More Censorship or Less Discrimination?
Sexual Orientation Hate Propaganda
in Multiple Perspectives
Jonathan Cohen*
If hate propaganda pits anti-censorship advocates
ion advocates, sexual minorities oc-
against ani-discrimi
cupy an ambiguous position in this debate. Because they
often find themselves fighting against censorship–and
have, at least in the United States, made more gains in this
area than in that of equal protection-sexual minorities
have traditionally promoted strong freedom of expression
values. However, recent advances in jurisprudence inter-
preting the Canadian Charier of Rights and Freedoms.
particularly the inclusion of sexual orientation as an analo-
gous prohibited ground for discrimination under section 15,
have prompted sexual minorities to pursue a vigorous anti-
discrimination agenda. This agenda recently culminated in
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in riend v. Al-
berta and M. v. H., which, by reading sexual orientation
into a provincial human rights statute and extending
spousal support to same-sex couples, provide considerable
authority for extending Canada’s Criminal Code hate
propaganda provisions to sexual minorities. At the same
time, a growing body of comparative and international
law–in particular the United Nations Human Rights
Committee’s recent decision in Toonen v. Australia-has
extended the norm of anti-discrimination to sexual minori-
ties. These developments, combined with Canada’s well-
established commitment to criminalizing hate and
its
emerging commitment to substantive equality, suggest that
sexual orientation hate propaganda is best analyzed as an
issue of discrimination, not censorship. This conclusion
should commend the extension of hate propaganda meas-
ures to protect sexual minorities to even those gay rights
activists who dread further incursions into civil liberties.
Les minoritds smexules occupent une poitioa ambi-
gu’d dans I da at sur la propaganda haimuse. qui oppose
les partisans de mesmtes anti-cnsure Ai ceux dz nur
ant-discrimination. En effet. parce qu’cItes doiet sou-
vent ddfendre leur propre liber6 d’expressioa et oat. str-
tout aux ttats-Unis connu dans cc domainm dis sur cs
plus significatifs que dans ceii d ldgafitS d protection.
les minorits sexuelles se son faites les dfen-urs d la li-
bert6 d’exprcssion. Les prj8 r¢s de lajurispnxuenre
sous la Charre canadienme des drois el libercs. doant
rinclusion de l’oientation sexulle au nombre des motifs
analogues de discrimination prohil.
oant touzefois men
ces minoritds a faire de la lue judiciaire conte la discri-
mintation une priorit. Leur ction mna 5 des r&..d
concrets A travers les dkisions de la Cour supi’me du Ca-
nada dans Vend c. Albena et At. c. H. qui supportent par
une autorit6 considtrable 1’extemion des dispositions du
Code criminel portant sur la propaganda hainec at, mi-
en
noritds sexuelles. Lc droit comparn
particulier la d6cision du Comitd des drols d
‘Homme
des Nations Unies dans Toonen c. Australie –
pennt
6galement de constater un d argissement des nomas ani-
discrimination aux minoritds sexuelles. Ces dlvhlae-
ments r:ents, s’ajouant a I’engagement du Canadai cii-
minaliser les manifestations de hai
et Z ccIuL plus rdcent.
h protiger le droit A I’,gali
he m nt A [a conclusion qua la
propagande haineusc relide
i’orientation sexulle doit etre
analyst en termes de discrimination plutZt qua de censure.
Cette conclusion devrait mmr m2e les aztivi es homo-
sexuels qui craignent Ils limitations aum droits d: la per-
sonne a supporter I’extension des mesures comic la propa-
gande haineuse arm de promger lea membres des minoritls
sexuelles.
et international –
“BA. cwn laude (Yale), M.PhiL (Cambridge), LL.B. (Toronto); beginning a clerkship with Justice
Michel Bastarache at the Supreme Court of Canada in January 2001. The author would like to thank
Professor IrvAn Coder, M.P, for whose seminar this paper was first written.
McGill Law Journal 2000
Revue de droit de McGill 2000
To be cited as: (2000) 46 McGill L. 69
Mode de rfdrence: (2000) 46 R.D. McGill 69
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGLL
[Vol. 46
Prologue: The Third Wave
I. The Victim’s Perspective
I1. Sanctions against Sexual Orientation Hate Propaganda
A. Criminal Sanctions
B. Other Provisions
I1l. An International Perspective
IV. A Comparative Perspective
V. Strategic Dilemmas
A. Freedom “of” or Freedom “from”?
B. A Hierarchy of Claims?
VI. Options for Reform
A. Challenging the Criminal Code
B. Revisiting Group Defamation
Conclusion: Towards a Model of Holistic Advocacy
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
Prologue: The Third Wave
WASHINGTON, DC-The bulletin board of the Matthei Shepard Online
Resources Web site… was shut down Monday as a result of a coordinated
attack by thousand[s] of anti-gay fans of pro-wrestler Mick Foley Folq”s
supporters, angered that the slain student was winning a 2ime magazine
online poll for “Man of the Year”… ovenhelmed the board with a cn-
tinuous onslaught of anti-Shepard and anti-gay messages, requiring the
site to be temporarily shut down.
“On the same day Matt’s mont announced the Matthew Shepard Founda-
tion, thousands of wrestling fans descended onto my site to belittle Matt’s
death and attack gay people” said John Armosis … who has been man-
aging the site since Shepard’s attack and deatL “They wrote ‘AIDS kills
fags, and so do I’, and called Matt faggot’, ‘little queer,’ and ‘Dead Homo
of the Year.’ It was absolutely sickening” … .
North America is undergoing a “third wave” of hate propaganda, the first having
been the rise of anti-Jewish and anti-Black hate propaganda in the 1960s, and the sec-
ond the expansion and prosecution of those efforts in the 1970s and 1980s! The third
wave is characterized by the dissemination of cyberhate, the expansion of target
groups, and the corresponding rise in hate crimes directed at women and members of
minority groups The interplay of these three trends is poignantly illustrated by the
above news release, which describes how Web-savvy bigots sought to drown out pub-
lic sympathy for Matthew Shepard, the University of Wyoming student who was bru-
tally tortured and left to die because he was gay. After days of hate-filled postings,
several regular visitors to the site begged the systems operator to dismantle the bulle-
tin board, effectively destroying an online community of activists and mourners! In a
twist of irony, the so-called “marketplace of ideas” functioned to silence members of a
vulnerable minority.
Despite its promises of “electronic democracy”, the information superhighway
too often collapses into Darwinian struggles such as this one. Chris Gosnell writes, “It
‘ Wtred Strategies, News Release, “Vttual Violence Closes Shepard Message Board” (17 Decem-
ber 1998), online: Wired Strategies
8 April 1999).
2 Library of Parliament, Hate Propaganda by P. Rosen, rev. ed. (Ottara: Canada Communication
Group, 1996) at 1-4.
3 See generally C. Gosnell, “Hate Speech on the Internet A Question of Context” (199S) 23
Queen’s LJ. 369; M.-F Major, “Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda: Time to Regroup” (1996) 11:1
Can.
. L. & Soc. 221 [hereinafter “Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda”]; National Coalition of
Anti-Violence Programs, Anti-Lesbian, Gayi; Bisexual and Transgendered Ilolence in 1997, 4th ed.
(Detroit Triangle Foundation, 1998).
4 Wred Strategies, supra note 1.
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is a paradox that a medium with almost limitless potential for fostering diverse forms
of social exchange across traditionally impermeable boundaries and borders, may also
create and antagonize those divisions”‘ Indeed, even though Canadians are suppos-
edly protected from hate promotion through a variety of criminal and administrative
sanctions, messages like the one above are currently protected by the Constitution of
the United States, no matter where they are transmitted.’ In light of this protection, it
may be somewhat optimistic to suggest that expanding Canada’s sanctions would re-
duce sexual orientation hate propaganda. As I shall argue, however, such expansion
may be a necessary first step in combatting this proliferating form of vilification.
The idea of expanding of Canada’s anti-hate laws to protect sexual minorities has
recently attracted legislative attention at both the federal and provincial levels. In Oc-
tober 1999, NDP member of Parliament Svend Robinson introduced a private mem-
ber’s bill’ that would expand the definition of “identifiable group” respecting hate
propaganda in the Criminal Code0 to include “any section of the public distinguished
by … sexual orientation”‘ The impetus behind Robinson’s bill was, among other
things, the anti-gay hatred generated by the Kansas-based Reverend Fred Phelps.'”
Phelps, whose message of hatred and homophobia is widely available on the Internet,
gained notoriety in Canada when he threatened to stage an anti-gay demonstration on
the front lawn of the Supreme Court.” Along with specific attacks such as those di-
rected at Matthew Shepard, Phelps’s invective represents a growing body of hate
‘ Gosnell, supra note 3 at 439.
‘Ile First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of speech:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances (U.S. Const. amend. I).
The U.S. Supreme Court has withheld First Amendment protection from speech that poses a “clear
and present danger that [it] will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent”
(Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)), which has further been held to include “‘fighting’
words” (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)), and “inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and … likely to incite or produce such action” (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969)). To the extent that speech is merely “offensive conduct”, however, it has been held
not to fall within the “clear and present danger” exception. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22
(1971).
‘ Bill 263, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda), 2d Sess., 36th Parl., 1999 (1st
reading 26 October 1999).
‘ R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
9 Bill 263, supra note 7, cl. 1.
1″ See e.g. J. Tibbetts, “Robinson’s Bill Would Ban Hatred against Gays” The [Montreal] Gazette
(28 October 1999) A9; House of Commons Debates (4 April 2000) at 5703 (S. Robinson).
” See e.g. J. Tibbetts, “Police Can’t Use Hate Laws to Ban Phelps: Anti-Gay Preacher Labels Su-
preme Court Judges ‘Nine Heretics’ The Ottawa Citizen (25 June 1999) F6.
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
propaganda aimed at silencing and persecuting sexual minorities and inciting violence
against them.
Given the difficult questions of censorship and discrimination raised by this issue,
my aim is to examine the prohibition of sexual orientation hate propaganda from a va-
riety of perspectives: those of the victim (Part I), Canadian legislation (Part I), inter-
national law (Part ILL), other jurisdictions (Part IV), and the strategic advocate (Part
V). These multiple perspectives will facilitate a legal analysis of Canada’s approach to
sexual orientation hate propaganda (Part VI). I shall conclude by reflecting on the im-
portance of a holistic approach to this important issue.
I. The Victim’s Perspective
Does it really matter that the debate over free speed appears to become
more heated when it is the free speech interests of those in a dominant
group that are at stake? I think it is a phenomenon to which we should pay
close attention.’2
The pureness of… legal categories … collapses under the experiences of
lesbians and gay men.’a
The harm inflicted by sexual orientation hate propaganda defies traditional legal
categories such as libel and defamation. Critical race theorist Mari
. Matsuda ex-
plains that just as the harm caused by racist speech cannot be analyzed apart from the
structural reality of racism, so the harm caused by sexual orientation hate propaganda
must begin with an analysis of homophobia.” Matsuda refrains from conducting such
an analysis, however, claiming that it “require[s] a separate analysis [from racist
speech] because of the complex and violent nature of gender subordination, and the
different way in which sex operates as a locus of oppression:”‘ This task is partially
performed by William B. Rubenstein, former director of the American Civil Liberties
Union Lesbian and Gay Rights Project. He focusses on the way in which idealizations
of heterosexual love operate to silence–or “closet”–people who violate these roles.”
According to Rubenstein, lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgendered persons, and
‘ J.C. Love, ‘Tort Actions for Hate Speech and the First Amendment: Reconceptualizing the Com-
peting Interests” (1992) 2 L. & Sex. 29 at 33.
