COMMENTS
COMMENTAIRES
Redhibition as a Twentieth Century Remedy:
A Discussion of Louisiana Solutions to
General Motors Ltd v. Kravitz
Katherine Connell-Thouez*
Introduction
A comparative analysis of the legal aspects of General Motors
Products of Canada Ltd v. Kravitz1 would be incomplete without a
discussion of the Louisiana doctrine and jurisprudence in the area
of manufacturers’ liability for defective products. The study of any
field of civil law in Louisiana, however, invariably reveals the con-
stant battle to maintain the integrity of this jurisdiction’s civilian
legal system in the face of omnipresent common law doctrine and
* Teaching Fellow, Faculty of Law, McGill University; Research Associate,
Centre of Private and Comparative Law, Faculty of Law, McGill University.
The author wishes to thank Professors Cr6peau, Jobin, Haanappel and Bridge
for their comments and suggestions concerning this text.
1 [1979] 1 S.C.R. 790.
2 Louisiana, like Quebec, is a civilian jurisdiction of predominantly French
origin where the Civil Code dates from the Digest of the Civil Laws
(generally known as the Civil Code) of 1808. See Batiza, The Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance (1971) 46 Tul. L. Rev.
4; Sweeney, Tournament of Scholars over the Sources of the Civil Code of
1808 (1972) 46 Tul. L. Rev. 585; Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of
1808, Facts and Speculation: A Rejoinder (1972) 46 Tul. L. Rev. 628. But see
Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza (1972)
46 Tul. L. Rev. 603, reflecting the opinion of certain historians in Louisiana
that “the Digest of 1808, though written largely in words copied from, adapted
from, or suggested by French language texts, was intended to, and does for
the most part, reflect the substance of the Spanish law in force in Louisiana
in 1808”: ibid., 604.
The Digest of the Civil Laws of 1808 was followed by the Civil Code
of 1825 and the Revised Code of 1870. See Batiza, The Actual Sources of the
Louisiana Projet of 1823: A General Analytical Survey (1972) 47 Tul. L. Rev. 1.
It is significant, however, that almost 50% of the provisions of the Digest
of 1808 still survive in the Revised Code of 1870: Batiza, The Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance (1971) 46 Tul. L. Rev.
4, 5. For an excellent summary of the scholarly battle concerning the sources
of the Digest of 1808, see Hoff, Error in the Formation of Contracts in
Louisiana: A Comparative Analysis (1979) 53 Tul. L. Rev. 329, 331, n. 12.
19801
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
jurisprudenceY The field of products liability reflects dearly the
many facets of this struggle as well as a most remarkable effort to
profit from the recent renaissance of French influence6
in order to
respond in civilian terms to the demands of an increasingly con-
sumer oriented society6
If the question were asked: “Would the Louisiana Supreme
Court have rendered the same decision as the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Kravitz case?”, the answer would most probably be
in the affirmative. It is significant, however, that one finds in the
relevant doctrine and some jurisprudence the elements of a co-
4 Many difficulties result from Louisiana’s membership
3 Louisiana, as the only civilian jurisdiction in the United States, suffers
from such obvious disadvantages as language barriers with European civilian
systems, the relative difficulty of acquiring information and materials from
abroad, the plethora of common law materials available within the United
States, and the virtual monopoly of case reporting by common law publishers.
in the federal
system of the United States. Although the federal courts are obliged to apply
state law in matters outside of the federal competence, federal judges often
restate Louisiana law in common law terms. See Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. 317 F. 2d 19, 32 (5th Cir. 1963) which treats Doyle v. Fuerst &
Kraemer, Ltd 129 La 838, 56 So. 906 (1911) as a tort case rather than a case
in redhibition. The obvious result is the assimilation of decisions into the
common law fabric when they are cited as the rule of law by subsequent
jurisprudence. For a discussion of federal legislation affecting Louisiana in
the area of consumer protection, see Hersbergen, On the Necessity or
Desirability of Consumerism –
Inspired Revision of the Louisiana Civil
Code – A Summary of Research Undertaken and Conclusions and Tentative
Conclusions Reached (1979) 10 R.G.D. 20. See also Comment, Louisiana’s Con-
sumer Protection Law – Three Years of Operation (1976) 50 Tul. L. Rev. 375.
5 In recent years there has been a serious effort to re-establish contacts
with other civilian jurisdictions and particularly with France. The Louisiana
State Law Institute has arranged for the translation of numerous French
commentators: e.g., Planiol, Traitg dlmentaire de droit civil 11th ed. (1959),
La State L. Inst. (transl.); G6ny, Mdthode d’interprdtation et sources en
droit privg positif 2d ed. (1963), La State L. Inst. (transl.); Aubry & Rau,
Cours de droit civil frangais 6th ed. (1971), La State L. Inst. (transl);
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1972), vol. 5, La State L. Inst. ‘(transl.), con-
taining articles by Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, Aubry & Rau, Carbonnier;
David, French Law: Its Structure, Sources and Methodology (1972), Kindred
(transl.).
In celebration of the 150th anniversary of the Civil Code of 1825, some
members of the Louisiana Bar Association met in France with distinguished
French jurists. From this meeting came a number of interesting papers on
subjects of common interest which were published in (1976) 50 Tul. L. Rev.
457-629.
6 Compare the reasoning in Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. 259 La 599,
250 So. 2d 754 (1971) with that in Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 358 So. 2d
926 (La 1978).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
herent civilian theory of contractual responsibility for the manufac-
ture of defective products.
