The Derivative Action under the
Ontario Business Corporations Act:
A Review of Section 97
Michael St. Patrick Baxter*
Synopsis
Introduction
I.
II.
The Personal Action vs The Derivative Action
Conditions Precedent to a Derivative Action
A. Leave to Commence a Derivative Action
1. Probability of Success
2. Novelty of Cause of Action
3. Onus of Proof
B. Other Requirements
1. Contemporaneous Ownership
2. Demand
3. Bona Fides
4. Residual Discretion
C. Discontinuance and Settlement
Conclusion
Appendix
Introduction
Prior to 1971, it was encumbent upon a shareholder seeking to sue in
Ontario to enforce a right or duty owed to the corporation to bring himself
within the exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.1 Since the corporation
was considered to be an entity distinct from its shareholders, only the
corporation could maintain an action against a wrongdoer to remedy the
* LL.B., University of Western bntario. Of the Ontario Bar, formerly Law Clerk to the
Chief Justice of Ontario. I am grateful to Harvey J. Kirsh of the Ontario Bar for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
‘(1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 E.R. 189 (V.C.). See, generally, Wedderburn, Shareholders’Rights
and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1957) 15 Cambridge L.J. 194 [Part I], (1958) 16
Cambridge L.J. 93 [Part II]; Beck, “An Analysis of Foss v. Harbottle” in J. Zeigel, Studies in
Canadian Company Law (1967), vol. I, 545.
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injury sustained. Where the wrongdoer was in control of the corporation,
and unless the minority shareholders could maintain a derivative action, the
wrong to the company would probably go unredressed.
A body of law developed from the decision in Foss v. Harbottle which
would for the next century frustrate and bedevil minority shareholders
seeking to right a wrong done to the corporation. The route to redress was
not an easy one and did not often allow the shareholder his day in court.
In an attempt to clear the procedural stumbling blocks that impeded the
way to a shareholder’s derivative action, the Select Committee on Company
Law 2 recommended that a statutory derivative action3 be entrenched in The
Ontario Business Corporations Act.4 The Committee, while concluding that
the derivative action was the most effective remedy to enforce the duties and
responsibilities imposed upon directors and officers, was concerned with a
related, American problem. In the United States, shareholder derivative
actions are frequently commenced with the hope of obtaining large counsel
fees or private settlements without any intention of benefitting the
corporation on whose behalf the lawsuit was theoretically brought. In order
to avoid the problems of these “strike suits”, the Lawrence Committee
recommended various procedural provisions designed to maintain the
integrity of the derivative action.5
Section 97 of the Act sets out a procedural code for commencing a
derivative action. It is now clear that it embraces all forms of shareholder
actions purporting to be brought on behalf of and for the benefit of the
corporation. 6 Since s. 97 subsumes all causes of action in law or in equity
that a shareholder may sue for on behalf of a corporation, compliance with
the procedural requirements is mandatory where a derivative action is
sought to be commenced. The right of the shareholder to bring a personal
action to redress a wrong done to him remains unaffected by s. 97.
Accordingly, a shareholder is free to sue to enforce a right or duty owed him
without regard to s. 97.
2 Hereinafter “the Lawrence Committee”.
3 While the Act does not speak of “derivative actions” as such, the American terminology
is, in practice, almost exclusively used and has received wide judicial recognition. This is,
perhaps, because the name “derivative action” is indicative of the true nature of the action,
that being a suit on behalf of a corporation to enforce rights derived from it.
4 R.S.O. 1970, c. 53, s. 99 proclaimed in force on 1 January 1971; now R.S.O. 1980, c. 54,
s. 97. [Hereinafter the Act will be cited as the Ont. B. C.A.]. See Appendix.
51967 Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company. Law, 27th Legis. Ontario,
5th Sess. [hereinafter the Lawrence Report].
6 See, e.g., Farnham v. Fingold[l 973] 2 O.R. 132 (C.A.). But see also the criticism of this
decision in Zacks, Comment (1973) 8 U.B.C. L. Rev. 191.
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
It is less certain whether the statutory derivative action in Bill 6 is, like
s. 97, exhaustive of the common law.7 Its language is clearly not as expansive
as that of s. 97. Section 244 of the proposed Act deals with leave to bring,
defend or intervene in any action under that Act. It does not purport to
subsume all causes of action under any other statute or in law or equity that
could be enforced by the corporation. Since s. 244 is virtually identical to
s. 232 of the Canada Business Corporations Act,7a the interpretatiori given to
the latter would be of assistance. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be
any reported case law in this area. It is therefore uncertain whether it is
necessary to comply with s. 244 if the cause of action arises outside of the
proposed Act.
Since compliance with s. 97 of the Act is a condition precedent to
commencing a derivative action,
the critical threshold question in
shareholder litigation is whether the action is personal or derivative. This
question is a difficult one in itself and has been the subject of discussion.8 For
the purposes of this article, it is assumed that the action has been determined
to be derivative. The objective of this article is to examine the procedural
requirements for commencing a derivative action in Ontario. Reference will
also be made to Bill 6 and the changes it proposes. While a discussion of
whether the shareholder action is personal or derivative is outside the
intended scope of this article, the issue is so fundamental to shareholder
litigation that any examination of derivative actions would be incomplete
without reference being made to it.
I. The Personal Action vs The Derivative Action
As Professor Beck points out,9 the real distinction for company law
purposes is between the personal action and the derivative action. The
Ontario Court of Appeal in Goldex Mines Ltd v. Revill dealt with this
distinction:
Where a legal wrong is done to shareholders by directors or other shareholders, the
injured shareholders suffer a personal wrong, and may seek redress for it in a personal
action. That personal action may be by one shareholder alone, or (as will usually be the
case) by a class action in which he sues on behalf of himself and all other shareholders in
the same interest (usually, all other shareholders save the wrongdoers). Such a class
action is nevertheless a personal action.