‘3W. Rubenstein, “Since When Is the Fourteenth Amendment Our Route to Equality?: Some Re-
flections on the Construction of the Hate Speech Debate from a LesbianlGay Perspective’ (1992) 2 L
& Sex. 19 at 20.
‘4MJ. Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story” (1989) 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2320 at 2331-32. See also R. Delgado, “Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Nar-
ratives in Collision” (1991) 85 Nw. U.L. Rev. 343.
!biN. at 2332.
“Rubenstein, supra note 13.
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transvestites (to whom I refer collectively as “sexual minorities”‘”) disappear from the
media and into their personal lives as if they do not exist. There is “an absolute ban on
speaking about lesbian and gay issues” he writes, “other than writing the word ‘fag-
got’ or ‘dyke’ on the wall of the bathroom'”‘ Thus, while racism and homophobia are
both supremacist ideologies that profoundly undermine the identities of their victims,
the hallmark of homophobia is the invisibility of its victims.”t This invisibility-the
antithesis of freedom of expression-is both encouraged and exacerbated by the very
hate-mongers who invoke freedom of expression values.”‘
In addition to critical theorists, social psychologists offer a valuable perspective
on the structure of homophobia. Countless experts have discussed the way in which
rigid gender roles create a culture of deviance,2′ perpetuate sexism and patriarchy,”
and further an ideology of heterosexism.2 Most experts agree that homophobia is
more than a visceral fear of lesbians and gay men; it is, for lack of a conclusive defi-
nition, an ideology of perceived sexual deviance that operates to silence, subordinate,
and exploit anyone who violates traditional gender roles.
The above phenomena-closetry, deviance, sexism, and supremacy-form the
context of homophobia against which hate propaganda works its harms. These harms
are not just those of individual libel writ large; they are, seen contextually, the imple-
ments of heterosexual domination.’ First among them is a range of physiological and
psychological traumas experienced by members of the targeted group, all of which
exacerbate existing feelings of vulnerability and isolation.’ Second, these effects ex-
71 credit this term to J.D. Wilets, “International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation” (1994)
18 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 at 4.
” Rubenstein, supra note 13 at 22.
‘9 See also Love, supra note 12 at 35; A.A.M. Mattijssen & C.L. Smith, “Dutch Treats: The Lessons
the U.S. Can Learn from How the Netherlands Protects Lesbians and Gays” (1996) 4 Am. U.J. Gen-
der & L. 303 at 314; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 308, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 577, Bastarache J.,
concurring.
:’ Rubenstein defends the intuitive view that this “silencing” is a reason to expand free speech as
much as possible (supra note 13 at 25-26). I prefer the view that this “silencing” confirms that hate
propaganda is inimical to freedom of expression.
2 See J. Harry, “Derivative Deviance: The Cases of Extortion, Fag-Bashing, and Shakedown of Gay
Men” (1982) 19 Criminology 546.
2 See G.M. Herek, “On Heterosexual Masculinity: Some Psychical Consequences of the Social
Construction of Gender and Sexuality” (1986) 29 Am. Behav. Sci. 563.
2 See ibid.; G.M. Herek, “Beyond ‘Homophobia’: A Social Psychological Perspective on Attitudes
toward Lesbians and Gay Men” (1984) 10 J. Homosexuality 1.
24 In contrast, if one looks at the law of libel in its historical context, one sees that it is usually in-
voked by privileged people with a good reputation to protect. See Love, supra note 12 at 32-33.
2 See R. Delgado, “Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling” (1982) 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133; “Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda”, supra note 3
at 227; Matsuda, supra note 14; J. Peters, “When Fear Turns to Hate and Hate to Violence: The Per-
secution of Gays Is Increasing” (1991) 18:1 Hum. Rts. 22 at 25, 30.
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
tend beyond the targeted group, causing particular detriment to freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of association, and democracy.? Third, sexual orientation hate propa-
ganda reinforces (and is reinforced by) the other tools of homophobia, which include
harassment, gay bashing, overt and covert discrimination, extortion, stigmatization,
murder, and genocideY Finally, the absence of protection from hate propaganda-
particularly in jurisdictions such as Canada, where other target groups receive protec-
tion-signals to members of sexual minorities that they are second class citizens not
entitled to equal protection of the law.’ It is the individual and combined effect of
See Note, ‘A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws” (1988) 101 Har. L Rev. 62.
See J. Alter, ‘Trickle-Down Hate: Conservatives Have to Take Care That Their Condemnation of
‘Sin’ Doesn’t Turn Ugly”, online: Newsveekcorn
April 1999); E. Faulkner, “Lesbian Abuse: The Social and Legal Realities” (1991) 16 Queen’s L.J.
261; “Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda”, supra note 3; Harry, supra note 21; G11. Here., “Hate
Crimes against Lesbians and Gay Men: Issues for Research and Policy” (1989) 44 Am. Psychol. 948;
‘Hate Crimes against Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Americans Are a Serious National Problen’, online:
Human Rights Campaign
2000); SJ. Lowe, “Words into Stones: Attempting to Get beyond the Regulating Hate Speech De-
bate” (1992) 2 L. & Sex. 11; National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, supra note 3; Peters, su-
pra note 25; C. Petersen, ‘A Queer Response to Bashing- Legislating against Hate” (1991) 16
Queen’s LJ. 237; Canada, Department of Justice, Disproportionate Harm: Hate Crime in Canada:
An Analysis of Recent Statistics by J.V. Roberts (1995); M. Shaffer, “Criminal Responses to Hate-
Motivated Violence: Is Bill C-41 Tough Enough?” (1995) 41 McGill L.. 199.
‘ See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R 493, 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Vriend]. Com-
menting on the silence respecting sexual orientation in the Individual’s Rights Protection Act, R.S.A.
1980, c. 1-2 [hereinafter IRPA], Cory J. held:
[The] exclusion, deliberately chosen in the face of clear findings that discrimination on
the ground of sexual orientation does exist in society, sends a strong and sinister mes-
sage. The very fact that sexual orientation is excluded from the IRPA, which is the
Government’s primary statement of policy against discrimination, certainly suggests
that discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is not as serious or as deserving
of condemnation as other forms of discrimination. It could well be said that it is tanta-
mount to condoning or even encouraging discrimination against lesbians and gay men.
Thus this exclusion clearly gives rise to an effect which constitutes discrimination.
The exclusion sends a message to all Albertans that it is permissible, and perhaps
even acceptable, to discriminate against individuals on the basis of their sexual orienta-
tion. The effect of that message on gays and lesbians is one whose significance cannot
be underestimated. As a practical matter, it tells them that they have no protection from
discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation. Deprived of any legal redress
they must accept and live in constant fear of discrimination. These are burdens which
are not imposed on heterosexuals (Vriend, ibik at paras. 100, 101).
See also “Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda”, where Major concludes that “(mI]embers of a group
who do not receive legal protection but are the targets of outbursts of hate propaganda often perceive
themselves as doubly persecuted, simply because they live in a society that protects other groups but
not the group to which they identiy”‘ (supra note 3 at 231); House of Commons Debates (4 April
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these interconnected tools of homophobia, and not the mere pluralization of individ-
ual defamation or libel, that ultimately justifies state sanction of anti-gay hate propa-
ganda.
II. Sanctions against Sexual Orientation Hate Propaganda
For generations, Canadian legislation did not effectively address hate propaganda
of any kind, let alone that directed toward sexual minorities.” Prior to 1970, a web of
highly restrictive Criminal Code provisions, including sedition, public mischief,
mailing obscene or scurrilous material, defamatory libel, intimidation, and spreading
false news, failed to capture the pestilent activities of Canada’s worst hate-mongers. ‘
Because of the virtually insurmountable standard of proof in civil proceedings, the
law of tort proved similarly ineffective.” Debates over hate propaganda focussed on
how to adapt these inadequate sanctions to the unique context created by the com-
plexity of homophobia, leaving victims of hate speech searching for an appropriate
pigeonhole in which to insert their grievances. Much like the American practice of
“categorization”, ‘ 2 this approach provided maximum protection to hate-mongers and
denied substantive equality to groups historically treated as unequal?3 In the last gen-
eration, however, Canada has developed a range of criminal and administrative sanc-
tions and possibly civil remedies.
A. Criminal Sanctions
Sections 318 and 319 of the Criminal Code contain Canada’s most powerful
sanctions against hate propaganda. These provisions are also the sole anti-hate propa-
ganda sanction to discriminate overtly on the basis of sexual orientation:
2000) at 5703 (S. Robinson) (commenting that the exclusion of sexual orientation from s. 318(4) of
the Criminal Code “sends a very destructive message”).
See Canada, Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in
Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966) [hereinafter Cohen Report]; W. Kaplan, “Maxwell Cohen
and the Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda” in W. Kaplan & D. McRae, eds., Law,
Policy, and International Justice: Essays in Honour of Maxwell Cohen (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993) 243 at 244.
30 Kaplan, ibid. at 244.
31Ibid.
32 Rather than adopting a contextual approach to hate propaganda–one that examines hate propa-
ganda from the victim’s perspective and balances that against other countervailing interests-U.S.
courts have attempted (unsuccessfully) to fit extremist speech into one of several inadequate catego-
ries. See supra note 6. See also e.g. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich.
1989); American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985); Collin v. Smith,
578 E2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
” See Note, ‘First Amendment-Racist and Sexist Expression on Campus-Court Strikes Down
University Limits on Hate Speech” Case Comment on Doe v. University of Michigan (1989) 103
Harv. L. Rev. 1397.
2000]
J. COHEN- SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
318. (1) Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of an …
offence…
(2) In this section, “genocide” means any of the following acts com-
mitted with intent to destroy in whole or in part any identifiable
group…
(4) In this section, “identifiable group” means any section of the pub-
lic distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin.
319. (1) Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place,
incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incite-
ment is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of [an of-
fence]…
(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in pri-
vate conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifi-
able group is guilty of [an offence] …
The genus of these provisions continues to shape legal and political debates over
their expansion. When Don Boudria, M.P., introduced a bill to add age as an identifi-
able criterion to Canada’s hate propaganda legislation,”3 Jean Charest, M.P., responded
that “it is obvious based on the historical background of the provisions relating to hate
propaganda, that these provisions were originally intended and are still intended to
protect visible minorities, religious groups and ethnic minorities in Canada…. What
the hon. member is proposing today is a definition that goes beyond the genus”‘.
Charest found support for this claim in the Cohen Report,” the landmark report that
has since been called the “proximate cause of the passage of hate propaganda legisla-
tion in Canada.’ – To say that the Cohen Report still resonates would be a gross under-
statement. As William Kaplan observes, ‘Almost all commissions of inquiry make
recommendations. Cohen’s special committee led to the passage of a law; one which
to the present day raises important questions about the limits to freedom in Canadian
society” Whether unregulated types of hate propaganda fall within the Cohen Re-
port’s vision is therefore a crucial question for strategic advocates.
Cohen’s committee focussed on the corrosive effects of hate propaganda and the
didactic function of criminal law. While it acknowledged that the number of people
and organizations purveying hate was small, it concluded that “the damage which hate
propaganda can cause is not necessarily related to its volume … ” On the contrary,
Criminal Code, supra note 8, ss. 318, 319.
Bill C-207, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda-age group), 2d Sess, 34th
ParL, 1989 (lst reading 7 April 1989; 2d reading 28 September 1990).
House of Conmons Debates (28 September 1990) at 13601 (J. Charest).