The decision in General Motors v. Kravitz involved the re-
sponsibility of a manufacturer to a remote purchaser under the
legal warranty provided in articles 1522 and 1527 of the Quebec
Civil Code.r It is very interesting to note the similarity between the
Quebec articles concerning
the analogous
Louisiana ,provisions.
legal warranty and
The articles of the Louisiana Civil Code respecting the obligations
of a vendor in a sales contract provide that the seller “is bound to
two principal obligations, that of delivering and that of warranting
the thing which he sells”.8
The warranty respecting the seller has two objects:
the first is the
buyer’s peaceable possession of the thing sold, and the second is the
hidden defects of the thing sold or its redhibitory vicesP
Article 2520 of the Louisiana Civil Code defines the -action in red-
hibition:
Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on account of some vice or defect
in the thing sold, which renders it either absolutely useless, or its use so
inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer
would not have purchased it, had he known of the vice.10
The redhibitory defect” cannot be apparent “such as the buyer
might have discovered [it] by simple inspection”, 2 and it must have
existed before the sale.’8 The purchaser has the right to tender the
See also Perret, La garantie du manufacturier: Rdcents ddveloppements
et perspectives futures en droit qudbdcois (1979) 10 R.G.D. 156, 168-72.
8 La Civ. Code, art. 2475 (1870). Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art. 1491 -and Fr. Civ.
Code, art. 1603.
9 La Civ. Code, art. 2476. Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art. 1506 and Fr. Civ. Code,
art. 1625.
10 Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art. 1522 and Fr. Civ. Code, art. 1641. For a detailed
discussion of the Roman origins of the redhibitory action,- see Morrow,
The Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey –
I (1940) 14 Tul. L. Rev.
327, 347 et seq.
” The question of what constitutes a defect sufficiently serious to resolve
the contract has been the subject of much study. See Redmann, Redhibition
in Louisiana: Its Uses and Its Problems Today (1976) 50 Tul. L. Rev. 530,
535; Robertson, Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Products in Louisiana
Law (1976) 50 Tul. L. Rev. 50, 88. It is safe to assume that the Louisiana
courts would have found redhibitory defects in a fact situation comparable
to Kravitz; see jurisprudence cited infra, note 64.
12La Civ. Code, art. 2521. Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art. 1523 and Fr. Civ. Code,
art. 1642. For a discussion of the buyer’s obligation to inspect, see Comment,
The Nature of the Redhibitory Action (1930) 4 Tul. L. Rev. 433, 438.
‘3La Civ. Code, art. 2530 (1870). This article also provides that the defect
which appears within three days immediately following the sale is presumed
1980]
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
object 14 and to institute the redhibitory action for the resolution of
the sale; alternatively, he may demand a reduction in the price. 5
Since 1974 the good faith seller is “only bound to repair, remedy
or correct the [redhibitory] vices”; if he is unable or fails to repair,
he is then obliged to restore the price and reasonable expenses.’
The bad faith seller is responsible for “restitution of the price and
repayment of the expenses, [and he] is answerable to the buyer in
to have existed before the sale. Some jurisprudence suggests that proof that
the defect was more likely than not caused by the manufacturer (and
thus in existence before the sale) is sufficient: see Moreno’s, Inc. v. Lake
Charles Catholic High Schools, Inc. 315 So. 2d 660 (La 1975).
14 La Civ. Code, art. 2536 allows the action in redhibition even after the
loss of the object “if that loss was not occasioned by the fault of the
purchaser”. “If the thing affected with the vices has perished through the
badness of its quality, the seller must sustain the loss”: La Civ. Code, art.
2532. However, if it has perished by fortuitous event before institution of
the redhibitory action, the buyer must bear the loss. “But if it has perished,
even by a fortuitous. event, since the commencement of the suit, it is for
the seller to bear the loss”: La Civ. Code, art. 2-533. Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art.
1529 and Fr. Civ. Code, art. 1647.
The difficulty lies in proving that the defect existed before the sale
when the object is no longer intact. The recent Louisiana jurisprudence is
favorable to the plaintiff: see Margan v. Precision Motors, Inc. 360 So. 2d
621 (La App. 4th Cir. 1978); Burns v. Lamar-Lane Chevrolet, Inc. 354 So. 2d
620 (La App. 1st Cir. 1977); Sam’s Diesel Repair Service, Inc. v. Davis 348
So. 2d 1309 (La App. 3d Cir. 1977). But when the object has been resold or
cannot be returned for other reasons, the buyer can only proceed in quanti
minoris: Bendana v. Mossy Motors, Inc. 347 So. 2d 946 (La App. 4th Cir.
1977).
15 La Civ. Code, arts. 2531, 2541. Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art. 1526 and Fr. Civ.
Code, art. 1644.
1 La Civ. Code, art. 2531 as am. by La Acts 1974, No. 673, 1. The text of the
amended article provides, in part:
The seller who knew not the vices of the thing is only bound to repair,
remedy or correct the vices as provided in Article 2521, or if he be unable
or fails to repair, remedy or correct the vice, then he must restore the
purchase price, and reimburse the reasonable expenses occasioned by
the sale, as well as those incurred for the preservation of the thing,
subject to credit for the value of any fruits or use which the purchaser
has drawn from it.
See Note, (1975) 49 Tul. L. Rev. 484. This amendment overrules in part
Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co. 281 So. 2d 112 (La 1973) where the Supreme
Court held that the facility of repairing a defect was not a criterion in
deciding whether it constituted a redhibitory vice. After the amendment
there was some fear that the good faith seller might be allowed to repair
forever; however, the subsequent jurisprudence has been quite favorable
to the purchaser: Moran v. Willard E. Robertson Corp. 372 So. 2d 758 (La
App. 4th Cir. 1979). But see Jordan v. LeBlanc & Broussard Ford, Inc. 332
So. 2d 534 (La App. 3d Cir. 1976).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
damages”.17 The prescriptive period for the redhibitory aotion is
one year from the date of the sale in the case of a good faith seller
and one year from the discovery of the defect for a bad faith
seller.
18
For the purpose of this discussion let us compare the following
edements of the Kravitz opinion with the analogous solutions in
Louisiana:
I. The Supreme Court in Kravitz abandoned the classical rules
of “privity” in allowing the purchaser of a defective auto-
mobile to proceed directly against the manufacturer under
the theory of the legal warranty of article 1522 of the Quebec
Civil Code.
II. The Court invoked the presumption of the manufacturer’s
knowledge of defects in the product he places on the market
to preclude a waiver of the legal warranty by means of a con-
ventional warranty agreement.
