COMMENTS
CHRONIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE
Re-thinking Penalties for Corporate Environmental Offenders:
A View of the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s
Sentencing in Environmental Cases
John D. Wilson*
The author critically examines Sentencing
in Environmental Cases, a Report of the
Law Reform Commission of Canada by
John Swaigen and Gal Bunt. The Report
emphasizes the traditional sanctions for
preventing pollution, including fines and
incarceration. The author believes, how-
ever, that more fundamental reforms are
necessary in the area of environmental law
the traditional remedies are inadequate
–
and create problems, especially on a the-
oretical level, when they are applied to ar-
tificial entities such as corporations. More
innovative remedies, including divesti-
ture, licence revocation, and probation
should be developed. The author advo-
cates decriminalization since civil law
remedies would be both more flexible and
more effective.
L’auteur fait l’examen critique d’un rapport
de la Commission de r~forme du droit par
John Swaigen et Gail Bunt, intitul6 La d6-
termination de la peine en droit de l”environ-
nement. Ce rapport met l’accent sur les
sanctions traditionnellement destinies A pr6-
venir la pollution, dont les amendes et l’em-
prisonnement. Toutefois, rauteur estime qu’une
r~forme plus fondamentale s’av~re n~cessaire
dans le domaine du droit de l’environne-
ment. Les sanctions traditionnelles sont ina-
d~quates et cr~ent des probl~mes,
particuli~rement au niveau th~orique, quand
elles sont appliqules A des personnes morales
telles les corporations. Des sanctions plus in-
novatrices comme le d~sinvestissement, la
revocation de permis et la probation de-
vraient 8tre mises de l’avant. L’auteur pr6-
conise la d~criminalisation car les sanctions
civiles seraient A Ia fois plus flexibles et plus
efficaces.
*Of the Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. I wish to acknowledge the contribution of
Professor Joseph Vining of the University of Michigan Law School. While he did not comment
on the paper, his influence is apparent. I would also like to thank Wendy Elliott for commenting
on an earlier draft.
McGill Law Journal 1986
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I.
Introduction
Environmental offences generally provoke strong reaction. Except for
a few industrial groups, everyone abhors pollution, especially in this day of
toxic spills and the patriotic protest against acid rain. Beyond this emo-
tionalism is the central issue of how to prevent future pollution. Effective
sanctions are one alternative.
It is in this context that the Law Reform Commission has published
Sentencing in Environmental Cases, authored by John Swaigen and Gail
Bunt.’ The Report presents a useful review of current sentencing principles
in environmental cases and argues for reforms that will provide more ef-
fective sanctions. The two reforms which have been given the most attention
are that fines should be increased for large corporate offenders and that jail
should be considered for responsible actors. While I do not doubt that these
recommendations will please environmental interest groups, the true effec-
tiveness of these sanctions can be questioned. Indeed, the emphasis on
traditional sanctions may be regarded as naive given that a significant num-
ber of environmental crimes involve corporations.2 There are serious doubts
whether fines or the threat of incarceration effectively deter these entities.
The failure of the study to adequately discuss the problems inherent in
enterprise liability is its major weakness. The recommendation for greater
use of incarceration superficially merits praise.3 However, what becomes
‘Law Reform Commission of Canada, Sentencing in Environmental Cases (Protection of
Life Series: Study Paper) by J. Swaigen & G. Bunt (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission, 1985)
[hereinafter the Report].
2There does not appear to be a Canadian empirical study establishing the veracity of this
statement although it is at least common belief that corporations are predominantly responsible
for environmental crime. Although imperfect from a methodological point of view, reference
may be made to the citations of cases in the Report itself. Within the definition of corporations
in this context, I would include other artificial entities such as cities and ships.
The word “corporate” should be value-neutral but it is not. In this comment the word is
used without respect to the size of the entity because the attachment of criminal sanctions does
not depend on such a criterion. Thus, no distinction is made between multinationals and
“mom and pop” operations. At several points in the Report such a distinction is attempted.
Where relevant, I will discuss the authors’ point of view.
3It may be unfair to emphasize the incarceration recommendation since the authors appar-
ently gave greater weight to the reform of fines. I defend my emphasis by reference to the Press
Release which accompanied the issue of the Report: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
“Law Reform Commission Releases Study Paper on Sentencing in Environmental Cases”
(Communiqu6 no. 106-85-06) which begins with the sentence: “Some people who deliberately
pollute the environment should be sentenced to jail.” The Release ‘goes on to point out that
this is merely “one of the many recommendations … “. The Law Reform Commission staff
thus emphasized the jail alternatives as did newspapers which reported on the release of the
Report. See, e.g., M. Strauss, “Law Reform Study Urges Prison Terms to Stop Polluters” The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 June 1985) 3.
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clear is that the recommendation merely begs further questions. Since a
corporation cannot go to jail, who does? The responsible actor may be an
obvious response, but, as will be discussed in the body of this comment,
identification of such actor may not be so obvious. For this reason, the
recommendations may be very difficult to apply in practice.
The same criticism may be made of the recommendation to alter the
structure of fines so that they are more meaningful. Increasing fines for large
corporations may have appeal, especially when deterrence theories are con-
sidered. However, corporations often possess the capacity to pass fines on
to others thus muting or even destroying any deterrent effect. As is the case
with incarceration, the Report fails to explore this problem in an adequate
manner.
In this comment I will discuss some of the problems neglected by the
authors.4 The difficulties of applying the traditional criminal sanctions of
fines and incarceration to artificial entities will be briefly explored in the
first two sections. In the third section I will deal with more fundamental
prospects for reform. In particular, alternative remedies will be discussed
and an argument for the decriminalization of environmental infringements
presented. Fundamental reforms have vast potential in the environmental
area and the Report could have profited from a more in-depth study of
these real reform issues.
