NOTES
Meech Lake – The Reality of the Time Limit
R.E. Hawkins*
In a recently published piece, Gordon
Robertson argued that the three year time-limit
on the ratification of the Meech Lake Accord
was illusory. He suggested that s.41 of the
Consititution, under which ratification by all
the provinces as well as the Senate and the
House of Commons is required, contains the
suitable amending formula for the Accord.
Since s.41 is not associated with a time limit,
the June 23, 1990 “deadline” for the Accord is
meaningless.
In this reply, the author argues that Mr.
Robertson’s thesis is unconvincing. Although
the matters within the Accord are inseverably
bound, the different subjects may continue to
attract different amending formulae. The
Constitution does not contain any provision
which permits the substitution of one amend-
ing procedure for another. In addition, Mr.
Robertson’s argument that s.41 is equivalent to
the “highest level approval” is wrong because
it ignores the temporal restrictions imposed by
s.38(1). The author emphasises that there is
not a hierarchy of consents, but rather that
there are different qualities of consent, some
more appropriate for certain subjects than for
others. Finally, Mr. Robertson’s purposive
interpretation is flawed. It is true that the con-
stitutional drafters wished to prevent s.43 or
s.44 procedures from being used to amend s.42
subjects. However, they also wanted to prevent
s.42 subjects from being brought under the
s.41 unanimity formula, and the text of the
section bears this out.
Dans un r6cent article, Gordon Robertson
soutient que la limite de trois ans pour ]a rati-
fication de l’Accord du Lac Meech est illu-
soire. I1 sugg~re que l’article 41 de la
Constitution, qui requiert la ratification par
toutes les provinces, ainsi que par le Sdnat et
]a Chambre des communes, repr~sente ]a for-
mule d’amendement la plus appropride A l’ac-
cord. Puisque l’article 41 n’impose aucune
date limite, l’ch6ance du 23 juin 1990 est vide
de sens.
Dans cet article, l’auteur r6plique que les pro-
pos de M. Robertson ne sont pas convaincants.
Bien que les themes majeurs de l’accord soient
inextricablement li6s, les points individuels
peuvent 8tre soumis h diff6rentes formules
d’amendement. La Constitution ne contient
aucune disposition permettant de substituer
une formule t une autre. De plus, l’argument
de M. Robertson ? l’effet que l’article 41
6quivatu au “plus haut degr6 d’assentiment”
est erron6 puisqu’il fait abstraction des limites
temporelles de l’article 38(1). L’auteur sou-
ligne qu’il n’existe pas une hi~rarchie d’assen-
timents, mais plut6t diff~rentes formes d’as-
sentiment, et que certaines sont mieux
adaptdes h certains sujets que d’autres.
L’auteur conclut que l’interpr6tation de M.
Robertson, bas~e sur l’objectif poursuivi, est
inadequate. I1 est vrai qu’on a tent6 de faire en
sorte que les procedures d6crites A l’article 43
ou t l’article 44 ne servent pas At amender des
sujets compris A l’article 42. Toutefois, on a
aussi voulu 6viter que les sujets de I’article 42
ne soient soumis t ]a rtgle d’unanimit6 de l’ar-
ticle 41, et le texte de la section en fait bien
6tat.
Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. I am grateful to former Dean Soberman and to Dean Whyte
of the Faculty of Law, Queen’s University, for discussions which we have had on this topic.
McGill Law Journal 1989
Revue de droit de McGill
1989]
NOTES
In the Institute for Research on Public Policy ‘Newsletter’, Volume III,
Number 3, May/June 1989, Gordon Robertson published a piece entitled
the Myth of the Time Limit’.’ It was an interpretation of the
‘Meech Lake –
amending formula contained in the Constitution Act, 1982.2 According to Mr.
Robertson, the formula would impose no time limit on the ratification of the
amendments contained in the Meech Lake Accord. This is a startling conclu-
sion. As Mr. Robertson pointed out, spokesmen for the Government of Canada,
and for some of the provinces, have frequently suggested that the Accord will
die if it is not ratified by all eleven Canadian governments within three years
from the adoption of the resolution initiating the procedure. That initiating res-
olution was passed by the Quebec Assembly on June 23, 1987, making the rat-
ification expiry date June 23, 1990. Mr. Robertson, with all the authority of the
senior advisor to Prime Ministers Pearson and Trudeau in the conferences of
First Ministers on the Constitution from 1968 to 1978, argues that the ‘solemn
sentence of death’ pronounced by the federal and provincial governments ‘is
almost certainly wrong’. In fact, this time it is Mr. Robertson who is almost cer-
tainly wrong.
