Parliamentary Debates in Statutory
Interpretation: A Question of
Admissibility or of Weight?
St6phane Beaulac”
The exclusionary rule which prohibits references
to parliamentary materials as an aid to statutory inter-
pretation has been applied for decades in most common
law jurisdictions. The House of Lords handed down its
fundamental decision in Pepper v. Hart which allowed
reference to parliamentary debates in limited circum-
stances.
The author first examines the English origins of
the exclusionary rule as well as its application in other
common law jurisdictions, including Australia, New
Zealand, the United States and Canada. The author also
comments on the situation prevailing in Quebec’s civil
law system. The exclusion of parliamentary debates is
then considered in the broader context of the methods
and principles of statutory construction.
The author contends that the issue of parliamen-
tary debates in statutory interpretation is a question of
weight and not of admissibility. To support this posi-
tion, the rationales underlying the exclusionary rule are
analysed and, for the most part, refuted. After demon-
strating that parliamentary debates should play a role as
an interpretative aid to ascertain legislative intent, the
author concludes by suggesting factors to consider in
determining their persuasive force.
La r~gle qui exclue l’utilisation des debats parle-
mentaires comme outil d’interpr6tation legislative a te
appliqude pendant des d6cennies dans la plupart des ju-
ridictions de common law jusqu’a la decision de prin-
cipe du comit6 d’appel de la House of Lords dans Pep-
per c. Hart. L’auteur examine d’abord les origines an-
glaises de la r~gle d’exclusion ainsi que ses applica-
tions dans d’autres juridictions de common law telles
I’Australie, la Nouvelle-Z6lande, les ttats-Unis et le
Canada. L’auteur commente aussi la situation dans le
syst~me de droit civil qu6b6cois. L’exclusion des d6-
bats parlementaires est ensuite consid6r6e dans le con-
texte plus global des m6thodes et des principes
d’interpretation legislative.
L’auteur soutient que l’utilisation des d6bats par-
lementaires dans
l’interpretation legislative est une
question de poids plutft que d’admissibilite. Afin de
demontrer ceci, les justifications qui sous-tendent la r6-
gle d’exclusion sont analys6es et, pour la plupart, refu-
tees. Apr~s avoir demontre que les d6bats parlementai-
res devraient jouer un r6le dans la d6termination de
l’intention du Igislateur, l’auteur conclue en sugg6rant
des
facteurs qui pourraient 8tre consider6s dans
l’6valuation du poids devant leur 6tre attribu6.
.LL.M. in Comparative Law (Cantab), Diploma in Legislative Drafting (Ottawa), LLB. in Com-
mon Law (Dalhousie), and LLL in Civil Law (Ottawa). The author wishes to thank Sir Anthony Ma-
son, former Chief Justice of the Australian High Court, for his helpful comments. He is also grateful
to Fr6ddric Bachand and Amilia Salmond for their suggestions and editing assistance.
McGill Law Journal 1998
Revue de droit de McGill
To be cited as: (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 287
Mode de r6fdrence : (1998) 43 R.D. McGill 287
288
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[Vol. 43
Introduction
I. The Exclusionary Rule in England
I1. The Exclusionary Rule in Other Common Law Jurisdictions
A. Australia
B. New Zealand
C. The United States
D. Canada
Ill. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
IV Parliamentary Debates: A Question of Admissibility or of Weight?
A. Historical Reasons
B. Theoretical Reasons
C. Practical Reasons
Conclusion
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S. BEAUL4C – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
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“Hansard is for the Judges a closed book.
But not for you.”
– Lord Denning M.R.’
Introduction
Parliamentary debates – Hansard’ –
form part of the history of legislation. They
constitute extrinsic aids to statutory construction, that is, “materials that are consid-
ered to be external to the words of the legislative enactment?’ Extrinsic aids include
dictionaries, statutes in pari materia, interpretation acts, the prior state of the law, as
well as other legislative history materials. In contrast, the sources of interpretation that
lie within the four corners of the statute, “written in ink discernible to the critical
eye,'” are known as intrinsic aids. Intrinsic aids include materials such as preambles,
headings, punctuation, definition sections and marginal notes which can provide in-
sights to interpret the words of the provision at issue.
The leading authorities do not provide a precise meaning of the term “legislative
history.”‘ In this article, the term is used to denote documents relating to events that
occurred during the conception, preparation, and passage of the enactment. Peter
Hogg considers legislative history to include the following materials:’
1.
the report of a royal commission or law reform commission or parliamen-
tary committee recommending that a statute be enacted;
2. a government policy paper (whether called a white paper, green paper,
budget paper or whatever) recommending that a statute be enacted;
3. a report or study produced outside government which existed at the time of
the enactment of the statute and was relied upon by the government that
introduced the legislation;
‘Lord A.T. Denning, The Discipline of Law (London: Butterworths, 1979) at 10.
2 In 1812, T.C. Hansard took over the work of reporting the debates of the House of Commons, first
undertaken by W. Cobbett in 1803. His name is now the eponym for what, in 1908, became the offi-
cial parliamentary reports, and has been adopted to refer to parliamentary reports throughout the
Commonwealth.
W.H. Charles, “Extrinsic Evidence and Statutory Interpretation: Judicial Discretion in Context”
(1983) 7:3 Dalhousie L.J. 7 at 8. See also R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d
ed. (Scarborough: Butterworths, 1994) at 427.
4 F. Frankfurter, “Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes” (1947) 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 at
529.
‘ See J. Bell & Sir G. Engle, ed., Cross on Statutory Interpretation, 3d ed. (London: Butterworths,
1995) at 152; EA.R. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1992)
at 445; R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975) at
137; and Sullivan, supra note 3 at 431.
‘ P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 1283-84.
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4. earlier versions of the statute, either before or after its introduction into
Parliament or the Legislature;
statements by ministers or members of Parliament and testimony of expert
witnesses before a parliamentary committee charged with studying the bill;
and
speeches in the Parliament or Legislature when the bill is being debated.
5.
6.
Absent from the foregoing list are explanatory memoranda –
frequently used in
some common law jurisdictions, such as Australia7 – which are documents explain-
ing the contents and objects of the bill to members of the house.’ These materials are
also considered to be part of legislative history.
This article will be limited to the examination of parliamentary debates, that is,
speeches made in parliament during the enactment of a statute. The question of
whether it should be permissible to utilise them in the construction of statutes will be
the primary focus of this discussion. Explanatory memoranda, which are also public
documents pertaining to the enactment of a statute, will be treated as sources akin to
parliamentary debates. The situation regarding commission reports, in so far as it may
differ, will not be examined per se,’ although such materials are often considered, to-
gether with parliamentary debates, as part of legislative history.'”
” See D.C. Pearce & R.S. Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 3d ed. (Sydney: Butter-
worths, 1988) at 41.
‘For more detail on explanatory memoranda, see Bennion, supra note 5 at 454.
In England, the rule used to be that such materials could be looked at only for the purpose of as-
certaining the mischief that the statute was intended to cure, but not for the purpose of interpreting the
statutory text to effect such remedy: see Herron v. Rathmines Improvement Commissioners, [1892]
A.C. 498, 67 L.T. 658 (H.L.) [hereinafter Herron]; Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Comp.
troller-General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, [1898] A.C. 571, 15 R.P.C. 476 (H.L) [herein-
after Eastman Photographic Materials]; and Assam Railways and Trading Co. v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue (1934), [1935] A.C. 445, [1934] All E.R. Rep. 646 (H.C.) [hereinafter Assam Rail-
ways]. Such distinction is now obsolete and commission reports can now be used for the purpose of
constructing statutes: see R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd. (1990),
[1991] 1 A.C. 603, [1991] 1 All E.R. 70 (H.L.) [hereinafter Factortame]; and, unequivocally, Pepper
v. Hart (1992), [1993] A.C. 593 at 635, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42 (H.L.) [hereinafter Pepper cited to A.C.].
Similarly, in Canada, the initial rule was that commission reports could be used only to identify the
see Laidlaw v. Toronto (City ofD, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 736, 87 D.LR. (3d) 161; and Morguard
mischief-
Properties v. Winnipeg (City oJ), [1983] 2 S.C.R. 493, 3 D.L.R. (4th) 1. But they can now be consid-
ered to ascertain the remedy of the statute: see Hills v. Canada (A.G.), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 513,48 D.L.R.
(4th) 193; and R. v. Mailloux, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1029, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 193. In Australia, see Bitumen
and Oil Refineries (Aust.) Ltd. v. Commissioner for Government Transport (1955), 92 C.L.R. 200,
online: LEXIS (Aust, AUSMAX); and Dillingham Constructions Pty. Ltd. v. Steel Mains Pty. Ltd.
(1975), 6 A.L.R. 171, 132 C.LR. 323. In New Zealand, see N.Z.E.L v. Director-General of Educa-
tion, [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 397. The N.Z.L.R. is available online: LEXIS (Nz, NZCAS).
” In the discussion that follows, the term most often referred to will be “parliamentary debates”
which includes explanatory memoranda. “Legislative history” will sometimes be used to comprise
parliamentary debates and commission reports. The term “extrinsic aids” will seldom be utilised and
will refer to all the materials external to the legislative enactment.
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The parliamentary procedure is similar across most common law jurisdictions,”
except for the United States.'” After the draft legislation has been accepted by the gov-
ernment, it is introduced in the Parliament. It then proceeds through the normal stages
of first and second readings, reference to committee, report stage, and final reading of
the bill. House members’ commentary on the bill during the three readings is recorded
in Hansard, the official reporter of parliamentary debates. The vast majority of drafts
are public bills introduced by the government; there are also private bills and private
members’ bills. The main concern of this article, however, is parliamentary debates on
public bills.
It is noteworthy that speeches in Parliament on a statute made subsequent to its
enactment –
such as parliamentary statements during the debate on an unsuccessful
cannot be considered part of its legislative history.’3 Such
amendment to the statute –
speeches did not occur during the enactment, and are not antecedent to the crystalli-
sation of the words in the statute. Therefore, although they are recorded in Hansard,
they cannot be regarded as parliamentary debates on that particular legislation.
As a final preliminary remark, parliamentary debates –
or, more broadly, legisla-
tive history – must be distinguished from the so-called social-science data and other
factual materials that have played no role in the legislative process. Social-science
data can be introduced as evidence in certain courts, particularly in the United States,
in the form of a “Brandeis brief.”” They are, however, distinct from (and cannot be
considered part of) the legislative history of a statute.” Although they can have bear-
ing on the construction of a statute, social-science data are, in effect, facts submitted
” See generally J. Redlich, The Procedure of the House of Commons (London: Archibald Consta-
ble, 1908); and Sir D. Limon & W.R. McKay, eds., Erskine May’s Treatise on The Law, Privileges,
Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 22nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1997). On the materials re-
corded in the preparation and passing of a bill in Canada, see E.A. Driedger, “The Preparation of
Legislation” (1953) 31 Can. Bar Rev. 33.
‘2 See J.A. Corry, “The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes” (1954) 32 Can.
Bar Rev. 624 at 633. For more detail on the American process of law-making in Congress and in state
legislatures, see S. Breyer, “On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes” (1992) 65 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 845 at 858-59.
” See the Australian case of Hunter Resources v. Melville (1988), 62 A.LJ.R. 88 at 90, 164 C.L.R.
234, Mason CJ. and Gaudron J. See also P. Brazil, “Reform of Statutory Interpretation – The Aus-
tralian Experience of Use of Extrinsic Material: With a Postscript on Simpler Drafting” (1988) 32
Australian LJ. 503 at 509-10. In the United States, although the official position is against the use of
subsequent legislative history, courts nevertheless do sometimes consider it: see W.N. Eskridge, “The
New Textualism” (1990) 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621 at 635-36.
” This appellation originates from the case of Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), where L.D.
Brandeis, when he was an attorney, filed a brief in the United States Supreme Court which included
social-science data from books, articles and reports. The best known use of a Brandeis brief was in
the famous school desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686
(1954).
” See Hogg, supra note 6 at 1284.
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to the general rules of evidence. In contrast, legislative history materials are not facts
–
neither adjudicative nor legislative – but rather interpretive aids.”
Having defined the problem, the substantive elements of this article shall now be
outlined. Section I will examine the origin of the exclusionary rule on parliamentary
debates and its application in England. Then, Section II will give a brief account of
the situation in the common law jurisdictions of Australia, New Zealand, the United
States, and Canada. A broader perspective on the issue will follow in Section III,
which will look at the general methods of statutory construction and where parlia-
mentary debates fit in the picture. It will then be argued, in Section IV, that the central
question of the use of parliamentary debates in statutory interpretation is one of
weight and not of admissibility. For this purpose, the various rationales supporting the
exclusionary rule will be systematically examined. In conclusion, a guideline will be
proposed to help determine how much weight parliamentary debates should be given
in particular cases of statutory construction.
I. The Exclusionary Rule in England
In England, the traditional exclusionary rule on parliamentary debates prohibited
reference to parliamentary material as an aid to statutory interpretation. This rule was
judge-made,” and has not always applied. There are cases in the seventeenth and
nineteenth centuries where English courts used parliamentary materials in interpreting
a statute.’8
What appears to be the first explicit statement of the exclusionary rule was made
in the 1769 case of Millar v. Taylor,” which involved the interpretation of the Act for
the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors
or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned’ of 1709. Justice
Willes said, in obiter dictum:
The sense and meaning of an Act of Parliament must be collected from what it
says when passed into a law; and not from the history of changes it underwent
in the house where it took its rise. That history is not known to the other house,
or to the Sovereign.2′
This proposition, however, was not followed by Willes J. himself, as he subsequently
referred to the bill’s history, holding that the original preamble was “infinitely
t6 See Section IV, below.
