Open Terms Relating to Time in Contracts
for the Sale of Goods
Michael Howard*
The purpose of this article is to examine the various ways in
which the courts, by the use of the standard of reasonableness, can
assist parties who have shown an intention to contract but who
have left open terms relating to time. As Corbin has stated:
… a contract is usually not too indefinite merely because it fixes no time
for an agreed performance … the court will infer that the parties have
agreed upon performance within a reasonable time. Of course, this stan-
dard is itself indefinite; what is reasonable is a question of fact and a
matter on -which opinions differ. Nevertheless, it is a standard that is
practically workable and one that results in satisfactory resolutions.’
The cases show that the courts have been concerned with several
questions. In the first place, they must decide whether the parties
have begun to perform their obligations under the contract within
a reasonable time after the formation of their agreement where the
contract fails to provide for the time for delivery of the goods or
the time for payment. Secondly, a contract may not have provided
for its duration, in which case the court may have to decide whether
the contract can be terminated by either party giving reasonable
notice or whether the agreement is of a perpetual character. Problems
of this nature must be distinguished from two other quite separate
matters. The first is where no time is fixed for the acceptance of an
offer. In such a case, the courts will usually hold that it must be
accepted within a reasonable time. The present problems are dif-
ferent because they are concerned with time in relation to obliga-
tions under an existing contract. The second is where the parties
have used vague, ambiguous phrases relating to time, such as one
requiring that delivery should be made ‘as soon as possible’, ‘imme-
diately’ or ‘forthwith’. ‘The task of the court with this problem is to
determine what these phrases mean in the context of the agreement
and in the light of the circumstances surrounding the contract, but it
can easily be seen that problems of this nature are totally different
from those which face the court where the parties have left terms
open. Here:
* Ph.D. (Birm.), Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Tasmania.
1 Corbin on Contracts, vol. I, (1963), 416.
19731 CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
225
The question is not one of construction in the narrow sense of putting a
meaning on the language which the parties have used, but in the wider
sense of ascertaining, in the light of all the admissible evidence and in the
light of what the parties have said or omitted to say in the agreement,
what the common intention of the parties was in the relevant respect
when they entered into the agreement0
It is proposed to consider these problems under the following head-
ings:
I Where No Time is Fixed for Payment.
II Where No Time is Fixed for Delivery.
III The Indefinite Duration of Obligations under the Contract.
I WHERE NO TIME IS FIXED FOR PAYMENT
The English Sale of Goods Act provides that, unless otherwise
agreed, payment and delivery are deemed to be concurrent obliga-
tionsY Thus neither is a condition precedent to the other and the
seller must be ready to give possession of the goods to the buyer
in exchange for the price and, in turn, the buyer must be ready to
exchange the price for possession of the goods. This implication will
obviously be negatived where the parties have expressly or impliedly
agreed that the time for payment shall be different from the time
for delivery since the possibility of this contrary intention is expressly
provided for in the Sale of Goods Act.4 It will also be negatived where
there is evidence of a trade usage 5 or a course of dealing between the
parties which fixes the time for payment where the contract is silent
on the matter.
It is with this latter situation that we are primarily concerned:
where the contract is silent on the time for payment. However, there
are one or two points worth noticing where the parties have expressly
or impliedly negatived the implication that delivery and payment
are concurrent conditions. The contract could provide that payment
of the whole or part of the price should be made at an earlier date
than delivery of the goods. This may easily be the case, for example,
where the seller is to manufacture the goods and requires a down
payment before he can purchase the materials. Similarly, any form
2 Re Spenborough U.D.C.’s Agreement, [1967] 1 All E.R. 959, 962 per Buckley,
J. (Ch.D.).
3 The Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (Eng.) 56 & 57 Vict. c.71, s.28.
4 Ibid.
5 Article 13(l) of the Uniform Law on International Sales defines ‘usage’ as
“a practice or method of dealing which reasonable persons in the same situa-
tion as the parties usually consider to be applicable to the formation of their
contract”.
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of agreement which requires the buyer to pay upon presentation of
documents (which usually occurs before the delivery of the goods
themselves) would negative the implication that payment and de-
livery were concurrent obligations. Thus the sale of goods on c.i.f.
terms is a very common shipping contract and, under such an agree-
ment, delivery is satisfied by delivery of the shipping documents to
the buyer.0 It may be noticed that the implication of law will also
be impliedly negatived where delivery is to be ‘as required’ or ‘as
needed’ by the purchaser. This particular problem will be considered
later.7
However, goods will more usually be supplied on credit, where
payment for the goods is to be made at some time after the date of
delivery. A difficulty will occur where there is a transaction which
one party maintains is a sale for cash and the other wishes to adduce
extrinsic evidence showing that the transaction was a sale on credit.
Again, difficulties will occur where the transaction is a credit sale
but the parties have made no provisions for the period of credit.
While extrinsic evidence of a trade usage or a previous course of
dealing cannot be used to contradict any provisions which state, for
example, that the sale is for ready cash, or if a credit sale, which
fix the period of credit, it is submitted that such evidence ought to
be admitted where the contract is silent upon both those matters
unless, of course, the writing was intended by the parties to be the
complete contract. The cases which illustrate this point also illus-
trate the principles applicable to the situation where the parties can
be regarded as having ‘otherwise agreed’, i.e. where the contract was
silent on the time for payment but where this is fixed by evidence of
a course of dealing or trade usage. It is now proposed to consider
the cases under that heading but it will be seen that they also illus-
trate the principles upon which evidence can be received to establish
such things as the existence of a credit sale or a period of credit.
It is clear that the court will not admit evidence of a trade usage
or a course of dealing which is relied upon to fix the time for
payment where it is satisfied that the parties intended their written
contract to be complete. Thus in Okerby and Co. Ltd. v. Fabricus 8
the court rejected evidence of a previous course of dealing between
the parties, where the goods had been sold on credit, because other
evidence showed that the present, written contract, which made no
mention of a credit sale, was intended to be a complete one. The
6 See e.g. E. Clemens, Horst Co. v. Biddel Bros., [1912] A.C. 18 (H.L.).
71nfra, at pp. 235-238.