The Robertson thesis is, at first blush, persuasive. It is categoric: s. 41 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 contains the necessary and unique amending formula
for ratifying Meech Lake. It is direct: it proceeds on the basis of a strict textual
construction of s. 41. According to Mr. Robertson, the Meech Lake amendments
to the constitutional amending formula and to the Supreme Court attract the
s. 41 procedure. That procedure calls for the unanimous approval by the Senate,
the House of Commons and the legislative assembly of each province. The pro-
cedure contains no time limit for gathering the necessary approvals. Ergo, there
is no time limit for the ratification of Meech Lake.
Meech Lake also contains proposals for constitutional change which fall
within categories governed by s. 42 and s. 38(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The procedure to be followed in both of these categories is outlined in s. 38(1).
It differs from the unanimity procedure of s. 41 in that it requires that proposed
constitutional amendments be ratified by the Senate, House of Commons and
only seven out of ten provinces containing 50% of the country’s population. In
addition, by way of s. 39(2), this procedure imposes a three year time limit on
ratification of proposed amendments. Mr. Robertson’s challenge is to explain
how those provisions of Meech Lake, which would have attracted the time limit
had they stood alone, somehow escape that time limit because they are included
IThis interpretation has also been published as chapter three in Mr. Robertson’s book A House
Divided(;) Meech Lake, Senate Reform and the Canadian Union (Halifax: Institute for Research
on Public Policy, 1989).
2Being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Constitution Act,
19821.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 35
in a package with changes governed by an amending procedure containing no
time limit.
Mr. Robertson accepts that challenge head on. He assumes that the amend-
ments proposed in Meech Lake are not severable, that the various proposed
changes are ‘so inextricably bound up’ that it cannot be assumed that they
would have been adopted independently.3 This assumption is plausible given
that the Accord is a compromise package reached as a result of a negotiating
process which would inevitably have involved concessions on some items for
gains on others. All of the items are important, more than mere housekeeping
matters. To allow some of them to stand, and others to fall, would upset the bal-
ance of the Accord. However, the provisions of the Accord are severable in the
sense that they can be made operative standing alone: for example, the amend-
ments affecting the Senate are not directly related to the amendments affecting
the Supreme Court.
Accepting that the parts of the Accord are inseverable, Mr. Robertson uses
three manoeuvres to do away with the three year time limit arguably attached
to the proposed amendments in the s. 38(1)/s. 42(1) category. First, he proceeds
on the basis that the Accord, being inseverable, must be covered by one, and
only one, applicable amending procedure. He points out that the Accord’s
authors stipulated in two places in the Accord’s recital that s. 41 was the appro-
priate ratification procedure. I will call this manoeuvre the ‘single ratification
formula’ move.
The second manoeuvre is to label s. 41, the unanimity procedure, the ‘high-
est level of approval’. That being the case, the theory is that it can be substituted
for the s. 38(1) amending procedure as necessary. Even though s. 42(1) says that
amendments affecting that category of subjects, ‘may be made only in accord-
ance with subsection 38(1)'(original emphasis), Mr. Robertson states that
s. 42(1), ‘cannot mean what it appears to say’. To interpret the section literally,
‘would be nonsense … would be absurd’.4 This is because s. 38(1) calls for rat-
ification by seven of ten provinces with 50% of the population whereas s. 41
calls for ten of ten provinces with 100% of the population. For Mr. Robertson,
s. 41 requires, ‘everything that s. 38 does in the way of consent and approval
and a good deal more’. I will call this manoeuvre the ‘highest level approval’
move.
The third manoeuvre attempts to bring s. 42(1) subject matters under the
s. 41 amending procedure by demonstrating that such a move does not offend
the intended purpose of s. 42 of the Constitution Act, 1982. According to Mr.
3A.G. Alberta. v. A.G. Canada, [1947] A.C. 503 at 518. See P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of
Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 325-27.