Supra note 29.
“Kaplan, supra note 29 at 244.
39bid
” Cohen Report, supra note 29 at 27, cited in Kaplan, ibid. at 257.
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the small number of materials circulating in Canada at the time were found to be
“deeply hurtful to the minority groups at which they [were] aimed” and to have both
“a deleterious effect on society” and “a tendency to encourage other discriminatory
social practices'”‘ These findings, coupled with the basic conviction that minority
groups were entitled to the protection of the criminal law, drove the committee’s rec-
ommendations and defined subsequent debate in the House of Commons and the
Senate. After almost five years, Parliament enacted the above provisions,”2 sections
281.1 to 281.3 of the Criminal Code (now sections 318 and 319), which prohibit (1)
the advocacy or promotion of genocide, (2) the incitement of hatred against any iden-
tifiable group, and (3) the wilful promotion of hatred against any identifiable group.
In addition to restricting the definition of an “identifiable group” to “any section of the
public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin,” the statute provides
four statutory defences and requires the consent of the attorney general as a prerequi-
site for any prosecution. These restrictions helped to persuade the Supreme Court that
subsection 319(2) of the Criminal Code infringed the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms as little as possible.”
Legislative efforts to expand the definition of “identifiable group” began just be-
fore the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of part of the hate
propaganda provisions. In fact, the bill on which Charest commented was neither the
first nor the only one introduced by Boudria. Between 1988 and 1994 Boudria intro-
duced a series of bills that sought to add “age” to the list of prohibited grounds,
thereby halting the importation into Canada of trading cards depicting the mutilation
of children. 5 In Boudria’s view, the popular trading cards known as “Garbage Pail
Kids” and a product known as the “serial killer board game” constituted hate propa-
ganda against children.’ Although Boudria drew a comparison between Garbage Pail
Kids and obscene pornography, he did not propose the inclusion of “gender” in the
4, Cohen Report, ibid.
42 R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 11, s. 1.
” Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter Charter].
” R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 117 N.R. 1 [hereinafter Keegstra cited to S.C.R.]. Keegstra
was part of a trilogy of hate propaganda cases, with R. v. Andrews, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870, 77 D.L.R.
(4th) 128, and Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, 117 N.R. 191.
Keegstra was affnmned in R. v. Keegstra, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 458, 197 N.R. 26. See also J.R.T and W.G.P
v. Canada (No. 104/1981), printed in Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN GAOR, 38th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, UN Doc. A/38/40, Annex XXIV (1983) 231,4 H.R.L.J. 193.
45 See Bill C-204, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda-age group), 1st Sess.,
34th Parl., 1988 (1st reading 16 December 1988); Bill C-207, supra note 35; Bill C-223, An Act to
amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda-age group), 3d Sess., 34th Parl., 1991 (1st reading 3
June 1991); Bill C-214, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda-age group), 1st
Sess., 35th Parl., 1994 (1st reading 11 February 1994; 2d reading 15 March 1994).
,6House of Commons Debates (16 December 1988) at 157 (D. Boudria); ibid. (7 April 1989) at
230; ibid (28 September 1990) at 13597; ibid. (15 March 1994) at 2315-16.
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
list of identifiable groundsf The limited scope of his bill drew criticism from Pierrette
Venne, M.R, who proposed that “[finstead of designating a few ‘identifiable’ groups,
the law should prohibit any form of hate propaganda against any group. Public in-
citement to kill women, welfare recipients or homosexuals is no different than inciting
people to kill Jews, Catholics or Muslims.”‘ Boudria’s bills were eventually dropped
from the order paper, largely because the Department of Justice had already begun to
research the issue.’
Between 1990 and 1996 there were six proposals to add sexual orientation to the
list of identifiable groups. Robinson sought twice to add both sexual orientation and
gender to the list,” citing “an increasing amount of material promoting hatred and
violence against lesbians and gay men and against women in Canada.” On the first
reading of Bill C-326, Robinson stated that “[tihe purpose of this bill is to send out a
clear message from Parliament, despite the Neanderthals in some sections of the Con-
servative Party, that this hate literature will not be tolerated in Canada:” This cause
was taken up a year later by Peter Milliken, M.P, who had been receiving complaints
from the Kingston Police Services Board about comments in the press that promoted
hatred against persons with HIV and AIDS.” Milliken sought in 1992 to add age, sex,
sexual orientation, and mental or physical disability to the list of identifiable groups,”
though he removed “age” from his proposal in two subsequent bills.” Only one mem-
ber of Parliament, Margaret Mitchell, has proposed a comprehensive overhaul of sec-
tions 318 and 319, which would include expanding the list of identifiable groups and
the grounds for prosecution and removing the mens rea requirement from subsection
,7iL (28 September 1990) at 13599.
48/bid (15 March 1994) at 2317 (P. Venne).
,bid at 2319-21 (R. MacLellan). See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
” The first of Robinson’s proposals, Bill C-326, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propa-
ganda), 2d Sess., 34th Parl., 1990 (1st reading 27 June 1990), was introduced approximately six
months before the constitutionality of s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, supra note 8, was upheld in
Keegstra. His second proposal, Bill C-247, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda),
3d Sess., 34th Parl., 1991 (1st reading 19 June 1991), vas introduced approximately six months after
the release of Keegstra.
-” House of Commons Debates (27 June 1990) at 13172 (S. Robinson).
-2 bidL
Note that the ground concerning hate propaganda related to HIV/AIDS might also be physical
disability.
5″Bill C-350,An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda), 3d Sess., 34th Pad., 1992 (1st
reading 10 June 1992; 2d reading 26 November 1992).
55 This was to reflect some concerns discussed in private members’ hour. See House of Commons
Debates (3 May 1993) at 18817 (P Milliken); Bill C-429, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate
propaganda), 3d Sess., 34th Pail., 1993 (1st reading 3 May 1993); Bill C-256, An Act to amend the
Criminal Code (hatepropaganda), 2d Sess., 35th Par!., 1996 (1st reading 29 March 1996).
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319(2).’ This proposal died before the 36th Parliament convened, and only Robinson
has proposed similar amendments subsequently.
At least three events stalled the House of Commons debate over these amend-
ments: the release of Keegstra, the government’s establishment of a working group on
hate propaganda, and the election of the 36th Parliament. In Keegstra, the Supreme
Court held seven to zero that subsection 319(2) of the Criminal Code (wilful promo-
tion of hatred) violated the freedom of expression guarantee in the Charter,” but a
narrow majority (four to three) saved the provision as a reasonable limit under section
1.’ By applying a purposive approach to section 1, one that emphasized the values
and international obligations underlying the enactment of subsection 319(2) of the
Criminal Code, the majority refuted the powerful contention that that provision was
vague, overbroad, and rarely applied. 9 Interestingly, this laudable approach to section
1 of the Charter echoed the pre-Charter sentiments of Maxwell Cohen, who re-
sponded to similar objections by stressing the symbolic effects of the legislation. In-
deed, when examining Keegstra and the Cohen Report side by side, one is bound to
conclude that the prevailing approach to hate propaganda in Canada is to emphasize
“values” over “volume”-that is, the importance of prohibiting hate speech per se
rather than the actual volume of hate speech in circulation.
The release of Keegstra prompted the Department of Justice to establish a work-
ing group on hate propaganda and to charge it with investigating the possibility of (1)
expanding the list of identifiable grounds, (2) removing the mens rea requirement
from sections 318 and 319, and (3) removing the consent of the attorney general as a
‘6Bill C-431, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda), 3d Sess., 34th Parl., 1993 (1st
reading 5 May 1993).
“Section 2 of the Charter, supra note 43, reads as follows:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: …
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the
press and other media of communication …
The Court rejected the argument that hate propaganda constitutes violent expression (as discussed in
Irwin Toy v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577) and is thus inimical to the val-
ues of freedom of expression. On the Court’s narrow reading of the violence exception, see R. Moon,
‘The Supreme Court of Canada on the Structure of Freedom of Expression Adjudication” (1995) 45
U.T.LJ. 419 at 424-35; K. Mahoney, “R. v. Keegstra: A Rationale for Regulating Pornography?”
Case Comment (1992) 37 McGill LJ. 242 at 246-50. Moon also argues that the Court’s s. 2(b) Char-
ter analysis is inconsistent with that for s. 1 (ibid. at 466).
Section 1 of the Charter, ibid., provides as follows:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be de-
monstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
9 See L.E. Weinrib, “Hate Promotion in a Free and Democratic Society: R. v. Keegstra” Case
Comment (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 1416 at 1431-32.
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTA7ON HATE PROPAGANDA
prerequisite for prosecution. ‘ As originally constituted, the FPT Working Group
never released any recommendations to the general public, and its existence was put
forth at least once as an excuse not to send amendment proposals to the parliamentary
committee stage.” That said, the challenge faced by Parliament, as well as by Charter
lawyers at the Department of Justice, is intricate. Because the Keegstra Court cited the
narrow list of identifiable grounds, the mens rea requirement, and the consent of the
attorney general as reasons why subsection 319(2) survived the “minimal impair-
ment’ branch of the section 1 analysis, proponents of an expanded provision may
have to establish a specific pressing and substantial objective to withstand future
Charter challenges.’ Yet this completely misses the point of expanding the identifi-
able grounds. If the value of prohibiting hate propaganda really does trump the ques-
tion of the volume of hate propaganda in circulation, the government should analyze
the expansion of identifiable groups as a symbolic anti-discrimination measure, not an
unnecessary act of censorship.
B. Other Provisions
Public debate surrounding the above sanctions should not obscure the panoply of
other remedies available to victims of hate propaganda.’ First, there are a number of
legislative measures that rely on the definition of “identifiable groups” in subsection
318(4) of the Criminal Code, including the following examples:
The working group [hereinafter FPT Working Group] was composed of federal, provincial, and
territorial ministers of justice (interview with vl. Berlin & E. Ueff, Department of Justice Criminal
Law Policy Section (1 March 1999)).
6,House of Commons Debates (15 March 1994) at 2321 (R. MacLellan). The FF1 Working Group
has changed over the years and is no longer active in its original form, having evolved after several
years into a diversity working group. In 1998 this diversity working group released several recom-
mendations that were approved in principle by the federal and provincial ministers responsible for
justice at a meeting in Regina (J. Bronskill, “Criminal Code Updates to Toughen Hate Laws: ‘Unani-
mous Support’ among Justice Ministers for Proposed Changes” The Ottava Citizen (25 November
1998) A3). The “ministers responsible for justice approved for consideration, subject to an in-depth
charter [sic] review, a number of recommendations which would further ensure that hate crimes are
dealt with firmly” (House of Conwns Debates (4 April 2000) at 5703 (J. Manley)).
‘ In the debate over Bill C-350, supra note 54, Scott Thorkelson, M.P., commented that to expand
the list of identifiable grounds, one would have to establish “a pressing and substantial objective in
Canada of a significantly substantial amount of hate propaganda aimed at particular groups [not cur-
rently covered by the definition]” (House of Conmons Debates (26 November 1992) at 14133 (S.
Thorkelson)).
See especially L Coder, “Hate Speech, Equality, and Harm under the Charter Towards a Juris-
in G.-A. Beaudoin & E. Mendes,
prudence of Human Dignity for a ‘Free and Democratic Society’
eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 3d ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996) 20-1 at
20-12 to 20-55. What follows borrows heavily from Professor Cotler’s piece.
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” Sections 184.2, 320, and 319(4) of the Criminal Code authorize the
interception, seizure, and forfeiture of hate materials by agents of the
state. All of these provisions are related to an offence defined in sec-
tions 318, 319(1), or 319(2) of the Criminal Code.