II. The Argument Regarding Fines
A principal argument of the Report is that present fine structures are
not adequately sensitive to the wealth of the offenders.5 It is thus argued
that penalty levels are too high for impoverished offenders and too low for
super-rich multinationals. This wealth effect has direct impact on the goals
of sentencing. 6
The focus on wealth is valid, even if it is not the usual legal standard.
Common theories of punishment generally require that the penalty fit the
crime. This is normally considered as offence-regarding rather than offender-
regarding. If two persons commit identical crimes, the penalty should also
4The problems of enterprise liability are complex. In a comment of this length I can only
propose to offer an introduction to them.
5Supra, note I at 5-7 and 45.
6The conventional goals of sentencing are deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation and re-
tribution. See, e.g., K. Mann, S. Wheeler & A. Sarat, “Sentencing the White-Collar Offender”
(1980) 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 479; H.L.A. Hart; Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1968).
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be identical. While this approach superficially promotes equality in sent-
encing, it may not do so because of its failure to account for the marginal
disutility of the penalties to the offenders.
Punishment depends on pain. Some unpleasant consequences must be
visited upon the offender in order to deter him and others, by means of
example, from committing prohibited acts. One view of equality in sent-
encing is that the amount of pain infficted on identical offenders should be
the same. Accordingly, equality should be offender-regarding. Thus, a wide
range of fines must be available since poor people will value marginal dollars
much more highly than rich people.7 As such, equality can be achieved with
relatively low fines for poor offenders while a substantial fine will be de-
manded for the wealthy.
The authors of the Report appreciated this point in their recommen-
dations regarding fines. Throughout the Report the view is taken that higher
fines are required for wealthy individuals and corporations while lower
penalties should be retained for the less well-endowed.8 The authors have
thus chosen to emphasize penalties which are offender-regarding. If marginal
utility analysis and offender-regarding equality are the only criteria to be
applied then no issue can be taken with this recommendation. However,
the premise may be faulty.
The alternative theory of punishment equality, namely that it should
be offence-regarding, 9 also deserves emphasis. This view of punishment has
particular application to environmental offences where the primary concern
is the fouling of the environment and not the position of the offender. Indeed,
I would suspect that the indignation felt against “night-haulers”‘ 0 is con-
siderably greater than that felt for multinationals which commit breaches
7This is merely a corollary of scarcity theory. The scarcer a resource, the more valuable it
will be perceived to be; lower values will be ascribed to abundant resources. Behind this
economic terminology lies an obvious and simple concept –
poor people with their scarce
resources will value each dollar more highly than rich people. Therefore, a low fine imposed
on a poor person may cause considerable pain whereas a much greater amount may have to
be levied on a rich person to achieve the same result. For an article which expresses this view
in a different context, see R.A. Posner, “Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals” (1980)
17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 409. Marginal utility analysis is dealt with in all introductory economics
texts.
8See, e.g., Report, supra, note 1 at 49: “The $5,000 maximum available in Ontario, Nova
Scotia, and Quebec appears to be adequate to reflect the gravity of the average case and the
means of most individual persons and many small corporations” and later “[t]hese provisions
might include higher fines for larger corporations….
9See, e.g., Hart, supra, note 6 at 161ff.
I0″Night-hauling” refers to the dumping of harmful chemicals or waste on roadsides, fields,
etc., usually under the cover of darkness. Commonly this is done by independent contractors
who assure their customers that the unwanted matter will be dumped legally, then dispose of
it in the first convenient place.
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in the course of business even though the effect of each activity and the
charging section may be the same. In this case, especially due to the obvious
existence of intention in the night-hauler, he appears to be more “criminal”
and worthy of greater punishment. However, under marginal utility analysis
a lower penalty may be levied against the night-hauler as his is likely to be
a small business with limited wealth. For this reason, it is doubtful whether
a wholesale application of marginal utility analysis would be accepted by
the legislatures or the populace generally.’I
Another method of imposing fines advocated by the authors is the use
of the so-called “day-fine”. Under such a system, the fine is set at the amount
of profit during each day of non-compliance with environmental standards.
This alternative possesses attractions but it requires a great deal of fine-
tuning to effectively meet the goals of sentencing.
In the example employed in the Report, 12 the fine would equal a day’s
profits. This, however, may not be adequate to deter the offending conduct,
since it is reasonable to assume that most firms profit-maximize. 13 In this
context, it must be appreciated that profit need not always be positive to
be a maximum. For instance, assume a firm finds itself with an excess of
dioxin and wishes to dispose of it. It contacts a disposal firm which, due
to the nature of the chemical, quotes an extremely high price for its removal.
This figure vastly exceeds the firm’s profit for the period which would be
forfeited if the firm illegally dumped the dioxin into the sewer system. Setting
day-fines at the daily profit rate and applying a cost-benefit analysis, there
is little question what an economically rational firm will do: it will dump
the chemical and pay society’s price for such conduct. 14
In order to effectively deter the dumping in this hypothetical, the day-
fine would have to be fine-tuned to the point where the pain of penalty
exceeds the gain from the illegal conduct. According to the hypothetical,
setting the fine at the level of daily profits would not be sufficient to deter
the offensive conduct. Rather, the fine must be raised to the point where it
exceeds the cost of legal disposal in order to prompt the desired outcome.
It might also be noted that a legislative standard encouraging fines based on wealth arguably
offends s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
‘2Supra, note 1 at 54.
’13There are competing views of firm behaviour, notably one called “satisfying behaviour”.
According to this view, managers seek satisfactory results rather than optimal ones. While
these theories are acknowledged, their premises are not fatal to the argument which follows.
Satisfying behaviour, for instance, can also “justify” the dumping of the chemicals. See F.M.
Schere4 Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2d ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1980).