4Robertson insists on interpreting s. 41 literally, that is as a section containing no time limits.
Somehow his penchant for literal interpretation wanes as he moves from s. 41 to s. 42.
19891
NOTES
Robertson, certain matters were included by s. 42 under the seven of ten prov-
inces, 50% of the population amending procedure in order that they would not
be included under either the s. 43 or s. 44 amendment procedures. Section 43
permits amendment of certain matters by Parliament and only the provinces
affected; section 44 permits Parliament acting alone to make constitutional
amendments where only its interests would be affected. As Mr. Robertson
points out, using the 1912 territorial expansion of certain provinces as an exam-
ple, without s. 42(1) it might arguably have been possible to accomplish the ter-
ritorial expansion under either s. 43 or s. 44. In such a scenario, s. 43 or s. 44
would then provide a way of evading the seven of ten provinces/50% of the
population consent requirements. The purpose of s. 42 was to prevent this by
requiring a more broadly based consent where amendments would affect prov-
inces, either directly or indirectly. It follows that s. 42 was never intended to
exclude subject matters from the s. 41 unanimity procedure. I will call this
manoeuvre the ‘purposive interpretation’ move.
These three moves unlock the Meech Lake ratification difficulty for Mr.
Robertson. Even though the Meech Lake package contains matters attracting
two different amending formulae, and even though the subject matters are
inseverably bound, the moves enable Mr. Robertson to argue that there is, in
fact, one amending formula which will get the whole job done. That formula is
s. 41. Section 41 has no time limit attached to it. The three year ratification
deadline disappears.
The difficulty is that each of these attempts to bring s. 38(1) and s. 42(1)
subject matters under the s. 41 amending procedures fails under careful analysis.
With respect to the ‘one applicable formula’ move, even if one considers Meech
Lake to be an inseparable package, it does not follow that ratification must, or
can, be achieved using only one amending formula. The different subject mat-
ters may continue to attract the appropriate amending procedures set out for
them in the Constitution. Inseverability does not oblige, or even permit, the
adoption of one convenient formula. Severability implies that all of the exigen-
cies of the several amending formulae in play must be met. One could say that
the inseverability feature of the amendment package makes the amending for-
mulae themselves inseverable.
Why is this the case? Simply, when dealing with packages of reform pro-
posals, the Constitution nowhere authorizes a special procedure which would
permit either the abandoning of the ratification procedures appropriate to the
subjects in question or the substitution of other amending procedures. The sit-
uation would be’ different if the Constitution contained the following clause:
s.42(A) Where amendments to be made in accordance with the procedures under
subsection 38(1) are inextricably linked with amendments to be made under sec-
tion 41, for the purpose of ratification the amendments may be treated as one
amendment to be made in accordance with the procedures under section 41.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 35
However the Constitution does not imply such a clause, nor is it permissible to
imply it. First, there is no need to imply such a clause: there is nothing in the
package aspect of the Meech Lake situation which prevents the procedures actu-
ally set out in the Constitution from being followed. Second, consent require-
ments in the constitutional amendment process are strict requirements. If one is
to err, it should be on the side of caution. When one amends the Constitution,
one writes the Constitution. For the Constitution to retain its legitimacy as
‘supreme law’,5 with the grave consequences flowing therefrom, it must be
amended using the precise kind of consensus and in the precise manner called
for. Otherwise, the moral authority of the Constitution is put in doubt. It does
not add anything that the signators of Meech Lake cited s. 41 in the recital to
the Accord. It is not for the authors of constitutional change to dictate the proc-
ess of ratification. That task is left to the Constitution itself.
With respect to the ‘highest level approval’ move, the very fact that some-
how Meech Lake ratification becomes easier using the ‘highest level of appro-
val’ procedure suggests that something is wrong with the characterization of
that procedure. In fact, there is no basis for saying that the s. 41 unanimous
amending procedure is ‘higher’ than the s. 38(1) seven of ten, 50% procedure.