* The Canada Post Corporation Act’ authorizes the minister responsible
for the Canada Post Corporation to remove a person’s mail privileges
where there are reasonable grounds for believing that person is corn-
mitting an offence.” “Offence” of course includes the offences in sec-
tions 318, 319(1), and 319(2) of the Criminal Code.
* The Customs Tariff Act’ prohibits the importation into Canada of,
among other things, material that constitutes hate propaganda within
the meaning of the Criminal Code.”
* The Broadcasting Act,” which is administered by the C.R.T.C., re-
quires licensed broadcasters both to “encourage the development of
Canadian expression by providing … programming that reflects Cana-
dian … values” and to abide by the Criminal Code. Any licensee who
permits his or her broadcasts to be used for the wilful promotion of ha-
tred runs afoul of section 319(2) of the Criminal Code and thus of the
C.R.T.C.’s licensing requirements.
This widespread reliance on the Criminal Code’s definition of “identifiable groups”
furthers the case for expanding that provision.
Second, Canada provides a range of remedies that would be unaffected by the ex-
pansion of subsection 318(4) of the Criminal Code. While some of these provisions
have been either struck down7′ or interpreted narrowly” by the courts, others have
“R.S.C. 1985, c. C-10.
“IbiT, s. 43.
R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 41.
67 Ibid, s. 114, Sch. VII. This provision creates a discretion that is often exercised prejudicially
against sexual minorities. For example, Canadian customs officials routinely confiscate same-sex por-
nography on the grounds that such literature constitutes “hate propaganda”. See infra note 130.
6″ S.C. 1991, c. 11.
Ibid, s. 3(1)(d)(ii), cited in Coder, supra note 63 at 20-39, n. 141.
7′ For example, the Criminal Code, supra note 8, s. 181, provides as follows:
181. Every one who wilfully publishes a statement, tale or news that he knows is false
and that causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest is guilty
of [an offence]…
In R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, 95 D.L.R. (4th) 202, the Supreme Court narrowly struck down
this historical provision, distinguishing Keegstra on the grounds that the impugned provision was
vague and lacked an identifiable purpose.
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
generated a substantial amount of litigation. In particular, the Canadian Human
Rights AcF? provides that repeated telephonic communication of “any matter that is
likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that
that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of dis-
crimination ‘” constitutes a discriminatory practice. In 1996 Parliament fulfilled a
promise made four years earlier to add “sexual orientation” to the list of prohibited
grounds in that act.7′ This amendment extended Canada’s most-litigated hate propa-
ganda provision to sexual minorities, though it remains to be seen whether it further
affects the constitutionality of the statute.” The amendment also brought the CHRA in
line with similar statutes in Quebec, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and
Ontario, all of which acknowledged sexual orientation as a prohibited ground for dis-
crimination.7′ Today human rights legislation in every province recognizes sexual ori-
entation as a prohibited ground for discrimination.7
Third, there are a number of remedies that, with progressive development, might
one day enlarge Canada’s anti-hate regime. For example, the Criminal Code prohibits
defamatory libel against individuals, defining such libel as “matter published, without
lawful justification or excuse, that is likely to injure the reputation of any person by
exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or that is designed to insult the person of
or concerning whom it is published’ ‘” Although these provisions have been inter-
preted not to cover “group libel” such as that directed toward sexual minorities,’ the
distinction between individual and group libel cannot always be sharply drawn. Not
only does group libel implicitly target “each and every individual” in that group-an
admittedly abstract proposition-but much group libel implicitly singles out particular
individuals. A recent example that I discuss below was an online message to a specific
7 For example, the Crinnal Code, ibid, ss. 59, 61, prohibits seditious libel, but this has been inter-
preted narrowly by the Supreme Court. See R. v. Boucher, [1951] S.C.R. 265, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 369,
holding that intent to incite violence, public disorder, or hatred or contempt against the administration
of justice is an element of the offence of seditious libeL For a lengthier discussion, see Coter, su-
pra note 63 at 20-31.
72RS.C. 1985, c. H-6 [hereinafter CHRA].
!lbii, s. 13(1).
7
dbid.,
s. 3(1), as am. by S.C. 1996, c. 14, s. 2.
Not surprisingly, House of Commons debate over adding “sexual orientation” to the CHRA fo-
cussed on whether this amendment would create “special rights” for sexual minorities.
‘6 See “Sexual-Oientation Hate Propaganda!, supra note 3 at 234, n. 50.
“IRPA, supra note 28 (as altered by the reading-in remedy in Vriend, supra note 28 at para. 179);
Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, ss. 7-14; Human Rights Code, RS.M. 1987, c. H175, s.
9(2)(h); Human Rights Act, IRS.N.B. 1973, c. H-11, Preamble, ss. 3-7; Human Rights Code, R.S.N.
1990, c. H-14, ss. 6-9, 12, 14, 18, 19; Hunuu Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214, s. 5(1)(n); Human
Rights Code, RS.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 1; Human Rights Act, R.S.PE.L 1988, c. H-12, s. l(l)(d);
Charter of Human Rights and Freedons, R.S.Q. c. C-12, s. 10; The Saskatchewan Human Rights
Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1, ss. 9-19.
“Supra note 8, ss. 298-301.
See Genest v. R. (1933), 71 Que. S.C. 385, cited in Coder, supra note 63 at 20-30, a. 109.
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gay Web site visitor that read, “I Hate Fags.” Internet communications such as this,
both personalized and public, blur the distinction between individual and group libel,
thus expanding the possibility for criminal sanction.
Finally, there is little promise in pursuing civil remedies for hate propaganda in
Canada. Common law courts have severely restricted any cause of action in group li-
bel, requiring that a specific individual be personally targeted in the libellous state-
ment.’ In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bhadauria v. Seneca
College of Applied Arts & Technology8 foreclosed the possibility of a tort of discrimi-
nation, choosing instead to vest the whole of anti-discrimination law in administrative
tribunals. Similarly, there appears to be no delictual remedy for group libel under the
civil law of Quebec, despite the Quebec Court of Appeal’s decision in Ortenberg v.
Plamondon.’
III. An International Perspective
Although five major international human rights documents contain specific limi-
tations on hate speech, and three others contain general limitations on speech, none
includes sexual orientation among its identifiable grounds.” The general limitation
‘ See S.S. Cohen, “Hate Propaganda-The Amendments to the Criminal Code” (1972) 17 McGill
LJ. 740 at 741-49; N. Lerner, “Group Libel Revisited” (1987) 17 Israel YB. Hum. Rts. 184 at 188.
SI [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193.
62 (1914), 24 B.R. 69 & 385 (C.A.). While in this case the court recognized an individual’s right to
sue a group libeller, the court clarified that the suit disclosed no cause of action in group libel, only
one for personal defamation. Moreover, the subsequent case of Germain v. Ryan (1918), 53 C.S. 543,
held that no action for group libel exists when the size of the group is so large that it cannot be con-
cluded that the individual plaintiff was personally targeted. See Cohen, supra note 80. There arc,
however, several avenues in the civil law of Quebec for pursuing a tort of discrimination. These are
discussed in Cotler, supra note 63 at 20-48.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(11), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13,
UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered
into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [hereinafter 1CCPR]; International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, GA Res. 2106(XX), UN
GAOR, 21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]; Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, Can. TS. 1949 No. 27
(entered into force 12 January 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Eur. T.S. 5
(entered into force 3 September 1953) [hereinafter European Convention]; Banjul Charter on Hutman
and Peoples’ Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1981) [hereinafter African
Charter]; American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Josd, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 [hereinafter American Convention]; Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, 1 August 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 [hereinafter Final
Act]. For a brief critique of the omission of sexual minorities from hate speech conventions, see E.
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
clause in the Universal Declaration provides that “[t]hese rights and freedoms may in
no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,”‘
of which one of the significant goals is to promote and encourage respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms “without distinction as to race, sex, language, or re-
ligion:” The ICCPR modifies this list of identifiable grounds slightly, requiring states
to prohibit “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes in-
citement to discrimination, hostility or violence… “‘
In addition to these comprehensive human rights treaties, a number of specialized
treaties oblige states to prohibit racial and religious hate propaganda. One of the
strongest statements on hate propaganda in international law is in the CERD, which
requires signatories to “adopt immediate and positive measures to eradicate all in-
citement to, or acts of, such discrimination … [by declaring] punishable by law all dis-
semination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial dis-
crimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts … ” Similarly,
the Genocide Convention, which provides that “[d]irect and public incitement to
commit genocide” shall be punishable, defines genocide as “acts committed with in-
tent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious groups
[sic] … “s
Finally, regional conventions in Europe, Africa, and Latin America omit sexual
orientation from their enumerated grounds of discrimination. Like the Universal
Declaration, neither the European Convention nor the African Charter explicitly re-
quires states to proscribe hate propaganda; however, the European Convention affirms
equality and non-discrimination rights on the basis of “sex, race, colour, language, re-
ligion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status:’ These rights have been interpreted by both
the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human
Rights to permit restrictions on speech that promotes racial and ethnic hatredY Re-
gional documents also require states to prohibit hate propaganda. The Helsind Final
Act does so indirectly in its article on respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms, which requires participating states to act in conformity with the Charter of the
Heinze, Sexual Orientation. A Human Right: An Essay on International Humian Rights Lm, (Dor-
drecht Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) at 269-70.
84 Universal Declaration, ibid, art. 29(3).
‘5 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7,59 Stat. 1031, art. 1(3).
ICCPR, supra note 83, art 20. The Human Rights Committee jurisprudence, which has held that
art 20 is compatible with art 19, is discussed in E.E Defeis, “Freedom of Speech and International
Norms: A Response to Hate Speech” (1992) 29 Stan. J. Int’l L 57 at 83.
CERD, supra note 83, art 4.
Genocide Convention, supra note 83, arts. 2, 3.
European Convention, supra note 83, art. 14.
The jurisprudence is discussed in Defeis, supra note 86 at 98-103.
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United Nations and the Universal Declaration.” The American Convention is more
specific, requiring states to prohibit “propaganda for war and any advocacy of na-
tional, racial, or religious hatred … against any person or group of persons on any
grounds including those of race color, religion, language, or national origin… ”
This cursory analysis of international human rights documents reveals that some
group classifications are always protected, some are only sometimes protected, and
still others are never protected. Yet despite this apparent hierarchy of minority claim-
ants in international law, recent jurisprudence has affirmed the universal application
of international human right norms.” In Toonen v. Australia,’ the United Nations
Human Rights Committee went as far as to interpret discrimination based on “sex” as
including sexual orientation, thus finding Tasmania’s anti-sodomy statute in breach of
Australia’s obligations under the ICCPR. Although this was a tentative judgment in
many respects-not least because it failed to recognize sexual orientation as an “other
status”—it cast doubt on any domestic statute that discriminates on the basis of sex-
ual orientation. For this reason, international law might be interpreted to compel the
criminalization of sexual orientation hate propaganda in Canada and other countries.
IV. A Comparative Perspective
A comparison of domestic remedies for hate propaganda reveals the same hierar-
chy of minority-rights claimants that pervades international law. Although “free and
democratic societies in every region of the world have now enacted … [hate propa-
ganda] legislation,” most of this legislation exhibits the same underinclusiveness as
Canada’s.’ The United Kingdom specifically targets racial incitement, having drawn
the line at “racist speech” that is “threatening, abusive or insulting”.” Germany pro-
hibits “inciting the public to race hatred,” and it has also enacted specific proscriptions
9′ FinalAct, supra note 83, art. I(VII).