14I have, of course, ignored the morality of the decision-maker. The example employs only
economic criteria with an assumption of profit-maximizing behaviour.
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In some cases, including this hypothetical, the required level of fine is
not difficult to determine but other cases may not be so simple. For instance,
if the issue is the installation of a chimney-scrubber’ 5 the court would need
to know the cost of acquisition, operating costs, depreciation and other tax-
related matters in order to determine the optimal day-fine. The problems
of dealing with these issues are not insurmountable, 6 but they are none-
theless difficult, especially in the context of a trial.
There is a more general problem with the imposition of monetary pen-
alties in environmental cases. The majority of prosecuted environmental
offences are committed by artificial entities. Business corporations are usu-
ally involved, but municipalities and ships are also frequently offenders.
These entities are mere constructs with no existence beyond what they rep-
resent. For this reason serious questions arise as to whether punishment by
fine has any effect on the entities themselves. Consequently, there is doubt
whether any of the objectives of sentencing are met by fining these entities.17
The dominant objective in sentencing corporations is deterrence, both
specific and general. 18 The other objectives of sentencing, such as rehabil-
itation, are not generally applicable. 19 However, owing to the structure of
corporations and markets, fines are inadequate in deterring corporate crim-
inal conduct, since most corporations have the capacity to pass fines on to
their owners or customers without significant harm to themselves.
The incidence of the fine, whether upon owners or customers, depends
upon the market power possessed by the corporation. If the firm possesses
such power, the customer will pay; if it does not, the owners will pay.
For a corporation without market power a fine represents a diminution
of assets and thus reduces shareholder equity. The corporation itself suffers
15This is a device for removing harmful emissions from smokestacks.
16For an argument that pollution can be adequately priced, see L.E. Ruff, “The Economic
Common Sense of Pollution” (1970) 19 Pub. Interest 69. For a more sceptical view, see M.
Sagoff, “Economic Theory and Environmental Law” (1981) 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1393. The “pric-
ing” of pollution is at the core of the argument. If Ruff is right and pollution can be fairly
easily priced, then setting optimal fines would consequently be relatively unproblematic.
’71n order to avoid cumbersome language, I will generally only refer to business corporations.
Similar or identical arguments will normally apply to other artificial entities.
“Specific deterrence refers to the offender. General deterrence refers to the effect on other
potential offenders who, due to the example of the punishment of the actual offender, may
legitimize their conduct. See F Zimring & G. Hawkins, Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime
Control (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).
191f we consider the entity itself, rehabilitation is not a true option. Individual actors might
be rehabilitated but not the thing that is the corporation. Incapacitation may apply but not
through the usual method of incarceration; rather, court orders must be used. Retribution might
apply, but as argued below, it will often be futile given the entity’s ability to pass its penalties
on.
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nothing since it is a mere fiction representing the interests of its owners. It
cannot feel pain or remorse over an alteration in its balance sheet. It either
goes on as usual or is dissolved, in which case the shareholders truly feel
the loss. As the corporation is fictional, it can have none of the reactions
we might associate with deterrence.20
There are counter-arguments to this view. One such argument is that
since shareholders possess voting power, their loss of equity will encourage
them, through the exercise of that power, to force the corporation into com-
pliance with the law. However, the interests of individual shareholders are
likely to be so diffuse that the fines levied in environmental cases would
not provoke them to action. Furthermore, the common attitude of share-
holders in all but very closely-held corporations is one of passivity. As long
as dividends are paid and there is reasonable expectation of appreciation,
the shareholders will be satisfied notwithstanding a few criminal convictions.
Thus, the argument is not convincing.
Before leaving this issue, a brief point about municipal corporations
might be made. Municipalities possess the ultimate power to pass fines on
to their owners –
they merely raise taxes to cover the penalties or cut back
on services which are offered. In either case the taxpayer pays for the sins
of the entity. On the other hand, governments are generally more account-
able than business corporations. Given the public’s abhorrence of pollution,
the executive of a municipality which ignores environmental laws faces a
much greater chance of dismissal than does its counterpart in a business
corporation.
The alternative to passing the fine on to shareholders is to pass it on
to customers. In order to do this, it is necessary that the firm possess market
power. Unfortunately, this attribute is all too common in the Canadian
economy. Possessed of market power, a fined firm need only include the
penalty in its cost of production with the result that prices are raised to the
degree necessary to cover the loss. Consequently, the entity loses very little
and consumers bear the burden. As such, the deterrent effect on the cor-
poration is minimal or non-existent.
The most cogent criticism of this argument is that the fine and con-
sequent increase in price will nonetheless reduce total profit and thus the
entity will suffer either directly through this loss of profit or indirectly through
the protests of shareholders. While this argument is valid, it is not absolutely
correct. The firm will still be making the maximum profit available under
the altered conditions caused by the fine. Once the fine is amortized, the
20See, e.g., J.C. Coffee Jr, “‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick’: An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment” (1981) 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386.
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firm will be able to return to its original profit-maximizing position. For
most firms with market power, the temporary movement away from the
maximizing position will be a mere blip in a history of high profitability.
The view that shareholders will intervene has already been discussed. As
long as the firm remains profitable and pays reasonable dividends, share-
holder intervention is regarded as a remote possibility.
We therefore reach a nihilistic conclusion. If the offender possesses
market power, increasing fines will be futile in deterring the entity from
violating environmental laws as the effect of those fines will be passed on
to customers. If this market condition does not exist a different group of
innocents, the equity holders, will pay. Again, the entity will not be deterred.
Possible exceptions to these pessimistic conclusions include the very closely-
held powerless corporation and the imposition of exceedingly high penalties
on other corporations. If shareholders are actually hurt by the loss of equity,
they may be inspired to act. Similarly, if the temporary diminution of max-
imum profit earned by the firm with market power is really severe, the firm
might react. Perhaps unfortunately, implementation of this latter method
is unlikely. In all cases deterrence is only a marginal possibility.