When Mr. Robertson says ‘higher’, he is speaking in numerical terms. There is
no doubt that all ten provinces includes any subset of seven provinces imagin-
able. This, however, entirely misunderstands the nature of the amending for-
mula contained in the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 41 emphasizes the numer-
ical element: one must have the approval of all of the eleven governments, and
time is not a factor. Section 38(1) emphasizes the temporal factor: one need only
have seven of ten provinces containing 50% of the population but the consents
must be gathered within three years. Sections 43 and 44 emphasize the jurisdic-
tional aspect: only those governments directly interested or affected by the pro-
posed amendment need consent. Where those affected consist of the federal
government plus some of the provinces, the s. 43 procedure is appropriate;
where only the federal government is affected by the proposed amendment, s.
44 provides the appropriate procedure.
Under each of the three procedures, the quality of consent is different
depending on whether the numerical, temporal or jurisdictional plane is empha-
sized. The Constitution calls for different kinds of consent depending on the
subject matter of the amendment. The point is not that there is a hierarchy of
consents, some high and some low; the point is that there are different qualities
of consent, some more appropriate for certain subject matters than for others.
The authors of the Constitution set out which amendment procedures were
appropriate for which subject matters. It is not open to us to second guess their
5Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52.
1989]
NOTES
judgment on what is appropriate in terms of approval by attempting to create a
hierarchy out of what are essentially apples and oranges.
There is a beguiling simplicity in Mr. Robertson’s “ten is greater than
seven” assertion; it is a little more subtle to say that the temporal element can
undermine the numerical truism. An example proves the point. Suppose that the
federal government proposes to give to the provinces its s. 91(9) power over
buoys in the Constitution Act, 1867.6 The appropriate amending procedure is
s. 38(1). Six provinces ratify the proposed amendment quickly. The four mari-
time provinces hesitate because of the cost of maintaining buoys. Finally the
maritime provinces decide to ratify the amendment, but only manage to do so
three years and one month after the first government to approve the amendment
passed its ratifying motion. The amendment will fail because the exigencies of
the temporal element of the s. 38(1) amendment procedures, as set out in s.
39(2), have not been met.
However, had the s. 41 unanimous consent procedure been the operative
procedure in this buoy example, the amendment would have passed as s. 41
contains only a numerical, and not a temporal, element. Using Mr. Robertson’s
analysis, it would be possible to substitute the ‘higher level’ approval of s. 41
for the ‘lower level’ approval of s. 38(1) and thereby save the amendment.
However, this cannot be correct. Nor could it be correct that the buoy amend-
ment would be saved had it been included as part of an inseverable package.
Even supposing the package attracted the recalcitrant four provinces, thus cre-
ating unanimity in the thirty-seventh month, why should the buoy amendment
be approved when it could not have attracted the approval of seven out of ten
provinces within thirty six months as would have been necessary had it been
standing alone? Of course in this ‘late consent’ situation there is an answer and
the answer would apply equally to the Meech Lake Accord. It is not, as Mr.
Robertson suggests, to substitute one amending procedure for another. That
does not meet the constitutional concern, implicit in the time limit requirement,
that consent with respect to certain categories of amendment will go stale. The
correct solution is for the provinces which did ratify the proposals within the
original thirty six months to confirm their continuing consent by re-ratifying the
package.
This is the point to deal with a red herring which Mr. Robertson raises. He
correctly points out that (unlike in the above buoy example) the s. 38(1) subject
matters in the Meech Lake Accord have in fact met the s. 38(1) approval
requirements within the three year time limit. However, the three year period
applies not to the gathering of approvals but to the issuance of the proclamation
of ratification (s. 39(2)). In terms of the s. 38(1) procedure, it matters not
whether the delay in ratification is caused for want of adequate consent (the ini-
6Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
(Vol. 35
tial buoy scenario above) or for an inability to sever certain proposals from a
total package (Meech Lake). What matters is that for amendment of these par-
ticular subject matters, delay in ratification will cause consent to go stale.
Re-ratification, not changing the rules of the game, cures the difficulty.
In sum, contrary to the suggestion made in the ‘highest level approval’
move, s. 41 does not require everything by way of consent that s. 38(1) does.
