The Assessment of Corporate Criminal
Liability on the Basis of Corporate
Identity: An Analysis
Jennifer A. Quaid’
Current theories of corporate criminal liability in
Canada and the U.K. focus upon the individuals who
make-up an organization. However this approach, called
the identification doctrine, has its limitations, especially
when employed in the context of large, decentralized or-
ganizations. The present article examines a different basis
for liability, proposed by some scholars, which concen-
trates on the organization itself. It is believed that this form
of liability could enhance both the effectiveness and the
fairness of the current system.
The article is divided into two parts. In the first part,
the author provides a synthesis of the work of some of the
main advocates of a “corporate” criminal liability. From
this overview, she argues that it is conceptually possible
and philosophically justifiable to treat organizations as
subjects of criminal law. Drawing on the contributions of
scholars, the author identifies the characteristics which en-
able organizations to be viewed as intentional actors, ac-
countable for their actions. She concludes by examining
some of the justifications for recourse to a organizationally-
defined basis of liability.
The second part of the article takes the concept of a
“corporate” intentional actor and applies it to the traditional
analysis of the conditions required for the imposing of
criminal liability. The author retains the traditional division
of an offence into actus reus and mens rea elements be-
cause any novel concept of corporate liability will nonethe-
less be incorporated into the existing body of offences. In
addition, examining how it functions within the current
system serves to demonstrate the proposed concept’s
strengths and weaknesses. The author ultimately concludes
that because “corporate” liability reflects aspects of corpo-
rate culture not captured by the current system, its inclusion
would contribute to the development of corporate criminal
law.
Les theories actuelles de la responsabilit6 criminelle
des personnes morales s’attardent, au Canada comme au
Royaume-Uni, aux individus qui forment l’organisation.
Toutefbis, ce e approche appele la drtine d’identification a
ses limites, surtout dans le cas de grandes organisations d6-
centralis~es. Cet article examine les diffrrentes bases de
responsabilit6 avanedes par certains auteurs se concentrant
sur l’organisation comme telle. I1 semble qu’une telle
forme de responsabilit6 pourrait augmenter tant l’efficacit6
que l’6quit6 du syst~me actuel.
L’article se divise en deux parties. Dans la premiere,
l’auteure prsente une synth~se de l’oeuvre des principaux
tenants d’une responsabilit6 criminelle des personnes mora-
les. Ce survol permet 4 l’auteure de difendre conceptuel-
lement et philosophiquement l’identification de personnes
morales comme sujets de droit criminel. A partir des tra-
vaux de certains chercheurs, l’auteure identifie les traits
permettant de voir les organisations comme des acteurs ca-
pables d’intentions et responsables de leurs actions. Elle
examine certaines justifications pour un recours b une res-
ponsabilite d~finie sur des bases organisationnelles.
La deuxi~me partie de l’article applique le concept de
personne morale capable d’intentions et l’applique h
l’analyse traditionnelle des conditions de responsabilit6
criminelle. L’auteure retient la division traditionnelle de
l’infraction en 616ments, actus reus et mens rea, puisque
tout nouveau module de responsabilitd criminelle devra etre
incorpor au systme actuel. L’examen de cette nouvelle
responsabilit6 dans le cadre actuel permet d’dvaluer les for-
ces et faiblesss du concept propos6. L’auteure conclut que
le fait de refl~ter des aspects de la culture organisationnelle
jusqu’ici n6glig~s permet au module de responsabilit6 de
contribuer au d6veloppement du droit criminel des person-
nes morales.
. Associate-in-Law, Columbia University. B.Soc.Sci. 1990, LL.L. 1993, LL.B. 1994 Ottawa; LL.M.
1996 Cambridge. The author wishes to thank Andr6 Jodouin and Andrew Simester for their helpful
comments on previous drafts. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Fonds
pour les chercheurs et aide L la recherche, the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies and
Columbia University. This article is dedicated to the memory of Philip Geoffrey Quaid.
McGill Law Journal 1998
Revue de droit de McGill
To be cited as: (1998) 43 McGill L.. 67
Mode de rf~rence: (1998) 43 R.D. McGill 67
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL/REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
Introduction
1. The Corporation as a Responsible Actor
A. The Attribution of Responsibility
1. The Foundations of Criminal Responsibility
2. The Responsible Actor
B. The Nature of Corporations
1. Types of Organization
2. The Characteristics of an Organization
C. Corporate Intentionality
D. Justifications for Corporate Responsibility
!1. The Conditions for Liability
A. Act Requirements
1. The Notion of Act and the Requirement of Voluntariness
2. Causation
3. Justifications
B, Fault Requirements
1. The Notion of Corporate Fault
2. Types of Fault
a. Fault Based on an Aware State of Mind
i. Knowledge or Intention
ii. Recklessness and Wilful Blindness
b. Strict Liability
c. Absolute Liability (No Fault)
3. Defences
Conclusion
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Introduction
Much of the difficulty surrounding the discussion of corporate criminal liability
lies in the fact that it challenges some of the basic assumptions underlying the criminal
law. In particular, discussions of a theory of corporate criminal liability have often been
confined within individualist conceptions of criminal law. This paradigm bases the
characteristics necessary for an actor to be treated as blameworthy, as well as the nature
of the concepts of actus reus and mens rea on a distinctly human model.
The current system of corporate liability in Canada and the United Kingdom,
based upon vicarious liability and the identification doctrine, is a reflection of this in-
dividualist model. Although no one suggests that the individualist model for liability
should be abandoned, it has nonetheless been the object of much criticism. Critics find
that individualism is an incomplete basis upon which to ground the criminal liability of
corporations because it does not accurately capture the nature of corporate behaviour.
As a result, the purpose of the present article is to examine how the alternative basis of
liability most commonly advocated by these same critics –
one which seeks to impose
criminal liability on the basis of a corporate blameworthiness incorporating the reali-
ties of the modem corporation – might enhance the current model of corporate crimi-
nal liability.
Given this focus, the article shall be divided into two parts. The first will examine
the suitability of the corporation as a subject of criminal law. The purpose of this part is
to demonstrate that it is both practically possible and philosophically justifiable to treat
corporations as accountable for the wrongs and harms they cause. The first section will
examine the notion of a responsible actor and determine if there are non-human charac-
teristics upon which one can base an attribution of responsibility. The next two sections
will describe the particular characteristics of a corporation and then identify those
which enable it to be viewed as a subject of criminal liability. From the conclusion that
it is such a subject, the final section will consider the justifications for imposing crimi-
nal liability upon corporations.
The second part will apply the above-mentioned concept of “corporate responsible
actor” to the traditional criminal law evaluation of the conditions required for the im-
position of liability with respect to a particular offence. Retaining the classic analytical
division of the elements of an offence into actus reus and mens rea is important, given
the reality that any novel concept of corporate liability will nonetheless have to be in-
corporated into an existing body of offences defined separately in terms of conduct and
mental elements. Although modifications to this bi-partite assessment of criminal be-
haviour may be desirable in the long run, it is the approach currently used and is un-
likely to be radically changed for the moment. More importantly, however, following
the structure of the current criminal law will serve as a useful means of comparison
with new proposals as well as a demonstration of its inherent limitations when applied
to corporations.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL/REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
(Vol. 43
I. The Corporation as a Responsible Actor
The purpose of this part is to identify the basis upon which corporations may be
considered responsible actors. It is divided into four sections: the attribution of respon-
sibility, the nature of corporations, corporate intentionality and justifications for corpo-
rate liability.
A. The Attribution of Responsibility
1. The Foundations of Criminal Responsibility
In order to better construct a theory of corporate responsibility, it is necessary to
begin with a brief consideration of what constitutes criminal responsibility generally.
Paul Fauconnet, in his seminal work, La responsabilitg.: 6tude de sociologie, advances
the following general definition: “la responsabilit6 est commun6ment entendue comme
la propri6t6 qu’a une personne de devoir l6gitimement supporter une peine; dans
1’usage, les mots responsable et justenment punissable sont largement synonymes.”‘
Thus, in his view, it is the capacity to be blamed –
and therefore punished – which
animates our conception of the notion of responsibility.
For Fauconnet, there are two steps to consider in the attribution of responsibility.
The first is that the subject must possess these aptitudes of a potential subject of pun-
ishment. This is a necessary precondition to the second step, which corresponds to the
transformation of this potential liability into actual liability through the occurrence of
an event “capable of generating responsibility”
In the general criminal law, however, discussion focuses upon the second branch
of Fauconnet’s conception of responsibility –
the circumstances which lead to the
blaming of an individual. It is apparent that the first arm, the issue of capacity to be
blamed or what Peter French calls “moral personhood”, is rarely addressed. In fact, the
principle upon which responsibility is premised, autonomy of the individual, is largely
assumed:
The principle [of autonomy] is usually assumed rather than stated in legal doc-
trine … If… the principle is expressed in terms of sufficient freedom in most
situations, making it fair to use concepts such as “desert”, “choice” and
“control”, that expresses … the position which criminal law has reached. It also
accords with the political underpinnings of the law, namely, that citizens should
‘P. Fauconnet, La responsabiliti. itude de sociologie (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1920) at 7
[emphasis in original]. The author’s translation is: “responsibility is commonly understood to be the
capacity of a person to be legitimately subjected to punishment: usually, the terms responsible and
justly punishable are synonymous.” Following quotations from this source are translated by the
author of this paper.
2lbid at 26-27.
3 RA. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press,
1984) at 38.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
be regarded as rational, choosing individuals whose autonomy the law should
respect.
While this point of view has been challenged by utilitarian thought,5 the current
criminal law has adopted the view that the imposition of responsibility upon an indi-
vidual flows naturally from the freedom to make rational choices about actions and be-
haviour. Implicit in this idea of autonomy is that people have causal power over their
bodies, something Celia Wells considers an essential attribute by which we understand
and evaluate ourselves as persons.’ She goes so far as to assert that the language of
both rationality and autonomy assumes a human body.’
Of course, as with Fauconnet’s analysis, the principle of autonomy is only the
starting point of the discussion of individual responsibility. There are various subse-
quent lines dividing responsibility and non-responsibility of individuals, such as volun-
tariness, justifications and excuses6 Nonetheless, the significant consequence of the
principle of autonomy is that the law initially assumes the adult human being to be an
apt subject of responsibility.
It is clear, therefore, that the first challenge to any theory of corporate criminal li-
ability lies in the ability to go beyond the confines of the human person and identify
other attributes which enable an entity to be capable of being a responsible actor. The
inquiry is not without general interest, as Wells notes, because a corporate criminal li-
ability may even enhance our appreciation of the factors which influence responsibil-
ity:
One of the reasons why contemporary legal systems have difficulty with any
concept other than that of the individual is the heritage of political liberalism.
The dominance of liberalism which has celebrated the ultimate value of the
individual person and correspondingly denounced collectivism or social wel-
farism has inevitably been reflected in legal accounts of responsibility. Corpo-
rate accountability can be seen as an example of the beginnings of a shift to-
ward a mid-way theory of communitarianism, which undermines the liberal
theory of self, but is equally wary of social welfarism. Not only has the sover-
eignty of the individual obscured group and cultural influences, methodologi-
cal individualism “is unable to account for the corporateness of corporate ac-
tion and corporate responsibility”.9
Thus, for Wells and many others there are perhaps good reasons why corporate li-
ability should neither flow from nor depend on the same arguments as those which
A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 80-81.
See ibid. at 79-80.
C. Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at 63
[hereinafter Corporations].
‘Seeibid.
6 See Ashworth, supra note 4 at 81.
9 Corporations, supra note 6 at 66-67 [footnotes omitted]. The quote if from B. Fisse & J. Braith-
waite, “The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Ac-
countability” (1988) 11 Sydney L. Rev. 468 at 476 [hereinafter “Allocation of Responsibility”].
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
serve for individuals.'” Support for such a view can be found first in a more detailed
examination of the notion of responsibility, and then in a consideration of the character-
istics of the modem corporation. Once this basis for an aptitude for responsibility has
been established, its justifications shall be examined.
2. The Responsible Actor
Before considering the appropriateness of clothing corporations with a capacity to
be blamed, it is important to consider in greater depth what it means to be a responsible
actor or intentional agent. As Wells has noted, “moral personhood has tended to be the
meeting-place for theories of corporate accountability.”” Therefore, the fundamental
question is whether an organization can be blameworthy in itself, or is it always a
function of the blameworthiness of the individuals involved?” The object of this sec-
tion is to demonstrate that corporations are capable of being blameworthy on the basis
of a moral accountability which does not depend upon human characteristics.
Fauconnet is of the view that the blame for wrongful acts of collective entities can
and must be borne by the entity itself and not by its constituent members. This derives
from the distinct personality of a collective entity, which subsumes the individual per-
sonalities composing it. As such, it is unfair to hold individuals responsible for what is
the fault of the entity itself. Collective responsibility is likened to a new form of indi-
vidual liability, derived from the fact that corporate legal personality assumes a single
juridical unit.'”
A more developed approach is elaborated by French.” He grounds his analysis in a
consideration of what it means to be part of the moral community, the principle being
that only those who are moral actors can be responsible. Unlike Fauconnet, he con-
cludes that legal personhood is unhelpful for the purposes of determining who is a re-
sponsible actor because it fails to distinguish between subjects of rights and administra-
tors of rights. Within the former type are those right-holders who, though legal persons,
lack the capacity to dispose of or administer their rights and thus cannot be intentional
actors. As a result, French warns against relying on the notion of legal personhood in
order to settle the issue of the qualities required for moral personhood.”
Wells echoes this observation by noting that traditionally, “[riecognition [of a cor-
poration] as a legal person has largely carried with it protections without the imposition
of corresponding responsibilities or obligations.”‘” She also points to the irony that the
separate legal personality of the corporation often serves as a shield for the directors
‘0 Corporations, supra note 6 at 63. See also “Allocation of Responsibility”, ibid.; French, supra
note 3 at 1-47.
” Corporations, supra note 6 at 87.
‘2 See ibid.
‘ See Fauconnet, supra note I at 340-41.
” French, supra note 3.
5 Ibid at 38.
‘6 Corporations, supra note 6 at 3.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
and shareholders from their individual responsibility.” In short, the possession of legal
personality by both corporations and individuals does not mean that they are subjected
to the same legal treatment, nor that they are perceived in the same way.” Ascriptions
of responsibility do not flow from the current notion of legal personhood.
It is within the interdependent notions of moral and metaphysical personhood that
French sets the conditions for participation in the moral community. A moral person is
“the referant of any proper name or of any noneliminatable subject in an ascription of
moral responsibility.”” At a minimum, a moral person must be an intentional actor.
Thus, the issue of whether corporations are moral persons must be resolved by deter-
mining if it is possible to characterize certain events as being intended by the corpora-
tion itself The concept of metaphysical personhood adds the possibility of describing
an event as an intentional action. Attributing reasons for an action rationalizes its oc-
currence and helps causally explain it.2′ However, French notes that there may exist
more than one set of reasons – or even different kinds of reasons –
for an event. This
is particularly important in the corporate context as the actions of a corporation in-
volve, or at least include, the actions of individual human actors. For corporate re-
sponsibility to exist there must be corporate reasons for a given action, irrespective of
those of the individual actors involved’
Thus in French’s model, moral, or responsible, persons are those persons who pos-
sess an intentionality, and act for reasons related to it. For the corporation to be re-
sponsible it must be capable of demonstrating its own intentionality. Wells expresses it
another way: “If intentions are taken broadly as reasons for acting, then this requires
the identification of a corporation’s reasons for acting, over and above the reasons of
the individuals.”‘
In essence, corporate intention should be something more than a
means of referring to the collection of the intentions of the individuals comprising the
corporation. Whether corporations actually have this ability will be discussed later on
in this paper, in the section on the nature of the corporation.