III. The Court granted the redhibitory action under articles 1526
and 1528. The difference between the retail and wholesale
price plus additional heads of damage were recovered under
article 1527(2) of the Quebec Civil Code.
I. The “privity” requirement in redhibitory actions
The question of lack of privity is one of the most controversial
aspects of the Kravitz decision; indeed, in Louisiana, the concept
17 La Civ. Code, art. 2545. Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art. 1527 and Fr. Civ. Code,
art. 1645. Following the 1974 amendment of article 2531, there was speculation
as to whether the manufacturer would have the right to repair also. The
jurisprudence has not allowed this, however, holding that the right to
repair does not apply to the bad faith seller: Moran v. Willard E. Robertson
Corp., supra, note 16; Bernard v. Bradley Automotive 365 So. 2d 1382 (La App.
2d Cir. 1978); Burns v. Lamar-Lane Chevrolet, Inc., supra, note 14.
1 La Civ. Code, arts. 2534, 2546. Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art. 1530: “L’action
r~dhibitoire … doit 8tre intentde avec diligence raisonnable” and Fr. Civ.
Code, art. 1648: “‘L’action r6sultant des vices redhibitoires doit 8tre intent6e
par l’acqudreur, dans un bref ddlai”.
The courts are often lenient where pleas of prescription are concerned;
the prescription may not begin to run until the seller abandons his attempts
to repair the product he has sold. See Weaver v. Fleetwood Homes 327 So.
2d 172, 176 (La App. 3d Cir. 1976); noted in Day, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term – Prescription (1977) 37 La L. Rev.
386, 388. See also Rev v. Cuccia 298 So. 2d 840 (La 1974); Robertson v. Jimmy
Walker Chrysler-Plymouth 368 So. 2d 747 (La App. 3d Cir. 1979); Fleur de Leis
Apts v. Davidson Sash & Door Co. 364 So. 2d 234 (La App. 3d Cir. 1978);
Alexander v. Burroughs Corp. 350 So. 2d 988 (La App. 2d Cir. 1977) rev’d in
part, 359 So. 2d 607 (La 1978).
1980]
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
of privity constituted, until quite recently, a bar to the action of a
remote purchaser against the manufacturer. Article 1889 of the
Louisiana Civil Code,’
the counterpart of article 1165 of the French
Civil Code and article 1023 of the Quebec Civil Code, was the basis
for the long accepted theory that the legal warranty which flows
from the contractual obligation of sale can only be invoked between
parties to the same contract 2 0
In the very important case of Media Production Consultants, Inc.
v. Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc.,2″ however, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana allowed the purchaser of a defective automobile
to proceed directly against the North American distributor who was
treated as the manufacturer 2 2 The Court did not decide whether the
recovery was delictual or contractual but invoked the public policy
criterion of consumer protection, expressly aligning itself with the
jurisprudence of common law neighboris. Nevertheless, the distribu-
tor as manufacturer was held liable in solido with the dealer for the
pecuniaty loss2 4 resulting from an “unusable vehicle … when there
is an … implied warranty without privity”. 25
10 La Civ. Code, art. 1889 provides:
No one can, by a contract in his own name, bind anyone but himself
or his representatives; but he may contract, in his own name, that
another shall ratify or perform the stipulation which he makes, and in
this case he shall be liable in damages, if the contract be not ratified
or performed by the person for whose act he stipulates.
2 See Campbell, The Remedy of Redhibition: A Cause Gone Wrong (1974)
22 La B.J. 27, 29 and cases cited therein.
21262 La 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
22 This finding was necessary because the local dealer was defunct and
the German manufacturer was not a corporation licensed to do business
within the U.S. The Court stated that the supplier, by placing the vehicle on
the market, represented to the public that it would be suitable for use. The
intervention of a dealer would not mitigate the supplier’s responsibility;
the dealer served “only as a conduit” for marketing the automobile: ibid., 381.
2:3Ibid., 381: “Louisiana has aligned itself with the consumer-protection
rule, by allowing a consumer without privity to recover whether the suit
be strictly in tort or upon implied warranty”. The Court cited decisions
based upon art. 2315 (delict), and in a footnote referred to French authorities
for the transmission of warranty with the object of sale.
24 The purchaser in Media recovered the purchase price paid the dealer and
expenses: ibid. The Court does not explain the basis upon which the dealer
and the distributor-manufacturer were held solidarily liable. For an ar-
gument in favor of solidary liability in a redhibitory action, see Barham,
Redhibition: A Comparative Comment (1975) 49 Tul. L. Rev. 376, 385; Litvinoff,
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term –
Sales
(1975) 35 La L. Rev. 310, 315. But see Campbell, supra, note 20, 24-25.
2 Ibid.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
If the theoretical basis of the Media case was unclear, the sub-
sequent Supreme Court decision in Rey v. Cuccia,2 6 allowing the
purchaser of a defective camper trailer to recover the price and
damages from the remote manufacturer, was not:
In effect, the consumer’s cause of action, which is based upon the
breach of the sale’s implied warranty, is enforceable directly against the
manufacturer, who himself
implied
warranty.X
is by law bound
to the same
Since the Rey interpretation of Media, there is no question as to the
purchaser’s right to proceed directly in redhibition against the
remote manufacturer.
Although Media was stated in common law terms, the similarity
between the Louisiana Civil Code articles in the field of obligations
and those of the French Civil Code is such that a civilian analysis
of the Media “direct action” (already the rule in France for some
years) was quick to follow in the doctrine2 8 There are at least
three possible theories under the Louisiana Civil Code upon which
the Supreme Court in Media might have relied to achieve the
result so desirable from a public policy perspective.
A. The theory of transmission
Louisiana Civil Code article 2461 provides:
The sale of a thing includes that of its accessories, and of whatever
has been destined for its constant use, unless there be a reservation to
the contrary.