“See Pepper, supra note 9 at 617, per Lord Griffiths, and at 630, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See
also D. Oliver, “Comment – Pepper v. Hart: A Suitable Case for Reference to Hansard?” [1993]
Pub. L. 5 at 7.
“‘ See Ash v. Abdy (1678), 3 Swans. 663, 36 E.R. 1014; and In Re Mew and Thorne (1862), 31 LJ.
Bank. 87, online: LEXIS (Enggen, CASES).
‘9 (1769), 4 Burr. 2303, 98 E.R. 201 [cited to E.R.].
2″ (U.K.) 8 Anne, c. 19 [known as the Copyright Act of 17091.
2,Supra note 19 at 217.
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S. BEAULAC – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
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stronger”.” Consequently, the very founding case on the exclusionary prohibition
seems to be of somewhat dubious origin.’
Although the exclusionary rule was subsequently relaxed in regard to the use of
commission reports’ (yet limited to elucidating the mischief at which legislation was
aimed, and not the legislative intent), it was upheld with respect to parliamentary de-
bates in Viscountess Rhondda’s Claim'” and Assam Railways.’ In the second half of
this century, the rule came under attack, but was unequivocally reiterated, in 1968, by
the House of Lords in Beswick v. Beswick,’ per Lord Reid.
Later that year, however, Lord Reid himself opined that there was “room for ex-
ception where examining the proceedings in Parliament would almost certainly settle
the matter immediately one way or another.”‘ As has been suggested this tentative ex-
ception was highly unsatisfactory, as it required that parliamentary materials be con-
sulted in every case in order to know whether they “settle the matter one way or the
other.” After consultation, there is no reason to use the debates only if they are com-
pelling and not if they are just persuasive.
In 1969, the English and Scottish Law Commissions considered the appropriate-
ness of the exclusionary rule.-‘ Primarily for practical reasons, they recommended that
the rule be maintained: “In considering the admissibility of Parliamentary proceed-
ings, it is necessary to consider how far the material admitted might be relevant to the
interpretive task of the courts, how far it would afford them reliable guidance, and
how far it would be sufficiently available to those to whom the statute is addressed?”
The Renton Committee, in 1975, also recommended that the exclusionary prohibition
on parliamentary debates not be modified.’- In 1980 and 1981, two interpretation bills
were introduced into the House of Lords to change the rule, both of which were
2 Ibid. at 217-18. See also the speech of Aston J., who referred to parliamentary debates as well.
Mansfield and Yates JJ., dissenting, did likewise.
See P. Brazil, “Legislative History and the Sure and True Interpretation of Statutes in General and
the Constitution in Particular” (1964) 4 U. Queensland LJ. 1 at 6; G. Bale, “Parliamentary Debates
and Statutory Interpretation: Switching on the Light or Rummaging in the Ashcans of the Legislative
Process” (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 1 at 4; and Charles, supra note 3 at 34.
24 See Herron, supra note 9; and Eastman Photographic Materials, supra note 9.
[1922] 2 A.C. 339 (H.L.).
“Supra note 9.
27 [1968] A.C. 58 at 74, [196712 All E.R. 1197 [cited to A.C.].
“Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1969] 2 A.C. 256 at 279, [1968] 2 All E.R. 356
(H.L.) [hereinafter Warner cited to A.C.].
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 131 at 136.
” P.W. Hogg, “Legislative History in Constitutional Cases” in RJ. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation
“See U.K., Law Commission, The Interpretation of Statutes (Law Commission No. 21) (London:
H.M.S.O., 1969); Scottish Law Commission, The Interpretation of Statutes (Scottish Law Commis-
sion No. 11) (London: H.M.S.O., 1968).
” U.K., Law Commission, ibid. at para. 53.
“See U.K., H.C., “The Preparation of Legislation: Report of a Committee Appointed by the Lord
President of the Council”, Cmnd 6053 in Sessional Papers, vol. 12 (1974-75) 545 (President: D.
Renton).
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aborted. The first bill was withdrawn during the second reading, while the second bill
passed all the stages in the House of Lords but did not prove successful in the Com-
mons.3
Meanwhile, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords expressly reaffirmed
the prohibition against the use of parliamentary debates as an aid to statutory inter-
pretation in two cases: Davis v. Johnson”4 and Hadmor Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton.”
The exclusionary rule could hardly have been stated more explicitly than in the latter
case, per Lord Diplock:
There are a series of rulings by this House, unbroken for a hundred years, and
most recently affirmed emphatically and unanimously in Davis v. Johnson, that
recourse to reports of proceedings in either House of Parliament during the
passing of a Bill which upon the signification of the Royal Assent became the
Act of Parliament which falls to be construed is not permissible as an aid to its
construction?
In 1989, the House of Lords again considered the question of the exclusionary prohi-
bition on parliamentary debates,” but the rule remained unchanged.
Thus, despite the repeated attacks on the exclusionary prohibition in its absolute
form, the prospect of any change to the rule – whether statutorily or judicially -ap-
peared to be slimY Indeed, the rule was described as “one of the best established of
our rules of statutory interpretation.”‘ Accordingly, the English legal community was,
to say the least, astonished by the paradigm-shift of the House of Lords in Pepper v.
Hart.?
The case of Pepper arose out of a benefits scheme for teachers employed at Mal-
vern College under which members of staff were entitled to have their children edu-
cated at twenty per cent of the fee charged to the public. The issue concerned two
possible rival interpretations of income tax enactments contained in the Finance Act
1976,” subjecting such benefits to income tax. The interpretation question revolved
around the meaning of the word “cost” in section 63 and, in particular, whether the
benefit should be taxed on the marginal cost of educating those children – which
would be a small sum –
or on the average cost for each pupil. The special commis-
– See, for the first bill, U.K., H.L, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 405, col. 151 at col. 306
(13 February 1980) and, for the second bill, U.K., H.C., Parliamentary Debates, 6th ser., vol. 6, col.
643 at col. 704 (12june 1981). See also EA.R. Bennion, “Another Reverse for the Law Commission’s
Interpretation Bill” (1981) 131 New L.J. 840.
(1978), [1979] A.C. 264, [1979] 1 All E.R. 1132 (H.L) [cited to A.C.].
(1982), [1983] 1 A.C. 191, [1982] 1 All E.R. 1042 (H.L) [cited to A.C.].
Ibid at 232 [footnotes omitted].
37See U.K., H.L., Parliamentary Debates, [10th ser.], vol. 503, col. 278 (18 January 1989).
See A. Lester, “English Judges as Law Makers” [1993] Pub. L. 269 at 274; and S.A. Girvin,
“Hansard and the Interpretation of Statutes” (1993) 22 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 475 at 481.
“‘ S.C. Styles, “The Rule of Parliament: Statutory Interpretation after Pepper v. Hart” (1993) 14 Ox-
ford J. Leg. St. 151 at 151.
40 Supra note 9.
41 (U.K.), 1976, c. 40.
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S. BEAULAC – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
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sioner found in favour of the taxpayer, holding the marginal cost basis applicable, but
this decision was reversed by Vinelott J.” in a judgement later confirmed by the Court
of Appeal.”
Pepper was first argued before the Appellate Committee in November 1991. In
February 1992, prior to judgement, it was decided that there should be a further hear-
ing before an Appellate Committee of seven Law Lords for the specific purpose of
considering whether to depart from the rule prohibiting the use of parliamentary de-
bates as an aid to statutory interpretation. Here, the relevant passages in Hansard were
statements made by the Financial Secretary when he withdrew a sub-clause from the
bill.” In reply to a specific question, he said that removing the sub-clause “will affect
the position of a child of one of the teachers at the child’s school, because now the
benefit will be assessed on the cost to the employer, which would be very small in-
deed in this case”‘ In November 1992, the House of Lords reversed the Court of Ap-
peal and unanimously found in favour of the taxpayer, holding that the benefit should
be taxed on the marginal cost basis. However, neither Lord Mackay nor Lord Griffiths
made reference to parliamentary materials in constructing their interpretation of the
Finance Act 1976.
With the exception of Lord Mackay, who dissented solely on the basis of practical
objections and not on principle, the Law Lords decided that the exclusionary prohibi-
tion on parliamentary debates should be relaxed and reference to Hansard permitted in
certain limited circumstances. Lord Browne-Wilkinson delivered the main speech and
set out the test as follows:
I therefore reach the conclusion, subject to any question of Parliamentary
privilege, that the exclusionary rule should be relaxed so as to permit reference
to Parliamentary materials where (a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or
leads to an absurdity; (b) the material relied upon consists of one or more
statements by a Minister or other promoter of the Bill together if necessary
with such other Parliamentary material as is necessary to understand such
statements and their effect; (c) the statements relied upon are clear.
In the case at hand, the statements made by the Financial Secretary clearly resolved an
ambiguity in the Finance Act 1976 and, as a consequence, it was appropriate to use
them as an aid to construction.
The rationales behind the exclusionary rule, the reasons to repudiate it, and the
pivotal speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson will be explored in more detail in Section
IV. In passing, the numerous notes and comments’7 on Pepper undoubtedly bear wit-
See Pepper v. Hart, [1990] 1 WL.R. 204 (Ch.).
See Pepper v. Hart, [1991] Ch. 203, [1991] 2 All E.R. 824 (C.A.).
“The said passages are reproduced in the reason of Lord Browne-Wilson in Pepper, supra note 9 at
626-29.
45 IbiL
‘6Pepper, ibid. at 640.
See T.SJ.N. Bates, “Parliamentary Material and Statutory Construction: Aspects of the Practical
Application of Pepper v. Hart” (1993) 14 Stat. L. Rev. 46; D. Miers, “Taxing Perks and Interpreting
Statutes: Pepper v. Hart” (1993) 56 Mod. L. Rev. 695; EA.R. Bennion, “Hansard – Help or Hin-
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ness to how much this decision constitutes a break point, a paradigm shift, a volte-
face, in English law.”
The next Section will provide a brief account of the situation in other common
law jurisdictions regarding the use of parliamentary debates in statutory interpretation.
II. The Exclusionary Rule in Other Common Law Jurisdictions
Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada, all inherited, and origi-
nally applied, the British exclusionary prohibition. The following discussion will em-
phasise the particularities of each country in developing their own rule on parliamen-
tary debates.
A. Australia
Prior to the legislative reform of 1984, the common law rule in Australia prohib-
ited the use of parliamentary debates for the construction of statutes.’ In 1977, Mason
J. (as he then was) wrote, in Commissioner for Prices & Consumer Affairs (S.A.) v.
Charles Moore (Aust.) Ltd.,’ that the exclusionary rule “is so firmly entrenched that
the courts should not depart from it, notwithstanding that it may in isolated cases pro-
duce unintended results. It is, I think, peculiarly a matter for Parliament to decide'”
This is, indeed, what the Australian legislature did.
The Commonwealth of Australia, as well as the states of New South Wales, Vic-
toria, Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, have all enacted legisla-
tion altering the rule on the use of extrinsic materials, including parliamentary de-
bates, in statutory interpretation. Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and the
Northern Territory have not yet amended their legislation in similar respects; and thus
the common law rule – most likely as modified by Pepper –
is still applicable.
Except for the State of Victoria – whose legislation does not prescribe the pur-
poses for which reference to extrinsic aids may be made –
the provisions of these
various interpretation acts are substantially similar. At the federal level, section 15AB
was inserted in the Acts Interpretation Act, 1901 by the Acts Interpretation Amend-
mentAct 1984, section 7 2 Both the underlying philosophy and the drafting of section
drance? A Draftsman’s View of Pepper v. Hart” (1993) 14 Stat. L. Rev. 149 [hereinafter “Hansard –
Help or Hindrance?”]; JI.: Baker, “Case and Comment – Statutory Interpretation and Parliamentary
Intention” (1993) 52 Cambridge L.J. 353; Oliver, supra note 17; and Styles, supra note 39.
‘ See Girvin, supra note 38 at 494.
41 See South Australia v. Commonwealth, [1942] C.L.R. 373, online: LEXIS (Aust, AUSMAX); and
Dugan v. Mirror Newspapers Ltd. (1978), 142 C.L.R. 583, 22 A.L.R. 439. See also D. Gifford,
Statutory Interpretation (Sidney: Law Book, 1990) at 130; Brazil, supra note 13; and Pearce & Ged-
des, supra note 7.
“(1977), 51 A.LJ.R. 715, 14 A.L.R. 485 [cited to A.LI.R.].
5 ibid. at 729.
52Acts Interpretation Act, 1901 (Austl.), online: Australasian Legal
Institute
(date accessed: 14 July
1998); Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 1981 (Austl.), online: Australasian Legal Information In-
Information
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15AB were highly influenced by articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.53 Section 15AB allows the consideration of extrinsic materials for two
purposes. First, to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning
conveyed by the text, taking into account its context and the purpose of the act. Sec-
ond, to determine the meaning of the provision when it is ambiguous or obscure, or
when the ordinary meaning leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
The provision then provides a non-exhaustive list of eight categories of materials
which may be considered, including explanatory memoranda and parliamentary de-
bates (or, more specifically, the second-reading speech of the minister). In determin-
ing whether or not to use such materials and in deciding the weight to assign to them,
due regard must be paid to: i) the desirability of people being able to rely on the ordi-
nary meaning of the text, and ii) the need to avoid prolonging proceedings without
compensating advantages.”
