Selected Problems uider the Quebec Law of
Conditional Sale
Richard W. Pound*
Introduction
The Articles in the Civil Code relating to the conditional sale of
moveable property are comparatively recent. Articles 1545a and b
were enacted in 19331 but were restricted in scope to provisions
dealing with the right of the purchaser in a conditional sale contract
to pay the balance of the purchase price and thus obtain title to
the property, as well as to the right of the purchaser to pay what
was due and recover the object, in the event that the vendor
repossessed the property, provided the right was exercised within
twenty days and the seller was reimbursed the expenses of re-
possession and preservation of the thing sold. The scope of these
provisions was broadened in 1947 by the enactment of the Instalment
Sales Act, the provisions of which added Articles 1561a to j as a
separate heading forming Chapter VI A, “Of Instalment Sales”,
to the Code.2 This ,legislation was among the first of its type in
Canada, with the result that its draftsmanship is somewhat primitive
and, in 1970, probably outdated.3
There are a number of aspects of this legislation which have
remained virtually unintelligible to the instalment creditor, instalment
purchaser and practitioner alike. It is proposed to examine three
such matters.
1 Operation of Article 1561i CC.
Article 1561i CC reads in part as follows:
Every sale of moveable property, promise of sale of moveable property with
delivery and possession or any contract having the effect of a sale of
Member of the Bar of Montreal.
123 Geo. V, c. 107, 1933 S.Q.
2 11 Geo. VI, c. 73, 1947 S.Q.
3 All provinces, with the exception of Quebec and Manitoba, now have Con-
ditional Sales Acts: Alberta, R.S.A. 1955, c. 54; British Columbia, S.B.C. 1961,
c. 9; New Brunswick, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 34; Newfoundland, S. Nfld., 1955, c. 62;
Nova Scotia, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 48; Ontario, R.S.O. 1960, c. 61; Prince Edward
Island, R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 28; Saskatchewan, R.S.S. 1965, c. 393.
No. 2″1
CONDITIONAL SALE
moveable property, which admits of the deferred payment of the price or
of a part of the price of sale and which does not comply with the require-
ments of articles 1561a to 1561e inclusively, is a sale on terms, subject
to the ordinary provisions of obligations with a term, which transfers to
the buyer the property 4 of the thing sold, notwithstanding any stipulation
or declaration to the contrary.
Assume that a sale has taken place which proports to be a conditional
sale but which for some reason violates or fails to comply with
a provision of Articles 1561a to 1561e. It is clear that in such case
the conditional vendor is no longer the owner of the property, that
title will be deemed to have passed and that he will no longer have
a right in rem against the moveable property. A saisie-revencication
has been disallowed on the ground that the conditional sales con-
tract in question did not conform to the requirements of Article
1561d as to the calculation of finance charges. 5 Similarly a seizure
before judgment has been disallowed on the ground that conditions
of Article 1561a and following had not been observed.( The correctness
of the holdings in these two decisions cannot be seriously questioned,
insofar as refusal to recognize a right in rem is concerned.
A more difficult problem relating to Article 1561i is the inter-
pretation to be given to the words “subject to the ordina-y provi-
sions of obligations with a term”.7 Does this mean, for example,
that any clauses in such contracts 8 relating to finance charges,
default charges and other matters will also fail ? In other words,
does the failure to observe the requirements of Articles 1561a to
1561e not only cause title to the goods to pass but also operate to
set aside any other terms and conditions in the contract between
the vendor and purchaser?
The jurisprudence on this point is best described as mixed. In
Canadian Family Food Plan Ltd. v. Cosgrove,9 the Court was pre-
pared to allow the plaintiff, the conditional vendor, to claim for
the amount due for the goods sold and delivered as well as costs
of a mise en demeure to the purchaser from its attorneys, but held
that the vendor had no right to claim the finance charges nor the
interest at 9% stipulated in the contract in question.’0 A similar
4 French: propridt4.
G Circle Acceptance Co. v. Kerr, [1068] P.R. 305. (Provincial Court).
6M. Aber Inc. V. Deneault, [1968] P.R. 385 (Provincial Court).
7 French: g sujette aux dispositions ordinares des obligations A termes.>
si.e. to which the provisions of Art. 1561i apply.
9 [1956] S.C. 439.