Notwithstanding the views of the public and a small number of courts
to the contrary,2′ most judges regard pollution as a regulatory offence. Being
considered mala prohibita, there is a reluctance to impose large penalties. 22
Even when high maximum fines are legislated judicial nullification of those
penalties is a distinct possibility. 23 Compounding this problem is the fact
2’See, e.g., R. v. United Keno Hill Mines Ltd (1980), 10 C.E.L.R. 43 at 47 (Y.T. Tern Ct)
where Stuart J. stated that “pollution is a crime”. See also the Report, supra, note 1 at 2fX.
22See Report, ibid. at 49 where it is argued that a $5,000 maximum is probably adequate.
23Nullification is an extreme problem in these areas. The judge, having formed a subjective
opinion that the conduct subject to prosecution is not morally blameworthy, either acquits or
imposes negligible penalties notwithstanding high statutory maxima. The problem is partic-
ularly evident in corporate crime. See L. Orlando, “Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in
Search of Theory and Scholarship” (1980) 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 501 at 511:
[Mlany judges perceive corporate crime as victimless, as morally neutral, and as
undeserving of condemnation, let alone of harsh criminal sanction. Corporate crime
is seen as nothing more than aggressive capitalism –
a virtue, not a vice, in a
capitalistic system which espouses profit maximization as morally sound.
For empirical studies on lower penalties for white-collar offenders, see Mann, Wheeler & Sarat,
supra, note 5; J.L. Hagen & I.H. Nagel, “White-Collar Crime, White-Collar Time: The Sent-
encing of White-Collar Offenders in the Southern District of New York” (1982) 20 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 259. See also Comment, “The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pol-
lution of the Environment” (1972) 37 Alb. L. Rev. 61 at 69; A.S. Pelaez, “Of Crime and
Punishment: Sentencing the White-Collar Criminal” (1980) 18 Duq. L. Rev. 823 at 836.
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that many environmental offences are strict liability and such offences, by
their nature, are not consistent with excessive penalties.2 4
We thus come to a rather negative view of the effectiveness of fines as
a sanction for environmental offences. It would appear that the only way
for monetary penalties to have significant deterrent effect is for them to be
extremely high, but such high fines are likely to be nullified. When fines are
lower, artificial entities will be able to pass them on to shareholders or
customers with impunity. In the result, there is little deterrence and the
objectives of sentencing are thwarted.
III. The Argument Regarding Incarceration
Despite the public relations emphasis on incarceration, 25 the Report in
fact gives this alternative little attention. 26 Although they recommend im-
prisonment, the authors take a very narrow view of when it should be
applied. According to the Report, jail should be used when a fine is not
appropriate given the offensiveness of the conduct leading to prosecution
or would be oppressive given the limited wealth of the offender.27 Jail is
thus seen principally as an alternative to fines.
Acceptance of the argument in favour of imprisonment 28 also leads to
problems of implementation. Only individuals may be jailed, but corpo-
rations are common offenders in environmental cases. It thus becomes nec-
essary to find the responsible individual within the corporation. Yet even
if that person is found, and this may be difficult, the fact that he suffers the
penalty may mean that the entity itself is not punished and therefore not
deterred.
The problem of identifying a responsible actor is a real one. The com-
mon law tradition demands that in order for societal punishment to be
24
See R. v. Sault Ste Marie (1978), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161; R. v. Chapin
(1979), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 121, 95 D.L.R. (3d) 13; Pennsylvania v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825 (Pa
S.C. 1959); G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2d ed. (London: Stevens, 1983) at 948ff.
and 952.
25See supra, note 3.
26The Report devotes only two pages of text to the option of incarceration, supra, note 1 at
58-60.
2Ibid. at 59.
28For a contrary argument, see Posner, supra, note 7. Posner employs a social utility analysis
to argue that white-collar criminals should always be given an option to pay a fine rather than
go to jail. The argument is that it is always less expensive for society to fine rather than to
incarcerate. See also J.C. Coffee Jr, “Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View
of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions” (1980) 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 419. Coffee also has
doubts about the efficacy of incarceration but relies more on criminology and the problems of
enterprise liability than on economics.
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justified, it is necessary to insure that the offender is guilty. 29 In the vast
majority of criminal cases the necessary inquiry will not be overly compli-
cated because in most cases courts can adequately deal with the problems
of finding actus reus and mens rea. In a fringe of cases the inquiry becomes
more difficult, for instance, in the inchoate offences. The height of com-
plexity is reached in cases involving corporate defendants.
Since incarceration is a personal sanction, it is necessary to ensure that
the accused bears personal responsibility. The corporate structure, however,
may obscure this inquiry. Most corporations are bureaucratic and therefore
responsibility may not reside in a single office. This results in pragmatic
problems in locating the person deemed worthy of incarceration.
An illustration may elucidate this point.30 In the course of the con-
struction of a petro-chemical plant, it is discovered that because of soil
conditions, shifting and sinkage is highly probable. This could lead to the
rupture of holding tanks and piping with the resulting discharge of toxic
chemicals into the environment. Despite this knowledge, the plant is built
and indeed a spill does occur. The responsible corporation is prosecuted
and the Crown seeks jail as a penalty. To accomplish this it is of course
necessary to locate an appropriate individual for incarceration. A first re-
action may be that the engineer who was alerted to the soil problem is
responsible. On further inquiry, it is found that a team worked on the design
and all shared responsibility. The facts so far could justify charging all of
them. In an interview with one of the engineers, it is learned that they
sought the advice of their corporate superior, the Director of Engineering,
on the potential danger. The Director in turn went to the executive vice-
president who indicated that he had neither the time nor the inclination to
study engineering reports and the only important thing was that the plant
be completed on time and under budget. The engineers, informed of these
directives, determined that curing the underground defects would be too
expensive. Fearing for their future promotability, they left the design as it
was.