8 (1915), 17 W.A.L.R. 93 (S.C. WA.).
1973] CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
227
court followed Ford v. Yates 9 where evidence of a course of dealing
that goods so purchased were on a credit sale of six months was
rejected. The memorandum of sale had stated that “of E.Y., 39
pockets of Sussex hops, Springett’s, 5 pockets of Sussex hops,
Kenward’s 78s. Springetts to wait orders”. The court held that
extrinsic evidence was not admissible because “the legal construc-
tion of this contract is, that the hops were to be paid for on delivery”
and “the writing does in terms, import a contract of sale for ready
money” .
Where the conclusion is reached that the written contract was
intended by the parties to be the complete agreement and if the time
for delivery is stated, then this will fix the time for payment because
the obligations will be held to be concurrent. However, if one party
attempts to adduce evidence of a trade usage or a course of dealing
in order to fix the time for payment the question then arises of
whether the writing ought to be regarded as a complete contract. It
is submitted that if the contract before the court is one of a type
similar to others which the parties have entered into over a period
of time, this course of dealing ought to fix the time for payment if
the contract is silent; and the same principle ought to apply where
the parties have negotiated against the background of a trade usage
because this, like the previous course of dealing, is really part of
their contract. In other words, payment and delivery are not concur-
rent obligations because the parties have, in effect, ‘otherwise agreed’
and this evidence should be admitted to fix the time for payment.
Lockett v. Nicklin,” though not concerned with evidence of a
course of dealing or trade usage, is worth noting as an example of
the willingness of the court to admit evidence fixing the time for
payment where the written communications between the parties
were silent on this matter. Although the writing was not sufficient
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds,2 a delivery and acceptance of the
goods was held to be sufficient to take the case out of the provisions
of the statute and it was further held that evidence was admissible
to show the terms upon which the goods had been accepted. As
Alderson, B. said:
The question, then, is whether the defendant has not a right to adduce
evidence, not to contradict the written instruments, but to show the real
9 (1841), 2 Man. & G. 549; 133 E.R. 866.
10 (1841), 2 Man. & G. 549, 559; 133 E.R. 866, 870 per Tindal,CJ. and Bosan-
quet,J. It appears, however, that the memorandum of sale did not mention
either the time for payment or the time for delivery.
11 (1848), 2 Ex. 93; 154 E.R. 419.
1229 Car. II (1677), c.3.
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contract, of which the paper contains only one of the terms. In order to
do that, the defendant must resort to the previous conversation.13
This evidence showed that the goods were accepted upon the basis
of six months’ credit.
A type of case which would not present any of the above problems
would be where the contract was entered into orally, there being
acts of part performance, for example, to take it outside the sphere
of the evidence requirements of the Sale of Goods Act.14 Thus in
Reedman v. King 5 there was an oral contract for the sale of a
quantity of potatoes but there was no agreement on the time for the
delivery of the goods. The defendant had made five deliveries under
the contract but then refused to deliver the balance and argued that
the plaintiff had refused to pay for the goods at the place of delivery.
The plaintiff stated, however, that he was willing to pay for the goods
but that the time for payment was after he had received and in-
spected the goods and he adduced evidence that payment for the first
five deliveries had been made in this way. Evidence of this course of
dealing under an existing contract was accepted as proof that
payment and delivery were not concurrent obligations. The course
of dealing relied upon would usually relate to previous transactions
but this appears to be unnecessary and this case illustrates the point
that the course of dealing can be relied on even under an existing
contract.
It is clear that the implication that payment and delivery are con-
current obligations can be negatived either by agreement or, where
the written contract was not intended by the parties to be complete,
by evidence of a course of dealing or trade usage. However, where
the time for payment and delivery are not fixed by the agreement
and there is no evidence relating to the time for payment, then
delivery and payment would be concurrent obligations and the time
for payment would be the same as the time for delivery. It is now
proposed to consider problems relating to the time for delivery.
II WHERE NO TIME IS FIXED FOR DELIVERY
Article 22 of the Uniform Law on International Sales provides
that where the date for delivery has not been determined the seller
is bound to deliver within a reasonable time after the conclusion of
the contract having regard to the nature of the goods and the cir-
‘s (1848), 2 Ex. 93, 100; 154 E.R. 419, 422.
14 Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.421, s.5.
15 (1883), 49 L.T. 473 (Q.B.).
1973] CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
229
cumstances.”‘ What would be a ‘reasonable time’ in any given case is
a question of fact which depends upon all the circumstances of the
particular case. It is suggested, therefore, that all that can usefully
be done is to consider the various factors which may assist the
courts in arriving at the standard of what is a reasonable time for
delivery in the case before it. Where no time for delivery is fixed by
the contract and the buyer complains that the seller has not delivered
the goods within a reasonable time it is submitted that the factors
which the court could properly take into account would include the
circumstances surrounding the obligation of the seller to have the
goods ready for delivery; events, outside the control of the seller,
which occur after the formation of the contract; and the nature of
the goods. These matters will now be considered.
1. The Circumstances Surrounding the Obligation of the Seller
If the goods are in a deliverable state at the date of the formation
of the contract 17 then, unless subsequent events outside the control
of the seller delay or prevent delivery, the ‘reasonable time’ for
delivery would be quite a short period of time. However, the position
might be quite different. The buyer may know or ought to have
known, for example, that the goods have to be specially ordered by
the seller from a manufacturer as in Allen v. Danforth Motors ‘8
where a car of a particular colour had to be ordered from the manu-
facturers. The car was delivered within ten days of the formation of
the contract and this was held to be a reasonable time in the circum-
stances. Again, the goods may have to be manufactured by the seller
himself as in Foster v. Heintzman,9 where it was held that four
months was a reasonable time for the delivery of a piano (being
different from the usual orders) which the defendant had agreed
to manufacture. In this latter situation, the capacity of the seller’s
16 See also the similar provisions in The Sale of Goods Act and the American
Uniform Commercial Code (U.LA.), s2-309. The seller, of course, may not be
bound to deliver under the contract. Where the buyer is to get the goods
from a third party or take possession from the seller, the seller is deemed
to promise that the buyer shall receive the goods if he applies for them within
a reasonable time.
