On Having Cake and Eating It: A Review of
Jeremy Webber’s Reimagining Canada
Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1994. Pp. ix, 368 [Cloth $44:.95 (Can.); paper $19.95 (Can.)].
Reviewed by Dale Gibsoif
There is an exception to the well-known rule that “you cannot have your cake
and eat it too.” A lawyer might express the exception as follows: “provided always
that the said rule does not operate where two or more cakes are available to the
cake consumer.”‘ Reimagining Canada contains some wise and important thoughts
concerning the application of that exception in the realm of constitutional reform.
Professor Webber, a member of the McGill University Faculty of Law, was one
of the founders of a group called “Friends of Meech Lake”, which laboured in sup-
port of the ill-starred Meech Lake Accord in 1989 and 1990. The failure of that ex-
periment in constitutional reform, as well as of its sequel, the Charlottetown Ac-
cord,’ so piqued his civic concern and his scholarly curiosity that he was prompted
to produce this thoughtful analysis of those events. Anyone interested in the consti-
tutional process in Canada or elsewhere will read it with profit, and recent devel-
opments have sharpened its relevance considerably.
The book begins, necessarily I suppose, with a lengthy review of events preced-
ing the Meech Lake-Charlottetown debacles. Inevitably, so highly compressed a
summary will draw quibbles from readers who feel that some topic of special inter-
est to them has been misrepresented, overlooked or short-changed. I, for example,
think Professor Webber was mistaken to say that accounts of the “Riel rebellion[s]
… have suffered from an excessive emphasis on central Canadian linguistic con-
.Belzberg Fellow of Constitutional Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, Edmonton,
Canada.
McGill Law Journal 1995
Revue de droit de McGill
To be cited as: (1995) 41 McGill LJ. 311
Mode de rdfdrence: (1995) 41 R.D. McGill 311
‘This figure of speech does not appear in the book. If it is inappropriate, the blame lies with the re-
viewer, not the author.
2 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994).
3 Constitutional Accord (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1987) [hereinafter Meech Lake].
” Draft Legal Text (9 October 1992) (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1992)
[hereinafter Charlottetown].
MCGILL LAwJOURNAL/REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
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flicts.”‘ The principal accounts of the Riel uprisings indicate that the key issue was
land, and language never played a major role.’ Professor Webber’s description of
the Bill C-3 l controversy is too brief and leaves the misleading impression that the
re-instatement was uniformly welcomed in the aboriginal community. As well, his
contention that Prime Minister Trudeau was primarily motivated during the patria-
tion campaign by a desire to displace Qu6bec nationalism with Canadian national-
ism’ will be puzzling to some observers. Generally speaking, though, the historical
overview is well presented and will be helpful to readers unfamiliar with the sub-
ject.
Professor Webber’s most important contributions to the constitutional reform
debate, however, are undoubtedly his analysis of what went wrong with the Meech
Lake and Charlottetown initiatives and his suggestions for getting out of the mess
in which we now find ourselves. It is here that questions of twice-eaten cake arise.
At an early point in the discussion, he quotes the well-known joke of Yvon
Deschamps: “What do Quebeckers want? But it’s quite simple: a free and inde-
pendent Quebec in a strong and united Canada.”‘ Professor Webber believes that
this is an accurate assessment of what Qu6b6cois want,1’ and his book is an attempt
to show that it is possible for them to achieve their goal. I agree: they can have their
cake and eat it, because in my view “a free and independent Qu6bec” and “a strong
and united Canada” are different cakes.
The notion of “two solitudes” is often misunderstood and given inappropriately
negative connotations, Professor Webber contends. He traces the term to a letter by
German poet Rainer Maria Rilke, who referred to the love of two people whose
“two solitudes protect, and touch and greet each other.”‘” Turning then, very aptly,
to the McGill poet and constitutionalist Frank Scott, Professor Webber quotes a
poem extolling the replacement of arm-in-ann dancing with the more independent
dance styles which became popular, appropriately enough, at about the time of
Qu6bec’s “Quiet Revolution”:
5 Reimagining Canada, supra note 2 at 30.
6See e.g.: G.F.G. Stanley, Louis Riel (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1963); B. Beal & R. MacLeod, Prai-
rie Fire: The 1885 North-West Rebellion (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1984).
7 This Bill related to the re-instatement of Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-15, status for Indian women
and their offspring previously deprived of it because of marriages with non-status men (see Reimagin-
ing Canada, supra note 2 at 69).
8 This assertion permeates the book. Early references occur ibid at 56-7.
‘ C. Taylor, “Quebec Focus” (1990) 70:1 McGill News 8, quoted in Reimagining Canada, ibid at
18.
‘0 See Reimagining Canada, ibid at 26.
” Letter of R.M. Rilke to EX. Kappus (14 May 1904) in R.M. Rilke, Briefe, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: In-
sel-Verlag, 1950) 74 at 80, quoted in Reimagining Canada, ibid at 190.
1995]
D. GIBSON – REIMAGINING CANADA
Long ago
when I first danced
I danced
holding her
back and arm
making her move
as I moved
Now I dance
seeing her
dance away from
me she
looks at me
dancing we
are closer
held in the movement of the dance
I no longer dance
with myself
we are two
not one
the dance
is one”
Webber’s message seems to be that describing Qu6bec as a “distinct society”
and agreeing to a somewhat distinct constitutional status for that province, as the
Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords would have done, would no more under-
mine Canadian unity than would a married couple’s change of dance style endanger
their marriage. That seems to me to be so self-evident as not to require proof, but
Professor Webber, nevertheless, provides considerable scholarly evidence. Proving
his point entails examining both nationalism and constitutional asymmetry. His dis-
cussion of each topic is valuable, though I do not entirely agree with his approach
to nationalism.