The hypothetical illustrates the problem of locating responsibility in
bureaucracies, but if a jail term is to be imposed, this is a necessary inquiry.
Arguments may be made for the imprisonment of all the actors, but it is
very important that the concept of criminal responsibility be kept in mind.31
Conventional analysis can support the punishment of the engineers since
references at 12, 18fN and 160.
29While the whole of Hart’s treatise, supra, note 6, advances this theory, see, specifically,
30For an analogous fact situation, see J. Warren & B.J. Kelly, “Inside the Pinto Trial” (1980)
31See Hart, supra, note 6 at 220-21.
2 Am. Law. 28.
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CHRONIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE
mens rea and actus reus are arguably present, but given the directive they
received, can it truly be said they were responsible? The Director of Engi-
neering might also be culpable, yet he too can argue that the statements of
the executive vice-president relieve him of guilt. This leaves the senior
bureaucrat whose defence is obvious. Due to the pressures of office and the
need to delegate, there was no knowledge of the impending offence. In
summary, because of the very nature of corporate hierarchy, good arguments
may be made that no one other than the corporation itself is responsible.
Acceptance of this argument results in the conclusion that incarceration is
not a justifiable alternative.
There are a number of potential solutions to this theoretical problem.
One is to admit the doctrine of vicarious responsibility into the criminal
law. In a way this has already been done in acknowledging corporate crim-
inal liability.32 It is a relatively small step to apply the doctrine to natural
persons. 33 However, it is a step with potentially great cost to the integrity
of criminal justice because it separates punishment from actual, proven
responsibility.
While vicarious criminal responsibility may be attractive to some, prob-
lems of criminal theory remain. Primarily, it should be realized that vicar-
ious liability changes the nature of the offence. The offending conduct is no
longer causing death or causing pollution, but rather the failure to adequately
supervise so as to prevent those offences. By extension of reasoning, the
offence becomes one of holding office.34 Such characterization results in
problems not the least of which is the divergence between responsibility
and punishment. Another problem is that of certainty. What standard of
supervision is required? What offices will be subject to the imputation of
responsibility? 35
32Since a corporation can neither think nor act, it may attract criminal liability only vicar-
iously. There are some examples in the present law of personal vicarious liability but these
are generally limited to absolute liability and status offences. See R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd
(1969), [1971] S.C.R. 5, [1969] 4 C.C.C. 163; R. v. Larsonneur (1933), 149 L.T. 542, 24 Cr.
App. Rep. 74 (Ct Crim. App.); Williams, supra, note 24 at 157ff.
In order to avoid misunderstanding, the term vicarious liability should be employed only
when personal guilt is not an element. Thus the phrase is improperly applied to strict liability
offences where some evidence of fault is required even if this is a minimal failure to exercise
due diligence.
33For a case which arguably does this, see United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
34See Comment, supra, note 23 at 72 citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
35For the purposes of a comment of this length, I will leave these questions as rhetorical
ones. Inquisitive readers may wish to refer to a number of analogous sources which might
assist in reaching answers. Obviously, the duty to supervise relates closely to the due diligence
defence. See R. v. Sault Ste Marie, supra, note 24. Analogies to the identification of responsible
offices may be made to the American law of corporate attorney-client privilege, military law
and admiralty. See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 ESupp. 483 (E.D.
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Imputation of responsibility also results in problems in applying de-
terrence theory. Even if personal liability can be justified on theories of
actual or vicarious responsibility, doubt remains as to whether deterrence
will result.
The case of actual responsibility may appear to be the simplest. If the
responsible person can be identified in the corporation, then deterrence
theories appear to apply. Through punishment the offender and other sim-
ilarly situated persons may be convinced that commission of the offence is
unprofitable. Such a view, however, may be overly simplistic. Bureaucracies
often create their own internal pressures; members are expected to perform
according to standards and failure to meet those standards may result in
unemployment. This has an impact on deterrence. Refer to the example of
the petro-chemical plant noted earlier.36 In that hypothetical the pressure
was to construct the plant on time and under budget. This pressure is real
and immediately felt. On the other hand, the risk of criminal prosecution
is, by comparison, rather remote. Thus, the primary pressure is to perform
even at the risk of committing an offence. 37 As such, the deterrent effect is
muted by the very fact that the individual is operating within a corporate
bureaucracy.
Another aspect of organizational crime is that even if a personal penalty
is imposed the bureaucracy may nurture the offender. This may not totally
relieve the pain felt by the punished individual. 38 Nonetheless, there may
be a significant effect on general deterrence. Others, not appreciating the
humiliation of spending time in jail, may perceive only that upon release
the offender was re-hired and promoted. The phenomenon of nurturing and
even rewarding corporate criminals is not rare,39 and others may feel an
offence was “worth it”, thus frustrating the goal of general deterrence. We
therefore again reach a nihilistic result. While the incarceration of environ-
mental offenders can be justified, given that such crimes are commonly
committed by corporations, implementation is difficult. Often identification
Pa 1962); Natta v. Hogan, 392 E2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Upjohn, 449 U.S.
383 (1981); J.D. Wilson, “The Attorney-Client Privilege in a Corporate Context” (1985) 9 Can.-
U.S. L.J. 59; Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); The President Coolidge, 101 E2d 638 (9th Cir.
1939).
36See, supra, note 30 and accompanying text.
37See Coffee, supra, note 20 at 409ff.
38Jail is generally regarded as causing greater suffering to the middle-class and white-collar
criminals than to street criminals. See Pelaez, supra, note 23 at 832; H. Pollack & A.B. Smith,
“White-Collar v. Street Crime Sentencing Disparity: How Judges See the Problem” (1983) 67
Judicature 174.