10 Reference was made to H. Laflamme Limit6e v. Cdt6, reported in summary
at [1054] QEB. 253 and Pdquet v. Plammondon, [1054] R. L. 2 53 (Court of Queen’s
Bench (Appeal Side)).
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holding is found in Le Syndicat St-Henri Inc. V. Ross Barltay.11
The decision in this case provided that if the requirements of Arti-
cles 1561a and following are not fulfilled, the contract is placed
under the sole operation of law and, in addition to title to the goods
passing, any other special condition in the contract would be lost.
The case was heard in Magistrate’s Court by Judge G6rard Trudel and
although inscribed by -default, it appears that witnesses were called
and likely some argument made by plaintiff.12 The particular defi-
ciency in the contract in question was the amount of the down
payment, which was considerably less than the 15% required by
Article 1561b. Given this deficiency, the learned judge regarded the
provisions of Article 1561i as imposing a. double sanction on the
conditional sale vendor, the first being the transfer of title to the
property (a sanction attaching to the jus in re, presumably on the
il persons)
ground that the claim as owner is opposable against
and the second nullifying the other clauses in the contract which
itself but which relate
are not concerned with the property
to the private obligations between the contracting parties them-
selves. This latter sanction is regarded by the learned judge as
attaching to the jus ad rem as being entirely between the parties
and not directly affecting the property itself.13 It is the idea of a
double sanction that separates this case from other cases which
simply hold that title to the property passes in the event of a breach
of the terms of Articles 1561a and following.
A further decision to the same effect is the case of La Compagnie
L6gar6 Limit6e v. St-Amant,14 in which, due to non-observance of
the requisite formalities, title to the goods was held to have passed.
The Court, relying on the St-Henri case, held that the contract, once
invalid as a conditional sale contract, became automatically a con-
tract of sale with a term, regulated solely by Articles 1089 to 1092
C.C., and any special conditions in the contract thus became in-
operative. In Sunrise Industries (Mtl.) Limited v. Robert,15 the con-
tract in question was also held to become a contract of sale on terms
subject to the ordinary provisions of law and, in this case, the
interest on the contract was limited to 5% per annum on instalments
11 [1957] R.L. 35.
12 Argument may not have been heard on this point, however, as the learned
judge appears to have been unaware of the decisions in H. Laflamme Limit~e V.
Ct , (supra), Pdquet v. Plammondon, (supra) and Canadian Family Food Plan
Ltd. v. Cosgrove (supra), all of which had been reported prior to his decision.
13 For the development of this thesis, [1957] R.L. 35 at pp. 39-41.
14 [1962] S.C. 29.
15 [1964] S.C. 678.
No. 2]
CONDITIONAL SALE
due. The most recent reported case in this line of jurisprudence is
Federal Acceptance Corporation v. Di Loretto,16 a decision of the
Provincial Court in Montreal, which relies on the decision in St-
Henri, Sunrise and Cosgrove.
The opposite view has been taken in a decision of the Supe-
rior Court; in Commodity Discount Limited v. Dame Gagnon,17
an action
taken by the assignee of a conditional sale con-
tract and a promissory note attached thereto against the purchaser
under the contract. While the action was based primarily on the
note rather than the contract, matters relating to the contract were
raised by the defendant purchaser. The operation of Article 1561i
had been invoked because of the failure to require a down payment
of at least 15%. The Court held, that notwithstanding this failure
a special clause relating to the annulment of the sale was not in-
valid, in spite of the fact that the sale was no longer a conditional
sale. In giving judgment, the Court allowed the full interest of 9%
per annum on the amount of the note, even though it was clear
that the conditional sale giving rise to it did not conform to the
provisions of Articles 1561a and following. A more explicit decision
on this question is to be found in the Provincial Court decision in
American Music Corporation Ltd. V. Malette,1s in which, although
the conditional aspect of the sale was clearly disqualified, the Court
was not prepared to conclude that other terms of the contract, such
as penalty clauses, stipulated interest and the like were annuled for
the sole reason that the conditions required by Articles 1561a and
following had not been met. The Court went on to state that it was
necessary to consider the contract as if the chapter on instalment
sales did not exist and to give effect to all the conditions as to pay-
ment, interest and penalties so long as they were not contrary to
good morals nor prohibited by any other law.