Professor Webber believes that nationalism is a major source of our constitu-
tional problems. He considers the concept of “nation” to involve an exclusivity that
would preclude one’s simultaneous membership in a Canadian nation and a Qu6b6-
cois or aboriginal nation. He argues,
terms
“community” or “society” for “nation” when referring to the latter allegiances.” I
do not think that would help.
therefore, for substituting the
Etymologically, “nation” simply refers to one’s group association at birth. It is a
sociological concept as much as a political one. It is a notion that attracts powerful
emotional attachments. It would be futile (and perhaps even foolhardy in some cir-
cumstances) to tell the Cree or the M6tis of western Canada, the Hasidim of the
2 F.R. Scott, “Dancing” in The Dance is One (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1973) at 20, quoted
in Reimagining Canada, ibid. at 191.
‘ Reimagining Canada, ibid at 23-24.
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world or the Qurb6cois that they are mere “communities” rather than nations. Cree,
M~tis, Hasidic or Qubrbcois nationhood does not, however, prevent citizens of
those nations from simultaneously belonging to the Canadian nation. Professor
Webber has correctly identified misunderstandings about nationhood as a major
source of trouble for the Canadian constitutional dialogue. The problem lies, how-
ever, not in assertions of nationhood by various sectors of the Canadian population
but in the fallacy that nationhood is, as Professor Webber claims, an “exclusive”
concept. As I see it, nationhood involves several cakes (or solitudes or dancers), not
one.
I find it easier to agree with Professor Webber’s observations about constitu-
tional asymmetry. Objections to the Meech Lake and Charlottetown proposals on
the ground that treating one province or group differently than another would create
an unacceptably asymmetrical constitution are in Webber’s view, and in mine,
misplaced. As he points out, the Canadian Constitution” has never been symmetri-
cal.” For example, bilingual legislation and court processes are required in only
three provinces. Constitutional protections for denominational schools vary consid-
erably from province to province. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were originally
guaranteed subsidies not available to Ontario or Quebec. Unlike other provinces,
the prairie provinces did not own their public lands until 1930, by which time the
lands had been largely alienated by the Government of Canada. No province has, or
will, ever enjoy the same constitutional status as any other province.
Professor Webber’s illuminating discussion of the implications of constitutional
asymmetry”‘ demonstrates that there is nothing to fear from reforms that might
make the Canadian Constitution slightly more asymmetrical than it already is. A
poet the author did not mention, William Blake, coined the phrase “fearful symme-
try” in reference to the awesome patterning of the universe:
Tyger Tyger, burning bright,
In the forests of the night;
What immortal hand or eye,
Could frame thy fearful symmetry?7
Jeremy Webber’s analysis has shown that there is nothing fearful about a lack of
constitutional symmetry. I would only add that it may well require an “immortal
hand or eye” to achieve perfect symmetry in something as complex as a constitu-
tion designed to govern millions of diverse human beings for decades or centuries;
so long as mortal hands hold the drafting pens, asymmetrical constitutions are the
best we can reasonably expect.
“Constitution Act, 1867 (U.Kt), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3; Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Canadian Constitution].
‘5 See Reimagining Canada, supra note 2 at 231-32.
6 See ibid at 232-59.
17 W. Blake, “The Tyger” in Songs ofInnocence and of Experience (New York: Orion Press, 1967)
at42.
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D. GIBSON – REIMAGINING CANADA
In his concluding discussion of realistic ways out of Canada’s constitutional
morass, Professor Webber makes an important point about the future of wholesale
constitutional revision:
Given the collapse of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown rounds, we have
probably seen the last of full-scale constitutional reform for the foreseeable fu-
ture. If we achieve reconciliation, it will probably be through adjustments’
within the existing framework (at least in the short term). That framework al-
lows substantial, though not unlimited, scope for change. Moreover, adjust-
ments can be made more easily by subconstitutional means than by formal
amendment. Informal adjustments do not require the same degree of consensus
… They do not have the same prominence, the same symbolic charge, or the
same high stakes as formal amendment.”
He then offers some suggestions concerning “subconstitutional” ways in which
such objectives as reconciliation between francophone-Qu6bocois and other Cana-
dians and accommodation of the aboriginal peoples’ self-government aspirations
can be achieved without formal constitutional amendments. They are good sugges-
tions, worthy of careful consideration by everyone whose interests are affected.
Here again, to some extent, is a multiple-cake situation. We can consume a consid-
erable number of small defacto constitutional reform cakes without nibbling at the
formal wedding cake we call the Canadian Constitution.
Unfortunately, that will not be enough. Symbolism and formal recognition are
the essence of some of our thorniest constitutional difficulties. Qu6b6cois will
probably be dissatisfied with a defacto conferral of distinct status (which, to a very
large degree, they already possess). They seek, and in my view are entitled to, for-
mal recognition in the text of the Canadian Constitution that they are a distinct so-
ciety within the Canadian confederation. Canadians of aboriginal ancestry similarly
seek, and are similarly entitled to, a forthright acknowledgement in the Canadian
Constitution of their inherent aboriginal right to self-government. These are not
matters for quiet back-room deals; they require formal public pronouncement. To
that extent, we will simply have to eat part of the wedding cake.
Jeremy Webber acknowledges that some such formal amendments must be
made. His splendid book should help persuade Canadians that those changes are
vital to Canada’s future constitutional health, and that if politicians have the mettle
to make them, there will be nothing to fear from the bogey-man of constitutional
asymmetry.
” Reihnagining Canada, supra note 2 at 261.