39See W. Robertson, “The Directors Woke Up Too Late at Gulf’ Fortune (June 1976) 121;
R. Loving, “How Bob Rowan Served His Time” Fortune (August 1979) 42. Both of these
sources are cited and discussed by Coffee, supra, note 20 at 434.
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of a responsible actor will not be possible and even if this hurdle is crossed,
there are cogent arguments that deterrence may not result in a meaningful
way.
IV. Fundamental Reform
Law Reform Commissions have the luxury of engaging in radical re-
thinking of legal problems. Unfortunately, this Report spends little time on
a fundamental examination of sentencing. To be fair, this may not be the
fault of the authors. I do not have access to their terms of reference which
may have emphasized conventional analysis. Whatever the reason, the Re-
port does not adequately explore true alternatives to the present system.
In this section of the comment I will discuss two areas where funda-
mental reform should be considered. The first, which is dealt with in the
Report, is the need for innovative sanctions. The second is a suggestion
that decriminalization might solve some of the problems of environmental
sentencing. While this second argument is noted in the Report, it is not
really analyzed.
1.
Innovative Remedies
In earlier sections of this comment some of the problems of fines and
incarceration in environmental cases were discussed. Both of these sanctions
are inadequate in dealing with such offences. In order to achieve societal
goals with respect to the environment, it is necessary to adopt innovative
approaches to sentencing. In this regard, the greatest potential lies in what
may be broadly termed “structural remedies”. Under such an approach an
attempt is made to restructure the offender or the market to prevent the
repetition of the offence. This may be done through actual restructuring,
such as divestiture, or through the channelling of behaviour by means of
sanctions, such as probation.
Divestiture is an extreme sanction, but there are, nonetheless, circum-
stances when its use can be justified in environmental cases. In particular,
divestiture should be considered for repeat offenders which show little
likelihood of future compliance. Normally this will occur when the “benefit”
to the firm of dumping is greater than the cost of consequent penalties. 40
It is possible that divestment could change the economics so that dumping
40See “The Enforcer” Newsweek (18 October 1971) 101. Standard Oil of California had been
convicted of spilling oil into San Francisco Bay and probation was ordered. The probation
officer reported that the company had been repeating the offence with alarming regularity. The
maximum fine was $1,000. I would suspect that the cost of total compliance exceeded this by
a staggering amount. Thus, in the context of profit maximization, continuing the offences was
rational behaviour.
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would no longer be rational because, in the hands of another firm, the
incentives to dump may be reduced or eliminated.
This argument is tricky since it relies on speculative economic theories.
There is no assurance that the forced sale of all or part of an offender’s
business will alter the economics in any significant way. Furthermore, de-
termining the economics in a judicial context will be extremely difficult and
time consuming.41 Divestiture can also be criticized as it may bankrupt the
firm, thus punishing innocents such as shareholders and employees. 42 This
latter argument is weak despite its truth. Every criminal sanction harms a
group wider than the offender. The incarceration of a bank robber hurts his
family and it is the taxpayer who must undertake his upkeep. However, if
we begin to emphasize these “ripple-effects” of sentencing over its primary
goals then the process may become intractable. This is not to argue that
social cost should not be considered. Rather, it should be stressed that social
cost is merely one of a number of values inherent in the sentencing process.43
Despite the problems with the argument for divestiture, there may be
cases where its use is justified. An example may be when a firm involved
in the same business has an excellent environmental compliance record and
is interested in the purchase of the divested business.
A remedy which is more tractable than divestiture, although in some
ways similar to it, is the revocation of licences.44 A wide range of polluting
activities are conducted under licences or quasi-licences. For instance, a
night-hauler can only operate if he has plates on his truck. If convicted
night-haulers were required to surrender all licences relevant to the operation
of their trucks, the incidence of these offences might be expected to drop
significantly. Another example is allowable emission levels. I regard these
as quasi-licences since pollution up to the allowable limit is permitted by
government. When a firm repeatedly exceeds those levels, a possible penalty
is to reduce that firm’s allowable limit to zero.
4’Divestiture requires an intensive and often speculative inquiry into the economics of the
firm and the market to determine whether the remedy is justified. In fact, the complexity of
divestiture often causes extreme reluctance to apply the remedy. See, e.g., K.G. Elzinga, “The
Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?” (1969) 12 J.L. & Econ. 43.
42See Report, supra, note 1 at 57.
43But see Posner, supra, note 7, who takes a different view of the importance of social cost.
44See M. Sheils, L. Howard & E.B. Washington, “The FCC’s Toughest Crackdown” Newsweek
(4 February 1980) 65. The Federal Communications Commission revoked three television
licences held by R.K.O. General Inc. R.K.O. and its parent, General Tire, were found to have
pressured General Tire’s customers into advertising on R.K.O. stations. It was estimated that
the revoked licences represented a loss to General Tire of U.S.$400 million or 25 per cent of
total assets.
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CHRONIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE
Licence revocation is a remedy with great potential. From a pragmatic
point of view it is easily justified. The right underlying the licence is given
by the good grace of government and should that right be abused its loss
is justified. In many cases, because the offender is incapacitated, the sanction
will also be efficient in stopping pollution. An argument against licence
revocation is that it can be draconian and may cause bankruptcy but, as
noted above, I think this argument is weak.