It has been suggested that this artiole, combined with its companion
artidle 2490,9 could well justify the theory that the legal warranty
for redhibitory defects is transmitted “as an accessory” of the
object of sale from the manufacturer to the ultimate purchaser
This theory finds support in French doctrine and jurisprudence l
26 Supra, note 18.
27 Ibid., 845, citing Media.
28See Redmann, supra, note 11; Barham, supra, note 24; Note (1973) 47
Tul. L. Rev. 473.
29La Civ. Code art. 2490 provides: “The obligation of delivering the thing
includes the accessories and dependencies, without which it would be of
no value or service, and likewise everything that has been designed to its
perpetual use”. Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art. 1499 and Fr. Civ. Code, art. 1615.
80 See Barham, supra, note 24, 381.
31 Aubry & Ratt, Droit Civil Frangais 7e 6d. (1975),
t. 6, no 414, 638-42;
Mazeaud, Legons de Droit Civil 4e 6d. (1974), t. 3, no 985-2, 253-54; Planiol &
Ripert, Traitj Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1956), t. 10, no 138, 157-58; Huc,
Commentaire Thdorique et Pratique du Code Civil (1897), t. 10, no 154, 209;
Baudry-Lacantinerie & Saignat, Traitd thdorique et pratique de droit civil
1980]
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
although it presents the disadvantage that it is only available at any
given moment to the owner of the object.32 This theory might well
explpain the direct recourse available to Mr Kravitz in Quebec.3
13. The “stipulation pour autrui”
There is French authority for the proposition that the manufac-
turer may be held to have stipulated a legal warranty in favor of
an ultimate purchaser, under the theory of a stipulation in favor
of a third party beneficiary 3 4 This -theory is more difficult of appli-
cation in Louisiana. Although article 1890 allows for the stipulation
pour autrui5 in terms analogous to the French Civil Code article
1121,”‘ there
is a strong judicially-created presumption that a
stipulation in favor of a third party will not be inferred from the
contract but must figure expressly therein3 7
C. The theory of subrogation
Article 2503 as amended in 19241s provides
that “whether
warranty be excluded or not the buyer shall become subrogated
to the seller’s rights and actions in warranty against all others”.
Although this article is found among the articles dealing with the
warranty against eviction, the Louisiana jurisprudence has in fact
applied it in cases of warranty for redhibitory defects. 9
3e 6d. (1908), t. 19, no 432, 450; Malinvaud, Select Problems in the Civil Law:
The Law of Redhibition in France and Louisiana (1975) 49 Tul. L. Rev. 372,
374; Morrow, The Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey –
11 (1940) 14
Tul. L. Rev. 529.
32 See Ghestin, L’arr~t Kravitz et le droit positif frangais sur la garantie
des vices cachds (1980) 25 McGill L.J. 315.
3 See Haanappel, La responsabilitg civile du manufacturier en droit qug-
bicois (1980) 25 McGill L.
300.
3 Cf. Mazeaud, Legons de Droit Civil 5e 6d. (1973), t. 1, 802, 806; Starck,
Droit Civil, Obligations (1972), nos 2576, 2580; Weill & Terr6, Droit Civil,
Les obligations 2e 6d. (1975), no 859.
35 La Civ. Code, art. 1890 provides: “A person may also in his own name,
make some advantage for a third person the condition or consideration
of a commutative contract, or onerous donation; and if such third person
consents to avail himself of the advantage stipulated in his favor, the con-
tract can not be revoked”. Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art. 1029.
36 See Ghestin, supra, note 32.
37See Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana, The Stipulation Pour
11 Tul. L. Rev. 18 and jurisprudence cited therein; Barham,
Autrui (1936)
supra, note 24, 380.
38 La Acts 1924, No. 116.
39 See Barham, supra, note 24, 382-83; Litvinoff, supra, note 24, 312-14. See
generally Morrow, supra, note 31.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
There is theoretical justification for extending this article, by
analogy, to the warranty for hidden defects, for both warranties are
indivisible elements of the obligation to deliver.40 The subrogation
theory presents problems of a practical order, however, for the
vendee only accedes to the rights of his vendor. Not only is it
possible, then, for the vendee to lose the warranty protection due
to a prior valid waiver, but also Louisiana’s short prescriptive period
for the redhibitory action 4′ may well mean that the vendee accedes
to a prescribed right. Nevertheless, this theory has been invoked
by some some post Media jurisprudence42 and some commentators. 4 3
Since Media and Rey, there has been no unanimity as to the
appropriate theory in either the doctrine or the jurisprudence. This
is due in part to the facility of continuing the common law language
in Media but equally to the multiplicity of civilian theories – none
of which is entirely satisfactory. A difference of opinion subsists in
France for the same reasons44 and it is reasonable to assume that
there will be similar uncertainty in Quebec.’45
II. Waiver of warranty in the presence of constructive knowledge
In Kravitz, the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with the
possibility of a purchaser’s waiver of the legal warranty.40
In
applying the articles concerning a bad faith seller to the manufac-
40 1bid.
41See supra, note 18.
42 Moreno’s Inc. v. Lake Charles Catholic High Schools, Inc., supra, note
13; noted in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-70
Term (1977) 37 La L. Rev. 353; Cotton States Chemical Co. v. Larrison Enter.
prises 342 So. 2d 1212, 1215 (La App. 2d Cir. 1977), noted in Levasseur, The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term – Sales (1978)
38 La L. Rev. 360.
43 See supra, note 39; Levasseur, supra, note 42, 365-66.
44 See Ghestin, supra, note 32.
45 The following language in Kravitz, supra, note 1, 799, suggests that the
Court is not relying on subrogation:
“Dans des circonstances approprides, Kravitz aurait pu exercer lui-m~me
ce recours au moyen de l’action subrogatoire.
Mais, ce n’est pas cc que Kravitz a choisi de faire: I1 prdtend exercer con.
tre G.M. un droit propre qui lui permettrait d’invoquer directement contre
le fabricant la garantie l6gale des vices cachds r6sultant de la vente faite
par celui-ci A son concessionnaire et dont Kravitz serait devenu le titulaire
en sa qualit6 de propridtaire de l’automobile”.
460In principle, the good faith seller has the right to renounce the legal
implied warranty: La Civ. Code, arts. 1764(2), 2522. Cf. Que. Civ. Code, arts.