While French’s attempts at integrating corporations into the moral community
may have a certain analytical appeal, some are not convinced that this is the best way
to found corporate responsibility. In particular, Wells is critical of this position because
it asserts, on the one hand, that corporate minds are not like human ones, but on the
other, argues that responsibility is rooted in moral blame. While she argues that it does
make sense, both philosophically or practically, to treat a corporation as a single and
separate entity capable of committing a criminal offence, she prefers the more neutral
term “accountability” to describe the corporate capacity to be blamed. The term con-
veys the notion that corporations are not analogous to human beings but remain crimi-
17 IbiL at 92.
8 See ibid at 84.
‘
“French, supra note 3 at 38.
20 Ibid
21 See Corporations, supra note 6 at 63.
22 See French, supra note 3 at 40.
‘ Corporations, supra note 6 at 88-89.
24Ibid at 90.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
nally responsible for their behaviour’ This qualification is important because invaria-
bly organizational accountability will have an impact upon some individuals, but this
should not mean that only individuals can be responsible.”6 As she states:
Corporations may be likened to, or treated as, individuals for some purposes,
but should not be regarded as individuals. To do so would artificially limit the
role of corporate liability and render sterile much of the argument about corpo-
rate structures, activities and capacities to cause harm.”
A similar “non-moral” view is held by Brent Fisse, who, in developing his justifi-
cation of corporate liability, disputes the necessity of attributing a moral character to
the offences for which corporations are punished.’ In fact, he goes so far as to say that
corporations are not capable of being immoral in the sense we understand human be-
ings to be.
Indeed, if one believes that offences are “sins with legal definitions” … then
one cannot believe in corporate criminal liability; corporations lack a con-
science in any real sense and hence are incapable of committing sinfid of-
fenses.
The advantage of the non-moral approach is that it avoids entering the debate of
whether corporations make truly moral choices when choosing one course of action
over another. Certainly, it is on the strength of the moral character of the criminal law
that the individual has remained the base unit of responsibility. Indeed, it is virtually
impossible to argue that corporations have souls in the sense the term is understood.
Wells and Fisse are justified when they argue that it is unnecessary and even undesir-
able to frame corporate responsibility in moral terms. Blameworthiness does not have
to be tied to morality. It does, however, require a principled foundation to guide its
application.
Such a principled foundation may be found in Fauconnet’s discussion of the an-
cient Greek practice of holding entire cities responsible for the acts of their leaders. The
rationale for the practice was that a city had a single and continued existence over time
in much the same way as a human being remains the same individual throughout life.
Just as the achievements of its citizens, past and present, became part of its heritage,
certain criminal acts were also identified with the city itself. Responsibility for criminal
acts flowed as naturally to a Greek city as did glory for great achievement?’
See ibid at 84.
26 See ibid at 90.
I7lbid at 94.
B. Fisse, “Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanc-
tions” (1983) 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1141 at 1177 [hereinafter “Reconstructing”].
Ibid [emphasis added].
” See Fauconnet, supra note 1 at 89. This example is not an endorsement of the notion of imposing
liability on a city for the acts of its leaders. This type of liability was developed in a context very dif-
ferent from the modem era, where distinctions between leaders and citizenry resulted in differing
treatment at the hands of the law. The interest in this example is in the development of a concept of
identity of a composite entity distinct from the individuals who compose it.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
This distinct identity enabled the city to be considered responsible as a collectivity.
Thus, once its responsibility was triggered, the city as a whole was punished, irrespec-
tive of whether the individual actor who committed the act was actually subjected to
any punishment. It was punished on the basis of its own separate blameworthiness.
Thus the city, at least for the purposes of specific criminal offences, was considered to
be a responsible actor, capable of being blamed and thus punished for wrongful acts.
The above example describes a concept of a continued and collective existence
that goes beyond that of the individuals composing it. The idea of a distinct identity is a
first step toward recognizing corporations as responsible actors. The second and more
decisive step is made with the assistance of the concept of intentionality. While French
uses it as a means of incorporating collective actors into the moral community, it is
contended that intentionality does not contain any moral element itself. It is simply a
means of setting out a criterion of responsibility which is independent of human char-
acteristics.
Nonetheless, this non-human criterion of intentionality must be based upon a cer-
tain fixed conception of the corporation. At this point, it is particularly important to
establish more clearly the general characteristics of the modem organization before
continuing a discussion of corporate liability. Many critics feel the current system falls
to integrate modem corporate reality into its framework. Therefore, the next section
will examine the characteristics of a corporation in order to develop a notion of inten-
tionality which appropriately reflects them. To do so requires a brief discussion of or-
ganization theory.
B. The Nature of Corporations
One of the significant differences between individual and corporate liability is that
in the former the subject of responsibility is easily identified. Adult human beings all
take one of two basic physical forms, despite infinite individual variations. It is upon
this common ground of the human body that the twin principles of fault ascription –
rationality and autonomy –
are premised?’ There is, of course, considerable debate
surrounding the conditions under which human beings fulfill these requirements of
moral personhood,32 but this does not alter the fact that the notion of a human being
corresponds to something quite specific.
No such standard form or structure links all the disparate forms of collectivities
which operate within and influence the course of modem society. Even more specific
terms, such as organization and corporation, offer limited assistance in identifying a
fixed set of characteristics upon which to develop a general doctrine of responsibility.
And yet, as Meir Dan-Cohen has stressed, it is necessary to fix an initial conception of
the organization before subjecting it to the norms of law and morality’ As a result, this
3′ See Corporations, supra note 6 at 63. See also Ashworth, supra note 4 at 81.
‘ See Ashworth, ibid. at 93-111.
3 See M. Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons and Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1986) at 27.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
section will review the different types of organization and, from these, distill those
characteristics of collectivities which are consistent with an ascription of liability. The
resulting composite will serve as the base unit of responsibility in the ensuing discus-
sion of corporate liability.
1. Types of Organization
holistic and atomistic –
While accepting that organizations are different from individuals may seem intui-
tive, Dan-Cohen observes that the two most common conceptions of the organization
are both based upon a human model.” The holistic ap-
–
proach – or personification –
acknowledges the reality of collective entities and de-
nies the possibility of their complete reduction into individuals and their interrelations.”
However, the theory goes further by finding that as organizations share some of the
characteristics of individuals, they must therefore have all the characteristics relevant to
the individual’s moral and legal status.” It is on this assumption that the holistic theory
deems a corporation fit for legal personhood. Nonetheless, personification is useful:
It conveys the triple insight that organizations are commonly the objects of
meaningful predication; that this predication is possible and meaningful apart
from and in the absence of any detailed knowledge pertaining to individual
constituents of the organization; and that in many cases the same predication is
appropriate for organizations and individuals.37
or aggregation –
In stark contrast, the atomistic approach –
sees collective enti-
ties as aggregates of individuals, and thus completely reducible into individuals and
their interrelations. As Dan-Cohen notes, “it correctly insists upon the critical depend-
ence of organizations, both phenomenally and normatively, on the actions and interre-
lations of individual human beings.” However the theory exaggerates this interrelation
by equating an organization with a homogeneous group of individuals and dictating
that the normative status of the collective entity must correspond to the normative
status of the individuals that compose it.” This latter approach is more commonly as-
sociated with the theory of individualism, its principal tenet being that only individuals
act, that only individuals are responsible and that corporate action is no more than the
sum of its parts.”
34Ibid at 15-16.
33See ibid at 15.
36 See ibid at 27.
37 Ibid at 26 [emphasis in original].
3
1 Ibid at 27.
39 See ibid at 15.
, See “Allocation of Responsibility”, supra note 9 at 475. This paper does not challenge the notion
that there are many circumstances where individually-based liability may be the most appropriate re-
sponse to corporate misconduct. The most notable example is that of small, closely-held corporations
where the principal owners and shareholders are probably more concerned about individually-
incurred liability than that of the corporate shell within which they operate. As a result, the threat of
individual liability will have greater deterrent value than a corporate liability. However, my difficulty
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
While the focus upon individualism can be criticized when applied to all organiza-
tions, it does not follow that all organizations transcend and exceed the cumulation of
their individual members. Wells identifies two conceptions of the organization: atomic,
where the organization is viewed as a collection of individuals; and organic, where it
corresponds to more than the sum of its parts.” French observes a similar division be-
tween types of collectivities, which he names respectively aggregate and conglomer-
ate. 2 As the name suggests, the first of these designates a mere collection of people. It
follows that the identity of the collectivity is altered with each change in its constituent
membership and that, in general, acts and intentions of the collectivity are reducible to
those of the collectivity members. 3 Such a collectivity is by definition not capable of
being an intentional actor.”
French uses three characteristics to distinguish aggregates from conglomerates.
First, conglomerates have internal decision-making procedures by which courses of
concerted action can be chosen. Second, there is more stringent enforcement of stan-
dards of conduct of individuals within the conglomerate than there is in the larger
community of individuals. Third, members of a conglomerate fill differing defined
roles within it, but a change in the identity of the individual occupying a given role
does not necessarily cause a corresponding change in the conglomerate’s identity. 5 A
conglomerate thus possesses an identity not exhausted by the identities of its constitu-
ent members. As such, ascriptions of responsibility to the conglomerate cannot be re-
duced to a conjunction of ascriptions of responsibility to the individuals with which it
is associated.”
The importance of recognizing the enduring existence of organizational identity,
especially in the light of changing membership, is brought into sharper focus by Dan-
Cohen when he traces the evolution in the structure of corporations over the past cen-
tury. First, the concept of a corporation has shifted from the notion of an enterprise
headed by one entrepreneur, who both owns and runs the going concern, to that of an
organization where stock ownership becomes separated from the control of the corpo-
ration’s affairs, the latter being managed by a professional, hired and self-perpetuating
bureaucracy. Second, the individual shareholder’s role has changed from part-owner to
investor, and its importance has diminished in large corporations where the most sig-
nificant shareholders are collective entities.! Third, the attachment of the shareholder
to the corporation is becoming secondary and indirect, reflecting the fact that corpora-
tions serve a variety of interests besides those of shareholders, including those of their
employees, customers and the community at large. As Dan-Cohen observes, “the cor-
poration can no longer be identified with a single homogeneous group of individuals.
with individualism, or at least with some of its advocates, is the idea that there is no other basis, be-
sides the individual, upon which it is appropriate to impose criminal liability.
“Corporations, supra note 6 at 84.
42 French, supra note 3 at 5, 13.
43 See ibid at 5.
“See ibiL at 12.
4I lbid at 13-14.
4 See ibid at 13.
41 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 33 at 16ff.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL /FREVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
Its decisions and activities are the resultant of and are responsive to a complicated set
of interests and conflicting claims.”‘”
However, the more significant change for the purposes of the criminal law is the
fact that the structure of many, especially large-scale, corporations is no longer based
on a pyramid headed by a single, all-powerful individual.’ The modem organization is
“portrayed as a coalition of groups of divergent claims and interests, engaged in a con-
tinuous process of bargaining with one another.””0 This vision of the corporation is not
included in the current individual-based responsibility model, which imposes liability
only upon the individual or individuals identified as the “directing will and mind” of
the corporation.’ Wells aptly characterized the relationship between large corporations
and the various groups of individuals which compose them, demonstrating the need for
a separate, corporate basis for responsibility:
Public corporations … are owned by a dispersed range of shareholders who
have little or no control over the day-to-day or even year-to-year management.
Managers have control over resources which they do not own and on a scale
which no one individual would ever be likely to own. In addition, the organ-
izational structure is such that knowledge and control is disaggregated: corpo-
rate goals are the responsibility of a large number of individuals who may or
may not know what other individuals are doing.”
A final change to be noted is the orientation of corporate goals. It is no longer ac-
curate to describe them solely as a function of the self-interested and profit-seeking
entrepreneur. The modem corporation pursues various goals, some of which may not
be consistent with one another nor pursued concurrently. Corporate choices are made
as a function of both monetary and non-monetary considerations’ Thus, a wide range
of factors can influence corporate decisions, the extent of such influence is circum-
scribed by both information constraints and the internal structure and operating proce-
dures of the firm.’
The ultimate consequence of the above changes is that many corporations, particu-
larly large ones, have developed to the state of being ownerless. The idea of a group of
individual members has given way to that of a permanent, self-perpetuating bureau-
cratic machine in which members are only secondary and can no longer be realistically
identified with the organization.” This view is analogous to that of the Greek city de-
scribed earlier, in that a separate collective identity emerges from the contributions of
many individuals. However, the separate identity of the modem organization is based
“Ibid at 19.
” See ibid at 19-20.
0 Ibid at 19.
“, See “Allocation of Responsibility”, supra note 9, for an excellent critique of the individualist
position.
s2 Corporations, supra note 6 at 36.
“See “Reconstructing!’, supra note 28 at 1154-55.
4 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 33 at 20.
” See ibid at 22.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
upon a complex set of characteristics which go far beyond those of the ancient theory
and allow for separate blameworthiness on the basis of truly corporate action.
2. The Characteristics of an Organization
A very complete description of the characteristics of an organization is provided
by Dan-Cohen who finds that an organization possesses functional structures, it is
permanent, large, formal, complex and goal-oriented, and has decision-making struc-
tures 6 As will be readily observed, organizations in which these characteristics are
present provide a strong case for the need to recognize, in certain circumstances, a
separate corporate identity. The existence of structure implies a more or less fixed and
perceptible pattern of order, which is susceptible to representation in the form of an or-
ganizational chart. Organizational permanence is reflected in its operative time-span,
which can extend for many generations and is distinct from that of any of its constitu-
ent individual members.
Of particular significance for an eventual criminal liability of organizations is the
decision-making aspect. This highlights the role that information plays in organiza-
tional activities and underlines the fact that information activities (gathering, recording,
registering, decoding, disseminating) are best attributed to the organization because the
total information required for a specific decision is not normally possessed by an iden-
tifiable individual or group of individuals. Moreover, an organizational decision em-
bodies organizational preferences, which may or may not reflect the individual prefer-
ences contributing to them.!
Although not all organizations share the characteristic of being large-scale opera-
tions involving many individual participants, it should be noted that small corporations
do not generally raise the same problems for prosecutors as large ones. One of the
criticisms of the current individual liability model is that it cannot attribute blamewor-
thiness where no one individual can be identified as responsible’ In large corporations,
the presence of many individuals contributes to the anonymity and impersonality of
corporate decisions, which translates into a discontinuity between individual interests
and those of the organization’ This discontinuity does not exist to the same extent in
small corporations, where the acts of the corporation can more easily be attributed to
high-ranking individuals constituting its directing will and mind.’ Moreover, the social
Ibis argument is taken from Dan-Cohen, ibid at 31-33.
“See ibid at 32-33.