Two further points are worth making at this stage. First, under section 15AB of
the Acts Interpretation Ac4 1901, ‘ extrinsic materials may be taken into account even
if the statutory provision is “clear on its face.”‘ In other words, there is no formal re-
quirement to establish the existence of an ambiguity before resorting to extrinsic aids.
In such cases, however, extrinsic materials can only be used to confirm the literal
meaning of the provision, they cannot contradict the language used in the statute.7
Second, even in situations where the use of extrinsic aids is appropriate, they can only
be persuasive, and not determinative.’ This makes it clear that extrinsic materials,
such as parliamentary debates, are just another interpretive tool to ascertain legislative
intent.
B. New Zealand
In 1990, the New Zealand Law Commission reported that “a prohibitory rule has
never been clearly established
in New Zealand?”” To confirm this statement, the
Commission cited several decisions.” It further opined that “[a]ccess to legislative
stitute
cessed: 14 July 1998).
(date ac-
” 23 May 1969, Can. T.S. 1980 No. 37, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332. See generally Pearce & Geddes, supra
note 7 at 45.
“See J. Evans, Statutory Interpretation: Problems of Communication (Auckland: Oxford -Univer-
sity Press, 1988) at 279-80; Gifford, supra note 49 at 126-29; and Brazil, supra note 13 at 503-04.
55Supra note 52.
See Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v. Curran (1984), 55 A.L.R. 697 at 706-07, 3
F.C.R. 240 [hereinafter Curran cited to A.L.R.].
“‘ See Re Australian Federation of Construction Contractors; Ex parte Billing (1986), 68 A.L.R.
416 at 420, online: LEXIS (Aust, AUSMAX) [cited to A.L.R.]; and Mills v. Meeking (1990), 91
A.L.R. 16 at 21, 169 C.L.R. 214 [cited to A.L.R.].
“See R. v. Bolton; Exparte Beane (1987), 70 A.L.R. 225 at 227-28, 162 C.L.R. 514.
” New Zealand Law Commission, A New Interpretation Act (Report No. 17) (Wellington: The
Commission, 1990) at 50.
” See ReA.B. (1905), 25 N.Z.L.R. 299; Monk v. Mowlem, [1933] N.Z.L.R. 1255; Police v. Thomas,
[1977] 1 N.Z.LR. 109; and Levave v. Immigration Department, [197912 N.Z.L.R. 74.
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History is now beyond doubt part of the law and practice of the interpretation of leg-
islation in New Zealand.”‘ The situation may not, however, be as clear as the Com-
mission believes.
Early judgements by New Zealand courts held that parliamentary debates could
not be used as an aid to statutory interpretation. ‘2 As one commentator notes, however,
a trend towards allowing the use of parliamentary debates as an aid to statutory inter-
pretation commenced in 1985. ‘ This shift occurred without any legislative reform and
was the product of a series of decisions rendered by the New Zealand Court of Ap-
peal.” Even then, as the following excerpt shows, the use of parliamentary debates to
construe statutes was not without limits:
Whilst the Court is prepared to look at reports of Parliamentary debates in
some cases, this development is certainly not intended to encourage constant
references to Hansard and indirect arguments therefrom. Only material of ob-
vious and direct importance is at all likely to be considered; and the Court will
not allow such references to be imported into and to lengthen arguments as a
matter of course.”
In any event, for present purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge that in New
Zealand the modification of the exclusionary prohibition on parliamentary debates has
been more or less achieved, not through legislative reform, but through judicial deci-
sions.” In fact, the New Zealand Law Commission recommended that the interpreta-
tion act not be amended to include provisions comparable to section 15AB of the Acts
Interpretation Ac4 1901 in Australia, and that the courts be allowed to continue to de-
velop its own rule on the use of parliamentary debates as an aid to statutory construc-
tion.’
C. The United States
Initially, the United States adhered strictly to the English rule prohibiting the use
of parliamentary debates in statutory interpretation. ‘ In 1860, the United States Su-
preme Court relied on congressional debates for the first time.” Throughout the re-
61 New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 59 at 50.
,See Otago Land Board v. Higgins (1884), N.Z.LR. 3 at 80 (C.A.); Hamilton Gas Co. v. Mayor of
Hamilton (1908), 27 N.Z.L.R. 1020 at 1030-31.
See Evans, supra note 54 at 280.
See Proprietors ofAtihau-Wanganui v. Malpas, [19851 2 N.Z.LR. 468; Marac Life Assurance v.
Commission of Inland Revenue (1986), 1 N.Z.LR. 694; Maori Council v. A.G. (1987), 1 N.Z.LR.
641.
” A.G. v. Whangerei City Council, [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 150.
6″See Evans, supra note 54 at 280.
61See New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 59 at 50-51.
See Mitchell v. Great Works Milling Co., Fed. Cas. No. 9662, (1843) online: LEXIS (Genfed,
US); and Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9 (1845). See also J. TenBroek, “Admissibility of
Congressional Debates in Statutory Construction by the United States Supreme Court” (1937) 25 Cal.
L Rev. 326.
69 See Dubuque & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Litchfield, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 66 (1860).
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S. BEAULAC – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
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mainder of the nineteenth century, judicial willingness to consult legislative history
increased, although contradictory views were expressed.'” Slowly, it was becoming the
rule, rather than the exception, for American courts to consult legislative materials.
In 1892, the Supreme Court explicitly allowed itself to resort to congressional de-
bates as an aid to interpret an ambiguous statutory provision’ The next step, permit-
ting the use of such materials for unambiguous statutes, was predictably endorsed by
the Supreme Court in 1928.’ ” This culminated in 1940 with the repudiation of the ex-
clusionary rule in United States v. American Trucking Associations,7′ where Reed J.,
in a majority judgement, stated: “[Tihere certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which for-
bids [the use of legislative history], however clear the words may appear on ‘superfi-
cial examination.”
It appears, therefore, that ever since the nineteenth century, there
was a definite increase in the consultation of congressional debates by the judiciary in
the United States.7
As statistical surveys of Supreme Court opinions demonstrate, the use of all forms
of legislative history has increased exponentially. In 1938, the Court consulted legis-
lative history nineteen times; by the 1970s, three to four hundred references were
made each term.” In 1983, Wald J. wrote that “no occasion for statutory construction
now exists when the court will not look at the legislative history.”‘ The American
practice inspired the sarcastic comment that “only when legislative history is doubtful
do you go to the statute.””‘
The situation has produced a ricochet
in academic circles,’ which now
discuss a return to a stricter rule on the use of legislative history in statutory construc-
tion.’ Recent complaints about the overuse of such materials were heard by Scalia J.
” See e-g. United States v. Union Pacific, 91 U.S. 72, L. Ed. 224 (1875); and United States v. Trans-
Missouri FreightAssociation, 166 U.S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 590 (1897).
71 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511 (1892).
7- See Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 519, 48 S. Ct. 121 (1928).
7-‘310 U.S. 534, 60 S. Ct. 1059 (1939).
‘Ibid. at 545.
7′ See H.W. Jones, “Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts” (1940) 25 Iowa L. Rev. 737 at 743-50.
76 See J.L. Carro & A.R. Brann, “The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A
Statistical Analysis” (1982) 22 Jurimetrics J. 294 at 298.
“P.M. Wald, “Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term” (1983) 68 Iowa L Rev. 195 at 195 [emphasis in original]. For further statistics, see P.M. Wald,
“The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of
the United States Supreme Court” (1990) 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 277 [hereinafter “The Sizzling Sleeper”].
7’ Frankfurter, supra note 4 at 543. Despite that this quip was first formulated by an American
author, many believe that it comes from Corry, supra note 12 at 636. See K.W. Starr, “Observations
About the Use of Legislative History” [1987] Duke LJ. 371 at 374; and Wald, “The Sizzling
Sleeper”, ibid. at 281. For a Canadian commentator, see Dickerson, supra note 5 at 164.
See especially Dickerson, ibid. at 174-75; R. Dickerson, “Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into
Legislative History” (1983) 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 1125 at 1131-33; and Eskridge, supra note 13 at 641-
42.
‘ See N. Zeppos, “Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding
Model of Statutory Interpretation” (1990) 76 Va. L. Rev. 1295; H.W. Baade, “Original Intent in His-
torical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses” (1991) 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1001; W.D. Slawson, “Legislative
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of the United States Supreme Court who has taken a forceful stand against its consid-
eration. He has argued for the disregard of congressional debates in the great majority
of cases, except on the rare occasion when the statutory text is absurd on its face.”‘
Other members of the Court, in particular Kennedy J., have occasionally endorsed
Scalia J.’s view. This attitude regarding legislative history falls within the approach to
statutory interpretation called “new textualism”,”‘ which shares both the philosophy
and the partisans of the “originalist” method of constitutional interpretation.”
Thus, the American position on the role of congressional debates in statutory in-
terpretation remains highly permissive,” although the textualists are on the march. In
effect, their use is in decline and a certain tone of caution can be detected in almost
every case where the Supreme Court resorts to legislative history.” This gradual swing
of the pendulum to a more exclusionary approach should be regarded as a warning for
other common law jurisdictions to take notice in monitoring the scope of Pepper.’
D. Canada
In Canada, the judicial consideration of parliamentary debates in statutory inter-
pretation is typified by its evolution through constitutional challenges of legislation.
At first glance, the treatment of parliamentary debates by Canadian courts seems to
depend on whether they are used i) as an aid to interpreting legislation; ii) for consti-
tutional characterisation of statutes; or, iii) to help construe the Canadian Constitution.
Each of these classes of cases will be examined in turn.
History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation under the Rule of Law” (1992) 44 Stan. L.
Rev. 383; WD. Slawson, “Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today”
(1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1005; PC. Schanck, “The Use of Legislative Histories in Statutory Inter-
pretation: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography” (1993) 13 Leg. Ref. Ser. Q. 5-14; Starr, supra
note 78; Breyer, supra note 12.
“‘For a list of these cases, see Eskridge, supra note 13 at n. 116.
See ibid. at 650-56; and “The Sizzling Sleeper”, supra note 77 at 281-86. The following excerpt
from Scalia J.’s reasons in Green v. Bock Laundry Mad. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989), summarises well
the “textualist” approach:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of
which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the
Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord
with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the
whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens
subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the
provision must be integrated –
a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume
Congress always has in mind (ibid. at 528 [emphasis in original]).
“The originalist approach will be examined in more detail at the end of Section III, below.
“The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the more conventional approach towards the use of
legislative history in Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989),
and has still not departed from it.
‘”See “The Sizzling Sleeper”, supra note 77 at 309-10.
Supra note 9; see Girvin, supra note 38 at 486.
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For the construction of statutes, the English exclusionary rule on parliamentary
debates still appears to be officially applicable in Canada.’ The Supreme Court of
Canada first enunciated the exclusionary prohibition in R. v. Gosselin,’ albeit in a
somewhat equivocal matter, when Tachereau C.J. wrote: “I did not feel justified in de-
parting from the rule so laid down, though, personally, I would not be unwilling, in
cases of ambiguity in statutes, to concede that such a reference might sometimes be
useful.”‘7 In Canadian Wheat Board v. Nolan,’ both the Supreme Court and the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council refused to consider the speech of the Minister of
Agriculture in interpreting an order-in-council adopted pursuant to a statute?’
The exclusionary rule was then gradually relaxed in Canada, first by lower
courts, ‘ and ultimately by the Supreme Court in R. v. Vasil.’ In this case, Justice
Lamer (as he then was) used parliamentary materials to interpret the phrase “unlawful
object” in section 212(c) of the Canadian Criminal Code.’ Speaking for the majority,
he said:
Reference to Hansard is not usually advisable. However, as Canada has, at the
time of codification, subject to few changes, adopted the English Draft Code of
1878, it is relevant to know whether Canada did so in relation to the various
sections for the reasons advanced by the English Commissioners or for reasons
of its own.
Indeed, a reading of Sir John Thompson’s comments in Hansard of April 12,
1892, (House of Commons Debates, Dominion of Canada, Session 1892, vol.
I, at pp. 1378-85) very clearly confirms that all that relates to murder was taken
directly from the English Draft Code of 1878. Sir John Thompson explained
the proposed murder sections by frequently quoting verbatim the reasons given
by the Royal Commissioners in Great Britain, and it is evident that Canada
,7See P.A. C6t6, Interpretation des lois, 2d ed. (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1991) at 414; and Sulli-
van, supra note 3 at 435.
‘7(1903), 33 S.C.R. 255,7 C.C.C. 139 [cited to S.C.R.].
lbid. at 264.
[1951) S.C.R. 81, [1951] 1 D.L.R. 466, rev’d (sub nom. Canada (A.G.) v. Hallet & Carey Ltd.)
[1952] A.C. 427, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 433 (P.C.).
” See K.C. Davis, “Legislative History and the Wheat Board Case” (1953) 31 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
Davis forcefully argued, however, that had the Judicial Committee considered the legislative history in
question, it could not have arrived at the conclusion it reached. For a contrary view of the case, see
D.G. Kilgour, “The Rule Against the Use of Legislative History: ‘Canon of Construction or Counsel
of Caution’?” (1952) 30 Can. Bar Rev. 769 at 779; see also J.T. MacQuarrie, “The Use of Legislative
History” (1952) 30 Can. Bar Rev. 958.