9 American Convention, supra note 83, art. 13(5) [emphasis added].
9′ See Wilets, supra note 17 at 3, 119-20.
(No. 488/1992), UN Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), printed in Report of the Human Rights
Committee, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, UN Doc. A/49/40, Appendix (1994) 226 [herein-
after Toonen]. The case is discussed in Wilets, ibid. at 51, n. 209.
‘ ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 2(1).
See Cotler, supra note 63 at 20-61.
In addition to the sources cited below, comparative hate propaganda law is discussed in S. Coliver,
ed., Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination (London: Arti-
cle 19, 1992); Coder, ibid; N. Lemer, The Crime of Incitement to Group Hatred: A Survey of Inter-
national and National Legislation (New York: World Jewish Congress, 1965); H. Schwartz, “Defa-
mation and Democracy” (1996) 3 Parker Sch. J. E. Eur. L. 217.
“See E. Barendt, Book Review of Coliver, ibid. [1993] Pub. L. 208 at 210. For critiques of the
British regime from the point of view of other countries, see L. Johannessen, “A Critical View of the
Constitutional Hate Speech Provision” (1997) 13 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 135 at 141; A. Scahill, “Can
Hate Speech Be Free Speech?” (1994) 4 Australasian Gay & Lesb. L.J. I at 8.
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
on Holocaust denial.7 South Africa’s hate propaganda legislation has its roots in the
African National Congress’s Bill of Rights, which was designed to dismantle apart-
heid and reduce systemic racism.” Many other African nations have enacted hate
propaganda legislation, most of which mirrors those nations’ obligations under the
CERD.”‘ As these examples illustrate, many nations have used hate propaganda laws
to address a particular experience with racial or religious persecution. Such laws aim
to conclude a historical narrative that begins with persecution and ends with recon-
ciliation, and enshrines a vision of racial and religious harmony into the criminal law.
Just as sexual minorities are absent from these narratives, so too are they absent from
anti-hate legislation.
Nevertheless, a growing minority of jurisdictions have prohibited sexual orienta-
tion hate propaganda, either in a criminal or civil context. Following a strong con-
demnation of its treatment of sexual minorities, Ireland added sexual orientation to its
Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989, thus making it a “criminal offence to
incite hatred on the basis of sexual orientation.”” Norway and Denmark have also
criminalized some forms of verbal abuse against sexual minorities, the latter having
made it illegal “to utter publicly or deliberately, for the dissemination in a wider cir-
cle, a statement or remark, by which a group of people are threatened, derided or hu-
miliated on account of their … sexual orientation.””
The Netherlands and New South Wales provide particularly helpful examples of
how to use different strategies to combat sexual orientation hate propaganda. In 1993
the government of New South Wales passed the Anti-Discrimination (Homosexual
Wlification) Amendment Act,”‘ which outlaws all homosexual vilification that does not
take place during the course of religions instruction.”‘ This act contains two types of
proceedings: (1) a civil complaint procedure to the Anti-Discrimination Board about a
“public act” that incites hatred toward, serious contempt for or severe ridicule of a
person or group of persons on the ground of their homosexuality; and (2) criminal
proceedings permitted by the attorney general where threats of physical harm towards
persons or property are made or where there is incitement to threats of such physical
harm on the ground of a person’s homosexuality.”‘ A number of social and political
SBA. Appleman, “Hate Speech: A Comparison of the Approaches Taken by the United States and
Germany” (1996) 14 Wis. Int’l LJ. 422 at 432. For a critical perspective, see Johannessen, ibid. at
141.
“‘ Johannessen, ibid. at 137; E. Neisser, ‘ate
Speech in the New South Africa: Constitutional
Considerations for a Land Recovering from Decades of Racial Repression and Violence” (1994) 10 S.
Aft= J. Hum. Rts. 336.
“‘oDefeis, supra note 86 at 118-19.
‘Scahill, supra note 98 at 4, n. 2; Wilets, supra note 17 at 82.
,o Danish Penal Code, art. 266b, cited in Wilets, ibid at 82; Defeis, supra note 86 at 98.
‘(N.S.W.), 1993, No. 97.
‘For a discussion of the federal law in Australia, see Scahill, supra note 98 at 6.
6 bil at 5. For an excellent overview of the substance of the act, see generally ibid.
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factors contributed to the enactment of this legislation, chief among them the release
of the Anti-Discrimination Board’s inquiry into HIV/AIDS-related discrimination.”
This report proposed the introduction of homosexual vilification legislation on the
grounds that “public vilification of gay men encouraged and incited discrimination
and violence against gay men:”‘ Combined with public pressure from the lesbian and
gay community and an increase in gay bashing and murders, this finding galvanized
key members of Parliament into proposing the bill three times in one year. Aside from
a few objections that it would interfere with freedom of speech, the bill passed with
little public debate.
In the area of civil remedies, a recent decision of the highest court in the Nether-
lands signals substantial progress in the redress of sexual orientation hate propaganda.
In Van Zijl v. Goeree,'” the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) issued an injunction
against the further publication of an anti-gay article entitled “Sodom is Everywhere”,
which was published by a militant religious group led by the Reverend Goeree.” The
article contained numerous slurs against lesbians and gay men, including warnings
that lesbians and gay men would be punished with AIDS by God. The following were
among the statements:
Now that homosexuality has been legalized, the new death appears. It is the
result of sin: AIDS!
A consequence of homosexuality is AIDS which, without possibility of ap-
peal, brings about death.
Being a lesbian is rewarded. AIDS passes by the door of lesbian women.
At the moment, anyway. Ten years ago, the homosexuals were rewarded like
this. They didn’t have AIDS. God lets no-one [sic] ridicule him.
Those who practice homosexuality incures [sic] a blood-guilt comparable
to a murderer. He deserves the death penalty.
Homosexuality leads irrevocably to damnation. Legalization of homosexu-
ality is the product of a reprehensible government leading the country into
1
ruin.”‘
These slurs prompted a distressed AIDS nurse to seek both an injunction and dam-
ages for each day the article appeared in print. Although the plaintiff was not named
in the article, he feared that readers of the pamphlet would accuse him of being re-
sponsible for the transmission of the virus. The Hoge Raad balanced these fears
against the pamphleteer’s freedom of religion, ultimately deciding in the plaintiff’s fa-
vour. In its ruling, the court noted that the propaganda diminished the plaintiff’s posi-
“7Ibid. at 2.
‘”3 Ibid.
09 (1990) RvdW Nr.41 (HR Neth) [hereinafter Goeree].
“‘ See generally Mattijssen & Smith, supra note 19.
‘ Quoted in ibid. at 303.
200]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
tion in society and thus violated his right to equal treatment under the Dutch Consti-
tution. This right, which prohibits discrimination “on any grounds whatsoever”,”‘ thus
functioned to limit the right to free speech.
On the one hand, such a ruling would appear to exert little influence on Canadian
courts. One reason is that Dutch courts apply non-discrimination principles to the pri-
vate, as well as the public, sector,”‘ while Canada applies its equality provisions only
to state actors. The Charter restricts its own application to “the Parliament and gov-
ernment of Canada … and … of each province,””‘ effectively leaving Canadians with
non-constitutional remedies for discrimination by private actors. Moreover, Canadian
courts have all but foreclosed civil remedies for group libel and the tort of discrimina-
tion. As discussed above, a cause of action in libel requires that an individual have
been personally targeted, and no cause of action in discrimination exists at all.” Fi-
nally, even if the Charter did apply to private actors in Canada, the tension between
rights and responsibilities-in this case, between the right to free speech and the re-
sponsibility to treat people equally-is entrenched in the Dutch Constitution, while it
is not so entrenched in the Charter. Article 6 of the Dutch Constitution refers to “each
person’s responsibility before the law,’ thus according less status to freedom of ex-
pression than that of a ‘Tundamental freedom”.”‘ In sum, it would appear that Canadian
law is not structured in a way that could accommodate the Hoge Raad’s reasoning.
On the other hand, Goeree contains normative principles that merit the attention
of Canadian courts and legislators. First, the court’s emphasis on hate propaganda as a
violation of equality rights suggests that expanding even Canada’s Criminal Code to
protect sexual minorities may be constitutionally required. Rather than adopting the
view that additional protection constitutes a further offence to freedom of expression
values, Canadian courts might balance such an offence (assuming there is one) against
the equality guarantee in subsection 15(1) of the Charter.”” Second, Van Zijl’s testi-
mony suggests that a cause of action in group libel may not be as far-fetched as is tra-
ditionally believed. As a gay man with a prominent AIDS-related position at a local
hospital, Van Zijl had a reasonable apprehension that readers of the article would ac-
cuse him of transmitting the AIDS virus. Depending on the surrounding circum-
stances, he may have believed that the article implicated him personally. As I shall
2Ibki, at 306.
“1 !bih
114 Supra note 43, s. 32.
” See supra notes 80,81, and accompanying text.
116 Mattijssen & Smith, supra note 19 at 307, n. 13.
“7 The Charter, supra note 43, s. 15(1), sets out equality rights as follows:
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
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discuss below, such circumstances may be said to conform to the common law test for
group libel. Finally, and most important, the court’s recognition of sexual orientation
hate propaganda marks a watershed for hate propaganda jurisprudence and the rights
of sexual minorities generally. By combining a commitment to regulating hate propa-
ganda with a constitutional obligation to protect sexual minorities, the Goeree deci-
sion calls on Canada to do the same.
In contrast to the countries just discussed, the United States has remained a “con-
spicuous exception” to the worldwide trend toward criminalizing hate propaganda.”‘
“It was to be expected,” writes Abraham S. Goldstein, ” … that the United States
would enter a ‘reservation’ to the UN Covenant on Human Rights, signifying that its
approval did not include the Covenant’s prohibition of group libel”‘ 9 Having clung to
strong First Amendment values, the United States now resorts to regulating group ha-
tred only after it has turned to violence. It is not until the commission of an anti-gay
hate crime that federal hate crimes legislation kicks in, providing the relatively small
mercy of an increased sentence or a hate-crimes statistic.'” Meanwhile, scholars con-
tinue to debate whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois2′ is
still good law, and municipalities and college campuses struggle to fine-tune their hate
speech regulations so as to survive First Amendment scrutiny.’
Although the First Amendment exerts a profound influence on the hate propa-
ganda debate, Dickson C.J.C. held in Keegstra that Canada “must not hesitate to de-
part from the path taken in the United States “‘” Civil libertarians are quick to dispar-
age such departures, claiming that they represent a naYvet6 about the courts’ ability to
prevent mass censorship.'”‘ The better view is that the divergence stems from different
,, A.S. Goldstein, “Group Libel and Criminal Law: Walking on the ‘Slippery Slope”‘ (1993) 22 Is-
rael YB. Hum. Rts. 95 at 95.
9/bid at 96.
”
‘o The federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. 534 (1966), calls for states and localities to
voluntarily report all hate crimes to the FBI, which in turn compiles these statistics into an annual re-
port. Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. 994 (1984) provides for tougher sentencing when it is proven beyond
a doubt that a crime committed was a hate crime. The latter provides limited protection to sexual mi-
norities, however, because federal law enforcement agencies do not have jurisdiction over anti-gay
hate crimes. Indeed, 18 U.S.C. 245 (1968), which allows federal investigation and prosecution of
hate crimes, does not cover hate violence based on sexual orientation, gender, or disability. There is
currently a bill pending before Congress, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1082, S. 622,
106th Cong. (1999), which would expand this provision to include serious, violent hate crimes against
members of sexual minorities. See Human Rights Campaign, supra note 27.