Peut-on raisonnablement dire que les conditions de la vente, les clauses
p~nales, l’int6r~t stipul6, etc., sont annul6s –
par le seul motif que les
conditions requises pour bdn6ficier des avantages accord6s par la vente b.
tempdrament n’ont pas
Ce
serait aller bien au-delh de la loi. –
Il faut alors consid6rer le contrat
comme si le chapitre de la vente A tempdrament n’existait pas et donner
effet h toutes les conditions quant au paiement, aux p6nalitds et aux intdr~ts
stipul4s pourvu qu’elles ne soient ni contraires aux bonnes moeurs, ni prohi-
b6es par une autre loi.
t6 rencontr~es ? Le tribunal ne le croit pas. –
Dars la pr~sente cause, ii est clair que la venderesse n’est pas dans les
conditions pour r~clamer la propri6t6 de sa chose comme dans la vente b
temperament, parce que le paiement initial est infdrieur 4 15%1.
16 [1969] R.L. 561 (Provincial Court).
17 [1960] S.C. 675.
Is [1967] R.L. 552 (Provincial Court).
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Rien ne l’emp6che de r~clamer le prix de sa chose et le coat de finance-
ment que le d~fendeur a librement consenti A payer.’9
It is submitted that the decision in American Music Corporation
Ltd. is the better view of the meaning of the provisions of Article
1561i. It is doubtful that the words “subject to the ordinary pro-
visions of obligations with a term”’20 are sufficiently broad to permit
the Courts to disregard all of the conditions and terms of a contract
freely agreed upon between a purchaser and vendor.
Even the cases headed by St-Henri,21 are in general agreement
that the provisions governing obligations with a term axe to be
found at Articles 1089 to 1092 C.C. An examination of these articles
discloses nothing which relates to agreement on special conditions
in such obligations, such as finance charges, penalty clauses and
other commercially necessary provisions. Article 1089 explains that
an obligation with a term is not an obligation which has been sus-
pended, but only one whose execution has been delayed. Article 1090
provides that payment cannot be exacted before the expiry of the
term, but that voluntary payment in advance is perfectly acceptable.
Article 1091 states that the term is presumed, in the absence of
express stipulation or circumstances indicating the contrary, to be
stipulated in favour of the debtor. Article 1092 sets forth situations
in which a ‘debtor may not claim the benefit of the term. These
articles would appeax, therefore, to be “the ordinary provisions of
obligations with a term”.
Considerable emphasis is placed, in the St-Henri 22 case, on the
wording of Article 1561i as giving rise to two separate and distinct
sanctions which apply in cases where the parties have not respected
the provisions of Articles 1561a and following. This was discussed
briefly without comment as to the extent of each sanction. 23 The
sanction which is obvious is that relating to the passing of title
and can be seen from the words “is a sale on terms… which
transfers to the buyer the property of the thing sold.. .”. It is not,
however, clear that the words “subject to the ordinary provisions
of obligations with a term” impose a separate sanction or whether
they merely flow from the surrounding provisions as a corrolary
to the main proposition. Even if a separate sanction is imposed
thereby, it is doubtful if it is sufficiently express to warrant the
pervasive effect given to it by the St-Henri line of cases.
19 Id., at pp. 554-555.
20 French: see n. 7.
21Supra, IL 11.
22 Supra, n. la at 1pp. 39-41.
23 STprz,. p. 314.
No. 2]
CONDITIONAL SALE
It is submitted that the proper view of this provision is that
a separate sanction is not imposed by Article 1561i over and above
that of causing title to the property to pass to the purchaser. The
only separate effect of the words “subject to the ordinary provisions
of obligations with a term” might be to override any contractual
provision aiming at depriving the purchaser of the benefit of the
term in the absence of a default by him in any of his obligations.