1507, 1524 and Fr. Civ. Code, arts. 1626, 1627, 1643. See generally Litvinoff,
Stipulations as to Liability and as to Damages (1978) 52 Tul. L. Rev. 258.
19801
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
turer to preclude a waiver, 7 the Kravitz decision has gone further
than the Louisiana jurisprudence, although the Louisiana solution
would probably be the same.4 8
It is well settled in Louisiana that the manufacturer is held to
know of the defects in his product.49 Although it has been suggested
47 In the Kravitz case, the Supreme Court found that the seller-dealer’s
renunciation of the legal warranty in the sales contract was invalid because
knowledge of the defect could be imputed to him as a professional vendor.
The manufacturer’s argument that the legal warranty had been waived by
a conventional agreement contained in documents (the “Owner’s Manual”
and the “Owner Protection Plan and New Vehicle Warranty”) delivered to the
plaintiff-buyer with the automobile was rejected on the basis of the manufac-
turer’s imputed knowledge of the defect. In both instances of liability, the
Court invoked para. 2 of art. 1527, Que. Civil Code: “[Le vendeur] est tenu
de la m~me mani~re [de tous les dommages-int6r8ts] dans tous les cas oil
il est l6galement pr~sum6 connaitre les vices de la chose”. There is no
comparable provision either in the French Civil Code or in the Louisiana
Civil Code. It is to be noted that the Court did not decide whether or not
the presumption of knowledge would be irrebuttable as it is in France.
48 1n Media, supra, note 21, the Court was faced with a contractual agree-
ment of warranty between the North American distributor (in the position
of manufacturer) and the dealer-seller. The dealer-seller delivered to the
purchaser a “Mercedes-Benz Owner’s Service Policy” containing both a
warranty that the vehicle was “free from defects in material and workman-
ship” and the dealer’s agreement to repair or replace defective parts. In the
document, the distributor and the dealer purported to renounce all other
warranties. The purchaser was instructed to send a postcard to the distri-
butor to activate the warranty. The Court disposed of the waiver claims,
citing the jurisprudential rule that waivers contained in automobile manuals
and similar documents have no effect on the warranty of fitness: ibid., 380.
See also infra, note 52.
49 Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, supra, note 4; George v. Shreveport Cotton
Oil Co. 114 La 498, 38 So. 432 (1905). Note the following language from Doyle:
“[Ejveryone ought to know the qualities, good or bad, of the things he
fabricates in the exercise of the art, craft, or business of which he makes
public profession, and … lack of such knowledge is imputed to him as a
fault, which makes him liable to the purchasers of his fabrications for the
damage resulting from the vices or defects thereof which he did not make
known to them and which they were ignorant of”: ibid., 907. The Court goes
on to cite Pothier and other French authorities: ibid., 908. For a discussion
of this rule see Babst, Redhibition and Tort: Are They Enough? (1974) 22 La
B..
19, 23, n. 21; Campbell, supra, note 20, 32-33.
It is interesting
to note that in Louisiana, although there
is some
doctrinal support for holding the professional vendor to the same pre-
sumption of knowledge as the manufacturer (Barham, supra, note 24, 387;
Note, (1973) 47 rul. L. Rev. 473, 477), this is not the general rule. The juris-
prudence has imputed the knowledge of a manufacturer only to such vendors
as place their names on the product or are so closely connected therewith
that the buyer would have reason to consider them the actual manufacturer.
See the Media case, supra, note 21; Bernard v. Bradley Automotive, supra,
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
that the presumption of knowledge on the part of the manufacturer
renders any stipulation of waiver of the legal warranty contra
bonos mores,50 the courts hesitate to follow this theory.” Never-
theless, as a practical matter, it is virtually impossible to waive
the warranty for redhibitory defects.52
A serious dilemma in Louisiana concerns article 2545’s require-
ment that the bad faith seller know of the vice and omit to declare
itP. Article 2548 then provides that the “renunciation of warranty
note 17; Fairburn v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc. 349 So. 2d 1280 (La App.
1st Cir. 1977). But see Reeves v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 370 So. 2d
202 (La App. 3d Cir. 1979) (the manufacturer of cola syrup was not the
manufacturer of the bottle of defective cola); Burns v. Lamar-Lane Chevrolet,
Inc., supra, note 14 (contracting to install a stereo in a van did not render the
dealer a manufacturer).
The presumption of a manufacturer’s knowledge of defects
is cited
indiscriminately in cases in redhibition and suits for delictual recovery: see
infra, note 78. If, indeed, the courts are applying the same criteria in both
contractual and delictual recovery, it is interesting to note the reasons
advanced by the Supreme Court in the delictual proceeding, Chappuis v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., supra, note 6, 930, for holding Sears to be a pro-
fessional vendor: “The relationship between a retailer like Sears and its
manufacturer on the other hand, with its capabilities for controlling the
quality of its merchandise, justifies the imputation to Sears of knowledge of
its defects” [emphasis added].
5 0See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Frey 127 La 183, 53 So. 486 (1910)
(dicta). In Aetna Insur. Co. v. General Electric 362 So. 2d 1186 (La App. 4th
Cir. 1978), Redmann J. suggests that a manufacturer may never be able to
waive a warranty but he is careful to distinguish Aetna as a case of fraud
under art. 2547 (express warranty).
51 See A.A. Gilbert Pipe & Supply Co. v. Cassard 240 La 180, 121 So. 2d 736
(1960); FMC Corp. v. Continental Grain Co. 355 So. 2d 953 (La App. 4th Cir.
1977); California Chem. Co. v. Lovett 204 So. 2d 633 (La App. 3d Cir. 1967)
where waivers were allowed. See generally Litvinoff, supra, note 46, 287.
However, the courts in the great majority of cases disallow the waiver,
either by distinguishing the case on the basis of fraud (Aetna Insur. Co. v.
General Electric Inc., supra, note 50; Edwards v. Port AMC/Jeep, Inc. 337
So. 2d 276 (La App. 2d Cir. 1976)), or by finding an absence of the clarity
required by La Civ. Code, art. 2474.