343 U.S. 250 (1952), upholding the constitutionality of a group libel ordinance.
‘ See e.g. R.M. Hulshizer, “Securing Freedom from Harassment without Reducing Freedom of
Speech: Doe v. University of Michigan” (1991) 76 Iowa L. Rev. 383; M.-F Major, ‘American Cam-
pus Speech Codes: Models for Canadian Universities?” (1996) 7 E.LJ. 13.
123 Supra note 44 at 743.
” See N. Strossen, “Balancing the Rights to Freedom of Expression and Equality: A Civil Liberties
Approach to Hate Speech on Campus” in Coliver, supra note 97, 295.
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
normative conclusions about the value of freedom of expression as against equal pro-
tection and non-discrimination.” These conclusions reflect a society’s deepest aspira-
tions, including whether it wishes to place the community above the individual and to
recognize any group as a potential beneficiary of legal protection. Having diverged
from the American path, Canada is now obliged to do so equitably.
V. Strategic Dilemmas
[TJhe journey between free speech and racial defamation is redolent of
that between Charybdis and Scylla.’:
Hiding their orientation, gays and lesbians are easy targets of hate speech
because they are often silent and imisible. The price offighting back-of
nmking their own voices heard-is often too dear a price to pay for be-
coning a part of the political process.'”
The perspectives provided above reveal a range of options for reducing sexual
orientation hate propaganda. Before turning to these options, however, it is important
to address two strategic questions. First, is it prudent for sexual minorities to advocate
further incursions into civil liberties? Second, how would identifying sexual orienta-
tion as a prohibited ground for hate propaganda affect other unidentified grounds,
such as gender, age, and disability?
A. Freedom “of” or Freedom “from”?
If hate propaganda laws pit anti-censorship advocates against anti-discrimination
advocates,'” sexual minorities occupy an ambiguous position in this debate. Because
they often find themselves fighting against censorship-and have, at least in the
12 See e.g. Keegstra, supra note 44; Goldstein, supra note 118; Mahoney, supra note 57 at 252. A
third view is that the disagreement stems from differences in political culture and the relative success
of lobby groups For this view, see Mattijssen & Smith, supra note 19 at 310-18. They explain that
“Itihe Goeree decision … cannot be dismissed as a product of either restrictive attitudes toward
speech, or a society which automatically grants protection to lesbians and gays. As with any other le-
gal rights extended to outsiders, the momentum is frequently started by core interest groups” (ibid. at
310).
12 D. Partlett, Trom Red Lion Square to Skokie to the Fatal Shore: Racial Defamation and Free-
dom of Speech” (1989) 22 Vand. I. Transnat’l L. 431 at 436.
‘ Mattijssen & Smith, supra note 19 at 314.
.. It should be noted that hate propaganda laws need not be rooted in ideas of equality and non-
discrimination. Some authors emphasize the value of “personhood” instead. See e.g. Love, supra note
12at34.
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United States, made more gains in this area than in the area of equal protection” –
sexual minorities have traditionally promoted strong freedom of expression values.
These values have protected their right to form campus organizations, organize gay
pride marches, distribute gay-positive literature, and sponsor highways. Most recently
in Canada, freedom of expression has been invoked as a shield against overbroad ob-
scenity laws.'” As civil libertarians are quick to observe, such efforts are not intended
to place freedom of expression above equality; on the contrary, the former is seen as a
vehicle by which sexual minorities are “equalized” with the rest of society.”‘ Con-
versely, any restrictions on freedom of expression are seen as a potential threat to the
liberation of sexual minorities. As Rubenstein has eloquently observed:
Coming from the perspective of doing lesbian and gay rights work, I am wary
of attempts to restrict speech. I say this not because I am wrapped up in a nar-
rative of the grandeur of free speech, but rather because, for lesbians and gay
men, much of our oppression has been a “silencing” of us and much of our lib-
eration has come through the mechanism of the First Amendment. We are, af-
ter all, engaging in “the love that dare not speak its name:””
Yet if it is hate propaganda that contributes to this silencing, sexual minorities are
caught in a quandary. While restrictions on hate propaganda might be manipulated in
discriminatory ways, such restrictions might also embolden sexual minorities to ex-
press their sexuality publicly.
In a way unparalleled in the United States, recent advances in Canadian Charter
jurisprudence, beginning with the inclusion of sexual orientation as an analogous pro-
hibited ground of discrimination under subsection 15(1),” have prompted sexual mi-
norities to pursue a vigorous equality agenda.” This agenda gained momentum with
“‘ Rubenstein, supra note 13 at 21-26 (concluding at 19 that “the Fourteenth Amendment has pro-
vided very little-if any—equality for lesbians and gay men, while, by contrast, the First Amendment
has been the only consistent friend of lesbian and gay rights litigators since Stonewall”).
3o As when, for example, customs officials seize non-violent gay pornography on the grounds that it
constitutes “obscenity”. See Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice)
(1996), 131 D.L.R. (4th) 486, 18 B.C.L.R. (3d) 241 (S.C.), aff’d (1998), 54 B.C.L.R. (3d) 306, [1999]
12 W.W.R. 445 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted (1999), 59 C.R.R. (2d) 188 (note), 239 N.R.
193 (note).
“‘ Rubenstein writes that “[w]hen the First Amendment vindicates our rights of association, we arc
made whole, we have been equalized” while “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment, which is supposed to
guarantee our right to equal protection of the laws, has never done so” (supra note 13 at 24, 25).
13 Ibid. at 21-22.
133Egan v. Canada, [199512 S.C.R. 513, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609 [hereinafter Egan].
” See, most recently, Foundation for Equal Families v. Canada (1999), 36 C.P.C. (4th) 201 (Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.), leave to appeal to Div. Ct. granted, [1999] OJ. No. 3119 (Sup. Ct. J.), online: QL
(OJRE), an omnibus suit against the attorney general of Canada challenging all statutes that discrimi-
nate against same-sex relationships. The appeal was stayed, [2000] OJ. No. 1995 (Sup. Ct. J.), online:
QL (OJRE), on the ground of mootness in light of then-Bill C-23, now the Modernization of Benefits
and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12 (assented to 29 June 2000).
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
the Supreme Court’s decision in Vriend,’7 which, by reading sexual orientation into a
provincial human rights statute, provides considerable authority for similarly extend-
ing Canada’s Criminal Code hate propaganda provisions. In the context of same-sex
relationships, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in AM. v. H.” provides similar
authority. In holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from Ontario’s spousal
support regime constituted unjustifiable discrimination under subsection 15(1) of the
Charter, the Court reiterated its finding in Egan and Vriend that discrimination in-
cludes exclusion from “a process that could confer an economic or other benefit.”
Outside Canada, a similar body of comparative and international law-not least the
Human Rights Committee’s recent decision in Toonen-has extended the norm of
anti-discrimination to sexual minorities. These developments, combined with Can-
ada’s well-established commitment to criminalizing hate and its emerging commit-
ment to substantive equality,’ :’ suggest that sexual orientation hate propaganda is best
analyzed in terms of equality, not censorship.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the debate over sexual orientation hate
propaganda divides the lesbian and gay community. In 1992 Rubenstein remarked
that
the hate speech debate, on a personal level, makes me very anxious because it
seems to pit friends against each other. It pits friends against each other in the
sense that while we are all engaged in the same process of overcoming oppres-
sion on a larger level, we are engaged in an argument about what the means to
fighting that oppression should be.’ ”
A recent episode of this “argument” arose in response to the proposed television show
of Dr. Laura Schlessinger, whose conservative views on homosexuality were recently
exposed by the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation. In the midst of this
controversy, the National Post reported that the proposed ‘Dr. Laura Show” has cre-
3 Supra note 28.
‘6Supra note 19.
‘” Ibid. at par. 66 [emphasis added]. The impugned provision was the Family Lav Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. F3, s. 29 [hereinafter FLA], which excluded same-sex couples from the definition of
“spouse”. A definition of “same-sex partner” has been subsequently added to s. 29 by the Amend-
ments Because of the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. u: H. Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 6, s.
25(2).
,’ See especially Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497,
170 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafe Law]. Lmv has already been widely cited; see eg. Delisle v. Canada
(Deputy A.G.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 513; British Columbia (Public Service Ema-
ployee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union
(B.C.G.S.E.U.), [1999] 3 S.C.R 3, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 1; M. v. H., ibid.; Corbi~re v. Canada (Minister
of Indian and Northern Affairs, [1999] 2 S.C.R 203, 173 D.L.R. (4th) 1; lInko v. British Cohmbia
(Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C-R. 625, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 193. Lmv will be discussed in
Part VIA, below.
‘3 Rubenstein, supra note 13 at 26.
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ated “a rift in the gay and lesbian community that has pitted activist against activist,
and Melissa Etheridge against Ellen DeGeneres.”” According to the National Post,
DeGeneres “has called Schlessinger’s rhetoric ‘very dangerous’,” while Etheridge “is
on the record as saying that Schlessinger ‘has her own opinion. If people want to lis-
ten to it, it’s fine … I don’t believe in shutting anybody up.””
It may be argued, however, that sexual minorities need not choose between “free-
dom of expression” and “equality” agendas. The careful crafting of subsection 319(2)
of the Criminal Code isolates a narrow genre of speech that, in the case of sexual mi-
norities, functions to silence many forms of expression and even cause physical
harm.’ 2 Extending this protection to sexual minorities may interfere with the civil lib-
erties of hate-mongers, but it would ultimately be healthy for democracy. Such pro-
tection may, for example, encourage more sexual minorities to perform the all-
important speech act of coming out. Furthermore, while the Fourteenth Amendment
has betrayed sexual minorities in the United States, the same cannot be said of the
impact of subsection 15(1) of the Canadian Charter. Not only has this provision ex-
tended legal equality to sexual minorities, but it has, as suggested above, indirectly
promoted freedom of expression. As Rubenstein acknowledges, “[L]esbian/gay equal
protection cases are almost always about speech because they rarely arise in the ab-
sence of the speech-act of ‘coming out’ … [A] lesbian or gay man must ‘come out’ to
be recognized as being gay … “” In addition to these speech acts, media coverage of
subsection 15(1) cases amplifies the voices of sexual minorities in the marketplace of
ideas. Such publicity illustrates that, in the final analysis, equality and freedom of ex-
pression need not be at loggerheads.
B. A Hierarchy of Claims?
A second strategic dilemma posed by the expansion of Canada’s anti-hate regime
is how to reconcile the claims of competing groups. The Criminal Code currently
identifies colour, race, religion, and ethnic origin as prohibited grounds for hate
propaganda, reflecting a strong focus on the category of “racist speech”. This focus,
as we have seen above, is also reflected in international treaties and European, Aus-
tralian, and African statutes. Canadian legislators have begun to realize, however, that
hate propaganda also affects members of sexual minorities, women, children, and per-
sons with disabilities. In some cases, the same propaganda targets more than one of
” J. Weiner, “Gays and Lesbians Divided over Silencing Dr. Laura: Movement to Kill TV Show”
National Post (8 March 2000) B2.
141 Ibid. Interestingly, The New York Times, which ran a full-page ad exposing Dr. Laura’s views,
chose not to expose a rift in the lesbian and gay community in their coverage of the controversy.
“‘ In Keegstra, for example, Dickson CJ.C. held that “the sense in which ‘hatred’ is used in s.
319(2) does not denote a wide range of diverse emotions, but is circumscribed so as to cover only the
most intense form of dislike” (supra note 44 at 778).