Nowhere in the provisions of the Civil Code concerning obligations
with -a term or in the rules of sale generally is there a suggestion
that parties cannot agree on matters such as penalties, interest and
similar items. Even Judge Trudel, in St-Henri, agrees that the
solution proposed, namely the loss of finance charges, among other
things, as well as the passing of title, is a sanction “6videmment
draconienne”, 24 although he suggests that it is one “…. qui ne con-
duise pas A des consequences pratiques, injustes ou inexplicables”. 25
The economic facts of life underlying conditional sales should
not be overfooked. 2 6 Reduced to its simplest terms, the purpose of a
conditional sae is to enable a vendor to make a sale on credit to
a purchaser who cannot, or chooses not to, pay the entire sale price
at the time of purchase. To reduce the risk of a loss on the trans-
action, the vendor reserves title to the property in question until
the final payment is made ‘by the purchaser. By so reserving title
to the property, the vendor attempts to ensure that if a purchaser
defaults in his obligations he can repossess his merchandise and
recover or limit his loss. The property, therefore, remains a type
of security for -the vendor. Security is a concept separate -and dis-
tinct from interest or finance charges, although from a commercial
point of view it is obvious that the adequacy of security will have
an effect on the cost of credit to a borrower. That this type of
security may be subject to abuse is quite obvious and one need look
no further than the many Conditional Sales Acts in force to deduce
the practices which have had to be remedied by legislation. The
general effect of legislation in this field has been* to require certain
formalities to be observed in contracts governed by the particular
statute, in default of which the vendor loses his security and is
placed in the same position as if he had been unable to take security
under the conditional sale contract.
Looking again at the provisions of the Civil Code, there is no
overt suggestion that the conditional vendor loses more than his
24 Supra, n. 1. at p. 41.
25 Supra, n. 11 at pp. 41-42.
20 See: Lubin IMlkoff, Aspect social et technique de la vente & tempgrament,
(1967) 27 R. du B. 1.
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[Vol. 16
security as a result of non-compliance with the provisions of Arti-
cles 1561a and following; that he is placed in the same position as
if he had contracted to advance money to the purchaser at the legal
rate, with no provisions relating to default and other special con-
ditions; or that he is to be worse off than a vendor who chooses
not to take such security. One should not look beyond the express
wording of the Code in order to obtain such a result, and Article
1561i contains no such provision. It would appear that the language
of Article 1561i justifies only withdrawing the security of the con-
ditional vendor and does not extend to voiding clauses in the con-
tract not specifically related to the passing of title to the property.
Many of the provisions of the Code relating to conditional sales
are unclear, whether by reason of conflicting jurisprudence, language
or commercial practice. In some cases a conditional vendor simply
may not know whether the goods he sells will come under the man-
datory provisions of Articles 1561a and following. If in the future
it becomes necessary for the vendor to enforce his rights, he may
find that the contract is governed by the provisions of the Code and
that the contract in question fails to conform fully with those provi-
sions. If the present trend in the jurisprudence (to which exception
has been taken herein) continues, the vendor will find that not only
has his security disappeared, but also his finance charges have been
reduced to the legal rate of interest, usually a rate considerably
below that which the vendor has had to pay in order to obtain the
use of the same money he now seeks to collect. In view of this, it
is suggested that the inclusion of the following clause in the con-
ditional sale contract itself might well be prudent:
In any contract hereunder where the regular cash sales price as defined in
Article 1561c of the Civil Codu does not exceed $800 (other than sales under
$800 to which reference is made in Axticle 1561j (a to f) of the Civil Code),
title to the goods shall pass to the purchaser and this contract shall become a
sale on terms. All other conditions of this contract (including without limita-
tion the cost of borrowing and charges for default and deferment) shall
remain in full force and effect, with the exception of those conditions which
purport to grant to the vendor or its assigns any title to or real rights in
the goods.
Even the most militant subscribers to the line of jurisprudence
above referred to should have difficulty in refusing to give effect
to such a clause.
2. Calculation of Finance Charges.
Until fairly recently there has been considerable doubt as to how
the maximum allowable finance charges for contracts governed by
the Civil Code articles on conditional sales should be calculated. The
No. 2]
CONDITIONAL SALE
matter is a crucial one, since failure to observe the provisions
could result in the conditional vendor losing his security and, ac-
cording to the majority of cases discussed above, the finance charges
themselves, to the extent that the effective rate of interest of such
charges exceeds the legal rate of 5% per annum. The calculation
of finance charges is also a matter for considerable commercial
analysis on the part of the conditional vendor or finance company,
since these charges must be sufficient to cover his risks, losses and
additional administration costs resulting from instalment sales. If
the allowable rate under the legislation is not sufficient, the vendor
must refuse instalment sale business or else sell outright and in-
crease his finance charges to cover the increased risk resulting from
having no security on the property which has been sold.