A derivative action, on the other hand, is one in which the wrong is done to the
company. It is always a class action, brought in representative form, thereby binding all
the shareholders.Y0
7 An Act to Revise the Business Corporations Act, 32d Legis. Ontario, 2d Sess., 20
October 198 1, 2d reading [hereinafter “Bill 6” or “the proposed Act”]. See Appendix for
relevant sections.
7a S.C. 1974-5-6, c. 33.
8See Beck, The Shareholders’ Derivative Action (1974) 52 Can. Bar Rev. 159.
9Ibid., 185.
10(1975) 7 O.R. (2d) 216, 221 (C.A.) per Brooke, Arnup and Estey JJ.A.
Me GILL LA W JO URNA L
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At a theoretical level, the distinction between the personal action and the
derivative action is quite clear. In practice, however, it can often be difficult
to distinguish one from the other, especially when personal and derivative
actions are interrelated.” The Court of Appeal in Goldex Mines Ltd v.
Revill recognized the difficulty of this interrelationship. The Court realized
that the same wrongful act can be both a wrong to the company and to each
shareholder. An attempt was made by the Court to provide some guidance
in the determination of whether the wrong gave rise to a personal or
derivative action. The Court quoted with approval from the judgment of
Traynor C.J. in the California case of Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.’2
wherein Traynor C.J. refers to Shaw v. Empire Savings & Loan Assoc.: 3
the court [in Shaw] noted the “well established general rule that a stockholder of a
corporation has no personal or individual right of action against third persons,
including the corporation’s officers and directors, for a wrong or injury to the
corporation which results in the destruction or depreciation of the value of his stock,
since the wrong suffered by the stockholder is merely incidental to the wrong suffered
by the corporation and affects all stockholders alike.” From this the court reasoned that
a minority shareholder could not maintain an individual action unless he could
demonstrate the injury was somehow different from that suffered by other minority
shareholders. In so concluding the court erred. The individual wrong necessary to
support a suit by a shareholder need not be unique to that plaintiff. The same injury
may affect a substantial number of shareholders. If the injury is not incidental to an
injury to the corporation, an individual cause of action exists.’ 4
The Court of Appeal interpreted Traynor C.J. to mean that a personal
action would not arise “simply because the corporation itself has been
damaged and as a consequence of the damage to it, its shareholders have
been injured”.’ 5 This distinction has been criticized as lacking clarity and
cogency in that it is impossible to determine with any confidence what
constitutes an incidental injury, and the absence of any good reason for not
treating an incidental injury as a wrong to the shareholders personally.’ 6
Notwithstanding the limitations of the distinction, it is the only judicial
assistance presently available. Regardless of the test employed, there will
always remain grey areas of wrongs that do not lend themselves to easy
categorization. All shareholder suits cannot be arbitrarily placed in one
“See Prentice, Comment (1976) 15 U.W.O. L. Rev. 225, 231-2 wherein Professor
Prentice discusses, as an example, the payment of excessive remuneration to directors.
While this is traditionally characterized as a wrong to the corporation, he argues that it could
just as easily be characterized as a wrong to shareholders individually as it depreciates the
value of their investment. However, the fact remains that it is almost inevitable that a wrong
to a corporation will adversely affect the value of each shareholder’s interest in the
corporation.
12460 P. 2d 464 (Cal. 1969).
‘3 186 Cal. App. 2d 401 (Dist. Ct App. 1960).
‘4 Supra, note 12, 470-1 [references omitted].
15 Supra, note 10, 222.
16 Supra, note 11, 232.
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
category to the exclusion of others. The concept of incidental injury serves a
useful purpose in the resolution of the threshold question of whether the
action is personal or derivative. The answer involves two considerations.
First, is the individual’s injury distinct from the corporation’s injury in that it
does not occur simply because the corporate injury exists? Second, is the
individual’s injury in an area where the shareholders by their own
representative actions are exercising a power in bad faith, or the directors are
abusing a duty owed to minority shareholders different from that owed to
the corporation? 7 If the answer to either consideration is affirmative, then a
personal cause of action will exist. Admittedly, there may, in some
circumstances, still be uncertainty as to the nature of the cause of action. In
those cases, leave should be obtained as a matter of precaution.
II. Conditions Precedent to a Derivative Action
A. Leave to Commence a Derivative Action
Section 97 of the Act, as already discussed, sets out a procedural code for
bringing a derivative action. It was designed to prevent the commencement
of derivative actions solely for the purpose of provoking secret settlements
with companies. To this end, s. 97(2) requires, as a condition precedent to
commencing the action, that the plaintiff obtain a court order permitting
him to commence it. The application must be made to a judge of the
Supreme Court on seven days’ notice to the corporation.’ 8 Bill 6 requires the
applicant to give 14 days’ notice to the directors of the corporation or its
subsidiaries of his intention to apply for leave. 19 Pursuant to s. 244(3) of the
proposed Act, where it is not expedient to give notice, the applicant may
make an exparte application to the court for an interim order pending the
giving of notice. This is an attempt to restore the time-honoured right of a
shareholder to seek ex parte interim relief in exigent circumstances. Under
s. 97, there could be no exparte applications. 9 a
Since an application under s. 97 is made only for the purpose of
obtaining authority to commence a derivative action, it is not necessary that
a draft writ and statement of claim be filed with the court in addition to the
supporting affidavit material. It is sufficient if an originating notice of
motion and a supporting affidavit are filed. 20 While it may be sufficient to
file an originating notice of motion and supporting affidavit to commence
s. 97 proceedings, it would appear that an application under s. 97 is in the
17 MacCallum v. MacCallum (Ont. H.C.) 12 November 1975, 7120/74 per Pennell J.
18 Ont. B. C.A., R.S.O. 1980, c. 54, s. 97(3). See also Saarimakiv. Unsworth (Ont. C.A.) 30
March 1978, 692/76 per Dubin, Lacourcirre and Zuber JJ.A.
19 Bill 6, s. 244(2).
19a See Re Goldhar and Qudbec Manitou Mines Ltd(1976) 9 O.R. (2d) 740-6 (Div. Ct)per
Reid J.