” Supra note 13 at 20, 25.
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
these excluded groups, as in the cases of anti-AIDS propaganda (targeting both gay
men and persons with HIV) and anti-lesbian propaganda (targeting both lesbians and
women more generally). While it would be dangerously reductive to collapse these
categories,” it would be imprecise to isolate “sexual orientation” as the only unpro-
tected ground. For this reason, one might adopt the wording of Bills C-429, C-256,
and C-431, all of which define “identifiable group!’ as “any section of the public dis-
tinguished by colour, race, religion, ethnic origin, sex, sexual orientation, or mental or
physical disability.”‘”
This approach presents its own strategic quandaries. For example, including “sex”
in the list of identifiable groups may incriminate many forms of non-violent pornog-
raphy that are not currently caught by the Criminal Code. To the extent that such por-
nography “wilftlly promotes hatred” against women, some advocates might view this
as a welcome supplement to the obscenity provisions in the Criminal Code.” Others
might view it as a dangerous incursion into civil liberties, one that could once again
impugn the constitutionality of those provisions. As many feminists argued in R. v.
Butler,” it is the violent nature of pornography-as opposed to the non-violent nature
of hate propaganda–that immunizes the obscenity provisions in the Criminal Code
from subsection 2(b) of the Charter.
While hate propaganda and pornography are similar in some respects, they
have qualitative differences. They are similar in their express or implied intent,
which is to distort the image of a group or class of people, to deny their hu-
manity, to make them such objects of ridicule and humiliation that acts of ag-
gression against them are viewed less seriously. The major difference between
them is the method used to achieve the desired effects. In some pornography,
the sexual use and abuse of women are direct, visual portrayals. Unlike most
hate propaganda, pornography often involves real violence where women are
coerced and sexually assaulted so that pornography can be made of them.’3
As Kathleen Mahoney points out, the Supreme Court’s subsection 2(b) analysis in
Keegstra demands this distinction. In including hate propaganda within the ambit of
subsection 2(b), the Court characterized hate propaganda as a “non-violent” form of
expression, one “attempting to convey meaning” through methods other than
“through physical harm. ‘ 9 By distinguishing hate propaganda from pornography on
precisely this point, Mahoney implies that criminalizing non-violent forms of pomog-
See eg. Wilets, supra note 17 at 4.
45 See supra notes 55, 56. Major makes this suggestion in “Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda”,
1
supra note 3 at 226.
” Supra note 8, s. 163. See e.g. J. Gentles, “A Legal Remedy for Sexual Injustice” (1995) 5 Aus-
tralasian Gay & Lesb. LJ. 65 (relying on the work of Catharine MacKinnon).
,47[1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 89 D.L.R (4th) 449, rev’g (1990), 73 Man. R. (2d) 197, [1991] 1 W.W.IL
97 (CA) [hereinafter Butler].
Mahoney, supra note 57 at 258 ×..
,49Keegstra, supra note 44 at 731, 732.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
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raphy would be unconstitutional. This was a powerful concession in Butler, but it may
frustrate any effort to add “sex” to subsection 318(4) of the Criminal Code.
A related danger is that legislating new identifiable grounds in subsection 318(4)
of the Criminal Code may expand the legislation beyond any “reasonable limit” on
freedom of expression, making it unconstitutional. In Keegstra it was the precisely the
limited number of “identifiable grounds” in this subsection that assuaged the Supreme
Court’s fears of overbreadth; in finding that subsection 319(2) targeted only “low
value expression”, Dickson C.J.C. noted that “[t]he act to be targeted is … the inten-
tional fostering of hatred against particular members of our society, as opposed to any
individual”‘” Yet as Egan, Vriend, and M. v. H. have recognized, a member of a sex-
ual minority who experiences discrimination is not “any individual”. As Human
Rights Watch and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission elo-
quently write, sexual orientation
defines a profound and rooted aspect of each individual’s personality and hu-
manity. … For heterosexuals as well as for lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and
transgendered persons, identifying and voicing one’s sexual orientation can be
as important to the constitution and growth of a self as can one’s race, ethnicity,
gender, or religious conviction. Like those categories, it can be a significant
side of the identity one shows the world.”‘
In a slightly different vein, Marie-France Major has argued that the wording of sub-
section 318(4) ought to be “consonant with the principle that such [targeted] groups
are of a primordial nature, as opposed to a voluntary nature:’ and to abide “by the
distinction between ‘instrumental’ and ‘constitutive’ affiliations.”” ‘ In light of the Su-
preme Court’s acknowledgement that sexual orientation may or may not be primor-
dial, the latter distinction shows more promise in terms of maintaining the constitu-
tionality of the provision. As Major explains, constitutive associations “play an essen-
tial role in defining the identity of members … [Miembership in these groups is at the
very basis of personal identity … “”‘ Bearing this principle in mind, the final section of
this paper will build on Major’s proposals for protecting sexual minorities from hate
propaganda.
” Ibid. at 772, 777.
“‘ Human Rights Watch & International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Public
Scandals: Sexual Orientation and Criminal Law in Romania (New York: Human Rights Watch and
IGLHRC, 1998) at 2.
“Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda”, supra note 3 at 229-30.
“3Ibid. at 230 ×..
2000]
J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
VI. Options for Reform
A. Challenging the Criminal Code
Keeping these strategic points in mind, one solution is to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the definition of “identifiable grounds” in subsection 318(4) of the Crimi-
nal Code. Although Major recently advised against such a challenge,”‘ her reason for
doing so-that the Supreme Court would be unlikely to apply the reading-in remedy
in this instance-may not apply after Vriend. Moreover, the Court’s landmark deci-
sion in Law signals progress toward substantive equality and away from the notorious
relevancy test. Combined with the Court’s recognition of sexual orientation as an
analogous ground of discrimination, these developments draw the gap in subsection
318(4) into further suspicion.
By recently substituting a “purposive” and “contextual” approach to section 15
for a rigid and formulaic one,”‘ the Supreme Court has significantly elevated the per-
spective of the subsection 15(1) claimant. According to Law, the crux of a subsection
15(1) violation now appears to be a conflict between the purpose of subsection 15(1)
and the effect of an impugned law, the purpose being as follows:
mo prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the
imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to
promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human
beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally de-
serving of concern, respect and consideration.’5T
This purpose contains both a negative component (“to prevent”) and a positive com-
ponent (“to promote”), thus expanding state responsibility under the Charter. To de-
termine whether the effects of the impugned law conflict with this purpose, courts are
required to undertake three “broad inquiries”. These inquiries, which harmonize the
three-part test in Andreivs v. Lmv Society of British Cohmbia” with subsequent juris-
prudence, are as follows:
Frst, does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claim-
ant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to
take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position within Cana-
dian society resulting in substantively differential treatment betveen the claim-
ant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics? … Second,
was the claimant subject to differential treatment on the basis of one or more of
the enumerated and analogous grounds? And third, does the differential treat-
ment discriminate in a substantive sense, bringing into play the purpose of s.
!’Ibid at 237-38.
“‘See Law, supra note 138 at paras. 40-55,59-75.
“Ibid at para. 51.
[1989] 1 S.C.R 143,56 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
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15(1) of the Charter in remedying such ills as prejudice, stereotyping, and his-
torical disadvantage?”‘3
The first of these inquiries relates to differential treatment, and the second and third
“are concerned with whether the differential treatment constitutes discrimination in
the substantive sense… ” Throughout, the “conflict” between purpose and effects is
to be assessed from the claimant’s perspective, taking into account a number of con-
textual factors.”w This crucial aspect of the Law methodology is particularly sympa-
thetic to victims of hate propaganda, whose perspective is frequently drowned out by
freedom of expression discourse. Moreover, the Law methodology recently led to a
finding of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in M. v. H.”
Given the empirical, psychological, comparative, and international perspectives
discussed above, the list of identifiable grounds in the Criminal Code clearly violates
subsection 15(1) of the Charter. Seen from the perspective of the victim-who is in
this case protected by an analogous prohibited ground of discrimination-the effect of
subsection 318(4) of the Criminal Code conflicts with both the “negative” and “posi-
tive” objectives outlined in Law. First and foremost, the provision denies members of
sexual minorities recourse to their country’s most potent and symbolic sanction
against hate propaganda. While they do receive protection on the basis of their race,
ethnic origin, nationality, religion, and language, members of sexual minorities are
denied protection on the basis of their sexual orientation. This leaves them with only
the most formal equality to the heterosexual population, an equality that was deemed
“impoverished” by a unanimous Supreme Court in Vriend.2 Referring to the exclu-
sion of “sexual orientation” as a ground of discrimination in the IRPA, Cory J. held:
It is true that gay and lesbian individuals are not entirely excluded from the
protection of the IRPA. They can claim protection on some grounds. Yet that
certainly does not mean that there is no discrimination present. For example,
the fact that a lesbian and a heterosexual woman are both entitled to bring a
complaint of discrimination on the basis of gender does not mean that they
have equal protection under the Act. Lesbian and gay individuals are still de-
nied protection under the ground that may be the most significant for them,
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”‘
“CLaw, supra note 138 at para. 39.
19 Ibid
160 These include pre-existing disadvantage, the relationship between the “ground” at issue and the
claimant’s characteristics or circumstances, the ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law
on another group, and the nature of the interest affected (ibid. at paras. 63-75).
.6 Supra note 19 at paras. 46-48.
Supra note 28 at para. 76.
‘Ibid.
at para. 77.
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J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATION HATE PROPAGANDA
Such discrimination conflicts with the “negative” purpose of subsection 15(1), which
is “to prevent the violation of human dignity and freedom through the imposition of
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice … ,,96,
Conversely, the gap in subsection 318(4) of the Criminal Code contravenes the
“positive objective” of subsection 15(1) of the Charter, which is “to promote a society
in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of
Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and con-
sideration.’ By undertaking to criminalize hate propaganda and then excluding a
targeted group, the legislature shirks an obvious opportunity to promote such a soci-
ety. As Major notes, ‘Vhen a group is covered as a protected class, the law sends a
statement about inclusion of such group within society. Quite apart from any protec-
tion that the law can give, simple inclusion within the ambit of the law sends a mes-
sage of full membership within the community”” Given that one of the purposes of
subsection 15(1) is now to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recog-
nition at law, such a message may, in fact, be constitutionally required.
The counter-argument, of course, is that hate propaganda is an issue of censor-
ship, not discrimination. Indeed, because the Court in Keegstra held that subsection
319(2) of the Criminal Code violated subsection 2(b) of the Charter, any expansion
of the provision is likely to be perceived as an increase in state-sanctioned censor-
ship.” Yet this view, which relies on the Court’s finding that “the communications re-
stricted by s. 319(2) cannot be considered as violence,’ misrepresents the lived ex-
periences of members of sexual minorities. Not only does the victim’s perspective
demand that even non-violent speech be excluded from the ambit of subsection
2(b)’
-an argument that was lost on the Court in Keegstra-but hate propaganda
may in fact be “analogous to violence.” While Dickson CJ.C. does not provide any
guidance as to what such an “analogy” would look like, it is the case that hate propa-
“‘ Law, supra note 138 at para. 51.
165 Thid
‘””Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda”, supra note 3 at 226 ×..