52 See Comment, Modification or Renunciation of Warranty in Louisiana
Sales Transactions (1972) 46 Tul. L. Rev. 894. See generally Barham, supra,
note 24, 386. The courts require that any waiver be (1) express,
(2) con-
sented to by both parties, (3) made in good faith, and (4) consistent with
public policy.
5 3 La Civ. C6de art. 2545 as am. by La Acts 1968, No. 84, 1, provides:-
“The seller, who knows the vice of the thing he sells and omits to declare it,
besides the restitution of price and repayment of the expenses, including
reasonable attorneys’ fees, is answerable
to the buyer in damages”. Cf.
Que. Civ. Code, art. 1527, which only requires that the seller “know” of
the defect. See Fr. Civ. Code, art. 1645 to the same effect.
19801
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
by the buyer is not obligatory where there has been fraud on the
part of the seller”.54 While article 1847 suggests that either asser-
tioh or suppression is tantamount to fraud,55 the question remains
whether it is fair to treat imputed knowledge as having been
“suppressed” in the absence of actual knowledge 6 The courts do,
however, systematically award attorneys’ fees against manufac-
turers under article 2545. 5″ Presumably, they are finding that im-
puted knowledge has been suppressed. 8 If, however, there is a
conflict between the codal provisions and the courts’ evident desire
to protect the public in this area, it might be preferable to Find an
obligation of safety on the part of the manufacturer rather than to
presume knowledge of the defects in the object of a sales contract 9
4 [Emphasis added.] The rule of the analogous article respecting the
warranty against eviction, art. 2504, which holds the seller accountable for
the consequences of his personal act, would have been more appropriate for
present day purposes, for there is some difficulty in finding fraud in cases of
imputed knowledge. See Morrow, supra, note 31, 533-35; and jurisprudence
cited supra, note 51.
5 5 La “Civ. Code, art. 1847 defines fraud thus: “Fraud, as applied to con-
tracts, is the cause of an error bearing on a material part of the contract,
created or continued by artifice, with design to obtain some unjust advan-
tages to the one party, or to cause an inconvenience [detriment] or loss to
the other. From which definition are drawn the following rules:… 5. [Error]
must be caused or continued by artifice, by which is meant either an asser-
tion of what is false, or a suppression of what is true”.
56 See Redmann, supra, note 11, 546; Campbell, supra, note 20, 32-33; Com-
ment, supra, note 52. See also Aetna Insur. Co. v. General Electric, supra,
note 50.
art. 2545, supra, note 53.
67 See the jurisprudence cited infra, note 64, and the text of La Civ. Code,
591t could be argued that, historically, the obligation
to declare the
defect followed logically from the knowledge in fact of its existence and
was not a supplemental criterion for holding the bad faith seller responsible
for damages. The impossibility of declaring what is not in fact known under
modem imputation of knowledge theories would not, then, become an ar-
gument in favor of the manufacturer to avoid liability.
59 La Civ. Code, arts. 1764 and 1930, concerning
the subject matter of
contracts and obligations incident thereto, may be susceptible of the same
development as Que. Civ. Code, art. 1024 and Fr. Civ. Code, art. 1135. See
Cr6peau, Le contenu obligationnel du contrat (1965) 43 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
Thus, the view may be advanced that the parties, in agreeing to a sale, im-
plicitly impose upon the seller as one of his obligations the duty to know of
defects and to eliminate them. For a discussion of the French theory that
the jurisprudence has established an obligation of knowledge rather than
a presumption of knowledge, see Malinvaud, Redhibitory Defects and their
Importance in Contemporary Society (1976) 50 Tul. L. Rev. 517, 522. For a
comparison of the obligation of security and the warranty against red-
hibitory defects, see Mazeaud, supra, note 31, no 993, 262-63.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 25
The 1974 amendment of article 2534 suggests that a waiver would
have no effect as between manufacturer and dealer. 0 Some com-
mentators see this as a general policy statement against waivers, 1
others are not sure.1
III. Damages under article 2545 of the Louisiana Civil Code
The recovery of the purchase price of the defective object plus
incidental costs, the solution in Kravit, 63 certainly conforms to the
Louisiana jurisprudence which allows a purchaser to recover from
the manufacturer (as a bad faith seller), inter alia, the purchase
price,’ attorneys’ fees, 5 interest on the price,6 finance charges,67
60 See supra, note 16. By the same amending act, a second paragraph was
added to article 2531 as follows: “In any case in which the seller is held
liable because of redhibitory defects in the thing sold, the seller shall
have a corresponding and similar right of action against the manufacturer
of the thing for any losses sustained by the seller”, and further provided
that “any provision of any franchise or manufacturer-seller contract or
agreement attempting to limit, diminish or prevent such recoupment by the
seller shall not be given any force or effect”. See Note, supra, note 16, 489-90.
This paragraph was intended to overrule one aspect of the holding
in
Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc. 291 So. 2d 786 (La App. 4th Cir. 1973).
01 Barham, supra, note 24, 388. See Robertson v. Jimmy Walker Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., supra, note 18.
62 See supra, note 56.
63 Kravitz sought as damages against G.M. the difference between the
retail price and the wholesale price of the automobile, the automobile in-
surance costs, damages for inconvenience, and loss of income. The trial
court essentially granted this relief although it reduced the quantum, and
the appellate courts confirmed.
4 Alexander-v. Burroughs Corp., supra, note 18; Rey v. Cuccia, supra,
note 18; Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz, supra, note
21; Harris v. Bardwell 373 So. 2d 777 (La App. 2d Cir. 1979); Reeves v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra, note 49; Robertson v. Jimmy Walker
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., supra, note 18; Bernard v. Bradley Automotive,
supra, note 17; Burns v. Lamar-Lane Chevrolet, Inc., supra, note 14.
65Ibid. But see Perrin v. Read Imports, Inc. 359 So. 2d 738 (La App. 4th
Cir. 1978) where the manufacturer was not held responsible for attorneys’
fees incurred by the dealer in conjunction with the latter’s obligation to
repair.
66Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., supra, note 18; Cangelosi v. McInnis
Peterson Chevrolet, Inc. 373 So. 2d 1346 (La App. 1st Cir. 1979); Burns v.
Lamar-Lane Chevrolet, Inc., supra, note 14.
67 Robertson v. Jimmy Walker Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., supra, note 18;
Alexander v. Burrough Corp., supra, note 18.
19803
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
and other expenses, 68 including, on occasion, loss of profit.6
The question which Kravitz may well raise in Quebec, and which
has indeed been debated in Louisiana since Media and Rey, con-
cerns the extent of “damages” for which the bad faith seller may
be liable. The issue is all the more important because Louisiana
has not expanded contractual
the virtually
parallel system of contractual and delictual recovery which exists
in France7 0 The theory of cumul is almost ignored in Louisiana,
and the jurisprudence, with few exceptions, 1 has long followed the
approach of suing in contract for economic loss, suing in tort for
personal injury or property damage.7 2
liability to create
68Bernard v. Bradley Automotive, supra, note 17 (transportation charges);
White v. Martin G.M.C. Trucks, Inc. 359 So. 2d 1094 (La App. 3d Cir. 1978)
(insurance premiums); Neck v. Coleman Oldsmobile, Inc. 356 So. 2d 532 (La
App. 1st Cir. 1977) (costs for a substitute vehicle); Fox v. American Steel
Bldg Co. 299 So. 2d 364 (La App. 3d Cir. 1974) (inconvenience).
It is interesting to note that the seller is allowed a credit for the buyer’s
use of the defective object where the utility to the buyer can be proven:
Robertson v. Jimmy Walker Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., supra, note 18. But
see Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., supra, note 18 (inconvenience outweighed
utility). See also Note, The Rights of the Vendor in Redhibition (1970) 30
La L. Rev. 509.
69 White v. Martin G.M.C. Trucks, Inc., supra, note 68. But see Albritton
v. McDonald 363 So. 2d 925 (La App. 2d Cir. 1978). In Alexander v. Burroughs
Corp., supra, note 18, the Court suggests that it considered as damages under
art. 2545 the consequences of inefficient business operations (e.g., late and
inaccurate customer billing, overtime pay to accounting personnel) and costs
of repairing the computer.
supra, note 31, no 988, 256-58; Aubry & Rau, supra, note 31, 63842.
10 See Malinvaud, supra, note 59, 518 and authorities cited therein; Mazeaud,
71 See Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, supra, note 4, and jurisprudence cited
infra, note 78. See also Fox v. American Steel Bldg Co., supra, note 68; Richard
v. Smith Engineering Works, Inc. 297 So. 2d 437 (La App. 3d Cir. 1974); Breaux
v. Winnebago Industries Inc. 282 So. 2d 763 (La App. 1st Cir. 1973).
72 See Robertson, supra, note 11, 82 et seq., 111 et seq. In this connection
it is interesting to note the partial dissent of Peters J. in Seely v. White
Motor Co. 403 P. 2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr 17, 28 (1965), suggesting that the choice
of tort or contract depends on the relationship between the parties rather
than the nature of the damages. Cf. Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term – Obligations (1978) 38 La L. Rev. 345,
347: ” ‘Contract’ and ‘tort’ are labels which we give to causes of action to
enforce an obligation which it is alleged the defendant had toward the
plaintiff. In our Civil Code, an obligation may arise from a conventional
agreement between the parties, or as a result of a delictual act by one of
them toward the other, or from certain other sources. Whatever the source,
the obligation is synonymous with a duty which the obligor has toward the
obligee. If the source is a convention between the two parties, that conven-
tion takes the place of law between them, and must be performed in good
faith. If it is not damages are awardable for the breach”.
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[Vol. 25
The interest in expanding the damages available in redhibition
against the bad faith seller has greatly increased since the 1968
amendment of article 2545 to allow the recovery of attorneys’ fees
as a component of damages.73 Indeed, the historical preference for
proceeding in “tort” in all cases of damages caused by defective
products74 is hardly necessary, since Media extended the liability
in redhibition of the bad faith seller-manufacturer to remote pur-
chasers. But the tradition of proceeding in “tort” and the common
law influence which reinforces theories of delictual recovery in
this area70 are formidable adversaries in any attempt to create a
comprehensive theory of contractual responsibility.
At least the courts have not lost sight of their mandate in
the adoption of a uniform consumer protection rule.”7
Media –
It is now clear that a court will not distinguish between contractual
and delictual recovery where the rights of a consumer might thereby
73 Supra, note 53.
74For a comprehensive analysis of the history of delictual recovery in
Louisiana, see Robertson, supra, note 11, 51 et seq. and authorities cited there-
in. Because of the requirements of privity in redhibition, the majority of
the injured consumers proceeded in delict. In step with the changing times,
the recourse available to the consumer became increasingly advantageous –
see Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 221 La 919, 60 So. 2d 873
(1952) – until Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., supra, note 6, 755 and 756,
where the Louisiana Supreme Court held: “A manufacturer of a product
which involves a risk of injury to the user is liable to any person, whether
the purchaser or a third person, who without fault on his part, sustains an
injury caused by a defect in the design, composition, or manufacture of the
article, if the injury might reasonably have been anticipated. However, the
plaintiff claiming injury has the burden of proving that the product was
defective … and that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by reason of the
defect. … If the product is proven defective by reason of its hazard to
normal use, the plaintiff need not prove any particular negligence by the
maker in its manufacture or processing; for the manufacturer is presumed
to know of the vices in the things he makes, whether or not he has actual
knowledge of them”.
