: A State which declares its neutrality must be regarded
as creating a “factor of international security”; this, he believes, ought to be
respected by all other countries. It should be pointed out that the Romanian
author Bolintineanu, Studii si Ceretari Juridice VII (1962) 316, also supports
the view that a State could create international legal obligations for other
States by its unilateral declaration of permanent neutrality..
No. 4] MEANING OF NEUTRALITY IN PEACETIME
379
policy, even when the attitude in question does not entail an anticip-
ated strengthening of the position of other states in future war.
This injects something new in the idea of neutrality in peacetime.
But it ought not to be overlooked that with such a legal commitment
the political dealings of neutral states will be dependent on one or
other of the unfriendly states; one should hesitate to advise a neutral
state to bind itself to a policy of non-alignment, when no independent
agency exists which can decide on alleged violations of this obligation.
An obligation in international law by a state not to take sides in
relation to a group of strong unfriendly states certainly can not
make a weak state more resistant to pressure by those states than
it already is. An obligation of international law among states un-
friendly among themselves not to induce the neutral state to abandon
its policy of non-alignment operates under a decided disadvantage:
if this obligation is broken by one of the unfriendly states, according
to general principles of international law, the other is no longer
bound; each-breach of contract can, so to speak, destroy the whole
neutrality system, while the neutral state can do nothing.
One ought, therefore, to consider whether the collective resistance
of the largest possible number of states which desire to be neutral
in peacetime, in relation to certain states unfriendly among them-
selves, could prevent one of the outside states from, for example,
attempting to grant an individual member of the neutral states
economic help and thereby imposing on it conditions of political
nature. Collective resistance by all neutral states against such an
attempt would parallel the collective armed neutrality of the 18th
century. 28 Whether the prerequisites of a true “collective defence of
non-alignment” exist for those states which desire to be neutral, in
other words, whether those states striving for peacetime neutrality
already represent a “third force”, is not a question for the jurist
to answer.
28 Vide Scott, The armed neutralities of 1780 and 1800 (1918).
