R. v. Noble: The Supreme Court and the
Permissibile Use of Silence
Ian Laing’
The Supreme Court of Canada’s 1997 decision in
R. v. Noble held that as a general rule of law, no inde-
pendent weight is to be attached to the silence of the
accused at trial. Writing for a majority of five judges,
Sopinka J. stated that placing independent weight on
the silence of the accused violates both the right to si-
lence and the presumption of innocence, and as such
constitutes an error of law. The author argues that So-
pinka J.’s conclusions are based on flawed reasoning,
and specifically on a misguided conception of the prin-
ciple of a “case to meet”. Further, Sopinka J. seems to
have given the past case law an unduly narrow reading
with the end product being a judgment which is at
times contradictory and results in a general rule of law
which may be impossible to adhere to in practice.
The dissenting judgment of Lamer C.J.C. is to be
preferred from both a legal and a rational perspective.
He simply reiterated the law as it existed prior to Noble,
stating that once the Crown has presented a “case to
meet”, the accused should legitimately be expected to
respond, with the alternative being to risk the trier of
fact drawing an adverse inference from silence. Such
an inference will properly be drawn where the evidence
of the Crown has enveloped the accused in a “strong
and cogent net-work of inculpatory facts”
It is hoped that in the future the Supreme Court
will revisit the proper use of silence at trial and endorse
the dissenting judgment of Lamer C.J.C., thereby add-
ing weight to the logic and effectiveness of the law of
evidence in Canada.
Dans la decision R. c. Noble en 1997, la Cour Su-
preme a tenu que, comme rgle grnrrale de droit, au-
cun poids indapendant n’est attribuable au silence de
l’accus6 pendant un proc s. M. le juge Sopinka, 6cri-
vant pour une majoritd de cinq juges, a expliqud que
placer un poids indapendant sur le silence de l’accus6
viole tant le droit au silence que la prdsomption
d’innocence, et constitue ainsi une erreur de droit. Cet
article propose que les conclusions du juge Sopinka
sont basses sur un raisonnement imparfait, et particu-
li~rement sur un concept peu judicieux du principe de
ble avoir attribu6 L la jurisprudence antrrieure une in-
terprdtation trop 6troite, le rsultat final dtant un juge-
ment par moments contradictoire et formulant une r –
gle grnrrale de droit qui pourrait 6tre impossible A
metire en pratique.
Le jugement dissident de M. le juge en chef La-
mer est prfrrable pour sa perspective a la fois 16gale et
de bons sens. It a simplement rdit&r6 le droit comme il
l’6tait avant la dacision Noble: une fois que la Cou-
ronne ait prsent6 sa preuve complete, l’on peut 16giti-
mement s’attendre A ce que l’accus6 rponde. Sinon, le
juge des faits risque de tirer des conclusions dtfavora-
bles quant au silence de l’accusd. Une telle conclusion
dafavorable sera proprement faite une fois que la Cou-
ronne aura presentd contre l’accus6 une preuve com-
plate constituant un <