Assuming the contract in question is governed by theprovisions
of Articles 1561a and following, the applicable provision relating
to the calculation of finance charges is Article 1561d, which reads
as follows:
The price of sale on the instalment plan consists in the regular cash sale
price increased in a proportion not exceeding three-quarters of one percent
of the total of the deferred payments for each month of the duration of the
term, such increase being in lieu of the interest and compensation for the
risks, losses and additional administration costs which may result to the
seller by the sale on the instalment plan. The latter shall not be entitled
to any other compensation or increase of the cash sale price, except interest
on the deferred payments from the time they become due, at a rate not
to exceed three-quarters of one percent per month.
It has been suggested that this Article would permit interest of
9% per annum on the total of the deferred payments at the com-
mencement of the term. The proponents of this view base their
interpretation on the words “of the total of the deferred payments”,
without, it seems, giving any meaning to the words immediately
following, namely “for each month of the duration of the term”.
Some comfort was also gained from Faribault, who gives the fol-
lowing example of the calculation of finance charges:
Un ameublement est vendu pour $500, prix r~gulier du marchand. Ce prix
est payable A raison d’un paiement initial de $100; et le solde de $400 en
vingt-quatre versements. A ce solde de $400 on ajoute pour frals de finance
$0.75 centins par cent dollars, soit $3.00 par mois, ce qui forme un total
de $82 (sic) pour le terme de vingt-quatre mois. Cette somme de $82 ajout~e
A celle de $400 forme un total de $482, qui sera payable en vingt-trois
versements 6gaux de $20.08 et un dernier versement de $20.11.27
27 Traitd de Droit civil du Qudbec, Vol. 1l, p. 410.
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The Courts have not, however, (and correctly so) accepted this
view of the wording of Article 1561d .2s The earliest reported case
is that of, Ferron V. Belisle,20 and the remarks of Caron, J., on the
commercial treatment of the provisions of Article 1561d are of
interest :
Le commerce en gdndral a ddcid6 que trois quarts de un pour cent par mois
6quivalent A 9% par annie (ce qui est vrai niath~matiquement) et que le
cofit de finance dolt 6tre fix6 en
lors
de-la vente. Si M eut W5 l’intention du lgislateur, il aurait 6t beaucoup
plus simple pour jui de dire que le prix de vente & temp6rament sera Cle
prix rdgulier plus 9% par ann6e du solde dfi lors de la ventex’. Ce n’est pas
ce qu’il a dit,
renant 9% par ann6e du solde d
Trois quarts de un pour cent doivent se calculer sur le total des verse-
ments difffrs pour chaque mois de ]a dur6e du terme. S’il W’agit d’un terme
de dix mois A $8 par mois, le total des versements diff6r6s pour le premier
mois sera de $80 et pour ce mois on calculera trois quarts de un pour cent
de $80. Une fois l’intrdt ajout6, on ddduira le premier paiement. Le rdsultat
sera le total des neuf versements diff6r~s pour le deuxi~me mois. Encore
M , calcul d’intdrdt, d~duction du deuxi6me paiement, et lon a le total des
versements diff6rds pour le troisidme mois. Ainsi de suite pour chaque mois.
Ce calcul sera de beaucoup plus compliqu6 que la simplification faite
, par le commerce en gdndral, mais il sera d’aprbs la loi et rien de plus ne
peut 6tre rdelam&30
* A further -and more recent decision on the point is La Compagnie
Lgyyr6 Limitge v. St-Amant 31 which, without referring to Ferron
v. Belsle, arrives at the same conclusion, that the maximum allow-
ble finance charge is 3/4 of 1% per month on the total deferred
payments remaining unpaid at the end of each month of the term.
A general statement of the relevant facts is sufficient to illustrate
the method followed in cadculating the charges and the view taken
by the Court.
‘ments diff6rds pour chaque moisD comme le venut encore
Le prix de vente r~gulier a 6 major6 de beaucoup plus que de % de 1%,
tel que le veut l’aat. 1561d C.C. En fait, cette majoration est de plus de 1%
par mois et ce, en calculant le pourcentage non pas sur le Ctotal des verse-
‘art. 1561d C.C.,
mais sur le solde initial, sans tenir compte des versements mensuels effectu~s.