” See B. Fisse, “The Attribution of Criminal Liability to Corporations: A Statutory Model” (1991)
13 Sydney L.R. 277 at 289-90 [hereinafter “Attribution of Criminal Liability”].
“‘ See Dan-Cohen, supra note 33 at 34.
‘The seminal case in Canada that analyzes the identification doctrine is R. v. Canadian Dredge &
Dock Co., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, 19 D.L.R. (4th) 314 [hereinafter Canadian Dredge cited to S.C.R.].
Estey J. describes the development of the doctrine from its English origins in the case Lennard’s Car-
rying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., [1915] A.C. 705 [hereinafter Lennards Carrying Co.]. The preoc-
cupation of the Court was how far this notion should extend beyond the definition used in Lennard’s
Carrying Co., which held that the directing will and mind was limited to a small class of persons:
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
importance of an organization’s policies and decisions increase with the magnitude of
its resources, reflecting the greater potential of large organizations to cause substantial
harm.
Two corollaries of size are formality and complexity. The first reflects a bureauc-
racy that is constituted by formal offices and the rules connecting them. The imper-
sonality of such formality renders the organization impermeable, such that events can
be said to affect the organization in a way which is not easily reducible to a comparable
impact on individuals.” Complexity also contributes to this opaqueness of organiza-
tional decision-making. The large number of interdependent sub-units that constitute
the organization and interact in various ways makes it “difficult to trace organizational
decisions and acts to the wills and actions of particular individuals.” 2
The final characteristics of an organization are functionality and goal orientation.
As organizations are functional structures, their distinct characteristic is that they have
been formally established for the explicit purpose of achieving certain goals. However,
it is not possible to fully explain organizational behaviour solely on the basis of stated
goals. Given that functionality and goal orientation are dynamic and relative, it is nec-
essary to impute to the organization some self-serving or reflexive goals, not necessar-
ily related to stated goals.”
There is one serious challenge to the idea of a separate corporate identity, which
poses significant problems for eventual criminal liability, although it does not under-
those under the direction of the shareholders, the board of directors itself, or those with authority
granted under the articles of association, who are appointed and removed by the shareholders.
Estey J. describes the broader operation of the identification theory in Canada at 693:
[The doctrine of identification] is a court-adopted principle put in place for the purpose
of including the corporation in the pattern of criminal law in a rational relationship to
that of the natural person. The identity doctrine merges the board of directors, the man-
aging director, the superintendent, the manager or anyone else delegated by the board
of directors to whom is delegated the governing executive authority of the corporation,
and the conduct of any of the merged entities is thereby attributed to the corporation….
a corporation may, by this means, have more than one directing mind.
While Estey does not expressly say that the doctrine applies better to closely-held corporations,
this conclusion can be inferred from his discussion of the economic effect of criminal penalties on
corporations (ibid. at 694):
The corporation which set the directing mind in position to do the wrong will suffer an
economic penalty. While it is true that this penalty will feed through to stockholders,
who may well be totally innocent as in the case of large public companies, it may be
seen as a risk or cost associated with the privilege of operating through the corporate
vehicle. In the case ofpersonal corporations, the imposition of a criminal penalty on
the corporation may be an additional penalty imposed upon the “personal” corporate
stockholder but such a result would be an acceptable part of the sentencing process as it
simply reflects the economic identification, as well as the legal identification, present
in such a corporation. [Emphasis added]
6’ See Dan-Cohen, supra note 33 at 34-35.
‘ Ibid. at 36.
, See ibid at 36-37.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
mine the ability of corporations to be intentional actors. It relates to the consequences
of insolvency upon the notion of the corporation and its legal personality. As Wells
states:
Ultimately there is an insoluble difficulty with maintaining the existence of the
juristic person for the purpose of administering a criminal sanction. If the com-
pany is forced to remain in existence, it cannot be forced to carry on its trading;
if it seeks to reconstitute itself, with different directors and members, then is it
the same entity? In other words, what is the entity –
its trading name, its
capital plant or its directors and members? Criminal liability can have a mean-
ing so long as the enterprise retains either its name or its directors, but once
these are lost then it is difficult to say what the company is.”
This difficulty may be more procedural than substantive. For if an act is committed
by a corporation that meets the criteria to be considered corporate in terms of its inten-
tionality, then it should not matter if the company exists as a formal legal entity or not.
However, as most statutes sanctioning criminal behaviour specifically define a corpo-
rate person with reference to corporate legal personality, difficulties in practice may
occur. This could be solved by statutory language which permits the prosecution of
unincorporated organizations possessing the characteristics necessary for corporate in-
tentionality. If these characteristics could not be demonstrated, then only individuals
may be held accountable. This is not meant to suggest that the impact on an eventual
criminal liability of changes in corporate ownership and management following the
commission of an offence is insignificant. Nonetheless, a fuller discussion of the issue
may await further study without undermining the premises of the present article.
This final reservation aside, the above discussion assists in the identification of
those aspects of organizational structure which can render an organization, at least
primafacie, a suitable subject of criminal liability. In essence, the organization must be
a conglomerate-type collectivity: that is, a collectivity which possesses an identity
which exceeds that of the sum of its individual members. According to Dan-Cohen’s
discussion of modem organizational structure such an identity results from the con-
junction of several characteristics: size, goal-orientation, permanence, complexity,
formality, and the possession of decision-making and functional structures. What these
characteristics reveal, in the words of Fisse and Braithwaite, is that “[o]rganizations are
systems, not just aggregations of people. More crucially, however, organizations con-
sist of sets of expectations about how different kinds of problems should be resolved.”‘
It is those organizations which fit these characteristics which shall be the object of dis-
cussion in this article. It shall be argued that an appreciation of the role of these charac-
teristics in corporate behaviour will enhance the current system’s ability to assess cor-
porate blameworthiness by incorporating an alternative basis of liability more reflec-
tive of how certain corporations operate.
Corporations, supra note 6 at 93 [emphasis in original].
“Allocation of Responsibility”, supra note 9 at 479.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
C. Corporate Intentionality
The above sections have laid the groundwork for the present discussion. The basis
upon which to impute corporations with accountability should be the distinct identity
of corporations, and their resultant capacity to act with intentionality. An examination
of the characteristics of the modem corporation confirms its corporate identity. Now, it
is necessary to determine how this distinct identity enables a corporation to act with
intentionality.
For French, intentionality can be attributed to a corporation by means of a concept
he describes as corporate internal decision (“CID”) structure.’ CID structure has two
elements: an organizational flowchart that sets out levels within the corporate structure
and corporate decision-recognition rules.”7 In essence, French argues that CI) structure
is the means by which the actions and intentions of individual human persons within
the corporation are transformed into a corporate decision. Moreover, it is through the
rules set out by CD structure that it is possible to identify whether or not a given ac-
tion or decision has been made “for corporate reasons”. It does this in two ways: first,
the corporate decision-making structure indicates the procedure that must be followed
in order for a decision to become the corporation’s; second, the decision must instanti-
ate the basic policy of the corporation.’ Wells has a similar approach in which the rea-
sons for corporate action are sought in procedural rules and corporate policies. Identi-
fying corporate reasons for action confirms the existence of corporate intentionality.”
A criticism of this approach is that corporate policy simply reflects the views of
the current directors of a corporation. French disagrees, stressing that in practice, es-
pecially in large corporations, this is not the case: even where the original incorporators
have organized an undertaking to further their personal interests, these give rise to a
long-range point of view which is distinct from that of the incorporators.” He traces
part of the reluctance to recognize corporate policy as a kind of intentionality to the
fact that it depends upon policies and purposes produced by a group of biological per-
sons: “Corporate intent seems somehow to be a tarnished illegitimate offspring of hu-
man intent.”‘ And yet, French sees the advantage of corporate intentionality based
upon CID structure as allowing corporate responsibility to co-exist with individual li-
ability. The fact that individuals can, through their actions, participate in corporate acts
does not exclude the possibility of them being held responsible for their actions in their
own capacity as intentional actors.’
There is another clear advantage to grounding corporate blameworthiness in a no-
tion of intentionality which corresponds to the capacity to make decisions on the basis
of reasons. It avoids the conceptual difficulty of asserting that corporations can enter-
“French, supra note 3 at 40-41.
67See ibid. at 41.
“See ibid at 42-43.
,See Corporations, supra note 6 at 89.
7′ French, supra note 3 at 45-46.
” Ibid at 46.
72Ibid at 47.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
tain a cerebral mental state, while still identifying the corporation as the source of the
wrong or harm caused. Fisse and Braithwaite correctly state:
The fact is that organizations are blamed in their capacity as organizations for
causing harm or taking risks in circumstances where they could have acted
otherwise. We often react to corporate offenders not merely as impersonal
harm-producing forces but as responsible, blameworthy entities. When people
blame corporations, they are not merely charmeling aggression against the ox
that gored or some symbolic object. Nor are they pointing the finger at indi-
viduals behind the corporate mantle. They are condemning the fact that the or-
ganization either implemented a policy of non-compliance or failed to exercise
its collective capacity to avoid the offence for which blame attaches. 3
It is thus appropriate to use the ability of a corporation to make decisions for im-
posing corporate liability when and because a decision instantiates both an organiza-
tional policy and an organizational decision-making process chosen by the organiza-
tion. The fairness of such a formulation is demonstrated by the fact that it avoids find-
ing liability of the corporation where a decision is made by a rogue individual in defi-
ance of corporate policy. However, this does not mean that the corporation cannot be
held responsible for the actions of individuals where the intention of the individuals is
other than to promote corporate goals and policies. In essence, the intention of indi-
viduals is irrelevant; what matters is whether the actions are animated by corporate in-
tentionality, as expressed through corporate policy.”
It is essential at this juncture to note that all the above conceptions of intentionality
are couched in terms of a responsibility based upon identifying corporate intention –
in the sense of fault. Intentionality, however, should describe the characteristics needed
to be a subject of responsibility, without regard to the question of fault While corporate
intentionality and corporate intention are both given meaning by reference to the dis-
tinct nature of corporate structure and policy, the two concepts are different although
obviously linked. It is a case of distinguishing the general from the specific. Inten-
tionality requires an aptitude for undertaking action on the basis of cognitive choices or
decisions.” Corporate policy and structure are the means to demonstrate that corporate
action is the result of rational decisions, in the same way that human characteristics
create an assumption that adult persons choose to act in the way they do. The existence
of intentionality distinguishes aggregates and conglomerates. ” By contrast, corporate
intention refers to the mental state to be established in a given case for a given offence.
With this distinction in mind, it is important to underline the more expanded de-
scription of corporate blameworthiness offered by Fisse and Braithwaite. Their model
incorporates into corporate intentionality the fact that corporations, because of their
collective might and resources and vast knowledge,” can be held to higher standards of
responsibility than individuals. These standards apply not only to affirmative acts but
7′ “Allocation of Responsibility”, supra note 9 at 481-82.
71 Ibid. at 484.
7′ See French, supra note 3 at 38.
” Ibid. at 5, 12.
7 “Allocation of Responsibility”, supra note 9 at 486.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
also to the existence of states of affairs which can in turn generate organizational fail-
ure to either achieve results or avoid harm.”‘ Responsibility for the outcomes of policies
and decision-making procedures can be imposed for two reasons: first, because corpo-
rations make decisions on the basis of reasons; and second, because they have the ca-
pacity to change not only the goals and policies animating decisions but also the man-
ner in which decisions are made.” Viewed in this way, corporations choose a course of
action based on a rational decision to do so, but this rationality is not fixed and can
adapt to differing circumstances.
From the above discussion it can be observed that corporations do exhibit the
characteristics necessary to be considered intentional actors. However, the imposition
of liability upon corporations must not only be justified in terms of their ability to ex-
hibit intentionality. Consideration must also be given to the reasons for imposing
criminal liability for corporate action per se. The next section examines the general
justifications for holding corporations accountable for the wrongs and harms they
cause.
D. Justifications for Corporate Responsibility
The rationale for imposing criminal liability upon corporations is often expressed
in terms of justifications for punishing corporations for their actions.” While the notion
of punishment is inextricably linked to criminal responsibility, there are justifications
for holding corporations responsible for their actions which lie beyond the traditional
utilitarian and desert-based theories of punishment. Not all corporate misconduct or
harm should be criminalized; not all types of corporate wrongdoing are appropriately
sanctioned through the recourse to the criminal law. This section examines justifica-
tions for imposing criminal liability upon corporations generally, without inquiring into
what specific corporate behaviour is best controlled by imposing criminal as opposed
to civil liability.
Of all the theories of justification for corporate responsibility, Fauconnet’s is the
most appealing. After conducting an extensive historical analysis of the imposition of
responsibility since ancient times, he concludes that responsibility is becoming more
and more individually-based, largely because the power of the State has triumphed
over that of smaller entities such as family clans. With the emancipation of the individ-
ual comes a diminution of responsibility because the person is no longer responsible
for collective acts, such as those of family members. The individual is only responsible
for personal acts.” Nonetheless, Fauconnet recognizes that collective responsibility
subsists, albeit in a form different than has historically been the case. This new form of
71 See ibidL at 483.
7 See ibid at 485.
so See e.g.: Note, “Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour
Through Criminal Sanctions” (1979) 92 Harv. L. Rev.1227 at 1231 [hereinafter Harvard Note]; J.C.
Coffee, “‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick’: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Cor-
porate Punishment'(1981) 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386; “Reconstructing”, supra note 28.
” See Fauconnet, supra note 1 at 334-35.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
responsibility is that of associations, corporations, foundations, unions and other per-
sonnes morales’2 –
entities which have a conscience, a personality and a will distinct
from that of their members. Fauconnet continues:
Et comme … les associations de toute nature ont repris dans les soci6s con-
temporaines un r6le important, il est de plus en plus ncessaire de reconnaitre,
comme contre-partie a la libertj et aux droits toujours plus 4tendus que nous
leur accordons, leur responsabilit6 p6nale.”
Thus, as corporations are capable of exercising rights and benefiting from an ever-
increasing number of entitlements granted to them by society, the natural corollary is
that they are equally capable of assuming responsibility for criminal acts. However,
Fauconnet is careful to note that this recognition of corporate criminal responsibility is
not a return to more ancient times, when collective responsibility took the form of a vi-
carious liability for the acts of other family members. Collective responsibility should
fall squarely on the entity itself and not the individuals which compose it.”
A more modem echo of the view that corporate responsibility is a counterweight
to the rights accorded to them is the opinion of Chief Justice Lamer of the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group:’
In my opinion, when the criminal law is applied to a corporation, it loses much
of its “criminal” nature and becomes, in essence, a “vigorous” form of adminis-
trative law. With the possibility of imprisonment removed, and the stigma
which attaches to conviction effectively reduced to a loss of money, the corpo-
ration is in a completely different situation than is an individual. While it might
be argued that in closely held corporations, where there are only two or three
shareholders who themselves manage the company, the stigma which attaches
to the corporation will carry over to those individuals and will, therefore, affect
human interests, it is my view that this consideration should not alter the
analysis. The corporate form of business organization is chosen by individuals
because of its numerous advantages (legal and otherwise). Those who cloak
themselves in the corporate veil and who rely on the legal distinction between
themselves and the corporate entity when it is to their benefit to do so, should
not be allowed to deny this distinction in these circumstances (where the dis-
tinction is not to their benefit).”