“‘Because the Charter, supra note 43, does not apply to courts by virtue of its s. 32, a court’s
reading “sexual orientation” into s. 318(4) of the Criminal Code could not properly be analyzed as a
violation of the Charter’s s. 2(b). Thus it is unclear precisely hov the Crown might invoke freedom of
expression arguments as a shield against the reading-in remedy. That said, the Crovn might argue that
the court ought to apply s. 15(1) jurisprudence in harmony with s. 2(b) “‘alues”, an argument con-
templated by cases such as IRW.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R 573,33 D.R. (4th) 174
[hereinafter Dolphin Delivery]; Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 126
D.LR. (4th) 129.
‘”Keegstra, supra note 44 at 732.
‘”See Mahoney, supra note 57 at 247.
170 Keegstra, supra note 44 at 731.
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ganda can traumatize and otherwise psychologically injure its victims.”‘ Moreover,
hate propaganda constitutes an act of discrimination. As Mahoney argues, “ITihe
regulation of hate propaganda should not be invalidated by the doctrine of free speech
any more than legal regulation of racial segregation is invalidated by the same doc-
trine.'”‘ This ought to persuade any court-or for that matter the Parliament of Can-
ada-that it can expand the Criminal Code hate propaganda provisions in conformity
with the values of subsection 2(b).
In defending its choice of “identifiable groups” under section 1 of the Charter,
the government may invoke the genus of Canada’s hate propaganda legislation. Be-
cause this legislation was enacted only after years of research and debate, powerful
arguments may be advanced in support of the continued omission of sexual orienta-
tion. First, one could argue that the legislation was intended to model emergent pro-
vincial fair-housing and fair-employment acts, none of which included sexual orienta-
tion. Similarly, one could argue that the legislation was inspired by the recently-
adopted CERD,’73 even though that convention did not include “language” or “relig-
ion’. Finally, one could argue that the empirical evidence fuelling the enactment of
Canada’s hate speech laws revealed widespread hate propaganda only on the basis of
colour, race, religion, and ethnic origin. Such arguments were used to stonewall Bou-
dria’s bills to add “age” to the list of identifiable grounds, and it is likely that they
would be repeated in a constitutional challenge.
However, it is the exclusion of sexual orientation, not the inclusion of the existing
grounds, that must be the focus of a section 1 analysis. Moreover, following the
Court’s analysis in Vriend, this exclusion must be justified, not merely explained.
Thus, one could say of the above arguments what lacobucci J. said of the Alberta
government’s submissions in Vriend:”‘
” Recall that in Keegstra, the Court departed from its position in Dolphin Delivery, supra note 167,
that threats of violence were not protected speech (Keegstra, ibid. at 731-32). See Mahoney, supra
note 57 at 246.
7 ibid. at 248 ×..
‘
” Supra note 83.
“” These arguments included the following:
The IRPA is inadequate to address some of the concerns expressed by the homosexual
community (e.g. parental acceptance);
attitudes cannot be changed by order of the Human Rights Commission;
despite the Minister asking for examples which would be ameliorated by the inclusion
of sexual orientation in the IRPA (e.g. employment), only a few illustrations were pro-
vided;
codification of marginal grounds which affect few persons raises objections from larger
numbers of others, adding to the number of exemptions that would have been needed
to satisfy both groups (supra note 28 at para. 113 [references omitted]).
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J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTATiON HATE PROPAGANDA
[A]lIthough … [they] go some distance toward explaining the Legislature’s
choice to exclude sexual orientation … this is not the type of evidence required
under the first step of the Oakes test. At the first stage of that test, the govern-
ment is asked to demonstrate that the “objective’ of the omission is pressing
and substantial. An “objective”, being a goal or a purpose to be achieved, is a
very different concept from an “explanation” which makes plain that which is
not immediately obvious. In my opinion, the above statements fall into the lat-
ter category and hence are of little help.”‘
By analogy, the continued omission of sexual orientation from the provision is diffi-
cult to justify on any principled grounds. Anti-gay prejudice has reached epidemic
proportions in Canada, and such prejudice “manifests the same social and psycho-
logical dynamics as racial and other ethnic prejudices.”‘” This analogy is supported by
substantial social science evidence, and it has been judicially recognized in many ju-
risdictions.”‘ In the final analysis, the success of a constitutional challenge will de-
pend on channelling this evidence into an attack on the object and purpose behind
limiting the identifiable groups in subsection 318(4).
If the public reaction to Vriend is any indication, a remedy such as reading “sex-
ual orientation” into subsection 318(4) is likely to generate considerable debate over
judicial activism.” On the one hand, such a remedy might be viewed as a premature
intrusion into parliamentary sovereignty; after all, the drafters of Canada’s anti-hate
law already earned the deference of the Supreme Court in Keegstra, and the current
Liberal government has appointed at least one working group to investigate several
amendments. On the one hand, for a court to intervene at this juncture may be viewed
as an inappropriate intrusion into parliamentary sovereignty. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has already begun to develop a set of criteria by which to gauge the
appropriate level of deference to give the legislature in a particular context. In his
concurring judgment in M. v. H., Bastarache J. applied a set of criteria that he began
developing in Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (AG.),'” thereby laying the foun-
dation for a strict application of the test in R v. Oakes.” The six criteria Bastarache J.
at para. 114.
17 ib
‘ “Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda”, supra note 3 at 227 ×..
“‘iba
” See e-g. A. Mitchell, ‘Thone-in Talk Show Reflects Full Spectnnm Strong Emotions Colour
Most Responses” The Globe and Mail (3 April 1998) A4; ‘Toes of Gay Ruling Bombard Klein” The
Globe and Mail (8 April 1998) A4; B. Laghi, “Alberta’s Gay-Rights Fight Turns Ugly: Tory Caucus
under Pressure to Override Supreme Court of Canada Ruling” The Globe and Mall (9 April 1998)
Al; B. Laghi, “Rage Finds Its Voice in Alberta Gay Rights: The Depth of Anger over Last Week’s
Supreme Court Ruling Surprised Even Premier Ralph Klein” The Globe and Mail (11 April 1998)
Al.
‘7[1998] 1 S.C.R 877,159 D.LR. (4th) 385.
‘w [1986] 1 S.C.L 103,26 D.L.R (4th) 200.
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found relevant in M. v. H. may apply equally to the exclusion of sexual minorities
from Canada’s anti-hate legislation.”‘
B. Revisiting Group Defamation
A less promising legal solution is to develop the criminal law of group defama-
tion. Because most legal systems provide civil and criminal remedies for victims of
individual libel, it has been argued that it is inconsistent to deny to an entire group a
protection that we afford to individuals.”‘ As the Special Conference on Anti-
Semitism and the Nazi-Fascist Revival concluded in 1962, “[Ihe present position
whereby individuals, and even several individuals, but not a group, may be libelled or
slandered, [is] illogical, and [falls] short of democratic society’s duty to protect its mi-
nority groups.”‘”‘
Although both common law and civil law courts have rejected this type of argu-
ment,'” one wonders why there has been so little movement to revive it.'” Interna-
tional law is increasingly more attuned to the role of groups in the social process, and
courts have long recognized group libel that is directed at a particular individual.
Thus, although Canada’s group defamation provisions are highly restrictive, an in-
creasing number of fact scenarios might fall within its purview. In particular, mes-
sages of hate posted on online bulletin boards often mention, respond to, or implicate
particular individuals, even if such messages are directed at entire groups. Consider
the following examples of hate propaganda culled from the Matthew Shepard Online
Bulletin Board:
[In response to a request to dismantle the Matthew Shepard Online Bulletin
Board, December 14, 1998] Whats wrong … hate the fact that some people
dont liek [sic] gays or their lifestyles? Can’t deal with it so you have to go cry-
Unfortunately, the scope of this paper precludes a discussion of this emerging development in
Canadian constitutional law. However, it bears mentioning that the six factors identified by Bastarache
J. were (1) the nature of the interest affected by the exclusion; (2) the vulnerability of the group af-
fected; (3) the possibility of isolating the challenged provision from the complex legislative scheme;
(4) the presence or absence of evidence of the government establishing priorities or arbitrating social
needs; (5) whether any consideration was given to the Charter right to equal concern and respect; and
(6) whether the government’s interest in setting social policy could be met without imposing undue
hardship on the excluded group (M. v. H., supra note 19 at paras. 304-21). Further, in applying these
criteria Bastarache J. observed a number of things about the FLA, supra note 137, s. 29, that may also
be observed of s. 318(4) of the Criminal Code, most notably that it “perpetuates a legal invisibility
which is inconsistent with the moral obligation of inclusion that informs the spirit of our Charter” and
that there is “clear evidence of adverse impact on a vulnerable group” (M. v. H., ibid. at paras. 308,
309).
,’ See generally “Group Libel Revisited”, supra note 80.
… Cited in ibid. at 191-92.
‘8 See Cohen, supra note 80 at 741-46.
‘Ibid. at 749.
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J. COHEN – SEXUAL ORIENTA7ON HATE PROPAGANDA
ing to their sysadmins? This is why special interest groups lick [sic] yours are
hated in this country, because you cry and bitch and stomp your feet when you
realize that you are in a lost and dying cause.”5
In Reply to: I Will Remember You: For Matthew posted by Andrew on Da-
cember 15, 1998 at 11:09:53:
1I HATE FAGS!!I
H!!!”!!!?
These examples illustrate the impact of sexual orientation hate propaganda on par-
ticular individuals. A reasonable person might believe that the above remarks were di-
rected at either “sysadmin”, ‘Andrew”, or another author, even though they expressed
hatred toward an entire group. The same would be true if a hate-monger responded to
a regular columnist in a gay newspaper with a vitriolic attack on all members of sex-
ual minorities. From an advocacy perspective, collecting nanatives such as these
might create some progress toward a viable criminal sanction against group defama-
tion. In this regard, the Goeree decision in the Netherlands underscores the impact of
group libel on particular individuals.
Conclusion: Towards a Model of Holistic Advocacy
In isolating options for reform, the strategic advocate must consider at least three
forms of advocacy: legal, political, and cultural.’ A Charter challenge aimed at
reading sexual orientation into section 318 of the Criminal Code is merely a “legal”
strategy-as opposed to a political or cultural one-and it is only one of many legal
strategies, in addition to litigating other Charter provisions or pursuing civil or ad-
ministrative remedies. The struggle against sexual orientation hate propaganda must
also be waged outside the courtroom, as illustrated by recent efforts at law reform,
Web sites such as www.stopdrlaura.com,
and the pioneering efforts of the Gay &
Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation.'”‘ While this article has focussed on the ad-
vantages of a constitutional challenge, these advantages must be weighed carefully
against the costs of litigation and the relative advantages of other options.
In 1996 Major concluded that “it appears to be prudent and more farsighted to
continue to seek protection for gays and lesbians through legislative action:’ Due to
‘mR Kof, online: Matthew Shepard Online Resources
‘” Mick Foley Is God, online: ibid (posted 15 December 1998; date accessed: 8 April 1999).
‘t See CJ. Davidson & M.G. Valentini, “Cultural Advocacy: A Non-Legal Approach to Fighting
Defamation of Lesbians and Gays” (1992) 2 L. & Se:,. 103.
” Online: Stop Dr. Laura: A Coalition against Hate
30 June 2000).
’90 See online: Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation
“‘”Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda, supra note 3 at 237-38.
104
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recent developments in the legal landscape-the use of the reading-in remedy in
Vriend, the purposive and contextual approach to equality in Law, the contextual ap-
proach to deference in M. v. H., and the slow progress of the Liberal government’s
hate propaganda working group, among others-litigation may now be a more effec-
tive tool. This is not to suggest that political and legal advocacy exclude one another,
nor that they are the only options. It is to suggest, at the very least, that extending
Canada’s hate propaganda regime to protect members of sexual minorities may be a
promising way to usher in the Law era.