A more immediate problem with licence revocation is its availability
under current law. Many environmental agencies have the power to revoke,
suspend or alter licences, 45 but this is normally done in an administrative
context. It is not clear at the present time whether a criminal court can
impose the penalty without statutory authorization. Some statutes contain
such authorization. 46 However, under the Criminal Code, the better view
is that licence revocation is not currently available; the most relevant state-
ment is in paragraph 663(2)(h) which provides that the accused may be
ordered to
comply with such reasonable conditions … desirable for securing the good
conduct of the accused and for preventing a repetition by him of the same
offence or the commission of other offences. 47
While an argument can be made that this section permits licence revocation,
it would strain the language. A licence or emission standard sets a threshold
for legal conduct. Conduct below this threshold thus does not entail repe-
tition of the offence. Therefore, it appears that at most a court could order
the accused to remain within the legal limits of the licence but could not
totally revoke the right.
On the other hand, I believe there is at least one instance when para-
graph 663(2)(h) can support revocation; that is, when the relevant licence
is not directly related to the polluting conduct. An example is the night-
hauler’s trucking licence. That licence gives no level of immunity from
prosecution for pollution and when a truck has been used in the commission
of more than one offence a good argument can be made that forfeiture of
the licence is a reasonable condition for preventing repetition.
In summary, licence revocation is easily justified and efficacious and
is a penalty which should be more commonly applied in environmental
45See the Report, supra, note 1 at 57ff.
46See, e.g., the Ontario Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 400, s. 70(2)(a) which allows
for the revocation of drivers’ licences. See the Report, supra, note I at 58.
47R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
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cases. 48 Enabling legislation should be considered by relevant levels of
government.
Another structural remedy which may be used to advantage in. envi-
ronmental cases is probation. 49 The principal attraction of this sanction is
that it permits rectification of the offending conduct without the imposition
of undue punishment which might be passed on to shareholders or cus-
tomers. A few comments on the federal probation provisions may illustrate
the usefulness of the sanction.5 0
Under subsection 663(2) the sentencing court may impose conditions
on the accused, including reporting to a person designated by the court51
and making restitution.52 The court may also impose other conditions for
securing the good conduct of the accused and for preventing repetition of
the offence. 53
These powers can be exceedingly useful in environmental cases. A ma-
jor problem in the enforcement of the law is detection. This problem might
be partially solved by requiring offenders to report extensively on their
operations resulting in pollution. Problems with the technical nature of these
reports54 could be solved by the court designating an appropriate environ-
mental protection agency.
An order for restitution is of obvious attraction in environmental cases.
Not only might this permit restoration of spoiled natural resources but may
also allow the imposition of a meaningful penalty when statutory maxima
are relatively low.
Conditions for securing good conduct and for preventing the repetition
of offences are also applicable to cases involving the environment. For in-
stance, when pollution is technically avoidable but such avoidance is un-
economic, the court could order compliance. Consider a firm which continually
exceeds air pollution emission standards. Appropriate chimney-scrubbers
481t would appear that a due process argument can be made against this recommendation.
The present administrative process for depriving someone of a previously held right is cum-
bersome and usually subject to review. An accused could argue that the same amount of
procedural fairness is required in a criminal court. The argument is a good one. However, I
believe that the sentencing hearing could be structured to meet the procedural concerns. In
addition, significant appeal rights could be given in lieu of judicial review.
49Report, supra, note 1 at 60ff. The probation provisions of the Ontario Provincial Offences
Act, supra, note 46, are reviewed in the Report, supra at 61. As noted in the Report at 62,
some other provinces have enacted the Criminal Code provisions for provincial offences.
5sCriminal Code, supra, note 47, s. 663.
51Ibid., s. 663(2)(a).
52Ibid., s. 663(2)(e).
53Ibid., s. 663(2)(h), quoted in the text at note 47.
54See “The Enforcer”, supra, note 40.
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are available but have been deemed too expensive by the company. Under
paragraph 663(2)(h), it appears that a court could order purchase of the
scrubbers. The counter-argument to this position is that such an order would
be unreasonable or punitive.55 The first aspect of the argument would be
that since installation is uneconomic, an order to do so is unreasonable, but
this argument is not a strong one. Reasonableness should be read as relating
to the prevention of offensive conduct, not to the economic rationality of
compliance. The punitive argument is similar. Forcing a firm to undertake
uneconomic programmes could be argued to be punitive, but the argument
is weak. Provisions directed towards law-abiding conduct cannot be so re-
garded. Indeed, an opposite conclusion would lead to some interesting the-
ories of social obligation.
There is some argument about whether a corporation can be made
subject to a probation order. Notwithstanding authority to the contrary, 56
I agree with the argument in the Report 57 that the better view is that section
663 of the Criminal Code does apply to business corporations.
While a number of other structural sanctions could be discussed, 58 to
do so would be repetitive as they are similar to those already dealt with.
When compared to the traditional sanctions of fine and incarceration, struc-
tural remedies offer much greater potential for encouraging compliance with
environmental laws. They are especially efficacious with respect to specific
deterrence as the court can correct the practices which lead to the com-
mission of the offence. In addition, since the business community is likely
to regard the remedies as radical, general deterrence should also result.
55An order may not be punitive: R. v. Ziatas (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 287 (Ont. C.A.).
56R. v. Algoma Steel Corp. (1977), 1 W.C.B. 118 (Ont. Prov. Ct).
57Supra, note 1 at 63ff.
5 8Among other possible sanctions are reparations, changes in the composition of the Board
of Directors and orders directed at specific individuals within the corporation. I do not think
it necessary to discuss reparations.
Changes in the Board composition may be effective where there has been lax management
or where there are “bad apples in the barrel”. See “Mattel Told to Put Outsiders in Majority
of Board Seats, Undergo Special Audit” The Wall Street Journal (3 October 1974) 4.