While this passage clearly reflects the paucity of corporate sanctions available and
the corresponding impact it has on perceptions of the gravity of corporate responsibil-
ity as compared to individual responsibility, there is nothing unfair about imposing
corporate criminal liability. In fact, Lamer C.J.C. underlines the reality that corpora-
2 Personne morale is the French term for a non-natural person who nonetheless possesses legal
personality.
” Fauconnet, supra note 1 at 339-40 [emphasis added]. The author’s translation is: “And as … as-
sociations of all types have taken on an important role in contemporary society, it is increasingly nec-
essary to recognize, as a counterweight to the liberty and the ever-expanding rights we grant to them,
their criminal responsibility.”
See ibid. at 340-41.
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 161-
6 ibiM at 182-83 [italics added].
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
tions exist largely for the convenience and benefit of those who constitute them.
Moreover, corporations are legal actors who can and do enjoy a full panapoly of rights
in the same way as individuals. As such, it is only natural that they bear the conse-
quences of participation in the legal and social order upon which society is based in the
form of responsibility for wrongful and harmful actions.
Additional support for this justification of corporate liability can be found in the
Law Reform Commission of Canada’s Working Paper Criminal Responsibility for
Group Action.” While it recognizes that corporations provide benefits to society, they
can and do produce significant harms. It views group liability principally as a means of
controlling the influence groups can have on society through the anonymous use of
power. The control of such groups is needed to prevent them from asserting their val-
ues and interests to the detriment of those less powerful groups and individuals.
While the goals of many of our corporations – profit and growth –
spur im-
portant advances in the technologies of production and marketing benefiting
the Canadian consumer, decisions made in the course of this development have
detrimental influences as well. In some cases these are felt by society generally,
for example resource depletion and environmental pollution; in others they are
felt by individuals –
for example, injuries caused by faulty production or mar-
keting standards. The fact that many corporations come into contact with large
numbers of people increases the risk of detriment flowing from corporate ac-
tion. ….
As a society we face the difficult problem of coping with the detrimental ef-
fects of corporate activities …
There is … a need for exerting controls over corporate processes and for de-
veloping policies that will keep the interests of corporations in line with public
interest considerations.”
On the Commission’s reasoning, it is legitimate to impose liability upon corpora-
tions for the detriment they cause, as a consequence of the license granted to them by
society to pursue their own goals and interests. As society usually bears the impact of
corporate harm, it is natural that the limits of lawful corporate action are set where
harm to others begins.
as opposed to an individually-based one –
The Commission also enumerates specific justifications for a corporate criminal li-
ability –
three of which are relevant to this
section. The first is that individual responsibility focuses on isolated acts, thereby fail-
ing to consider the impact of the system in use in the corporation upon the commission
of the offence. The second underlines that some offences simply have more meaning
when analyzed as a collective effort, which can reflect the pressures and procedures in-
volved in corporate decision-making better than the conduct of one individual. A third
justification is efficiency. The Commission favours directing efforts at making corpo-
“Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Responsibility for Group Action (Working Paper
No. 16) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1976) [hereinafter L.R.C.C.]. The observa-
tions of the Commission, although made two decades ago, are still valid today.
8 Ibid at 3-4.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
rations police themselves through internal disciplinary procedures. Thus the state
would be able to allocate its scarce resources to prosecuting only the corporation. The
resulting corporate liability would translate into internal action against individuals.’
These specific justifications for corporate liability are shared in large measure by
L.H. Leigh.” Like the Law Commission, he sees corporate liability as a means of trans-
ferring a police function from the community at large to persons and entities active in
industry. He adds that corporate liability avoids difficulties in identifying or locating an
individual offender, as well as locating evidence relevant to particular individuals.
Moreover, it offers a convenient and fair alternative to the conviction of a mere agent
of the corporation, or its top management, whose acts may be the result of corporate
pressures or policies’
However, Leigh’s strongest justification – what he calls fairness and social jus-
tice –
links back to Fauconnet’s original justification. Leigh states that “it is important
that the public realize that powerful entities are not above the law.” Here again is the
argument that corporations, as participants in society, must accept and abide by societal
rules like all other persons. The attraction of such a basis for liability is that it is rooted
in fairness and has the advantage of providing a close analogy with the situation of
natural persons. The principal defect in such reasoning, however, is that it assumes that
rights and obligations are correlative. Although in an ideal world this might be the
case, it is a feature of the Anglo-American and continental systems that not all bearers
of rights are also bearers of responsibilities.” The capacity to be responsible does not
flow from the mere possession of rights, but requires a recognition by the law of an
ability to act.
9 See ibid at 30-32. It is clear that the use of corporate liability in this way depends on the ability of
judges and courts to set fines at values which induce the corporation to conduct an internal investiga-
tion and to follow up with effective enforcement. Determining appropriate sentences and enforcing
them are crucial elements in any system of corporate criminal liability. While it is beyond the scope of
this article to discuss these issues in any detail, there is literature on the subject. A fine example is B.
Fisse & J. Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993) in which they develop a corporate accountability model which seeks, inter alia, to shift
the responsibility for investigations of individual responsibility onto the corporation in situations
where the complexity of the corporation or the crime involved renders it fruitless for the prosecution
to do so. In the final chapter, they address the question of how to ensure under such a model that cor-
porations would, in fact, follow through with required internal investigations. Under their model,
three means of enforcement would be employed: imposing sanctions, such as punitive injunctions
and adverse publicity orders for failure to undertake internal disciplinary action against responsible
individuals, working with top and middle management to ensure that compliance is taken seriously
and providing courts with the power to impose monitoring and supervisory controls on the corpora-
tion (ibid at 160-61).
90 L.H. Leigh, ‘The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups” (1977) 9 Ottawa L. Rev.
247.
9′ See ibid at 287.
92 Ibid
9′ See Part L.A., above.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
If one assumes that the justifications enumerated above are intended to apply only
to those types of corporations and organizations that already qualify as intentional ac-
tors, this difficulty is overcome. Although it may appear that this reverses the analysis,
an examination of the situation of individuals demonstrates that it is appropriate to pro-
ceed in this way. Justifications for individual criminal liability are premised upon the
notion of a human being who possesses certain characteristics independent of the law,
the most important of these being autonomy and rationality. Similarly, corporations,
although formally brought into existence by legal rules of incorporation, also have at-
tributes unrelated to these normative rules. These are the intemal decision-making
structures and rules of recognition by which the efforts of numerous individuals be-
come corporate policy and corporate acts. On such a basis, both individuals and corpo-
rations already possess the ability to make choices about their behaviour before the law
imposes liability upon them. Thus, justifications for imposing liability necessarily fol-
low the identification of the intentional actor in question, be it human or corporate.
The enumeration of the justifications for corporate liability indicates that it lies
upon a sound basis. The overarching principle governing the imposition of liability is
that corporations participate in and benefit from society. As intentional actors capable
of making rational decisions, they should be expected to assume their share of respon-
sibility for wrongs caused by these decisions which affect others or society as a whole.
Nonetheless, this general principle does not dictate a specific form of corporate liabil-
ity. It simply asserts that corporate wrongdoing should attract liability. In order to argue
that the corporation itself, and not the individuals who compose it, should be held li-
able, one must consider justifications of a more practical order, as described by the
Law Reform Commission and Leigh. These underline the fact that an imposition of li-
ability upon the corporation itself is necessary in certain circumstances because of the
nature of corporate criminality. The importance of the corporate basis for liability will
be discussed in greater detail in the next section.
Now that the basis for imposing corporate liability has been both established and
justified, it is necessary to examine the impact corporate liability has upon the evalua-
tion of the constituent elements of a criminal offence: the actus reus and the mens rea.
The following section will consider what circumstances transform the potential liability
of intentional actors into actual responsibility based on the combination of a particular
act, omission or state of affairs with a degree of fault.
II. The Conditions for Liability
From the starting premise that all adult human beings are responsible for the con-
sequences of their actions, the traditional criminal law then moves to a consideration of
the circumstances which may generate liability in a specific case, commonly referred
to as the general part of the criminal law. It divides the preconditions to individual
criminal liability into three elements: act requirements, fault requirements and de-
fences’ The consideration of corporate liability in this framework highlights the com-
” See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Law – The General Part: Liability and De-
fences (Working Paper No. 29) (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services, 1982) at 24 (describing the
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
plexities of defining corporate criminal conduct, as well as indentifying when it occurs
in a given case. While the focus of discussion is, of course, corporate liability, some of
the criticisms leveled at the conditions for individual liability are more general in na-
ture and go beyond the corporate context.”
A. Act Requirements
Act requirements can be referred to as the conduct element of criminal liability. In
the general criminal law, they are principally concerned with the need to protect indi-
vidual autonomy against unduly intrusive state action.’ They set the parameters within
which the action (or inaction) of an individual may attract criminal liability. Act re-
quirements can be divided into four parts: the notion of an act, voluntariness, causation
and justifications?
Fauconnet also considers the conduct element of criminal liability when discussing
the situations which generate liability, which he refers to as la thiorie de I’infraction.”
The elements of this theory are similar to the above division, although they are ex-
pressed in different terms. First, there must be an external act or material element to an
infractioi: in other words, there are no crimes of opinion or of pure intention. Next,
this act must be the product of human activity, not of natural forces beyond control,
and attributable to an agent or to a principal actor. Finally, only a voluntary act may be
attributed to an actor”
1. The Notion of Act and the Requirement of Voluntariness
Curiously, the traditional debate surrounding the question of what constitutes an
act for the purposes of individual liability –
imposing liability for omissions upon in-
dividuals –
is not really relevant to the corporate context. This may be traced in part to
the history of the criminal liability of corporations which was first imposed for nonfea-
sance, or the failure to fulfill a positive duty.”‘ Oddly enough, it was simpler for the
commonly understood conditions for liability in Canada). This view was retained in the L.R.C.C.’s
subsequent report, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal Law (Report 30), vol.
I (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986) [hereinafter Recodifying Criminal Law]. See also:
D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 3d ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1995). The British
criminal law divides the conditions for liability in a similar fashion. Ashworth, supra note 4 at 78-79,
describes them as act requirements, positive fault requirements and negative fault requirements.
“Wells makes a similar observation in Corporations, supra note 6 at 62.
“See Stuart, supra note 94 at 71-72.
“This
is Ashworth’s division, supra note 4 at 78-126. 1 prefer its more general terms to those of
Stuart, ibid at 74, who leaves out justifications and describes conduct as follows: “an act must, in
addition to coming within the precise offence definition, be an act (1) of commission, or, (2) in certain
cases only, of omission, (3) by a human being, and, (4) that is voluntary, and (5) if consequences are
part of the definition, have caused those consequences.”
93 Fauconnet, supra note 1 at 92. A literal translation is: the theory of infractions.
See ibid at 91-93.
“‘See Corporations, supra note 6 at 97-100; French, supra note 3 at 174-75; Leigh, supra note 90
at 249-50.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
courts to determine when a collective entity had failed to do something than it was to
determine when the same entity had actually done something. While corporate omis-
sions must still respect the requirement of fair notice, this is often accomplished
through the use of the notion of a “sphere of risk” within which the corporation oper-
ates.'”‘ On this basis, corporations, because they function within a regulated environ-
ment to begin with, have to accept the imposition of certain duties as a consequence of
the privilege of doing business. Only those duties which fall outside this sphere can
give rise to the argument that the corporation was not given fair notice.
More problematic is finding corporations liable for dangerous or risky states of af-
fairs where the realization of the risk has yet to occur. Particularly where the risky
situation is the product of diverse factors, it will be difficult to identify the existence of
the state of affairs without a harmful result. Fauconnet has suggested that these situa-
tions are somewhat analogous to attempts to establish when the line has been crossed
between preparatory acts and the execution of the crime. His discussion of more
primitive societies, which punish only acts without regard to the subjective state of the
actor, points to a possible solution –
rendering the existence of the risky state of af-
fairs an offence in and of itself.”4 Certainly in the case of corporations which create
situations of risk through positive actions or inaction, this approach has its attractions.
This view is shared by others, particularly Wells, who finds that our current conception
of risk is too restrictive to catch much corporate criminality, and that attitudes about
what constitutes criminal behaviour delays intervention in corporate activity to after the
occurrence of substantial harm.”3 This point will be discussed in further detail in the
sections on causation and intention.
The most difficult question of all, however, is the determination of positive corpo-
rate action. This can be attributed in part to the fact that corporations can only act
through their agents. As a result, there is a tendency to reduce the acts of the corpora-
tion into the acts of its agents who physically and mentally participated in the act. Even
if it is accepted that some actions by the agents of a corporation constitute corporate
action, the issue arises of which of these can be attributed to the corporation. As has
been discussed earlier, French” and Wells” argue that it is those actions which em-
” See Ashworth, supra note 4 at 138-39. In Canada, there is judicial language endorsing a distinc-
tion between the fair notice requirements needed for regulatory and “real” crimes for the purposes of
evaluating the vagueness of a statutory offence: R. v. Wholesale Travel Group, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154,
84 D.L.R. (4th) 161, Cory J.; 143471 Canada Inc. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 339, 167 N.R.
321, Cory J.; Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, 125 D.L.R. (4th) 385, Gonthier
J. (reference to the existence of the justification at 1077). One of the justifications for this lower stan-
dard of Charter scrutiny in regulatory crimes is the “licensing justification” which essentially states
that persons entering into the regulated field should be held liable for the harms they cause because
they are best able to control its occurrence. For another view, see Stuart, supra note 94 at 172-73,
587-88, who is unpersuaded by this line of reasoning, especially as regulatory crimes can be commit-
ted by persons as well as corporations.
‘ Fauconnet, supra note I at 99-101.
Corporations, supra note 6 at 72-73.
0 French, supra note 3 at 41-47.
Corporations, supra note 6 at 133-34.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
body corporate policy and are decided pursuant to corporate rules of procedure which
are corporate acts. It should be noted, however, that under this model of responsibility,
the intentions of the agents involved in the act are not relevant to the determination of
the “corporateness” of the act.”7 Agents who act in accordance with corporate policy
but for their own non-corporate reasons (such as the desire for promotion) still act for
the corporation. Furthermore, illegal acts committed by agents which are either tacitly
condoned or actively ratified after discovery by the corporation are also imputable to
it.’07
It is important at this stage to remember the distinction between the terms
“corporate intentionality” and “corporate intention”, which can be confused when dis-
cussing corporate acts. The first can be described as the source of the capacity of a cor-
poration to be accountable –
that it has the ability to act in a way which attracts liabil-
ity. The second corresponds to the presence of the mental element relevant to a given
offence. Bearing this in mind, it is an interesting feature of the definition of a corporate
act that it ensures a perfect overlap of corporate intentionality and action. Unlike hu-
man actors, who can involuntarily produce an external act through uncontrolled body
movements,”7 a corporation has no way of acting without a certain deliberateness. A
corporate act can always attract liability because it cannot occur without the existence
of a rational decision to act on the part of the corporation. Even where the corporation
is imputed with responsibility for the illegal acts of its agents, these must have been
either condoned tacitly or ratified. Both cases involve a conscious decision based on
knowledge of the illegal activity. Thus, in one fell swoop, it seems the problem of vol-
untariness is subsumed by the question of the existence of corporate action.