What is missing from s. 41 is the temporal element.7 It might well be harder to
get the approval of seven provinces containing 50% of the population in three
years than to get unanimity in an indefinite period of time. Given that, the con-
clusion that s. 41 represents a ‘higher level’ of consent than s. 38(1) fails. As
a result, there exists no valid hierarchical principle of the Constitution which
will permit the s. 41 procedure to be substituted for the s. 38(1) procedure when
dealing with the s. 38(1) subject in the Meech Lake package. Because the
s. 38(1) parts of the package are inseverable, if the package as a whole cannot
be ratified within the three year time frame, it will fail.
With respect to the third manoeuvre, the ‘purposive interpretation’ move,
Mr. Robertson only tells half of the story. True, the purpose of s. 42 was to pre-
vent s. 43 or s. 44 procedures from being used to amend s. 42 subjects, such as
new province creation. Sections 43 and 44 have smaller numerical consent
requirements whereas s. 42 subjects have broad direct impact. But the purpose
of s. 42, which expressly calls for the s. 38(1) procedure, was also to prevent s.
42 subjects from being brought under the s. 38(2) to (4) opting out provisions.
The subject matters covered by s. 42 are such that were opting out to be permit-
ted, the effect would be to create a provincial veto, a unanimity requirement,
over any amendment in this category. The drafters of the 1982 amendment for-
mula may not have wanted the federal government, with or without the support
of only some provinces, to create new provinces. However, neither did the draft-
ers want any one government to be able to veto such a move. This fits with the
underlying movement in the 1982 amendment formula away from the rigidity
of unanimity –
away from simple numerical consent, and towards temporal
and jurisdictional consent wherever possible. Contrary to Mr. Robertson’s
claim, s. 42 means exactly what it says. One cannot, in the guise of construing
a section using purposive reasoning, ignore the section’s express words, partic-
ularly when dealing with a constitutional amendment formula.
7Professor Soberman has pointed out to me that this, in itself, is a serious constitutional lacuna.
In the case where all consents but one were quickly obtained under the unanimity procedure, it can
hardly be doubted that these assents would have gone stale should the last consent eventually arrive
only twenty years later. Would the courts be required to determine what a reasonable time limit
would be in the circumstances? What factors would be taken into account? In any event, such is
not the case under review. The Constitution already stipulates a three year limit for s. 38(1) amend-
ments. For these changes, there is no lacuna.
1989]
NOTES
Where does all of this lead in terms of ratifying Meech Lake? Enough has
been said to show that Mr. Robertson’s quest to find a single amendment pro-
cedure to cover all of the changes contemplated by Meech Lake, while elegant,
is futile. In order to identify the correct ratification requirement the subject mat-
ter of the various proposed amendments must be identified. These must then be
matched with the appropriate amending procedure under Part V of the
Constitution Act, 1982. There are three proposed amendments in Meech Lake
which fall unambiguously within the purview of the s. 38(1) amendment proce-
dure: those amendments affecting immigration, those dealing with shared cost
programmes and those concerning the holding of First Ministers’ conferences.
There is one proposed amendment, that dealing with the alteration of the 1982
amending formula, which is caught clearly by the s. 41(e) unanimity procedure.
There is one amendment, that dealing with the appointment of senators, which
falls under s. 42(1)(b). The subject matters of two of the amendments are ambig-
uous when it comes to matching them to an appropriate amendment procedure.
The ‘distinct society clause’ falls under either the s. 41(c) ratification procedure
or under the s. 38(1) procedure.8 The proposed amendments to the Supreme
Court of Canada must be ratified under s. 41(d), if the current Supreme Court
Act is already considered an entrenched constitutional document. If not, the
Supreme Court amendments would fall under the s. 38(1) procedure.9
Recognizing the applicability of both the s. 38(1) and s. 41 amending pro-
cedures, and accepting that Meech Lake must be treated as a package, it follows
that the only way the ratification requirements of the Constitution can be fully
met is for the exigencies of both s. 38(1) and s. 41 to be fully satisfied. This is
possible because the two sections are in no way incompatible. The sections
together require that the Meech Lake changes attract the unanimous support of
all eleven Canadian governments (the numerical plane) within three years of rat-
ification by the first government (the temporal plane). This is exactly the posi-
tion of the federal government, to date, when it refers to the possible death of
Meech Lake in June, 1990.
81t could be argued that this clause will affect the interpretation of all of the language provisions
in the Constitution of Canada and as such comes under the unanimity ratification procedure.