Orders against individuals are of particular interest. Such orders could be mandatory or
prohibitory. A mandatory order could affix positive duties to prevent future offences on an
appropriate corporate officer. Prohibitory orders may be criticized since they merely impose
an obligation to obey the law. They can be useful, however, in imposing conditions and may
contain terms for monitoring compliance. An extreme form of prohibition order is one which
bars a given individual from involvement in an area of production or with the entity as a
whole. Such an order may be appropriate when a responsible actor is identified and repetition
is likely. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 ESupp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974). In Canada, it would appear that
such orders are only available if the individual is charged and convicted. See Criminal Code,
supra, note 47, s. 663.
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A great deal more thought must be given to the implementation of these
sanctions. In particular, extensive analysis should be undertaken to fit the
most appropriate sanction to specific environmental offences. Nonetheless,
structural remedies are the best reaction to such crimes. While the authors
of the Report did not disagree with this conclusion, 59 they could have ad-
vanced the further research required had they been more devoted to fun-
damental reform than to conventional analysis.
2. Decriminalization
As is apparent, one of the biggest problems in environmental law is the
design of effective remedies for non-compliance. This problem is com-
pounded by the fact that we are dealing with criminal and quasi-criminal
law. For this reason, the essential search for remedial measures must take
place in the context of finding guilt, protecting the accused and the goals of
criminal sentencing. When the complexities of the environment are con-
sidered, these otherwise bonafide values may serve only to deter the design
of remedies which accomplish what we intend them to.
A movement away from the criminal law could result in substantial
improvement in the ability to react positively to pollution. Once guilt is no
longer relevant, the emphasis would shift from punishment to compensation
or correction. The tortuous arguments required to justify the use of the
criminal law would be avoided and simultaneously the flexibility of the
remedies would be increased.
This alternative view of environmental law regards breaches as torts
committed either against specific individuals or the public. The difficulties
of criminal sentencing could thus be avoided and the tort principles sub-
stituted. Also, forward-looking remedies would be more readily available.
While such remedies are available in criminal law, for instance, probation,
the civil law injunction is both more applicable and more flexible.
Decriminalization, nevertheless, presents some theoretical and practical
difficulties. A majority of the population regards pollution as criminal and
thus, on a political level, legislative change may not be viable. A theoretical
argument against decriminalization is that it merely avoids rather than solves
the problems of sanctioning artificial entities. For the profit-maximizing firm
a loss of money is the same whether it is called a fine or damages. In addition,
changing the name has no effect on the firm’s ability to pass the loss on to
shareholders or customers. Similarly, the problems of applying forward-
looking orders to bureaucratic entities are not solved by decriminalization
59Supra, note 1 at 72.
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CHRONIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE
alone. These arguments are valid. They do not, however, totally destroy the
decriminalization argument.
With respect to the argument that tort awards may also be passed on
to innocent shareholders and customers in the same manner as are fines,
the key difference in civil law is that innocence, or guilt for that matter,
becomes irrelevant. Rather, the emphasis is on compensation for injuries
inflicted. Shareholders expect that firms will incur civil liabilities and thus
a damage award against a corporation cannot be considered unfair to its
owners. 60
The argument with respect to customers is more difficult to rebut. The
firm with market power can raise prices with the result that customers pay
for the wrong-doing. While this imposition on customers may not be jus-
tified, 61 it may nonetheless be rationalized. Civil liabilities generally may
be insured against. The premiums are a cost of doing business and may
fairly be passed on to consumers. On the other hand, it is not normally
possible to insure against truly criminal penalties. This is due to the theory
that the offender should suffer the consequences of his conduct personally.
Decriminalization thus makes the passing-on of civil penalties acceptable
even if it does not do so in a completely satisfactory manner.
While forward-looking remedies are always problematic when applied
to corporations, it should nonetheless be easier to design appropriate rem-
edies under the civil law. Criminal law sanctions must find their authority
in a strictly construed statute. On the other hand, injunctions have generally
been permitted to develop as judge-made law. 62 In practice this permits a
great deal of flexibility in terms of drafting the original order and subsequent
review. For this reason alone, the civil remedy should provide greater po-
tential for effectiveness.
There is one further problem with decriminalization which should be
noted. The power of the federal government to legislate with respect to civil
law is limited. The removal of this level of government from involvement
in environmental law may be a source of concern. However, the problem
60For an argument that shareholders also expect firms to commit crimes, see C. Kennedy,
“Criminal Sentences for Corporations: Alternative Fining Mechanisms” (1985) 73 Calif. L.
Rev. 443 at 452ff.
611n class I present an argument that consumers are responsible for corporate crimes because
it is their choices in the marketplace which dictate the behaviour of firms. At the risk of losing
a good teaching tool, I do not believe the argument under prevalent market conditions.The
argument was, however, attempted in the Pinto trial, see supra, note 30, and may have con-
tributed to the jury’s acquittal of Ford. The argument appears mainly in the transcripts, par-
ticularly in the closing submissions of Ford’s counsel.
62The equity power comes from statute but it is very wide, permitting the Courts to develop
the law. See Courts of Justice Act, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. I,
s. 109.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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is probably not a major one. Full legislative authority would remain in
Parliament in areas such as oceans and international waterways, as it would
with respect to federal undertakings.
V. Conclusion
In this comment I have attempted a general review of some of the
proposals put forth in the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s Sentencing
in Environmental Cases. I have also discussed some alternative approaches
to reform of the law.
In my view, the Report places too much emphasis on the adjustment
of fines as a sanction, but neither this recommendation, nor that dealing
with incarceration, is adequately dealt with on a theoretical level. In par-
ticular, the Report fails to deal sufficiently with the problem of applying
these sanctions to artificial entities.
In the area of environmental law, greater progress could be made through
innovative thinking about sanctions. More thought must be given to rem-
edies which account for the bureaucratic nature of offenders and more closely
attack aberrant behaviour. Perhaps more fundamentally, the costs and ben-
efits of decriminalization should be analyzed. The Law Reform Commission
Report may be criticized for its failure to tackle these issues.