The case has been cited as creating a conclusive presumption of neg-
ligence on the part of the manufacturer for placing into commerce products
which are unreasonably dangerous in normal use where the injuries and the
causal relationship have been shown. See Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
supra, note 6; and the partial dissent of Tate J. (Barham 1. concurring) in
Spillers v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 294 So. 2d 803, 810 (La 1974). See also
Laborde, Defences to a Louisiana Products Liability Action (1979) 25 Loyola
L. Rev. 95.
75 See Robertson, supra, note 11, 101.
71 See Robertson, ibid., 55 et seq., and the great interest in equating
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A (1965)
recovery in Louisiana
and principles of strict liability in tort.
t Media Production Consultants Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz, supra, note 21, 381.
1980]
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
be adversely affected s One common law commentator, writing on
Louisiana law, has suggested that the schema of the redhibitory
action should be used to create a uniform consumer protection rule.79
This is a pragmatic solution to a pressing problem and it is a so-
lution which has been advocated in other jurisdictions as wel.so
Judges generally appreciate practical solutions and the commentator
in question has been cited often to justify the cumulation of contrac-
tual and delictual recovery.8′
Nevertheless, recent Louisiana jurisprudence, especially in the
area of delictual responsibility, reflects an amazing effort to profit
from the resurgence of interest in civilian tradition.11 The influence
has also been felt in the area of redhibition. Certain recent cases
have awarded damages under article 2545 for the loss of property,sz
and in the very recent case of Harris v. Bardwell,84 the Court award-
ed damages to the purchaser of a motor boat for personal in-
juries suffered as a result of latent defects in a redhibitory action
against the manufaoturer.85 The Court found that there was no
78See Harris v. Bardwell, supra, note 64; Albritton v. McDonald, supra,
note 69; Townsend v. Cleve Heyl Chevrolet-Buick, Inc. 318 So. 2d 618 (La App.
2d .Cir. 1975); Hoffman v. All Star Insur. Corp. 288 So. 2d 388 (La App. 4th
Cir. 1974); Loyacano v. Continental Insur. Co. 283 So. 2d 302 (La App. 4th
Cir. 1973).
79 Robertson, supra, note 11, 111-13.
8oFor a recent discussion of problems of consumer protection common to
Louisiana and Quebec, see the Congras Henri-Capitant Qudbec: Les relations
du Code civil et du Droit de la Protection du Consommateur (1979) 10 R.G.D.
7-211. See also Office de revision du Code civil, Rapport sur le Code civil du
Quebec (1977), livre V, art. 102; Loi sur la protection du consommateur, L.Q.
1978, c. 9; Perret, supra, note 7, 170-72.
81See Harris v. Bardwell, supra, note 64.
82 See Loescher v. Parr 324 So. 2d 441 (La 1975); Langlois v. Allied Chemical
Corp. 258 La 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971). See also Andrews, Strict Liability
under Civil Code Articles 2317. 2318 and 2321: An Initial Analysis (1977) 25
La B.. 105; Verlander, Article 2317 Liability: An Analysis of Louisiana Juris-
prudence since Loescher v. Parr (1979) 25 Loyola L. Rev. 263; Note, The
Discovery of Article 2317 (1976) 37 La L. Rev. 234.
8 See Avoyelles Country Club v. Walter Kidde & Co. 338 So. 2d 379 (La App.
3d Cir. 1976).
84 Supra, note 64.
85 The Court stated (ibid., 783) that it was the first to discuss the combina-
tion of a demand for personal injury damages and a demand for attorneys’
fees under art. 2545 in the case of a defective object not for consumption.
Hoffman v. All Star Insur. Corp., supra, note 78, granted personal injury
damages to a plaintiff purchaser proceeding against the manufacturer with
injured third parties -without giving any theoretical basis for the recovery.
See also jurisprudence cited, supra, note 78.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[‘Vol. 25
difference in the meaning of the word “damage” as it appears in
the general article of delictual responsibility” and the redhibition
article (article 2545) governing the responsibility of a bad faith
seller.87
It is to be hoped that this reasoning will be carried one step
further. Article 1930 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides:
The obligations of contract extending to whatsoever is incident to such
contracts, the party who violates them is liable, as one of the incidents
of his obligations, to the payment of the damages, which the other party
has sustained by his default.
Article 1934 defines the word “damages” as the amount of the loss
sustained and the profit of which the creditor has been deprived:
When the inexecution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or bad
faith, the debtor shall not only be liable to such damages as were, or
might have been foreseen at the time of making the contract, but also
to such as are the immediate and direct consequence of the breach of
that contract ….
88
Nothing in this language would preclude the recovery of personal
injury damages, nor has French doctrine or jurisprudence inter-
preted the comparable articles 1149, 1150 and 1151 of the French
Civil Code to exclude such damages.8 9 On the contrary, the consumer
who demands resolution of a sales contract for a manufacturer’s
failure to perform the legal obligation of warranting the object
against latent defects can recover not only property and personal
injury damages (as well as damages representing economic loss)
but also “moral damages” –
damages for inconvenience or mental
anguish – which have been denied as a general rule in Louisiana.”
Conclusion
It is understandable that a departure from tradition is difficult;
nevertheless, the Louisiana judiciary may well be on the way to a
re-evaluation of the meaning of article 1934 and a redefinition of
86La Civ. Code, art. 2315 reads as follows: “Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened
to repair it”. Cf. Que. Civ. Code, art. 1053 and Fr. Civ. Code, art. 1382.
87 Supra, note 64, 784.
88 Cf. Que. Civ. Code, arts. 1073, 1074, 1075. See Mazeaud, supra, note 31,
256-58.
89 See supra, note 70.
9 Robertson v. Jimmy Walker Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., supra, note 18;
Albritton v. McDonald, supra, note 69; Burns v. Lamar-Lane Chevrolet, Inc.,
supra, note 14. See also Johnson, supra, note 72; Comment, Damages Ex
Contractu: Recovery of Non-Pecuniary Damages for Breach of Contract
Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934 (1974) 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1160.
1980]
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
403
damages in the case of contractual recovery. In view of the great
interest in protecting the Louisiana consumer, it is not unforesee-
able that the courts will give full scope to the action in redhibition.
It is a compliment to Louisiana’s venerable legal heritage that an
extensive interpretation of the Civil Code may provide the elements
of a solution to one of today’s more pressing legal problems.