20 Re Loeb and Provigo Inc. (1978) 20 O.R. (2d) 497 (H.C.).
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is generally required
nature of an interlocutory proceeding rather than an originating application.
Accordingly, it is not necessary that the affidavit be based on personal
in originating applications. 21 In
knowledge as
Armstrong v. Gardner22 an application for leave to commence a derivative
action was made by a minority shareholder. The affidavit material of the
applicant was based upon information and belief. Counsel for the
respondents contended that the application was in the nature of an
originating motion and that the Court should therefore not act upon an
affidavit based upon information and belief. Cory J. (as he then was)
realized the restricted access that minority shareholders have to corporate
information. His Lordship stated:
An application to bring an action such as this must in a great many situations be
dependent on information and belief of others that has been related to the deponent.
Almost invariably minority shareholders will be in such a disadvantageous position
that they will not be able to obtain firsthand evidence and information upon which to
found their motion. To deny an application on that ground would, in my opinion, fly in
the face of both the provisions and intent of the Business Corporations Act.
It may be that this application ought not to be considered an originating motion. By
analogy it most closely resembles an application under the former Rules of Practice for
leave to commence an action out of the jurisdiction. The affidavits used on such
applications were also of necessity often based on information and belief but were
accepted, for such applications were not considered to be originating motions. In my
opinion, this is not an originating motion. It is in nature an interlocutory application
brought pursuant to the provisions of the Business Corporations Act and ought not to
be refused solely because the affidavit in support is based in part upon information and
belief.2
Where the plaintiff does not have leave to commence a derivative action,
the facts set out in the statement of claim must only give rise to a personal
cause of action. If the cause of action is derivative or if derivative claims are
intermingled with personal claims then leave must be obtained under s. 97.
Where personal claims are interwoven with derivative claims and leave
was not obtained before the commencement of the action, the court may
either strike out the writ of summons or merely strike out the endorsement
on the writ with leave to amend. It appears that the court will not do the
former if a limitation period has expired since to do so would be to deny the
action. In Goldex Mines Ltd v. Revill the Court of Appeal, faced with an
endorsement that contained inextricably interwoven derivative and personal
claims, stated:
We considered whether it would be appropriate merely to strike out the endorsement
on the writ, with leave to amend, rather than strike out the writ itself, as the Divisional
Court did. We have decided against doing so, for two reasons. No limitation period is
21 Rules of Practice and Procedure, R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 545, Rule 292.
22(1978) 20 O.R. (2d) 648 (H.C.).
23 Ibid., 651-2.
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
involved, and a new writ can be issued. In addition, the plaintiff may decide to apply for
leave under s. 99 [now s. 97], and if it obtains leave, it can add to the derivative claims as
it sees fit (subject, of course, to the Rules).24
The Court makes it clear that a derivative action may be joined with a
personal action once leave is obtained if the rules respecting joinder have
been complied with.25 It would therefore seem that if there is any uncertainty
about the cause of action being derivative in nature, leave of the court should
be obtained.
A shareholder, who is attempting to sue on behalf of a corporation, must
bring the action in a representative capacity for himself and all the other
shareholders of the corporation. This was required at common law and is
adopted by s. 97(1) of the Act. Shareholders who are alleged wrongdoers
will be named as the defendants. 26 The purpose of this requirement is to
ensure that all the other shareholders will be bound by a judgment in the
action, thus avoiding a multiplicity of suits. Notwithstanding that the
plaintiff shareholder purports
in a
representative capacity on behalf of himself and all the other shareholders,
save the alleged wrongdoers, the corporation remains at all times both the
injured party and the true plaintiff. Where the plaintiff shareholder is the
only shareholder apart from the alleged wrongdoer, he is not precluded from
maintaining a derivative action even though he cannot purport to sue on
behalf of the other shareholder. 27
the derivative action
to bring
The corporation must be added as a nominal defendant to the derivative
action. This allows judgment to be given in the corporation’s favour and
renders any decision in the case resjudicata as concerns it.28
The proposed Act borrows the concept of “complainant” from the
Canada Business Corporations Act.29 This concept is a more expansive
genus than “shareholder” and potentially encompasses anyone with an
interest in the affairs of the corporation. It includes past and present
registered holders or beneficial owners of shares or debt obligation of the
corporation or any of its affiliates and present and former directors and
officers of the corporation or its affiliates. The concept goes even further to
include any other person who, in the discretion of the court, is a proper
person to make on application for leave. Unfortunately, the proposed Act
does not indicate the circumstances in which such a person will be considered
24 Supra, note 10, 226. See also Winchell v. Del Zotto (1976) 1 C.P.C. 338 (Ont. H.C.).
25Rules of Practice and Procedure, R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 545, Rules 69 and 73.
26 Goldex Mines, supra, note 10, 221; see also Feldv. Glick (1975) 8 O.R. (2d) 7 (H.C.).
27 Feld v. Glick, ibid., 13.
28L. Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th ed. (1979), 651; see also Beck,
supra, note 1, 562.
29 S.C. 1974-5-6, c. 33, s. 231.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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a proper person to apply for leave and there does not appear to be any case
law under the federal provision that can assist in this regard.