17Where the contract is silent on the matter, extrinsic evidence is admissible
to show that the goods were ready for delivery. This was held in Ellis v.
Thompson (1838), 3 M. & W. 445; 150 E.R. 1219 (Ex.) where, however, delay
in delivery was caused by events subsequent to the formation of the contract.
18 (1958), 12 D.L.R. (2d) 572 (Ont. CA.).
19 [1923] 4 D.L.R. 166 (Ont. S.C.).
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business and the availability of labour and materials are factors
which the court ought to take into account
Again, where the buyer knows or ought to have known that the
goods have to be acquired by the seller from another party, such
matters as the distance which the goods have to travel before reach-
ing the seller and any form of transportation problems which arise
must, it is submitted, be taken into account. Conversely, where the
goods are in a deliverable state, the seller may know or ought to have
known of the special needs of the buyer. The seller may know, for
example, that the buyer is under contract with a third party to
complete the work within a certain time. The ‘reasonable time’ for
delivery here would be that which would then enable the buyer, in
the normal course of his business, to complete the work for the
third party.
2. Events Outside the Seller’s Control, Occurring After the Forma-
tion of the Contract
The circumstances so far considered are all ones which existed
at the date of the conclusion of the contract. It is necessary, however,
to consider the effect of events occurring after the agreement was
concluded. In Ford v. Cotesworth 21 there is the dictum of Black-
burn, J. that:
Whenever a party to a contract undertakes to do some particular act, the
performance of which depends entirely on himself, so that he may choose
his own mode of fulfilling his undertaking, and the contract is silent as
to time, the law implies, a contract to do it within a reasonable time
under the circumstances, and if some unforeseen cause, over which he has
no control, prevents him from performing what he has undertaken within
that time, he is responsible for the damage.P2
However, it is submitted that in spite of this the court ought to be
entitled to look at all the circumstances of the case as they existed
at the date of the proceedings so that the occurrence of events, sub-
sequent to the conclusion of the contract, which are outside one
party’s control must be taken into account in assessing what is a
reasonable time for delivery.
Thus where goods are carried by sea, factors which would cause
a delayed delivery outside the control of the seller would be the fact
20 See Corbin on Contracts, vol. I, (1963), 415 for a discussion of these matters.
21 (1868), L.R. 4 Q.B. 127. This case, which involved concurrent acts in the
unloading of a cargo, was applied in Webber v. Copeynan (1912), 7 D.L.R. 58
(Sask. S.C.), where it was held that the plaintiff, through his own fault, did
not have a quantity of hay ready for delivery within a reasonable time.
22 Ibid., 133.
1973] CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
231
of the ship running aground and having to be refloated,2 the icing
over of the water or the water level being too low (if the goods were
being carried through canals as in Ellis v. Thompson 24), and the exis-
tence of strikes at the ports of discharge which may result in a
delayed discharge at that port or the need to go to another port for
the discharge of the cargo.25 These are merely examples dealing with
the carriage of goods by sea. They could be multiplied and it is easy
to imagine similar problems arising with other forms of transporta-
tion. Thus it is submitted that in spite of the dictum in Ford v. Cotes-
worth,20 these are matters which the court can quite properly take
into account.
Another example falling within this category is the activities of
third parties which hamper delivery of the goods, for examnple, by
virtue of the economic pressure which they bring to bear upon the
seller. In Monkland v. Jack Barcley 2s the contract for the sale of a
new motor car provided that: “The sellers will use their best endeav-
ours to secure delivery of the goods at the estimated time for de-
livery”, but no delivery date was written in the space provided. The
court agreed with the argument of the defendants that, since the
space was left blank, what was required of them was that. they
should use their best endeavours to secure delivery within a reason-
able time and that this is what they had done. The reason why the
defendants had not been able to secure delivery was because the
car manufacturers had refused after the conclusion of the agreement
to make deliveries of cars to the defendants unless they had obtained
from their customers a covenant against re-sale and in the present
case the plaintiff-customer had refused to sign this covenant. The
court held, however, that the defendants were not in breach because
23See Re Carver & Co. and Sassoon & Co. (1911), 17 Com. Cas. 59.
24 (1838), 3 M. & W. 445; 150 E.R. 1219 (Ex.).
2 5 See, for example, British and Beningtons Ltd. v. N.W. Cachar Tea Co. &
Others, [1923] A.C. 48 (H.L.).
26 (1868), L.R. 4 Q.B. 127, 133.
27See, for example, per Lord Watson in Pantland Hick v. Raymond & Reid,
[1893] A.C. 22, 32-33 (H.L.):
… the condition of reasonable time has been frequently interpreted; and
has invariably been held to mean that the party upon whom it is incum-
bent duly fulfils his obligation, notwithstanding protracted delay, so long
as such delay is attributable to causes beyond his control, and he-has
acted neither negligently or unreasonably.
See also Piesse v. Tasmanian Orchardists & Producers Cooperative Associa-
tion Ltd. (1919), 15 Tas.L.R. 67, where an agent was held to have delivered
goods within a reasonable time where delay in delivery was caused by cir-
cumstances outside his control.
28 [1951] 2 K.B. 252.
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they had attempted to secure delivery within a reasonable time and
this period had not elapsed at the date of the issue of the writ.0
This sort of pressure can be viewed in the same light as physical
events which delay or hamper delivery of the goods and which, it is
submitted, must be taken into account when assessing what is a
reasonable time.
3. The Nature of the Goods
The nature of the goods may be a very important factor in de-
termining what is reasonable. They may, for example, be goods of a
highly perishable nature, such as fruit and vegetables, which deter-
iorate very quickly. Alternatively, the subject-matter of the sale may
be a type of manufactured goods (the latest fashions in women’s
clothes, for example) where the effect of delay is to reduce their
effectiveness for the purpose for which they were designed and
purchased. These are all matters which would obviously affect the
reasonableness of the time for delivery.