“See e-g. R. v. Stevenson and McLean (1980), 57 C.C.C. (2d) 526, 19 C.R. (3d) 74 (Ont. C.A.),
where the Ontario Court of Appeal cited with approval the statement by Lord Reid in Warner, supra
note 27 at 279, that parliamentary materials might be used where their consultation might “settle the
matter immediately one way or the other.” See also R. v. Board of Broadcast Governors, Ex parte
Swift Current Telecasting Co. (1961), [1962] O.R. 657,31 D.L.R. (2d) 385 (Ont. H.C.).
0 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 469, 121 D.L.R. (3d) 41 [hereinafter Vasil cited to S.C.R.]. For a case comment
on this decision, see G. Parker, Case Comment (1982) 60 Can. Bar Rev. 502.
m R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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adopted not only the British Commissioners’ proposed sections but also their
reasons. s
Although reference to parliamentary debates “is not usually advisable”, lower courts
have liberally followed this new line of jurisprudence.’
It appears that the willingness to consider parliamentary debates in statutory con-
struction was strongly influenced by the development and the characterisation of stat-
utes for constitutional purposes. There are two contexts in which parliamentary de-
bates may be useful for the constitutional characterisation of statutes: first, in division
of legislative competence cases, to help identify the pith and substance of the chal-
lenged statute to determine if it comes within the powers of the enacting legislative
body; and, second, in cases involving the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
to decide whether the object of the challenged statute infringes a guaranteed right and,
if so, whether the infringement is justifiable under the limitation clause in section 1 of
the Charter.”
For a long time, however, the exclusionary prohibition applied mutatis mutandis
to constitutional cases.” In 1961, the Supreme Court of Canada clearly set out the rule
in Canada (A.G.) v. Reader’s Digest Association (Canada) Ltd., per Cartwright J.:
While I have reached the conclusion that the evidence in question [parliamen-
tary debates] in this appeal is inadmissible as a matter of law under the authori-
ties and on principle and not from a consideration of inconvenience that would
result from a contrary view, it may be pointed out that if it were held that the
Minister’s statement should be admitted there would appear to be no ground on
which anything said in either house between the introduction of the Bill and its
final passing into a law could be excluded.”
In a series of cases on division of legislative competence under the Constitution
Ac4 1867,”‘ the Supreme Court of Canada expressed the view that extrinsic aids, in-
9″Supra note 93 at 487 [emphasis added]. See also R. v. Paul, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 621, 138 D.LR. (3d)
455.
“See eg. Babineau v. Babineau (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 545, 122 D.L.R. (3d) 508 (H.C.), aff’d
(1982), 37 O.R. (2d) 527, 133 D.LR. (3d) 767 (C.A.); New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Canadian
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, [1984] 2 F.C. 410, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 77 (C.A.);
Canada (A.G.) v. Young, [1989] 3 F.C. 647, 100 N.R. 333 (C.A.); Swan v. Canada (Minister of Trans-
port), [1990] 2 F.C. 409, 61 D.LR. (4th) 390 (T.D.); and Vaillancourt v. M.N.R., [1991] 3 F.C. 663,
132 N.R. 133 (C.A.).
“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter] stipulates that “The Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic so-
ciety.’ See Hogg, supra note 6 at 1284-85.
“See Texada Mines v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1960] S.C.R. 713 at 720,24 D.L.R. (2d) 81.
[1961] S.C.R. 775, 30 D.L.R. (2d) 296 at 793 [hereinafter Reader’s Digest cited to S.C.R.]. For a
case comment on this decision, see M. Rosenstein, “The Attorney-General of Canada v. The Reader’s
Digest Association (Canada) Ltd., S61ection du Reader’s Digest (Canada) Lt6e” (1961-62) 8 McGill
LJ. 62.
” (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
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cluding parliamentary debates, should not be excluded as a matter of course. This
trend began in 1975 with the Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act (Canada),’ where La-
skin J. (as he then was) urged for a more flexible approach with regard to extrinsic
materials. In Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act 1971 (Ontario),” Dickson J. (as
he then was) reiterated the occasional need to refer to extrinsic aids in interpreting
statutes. However, he also stated that “speeches made in the Legislature at the time of
enactment of the measure are inadmissible as having little evidential weight.”” This
holding appears to confuse the question of whether it is permissible for courts to use
parliamentary debates, with the question of the weight that ought to be attributed to
them. In 1982, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions citing Residential Ten-
ancies as authority for the use of legislative history to constitutionally characterise
statutes to determine legislative competence.”
In Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act (Newfoundland),” McIntyre J.
stated that extrinsic materials, including parliamentary debates, could be used to show
the historical background against which the legislation was enacted, but not as an aid
to construction.”‘ This distinction between the background and the meaning of legis-
lation –
similar to that between the mischief and the remedy of a statute, in the con-
text of commission reports 7 – was the last vestige of the strict exclusionary rule. The
Supreme Court finally eliminated it in R. v. Morgentaler, per Sopinka J.:
The former exclusionary rule regarding evidence of legislative history [has]
gradually been relaxed … but until recently the courts have balked at admitting
evidence of legislative debates and speeches … The main criticism of such evi-
dence has been that it cannot represent the “intent” of the legislature, an incor-
poreal body, but that is equally true of other forms of legislative history. Pro-
vided that the court remains mindful of the limited reliability and weight of
Hansard evidence, it should be admitted as relevant to both the background
and the purpose of legislation. Indeed, its admissibility in constitutional cases
to aid in determining the background and purpose of legislation now appears
well established.””
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452. For case comments on this decision, see E.G. Hudon,
Case Comment (1977) 55 Can. Bar Rev. 370; and R.B. Buglass, “The Use of Extrinsic Evidence and
the Anti-Inflation Act Reference” (1977) 9 Ottawa L. Rev. 182.
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 123 D.LR. (3d) 554 [hereinafter Residential Tenancies cited to S.C.R.].
“”Ibid. at 721.
“,”See Reference Re Proposed Federal Tax on Exported Natural Gas, [19821 1 S.C.R. 1004 at 1048,
136 D.L.R. (3d) 385; and Schneider v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112 at 130-31, 139
D.L.R. (3d) 417.
“”[1984] 1 S.C.R. 297,8 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [cited to S.C.R.].
See ibid. at 318.
“”See supra note 9.
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 at 484, 107 D.L.R. (4th) 537 [emphasis added].
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The general nature of the above statement regarding parliamentary debates seems to
allow their use, not only for constitutional characterisation of legislation, but also to
construe statutes.”w
In cases under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court
was quick to hold that parliamentary debates could be used to determine whether the
object of the challenged statute infringed a guaranteed right and, if so, whether the
limit placed upon that right could be justified under section 1 of the Charter.”” This
comes as no surprise given that the process of classification for Charter-review is very
similar to the process of classification for division of legislative competence-review,”‘
and the jurisprudential developments in competence-review cases.
The recent decision of the Court in R. v. Heywood'”2 is very enlightening on the
Canadian position. The case examined whether or not section 179(1)(b) of the Crimi-
nal Code, which prohibits convicted sexual offenders from loitering in school yards,
playgrounds and public parks, violated certain Charter rights. Although this was a
Charter case, the Court was asked to use parliamentary debates, not to determine if
the object of the provision infringed a guaranteed right or whether the restriction was
justifiable under section 1, but rather to decide, as a matter of statutory construction,
what the word “loiter” meant in the context of section 179(1)(b) of the Criminal
Code. In other words, despite its appearance, this was a case of pure statutory inter-
pretation.
Justice Cory, writing for the majority, carried out an extensive review of the case
law on the use of parliamentary debates in the context of constitutional characterisa-
tion for division of legislative competence and for Charter-review purposes, as well as
statutory interpretation in general.”‘ The Court held that it was not necessary to decide
whether parliamentary debates could help interpret the provision at stake because in
the instant case they were not conclusive. The irony is that Cory J. then proceeded to
examine the said debates in order to support his conclusion.”‘ This decision clearly
indicates that the Supreme Court of Canada is on the verge of taking the leap and
” Recently, however, in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [19951 3 S.C.R. 199 at 242, 127
D.L.R. (4th) 1, La Forest J., dissenting in the result, seemed to go back to a more restrictive rule when
he wrote: “I note in passing the well-established principle that a court is entitled, in a pith and sub-
stance analysis, to refer to extrinsic materials, such as related legislation, Parliamentary debates and
evidence of the ‘mischief’ at which the legislation is directed.”
“”See R. v. Edwards Books & Art Lt,
[19861 2 S.C.R. 713 at 749, 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1; R. v. Whyte,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 at 24-25,51 D.L.R. (4th) 481; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
at 983-84, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577; and Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at
1371-72, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577.
.. See Hogg, supra note 29 at 143-44.
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 348 [cited to S.C.R.].
‘”See ibid. at 788-89.
“.. See ibid. at 789.
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holding that, as for constitutional characterisation, parliamentary debates can be util-
ised as an aid to statutory construction.”-
Finally, a brief note on the use of parliamentary debates in the interpretation of
the Canadian Constitution itself is in order. As regards the Constitution Act, 1867,””
the issue has seldom arisen, probably because of the sparse records of legislative his-
tory.”‘ Given the general exclusionary rule on parliamentary debates as an aid to
statutory construction, it is not surprising that such legislative history could not ini-
tially be used to interpret the Constitution Act, 1867.” However, in a series of cases
starting in 1975, the Supreme Court of Canada did have recourse to such legislative
history.” For instance, in the Senate Reference, the Supreme Court stated:
It is, we think, proper to consider the historical background which led to the
provision which was made in the Act for the creation of the Senate as a part of
the apparatus for the enactment of federal legislation. In the debates which oc-
curred at the Quebec Conference in 1864, considerable time was occupied in
discussing the provisions respecting the Senate.’2″
With regard to the Constitution Act, 1982,”‘ there are abundant records of the
legislative history leading up to adoption of this Act.’ – In light of the decisions re-
garding the Constitution Act, 1867, there is little doubt that such materials can be used
as an aid to interpret the Constitution Act, 1982.
“” See also, of similar circumstances and reasoning, R. v. Mailloux, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1029 at 1042,
89 N.R. 222; and R. v. Sullivan, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 489 at 502-03, 122 N.R. 166.
“‘ Supra note 100.
“7 There were three constitutional conferences that led to Confederation: Charlottetown (1864),
Quebec (1864), and London, England (1866). The records of them are very scanty indeed. The de-
bates in the British Parliament are available in the United Kingdom Hansard of 1867.
“” See Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 A.C. 575, 56 LJ.P.C. 87, 9 C.R.A.C. 296 (P.C.); and
Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1912] A.C. 571, 2 C.R.A.C. 89 (P.C.). On the early use of legisla-
tive history to interpret the Constitution Act 1867, supra note 100, see V.C. MacDonald, “Constitu-
tional Interpretation and Extrinsic Evidence” (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 77; and B. Laskin, Canadian
ConstitutionalLaw, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1975) at 59-65.
“” See Jones v. New Brunswick (A.G.), [19751 2 S.C.R. 182 at 194, 45 D.L.R. (3d) 583; Di Jorio v.
Warden of the Common Jail of the City of Montreal, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 152 at 200, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 491;
Quebec (A.G.) v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 at 1017, 101 D.L.R. (3d) 394; Reference Re Legisla-
tive Authority of the Parliament of Canada in Relation to the Upper House (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54
at 66-67, 102 D.L.R. (3d) 1 [hereinafter Senate Reference cited to S.C.R.]; Canada (A.G.) v. Cana-
dian National Transportation Ltd, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206 at 226, 3 D.L.R. (4th) 16; MacDonald v.
Montreal (City oj), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460 at 494, 27 D.L.R. (4th) 321; and Reference Re Bill 30 An Act
toAmend the EducationAct (Ontario), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 at 1173-74,40 D.L.R. (4th) 18. See also
E Vaughan, “The Use of History in Canadian Constitutional Adjudication” (1989) 12 Dalhousie LJ.
59.
Senate Reference, ibid. at 66.
Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
In fact, there exists the text of no less than seven versions of the Constitution Act, 1982. The text
of all versions is reproduced in R. Elliot, “Interpreting the Charter – Use of the Earlier Versions as an
Aid” (1982) U.B.C. L Rev. 11. There are also extensive parliamentary debates both in the Federal
Parliament and in that of the United Kingdom: see Hogg, supra note 29 at 147-48.
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This conclusion is supported by several cases dealing with the Charter which
have allowed reference to legislative history to interpret the language of the Charter
itself.'” In the Motor Vehicle Reference,”‘ the Court held that the proceedings and evi-
dence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on
the Constitution could be used to assist courts in interpreting the Charter. It was made
explicit, however, that the Court would not attach much weight to such materials. In
the words of Lamer J. (as he then was):
Were this Court to accord any significant weight to this testimony, it would in
effect be assuming a fact which is nearly impossible of proof, i.e., the intention
of the legislative bodies which adopted the Charter. In view of the indetermi-
nate nature of the data, it would in my view be erroneous to give these materi-
als anything but minimal weight.'”
The question of weight necessitates a brief discussion of the general principles of
constitutional interpretation in Canada. Simply put, legislative history of the Constitu-
tion can be either conclusive or indicative. The former view suggests that courts are
bound to the original understanding of the constitutional text; this is analogous to
what is described in the United States as “originalism”.’6 The latter view suggests that
legislative history constitutes one of the relevant elements to construe the constitu-
tional provision.