The availability of the derivative action to “complainants” makes it
possible for virtually any person to initiate a derivative suit. It is, however,
difficult to understand why security holders, other than shareholders, were
included in the definition of “complainant” when such creditors would,
presumably, be adequately protected by their own private security
agreements. The extension of status to directors and officers would serve to
better protect the rights of the corporation and the interests of minority
shareholders since directors and officers are generally, because of their access
to corporate information, better able to identify improprieties involving the
corporation 30
Unlike s. 97, the proposed Act treats the corporation and its affiliates as
one unit for the purposes of the derivative action. This is a positive step in the
recognition of the realities of modern corporate organization. With the
increasing emphasis in the business world on takeovers and conglomerate
acquisitions, a shareholder who finds himself in a corporate hierarchy
immediately acquires a vested interest in the well-being of the other
subsidiary companies. Bill 6 recognizes this and permits a “double
derivative” action. By treating the immediate corporation and all subsidiary
corporations as one, it confers upon the complainant the right to initiate a
derivative action in the name of the subsidiary notwithstanding that he does
not own securities of the subsidiary. The proposed Act provides that a
corporation is a subsidiary of another corporation only if
(a) it is controlled by,
(i) that other corporation, or
(ii) that other corporation and one or more corporations, each of which is
controlled by that corporation, or
(iii) two or more corporations, each of which is controlled by that other corpora-
tion; or
(b) it is a subsidiary of a corporation that is that other’s subsidiary.3 a
However, the control required is essentially dejure control. Voting securi-
ties of the controlled corporation carrying more than 50 per cent of the votes
for the election of the directors must be held by or for the benefit of the
controlling corporation. In addition, the votes carried by such securities
must be sufficient to elect a majority of the board of directors. This
restriction ignores the prevalence of defacto control in many widely held
corporations by holding companies. Corporations that find themselves
30See F. lacobucci, M. Pilkington & J. Prichard, Canadian Business Corporations: An
Analysis of Recent Legislative Developments (1977), 188-91.
30a Bill 6, s. 1(2).
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
controlled by a minority shareholder may escape the definition of “subsi-
diary” in Bill 6. However, it would seem that a shareholder of such a
corporation could be held by the court to be “a proper person”, within the
definition of “complainant”, to make an application for leave under s. 244.
If leave is granted under s. 244 of the proposed Act, the complainant is
entitled to sue in the name of the corporation rather than naming himself as
the nominal plaintiff and joining the corporation as a nominal defendant.
The proposed Act permits the corporation to be the nominal plaintiff
notwithstanding that the directors will not authorize the suit. This obviates
the necessity of requiring the applicant to bring the derivative action in a
representative form since ifjudgment is given, the matter will be resjudicata.
The proposed Act not only permits the commencement of a derivative
action but it also allows the complainant to intervene in an action to which
the corporation or its subsidiaries are a party for the purpose of prosecuting,
defending or discontinuing the action on behalf of such corporation. This is
a further step in the direction of the protection of the interests of minority
shareholders. It is in the nature of a prophylactic remedy in that it may
ultimately prevent the occurrence of a wrong to the corporation. The situa-
tion may arise where it is not in the personal interests of the directors of a
corporation to diligently defend an action against the corporation.31 In such
circumstances, a shareholder could not, under s. 97, apply to intervene and
defend the action on behalf of the corporation. The shareholder would have
to wait until the directors had breached their duty to the corporation by
failing to act in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation and then
apply for leave under s. 97 to commence a derivative action to redress the
injury sustained by the corporation. Under the proposed Act, the complain-
ant is permitted to apply for leave to intervene in the action for the purposes
of defending the action on behalf of the corporation provided that he
complies with the statutory procedural requirements. These are the same
requirements that must be complied with in order to obtain leave to com-
mence a derivative action under Bill 6.
1. Probability of Success
Both s. 97 of the Act and s. 244 of Bill 6 do not prima facie require that
the intended action have any probability of success. However, the courts
appear to have adopted the view that leave will not be granted if the
proposed action is frivolous or vexatious or is bound to be unsuccessful. It is
31 For example, in an action against a corporation on a debt where the loan was personally
guaranteed by the directors, if the corporation had a valid defence against the enforcement
of the loan agreement, the directors may prefer to spread the liability through the
corporation by not advancing the available corporate defence, thereby protecting
themselves from liability under their guarantee.
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important to note that since an application under s. 97 is in the nature of an
interlocutory proceeding, the court will not, at that time, try the case on its
merits in order to determine the probability of success of the action. The
court will weigh the affidavit material filed on the application to determine
whether it shows that the intended action is without merit or is frivolous or
vexatious.
In Re Marc-Jay Investments Inc. and Levy application was made
under s. 99 [now s. 97] for leave to commence a derivative action. O’Leary J.
stated that with respect to the application:
It is not my function to decide whether such contemplated action will succeed at trial,
but simply to decide whether there is primafacie merit to it.
It is obvious that a Judge hearing an application for leave to commence an action,
cannot try the action. I believe it is my function to deny the application if it appears that
the intended action is frivolous or vexatious or is bound to be unsuccessful. Where the
applicant is acting in good faith and otherwise has the status to commence the action,
and where the intended action does not appear frivolous or vexatious and could
reasonably succeed; and where such action is in the interest of the shareholders, then
leave to bring the action should be given.
I agree that I have to weigh [the affidavit material filed in support of the
application] to determine whether it shows that the intended action is without merit or
is frivolous or vexatious…. I believe, however, that is the extent to which I am entitled
to weigh the evidence. I am not to deny leave to bring an action simply because on a
weighing of the evidence I should decide it is unlikely that the action will be successful? 2
It may be argued that the applicant will be required to show that the
intended action could “reasonably” succeed in order to be granted leave.
This requirement may be extracted from the words of O’Leary J.33 But such
a requirement would appear to contradict the main thrust of His Lordship’s
reasons for judgment which suggests that primafacie merit is sufficient. It
seems apparent that O’Leary J. did not intend to require the applicant to
show a reasonable chance of success in the contemplated action in order to
obtain leave. Such a requirement may be particularly onerous and would
ultimately result in an assessment of the merits of the action at an interlocu-
tory stage of the proceedings. Reid J. in Geist v. Nazaret Construction
Company Ltd 34 seemed to be of the view that once the intended action is
determined not to be frivolous or vexatious, it becomes unnecessary for the
court to decide whether that action will be or even may be successful. If the
intended action cannot be properly described as frivolous or vexatious, in
which category His Lordship includes those actions that are apparently
bound to be unsuccessful, it is not up to the court, at that time, to weigh the
question of whether the action may succeed if the prescribed conditions of
32(1974) 5 O.R. (2d) 235, 236-7 (H.C.).