Section 41(c) includes under that procedure, ‘subject to s. 43, the use of the English or the French
language’.
9See Hogg, supra, note 3 at 62-64. Professor Hogg points out that the Supreme Court Act is not
included in the definition of the Constitution of Canada given in s. 52(2) of the Constitution Act,
1982. The s. 41 unanimity amendment procedure only applies to an ‘amendment to the
Constitution of Canada’. Accepting this approach, to the extent that Meech Lake purports to
entrench the Supreme Court in the Constitution, the s. 38(1) ratification procedure is the correct
one. Thereafter, changes to the composition of the Court would be made under s. 41(d). Professor
Hogg acknowledges and sets out the arguments of those who feel the Supreme Court Act, or at least
its basic elements, are already entrenched in the Constitution.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 35
It is possible that one day we will have an answer to the debate which Mr.
Robertson and I have joined. If Meech Lake does not receive unanimous rati-
fication within the three year, June 1990 deadline, there are three possibilities.
One is that it could be allowed to die. Alternatively, the federal government
might seek to proclaim those parts of the Accord subject to the s. 38(1) ratifi-
cation procedure assuming that seven of ten provinces with 50% of the popu-
lation still support the Accord at that point. Alternatively, the federal govern-
ment might wait to proclaim the Accord at some moment after the three year
expiry date when the remaining recalcitrant provinces have all added their con-
sent (the Robertson solution).’0 In the scenario where an attempt is made to pro-
claim only a part of the Accord, it will likely be challenged in court on sever-
ability grounds. Quebec, for one, might well object to certain constitutional
reforms being made before its demands with respect to the distinct society
clause or the amending formula are met.
In the case of proclamation where Meech lake received unanimous con-
sent, but only after the three year deadline, the Supreme Court would likely be
called upon to decide whether ratification could proceed on the basis of unanim-
ity or whether approval of the package necessitated respect for the temporal ele-
ment of s. 38(1). At the end of his article, Mr. Robertson reveals the real reason
why he is so anxious to do away with this temporal element. He is a fervent
political supporter of Meech Lake. He would allow an indefinite time for gath-
ering assent to the Accord which he qualifies as ‘a major accomplishment’ in
the ‘renewal of federalism’. However, this is a political position which will bear
no influence on the Court if it is called upon to decide the amending formula
issue.
Instead, the Court must base its decision on the text of the Constitution and
on the constitutional principles which underlie that text. On the level of textual
interpretation, I have argued that the Constitution makes no provision for read-
ing s. 38(1) out of the amendment process. The reference in s. 42 to the s. 38(1)
procedure is explicit. Similarly, s. 39 is explicit about the temporal aspects of
the s. 38(1) procedure.
On the level of constitutional principle, Mr. Robertson himself recognized
the importance that constitutional renewal carry ‘conviction’ when he discussed
the failure to obtain Quebec’s assent to the 1982 amendments. Acceptance of
the Meech Lake proposal on the basis of unanimity built over a period longer
than three years would also lack conviction. As mentioned, and as is implicit in
s. 39 of Part V, consents without renewal become stale. It will be objected that
‘0Here I am leaving aside the possibility of the governments which ratified the Accord within
the three year period re-ratifying the Accord as discussed earlier. In effect, the process of amend-
ment would be re-initiated, something which, if done correctly, would not be constitutionally
objectionable.
1989]
NOTES
205
the s. 39(1) procedure for revoking consent takes care of this concern. However,
after a certain passage of time, agreement requires something more than a fail-
ure to act if the agreement is to continue to carry force. It requires a positive
affirmation of unimpeachable character if the new constitutional amendments
are to command the authority necessary to give them legitimacy, even in the
eyes of those citizens originally opposed. The necessity for a consent which
respects the temporal element in the Meech Lake situation has been conceded
by other Meech Lake supporters in Mr. Robertson’s camp, most notably by the
federal government.
If the Supreme Court of Canada is called upon to decide the issue, the case
will likely be heard in 1991. The irony will not be lost on constitutional histo-
rians. Exactly a decade after the Court was first called upon to write an amend-
ment formula for our Constitution, it would be called upon to do so again. We
will know in a year if history is going to repeat itself.