Non. seulement done Ja majoration a Wtd calcul~e A 9% par annie du solde
dfi lors de -la vente, comme le font la plupart des coninergants –
ce qui
28 At least in cases where the couTT has- specifically considered the point. See,
however, Commodity, Discount Limited v. Dame Gagnon (supra, n. 17) where
the court allowed interest at 9% per annum on the note attached to a conditional
sale contra’ctIn Canadian Family Food Plan Ltd. V. Cosgrove (supra, n. 9) the
rate of interest was expressed as 9% per annum, but no finding was made as
to the method of calculation.
20 [1958] S.C. 645.
3oM., at p. 647.
3 t Supra, n. 14.
No. 2]
CONDITIONAL SALE
n’est pas moins ill6gal puisque le lgislateur a pris soir de spdcifier non pas
9% par annde du total des versements diff6rds mais c 3 de 1% du total des
paiements di’ffr6s pour chaque mois de la dur6e du termez – mais A au
moins 12% par anne du solde dfl lors des diffdrentes ventes.3 2
This latter decision has been followed on this point in M. Aber
Inc. v. Deneault 33 and Circle Acceptance Co. v. Kerr.4
Expressed as a rate per annum based on the original amount
financed, the amount thus calculated amounts to 41/%. Even on
the more accurate figure of 9% per annum on the amount out-
standing from time to time, many vendors and finance companies
find the maximum rate thus allowed insufficient to cover the cost
of money, risk, administration costs and related matters. Care
should now be taken, pending a revision of the legislation, to adjust,
as suggested in Section 1 (supra), what appear to be conditional
sale contracts in order to provide that title to the goods passes, thus
risking only a personal recourse against the purchaser in return
for a more reasonable rate of return through finance charges.
3. The $800 Limit.
Article 1561] provides that the provisions of the chapter on
Instalment Sales apply to commercial sales only at retail and not
exceeding, in each case, eight hundred dollars. There are certain
exceptions to this rule and also certain provisions which apply to
all conditional sales and similar arrangements regardless of amount
or type of moveable property involved. Would the provisions of the
Code apply to a conditional sale in which the regular cash sale price
was $750 before 8% sales tax, or in which the instalment plan sale
price was $750 before such sales tax? Does Article 1561] refer to
the cash sale price or the instalment sale price when it speaks of
$800? Can a vendor argue that if the sale price plus sales tax
equals $810, the contract is not governed by Articles 1561a and
following?
The point was raised in M. Aber Inc. V. Deneault35 in which
it was held that the sales tax did not form part of the sale price
and could not be added to the price in order to take the contract
from the operation of the provisions of the Code. The ground for
the ‘decision was that the Retail Sales Tax Act 3 provides that the
321d., at pp. 30-31.
33 Supra, n. 6.
34 Supra, n. 5.
35 Supra, n. 6.
30R.S.Q. ,1964, c. 71.
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[VCol. 16
tax is payable by the purchaser, although it is collected by the
vendor as agent for the Crown in right of the Province. This amount
does not form part of the sale price; it is merely calculated with
reference to it.
The Aber case did not raise the issue as to whether the cash
sale price or the instalment plan sale price was the relevant con-
sideration in determining the effect of Article 1561]. Suppose the
regular cash sale price of goods purchased by conditional sale is
$700, and the finance charges are another $150, bringing the sale
price on the instalment plan of $850. Would this be a contract
governed, in the absence of an exception under Article 1561], by
Articles 1561a and following? Would an initial payment of 15%
be required under Article 1561b ? The issue, of course, is whether
or not a commercial sale at retail “not exceeding… eight hundred
dollars” refers to the market value of the goods as expressed by
the regular cash selling price or whether the governing figure would
be the market value of the goods increased by the finance charges,
or the sale price on the instalment plan.37 In a chapter dealing with
conditional sales it might be reasonable to assume that the decisive
consideration would be to relate the provisions thereof to the amount
of the obligation undertaken by the instalment purchaser, namely
the instalment plan sale price. Whatever the merit of this approach,
it is likely that the view which would be taken by the Courts if
they are fixed squarely with the problem would be to extend the
protection granted by the Code to the purchaser as far as possible
and regard the regular cash sale price of the goods as determining.
An indication of this approach may be gleaned from the Aber case,
in which the discussion related to whether the addition of sales tax
to the regular cash sale price of the merchandise in order to bring
the total price over the $800 limit was permissible.38
3 7 To date, no reported decisions deal directly with this point.
38 Supra, n. 6, at p. 390.