Given that legislative history could not traditionally be used in interpreting the
Constitution, originalism has never had any support in Canada.’-7 Canadian courts
have instead favoured a progressive interpretation, that is, a construction which does
not freeze the language of the Constitution in time but adapts it to new conditions and
new ideas. This approach was eloquently formulated by Lord Sankey in Edwards v.
Canada (A.G.):
“The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree ca-
“2 See R. v. Dubois, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350 at 360, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 503; Reference Re Motor Vehicle
Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 504-507, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536 [hereinafter Motor Vehicle Reference
cited to S.C.R.]; United States v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 at 1479-80,96 N.R. 321; Mahd v.Al-
berta, [19901 1 S.C.R. 342,68 D.L.R. (4th) 69.
24 Ibida
, Ibid. at 508-509.
‘ See R. Berger, Government by Judiciary, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) c. 20; R.H. Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems” (1971) 47 Ind. LJ. 2; A. Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil” (1989) 57 U.
Cin. L Rev. 869; R.S. Kay, “Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication”
(1988) 82 NW. U. L Rev. 226; and M.W. McConnell, “Originalism and the Desegregation Doctrine”
(1995) 81 Va. L Rev. 947.
‘2 See Hogg, supra note 6 at 1288; and Laskin, supra note 118 at 59-65. In fact, even in the United
States, originalism is rejected by a majority of legal scholars: see P. Brest, “The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding” (1980) 60 Boston U. L Rev. 204; R. Dworkin, “The Forum of Prin-
ciple” (1981) 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469; HJ. Powell, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent”
(1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885; R.A. Posner, “Bork and Beethoven” (1990) 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1365; and
Symposium, “Originalism, Democracy and the Constitution” (1996) 19 Harv. J. L & Pub. Pol’y
237ff, especially C.R. Sunstein, “Five Theses on Originalism” (1996) 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 311.
” [1930] A.C. 121 at 136, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 98 (P.C.).
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S. BEAULAC – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
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pable of growth and expansion within its natural limits.”” As Hogg phrases it, “The
principle of progressive interpretation is flatly inconsistent with originalism, the
whole point of which is to deny that the courts have the power to adapt the Constitu-
tion to new conditions and new ideas.”‘ ” Accordingly, as illustrated by Lamer J.’s rea-
sons in the Motor Vehicle Reference,”‘ legislative history of the Canadian Constitution
plays a minimal role in its interpretation.
In summary, the practice in Canada with regard to the use of parliamentary de-
bates as an aid to statutory interpretation has been strongly influenced by the consid-
eration of such debates for the characterisation of statutes in constitutional challenges.
Perhaps it is time that the Supreme Court address the issue of whether it is permissible
to refer to parliamentary debates to ascertain the meaning of statutory provisions. Al-
though this step seems imminent –
in view of Cory J.’s reasons in R. v. Heywood.’
leaving the question unresolved undoubtedly inhibits legal certainty, especially as
–
it relates to the methodology of statutory interpretation and not merely to a substantive
law principle.’
Analysis of the Canadian approach would be incomplete without a word on the
contended differing approach prevailing in Quebec, the province whose private law is
based on a French-style civil law system. Briefly, the traditional civil law permits un-
limited use of legislative history –
in inter-
preting statutes and accords to this extrinsic material considerable persuasive force.”
Although this position is generally accepted in construing Quebec private law legisla-
tion,”‘ the Supreme Court of Canada recently warned, in Construction Gilles Paquette
Ltde v. Entreprises Vdgo Ltde, that “[p]arliamentary debates surrounding the enact-
ment of legislation must be read with caution, because they are not always a reliable
the so-called travaux prdparatoires –
“‘ This illustration has been recently reiterated by McLachlin J. in Reference Re Electoral Bounda-
ries Commission Act (Saskatchewan), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 at 180, 81 D.L.R. (4th) 16.
“‘ Hogg, supra note 6 at 1290.
3 Supra note 123 at 508-09.
“Supra note 112.
L’Heureux-Dub6 J., dissenting in 2747-3174 Qudbec Inc. v. Qudbec (Rdgie des permis d’alcool),
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 919 at 995, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [hereinafter Rdgie des permis cited to S.C.R.], ac-
knowledges the importance of setting out the rules of statutory construction in order to avoid “a
Humpty-Dumpty-like interpretation exercise” (at 1008-09).
‘m See F G6ny, Mdthode d’interprdtation et sources en droit privdpositif, t. 1, 2d ed. (Paris: Librai-
rie gdn6rale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1919) at 293ff; and M. Couderc, “Les travaux prdparatoires
de la loi ou la remont6e des enfers” D.1975.Chron.249. It is noteworthy, however, that in 1935, the
authoritative French legal scholar Henri Capitant deplored such a situation and praised the English
exclusionary rule: see H. Capitant, “L’interprdtation des lois d’apr~s les travaux pr6paratoires”
D.H.1935.Chron.77. On the situation in other European civil law countries, see S. Str6mholm, “Leg-
islative Material and Construction of Statutes – Notes on the Continental Approach” (1966) 10
Scandinavian Studies in Law 173.
‘3 See FP. Walton, The Scope and Interpretation of the Civil Code of Lower Canada (Montreal:
Wilson & Lafleur, 1907) at 80ff; P.B. Mignault, “Le Code civil de la province de Qu6bec et son inter-
pr6tation” (1935-36) 1 U.T. UI. 104 at 114ff; S. Normand, “Les
travaux pr6paratoires et
I’interpr6tation du Code civil du Qudbec” (1986) 27 C. de D. 347; and C6t, supra note 87 at 395. See
also A.-F. Bisson, “Pr6ambules et d6clarations de motifs ou objets” (1980) 40 R. du B. 58 at 65.
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In another recent case, Dord v. Verdun (City
source for the legislature’s intention.””
of,’ the Supreme Court discussed the weight to attribute to the Commentaires du
ministre on the Civil Code of Quibec, comments whose status differs somewhat from
the usual travaux priparatoires given that they were published after the adoption of
the C.C.Q.”‘ Starting from the premise that such materials could be utilised, Gonthier
J., for the Court, stated the following caveat:
Of course, the interpretation of the Civil Code must be based first and foremost
on the wording of its provisions. That said, however, and as noted by Baudouin
J.A. in the judgment under appeal, there is no reason to systematically disre-
gard the Minister’s commentaries, since they can sometimes be helpful in de-
termining the legislature’s intention, especially where the wording of the article
is open to differing interpretations. However, the commentaries are not an ab-
solute authority. They are not binding on the courts, and their weight can vary,
inter alia in light of other factors that may assist in interpreting the Civil Code’s
provisions.”‘
These two recent cases show that the position of the Supreme Court of Canada on the
use of travaux priparatoires to interpret Quebec private law does not substantially
vary from the approach adopted for common law statutes: consider them, but with
parsimony.
Having completed this review of the use of parliamentary debates, this article will
now explore the question of whether the use of such materials in statutory construc-
tion should be prohibited as a rule, or whether the issue should be one of the appro-
priate weight to be assigned to them. Prior to this analysis, it will be useful to survey
the role of parliamentary materials in the general framework of statutory interpretation.
‘- [1997] 2 S.C.R. 299, 146 D.L.R. (4th) 193, per Gonthier J., dealing with the interpretation of ar-
ticle 503.1 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure.
,’ [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, 150 D.LR. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Dord cited to S.C.R.], relating to the in-
terpretation of article 2930 of the Civil Code of Quebec, dealing with the three-year extinctive pre-
scription for bodily injury actions.
‘- Quebec, Ministre de la Justice, Commentaires du ministre de la Justice, vol. 1 (Qu6bec: Publi-
cations du Qu6bec, 1993). Gil Rdmillard, the Minister of Justice at the time of the adoption of the
Civil Code, described the objectives of these documents as follows:
foumir certaines indications sur
Les commentaires du Code civil du Qudbec visent
les motifs du 16gislateur, sur le contexte des dispositions I6gislatives nouvelles et sur les
sources qui ont 6t directement considdr~es (ibid. at viii).
See C. Masse, “Le recours aux travaux pr~paratoires dans l’interprtation du nouveau Code civil du
Quebec” in Le nouveau Code civil: interprdtation et application : les journdes Maximilien-Caron
1992 (Montr6al: Th6mis, 1993) 149, treats them as doctrine: “La richesse des travaux pr6paratoires ne
sera donc pas perdue et ces commentaires pourront valoir A titre de doctrine” (ibid. at 159).
‘ Dord, supra note 137 at para. 14 [emphasis added].
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S. BEAULAC – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
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III. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
It is an orthodoxy that statutory interpretation at common law is founded on three
pillars aimed at ascertaining legislative intent.” These three pillars are the literal
rule,”‘ which gives effect to the plain words of the statute and requires that they be
read in their ordinary sense; the golden rule,”‘ which permits departure from the literal
meaning when it creates an absurd result or some inconsistency with legislative intent;
and, the mischief rule,” which focuses on the defect in the law addressed by the stat-
ute, and applies the meaning that best remedies the problem. In addition to these three
canons, there are several other rules of construction, most often referred to by their
Latin maxims, that courts may use'”. These rules include noscitur a sociis, ejusdem
generis, and expressio unius exclusio alterius. As seen in the Introduction, there are
also various intrinsic and extrinsic interpretive aids which assist in ascertaining the
meaning of a statute.
It should also be noted that the interpretation of statutes is a somewhat subjective
process.” Courts choose to emphasise certain rules of statutory construction, but not
others, and make use of certain interpretive aids, but not others. This subjective exer-
“m See generally Bell & Engle, supra note 5; Sullivan, supra note 3; C6t6, supra note 87; Gifford,
supra note 49; Pearce & Geddes, supra note 7; Dickerson, supra note 5; J.W. Hurst, Dealing With
Statutes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); A. Samuels, “The Interpretation of Statutes”
[1980] Statute L Rev. 86; S.G.G. Edgar, ed., Craies on Statute Law, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & Max-
well, 1971); G.C. MacCallum Jr., “Legislative Intent” (1966) 75 Yale L.J. 754; and O.W. Holmes,
“The Theory of Legal Interpretation” (1898-99) 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417.
“‘ See Vacder and Sons Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors, [1913) A.C. 107, 82 LJ.K.B. 232;
Hill v. East and West India Dock Co. (1884), 9 A.C. 448, 53 L.J. Ch. 842 (H.L.); Sussex Peerage
(1844), 11 Cl. & Fin. 85,8 E.R. 1034.
“2 See Grey v. Pearson (1857), 6 H.L.C. 61, 10 E.R. 1216; and River Wear Commissioners v. Ad-
amson, [1877] 2 A.C. 743, 1 Q.B.D. 548 (H.L.).
” The Heydon’s Case (1584), 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 E.R. 637 [cited to E.R.], states the mischief rule as
follows:
And it was resolved by them, that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in
general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four
things are to be discerned and considered:
[i] What was the common law before the making of the Act.
[ii] What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
[iii] What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth.
[iv] The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to
make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to
suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and proprivato
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent
of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico (ibid. at 638).
‘”For more detail on these rules, see C6t6, supra note 87 at 293-304 and 315-22; and J.M. Kerno-
chan, “Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Methods” [1976] Dalhousie L.J. 333 at 360-63.
” See G.L. Gall, The Canadian Legal System, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 385.
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cise, however, must be conducted for an objective search of legislative intent.” The
concept of legislative intent is said to be a “legal fiction””‘ although it serves a useful
purpose: providing a guide outside the subjective judgement of the court which gives
effect to the role of Parliament and makes the legislative process work.”‘ In reality, of
course, there can be no single collective legislative intent in any legislative body.””
The acknowledgement that Parliament can only express itself through legislative
enactments, and not by a unified intention of its members, has traditionally been the
justification for the literal rule. This rule provides that the intention of Parliament
must be found within the four corners of the act and, consequently, cannot be sought
at large by using legislative history and other extrinsic aids.'” Such an approach is
epitomised by the following comments of Lord Reid in Black-Clawson International
Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg (A.G.), which dealt with the use of com-
mission reports:
We often say that we are looking for the intention of Parliament, but that is not
quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament
used. We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what
they said.’3’
The literal interpretive method, otherwise known as the “plain meaning rule”,
dates back to the time when it was thought that “Parliament changes the law for the
worse”” ” and that a legislative enactment was an “alien intruder in the house of the
See H.W. Jones, “Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention” (1940) 40 Colum. L Rev. 957:
[I]n many modem cases, the principle that courts are bound to follow “legislative in-
tention” has been taken to mean that in determining the effect of a statute in cases of
interpretative doub4 the judge should decide in such a way as will advance the general
objectives which, in his judgment, the legislators sought to attain by enactment of the
legislation…. The principle that doubtful questions should be resolved in accordance
with “legislative intention” requires, in this signification of “intention” that the judge
interpret the statute not in the light of his own personal notions of justice and expedi-
ency but in the light of the legislative conceptions of justice and expediency which un-
derlie the policy of the enactment (ibid. at 973).
See also Frankfurter, supra note 4 at 538-39; J.M. Kemochan, supra note 144 at 348; and V. Sacks,
“Towards Discovering Parliamentary Intent” [1982] Statute L. Rev. 143 at 143.
141 See Dickerson, supra note 5 at 73-79; Frankfurter, ibid. at 538; M. Radin, “Statutory Interpreta-
tion” (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863 at 869-70; and A. Cox, “Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation
of Statutes” (1947) 60 Harv. L Rev. 370 at 372.
law of negligence, against which the conduct of the defendant is evaluated.