33 See Armstrong v. Gardner, supra, note 22, 653 per Cory J.
34 (Ont. Div. Ct) 9 July 1980, 717/79 per Reid, Cory and J. Holland JJ.
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
s. 97 have been fulfilled. This is a sensible approach. The judge should not be
entitled to weigh the evidence to determine whether the action could reason-
ably succeed. Such a requirement would unduly restrict the development of
the derivative suit. Only established causes of action which had a proven
chance of success would be granted leave. It may be argued that the absence
of a requirement of a probability of success in the intended action will
encourage strike suits and harassing shareholder litigation. While this may
have been a problem in the United States, the absence of a contingency fee
system in Ontario and the prospect of the losing plaintiff being liable for
costs are both effective disincentives to frivolous litigation. In addition, the
procedural requirements for leave to be granted assist in maintaining the
integrity of the statutory derivative action.
2. Novelty of Cause of Action
The fact that a given cause of action is unknown in Ontario should not
per se be sufficient ground for a refusal to grant leave to commence a deriva-
tive action. In Farnham v. Fingold35 the claims made by the plaintiff were
completely novel in Ontario. Their success depended on the trial Court
applying or extending the principle followed in the American cases of
Perlman v. Feldmann36 and Brown v. Halbert37 or on the Court holding that
a breach of the provisions of Part IX of The Securities Act 38 constitutes an
actionable civil wrong. Jessup J.A., speaking for the Court, adopted the
decision of Morand J. in the High Court39 wherein Morand J. expressed the
view that difficult questions of law raised by the novelty of the plaintiff’s
claims should not be determined in interlocutory proceedings: “Where the
matters involved turn on an interpretation and application of a statute and
where there are important questions of fact to be determined as well, a Court
should not strike the pleadings at such an early stage. The fact of novelty
does not alter this….” Cory J., in Armstrong v. Gardner,40 was also of the
opinion that the fact that a cause of action is unknown in the Province of
Ontario ought not in itself constitute a ground for a refusal to grant leave.
3. Onus of Proof
The onus is on the applicant under s. 97 to bring before the court more
than mere suspicions to warrant the granting of leave. In Re Loeb and
Provigo Inc.4 1 a shareholder applied for leave to commence and maintain a
derivative action to seek an injunction restraining the corporation from
35 Supra, note 6.
36219 F. 2d 173 (Conn. C.A. 1955), cert. denied 349 U.S. 952 (1954).
3776 Cal. Rptr 781 (1st Dist. Ct App. 1969).
38R.S.O. 1970, c. 426.
39[1972] 3 O.R. 688, 698.
40 Supra, note 22, 653.
41 Supra, note 20.
McGILL LA WJOURNAL
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using its controlling interest to consolidate its operation with another corpo-
ration and divert present or future business to the detriment of the first
corporation. Steele J. refused to grant leave on the basis that there was
insufficient material before the Court to justify granting leave and that the
applicant had failed to satisfy the Court that the intended action was in the
interests of the company or its shareholders. His Lordship did not indicate
the materials that the applicant had relied on in support of his application.
However, His Lordship was of the opinion that there was no evidence or
material before the Court to indicate any impropriety on the part of the
directors. Steele J. referred to the burden on the applicant: “There is an onus
on an applicant to bring before the court more than mere suspicion to
warrant the granting of leave. ” 42
It is not clear how much evidence is required to support an application
for leave. The supporting affidavit should at least indicate that there has
been some improper conduct on the part of the directors. The applicant is
not required to prove his case on the application. He must, however, show
that the intended action is not completely without merit.
B. Other Requirements
A shareholder cannot obtain leave to commence a derivative action
unless he has satisfied the court of the following:
(i) he was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the transaction or other
event giving rise to the cause of action;43
(ii) he has made reasonable efforts to cause the corporation to commence or prose-
cute diligently the action on its own behalf;44
(iii) he is acting in good faith and it isprinafacie in the interests of the corporation or
its shareholders that the action be commenced. 45
Notwithstanding that the shareholder is able to satisfy the court as to all the
above, there appears to be a discretion in the court whether to grant leave.
1. Contemporaneous Ownership
Section 97(3)(a) of the Act requires the applicant to have been a share-
holder of the corporation at the time that the wrong occurred to the
corporation. It is a contemporaneous ownership requirement in that the
applicant must at the time of the application for leave still be a shareholder.
Thus, a person is unable to buy litigation. This requirement has been
42 Ibid., 500.
43 Ont. B.C.A., R.S.O. 1980, .54, s. 97(3)(a).
44Section 9703)(b).
45 Section 9703)(c).
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
criticized as not being appropriate in Canadian company law.46 There is no
apparent need for the applicant to have held shares in the company continu-
ously since the wrong was committed. It appears to be sufficient that he
owned shares at two crucial moments – at the time the wrong complained
of occurred and at the time he applies under s. 97 for leave to commence a
derivative action.
The proposed Act eliminates the contemporaneous ownership require-
ment. The complainant concept, as discussed previously, has discarded the
requirements that the applicant even be a shareholder. Former holders of
shares and debt obligations of the corporation have standing under s. 244 to
apply for leave to commence a derivative action. There is, in fact, no
requirement that the complainant, if he is a “security” holder, 47 have held
securities in the corporation at the time that the wrong occurred. It is
sufficient if he presently holds shares or debt of the corporation or did at any
time in the past hold such securities. It may seem that a former security
holder should have some connection with the wrong done to the corporation
as, for example, where he held shares at the time that the injury occurred and
subsequently sold the shares at a lower price than could be obtained in the
absence of the injury. However, the issue of ownership of securities of the
corporation is irrelevant to the derivative suit. The questions for determina-
tion should be: first, whether the corporation has been wrongly injured and
second, who is the most appropriate person to enforce the corporation’s
right of action. Whether the complainant is or was a security holder does not
alter the fact that the corporation has sustained an injury for which, unless
otherwise remedied, redress must be obtained through a derivative action.