Implication of a Reasonable Time Excluded
It is submitted that the implication of a reasonable time will be
excluded in the following circumstances:
1. Where the delivery of the goods requires the co-operative acts
of the buyer
In the cases so far considered the obligation to deliver has been
exclusively that of the seller and, in the absence of a stated time, his
duty is to deliver within a reasonable time. The same principle would
apply where the buyer is to take delivery from the seller or a third
party where the seller is deemed to have promised that the buyer
shall have the goods if he makes his demand within a reasonable
time In both cases either party who has the duty to perform is
allowed a reasonable time. But where delivery by the seller requires
the co-operative acts of the buyer, it has been held that the implica-
tion of a reasonable time is excluded and the obligation imposed upon
both parties is to use reasonable diligence in the performance of the
29See also Hartwells of Oxford, Ltd. v. British Motor Association, [1951]
Ch. 50, where delivery was to be ‘on the date agreed’ (and not on the date
‘to be agreed’) and the court held that this provision was inoperative because
no date was agreed and therefore the obligation was to deliver within a
reasonable time.
30 Buddte v. Green (1857), 27 L.J. Ex. 33.
1973] CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
233
acts required of them. In Ford v. Cotesworth 3′ Blackburn, J. said
that: “what is implied by law in such a case is not that either party
contracts that it shall be done within either a fixed or a reasonable
time, but that each contracts that he shall use reasonable diligence in
performing his part”.32 Thus where there is a delay by one party it
would be inappropriate for the other party to argue that he has
performed his obligations within a reasonable time where the act of
delivery requires the co-operative acts of both parties. It would,
however, be proper for him to say that he has performed the acts
required of him with due care but that the buyer has not used
reasonable care on his part. 3
2. Where the time for delivery is regulated by a trade usage or a
course of dealing
In Spartali v. Benecke 34 Wide, C.S. said that evidence of usage
is admissible for the purpose of annexing incidents to the contract
in matters upon which the contract is silent but that this “must not
vary or contradict, either expressly or by implication, the terms of
the written instrument”.3 5 It is submitted, however, that, if the
contract is silent on the time for delivery, evidence of a trade usage
or a course of dealing between the parties ought to be accepted by
the court and that this would fix the time for delivery. In this sense,
the time for delivery can be regarded as an ‘agreed’ time and thus
falls outside the problems being considered, the trade usage or
course of dealing being just as much a part of the contract as are
the parties’ written communications.
In Spartali v. Benecke, 6 the contract for the sale of goats’ wool
at a stated price contained the following clause: “Customary allow-
ance for tare and draft, and to be paid for by cash in one month, less
5 per cent discount”. The court held that this was a present contract
with a deferred time for payment which entitled the buyer to call
for delivery at any reasonable time within the month. It was also
held that oral evidence of a usage in the trade showing that the
3′ (1868), L.R. 4 Q.B. 127. See also Electronic Industries Ltd. v. David Jones
Ltd. (1954), 91 C.L.R. 288 (H.C.). An agreement for the installation and use
of equipment, requiring co-operative acts which negatived the implication of
a reasonable time.
32 (1968), L.R. 4 Q.B. 127, 134.
33 This, of course, might negative the ‘usual time’ for delivery allowed by
the custom of a particular port, where goods have been shipped and are to
be unloaded and delivered to the buyer at that port.
34 (1850), 10 C.B. 212; 138 E.R. 87.
35 (1850), 10 C.B. 212, 223; 138 E.R. 87, 91.
36 (1850), 10 C.B. 212; 138 E.R. 87.
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seller was not bound to deliver without payment was not inadmis-
sible because this would have had the effect of annexing to the con-
tract an incident which was impliedly excluded by the agreement.
In Field v. Lelean,37 however, Spartali v. Benecke 8 was overruled on
that point of evidence to the effect that the result of the introduction
of a usage about delivery of the thing sold would be to alter or vary
the time fixed for payment by the written contract. Field v. Lelean 19
took the view that “the time for payment would not be altered, and
the custom would only affect the time for delivery, with respect to
which the written contract was silent”.40
It is of interest to notice at this point a tendency to imply terms,
where no time for delivery is stated, and then to reject extrinsic
evidence where it is inconsistent with the implied ‘reasonable time’.
Thus in Allen v. Danforth Motors,41 where no time for delivery of a
new car was stated in the written contract, the court, after implying
a reasonable time for delivery (ten days), then rejected oral evidence
adduced by the defendants that delivery was to be made within two
or three days. The court applied Greaves v. Ashlin2 where the con-
tract did not provide for the time for delivery or the time for pay-
ment but where the court rejected oral evidence to the effect that
the defendant’s agent had verbally made it a condition of the sale
that the oats should be carried away immediately because this
“materially varied the contract, which had been reduced to writing”!’
However, it is submitted that, since the time for delivery did not
appear on the face of the contract in Greaves v. Ashlin,44 extrinsic
evidence ought to have been admitted even though this would have
‘materially varied the contract’. There appears to be nothing wrong
with this because, as was pointed out by Wightman, J. in Field v.
Lelean:
It was observed by Lord Campbell, in the case of Humfrey v. Dale that in
a certain sense every material incident which is added to a written contract
varies it, and makes it different from what it appeared to be, and so far is
inconsistent with it; and if such variance were a ground of objection, it
37 (1861), 6 H. & N. 617; 158 E.R. 255 (Ex).
38 (1850), 10 C.B. 212; 138 E.R. 87.
39 (1861), 6 It. & N. 617; 158 E.R. 255 (Ex.).
40 (1861), 6 H. & N. 617, 626; 158 E.R. 255, 259 per Wightman,J. (Ex.).
41 (1958), 12 D.L.R. (2d) 572 (Ont. CA.).
42(1813), 3 Camp. 426; 170 E.R. 1433.
43Ibid.
44 Ibid.
1973] CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
235
would be difficult in any case to introduce evidence of custom where there
is a written contract 5
Returning to Allen v. Danforth Motors,46 it is submitted that there is
no need to imply a ‘reasonable time’ when there is extrinsic evidence
which fixes the time for delivery. It would appear to be quite improp-
er to imply a reasonable time, as was done in Allen’s case, and then
to reject extrinsic evidence which is inconsistent with the implied
term. There is no need to imply the term in the first place.