” In fact, there are many legal fictions, one of which is the notion of the “reasonable person” in the
” See Kemochan, supra note 144 at 347; and J. Willis, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (1938)
16 Can. Bar Rev. 1 at 3.
“0 See A. Lester, supra note 38 at 273; Sullivan, supra note 3 at 436-37; Corry, supra note 12 at
625; and R. Munday, “The Common Lawyer’s Philosophy of Legislation” (1983) 14 Rcchtstheorie
191 at 193.
[1975] A.C. 591 at 626, 1 All E.R. 810 (H.L.) [hereinafter Papierwerke cited to A.C.].
F. Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1882) at 85.
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S. BEAUL4C – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
311
common law”” It is within this historical context that the following excerpt from
Hilder v. Dexter, per Lord Halsbury must be understood:
[For in construing a statute I believe the worst person to construe it is the per-
son who is responsible for its drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse
what he intended to do with the effect of the language which in fact has been
employed.'”‘
The plain meaning rule has been the subject of fierce criticism in England.”‘ In
the United States, where the Supreme Court is at the avant-garde of statutory inter-
pretation, Holmes J. memorably observed that a word “is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought” ‘
In effect, legislative enactments
cannot be read in isolation; their meaning is derived from their context, including their
parliamentary context.'”” This position is part and parcel of the modern approach to-
ward the interpretation of statutes – which F.A.R. Bennion calls the “informed inter-
pretation” method” – which emphasises the purposive and contextual construction
of legislation. As Lord Griffiths phrased it in Pepper:
The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict constructionist
view of interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the
language. The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give ef-
fect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much extrane-
” H. Stone, “The Common Law in the United States” (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at 15.
‘ [1902] A.C. 474 at 477,71 LJ. Ch. 781 (H.L.).
“.. Lord Denning, the champion of purposive interpretation of legislation, once wrote, in Magor and
St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation, [195012 All E.R. 1226 at 1236 (C.A.):
We do not sit here to pull the language of Parliament and Ministers to pieces and make
nonsense of it. That is an easy thing to do, and it is a thing to which lawyers are often
prone. We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers and carry it
out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than
by opening it up to destructive analysis.
The decision was confirmed by [1952] A.C. 189 (H.L.) but the reasons of Lord Denning were criti-
cised. See also: M. Zander, The Law-Making Process, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1994) at 121-
27.
‘6 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 at 425, 62 L. Ed. 372 (1919). Learned Hand J., in Giuseppi v.
Walling, 144 F2d 608 at 624, 155 A.L.R. 761 (2d Cir. 1944), wrote: “[Tihere is no surer way to mis-
read any document than to read it literally:’ See also NJ. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction,
vol. 2A, 5th ed. (New York: C.B.C., 1992) at 5-6; and W.N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpreta-
tion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) at 38-41.
“17 See Lester, supra note 38 at 274. See also Kemochan, supra note 144, where he writes: “The
question in human interchanges is not what the words mean but what the user of the words meant by
them” (ibid at 341).
OR Bennion, supra note 5 at 427-29. What Bennion refers to as the “informed interpretation” ap-
proach is called the “modem interpretation rule” by Sullivan, supra note 3; “pragmatic dynamism” by
Eskridge, supra note 154; and “modem interpretation” by G6ny, supra note 134 at 277. For a very
thorough analysis of the two interpretation methods –
and of the
position in Canada, see the reasons of L’Heureux-Dub6 J., dissenting, in Rdgie des permis d’alcool,
supra note 133 at 996 ff.
literal rule and modem approach –
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ous material that bears upon the background against which the legislation was
enacted. 5
As a result, the increasing use of parliamentary debates, witnessed in all common
law jurisdictions, falls squarely within the modern movement towards a more con-
textual and purposive construction of legislation.” What is really at issue is the extent
to which parliamentary debates should be considered as part of the appropriate con-
text within which courts should give effect to legislative intent.”‘ This is the next
question to be discussed.
IV. Parliamentary Debates: A Question of Admissibility or of
Weight?
The central contention of this paper is that the issue of parliamentary debates in
statutory construction is one of weight and not of admissibility.’ – In other words, it is
argued that as a rule of statutory interpretation, the attributes of parliamentary debates,
as well as the circumstances surrounding their utilisation, do not warrant a total pro-
hibition. Rather, courts should be permitted to resort to parliamentary materials as an
interpretive aid, and the question should revolve around the weight accorded to them.
To demonstrate this, the rationales supporting the traditional exclusionary rules will
be analysed.
There is one preliminary matter to address at this point:
the archaic and some-
what artificial distinction made between using legislative history to identify the mis-
chief of the prior state of the law and using it to ascertain the Parliamentary intention
‘ This
in enacting the legislation (these are the two main steps of the mischief rule).’
dichotomy was developed in the context of commission reports, and it meant that
such materials could only be used to determine the mischief and not the intention.’
This restrictive view was repudiated, although initially only with regard to commis-
sion reports.” In Pepper, Lord Browne-Wilkinson made it clear that such a distinction
‘5’ Supra note 9 at 617.
See Section III, above.
16 See H.M. Hart & A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Applica-
tion of Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958) at 1284; Charles, supra note 3 at 11; Sulli-
van, supra note 3 at 427; and Hogg, supra note 29 at 132-33. See contra Dickerson, supra note 5 at
138ff, who denies that legislative history qualifies as part of the context of a statute. The reasons
would be that: (i) it is unclear whether it was taken into account in the drafting of the statute; (ii) it is
not usually as readily available as the statute itself; (iii) it is likely unreliable. Perhaps these arguments
may justify the exclusionary rule –
but they can hardly support the position
that parliamentary debates do not form part of the context of a statute.
see Section V, below –
“2 Several Canadian legal scholars share this position: see Corry, supra note 12 at 635; Kilgour, su-
pra note 91 at 776 and C6t6, supra note 87 at 417.
‘ See Heydon’s Case, supra note 143 at 638.
‘ See Eastman Photographic Materials, supra note 9; and Assam Railways, supra note 9. For a
more detailed account of the rule concerning commission reports, see supra note 9.
6
5 See Factortame, supra note 9.
‘
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S. BEAULAC – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
313
between mischief and intention –
debates –
should no longer be considered as significant:
for both commission reports and parliamentary
Given the purposive approach to construction now adopted by the courts in or-
der to give effect to the true intentions of the legislature, the fine distinctions
between looking for the mischief and looking for the intention in using words
to provide the remedy are technical and inappropriate.”
The reasons for the exclusionary prohibition on parliamentary debates may be
grouped under the following headings: historical, theoretical, and practical.” Each of
these categories will be examined in turn.
A. Historical Reasons
The historical rationale underlying the exclusionary rule relates to the fact that,
between 1628 and 1908, the reporting of parliamentary debates was forbidden in
England.'” This regime had been installed by the House of Commons in order to pro-
tect the freedom of speech of its members. Given this context, it is not surprising that
a rule against the use of parliamentary debates developed. What is less comprehensi-
ble is that the position remained unchanged after the 1688 revolution, when freedom
of debate was secured by article 9 of the Bill of Rights (1689).”‘ The irony is that the
prohibition against publishing debates, which had been adopted as a shield against the
Crown, was not used as a sword against the publication of debates in Parliament.”
The House regarded the reporting of debates and, incidentally, their use by courts for
construction of statutes as a breach of parliamentary privilege.
In England, parliamentary privileges are largely, if not entirely, codified in article
9 of the Bill of Rights.” This provision declares that “freedom of speech, and debates
or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or
place out of Parliament. ‘ The contemporary significance of article 9 is that no word
spoken in either House by members of Parliament can be held against them.'” This
privilege means that leave must be granted to use documents relating to proceedings
I’ Supra note 9 at 635, Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
7f See Pepper, ibiUL at 633. See also Ct6, supra note 87 at 407-11; S.A. Girvin, supra note 38 at
494-95; and Oliver, supra note 17 at 7.
” See Kilgour, supra note 91 at 784-86; Davis, supra note 91 at 8; and L.-P. Pigeon, “L’61aboration
des lois” (1945) 5 R. du B. 365 at 368.
“6 1 Will. & Mary 2, c. 2.
‘” It was not until 1908 that the British House of Commons started to make official reports of its
debates in Parliament; the exclusionary rule on parliamentary debates, though, remained unchanged.
“‘ In Pepper, supra note 9 at 646, Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that nothing cited in that case had
“identified or specified the nature of any privilege extending beyond that protected by [article 9] of the
Bill of Rights”.
‘7-Supra note 169.
‘7’ See P.M. Leopold, “Freedom of Speech in Parliament –
Its Misuse and Proposals for Reform”
[1981] Pub. L. 30; and D. Miers, “Citing Hansard as an Aid to Interpretation” [1982] Statute L. Rev.
98 at 99.
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In Davis v. Johnson,” Lord Scarman observed that, so
of the House of Commons.'”
long as this practice is maintained, it would be wrong for a court to make any judicial
use of parliamentary debates to interpret statutes.
In 1980, the requirement to obtain such leave was repudiated by a House of
Commons resolution.'” This change of practice, however, did not affect whatsoever
the exclusionary prohibition on parliamentary debates,'” which indicates that the rule
owes little to the existence of any parliamentary constraint.” In Pepper, the argument
that the use of parliamentary debates to construe statutes would constitute “question-
ing” parliamentary proceedings, contrary to article 9 of the Bill of Rights, was dis-
missed as follows, per Lord Browne-Wilinson:
In my judgment, the plain meaning of article 9, viewed against the historical
background in which it was enacted, was to ensure that Members of Parliament
were not subjected to any penalty, civil, or criminal for what they said and were
able, contrary to the previous assertions of the Stuart monarchy, to discuss what
they, as opposed to the monarch, chose to have discussed. Relaxation of the
rule will not involve the courts in criticising what is said in Parliament. The
purpose of looking at Hansard will not be to construe the words used by the
Minister but to give effect to the words used so long as they are clear. Far from
questioning the independence of Parliament and its debates, the courts would
be giving effect to what is said and done there.'”
In other common law jurisdictions, which do not have a privilege equivalent to
that in article 9 of the Bill of Rights, this rationale for the exclusionary rule has been
translated into the need for comity, that is, the courtesy and respect that ought to exist
between the legislature and the judiciary.” In light of the above comments in Pepper,
such an argument in favour of the exclusionary rule should be disregarded.
B. Theoretical Reasons
The main theoretical explanation for the prohibition pertains to the constitutional
principle of the rule of law or, more specifically, the need for citizens to be able to
know the legal text by which they are regulated. Lord Diplock appealed to such rea-
soning to justify the exclusion of commission reports in Papierwerke:
‘7’ See Stockdale v. Hansard (1839), 9 Ad. & E. 1 at 114, 112 E.R. 1112; Bradlaugh v. Gosset
(1884), 12 Q.B.D. 271 at 275, 53 LJ.Q.B. 209; In re Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770, [1958] A.C.
331 (P.C.) at 350 [1958] 2 All E.R. 329.
‘7-Supra note 34 at 350.
‘” See U.K., H.C., Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 991, col. 879 at col. 916 (31 October 1980).
See also PM. Leopold, “Reference in Court to Hansard” [1981] Pub. L. 316.
’77 In Hadmor Production Ltd v. Hamilton, supra note 35, decision rendered in 1983, the House of
Lords reiterated the exclusionary rule without even mentioning the 1980 House of Commons resolu-
tion.
‘” See Miers, supra note 173 at 104.
‘” Supra note 9 at 638 [emphasis added]. For a criticism of this holding, see “Hansard – Help or
Hindrance?”, supra note 47 at 152-53. See also Oliver, supra note 17 at 10, who argues that this deci-
sion will have far-reaching implications for parliamentary practice.
‘ See Bennion, supra note 5 at 455.
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The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a
citizen, before committing himself to any course of action, should be able to
know in advance what are the legal consequences that will flow from it. Where
those consequences are regulated by a statute the source of that knowledge is
what the statute says. In construing it the court must give effect to what the
words of the statute would be reasonably understood to mean by those whose
conduct it regulates.”‘
Put another way, using parliamentary debates would be contrary to the principle of le-
gal certainty.'” According to this rationale, it should not be necessary to consult other
texts which are less accessible than the statute book.”
The maintenance of legal certainty is no doubt the most convincing rationale sup-
porting the exclusionary rule, the reason being that it relates to one of the fundamental
tenets of our legal system, that is, the rule of law. It would be illusory, however, to put
too much emphasis on the right of citizens “to rely on the text of legislation without
having to resort to Hansard “‘ “” In comparison, case law interpreting statutes, which is
necessary to understand the legislative text, can hardly be said to be more accessible
to ordinary citizens than parliamentary debates. Gaining access to statutes themselves
is becoming increasingly difficult due to the proliferation of legislation seeking to
regulate all areas of social and economic activity, thus, assertions that citizens can
readily access statutes are somewhat fallacious. In reality, ordinary citizens ascertain
their rights and duties through legal counsel, who examine the different sources of law
– which could indeed include parliamentary debates –
to advise their clients. The
concern increasingly becomes one of practicality, revolving around the time and costs
involved in using parliamentary materials, which will be considered shortly.