The applicant need not be the registered owner of the shares of the
corporation provided that he is the beneficial owner of such shares. The
beneficial owner of a share has the status to bring an action under s. 97 even
though he is not the registered owner of the share.48 This is adopted by the
proposed Act which defines “complainant” to include the beneficial owner
of a security of the corporation.
46 See Beck, supra, note 8, 205-6. Professor Beck contends that the requirement was taken
from American legislation where it served the valid purpose of preventing the collusive
practice of the resident of one state transferring his shares to the resident of another state to
manufacture diversity of federal jurisdiction in order that the matter may be litigated in a
federal court. The requirement also served to prevent strike suits and purchased litigation.
Beck argues that the first reason has no application in Canada. The second reason has little,
if any, application in the absence of the contingency fee in Canada and the presence of the
potential liability for costs of a litigant and the procedural requirements under s. 97 of the
Ont. B.C.A.
47 Bill 6, s. l(l)(38) defines “security” as a share or debt obligation of the corporation.
48Supra, note 32, 236 per O’Leary J.
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2. Demand
Before seeking leave under s. 97, the shareholder must first make
reasonable efforts to cause the corporation to commence or prosecute
diligently the action on its own behalf.49 This requirement gives the
corporation, or for all intents and purposes the board of directors, the first
opportunity to right any wrongs that the corporation may have suffered.
However, where the wrongdoers are in control of the company, any attempt
by a minority shareholder to cause the wrongdoers to take action against
themselves must necessarily be an exercise in futility.
The courts appear to be adopting a liberal approach to the interpretation
of s. 97(3)(b) of the Act. In Armstrong v. Gardnero the applicant
shareholder had sent two letters to the president of the company, who was
also a solicitor, suggesting that action be taken. It was argued by counsel for
the respondent in an application under s. 99 [s. 97], that the applicant had not
complied with the requirements of s. 99(3)(b) [s. 97(3)(b)] in that no
reasonable efforts were made to cause the corporation to commence or
prosecute diligently the proposed action. Cory J. refused to apply a
restrictive construction to s. 99(3)(b). His Lordship stated:
It must be remembered that although the letters requesting action were not framed with
great particularity as to the cause of action to be brought, they were directed to a
solicitor. I think that there was a sufficient demand made to bring an appropriate
action by the two letters sent on behalf of the minority shareholders to satisfy the
provisions of s. 99(3)(b) [s. 97(3)(b)]. I do not think that this section of the Business
Corporations Act ought to be construed in an unduly technical or restricted mannerSI
Unfortunately, this case may prove to be of limited value because the
letters suggesting action were directed to an officer of the corporation who
was also a lawyer. Cory J. was sufficiently impressed with this fact to direct
specific attention to it in his judgment. It may well be argued that if that
person were not a lawyer, the judge would have ruled that the applicant had
not complied with s. 97(3)(b) and accordingly, would have dismissed the
application. Notwithstanding this possible argument, some solace can be
taken by the clear statement of His Lordship that s. 97(3)(b) is not to be
construed in an unduly technical or restricted manner.
Southey J. in Solmon v. Elkind5 2 recognized the futility of a perfunctory
demand where
the wrongdoers are in control of the corporation.
Unfortunately, while His Lordship in that case realized that any efforts to
cause the corporation
to commence an action against the alleged
wrongdoers was doomed to failure, he did not indicate whether a failure to
make such reasonable effort would be fatal to the application under s. 97. It
49 0nt. B.C.A., R.S.O. 1980, c. 54, s. 97(3)(b).
5oSupra, note 22.
51 Ibid., 652.
52(1976) 3 C.P.C. 31 (Ont. H.C.).
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
became unnecessary to determine this point since His Lordship was of the
opinion that reasonable efforts had been made by the shareholder. Where
the wrongdoers are in control of the corporation, it should only be necessary
for the applicant to show such control and that any attempt to cause the
corporation to commence the action would be futile. There would seem to
be no valid purpose served by the reasonable efforts requirement in such
circumstances. Rather, s. 97(3)(b) may enable the wrongdoers to put the
applicant shareholder to additional unnecessary expense and delay the
ultimate commencement of the action. The proposed Act has eliminated the
demand requirement. Instead, the complainant need only satisfy the court
that the directors of the corporation or its subsidiaries will not bring,
diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue the action.
Section 97 is silent on the question of ratification. The possibility of a
ratification of the wrong by the majority shareholders has caused some
concern.53 While it is possible that a strict reading of s. 97 could result in the
denial of leave on the basis that the wrong was capable of being ratified by
the majority, it was clearly the intention of the Lawrence Committee to avoid
the strictures of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle and provide an effective
procedure whereby corporate wrongs could be put right.54 Section 247(1) of
the proposed Act states, in no uncertain terms, that the fact that an alleged
breach of a right or duty owed to the corporation has been or may be
approved by the shareholders cannot by itself determine either an
application for leave or a statutory derivative action. However, evidence of
the approval by the shareholders is a factor to be considered by the court
when hearing the application or the action.
3. Bona Fides
The Lawrence Committee recommended
that the shareholder be
required to establish to the court, before leave will be granted to commence a
derivative action, that he is acting bonafide and that it is primafacie in the
interests of the corporation or its shareholders that the action be brought.55
This was, undoubtedly, intended to prevent the bringing of shareholder
derivative actions which are commenced with no intention of benefitting the
corporation on whose behalf the suit is brought but are instead commenced
for the sole purpose of provoking secret settlements or causing harassing
litigation. In addition, there may be circumstances where, notwithstanding
that a wrong has been done to the company, the prosecution of the action
may be disadvantageous to the company and its shareholders because, for
instance, of the potential damage to the company’s reputation or because the
53 See Beck, supra, note 8, 196-202, and Buckley, Ratification and the Derivative Action
under the Ontario Business Corporations Act (1976) 22 McGill L.J. 167.
54 See the Lawrence Report, supra, note 5, 62-3.
55 Ibid., 63.
Mc GILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 27
prospect of recovery would not justify the expense of litigation.56 In an effort
to avoid these undesirable results, s. 97(3)(c) of the Act requires the
shareholder applicant to satisfy the court that he is acting in good faith and
that it is primafacie in the interests of the corporation or its shareholders that
the action be commenced.