The principal criticism of this definition of corporate act is that is it difficult to
prove when an act has been done in furtherance of corporate policy. The current alter-
natives, however, are corporate liability predicated on the individual liability of high-
ranking officers and managers, and vicarious liability. Neither one is a satisfactory ba-
sis upon which to assess all types of corporate criminal liability. The individualist ap-
proach requires at least one identifiable human actor in order to attribute fault to the
corporation. Such an approach cannot accommodate the situation where corporate
harm is caused by system failure or a cumulation of various faults by many agents of
the corporation, neither of which are sufficient to sustain an individual attribution of
blame. Vicarious liability is limited use because it holds the corporation liable for acts
of agents without regard to questions of fault.
Fisse has developed a statutory model for corporate liability which attempts to go
beyond individually-based and vicarious liability and proposes a means of integrating
the concept of organizational blameworthiness into the definition of an offence.”
However, he achieves this by creating a concept of corporate fault which reflects or-
0 See “Allocation of Responsibility”, supra note 9 at 483-84.
“0 7 See ibid. at 484.
,o For a discussion of the different types of automatism, see generally: Stuart, supra note 94 at
101-17; Ashworth, supra note 4 at 93-99.
” “Attribution of Criminal Liability”, supra note 58 at 277-78.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
ganizational blameworthiness, and by restricting the conduct element of a corporate of-
fence to the commission of the external elements of the offence by a person for whose
conduct the corporation is vicariously liable.”‘ This approach suggests that in order to
develop a workable framework for corporate liability, it is not necessary, and perhaps
not desirable, to include a concept of corporate action, as distinct from the notion of
corporate intention in the elements of an offence. What is important is that corporate
blameworthiness is part of the offence.
Certainly, there are practical advantages to reducing the actus reus component of
the offence to proof of an external act committed by an agent of the corporation. How-
ever, theoretically, such a view dissolves the division between the conduct and mental
elements of an offence. The consequence is that for a corporation to be liable on a cor-
porate basis, corporate fault will always be required. It might seem this is simply a de-
bate of terminology where the end result will be the same, irrespective of the approach.
Nonetheless, there is a need to recognize a corporate act, as distinct from corporate in-
tention. The fact that corporations act of necessity with a certain intentionality does not
change the fact that they do act. Moreover, limiting potential criminal conduct to that
which can be committed by an individual or a group of individuals is unduly restric-
tive. This is particularly true where an offence is drafted with a reduced level of fault,
such as strict liability or even a no-fault standard. Conviction of a corporation on the
basis of corporate rather than individual action reduces the power of charges of unfair-
ness traditionally leveled at lower-level fault offences. No-fault offences would be
transformed from vicarious liability into direct liability for behaviour over which, by
definition, the corporation must have had control.
The example of an eventual liability of corporations for risky states of affairs dem-
onstrates the problems of casting corporate action into an individual mold. Where it is
corporate policy itself or the structure of the corporation which creates risk, the link
between the individuals who physically or mentally contributed to the policies or the
state of affairs becomes quite tenuous. It is simpler to qualify the existence of the pol-
icy, without regard to which agent or agents created it, as a corporate act. This does not
mean liability should flow immediately from such a qualification; a consideration of
corporate intention may be required, but it does avoid a complicated process of attribu-
tion of cumulative or truly collective activity to specific agents in the corporation. This
process of attribution of an act to an agent –
should be considered.
causation –
2. Causation
Once an act, omission or state of affairs has been found to exist and is voluntary,
then the question arises of the attribution of the voluntary act to a responsible actor.”‘
However, scholars have noted that the principles governing causation in the criminal
law are far from coherent.”2 Nonetheless, the factual “but for” causal link is not usually
a problem in the criminal law: “The principle of individual autonomy presumes that,
“o Ibid at 280-82.
” See Ashworth, supra note 4 at 99.
” See ibid. at 99-100; Corporations, supra note 6 at 43; Stuart, supra note 94 at 120.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
where an individual who is neither mentally disordered nor an infant has made a suffi-
cient causal contribution to an occurrence, it is inappropriate to trace the causation any
further.” . It is the notion of legal causation which is more problematic. The concerns
in individual liability thus lie with those cases where other factors, such as obvious
culpability or intervening acts, are used to determine whether the attribution of the act
to an actor on the standard “but for” factual test is appropriate.'”4
For Wells, causation is inextricably linked to blame. She views the exercise of
blaming as the assertion of a causal link between an actor and an event Moreover she
believes that legal causation is a non-issue:
There is a deep tension between the needs of the legal system to name an indi-
vidual, whether in a civil or criminal action, and the multiplicity of causes of
any event. Causation illustrates well the argument that legal doctrine owes its
existence to and is therefore dependent on a constellation of a wide range of
factors. The inevitable result is that legal principles are blurred and often irrec-
oncilable. I have called legal causation a non-issue to emphasize the futility of
the traditional search for separate principles by which to impute cause beyond
the factual “but for” level. This of course does not mean that any “but for”
contribution must lead to a legal attribution, but that taking any steps beyond
“but for” means entering a complex terrain of responsibility attribution which
is connected to issues which lie beyond those of cause. Whether a result was
the sine qua non of the defendant’s act is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for imputing cause.”5
From this conception of causation, it becomes relevant to consider why blame is
attributed to certain actors and not to others. As Wells observes, “[m]any of the deci-
sions which establish which causal actor to pursue are made at a broad cultural
level.'”” Moreover, she argues that whether any causal link exists between an actor and
an event depends largely on cultural attitudes toward risk, and the qualification of
events as avoidable or unavoidable, natural or man-made.”‘
The relevance of these observations on causation to corporate liability can be seen
in two areas. First, the traditional approach to causation, which seeks a human actor
causally connected to the event, limits the inquiry into the range of potentially blame-
worthy actors. As corporate action is often an amalgamation of factors, the traditional
criminal law will tend to overlook this multiplicity of causes and concentrate on identi-
fying human actors. Not only does this individualize legal causation, it also ignores that
a combination of several individual acts can result in the event without any of them
alone being sufficiently causally connected to ground individual liability.
“. Ashworth, ibid. at 100. See also Stuart, ibid at 128-29.
“‘See Ashworth, ibid. at 103; Corporations, supra note 6 at 43-44.
” Corporations, supra note 6 at 43. Stuart, supra note 94 at 130, has expressed a similar view with
regard to the notion of “imputable cause” (his term for legal causation): “mhe question is then,
‘given that the accused’s conduct was at least a cause of the consequence, is he criminally responsible
for causing it’? This is not a scientific inquiry, rather one of fixing moral blame similar to, but distin-
guishable from, the moral inquiry involving the requirement of fault.”
“6 Corporations, ibid at 49.
117 Ibid
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
An absurd illustration of this point is found in the Sheen Report,'” published fol-
lowing an inquiry into the causes of the capsizing of the Herald of the Free Enterprise.
In the report, several employees were found to have contributed to the factual events
causing the capsize itself. However, the individual responsibility that could attach to
any one of them was problematic because it was the cumulation of their errors which
actually allowed the disaster to occur. Moreover, the acts of some of the employees
were a consequence of corporate policy.”‘ The company itself was eventually indicted
for manslaughter (although not convicted), but the corollary was to proceed against all
the individuals named in the Report. Such an approach reinforces the view that it is the
human element in causation which is the primary concern.
In the coporate context, a more appropriate use of causation principles would op-
erate in tandem with the notion of a corporate act described above. In this way, causal
connections could be based upon collective activities or multiple factors, without the
need to identify the individual causal connections of each constituent element of the
collective act. This better reflects the view that a corporate actor has an existence which
transcends that of its individual members and thus that events may be causally con-
nected to it directly, as a separate entity. Moreover, it avoids the problematic attribution
of blame for collective acts upon individuals who may constitute only a partial or indi-
rect factual cause of the event.
The second point to be raised concerning causation in the corporate context is
more abstract. It concerns the societal qualification of when certain actions should at-
tract blame. As corporate crime often involves activities which are not traditionally
considered avoidable or which are culturally accepted as part of an industrialist society,
it obscures the establishment of a causal link between harm caused and the corporate
actor because there is no perceived need to attribute blame at all. Fisse describes crimi-
nally proscribed harm as unwanted, in the sense that “[t]he infliction of criminal harm
is unwanted even if the victim receives full compensation.”” While he argues that cor-
porate crime is also unwanted, his observation goes to the public perception of the se-
riousness of corporate actions which are already criminalized. In particular, he is refer-
ring to the qualification of regulatory and strict liability offences as less serious than
classical crimes. As corporate crime tends to be more regulatory in nature, this fuels a
belief that corporate crime is less blameworthy than “real” crime.
However, Fisse’s comment does not consider those corporate actions which may
fail to be considered crimes at the outset. This issue has been discussed by Wells, who
notes that there is an “increasing trend towards blaming corporations for harms which
in earlier times would have been attributed to individual fault or fate.'”‘ More impor-
tantly, she stresses that responsibility and blame attribution are not confined to individ-
‘ Department of Transport, MV Herald of Free Enterprise: Report of the Court No. 8074 (U.K.
Department of Transport, 1987) [the Sheen Report].
“‘See Corporations, supra note 6 at 48.
‘2 “Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at 1150.
C. Wells, “Corporations: Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability” [1993] Crim. L. Rev. 551 at 553
[hereinafter “Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability”].
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
ual moral positions. Qualifications of harm and the expected response to them are
functions of the type of social system in which they arise.’22
Wells identifies a particular difficulty in attributing blame to corporations related to
the current legal conception of risk.” Although this notion plays a more significant role
in the assessment of the mental element in negligence and recklessness offences, it also
informs our conception of causation. In essence, to view a result as the materialization
of a risk is in some way a recognition that the event was foreseeable (whether rea-
sonably or not) and even preventable.’ This is a first step toward treating the event as
the result of a failure of foresight, a failure for which society may then require an attri-
bution of blame. Thus, as the concept of risk is widened, so is the ability to trace a
causal link between the harm caused by the materialization of the risk and a responsi-
ble actor. A further discussion of the nature of risk shall be presented in the section on
mental states.
3. Justifications
For those who subscribe to the theoretical dichotomy between justification and ex-
cuse, the effect of a justification is that “society regards the citizen’s conduct as right on
that occasion.”‘”3 Normally, justifications are rooted in arguments of individual auton-
omy, which allow a person to inflict harm to prevent a greater harm from materializing.
It is clear that such considerations do not apply to corporations as they cannot be sub-
jected to such serious acts as loss of life or grievous bodily harm. A discussion of cor-
porate defences to liability naturally flows from an examination of corporate fault.
B. Fault Requirements
It is this final step in imposing liability that has posed the greatest obstacle to a
separate corporate liability. The individualist bias in criminal law can be seen at its
strongest here, where the notion of corporate fault has been restricted in practice to the
Criminal Liability”, ibid at 553-558.
‘ See ibid.
‘3 Wells discusses this in detail in Corporations, supra note 6 at 68-75 and in “Culture, Risk and
,24 See “Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability”, supra note 121 at 556.
12 Ashworth, supra note 4 at 113. The dichotomy between justification and excuse was discussed
by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Perka, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 1. Even though
the Court split over how to classify the defence of necessity, both Dickson J. and Wilson J. recognized
the theoretical distinction between justification and excuse. Dickson J., writing for the majority, ex-
pressed it as follows:
Criminal theory recognizes a distinction between “justifications” and “excuses”. A
“justification” challenges the wrongfulness of an action which technically constitutes a
crime. … For such actions people are often praised, as motivated by some great or no-
ble object. The concept of punishment often seems incompatible with the social ap-
proval bestowed on the doer. In contrast, an “excuse” concedes the wrongfulness of the
action but asserts that the circumstances under which it was done are such that it ought
not to be attributed to the actor (ibid. at 246).
But see Stuart, supra note 94 at 421-23, arguing that the distinction is of questionable value.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL/REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
fault of certain high-ranking persons within the corporation. This approach, called the
identification or alter ego doctrine, denies the existence of fault on the part of the cor-
poration without the presence of fault by an individual.’26 It will be demonstrated that a
distinct form of corporate fault, based upon the independent corporate identity dis-
cussed earlier, is an important complement to current theories of criminal responsibil-
ity.
Any discussion of corporate fault must cut across the spectrum of degrees of fault,
and find the basis upon which corporations can fulfill the mental elements of an of-
fence. Corporate fault will be examined generally before its various forms and relevant
defences are considered. Moreover, reference will be made to the current system, in
order to highlight its limitations, and to new proposals, which seek to address them.
It is clear that fault requirements are also the subject of much discussion in the in-
dividual context. In particular, the disagreement over the proper qualification of regula-
tory crimes, the differing perceptions of strict and absolute liability offences, as well as
the subtleties of defining recklessness, raise important issues for the criminal law gen-
erally. While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss them in any detail, these is-
sues are interwoven into the corporate liability debate, and shall be examined as they
relate to it.
1. The Notion of Corporate Fault
The four principles under which fault is ascribed to persons –
accountability, fair
opportunity, answerability, and justification or excuse'”‘ –
help to explain why ascrip-
tion of fault to corporations has been problematic. These principles underlie the doc-
trine of mens rea, which Ashworth describes as follows: “criminal liability should be
imposed only on persons who are sufficiently aware of what they are doing, and of the
consequences it might have, [such] that they can fairly be said to have chosen the be-
haviour and its consequences.”” The notion of individual choice, therefore, animates
the understanding of when it is appropriate to ascribe fault for behaviour. The impact
of this concern for preserving individual liberty has been a focus of subjective fault, in
other words, the fault of the individual offender. Only where a defendant has intended
or knowingly risked the consequences can responsibility be ascribed.’9 Added to the
mens rea principle are the belief principle and the principle of correspondence. The
“‘ For an historical overview and discussion of the doctrine, see generally: Corporations, supra
note 6 at 103-111; French, supra note 3 at 181-86; Leigh, supra note 90 at 251-64.
See Corporations, supra note 6 at 62.
‘Ashworth,
supra note 4 at 128 [emphasis in original]. See also: Stuart, supra note 94 at 141:
“There is indeed a fundamental principle underlying the mens rea concept: in criminal law there
should normally be no responsibility without personal fault. … Criminal responsibility without per-
sonal fault removes the choice of lawful behaviour”; Recodifying Criminal Law, supra note 94 at 18:
“a person is not liable for his conduct unless he has some fault or blameworthiness.” Both Stuart and
the L.R.C.C. correctly note, however, that nens rea is a confusing term because of its dual meaning:
first, as a general expression of fault and second, as a degree of fault involving knowledge, intention
or recklessness. In this article, the term nens rea is used in the former sense.
‘. See Ashworth, ibid at 129; Stuart, ibid. note 94 at 146-48.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
former ensures that criminal liability is based upon the consequences the defendant be-
lieved, at the time, would result from it. The principle of correspondence requires that
the fault element of a crime correspond to the conduct element of the crime.'”
As has been stated earlier in this article, concerns of individual autonomy and lib-
erty are not relevant to corporations. Nonetheless, the prevailing opinion among advo-
cates of corporate liability is that criminal liability should be ascribed to corporations
on the basis of some form of fault. Therefore, the first step is to develop a notion of
fault which takes into consideration the nature of corporate entities and thus reflects
corporate blameworthiness.