A second theoretical reason for the exclusionary prohibition is that Parliament is
said to be distinct from its composing elements and its members;’ accordingly, no
intention could be discerned simply by looking at one segment of the legislature, such
as the House of Commons. Willes J., in Miller v. Taylor,”‘ was referring to this ration-
ale when he stated that legislative history “is not known to the other house, or to the
Sovereign.’ The interpreter of a statute should concentrate on the intention of Parlia-
ment not on that of the government; the intention of even the responsible minister
should not be equated with the intention of Parliament and should not be used as evi-
“‘ Supra note 151 at 638 [emphasis added]. See also, to the same effect, the speech of Lord Wilber-
force in that case, ibid. at 629.
“‘ See Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd, [1981] A.C. 251 (H.L.) at 279-80, [19801 3 W.L.R. 209;
and Pepper, supra note 9 at 619-20. See also Bell & Engle, supra note 5 at 152-53; Dickerson, supra
note 5 at 144; Sullivan, supra note 3 at 438-39; “Hansard – Help or Hindrance?”, supra note 47 at
155; see Charles, supra note 3 at 20; Pigeon, supra note 168 at 369-70.
‘See Evans, supra note 54 at 281.
“See Sullivan, supra note 3 at 439.
“‘SeeAlberta (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1939] A.C. 117 at 131, 108 CJ.P.C. 1 (P.C.); and Reader’s
Digest, supra note 99 at 793, where Cartwright compares Parliament to a corporate entity. See also
Sullivan, ibid. at 437.
“‘ Supra note 19 at 217.
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dence of the latter’s intention.'” As a result, parliamentary debates should not be used
to determine legislative intent.
Although attractive upon initial examination, this rationale supporting the exclu-
sionary rule does not hold much water. To deny that the intention of Parliament can be
discerned with the help of members’ statements may be compared to denying the ex-
istence of Cambridge University because there are only colleges! As an aggregate
body, while it may be true that the legislature can express itself only through legisla-
tion, it can hear, read and respond to numerous statements and materials put before it.
Like the opinions of other interpreters –
such as commentators and commissions –
such views, although not binding, may have considerable persuasive force and should
be considered where appropriate.'”‘
C. Practical Reasons
In Beswick v. Beswick, practical considerations were held to be the main objection
to the use of parliamentary debates as an interpretive aid:
For purely practical reasons we do not permit debates in either House to be
cited: it would add greatly to the time and expense involved in preparing cases
involving the construction of a statute if counsel were expected to read all the
debates in Hansard, and it would often be impracticable for counsel to get ac-
cess to at least the older reports of debates in Select Committees of the House
of Commons; moreover, in a very large proportion of cases such a search, even
if practicable, would throw no light on the question before the court.’
The chief practical reason for the exclusionary rule stems from the additional re-
search costs that a client would have to incur if lawyers were obligated to consult
Hansard prior to giving legal advice on the meaning of legislation.’ ” A preliminary
comment is that it seems curious that courts single out this particular type of research
as improperly time-consuming and expensive when the same criticisms may be ap-
plied to case law where the costs may outweigh the benefits.”‘
In Pepper, there was much debate on the increase of costs that would result from
permitting recourse to parliamentary debates in statutory construction. It was, in fact,
the principal reason why Lord Mackay dissented:
Your Lordships are well aware that the costs of litigation are a subject of gen-
eral public concern and I personally would not wish to be a party to changing a
well established rule which could have a substantial effect in increasing these
costs against the advice of the Law Commissions and the Renton Committee
“‘7See Baker, supra note 47 at 356.
” See Sullivan, supra note 3 at 439-40; and Kilgour, supra note 91 at 774.
‘9 Supra note 27 at 74.
“‘ See Bennion, supra note 5 at 451; Ct6, supra note 87 at 411; Dickerson, supra note 5 at 175;
Evans, supra note 54 at 288-89; Gifford, supra note 49 at 126; Bates, supra note 47 at 54; and Starr,
supra note 78 at 377.
“‘ See Sullivan, supra note 3 at 439.
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S. BEAULAc – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
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unless and until a new inquiry demonstrated that that advice was no longer
valid.’9,
In contrast, Lord Browne-Wilkinson observed, for the majority, that “it is easy to
overestimate the costs of such research: if a reading of Hansard shows that there is
nothing of significance said by the Minister in relation to the clause in question, fur-
ther research will become pointless.” 3 Further, he noted that the relaxation of the ex-
clusionary rule in Australia and New Zealand did not suggest that there would be a
substantial increase in litigation costs.” On the contrary, as Lord Griffiths pointed out
in a concurring speech, if such a search of parliamentary materials “resolves the am-
biguity it will in future save all the expense that would otherwise be incurred in fight-
ing the rival interpretations through the courts.” 5 Finally, Lord Browne-Wilkinson
warned that if excessive or unnecessary use of parliamentary debates were made to
prolong litigation, this could be penalised by the award of costs.'”
It is doubtful that lawyers would be inclined to embark on a search of parliamen-
tary debates where there is no indication that they would find something relevant to
the interpretation of the statutory provision at issue. Such information could be found
in annotations to the statute, and in textbooks or articles dealing with such legisla-
tion.'”, As one commentator suggested, new reference books could be published, with
such titles as “Parliamentary Statements on Statutes” –
a kind of statute citator giv-
ing the relevant legislative history.”‘ Furthermore, with the development of informa-
tion technology, searches can now be undertaken through electronic forms of Han-
sard'” in most common law jurisdictions.” There could also be the birth of “profes-
sional Hansard search companies” similar to title search companies hired to investi-
gate property status. As the clich6 goes “necessity is the mother of invention.’
Another practical reason given in support of the prohibition rule is the alleged
problem of accessibility to parliamentary debates. It is argued that Hansard reports are
‘” Supra note 9 at 615.
‘ Ibid at 637.
’94 Ibid. On the situation in Australia, see Pearce & Geddes, supra note 7 at 49. See contra, Lord
Mackay, rather unconvincingly, rejected the comparison with Australia and New Zealand on the basis
that their parliamentary procedure was different from that in the United Kingdom in material respects:
see Pepper, ibid at 615.
“‘ Ibid. at 618. There was no empirical evidence, however, that such a result would necessarily fol-
low from permitting the use of parliamentary debates in statutory construction.
” See ibid. at 637.
“7 See Bell & Engle, supra note 5 at 158.
‘” See G. Cain, “Interpretation of Statutes: Reference to Parliamentary Debates” [1962] New Zea-
land L.J. 207 at 209-10.
‘9 See Baker, supra note 47 at 354.
‘9 A non-exhaustive search on the Internet indicated that there is a web-site for parliamentary de-
bates of at
the following jurisdictions: Australia
(
(date accessed: 14 July 1998)), the United States
(
(
(date accessed:
14 July 1998)). Furthermore, Hansard reports are now available on CD-ROM in England.
least
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not readily available to legal practitioners and that they are inadequately indexed.”
This situation, if true, may be explained by the existence of the exclusionary rule it-
self: if parliamentary debates cannot be used in statutory construction, then the devel-
opment of an efficient index system to improve access is pointless.’ It is untenable to
justify the exclusionary prohibition by such logic when the rule itself has created the
practical impediment cited as the problem. This alleged difficulty will resolve itself
over time as the rule is relaxed,’ particularly as new reference tools and information
technologies are incorporated into legal practice.
Even if parliamentary materials were accessible and not too costly to consider,
another practical reason for their exclusion is that, in any event, they do not constitute
a reliable source to ascertain legislative intent.’
In Papierwerke, Viscount Dilhorne,
who was well-acquainted with the legislative process,’ had the following to say:
In the course of the passage of a Bill through both Houses there may be many
statements by Ministers, and what is said by a Minister in introducing a Bill in
one House is no sure guide as to the intention of the enactment, for changes of
intention may occur during its passage.’
In that respect, the whole process of enacting legislation was said not to be “an intel-
lectual exercise in pursuit of truth; it is an essay in persuasion, or perhaps almost se-
duction!”‘
It is on this same principle of unreliability that parliamentary debates were ini-
tially held to be inadmissible based on the parole evidence rule. This rule prohibits
evidence of what parties to a written contract said or did before its conclusion to ex-
plain the written terms on which the parties agreed.’ The parole evidence rule was
held to apply equally to legislative enactments, as statutes are written instruments.”
” See Bennion, supra note 5 at 452.
0- For the situation on access to parliamentary debates in the United States, where their use to inter-
pret statutes is permitted, see Breyer, supra note 12 at 868-69.
‘See Evans, supra note 54 at 289.
” See Dickerson, supra note 5 at 154-62; “Hansard – Help or Hindrance?”, supra note 47 at 154-
55; and Corry, supra note 12 at 629-31.
20 Viscount Dilhome served twenty years as a Member of Parliament in the British House of Com-
mons.
20 Papierwerke, supra note 151 at 623. See also Davis v. Johnson, supra note 34 at 349-50; and, in
Canada, Residential Tenancies, supra note 102 at 721.
” J.A. Corry, supra note 12 at 631; see also Cain, supra note 198 at 209. Even in France, where
there is no restriction on the use of legislative history as an aid to interpret legislation, Henri Capitant,
probably one of the most authoritative French auteur de doctrine, wrote: “il est dtonnant que, malgrd
les legons de l’expdrienc4 les auteurs et les tribunaux continuent h chercher des dclaircissements Ia
oil rgne la confusion” See Capitant, supra note 134 at 79.
See Inglis v. Buttery, [1878] 3 A.C. 552 at 577 (H.L); Prenn v. Simmonds, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381
at 1384, [1971] 3 All E.R. 237; and Schuler v. WIcknan Machine Tool Sales, [1974] A.C. 235 at 261,
[1973] 2 All E.R. 39 (H.L.).
2’ See Earl ofShrewbury v. Scott (1859), 6 C.B. N.S. 1 at 213, 141 E.R. 350; A.G. v. Sillem (1863),
2 H. & C. 431 at 537, 159 E.R. 178; and River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877), 2 A.C. 743
at 763,47 LJ.Q.B. 193 (H.L.).
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S. BEAULAC – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
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There is little doubt that the parole evidence rule had a direct influence upon the de-
velopment of the exclusionary rule on parliamentary debates.2 1
1 Such an approach,
equating a statute with an ordinary contract, is consistent with the plain meaning in-
terpretive method that is now rejected by most courts.”‘ C.K. Allen, noting that con-
tracts are submitted to strict rules of evidence, stated that “it may well be questioned
whether instruments of government are not of too wide import to be bound with the
same trammels as private transactions'”” It is noteworthy that the most recent deci-
sions applying the exclusionary prohibition ignored this rationale.23
However, in itself it appears that the problem of reliability does not warrant a
blanket prohibition on the use of parliamentary debates in statutory interpretation.
Rather, the argument should act as a counsel of caution in considering how much
weight to give to such interpretive aids. 4 It is, after all, the daily function of a court to
interpret legislation in accordance with the rules of statutory construction and to as-
sign weight to a variety of interpretive aids depending on their reliability and persua-
siveness.”‘ To completely exclude reference to parliamentary debates concerning a
legislative provision constrains courts in their efforts to ascertain the intention of Par-
liament, which is a function constitutionally entrusted to the judiciary.’ This seems to
be the main consideration that motivated the relaxation of the exclusionary rule in
Pepper, as the following excerpt of Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s speech indicates:
In sum, I do not think that the practical difficulties arising from a limited re-
laxation of the rule are sufficient to outweigh the basic need for the courts to
give effect to the words enacted by Parliament in the sense that they were in-
tended by Parliament to bear. Courts are frequently criticised for their failure to
do that. This failure is due not to cussedness but to ignorance of what Parlia-
ment intended by the obscure words of the legislation. The courts should not
deny themselves the light which Parliamentary materials may shed on the
meaning of the words Parliament has used and thereby risk subjecting the indi-
vidual to a law which Parliament never intended to enact.27
Connected to the reliability concern, and in light of the American experience, it is
further suggested that allowing the use of parliamentary debates to construe statutes
may result in them becoming even less reliable, as members of Parliament would try
to insert passages designed to influence judicial interpretation. This practice would
constitute a manipulation and perversion, not only of the technique of interpretation,
2,0 See Kilgour, supra note 91 at 787; and Baker, supra note 47 at 355-56.
2″ See Section III, above.
22 C.K. Allen, Law in the Making, 7th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) at 512. See also Kil-
gour, supra note 91 at 789.
21 See ag. Davis v. Johnson, supra note 34; and Hadmor Productions Lid, v. Hamilton, supra note
35.24 See Kilgour, supra note 91 particularly at 776.
2″ See Gall, supra note 145 at 385; and Kernochan, supra note 144 at 345-46.
216 See Evans, supra note 54 at 287; Kerochan, ibid. at 352; and 0. Hatch, “Legislative History:
Tool of Construction or Destruction?” (1988) 11 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 43 at 47.
2 7Supra note 9 at 637-38 [emphasis added].
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“cook the books” as some say –
but of the legislative process itself.”‘ In reality, however, it would seem doubtful that
members of parliament would deliberately fabricate or falsify parliamentary debates
in order to influence the judicial interpretation
–
given to a statute.29 Even if such were the case, it is highly unlikely that such a strata-
gem would go unnoticed, either by members of the opposition during the enactment,
or by courts at the interpretation stage. The bottom line is that this consideration, in so
far as it has merits, should go to the weight attributed to parliamentary debates and not
to the question of whether they can be used by courts as an aid to statutory construc-
tion.