There is little guidance as to what will be required to satisfy the court of
the bonafides of the applicant. The motive of the applicant would, of course,
be relevant. However, it is uncertain whether a purely selfish motivation
would be sufficient to deny leave. Each shareholder should be able, and
indeed expected, to move in his best interests. In a derivative action, the suit is
brought on behalf of the corporation in a representative capacity. Therefore,
regardless of the motivation of the applicant, the action should, in theory, be
in the interests of the corporation or its shareholders. Section 97(3)(c) does
not, or at least should not, require the applicant to be an altruist. It is
unreasonable not to expect the applicant to be motivated in his own interest.
In any event, even though the applicant may be actuated by self-interest,
since the cause of action is derivative in nature, any suit to redress the wrong
would generally be in the interest of all the other shareholders. The bona
fides requirement should be construed with regard to its purpose: it was
designed to prevent strike suits. Accordingly, the applicant should be
required to satisfy the court that the action is not intended to be brought
solely for the purpose of provoking secret settlement without any intention
of benefitting the corporation or the other shareholders.
The good faith requirement in s. 97(3)(c) is linked with the requirement
that the action be prima facie in the interest of the corporation or its
shareholders. While they appear to be two separate requirements, it is
submitted that they appear in the same subparagraph for more than
aesthetic reasons; they support each other. If the action is determined to be
in the interests of the corporation or its shareholders, then it will buttress the
applicant’s contention that he is acting in good faith. Conversely, if the
action is not in the interest of the corporation or its shareholders, then the
applicant’s good faith may be suspect. Some support for this proposition
may be gleaned from the judgment of Southey J. in Solmon v. Elkind.57 In
that case, the applicant, his father and three individual defendants were
shareholders in a closely-held private corporation. A dispute arose between
56 See Buckley, supra, note 53, 170: “A trifling breach [by the director] of the duty of care,
which causes only nominal loss, should not be the subject of the elaborate machinery of
section 99 [now s. 97]”. See also Leavell, The Shareholders as Judges ofAlleged Wrongs by
Directors (1961) 35 Tul. L. Rev. 331, 348: “A suit against a corporations’s director … even if
successful, can sometimes … do the corporation more harm than good: his services may be
lost; the standing of the corporation in financial circles may be adversely affected; public
relations may suffer, the value of the shares may be adversely affected in the market;
prosecution of the action may be expensive to the corporation”.
57 Supra, note 52.
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
the father and the three defendants as to the management of the company.
The father commenced a personal action against the three defendants
alleging wrongful conduct. The father then became concerned that certain of
the claims advanced in that action were derivative in nature. Instead of the
father applying for leave to commence a derivative action, his son, the
applicant, did so. The affidavit of the applicant in support of the application
was largely limited to information that was derived from an examination of
the corporate records. Counsel for the respondent argued that leave should
be refused since the applicant was really bringing the action as a nominee of
the father. Counsel contended that if the father had applied for leave, he
would have been subject to a searching cross-examination on his affidavit in
respect of the matters alleged in both statements of claim. Counsel’s position
was that an application under s. 97 should be refused unless the material
supporting it complied with the best evidence rule and the best evidence in
this case was an affidavit from the father.
While it may be said that counsel for the respondent was merely taking a
tactical position based on non-compliance with the technicalities, it is
submitted that what counsel was essentially asserting was that the applicant
was not acting in good faith. Assuming that the claims were derivative, the
action was intended to be brought in a manner which would avoid a
searching cross-examination of the most knowledgeable shareholder. This
motivation, it is suggested, does not affect the applicant’s good faith. It
should be sufficient to satisfy the court that the action is not intended to be
If the action would benefit the
brought for extortionate purposes.
corporation or its shareholders then this may be accepted as evidence of the
applicant’s good faith.
Southey J. stated:
The third requirement is that the proposed plaintiff be acting in good faith and that it is
prima facie in the interest of the corporation or its shareholders that the action be
commenced. I am satisfied from the material that there is very real and genuine dispute
between these parties, which, unless settled, must be determined eventually in the courts
and that the claims that are advanced in the proposed statement of claim are properly
the subject of a derivative action … . [I]f the proposed action is successful it will have
turned out to be in the interest of the corporation.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that Melvyn Solmon [the applicant] is acting in good faith
even though he may have brought the action instead of his father in order that the
defendants would not have the opportunity to cross-examine the father before the
action was commenced. In my judgment, the Solmons were under no obligation to
bring the action in such a way that permitted such cross-examination when it was
possible for it to be brought by a shareholder who would be a less fruitful subject of
cross-examination.
58
58 Ibid., 34.
REVUE DE DR OITDEMcGILL
[Vol. 27
In Anderson v. Anderson,5 9 O’Driscoll J. considered the issues of bona
fides and interest of the corporation or shareholders. In that case, an
application for leave to commence a derivative action was brought by the
daughter of the proposed defendant. The evidence revealed that the
respondent father owned 25 per cent of the corporation. He had given the
remaining 75 per cent to the applicant, his son and his daughter-in-law. The
respondent was president of the corporation and retained a casting vote
pursuant to the by-laws of the company. The applicant alleged essentially
that the respondent had mismanaged the company. O’Driscoll J., in a very
terse judgment, dismissed the application on the basis that the application
was not in good faith nor was it in the best interest of the corporation or the
shareholders that the action be commenced. His Lordship also held that in
any case, he would refuse the order under the residual discretion conferred
upon him by the closing words of s. 97(3).
O’Driscoll J. appears to base his decision that s. 97(3)(c) was not
complied with on a number of facts. First, two large independent
corporations – RoyNat (which held a five per cent beneficial interest in the
company) and the Royal Bank (which held the balance of the shares by way
of pledge) – both had sufficient confidence in the respondent to give him all
their proxies and the Royal Bank had during the last year loaned the
company in excess of one million dollars. Second, the applicant was never
involved in the daily operation of the company. Finally, whatever material
assets the applicant possessed was a result of gifting by the respondent.