Fisse describes three theories of corporate mens rea: managerial, composite and
strategic.3′ The first corresponds to the identification doctrine used by courts in both
England and Canada.’32 Taken strictly, it stands for the proposition that a corporation
should only be held personally liable for the acts and intentions of those to whom the
primary management of its affairs has been attributed in the constitutional documents
of incorporation.’3 Generally, this limits the ambit of responsibility to members of the
board of directors, the managing director or the general meeting, although these fixed
categories are increasingly flexible. The inevitable result, as some authors have
noted,3’ is that this model is not well-suited to the realities of large corporations where
the decentralization of decision-making results in decisions of consequence being
made by middle managers. Moreover, even if a more nuanced approach of identifying
the will and mind of the corporation were used, such as one which distinguished be-
tween those persons who are in fact responsible for corporate policy as opposed to
those who merely carry it out, the decentralization of decision-making makes it diffi-
cult to distinguish clearly between the two groups.’33
The greater difficulty with the doctrine, however, is that liability is predicated upon
the existence of at least one human actor possessing the requisite mental state for the
offence from within the limited class described above. If no one person can be imputed
with the mental element of the offence, the prosecution fails. The result is that system
failures and objectionable corporate policies which cause harm are left outside of the
scope of criminal responsibility.’6
The second type of mens rea reflects an attempt to correct this situation. As the
name suggests, composite mens rea is based on the knowledge of various persons
within the corporation. It is premised upon the idea that the collective knowledge of all
‘3 See Ashworth, ibid. at 129-30; Stuart, ibid at 327-31.
‘3, “Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at 1186.
‘ The seminal cases are: in the U.K., Tesco Ltd v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153; in Canada, Canadian
Dredge, supra note 60. However, Stuart, supra note 94 at 579, notes that in Canada the identification
doctrine has been interpreted more flexibly than in the U.K.
. See Leigh, supra note 90 at 254. Nonetheless, the question of the precise level of manager who
constitutes a “directing will and mind” is not definitively settled in Canada, see Stuart, supra note 94.
“4See
Stuart, ibid at 580.
t See “Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at 1188.
‘ See Corporations, supra note 6 at 132-33.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
the employees of a corporation is imputable to it. Nevertheless Fisse is critical of the
theory as it does not, in his mind, bear any connection to corporate blameworthiness:
“composite mens rea is a mechanical concept of mental state that fails to reflect true
corporate fault; discrete items of information within an organization do not add up to
corporate mens rea unless there is an organizational mens rea in failing to heed
them.”.. 7 However, Fisse’s criticism should be limited to only those cases where com-
posite mens rea is understood to mean disparate and unconnected knowledge within
the corporation. As Wells has pointed out, some of the objections to aggregation relate
more to a failure to define culpability criteria in a manner which can be intelligently
applied to corporations, rather than to the notion of aggregation itself.’8 This point will
be discussed in further detail below.
The most radical conception of mens rea, however, is that which Fisse calls stra-
tegic. This is mens rea manifested through corporate structures and policies. Such a
view clearly conforms with the emerging understanding of how a significant number
of corporations operate.’3 Organization theory emphasizes that corporations have an
existence which transcends those of its employees, directors, agents and original incor-
porators. Moreover, corporate decisions are the result of procedures and internal bar-
gaining processes which cannot be traced back to the individuals who contributed to
them. Strategic mens rea therefore reflects the truly corporate nature of the acts of cor-
porations.
It is conceptually appropriate to develop a notion of corporate fault which, like the
corporation itself, is dependent on no single person, but which is also distinct from any
individual. The nuance is significant because it means the concept is more discerning
and precise than aggregation. Thus discrete pieces of information or knowledge cannot
be added together and imputed to the corporation unless they have been subsumed into
the body of corporate knowledge through internal procedures and communication.
Only those types of fault which are the product of corporate mens rea can result in
corporate liability.
Strategic mens rea does leave one conceptual difficulty to be resolved. As corpo-
rate acts are only those animated by corporate policy, it would appear that all corporate
acts are intentional to begin with. As a result, it should be questioned whether the con-
duct element of an offence can only be qualified as corporate before corporate inten-
tion is established. This is possible as examining corporate policy enables a distinction
to be made between an act of the corporation and an act committed within the personal
capacity of an agent. It is conceded that in practice such a distinction may be difficult
to sustain. Nonetheless, it is possible that the level of intention required to identify the
act with the corporation is less than that required for the mental element of a particular
offence. However, this would only have a practical consequence where the corporation
is indicted for an offence with several variants based on differing degrees of fault while
“Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at 1189-90.
“‘ Corporations, supra note 6 at 133.
“‘. See Part I.B., above, on the nature of corporations.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
always requiring the same conduct element, or where no fault element is required.'” Of
course, it may also be argued that the attribution of the conduct to the corporation is
achieved solely by the establishment of whatever level of intention is required in a
given case.
The latter approach is the one preferred by Fisse. In his proposed statutory model
of corporate fault, he broadly defines the conduct element as the commission of the
external elements of the offence by a person for whose conduct the corporation is vi-
cariously liable.”‘ While this seems to cast the net of potential liability over a broad
range of activities, the fault element of the model is designed to attract only those cases
that embody corporate blameworthiness.
Without describing Fisse’s model in detail, it is important to mention his proposal
for a new form of fault which will overcome practical difficulties in proving strategic
mens rea.” As he states:
Although strategic mens rea is a genuinely corporate concept of mental state,
requiring the prosecution to establish a criminal corporate policy at or before
the time that the actus reus of an offense is committed would make corporate
mens rea extremely difficult to prove. Corporations almost never endorse
criminal behaviour by express policy, and boilerplate anticrime policy direc-
tives may make it very difficult to establish the existence of implied criminal
policies. The difficulty in proving strategic mens rea, however, may be signifi-
cantly reduced if the requisite criminal mens rea need not be shown to have
existed at or before the time of the actus reus of the offense. If the corporate de-
fendant is given a reasonable opportunity to formulate a legal compliance pol-
icy after the actus reus of an offense is brought to the attention of the policy-
making officials, the corporation’s fault can be assessed on the basis of its pres-
ent reactions rather than its previously designed formal policy directives.”3
A similar basis for responsibility is described by French, which he calls the principle of
responsive adjustment (“PRA”). In his view, this expression captures the notion that
the “causally responsible party for an untoward event should adopt specific courses for
future action calculated to prevent repetitions.”‘” The principle would hold an actor
who has not made adjustments to correct a situation which has caused harm morally
responsible for that harm. However, it is important to note that PRA does not amount to
an attribution of intention for the previous act.
“o This is in reference to the no-fault offence where proof of the actus reus suffices to convict the
defendant. However, nothing prevents no-fault offences from being drafted such that it is corporate
conduct which must be proved. This would constitute a more nuanced approach to no-fault offences
than is currently the case, where proof of conduct by an agent is sufficient to attract the liability of the
corporation. It would also expand the scope of possible conduct which could be viewed as unlawful
to acts which cannot be qualified as the act of an individual agent, such as dangerous states of affairs
and system failures.
“‘ Supra note 58 at 280-81.
,,2 Ibid. at 279-80; “Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at 1191.
“4 “Reconstructing”, ibid. at 1191-92.
‘”French, supra note 3 at 156.
100
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
PRA incorporates quite another idea. It might be expressed by saying that a re-
fusal to adjust one’s harm-causing ways of behaving has a second-level effect
of associating oneself, morally speaking, with the earlier untoward event. I take
it that refusal in this context is an intentional act or acts and that refusal may
take a myriad of forms from practiced indifference to blatant repetition. The
intuition to which PRA must appeal is that a person’s past actions (even if unin-
tentional) can be and usually are taken into the scope of the intentions that mo-
tivate that person’s present and future actions….
PRA entails the idea that the intention that motivates a lack of responsive cor-
rective action (or continuance of offending behaviour) affirms, in the sense that
it loops back to retrieve the actions that caused the evil.”‘
French’s philosophical justification for PRA is interesting, but the real usefulness
of the concept is in considerably lengthening the traditional actus reus-mens rea time-
frame. While the principle of contemporaneity is not absolute,”‘ a concept of reactive
fault, as Fisse and French conceive of it, would create a new manner by which the con-
duct of corporations could be assessed.” Wells adds that an extension of the traditional
time-frame used to consider the blameworthiness of actors would have a particularly
apt application in the case of corporations creating situations of risk.”‘ Finally, in prac-
tical terms, it would be easier to identify fault on the part of the corporation through its
failure to act as a consequence of harm, than to prove the existence of a faulty policy
prior to the harm.” The notion of reactive fault shall be discussed in greater detail as it
applies to different degrees of fault later in this section.
Having established that corporate fault is best captured through a reference to cor-
porate policy and structure, types of fault should be discussed. It will be necessary to
examine not only what degrees of fault are appropriate when attributing corporate re-
sponsibility, but also how these types of fault might be reformulated to better reflect the
manner in which corporate policy is adopted and carried out.
,’ Ibid at 156-57.
‘” See Ashworth, supra note 4 at 133-34; Stuart, supra note 94 at 329-31. The classic case recog-
nizing flexibility in the principle of contemporaneity is that of Fagan v. Convnissioner of Metropoli-
tan Police, [1968] 3 All E.R. 442 (C.A.) [hereinafter Fagan]. In that case, the accused ran his car onto
a police officer’s foot accidentally but then refused to remove it immediately afterward when re-
quested to do so by the officer. The Court of Appeal held that although there had been no intent when
the act had first occurred, because the accused had kept the car on the police officer’s foot, the re-
quired intent could be “superimposed on an existing act” (ibid. at 445). The Supreme Court of Can-
ada considered the Fagan approach in R. v. Cooper, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 146, 146 N.R. 367. In that case,
the accused grabbed the victim around the neck and shook her, but he lost consciousness before she
died some 30 seconds to 2 minutes later. It was held that the mens rea for murder had been estab-
lished. Cory J., writing for the majority, noted at 157 that the principle of contemporaniety did not re-
quire that the guilty act and guilty intent be “completely concurrent.” Instead, what was required was
that the intent and the act coincided at some point, although how this would apply in an individual
case would depend on the circumstances.
“‘ “Attribution of Criminal Liability”, supra note 58 at 284-86; “Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at
1201-03; French, supra note 3 at 167-69.
Corporations, supra note 6 at 133-134.
‘4 See “Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at 1192.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
2. Types of Faultl-
a. Fault Based on an Aware State of Mind
Fault based on an aware state of mind is a general label covering several types of
fault. Despite its varied content, it is a useful shorthand to describe fault based upon a
guilty mind. Nonetheless, confusing terminology abounds (this level of fault is also
called mens rea), complicated by an artificial distinction between regulatory and truly
criminal law offences which affects the analysis and classification of intention-based
fault levels.’5’ While it is trite to note that regulatory offences often require lower levels
of fault than crimes, this distinction is not useful when speaking about levels of fault
generally.’52 The fact that certain levels of fault may be constitutionally mandated in
specific circumstances does not alter this observation.
Much of the debate about intention-based fault concerns the appropriateness of a
given level of fault for a given offence, most often in the context of a potentially sub-
stantial loss of liberty for the accused. The debate concerning subjective versus objec-
tive intent requirements is centred on the level of intent required in traditional criminal
offences where the elaboration of fault is ambiguous in the description of the individual
offence. As stated earlier, however, it is outside the scope of the present article to ad-
dress this more general problem. The focus is to examine how the corporate model of
fault would operate within the broad categories of fault recognized by the criminal law.
As a result, the description of the variants of intention-based fault shall be brief, with a
focus on the elements specifically pertinent to corporate liability instead. For simplic-
ity, comments will be divided between intention and knowledge on the one hand and
recklessness and wilful blindness’53 on the other.
i. Knowledge or Intention
Intention, or subjective intent, is the highest degree of fault. Although the criminal
law has not defined it, its meaning has not usually caused any difficulty for courts.'”
‘0 In this classification of types of fault, the divisions between them are both blurred and the object
of dispute. The original version of this article used the British classification: intention, recklessness,
negligence and strict liability (no-fault), see Ashworth, supra note 4 at 135-171. In this version, the
adopted tripartite division was laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161 [hereinafter Sault Ste.Marie cited to S.C.R.]: fault based on
an aware state of mind or mens rea (intention, knowledge, recklessness or in some cases, wilful
blindness), strict liability (fault on a simple negligence standard), and absolute liability (no fault). This
is also the terminology used by Stuart, supra note 94 at 149. Although this is the division used for
regulatory offences, a discussion of the mens rea level of fault can be broken down into the traditional
divisions used for true crimes.
,’ See Stuart, ibid. at 172-73. Stuart does not subscribe to such a distinction, but concedes that it un-
fortunately has a bearing on how fault requirements are analyzed by the courts.
‘ See ibid.
m In Canada, wilful blindness has been recognized as a separate type of intention-based fault, see
ibid. at 209-213.
‘ See ibid. at 196.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
However, when considering the full range of offences which carry criminal sanctions,
the number of offences actually requiring proof of intention is relatively low.'” Of
these, only a handful can be committed by a corporation, for example: fraud, theft, and
in some jurisdictions, manslaughter.” In light of this, Wells is critical of the traditional
approach to corporate criminal liability, which puts too much emphasis on overcoming
the difficulties of holding corporations liable for intentional crimes:
Many of the discussions of corporate accountability fail to comprehend the
broad nature of criminal culpability principles. Often the discussion assumes
that intention is the base standard. Few crimes require proof of intention, but…
even objective recklessness, if rigidly applied, can be a powerful ally of a cor-
porate defendant. Additionally, where a subjective standard is embraced, it
draws on a dualist conception of human action which can be challenged as
both mistaken and misleading.”7
Despite the fact that corporations are unlikely to be prosecuted for truly criminal
offences, an examination of ways to establish when a corporation possesses an aware
state of mind is still relevant since many public welfare offences contain express fault
requirements’58 with respect to either the circumstances or the consequences of the con-
duct involved.’9 Thus, it is important to know how a corporation exhibits the intention
and knowledge levels of fault.
At the outset, it is clear that establishing a subjective intentionality through tacit
corporate policy presents serious evidentiary difficulties. Companies cannot (and
would not) have expressly illegal purposes,”w and proving unofficial policies might be
“‘ See “Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability”, supra note 121 at 562; Stuart, ibid. at 148 (referring
to the fact that even among criminal offences considered “crimes”, as opposed to public welfare of-
fences, an increasing number require a standard of fault less than subjective intent). Stuart also ob-
serves, ibid at 187, that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates a trend where only very few
offences will be found to require subjective intent. Under current Canadian law, Charter standards re-
quire proof of subjective intent for murder, attempted murder, accessory liability to an offence consti-
tutionally requiring subjective intent, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This being said, many
offences are nonetheless drafted in a manner which requires the Crown to prove subjective intent, see
ibid. at 192-95.
‘ See e.g. C. Wells, “A Quiet Revolution in Corporate Liability for Crime” [1995] New L.J. 1326
at 1326, referring to the recent British prosecutions of manslaughter in P&O European Ferries
(Dover) Ltd (1991), 93 Cr. App. R. 72 and OLLLtd. [1994] New L.J. 1704.
‘” “Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability”, supra note 121 at 561-62 [emphasis added].