As a final pragmatic consideration, the human factor will be examined which,
rather than supporting the exclusionary rule, actually encourages a realistic view of
parliamentary debates. Judges, being people, are curious and, notwithstanding a total
prohibition on the consultation of parliamentary materials, some of them cannot help
but have a peek at the debates to elucidate the meaning of a statutory provision.’ In
Davis v. Johnson, at the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning M.R. unremorsefully con-
fessed to have done just that:
and indeed have said –
Some may say –
that judges should not pay any at-
tention to what is said in Parliament. They should grope about in the dark for
the meaning of an Act without switching on the light. I do not accede to this
view. In some cases Parliament is assured in the most explicit terms what the
effect of a statute will be. It is on that footing that members assent to the clause
being agreed to. It is on that understanding that an amendment is not pressed.
In such cases I think the court should be able to look at the proceedings….And
it is obvious that there is nothing to prevent a judge looking at these debates
himself privately and getting some guidance from them. Although it may shock
the purists, I may as well confess that I have sometimes done it. I have done it
in this very case. It has thrown a flood of light on the position. The statements
made in committee disposed completely of Mr Jackson’s argument before us.22′
2I” See Bell & Engle, supra note 5 at 158-59; Bennion, supra note 5 at 452; Dickerson, supra note 5
at 82; Starr, supra note 78 at 376-77; C.P. Curtis, “A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation” (1949-50)
3 Vand. L. Rev. 407 at 411; G.B. Folsom, Legislative History: Research for the Interpretation of Laws
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972) at 6; S.L. Wasby, “Legislative Materials as an Aid
to Statutory Construction: A Caveat” (1963) 12 1. Pub. L 262 at 264. For the view that ambiguity is
sometimes left on purpose, see D. Payne, “The Intention of the Legislature in the Interpretation of
Statutes” (1956) 9 Curr. Leg. Probs. 96 at 106.
2See Kilgour, supra note 91 at 788-89.
See New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 59 at 48; Parker, supra note 93 at 504; and Sa-
muels, supra note 140 at 97. See also M. Krauss, “Interprdtation des lois –
‘La
queue qui remue le chien”‘ (1980) 58 Can. Bar Rev. 756, where the author discusses the effect of the
“secret law” in the case of R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282, 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473.
histoire 16gislative –
2, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 182 at 192-93 (C.A.). See also the admission, to the same effect, of Lord Grif-
fiths in Pepper, supra note 9 at 618: “[I referred to the Parliamentary materials] of course only to
check if my interpretation had conflicted with an express Parliamentary intention:’ Chief Judge Bre-
itel, of the New York Court of Appeal, also admitted to have referred to parliamentary debates in a
letter to R. Dickerson (21 August, 1978), reproduced in Dickerson, supra note 5 at 1134-35.
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At the Appellate Committee, although the Lords upheld the Court of Appeal’s deci-
sion, Lord Denning M.R. received a stern rebuke for his unorthodox views.’ How-
ever, undeterred by such reprimands, he found an indirect way of using parliamentary
debates, namely, when they are reproduced in some public documents or legal litera-
ture.’ He even had the audacity to give the following advice in his book, The Disci-
pline of Law:
Hansard is for the Judges a closed book. But not for you. You can read what
was said in the House and adopt it as part of your argument –
so long as you
do not acknowledge the source. The writers of law books can go further. They
can give the very words from Hansard with chapter and verse. You can then
read the whole to the Judges. 4
It goes without saying that such a practice is unacceptable, as it enables judges to con-
sider parliamentary debates indirectly.’
This is an appropriate note on which to conclude this section on the ostensible ra-
tionales supporting the exclusionary rule on parliamentary debates: when a rule of law
is no longer accepted, not by the citizens it regulates but by the judges themselves, it
is probably time to implement change. Such a modification was finally introduced in
England by the House of Lords in Pepper.’ In other common law jurisdictions, the
move has already been made’ or is on the way,’ either through legislative or judicial
reform.
Conclusion
or rather its modification or simple repudiation –
This article began with a discussion of the origin of the British rule prohibiting
the use of parliamentary materials as an aid to statutory interpretation, and its applica-
in England, Australia, New
tion –
Zealand, the United States and Canada. The general principles of statutory construc-
tion were examined, and parliamentary debates as an interpretative aid were located in
this general picture. Finally, to support the contention of this article –
that the issue
of parliamentary debates boils down to a question of weight and not of admissibility
the rationales underlying the exclusionary rule were analysed and, for the most
–
part, refuted.
Having demonstrated that parliamentary debates should be permissible as an in-
terpretive aid to ascertain legislative intent, it is appropriate to conclude by proposing
2z See Davis v. Johnson, supra note 34 at 337, per Viscount Dilhome. This view was confirmed by
the House of Lords in Hadmor Productions v. Hamilton, supra note 35 at 201.
‘2 See R. v. Local Commissioner for Administration of the North and East Area of England; EX
parte Bradford Metropolitan City Council, [19791 2 W.L.R. 1 at 20, [1972] Q.B. 300. See also C6t,
supra note 87 at 411-12; and Gifford, supra note 49 at 132-34.
2-‘ Supra note 1 at 10.
See Bennion, supra note 5 at 452.
Supra note 9.
227 See the section on Australia and the United States, Section 11A and C, above.
22 See the section on New Zealand and Canada, Section hI.B and D, above.
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factors which may guide courts in determining the weight to give to statements made
in Parliament. Before that, however, there is an aspect of the question that has yet to
be discussed, that is whether it must be shown that the language of the statutory provi-
sion is ambiguous before using parliamentary materials.
As previously discussed, according to the test in Pepper resorting to parliamen-
tary debates is permitted only if the “legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to
an absurdity.”‘
In the same case, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton added that “[i]ngenuity
can sometimes suggest ambiguity or obscurity where none exists in fact:’
Is this re-
quirement of an ambiguity in language essential, or is it merely a vestige of the plain
meaning interpretive method?
Many legal commentators support the need to establish an ambiguity before using
parliamentary debates to construe legislation based on the rule of law: citizens should
be able to rely on the legislative text unless the ordinary language of the statute is am-
biguous.’ The obvious difficulty is deciding whether a statute is ambiguous or unam-
biguous-” and this is, in effect, what may lead to legal uncertainty. In fact, the ambi-
guity requirement is misleading as it perpetuates the empty rhetoric of the plain
meaning rule’ which is now rejected by most courts.2″
As Justice L’Heureux-Dub6 phrased it in Rigie despermis: “In reality, the ‘plain
meaning’ can be nothing but the result of an implicit process of interpretation.” Put
another way, to hold that a legislative provision is clear or that it is ambiguous already
constitutes an interpretation pursuant to statutory construction principles.m At the out-
set, virtually all legislation is ambiguous as it is susceptible to more than one reading.
Ambiguity is a conclusion reached at the end of interpretation and it is illogical and
fallacious to consider it as a preliminary threshold test. Rather, it is an inference that
can only be made after a full assessment of legislative intent, using canons and rules
2′ Pepper, supra note 9 at 640, Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
” Ibid at 620.
“‘ See Ctd, supra note 87 at 417; Bell & Engle, supra note 5 at 157; Evans, supra note 54 at 281-
82; Davis, supra note 91 at 10; and Willis, supra note 149 at 10. For a review of the different types of
ambiguous, obscure or apparently absurd legislation, see T.SJ.N. Bates, “The Contemporary Use of
Legislative History in the United Kingdom” (1995) 54 Cambridge LJ. 127 at 139-45.
2-2 See C.B. Nutting, “The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes” (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 509; and
FJ. de Sloov~re, “Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes” (1940) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 527 at 531-
32.
See Sullivan, supra note 3 at 430; and Kemochan, supra note 144 at 343-44.
2 See Section IV, above.
2″ Supra note 133 at 997 [emphasis in original].
“26 See C6t6, supra note 87 at 268; Zander, supra note 155 at 121-27; Singer, supra note 156 at 5-6;
Eskridge, supra note 156 at 38-41; Radin, supra note 147 at 869; M. van de Kerchove,
L’interprdtation en droit -Approche pluridisciplinaire (Bruxelles: Facult6s universitaires St-Louis,
1978) at 37; and EE. Horach Jr., “In the Name of Legislative Intention” (1932) 38 W. Va. L.Q. 119 at
121.
1998]
S. BEAULAC – PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN INTERPRETATION
323
of statutory construction, and appropriate interpretive aids, including legislative his-
tory.37
A related, but different, question is whether the information found in parliamen-
tary debates can contradict the ordinary language of a legislative text. In this situation,
based on the rule of law requirement that the statute book be a reliable guide to citi-
zens, the language in the provision has to prevail over statements made in Parlia-
In other words, while the interpreters should not be confined to the text, when
ment.’
using interpretive aids such as parliamentary materials, they must still be confined by
the text.’
In Pepper, Lord Browne-Wilkinson expressed this view as follows:
The court cannot attach a meaning to words which they cannot bear, but if the
words are capable of bearing more than one meaning why should not Parlia-
ment’s true intention be enforced rather than thwarted? 2′
The position adopted by the courts in Australia, pursuant to section 15AB of the
Acts Interpretation Act 1901,-” is exactly that suggested here. Extrinsic aids may be
referred to even if the statutory provision is “clear on its face,”‘ but these materials
can only be used to confirm the literal sense of the language used in a statute and can-
not contradict it.24’
Except for rare cases in which there is a direct clash between the legislative text
and the parliamentary debates, the latter should be taken into account – with more or
as an aid to ascertain the intention of Parliament in enacting
less persuasive force –
the statutory provision at issue. However, it must be emphasised that although courts
should be allowed to consider parliamentary debates, they must not feel bound by
them.'” Accordingly, what should be the factors to determine how much weight to at-
tribute to statements made during the legislative process?
As a general principle it is submitted that the weight accorded to parliamentary
debates should depend upon: i) the reliability of the source of information; ii) the
contemporaneity with the actual legislative process; iii) the proximity to the legislative
process; and iv) the context in which the information is to be found. ‘ A special situa-
27 See Sullivan, supra note 3 at 430.
2″ See Dickerson, supra note 5 at 144; Bale, supra note 23 at 18; Kilgour, supra note 91 at 788; and
Miers, supra note 173 at 107.
1
1 Supra note 52. See also Pearce & Geddes, supra note 7 at 47.
2″ See Frankfurter, supra note 4 at 543.
21 Supra note 9 at 635.
2
24 Curran, supra note 56 at 706-07.
243 See Re Australian Federation of Construction Contractors; Ex parte Billing, supra note 57 at
420; and Mills v. Meeking, supra note 57 at 21. See also, for New Zealand, Real Estate House
(Broadtop) Ltd. v. Real Estate Agency Licensing Board, [198712 N.Z.L.R. 593 at 596.
24 See Bennion, supra note 5 at 467; Pearce & Geddes, supra note 7 at 47; and Styles, supra note
39 at 158.
245 See WK. Hurst, “The Use of Extrinsic Aids in Determining Legislative Intent in California: The
Need for Standardized Criteria” (1980) 12 Pac. L.J. 189; and R.M. Rhodes, J.W. White & R.S. Gold-
man, “The Search for Intent: Aids to Statutory Construction in Florida” (1978) 6 Fla. St. U. L Rev.
383.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
tion is where the act explicitly refers to legislative history materials, most often in its
preamble. In such cases, there is no doubt that considerable authority should be given
to the information found therein as it is the express will of Parliament that such extrin-
sic aids be considered in construing the statute.-”
As a result, speeches made by the responsible minister introducing a bill in the
House of Commons will carry more weight than the statement of an opposition
backbencher during the question period.!”7 Likewise, speeches from the throne, de-
tailed explanatory memoranda, as well as statements and responses made by the re-
sponsible minister during debates shall enjoy substantial persuasive force. ” Whereas,
in decreasing order of importance, statements made by other ministers, statements of
government members in debate, and statements made by opposition members in de-
bate will enjoy less credibility as to the meaning of the statutory provision. Regard-
less, the flexibility of any guideline is critical in order to take into account the par-
ticular circumstances of each enactment,” ‘4 and the tentative hierarchy proposed here is
by no mean absolute.
After having evaluated the extent to which the relevant parliamentary materials pos-
sess such qualities (reliability, authoritativeness, proximity and contextual value) to de-
termine their interpretive weight, the balance of the decision is a matter of judicial dis-
cretion to ascertain the meaning to confer upon the legislative provision at stake, in light
of the canons and rules of statutory construction and other interpretive aids. The likeli-
hood of finding the “crock of gold”
in legislative history, as in Pepper, is quite slim but
in Themis’s scale of justice even a few carats will often be sufficient weight to tip it to
one side.
246 See Bennion, supra note 5 at 448-49; and Bisson, supra note 135 at 64.
247 See Ct6, supra note 87 at 417-18.
244 In Pepper, supra note 9, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said that it was most likely that only statements
by the responsible minister would meet the test permitting limited use of parliamentary debates set
out therein: “In the case of statements made in Parliament, as at present advised I cannot foresee that
any statement other than the statement of the Minister or other promoter of the Bill is likely to meet
these criteria” (ibiL at 634). See also Bates, supra note 231 at 145-48.
241 See Bennion, supra note 5 at 473; and Dickerson, supra note 5 at 155.
This expression comes from Pepper, supra note 9 at 637, where Lord Browne Wilkinson wrote:
“If the rule is relaxed legal advisers faced with an ambiguous statutory provision may feel that they
have to research the materials to see whether they yield the crock of gold, i.e., a clear indication of
Parliament’s intentions” [emphasis added].