3. Where the parties have otherwise agreed
The implication of a reasonable time will, of course, be negatived
where the parties have provided for delivery. They may, for example,
have fixed a definite time for delivery or have provided machinery
for the fixing of that time which does not depend upon their own
future agreement. Thus they might provide that a third party should
fix the time for delivery. Alternatively, the contract may have pro-
vided that delivery is to be ‘as required’ or ‘as needed’ by the pur-
chaser. This requires a consideration of what is a ‘reasonable time’
but, and this will become apparent directly, different considerations
will apply in determining the standard of a reasonable time in cases
of this nature. It will also be seen that the obligation of the seller is
slightly more onerous in that he is bound to deliver after being re-
quired to do so by the purchaser.
Where the contract provides that delivery shall be ‘as required’
(or ‘as needed’) by the purchaser, the parties have not fixed a definite
time for delivery but the courts are able to uphold such a provision
by reference to the standard of reasonableness. An examination of
the obligations of the parties will illustrate the various points at
which the court will need to refer to the standard of a ‘reasonable
time’. In the first place, it is clear from Jones v. Gibbons,47 where the
goods were to be delivered ‘as required’ by the purchaser, that this
stipulation must be made within a reasonable time after the conclu-
sion of the contract; the parties are to be regarded as reasonable
people and it will be implied that the buyer requires delivery within
a reasonable time and not at any time during the lives of the
45 (1861), 6 H. & N. 617, 626-627; 158 E.R. 255, 259 (Ex.). In Canada, however,
it may still be quite difficult to avoid the strict application of the Parole
Ividence Rule: Hawrish v. Bank of Montreal, [1969] S.C.R. 515.
46 (1958), 12 D.L.R. (2d) 572 (Ont. C.A.).
47 (1853), 8 Ex. 920; 155 E.R. 1626. See also Jackson v. Rotax Motor & Car
Co., [1910] 2 K.13. 937 and Ross Bros. v. Shaw & Co., [1917] 2 I.R. 367.
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parties.4 s However, although the obligation of the seller under the
usual contract is that he should deliver the goods within a reasonable
time (where no time for delivery is stated), where delivery is ‘as
required’ by the purchaser the seller must be ready to deliver when
the buyer requires them and he cannot then delay delivery. It also
seems clear that in this situation the seller cannot deliver prema-
turely but only when the buyer requires the goods unless, of course,
the buyer waives this provision by accepting the goods.
A reference to the standard of a reasonable time is also necessary
where the buyer has failed to require delivery. It is again clear from
Jones v. Gibbons49 that, although the seller cannot terminate the
contract by doing nothing and pleading that a reasonable time has
elapsed, he can, by notice after the lapse of a reasonable time, require
the buyer to request the goods by a particular date and terminate
the contract after the expiration of that date. It would appear that
this final date for delivery must be a reasonable one. It can thus be
seen that there are a number of circumstances in which it is neces-
sary for the court to use the standard of a ‘reasonable time’ in deter-
mining the obligations of the parties.
It is now proposed to consider what sort of factors would assist
the court in determining what was, in all the circumstances of the
case, a reasonable time. A ‘reasonable time’ has been defined as
“such time as is necessary conveniently to do what the contract
requires to be done”. 0 What is a reasonable time will, of course,
depend upon all the circumstances of the particular case, but it is
suggested that the following factors might be relevant considera-
tions.
Taking first the obligation of the buyer that he should require
delivery within a reasonable time after the contract is concluded, the
seller may argue that either the buyer has not requested delivery
within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the contract or that
48See Chitty, Contracts, vol. II, 23d ed. (1968), 735, where it is stated that
“the buyer must require delivery within a reasonable time”. Cf. Halsbury’s
Laws of England, 3d ed. (1969), vol. 34, 95 f.n. (s), where it is said that: “Prima
facie, the buyer has the whole of his life to call for delivery… The rule as
to reasonable time is excluded”. Llanelly’s case (1875), L.R. 7 H.L. 550 is relied
upon but this decision, which was not a sale of goods case, was concerned
with the duration of the continuing obligations of both parties under a con-
tract which the court held to be perpetual. Therefore, it would appear that
such a decision is not relevant to the present problem which is concerned
with determining the time within which the single duty of the buyer (i.e.
requiring delivery) must begin.
49 (1853), 8 Ex. 920; 155 E.R. 1626.
50 See the American Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 77, 873.
1973] CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
237
the buyer has requested delivery at too early a date after the agree-
ment was concluded. In the first situation, where the seller argues
that the buyer has not required delivery within a reasonable time,
one of the factors upon which this argument might be based is that
the seller, having the goods ready for delivery, would like to deliver
them to the buyer because they are taking up valuable storage space
at his place of business. Alternatively, the reason might be that the
seller wants payment of the contract price. In this type of case
payment and delivery are not concurrent obligations but if the
contract so provided, the alleged failure of the buyer to require
delivery within a reasonable time would be an argument that the
seller would be likely to advance.
However, it is submitted that neither of these matters are cir-
cumstances of which the court ought to take any notice because they
are not factors which are relevant in determining the reasonableness
of the request of the buyer. Having regard to the nature of the agree-
ment which the seller has entered into (he has agreed to have the
goods ready when the buyer requires them), it is suggested that these
are matters of which he cannot complain and which are not relevant
in determining whether the buyer has required the goods within a
reasonable time. It is submitted, however, that the subject-matter of
the contract may be a very important consideration. Thus the subject-
matter may be food which must be consumed within a fairly short
period of time after being made or fresh fruit and vegetables which
deteriorate very quickly. Similar considerations would apply to any
form of manufactured goods where the effect of delay would be to
reduce their effectiveness or suitability for the purpose for which
they were made (the latest women’s fashions, for example). It may
be noticed, however, that if the parties had previously entered into
agreements for the supply of similar goods in the past or there was
evidence of a particular usage in the trade dealing with times for
delivery, where none were specified, then this would also assist the
court in deciding whether a reasonable time had elapsed.