‘”These fault requirements are described using mens rea terms such as “intentional”, “wilful”, or
“committed with knowledge.” The expression “mens rea term” is borrowed from Stuart, supra note
94 at 195.
’59 The intention level of a statutory crime should not prima facie be considered different from the
intention level required for a traditional crime where similar language is used to describe the intent. It
is clear that in more regulatory-type offences the Charter may not require proof of intention
(especially where imprisonment is not available as a sanction). This does not change the fact that
other offences can be drafted as intention-based, or have variants based upon more than one level of
fault.
“0 See Leigh, supra note 90 at 258-59. This follows, by implication, from the Canada Business
Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 15 [hereinafter CBCA] which provides that “A corporation
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
difficult without the cooperation of some of the agents of the corporation. The most
promising means of establishing intention or knowledge on the part of a corporation
would be through the ratification of the illegal act of an agent, either by failure to dis-
cipline the agent, or because the actions in question are the effect of another corporate
policy. Two examples of the latter are an insistence upon certain profit levels at what-
ever cost and maintaining of working conditions which greatly increase the likelihood
of employee failure.
Such a model for corporate fault recognizes that expressions of intention by a cor-
poration will rarely be overt. Nonetheless, by using ratification as a means of attaching
fault to a corporation, the attribution of intention or knowledge rests upon a fair basis.
After all, ratification can only occur where there is knowledge of the illegal act com-
mitted by an agent, thus revealing a tacit approval –
if not encouragement – of the
conduct.
Intention-based fault for corporations does not have to be limited solely to ratifi-
cation of individual acts. In keeping with the model’s appreciation for how corporate
actions and decisions are carried out, corporations could also be faulted for corporate
policies which seek to insulate higher officials from knowledge of illegal acts. While
the purpose of such action is to institutionalize wilful blindness, the policies themselves
are not wilful blindness. They reflect an intention to prevent detection of illegal acts
where the corporation has either the knowledge or the suspicion that such acts occur
within the organization. It should be emphasized, however, that the key to liability on
this basis is the existence of the intention to shield managers from blame and not the
mere fact that managers were not informed of illegal acts. While the existence of the
latter fact might point to a lower level of fault, such as negligence, it would not be suf-
ficient for proof of intention.
In essence, attributing intention to corporations focusses principally upon the insti-
tutional circumstances which allow illegal acts to occur or which seek to actively pre-
vent knowledge of illegal acts from being recognized through normal internal decision-
making procedures. It is not clear whether the creation of a separate offence prohibiting
the deliberate structuring of decision-making channels to avoid accountability on the
part of high-ranking officials would be a more effective way of controlling intentional
corporate conduct than simply allowing proof of such structuring to be substituted for
proof of intention of the specific crime at issue. The former better respects the fairness
concerns inherent in the doctrine of fair labeling,’ while the latter would link proof of
corporate intention more closely to how many large decentralized corporations operate.
These suggestions are all rooted in the corporate policy model of fault. It is clear,
however, that such a model can and should coexist with individual liability on the part
of agents of the corporation. Concurrent individual liability ensures that the corporate
structure does not serve as a bar, either to identifying responsible actors within the cor-
poration or to prosecuting them. Moreover, as has been mentioned, this may be the best
has the capacity and, subject to the Act, the rights, powers and privileges of a natural person.” Clearly,
this capacity excludes criminal activity, as is the case with natural persons.
26! See Stuart, supra note 94 at 190-91.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
way to proceed with small corporations, as their high-ranking officials may be more di-
rectly linked to the occurrence of corporate harm than is the case in larger corporations.
Of course, determinations of individual liability, particularly for intention-based of-
fences, require all the procedural and other protections to which individuals are entitled
under the general criminal law.
ii. Recklessness and Wilful Blindness
Recklessness is the standard of fault applied in many criminal offences of which
corporations can be convicted.’2 In Canada, recklessness is generally understood to be
subjective awareness of the consequences and/or circumstances of an act.’
In other
words, it refers to the case where a defendant has foreseen the particular harm pro-
scribed and yet has gone on to take the risk.'” The key element in this type of reckless-
ness is that it is based upon a risk the defendant believed to exist. In Great Britain, a
second form a recklessness based on an objective standard is also recognized.'”
For the purpose of applying the notion of corporate fault to recklessness, it is not
necessary to venture further into the appropriateness of a subjective or objective stan-
dard of recklessness.'” As Canadian law uses a subjective standard for evaluating
criminal recklessness, this analysis shall use the same standard. Lower standards of
fault will be discussed in the section on strict liability.
Evaluating corporate recklessness requires a similar approach to that used in in-
tention-based offences, namely, an awareness that express corporate policy will rarely
be of assistance in proving fault. Thus, establishing recklessness is dependant upon the
existence of tacit policies which the corporation adopted despite a known risk that
prohibited conduct could occur as a result. While the line between recklessness and
intention can sometimes be thin, even in individual liability,’ A general distinction can
be made between corporate policy which is actively undertaken to achieve an illegal
end and corporate policy which is adopted despite a known risk that the criminal of-
6 See Corporations, supra note 6 at 68.
163 See Stuart, supra note 94 at 202-203. In the U.K., Ashworth prefers to call subjective reckless-
ness “common law recklessness”, supra note 4 at 154.
‘6 See Stuart, ibid. at 206, notes that with the exception of criminal negligence, Canadian courts use
a standard of actual foresight, subjectively determined, in order to find recklessness.
” Ashworth refers to it as “Caldwell recklessness”, based on the decision of the House of Lords in
R. v. Caldwell, [1982] A.C. 341. This type of recklessness can be defined as where the defendant
failed to give thought to an obvious risk that the harm would occur. The important element of this
type of recklessness is that the risk would have been obvious to a reasonable person. Some have sug-
gested that because objective recklessness catches the defendant who fails to foresee an obvious risk,
it approaches the negligence standard of fault, see Ashworth, supra note 4 at 157-58. As noted above,
the Canadian position rests with a subjective standard, with the exception of criminal negligence.
‘” In essence, because corporations cannot commit the vast majority of intentional crimes, whether
the fault requirement of an intentional crime can be extended to recklessness does not raise the same
concerns of fairness as does the idea of the conviction of an individual on a basis other than subjective
awareness.
S67ee Stuart, supra note 94 at 203.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
fence could occur as a result. Moreover, in practice, offences can be drafted with vary-
ing degrees of fault.
If the key to showing recklessness is an awareness of the risk of criminal conduct
on the part of the corporation, then the issue of how a corporation gains an awareness
of the risk is raised. Basically, the corporation has an awareness of risk in two ways.
The first is where the agents of the corporation bring the risk to the attention of those
who create policy in the corporation. This is essentially an application of the current
system which finds corporate awareness through its agents. However, a second basis
for finding awareness exists in the decision-making processes of the corporation itself.
Just as the corporation transforms information and individual ideas into corporate de-
cisions, so does the individual awareness of risk, previously detected and drawn to the
attention of corporation, become part of an organization’s general awareness. Such a
conception of recklessness is in keeping with the idea discussed earlier in this article
that a corporation possesses a culture or identity which transcends that of its agents. In
essence, this second basis of finding corporate subjective awareness addresses the
situation where the current agents of a corporation are unaware of the risk, while in fact
the corporation itself had previously acquired information regarding the risk.
In reality, corporate recklessness may be easier to prove than corporate intention.
Thus, composite offences providing for different levels of fault combined with a given
form of conduct may be desirable. After all, outside of direct ratification of an illegal
act, it will be simpler to show that a corporation was aware of a risk of criminal con-
duct as a result of a given policy, rather than to show a clear intention to achieve the
criminal result through that same policy.
While it appears that the model of corporate fault could function within the current
definition of recklessness, there is cause to consider an original and very useful pro-
posal suggested by Wells to overcome some of the difficulties in applying a standard of
recklessness, whether objective or subjective, to a corporation. Her proposal deals with
the related issues of societal perceptions of risk and the use of foreseeability as the cri-
terion for assessing recklessness.
On the issue of risk, Wells notes that legal discussions of the concept of reckless-
ness take for granted that there is a common identifiable understanding of what risk
is,'” while in fact the underlying concept of risk on which recklessness rests is poorly
articulated.”9 She argues that the discussion fails to distinguish between two types of
risk: one based on probability and one based on a utility calculation.’ The first exam-
ines risk as a function of the frequency of past occurrences of an event. The second in-
volves a more complex analysis which looks at the nature of the activity, any future
benefits it might bring, the type of harm threatened and the cost of avoidance, with a
view to weighing the social utility of avoidance of the harm against the cost of elimi-
‘ Corporations, supra note 6 at 68,72.
“9 Ibid at 70.
“0o Ibid at 72.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE McGILL
[Vol. 43
nating or reducing the risk and the nature of the interest threatened.’2 As she notes,
“[r]isk is more complex and recklessness more simple than legal doctrine allows.’..
More importantly Wells discusses die cultural significance of risk: that is, how the
assignment of responsibility is a function of cultural standards of what constitutes a
proper risk. Communities use their shared experiences to determine what is acceptable
risk. The legal concept of recklessness, however, deems that some risks are justifiable
while others are not, without any calibration of the relevant risks based on a utility cal-
culus. As she notes:
Failure to recognise the cultural foundations of attributions of responsibility in
the general infi-astructure of criminal laws is one aspect of the inability of legal
institutions to respond to the cultural shift towards blaming corporations for
technological hazard.’74
She suggests that the notion of risk be assessed on the basis of an acceptance standard,
such as risk criteria. Moreover, variables such as ease of elimination of risk and nature
of harm could be incorporated into the analysis of an obvious and or serious risk used
in the objective definition of recklessness.’75
A second criticism Wells levels at the concept of recklessness is its emphasis upon
the ability of the actor to foresee the risk. She finds that such an approach misses the
mark:
It leaves untouched the problematic questions about the nature of risk and what
makes a risk obvious or serious. If some of these questions of justifiability of
risk-taking, in other words the utility calculus, are inherent in the phrase
“obvious and/or serious risk” then the question to be asked should not just be
whether that person would have foreseen the risk but also whether they would
have taken that risk.76
The significance of such a view for corporate liability is obvious. That a corporation
actually foresaw a risk of harm may be difficult to detect in its policies. By contrast, a
policy which dictates that certain activities will be undertaken (that is, that a risky ac-
tivity was actually taken) is more common. Although the decision to take a risk is
based upon an assessment of the likelihood of risk occurring, Wells’ model concen-
trates on making corporations accountable for such risk assessments, rather than asking
whether a risk assessment was or should have been done. The approach allows for
recklessness to be found based on practical indifference to risk.
Incorporating this novel idea of recklessness to the general notion of corporate
fault would attribute fault where corporate policy demonstrated an indifference to risk
or an unwillingness to alter or create policies to deal adequately with situations of risk.
171 Ibid.
‘7 “Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability”, supra note 121 at 554.
‘”See Corporations, supra note 6 at 73.
m “Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability”, supra note 121 at 558.
‘”In the Canadian context, such variables could be used in evaluating departures from a standard of
care in offences based on an objective or negligence standard.
… Corporations, supra note 6 at 73 [emphasis in original].
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
This focus on corporate attitude is important because it can apply to both reckless ac-
tion, such as the decision to proceed with a course of action irrespective of the risks,
and reckless inaction, such as corporate resistance to the implementation of adequate
safety measures.
A word should be said about wilful blindness. It is distinct from recklessness since
the offender is not subjectively aware of the risk. However, the reason for the lack of
knowledge is a deliberate effort to remain ignorant of that risk.” In essence, wilful
blindness is used where the offender consciously prevents subjective awareness of a
risk, even though the risk is suspected to exist.
In the context of corporate fault, wilful blindness would likely take the form of
managers who refuse to make inquiries into the actions of subordinates. The wilful
blindness of supervisors towards departments could be established by demonstrating
that the internal decision processes of the corporation do not ensure proper supervision
of employees, or that there is an established practice by management of refraining from
investigating questionable or suspicious activities. Wilful blindness might also be
found where a corporation undertakes an activity while deliberately refraining from in-
vestigating the consequences of the action. While it may prove easier to establish fault
for a failure to enquire on a negligence standard, there may be cases where the actions
of the corporation will be better characterized as “deliberate ignorance” ” rather than
failing to meet a standard of care.
b. Strict Liability
Before discussing how the corporate model of fault is applied to the strict liability
context, it is necessary to address the impact of the division of offences into two types:
truly “criminal” and public welfare.” Although this traditional separation between the
two types of offences is not necessarily useful when discussing corporate liability, the
division has a particular impact on the development of corporate liability which cannot
be ignored. As it is largely through regulation that the criminal law affects corpora-
‘” See Stuart, supra note 94 at 209. In R. v. Sansregret, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 577,
the Court discussed the notion of wilful blindness in the context of a defence of honest but mistaken
belief in consent to a charge of rape. While the Court’s decision to apply wilful blindness to the cir-
cumstances of the case was heavily criticized, the general principles expressed in the decision are not
controversial. McIntyre J., writing for the Court, distinguishes wilful blindness from recklessness:
Wilful blindness is distinct from recklessness because, while recklessness involves
knowledge of a danger or risk and persistence in a course of conduct which creates a
risk that the prohibited result will occur, wilful blindness arises where a person who has
become aware of the need for some inquiry because he does not wish to know the
truth. He would prefer to remain ignorant. The culpability in recklessness is justified by
consciousness of the risk and by proceeding in the face of it, while in wilful blindness
it is justified by the accused’s fault in deliberately failing to inquire when he knows
there is reason for inquiry (ibid. at 584).
The term is Stuart’s, ibid at 209.
‘ This article will not enter into a discussion of the relative merits of no-fault liability over fault-
based offences.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
tions, the practical importance of the distinction is on perceptions of the gravity of cor-
porate liability.”‘
It is generally accepted that the terms “strict” and “no-fault” liability carry conno-
tations of lesser gravity,” because no proof of a mental element is required.”‘ This dif-
ferential perception has roots in the historical view of the role of the criminal law,
which was to uphold a certain social order and protect private property interests.
Wastes of natural resources, as well as other more social harms were only later consid-
ered matters of public concern to be regulated through specific statutes. As Wells notes,
the bulk of corporate wrongdoing affects collective or social interests which are now
sanctioned through regulatory rather than criminal offences.”‘ This contributes to the
view that corporate harm is less serious because regulatory offences tend to be viewed
as the infringement of a statutory provision while otherwise pursuing a lawful activ-
ity.”4
In Canada, strict liability is a term confined to the public welfare context, origi-
nally conceived as a compromise solution between the requirement of a subjective
mental element and no-fault requirement at all. ‘” Context has played an important role
in the elaboration of this level of fault. In terms of burden of proof, the standard is far
from the “halfway house” label by which it is known.”‘ As a reversal of onus based on
an objective negligence standard,” it is much closer to the no-fault end of the spectrum
’40 See Corporations, supra note 6 at 78-79.
See Leigh, supra note 90 at 284-85.
” In Canada, strict liability is really a no-fault offence which allows for a defence of due diligence.
“5Corporations, supra note 6 at 23.
‘4See ibid. at 12, 76. The suggestion that statutory offences are viewed with less consideration than
those created by the common law is captured in the interpretive maxim that “statutes in derogation of
the common law should be construed strictly.” In Canada, the qualification “statutory” carries less of
a negative connotation than in Great Britain, because the traditional criminal law offences have long
been enacted into the Criminal Code.