In the second situation, where the seller complains that the buyer
has required delivery within too short a time after the conclusion of
the contract, there is a variety of reasons why the seller may not
have the goods ready for delivery. It is clear, however, that the seller
cannot normally argue that the request for delivery has been made
before the lapse of a reasonable time because he has agreed to be
ready to deliver when required to do so by the purchaser. It is
suggested, therefore, that the only cases in which the seller could
successfully argue that the buyer has not given him enough time
would be where the buyer was aware, or ought to have been aware,
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of special circumstances attending the obligations of the seller to
have the goods ready for him. If the buyer knew, for example, that
the goods had to be manufactured, then the court could quite prop-
erly take into account the length of time which it would take an
efficiently operated business of the same type as the seller’s to
manufacture the goods. Alternatively, where the buyer knows that
the seller has to get his supplies from a considerable distance, he
ought to take this unavoidable delay into account. In the presence
of such circumstances as these, it is submitted that the court would
uphold the seller’s argument that the buyer did not allow him a
reasonable time in which to have the goods ready for delivery. The
effect of the existence of these special circumstances is therefore
that the ‘reasonable time’ would be a longer period than usual
because the court ought to hold that the buyer had not allowed a
reasonable time to elapse between the formation of the contract
and the demand for delivery.
In addition to the special circumstances just noticed, it is sub-
mitted that the buyer ought not to be able to demand delivery imme-
diately where the evidence suggests that expressions such as ‘delivery
as required’ used in the contract mean ‘as needed in the course of the
buyer’s business’. Evidence, for example, that the buyer would
require delivery from time to time over a period of years might lead
the court to hold that the buyer was not entitled to demand delivery
of the whole quantity shortly after the contract was concluded.
It may be noticed, incidentally, that another unsatisfactory situa-
tion will occur where the contract provides that the price of each
instalment, to be delivered as required by the buyer, is to vary with
the market price at the date of delivery of the instalment. This would
make it possible for the buyer to ‘require’ small quantities when the
price is high and much larger quantities when the price is low. It
is submitted, however, that a way out of this difficulty is to adopt
the principle set out in s.1-203 of the American Uniform Commercial
Code 51 which provides that: “Every contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment”.52
Where the buyer has failed to require the goods within a reason-
able time, then the seller can give notice requiring him to request
delivery by a certain date and it is suggested that this final date for
the request for delivery should, in turn, be reasonable. The seller may
51 Uniform Commercial Code, (U.L.A.).
52 ‘Good faith’ is defined by s.1-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.)
as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned”.
1973] CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
239
be ready to deliver but the buyer may find that, contrary to his
expectation when the contract was concluded, his need for the seller’s
products is delayed or no longer exists. A reasonable time ought to
be allowed to the buyer to make alternative arrangements to deal
with his difficulty: either using the goods in some other way or
making arrangements to sell them. However, in view of the fact
that a ‘reasonable time’ has already elapsed since the contract was
concluded, it is suggested that this period ought to be a short one.
If the buyer still fails to require delivery after that final date, then
the seller would be justified in repudiating the contract if he so
desired.P
It remains to consider the relevant circumstances in deciding
whether the buyer has required delivery within a reasonable time.
The seller might argue that he has the goods ready for delivery and
the buyer could, as in Jones v. Gibbons,54 counter this by arguing
that he has not requested the goods because, as yet, he has no need
for them. Assuming that the position taken by the purchaser is
genuine, the only relevant consideration upon which the seller could
rely would be either the nature of the goods or, alternatively, a trade
usage or a course of dealing between the parties. Both of these
matters have been considered already 5
III THE INDEFINITE DURATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE CONTRACT 56
Parties may enter into a contract without providing for the dura-
tion of their agreement. The contract may provide, for example, for
the delivery once a month of a specified quantity of goods at a stated
price but may leave open the duration of the contract and, further,
may not provide for any events or circumstances which would bring
this agreement to an end. Faced with this problem, which is con-
cerned with the duration of a continuing obligation, the court might
interpret the promise as providing for perpetual performance. This
is, as we shall see, a possibility, but it would be more usual for the
court to interpret the promise as meaning that the performance is
to continue for a reasonable time or that the contract could be ter-
53 Unless the contract is divisible. The seller, of course, might not do any-
thing and the court might take the view that this, together with the failure
of the buyer to request delivery, amounts to an intention by the parties to
abandon their contract as in Pearl Mill Co. Ltd. v. Ivy Tannery Co. Ltd.,
[1919] 1 K.B. 78. See also Fisher v. Eastwoods, Ltd., [1936] 1 All E.R. 421.
54 (1853), 8 Ex. 920; 155 E.R. 1626.
55 Supra, at p. 237.
56 See Carnegie, Terminability of Contracts of Unspecified Duration, (1969)
85 L.Q.R. 392.
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minated by reasonable notice.57 In their efforts to uphold rather than
destroy contracts, the courts would prefer this solution rather than
hold that the parties can continue as long as they please or that the
term is to be settled some time in the future with the result that the
contract is of no effect.
It will be seen that problems of this nature are concerned with
the duration of continuing obligations under the contract and not
with the question of continuing offers. One party may argue that the
nature of his promise is that of a continuing offer and that, although
any acceptance of this offer forms a contract, it is separate and the
offer can then be withdrawn, thus preventing any subsequent con-
tracts being formed. On construing the contract, the courts may
find, however, that a contract, indefinite about duration but involv-
ing continuing obligations, has been formed. It is with this problem
of continuing obligations under a contract, and not continuing offers,
that we are concerned. It will be seen that, depending upon such
factors as the subject-matter of the agreement or the nature of the
contract itself, such agreements may be terminated by reasonable
notice. Thus in Wright & Co. Ltd. v. Maunder,”‘ a contract for the
return of cordial bottles, indefinite about duration, was held to be
terminable on reasonable notice. These agreements may also be
terminated without notice as in Duff v. Kyle,”‘ where a contract for
the supply of milk ‘All the year round’ was held to have been properly
terminated without notice. Alternatively, on looking at the objects of
the agreement, the court may come to the conclusion that perpetual
performance had been agreed to as in J. Kitchen & Sons Pty. Ltd. v.
Stewart’s Cash and Carry Stores.’0 It may also be noticed that prob-
lems relating to the duration of obligations under the contract are
separate from questions connected with the time within which
performance of a duty is to begin after the contract has been con-
57 Cf. s.2-309(3) of the American Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) which
provides that “Termination of a contract by one party except on the hap-
pening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received
by the other party and an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid
if its operation would be unconscionable”.
58 [1962] N.Z.L.R. 355. See also W.K. Witt (W.A.) Pty. Ltd. v. Metters Ltd.
and General Industries Ltd., [1967] W.A.R. 15, a re-seller agreement, indefinite
concerning duration, terminable on reasonable notice.
59 (1902), 20 N.Z.L.R. 706 (S.C.). See also Australian Blue Metal Ltd. v.
Hughes, [1963] A.C. 74 (P.C.), where it was held that a right to mine was
terminable at will.
60 (1942), 66 C.L.R. 116 (H.C.). Cf. Llanelly Ry. and Dock Co. v. London and
North Western Ry. Co. (1875), L.R. 7 H.L. 550, where it was held that the
obligation was perpetual having regard to the character of the parties and
the subject-matter of the contract.
1973] CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
241
eluded. Such matters as, for example, the time for payment or the
time for delivery of the goods fall within this category and have
already been considered.
Continuing Obligations Terminable by Reasonable Notice
In Llanelly’s case,61 Lord Selbourne stated that:
… an agreement de futuro, extending over a tract of time which, on the
face of the agreement, is indefinite and unlimited, must (in general) throw
upon any one alleging that it is not perpetual, the burden of proving that
allegation, either from the nature of the subject, or from some rule of law
applicable thereto. 62
It is submitted, however, that the better approach to this problem,
in the sphere of commercial contracts, is that of McNair, J. in Martin-
Baker Ltd. v. Canadian Flight Ltd.,4 where he preferred to approach
a mercantile contract without any presumption in favour of perman-
ence. Indeed if there was to be any presumption at all, it appeared
to the learned judge to be a presumption the other way.
For example, I have little doubt that the law merchant would regard a
contract for the sale of a hundred tons of coal monthly at a fixed price,
no period being fixed, as a contract determinable on reasonable notice…
The common law, in applying the law merchant to commercial transac-
tions, has always proceeded more on the basis of reasonableness in filling
up the gaps in a contract which the parties have made on the basis of
what is reasonable, so far as that does not conflict with the express terms
of the contract, rather than on the basis of rigidity.64
Taking the example suggested by McNair, J. of the quantity of
coal at a fixed price to be delivered at monthly intervals but with no
period for the continuance of the obligation being agreed upon,
either party could terminate such a contract by reasonable notice
and what would be a reasonable notice would, as a question of fact,
depend upon all the circumstances of the particular case. Assuming
that it is the buyer who has given notice of his intention to terminate
the contract, there are, however, a number of arguments which could
be put forward by the seller, all of which would deny the right of
the buyer to terminate the contract by reasonable notice. The seller
may argue, 4 for example, that:
61 (1875), L.R. 7 H.L. 550.
62Ibid., 567. See also (1873), 8 Ch. App. 942, 949 per James,LJ.
63 [1955] 2 Q.B. 556.
64 Ibid., 577. Quite apart from this, there are many categories of contracts
which, from their nature, are regarded as terminable. These include contracts
involving a delegation of authority, contracts of partnership, principal and
agent and employer and employee agreements. All of these involve an element
of trust and confidence.
65 These arguments are, of course, equally open to the buyer where the seller
proposes to terminate the contract by reasonable notice.
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I. The contract provides for a perpetual duration and that the
agreement can only be terminated by mutual consent or by
a breach by one party which is accepted by the other.
II. The contract itself makes exclusive provision for the termin-
ation of the contract.
III. He has begun performance of his obligations under the
contract.
I. Perpetual Duration
Williston has expressed the view that: “It is not often that a
promise will properly be interpreted as calling for perpetual perform-
ance. Only in such negative promises as to forbear suit or not to
carry on a business or occupation is so broad an interpretation likely
to be permissible.” 66 However, it is clear that the court may interpret
the contract in this way having regard to the character of the parties,
the subject-matter of the contract or its nature. Llanelly’s case 11
illustrates this point although not concerned with sale of goods but
with the use of railway lines by railway companies, both the subject-
matter and the parties being of a permanent character.68 Although
such an approach would be most unusual with sale of goods’ con-
tracts, the basis of the agreement between the parties may be such
that to interpret the contract in any other way would be to render
it commercially useless. J. Kitchen & Sons Pty. Ltd. v. Stewart’s Cash
and Carry Stores ‘9 illustrates this point very well. In that case the
High Court of Australia held that the price maintenance agreement
between the parties, which fixed no time for the duration of the
contract, was perpetual and that neither party had the right to
terminate the contract apart from breach by the other party. The
majority rejected the argument of the respondents that their right
-to take the goods of the appellant was a continuing offer which could
be withdrawn. They took the view that such an approach would
make the agreement commercially useless and that there were good
practical reasons for not placing a limit upon the duration of the
agreement and excluding the right of withdrawal by either party.
The majority held further that although performance was perpetual,
there was no restraint of trade. This was regarded as a common and
well-recognized feature of price-maintenance agreements such as
the one before the court.70
66Williston on Contracts, vol. I, 3d ed. (1957), 113.
67 (1875), L.R. 7 H.L. 550.
68 The ‘institutional character’ of the parties is not necessarily decisive: see
Crediton Gas Co. v. Crediton Urban Council, [1928] Ch. 174, where the contract
provided for termination on reasonable notice.
69 (1942), 66 C.L.R. 116 (H.C.).
70 The majority took the view that the decision in Palmolive Company (of
1973J CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
243
II. The Contract makes Exclusive Provision for its Termination
The agreement may not fix the duration of the contract but may
still provide for its termination upon the happening of certain events.
In such a case, the parties make it clear that this is a matter which
they have considered and state the circumstances in which the con-
tract is to terminate. It is submitted that the effect of these express
provisions is to prevent the implication that the contract can be
terminated in some other way, such as by giving reasonable notice.