“‘ See Stuart, supra note 94 at 157, referring to the seminal Supreme Court case of Sault Ste. Marie,
supra note 150.
..’ Ibid at 163.
“, Negligence is understood to be the failure of a defendant to take reasonable precautions to avoid
a risk where this could have been reasonably expected. The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the
distinction between subjective and objective evaluations of criminal fault in R. v. Hundal, [1993] 1
S.C.R. 867, 149 N.R. 189 [hereinafter Hundal cited to S.C.R.] in the context of dangerous driving.
Cory J. defines and sets out the test for establishing negligence:
Depending on the provisions of the particular section and the context in which it ap-
pears, the constitutional requirement of mens rea may be satisfied in different ways …
the mens rea or element of fault can be satisfied by proof of negligence whereby the
conduct of the accused is measured on the basis of an objective standard without es-
tablishing the subjective mental state of the particular accused …
Mhe test for negligence is an objective one requiring a marked departure from the
standard of care of a reasonable person. There is no need to establish the intention of
the particular accused. The question to be answered under the objective test concerns
what the accused “should” have known. The potential harshness of the objective stan-
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
than it is to subjective awareness.” Although the appropriateness of negligence as a
standard of fault in the general criminal law is debated,'” negligence is used mainly in
the public welfare context'” where the harm is great, the risk obvious, and the actor is
capable of taking the reasonable precautions required. 9′ The justifications for a lower
evidentiary burden on the prosecution are thus largely efficiency-based. As a result,
many commercial and other activities are regulated using a standard of negligence.
The development of strict liability is often explained by the difficulties in prosecut-
ing corporations for violations of public welfare offences, rather than in terms of the
lesser blameworthiness of the actor responsible. As Leigh notes, the common public
perception of decreased seriousness of regulatory offences can be misplaced: “in the
case of some serious offences, strict and vicarious liability is necessary if the legislation
is to be enforced efficiently or at all. The reasons why this is so are fairly clear. In many
cases it is impossible to draw any inference about the mental state of the offender from
the act done.”” 2 Indeed, what is more serious: pollution of a river as part of an indus-
trial process or stealing a loaf of bread to prevent starvation of one’s children?. 3
While the answer seems obvious, Wells notes that corporate activity is often per-
ceived differently from human activity:
The contrast between the social and legal constructions of crime prevents us
from seeing corporations as real criminals and highlights a paradox. Theft is
the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another. … Much of what
corporations do legitimately is the lawful pursuit of that which done dishon-
estly would be regarded as anti-social. Corporate goals are directed towards
making profits at another’s expense…. The line between acceptable and unac-
ceptable appropriation, then, may be a fine one. The process whereby class and
wealth determine the enthusiasm with which undesirable activities are re-
pressed is what Foucault dubbed “the restructuring of the economy of illegali-
ties.”‘ 94
In contrast to the efficiency argument is the position that all serious offences
should ideally require a subjective awareness standard of fault. This position reflects
dard may be lessened by the consideration of certain personal factors as well as the
consideration of a defence of mistake of fact (ibid. at 882-85).
‘ See Stuart, supra note 94 at 157, 162.
“, See ibid at 228 (with respect to individuals), 585 (with respect to corporations). In this section,
discussions of objective fault requirements outside of the public welfare context shall be avoided.
This is done for simplicity and it is recognized that it is possible to contemplate corporate liability for
non-public welfare crimes which require objective standards of fault, particularly that of criminal
negligence. However, within the limited context of this article, it is not the purpose to identify all the
possible sub-levels of fault used in the criminal law. Rather, it is to be demonstrated how the model of
corporate liability would fit into the major categories of fault. In that light, how corporations may be
found liable for objectively-based strict liability fault will be discussed. It is clear, however, that this
analysis can be adjusted to apply to other types of objective fault.
’90 See ibid. at 160-61.
“‘ See Ashworth, supra note 4 at 171.
.Leigh, supra note 90 at 285.
“” The example is slightly modified from Leigh, ibid.
’94 Corporations, supra note 6 at 10-11 [footnotes omitted].
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
concerns about objective liability in the regulatory context mainly because of the po-
tential burdens placed on individual accused persons. It is clear that justifications of ef-
ficiency in the corporate context do not sit well with concerns for individual liberty and
the right to a fair trial.
In light of these differing views, it is easy to see how attitudes about the legitimacy
of strict liability become hopelessly muddled with the idea of corporate liability. On the
one hand, corporate wrongdoing is not as serious as “real” crime because most corpo-
rate convictions are for offences based on a lower standard of fault, even though the
main concerns about a lower level of fault relate to the situation of individuals. On the
other hand, liability for public welfare offences is often rooted in the belief that the
harms caused by violations are serious enough to warrant that corporations be held ac-
countable for them. Ironically, it is because it is socially important to sanction viola-
tions that a lower level of fault is used; it is argued to be the most effective, if not the
only, means of controlling corporate behaviour.
The model of corporate fault discussed in this article cannot eliminate the legacy
of the public welfare/real crime distinction. However, it does allow for corporate liabil-
ity to be assessed in ways which shed light on how corporate action is often undertaken
in reality. Increasing the likelihood of finding corporations liable on higher levels of
fault such as recklessness and intention, could reduce the perception that corporate
crime is less serious. In addition, examining corporate behaviour in light of new con-
cepts of risk and on a reactive fault standard may serve to render the perception of
some regulatory offences more serious because they reveal more accurately the extent
to which corporations are able to prevent harms.’95
An awareness of the debate over regulatory offences, many of which are drafted in
the form of strict and no-fault liability offences, does cast light on some of the resis-
tance to corporate liability in these areas. Nonetheless, this debate must not obscure the
more crucial issue of holding corporations accountable for the harms they cause.
Lower fault liability is but one means of doing so, and is used primarily because it al-
leviates what can be an impossible task for the prosecution, namely to establish a sub-
jective awareness relevant to the harm caused.
Bearing in mind the general definition of corporate fault, corporate liability on a
negligence standard would be found where organizational failure resulted in the lack of
precautions being taken to avoid the risk.’ Fisse and Braithwaite offer the following
description:
Corporate negligence is prevalent where communication breakdowns occur, or
where organizations suffer from collective oversight. Does corporate negli-
gence in such a context amount merely to negligence on the part of individu-
Underlying this debate is the larger question of whether the criminal law is the most appropriate
means of sanctioning corporate behaviour, particularly of a regulatory nature. Without answering the
question directly, there can be little doubt that some corporate behaviour will always be more appro-
priately dealt with by the criminal law, especially intentional acts. It is equally clear, however, that
many regulatory offences are less about blameworthy acts than government regulation of activity.
.9 See “Attribution of Criminal Liability”, supra note 58 at 283.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
als? It may be possible to explain the causes of corporate wrongdoing in terms
of particular contributions of managers and employees, but the attribution of
fault is another matter. Corporate negligence does not necessarily reduce to in-
dividual negligence. A corporation may have a greater capacity to avoid the
commission of an offence and it may be for this reason that a finding of corpo-
rate but not individual negligence may bejustified.”‘
Thus, corporate negligence could also be found where there is a lack of corporate
policy to address situations of risk which can be reasonably expected to arise in the
field of activity in which the corporation operates. Negligence would no longer depend
on an individual failure to take precautions in a given situation, but could be found in
the general failure of the corporation to provide for situations of risk. Such an approach
would better reflect the reality that corporate harm is often the result of collective
oversight, or a general inertia with respect to instituting proper safeguards against
9
risk.’1
Another form of negligence liability is proposed by Fisse in his concept of reactive
fault.'” Under his model, an organizational failure to adopt policies to correct a situa-
tion of risk could attract liability as well as an organizational failure to prevent harm.
As has been mentioned, imposing fault upon organizations for a failure to respond
adequately to address a situation of risk or harm caused has the advantage of giving or-
ganizations a chance to redeem themselves following the occurrence of the offence.
Organizations found negligent on the basis of reactive fault would be unable to com-
plain of a lack of notice or an inability to detect the conduct before it occurred. In this
way, organizations would be less likely to claim that a lower standard of fault casts the
net of liability too far by convicting those who are morally innocent: that is, subjec-
tively unaware of the conduct. Under the reactive-fault principle they would be subjec-
tively aware of the conduct. In this model, the difference between negligence and
higher fault offences would be the evaluation of the adequacy of the reactive measures,
where an objective failure to respond adequately would suffice for a conviction.
c. Absolute Liability (No Fault)
Briefly, while the qualification of no-fault offences2’ varies, it corresponds gener-
ally to those offences which do not require proof of intention, knowledge, recklessness
or negligence.”‘ Conviction occurs once the prosecution proves the actus reus of the
offence. This category of no-fault offence attracts much criticism, mainly rooted in the
individualist concerns of autonomy and liberty, but also on more general grounds of
faimess. ‘ In addition, in Canada, absolute liability cannot be combined with impris-
“‘ “Allocation of Responsibility”, supra note 9 at 486 [emphasis in original].
“‘See “Attribution of Criminal Liability”, supra note 58 at 281-82.
199 Ibid. at 282-83.
In Canada, the term “absolute liability” is used to describe offences where only proof of the actus
reus suffices for a conviction. In the U.K., no-fault offences are referred to as strict liability offences.
20′ See Stuart, supra note 94 at 149; Ashworth, supra note 4 at 135-36.
202 See Stuart, ibid& at 585.
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
onment as a sanction; at a minimum, a due diligence defence must be available for im-
prisonment to be a sanction. 3
The significance of the corporate liability model of fault for no-fault offences is
the more accurate characterization of corporate action that the model offers. One of the
principal criticisms of the use of absolute liability in the corporate context is that it be-
comes tantamount to vicarious liability!” That is, conviction of the corporation can be
based on the actions of one individual in the organization. Such a situation raises ques-
tions of fairness because it imputes liability on the corporation regardless of whether
the act can be considered corporate. A stronger basis for grounding liability solely on
the actus reus – where this is necessary –
is to ensure that the actus reus is in fact an
act of the corporation.
However, even in light of the efficiency justifications, using corporate action alone
in imputing liability rests on questionable ground. A way of addressing the fairness
question and of overcoming evidentiary difficulties in corporate prosecution is through
the use of Fisse’s reactive-fault proposal, which can be adapted to the typical no-fault
liability type offence.’ Drafting many regulatory offences in terms of a duty to react to
harm caused would be a better sanction of harm-causing behaviour than no-fault li-
ability offences without the negative label of no-fault. In addition, the extended time-
frame for assessing blameworthiness would shed some of the commonly held illusions
that no-fault liability convicts subjectively unaware parties because the longer reaction
time might disclose that the defendant was in fact aware of the risk of the harm occur-
ring.’
3. Defences
automatism, self-defence, necessity, insanity and provocation -cannot
No mention thus far has been made of any defences, be they justifications or ex-
cuses. Part of the reason for this is that many of the traditional defences which apply to
individuals –
be applied to corporations, although it has been suggested that economic duress might
be an excuse for a corporation.’ While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss
defences in any detail, some general remarks can be made about how the concept of
corporate identity would affect the application of defences to corporate liability.
As corporate fault is based upon corporate policy, the defences open to corpora-
tions would be those asserting an interference with its ability to make or correct policy,
and those asserting an absence or negation of corporate intention. The first cases in-
volve situations where the corporation has either failed to implement a policy or has
not reacted to one appropriately. A circumstance where this excuse might be enter-
tained would be where the corporation is newly constituted and has not had the oppor-
266.
‘ See Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (British Colwnbia), [1985] 2 S.C.R, 486, 63 N.R.
… See Stuart, supra note 94 at 584-85.
2o”Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at 1202-204.
See Corporations, supra note 6 at 81.
o7See “Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at 1201.
1998]
J.A. QUAID – CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
tunity to adopt the appropriate policies.?’ A further situation would be where govern-
ment regulations imposing liability upon the corporation are contradictory or ambigu-
ous. 9
The second type of defence can be subdivided into two types. In the first type, the
corporation asserts that there is an absence of corporate intention, in essence challeng-
ing the qualification of the act as corporate. In the second, the corporation argues that
while the act is corporate, it should not be held liable because it acted with due dili-
gence. The defence of absence of corporate intention protects a corporation where, for
example, an offence is committed by a rogue individual, contrary to internal policy.”‘
Such a defence would not be easy to establish, as the corporation would have to prove
not only that the conduct was prohibited by corporate policy, but also that it had not
condoned such conduct on a previous occasion.”‘
The defence of due diligence would also place a heavy burden of proof on the cor-
porate defendant. In order to establish that it acted with corporate due diligence a cor-
poration would have to point to existing measures taken to avoid the risk, as well as
demonstrate that these measures reflected company practice!” The emphasis is thus on
the organizational attitude toward the prevention of risk. Fisse’s model would add a
concept of reactive due diligence in order to assess when a corporation has satisfied the
requirements of a duty to respond to a specific act of harm-causing or risk-taking be-
haviour3
Conclusion
The above discussion has argued that a separate notion of corporate blameworthi-
ness would constitute an invaluable addition to current theories of corporate criminal
responsibility. It has been demonstrated that through the creative use of the criterion of
intentionality, it is possible to fashion a concept of corporate blameworthiness which
takes into account the differences between human and corporate persons, and reflects
the distinct nature of much corporate action and expression. More specifically, inten-
tionality is based upon how corporate structure and policy can transform the input of
many individuals into decisions and actions of the corporation itself.
The justifications for treating corporations as accountable for the harms and
wrongs they cause are found first in this ability to make decisions upon a rational basis,
albeit one that is particular to them. A second more general justification is rooted in the
fact that corporations can and do participate in society as right-holders. As a counter-
weight to the many advantages and entitlements flowing from corporate structure, as
.. See “Attribution of Criminal Liability”, supra note 58 at 289.
“9 See “Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at 1201. In Canada, the ability of corporations to challenge
legislative provisions on the basis of vagueness and overbreadth has been limited when the offences
have been characterized as pubic welfare offences.
21o See Corporations, supra note 6 at 134.
… See ibi
1,2 See “Attribution of Criminal Liability”, supra note 58 at 290-91.
13″Reconstructing”, supra note 28 at 1208.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 43
well as to the power they now wield in society, fairness dictates that they also bear the
negative consequences of their actions. The licence granted to them to do business
should be restricted in the same way as is human action, that is, to activity which does
not harmfully or wrongfully interfere with the rights of others.
A consideration of the mechanics of liability based on a corporate identity reveals
that it presents many advantages and some problems. The advantages lie in the ability
to capture a wider spectrum of corporate action within the bipartite structure of a
criminal offence, thus rooting responsibility in a more complete understanding of cor-
porate blameworthiness. The problems, while not to be marginalized, are more practi-
cally-based and mostly evidentiary in nature. On the whole, therefore, the advantages
outweigh the potential problems and offer a means of ameliorating the current model
of corporate criminal liability.
While there are many other issues facing the development of a complete theory of
corporate criminal liability, the most important being the creation of effective sanctions
for corporate behaviour, the addition of a new basis upon which to attribute blamewor-
thiness is an important first step. Through the recognition that corporate criminality can
take many forms and thus require different ways of asssessing liability, separate corpo-
rate blameworthiness can serve as a foundation upon which a more complete frame-
work for corporate liability can be built.