The contract may provide, for example, that it is to continue for as
long as the seller delivers a stated quantity each year. It is suggested
that such an agreement cannot be terminated by a reasonable notice
because the contract shows that the parties have directed their minds
to the question and that, on this basis, the court should not allow
either party to terminate by reasonable notice. An express provision
would also exclude the interpretation that the contract is to continue
for an indefinite period and can only be terminated by breach by the
other party as in J. Kitchen & Sons Pty. Ltd. v. Stewart’s Cash and
Carry Stores.71
Prints for Pleasure v. Oswald-Sealy (Overseas) Ltd.72 was not a
case of sale of goods but was regarded by the court as being “con-
cerned with conferring exclusive marketing rights on certain condi-
tions”.13 However, the case shows very clearly the refusal of the court
to imply a term for termination upon reasonable notice where the
parties, although not making provision for the duration of their
contract, expressly provide for the circumstances upon which it
would terminate (a clause in the agreement that, “The agency agree-
ment is to be a continuing one whilst Australian orders are not less
than 10,000 prints per annum”). With an agreement such as this, the
right to bring the contract to an end is conferred upon one party
alone since a failure on his part to place the minimum of orders
would terminate the contract. The court held that this contract
could not be terminated by reasonable notice. It is submitted that
the same principle will apply to contracts for the sale of goods so
that the agreement cannot be terminated upon reasonable notice
where the parties have made provision for its termination.
England) Ltd. v. Freedman, [1928] Ch. 264 was the answer to the defendant’s
argument.
71 (1942), 66 C.L.R. 116 (H.C.). If, however, the contract provided that it
could only be terminated by breach, this may be interpreted as another way
of saying that the contract was to be of perpetual duration with no termina-
tion by reasonable notice.
72 (1968), 88 W.N. (N.S.W.) 375.
’73 Ibid., 381.
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In Prints for Pleasure v. Oswald-Sealy (Overseas) Ltd.74
the
parties had made provision for the termination of their contract by
the use of definite terms. Difficulties would arise, however, where
the parties attempt to provide for the termination of their agree-
ment, thus precluding the court from implying a ‘reasonable time’,
but have used expressions of such a nature that a definite meaning
cannot be attached to them. The agreement may provide, for ex-
ample, that it is to terminate when the goods ‘cease to be well-produc-
ed’ or when deliveries are for less than 100 ‘attractive dresses’. In
these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the court can help the
parties in the absence of performance by one party of his obligations.
If, for example, the seller had delivered a quantity of goods to the
buyer he would be entitled to payment at the contract price for the
goods so delivered.
III. Performance of the Obligations under the Contract
Where a continuing contract does not provide for its duration
and neither party has begun performance of any of the obligations,
then it would seem to be perfectly reasonable to allow either party
to terminate the contract by reasonable notice. If, however, one party
has begun performance of his obligations the position would be
different. It is suggested that ideally such a contract ought only to
be terminable by mutual consent. Termination by reasonable notice
may be permitted but only where the length of notice given is such
that the party who has begun performance is not prejudiced. In
other words, it is submitted that the court, in determining what is
‘reasonable’, must take into account the fact and extent of perform-
ance. Suppose, for example, that A has agreed to manufacture and
supply B with a yearly quantity of goods, It would, it is submitted,
be unjust to allow B to give notice of termination which does not
take into account the fact that A has manufactured a year’s supply
ready for delivery to B during the year. Although A would not be
entitled to manufacture any more goods after B’s notice, he should
be entitled to deliver those goods which were in the course of manu-
facture and to be paid the contract price for them. In other words,
74Ibid. Cf. In re Berker Sportcraft Ltd.’s Agreement (1947), 177 L.T. 420
(Ch.D.): an agency agreement which made express provision for termination
on specified events. This case was distinguished in Martin-Baker Ltd. v. Cana-
dian Flight Ltd., [1955] 2 Q.B. 556 (another agency agreement which was
terminable on reasonable notice). Martin-Baker’s case was applied in Re
Spenborough U.D.C.’s Agreement, [1967] 1 All E.R. 959. In both these cases
the contract did not provide for the termination of the agreement.
1973] CONTRACTS OF SALE: OPEN TERMS RELATING TO TIME
245
the court must, it is submitted, allow a reasonable time in the per-
formance of the seller’s obligations. 5
It is of interest to notice that in all the cases so far considered
it was argued by one party either that the contract was terminable
on reasonable notice or that it was of perpetual duration. Where X
claims to be entitled to terminate by reasonable notice, in no case
has it been argued by X that Y has not permitted the agreement to
run for that length of time which would be regarded as reasonable
having regard to the objects of the contract. The parties may have
agreed for the supply of a very large quantity of goods and the terms
of the contract, while not mentioning the duration of the agreement,
may clearly indicate that the parties intended their relationship to
continue for a long time. Would it be reasonable for the buyer, for
example, to attempt to terminate the contract by notice a short while
after the contract has been concluded? It is submitted that there
would be much in favour of the argument of the seller that this
contract ought to continue for a reasonable time and that any notice
which the buyer might be entitled to give at this point of time should
include a reasonable time for the running of the contractY6 The
argument of a ‘reasonable duration’ would be inapplicable, how-
ever, where the parties have agreed upon a total quantity of goods
which are, for example, to be manufactured and delivered. Here, the
contract will continue until that quantity has been manufactured
and delivered, within a reasonable time, so that the interpretation
of a ‘reasonable duration’ would be excluded.7
7
The various open term problems relating to time which have
been considered illustrate the willingness of the courts to fill gaps,
which the parties have either deliberately or inadvertently left in
their contract, where they are satisfied of the parties’ intention to
contract. Apart from the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act relating
to payment and delivery, the principal gap-filling device in this area
is the use by the court of the standard of what is ‘reasonable’. The
courts can thus ‘interpret’ the contract in the sense of filling gaps
by reference to this standard, whether the problem relates to the
time for payment, the time for delivery or the indefinite duration
of obligations under a contract for the sale of goods.
75 There appears to be no authority dealing with these matters and the
submission is made on the basis of what appears to be reasonable.
76It is submitted that evidence of a trade usage or a course of dealing,
fixing the duration of the contract, ought to be admissible and this may
assist the seller.
77Again, there appears to be no authority on these matters and the sub-
missions are made on the basis of what appears to be reasonable.