His Lordship did not specifically indicate why he was of the view that the
application was not in good faith. It would seem that His Lordship was
influenced by the evidence that the company, under the respondent’s
management, had enjoyed a dramatic increase in net worth in the last few
years. This was evidence of anything but mismanagement. In addition, the
respondent had given the applicant all her shares and had for some time
supported her financially. 60 It must have seemed that the applicant was
actuated by ill will to the respondent notwithstanding the respondent’s
apparent munificence. The fact that the corporation had prospered under
the control of the respondent was an indication that it was not in the best
interest of the company or its shareholders that an action be commenced.
While it may not have been expressed by O’DriscolU J. in his reasons for
judgment, this was likely viewed as a case where a derivative action was
sought not to benefit the corporation but to coerce the respondent into a
settlement.
59 (Ont. H.C.) 15 May 1978, 6529/77.
60 Counsel for the respondent in Anderson v. Anderson, ibid., described the 32 year-old
applicant as a “spoiled brat” who had conducted herself as a “professional student” for
several years until the respondent refused to continue to pay the expenses.
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
The touchstone of bona fides should be whether the interests of the
shareholders or the corporation are being served. Notwithstanding that the
applicant may be actuated by malice, ill will or other personal motives
towards the person in control of the company, if the action can be said to be
in the interest of the corporation or its shareholders, then the fact that the
persons on whose behalf the action will be brought will benefit should be
evidence of the applicant’s good faith under s. 97(3)(c).61 Where the
beneficiaries of the derivative suit will be the corporation or its shareholders,
as is intended by the derivative action, then the objective of the legislation has
been fulfilled.
The proposed Act maintains the requirement of good faith. 62 However,
this requirement is no longer linked with the requirement that the action be
in the best interest of the corporation or its shareholders. It is uncertain
whether this suggests that the issue of bonafides is to be determined solely by
an examination of the motives of the applicant or whether it is in recognition
of the fact that a derivative action by definition must necessarily benefit the
corporation on whose behalf it is brought. I would submit that it is more
likely the latter than the former and that the preceding analysis should still be
followed. It will no longer be necessary that the applicant satisfy the court
that it is primafacie in the interest of the corporation or its shareholders that
the action be commenced. Section 244(2)(c) of the proposed Act provides:
“It appears to be in the interests of the corporation or its subsidiary that the
action be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued.” 63 The deletion of
the words “prima facie” in favour of the words “appears to be” seem to
suggest that some lesser amount of evidence is required to satisfy the court
that the action is in the interests of the corporation. The deletion of the
in that paragraph does not effect any
interests of the shareholders
substantive change since anything in the interests of the corporation should
invariably be in the interests of the shareholders.
4. Residual Discretion
Section 97(3) of the Act appears to confer a residual discretion upon the
judge in an application for leave to commence a derivative action.
Notwithstanding that the applicant has satisfied the court as to paragraphs
(a), (b) and (c) of s. 97(3), the court may refuse to grant leave. The closing
words of s. 97(3) are permissive: “the court may make the order”.64
O’Driscoll J. in Anderson v. Anderson expressly acknowledged the existence
of such residual discretion:
61 See also Rainey v. Norman (Ont. H.C.) 6 May 1976, 33/76per Cory J., where good faith
appears to be determined by the validity of the dispute and the benefit to the corporation or
its shareholders.
62 Bill 6, s. 244(2)(b).
63 [Emphasis added.]
64[Emphasis added.]
Mc GILL 1A WJOURNAL
[Vol. 27
[I]f I am wrong in that finding and if the evidence before me today does meet that test
[under s. 97(3)], I am independently and separately of the view that I should refuse an
order under the residual discretion which I appear to have in the closing words of
subs. (3) of s. 99 [s. 97(3)].65
The rationale for this apparent residual discretion is less than clear given
the procedural conditions precedent to the institution of a derivative action.
If an applicant is able to convince the court that it has satisfied the procedural
requirements of s. 97, there would seem to be no good reason for giving the
court the authority to deny leave in those circumstances. Under what
circumstances will leave be denied notwithstanding that s. 97 has been
complied with? This question is left unresolved by s. 97 and as such, creates
an intangible obstacle to lawyers advising minority shareholders in a
derivative suit. If this residual discretion of the court does exist, as is
suggested by O’Driscoll J., then the court indeed becomes the final arbiter of
the issue of the commencement of a derivative action. While it may be
viewed as an additional precaution to prevent the abuse of the derivative suit,
it would necessarily imply a lack of confidence in the ability of the procedural
requirements of s. 97 to maintain the integrity of derivative actions.
The language of s. 244 of the proposed Act is such that there does not
appear to be any discretion in the court to deny leave to an applicant where
the procedural requirements of the section have been complied with.
C. Discontinuance and Settlement
In an effort to avoid secret settlements, the Lawrence Committee
recommended that court approval be required in order to discontinue,
compromise or settle any derivative action.66 Section 97(6) of the Act
provides that a derivative action cannot be discontinued, settled or dismissed
for want of prosecution without the approval of the court. It further
provides that if the court determines that the interests of the shareholders or
any class of shareholders may be substantially affected by such
discontinuance, settlement or dismissal, it may direct that notice be given to
the shareholders whose interests will be so affected.
A derivative action must be commenced before court approval is
required for settlement. The question is, at what point is the action
commenced? If the writ of summons marks the commencement of the
action, a shareholder who has applied for and has received leave to
commence a derivative action, may at any time up to the moment that the
writ is issued, settle the matter with the alleged wrongdoer without the need
to obtain court approval. It may be that the obtaining of leave rather than
the issuance of the writ will be the device used to provoke a secret settlement.
However, in light of the procedural requirements to th6 granting of leave and
5 Supra, note 59. See also Getz, Corporation Law (1971) 5 Ottawa L. Rev. 154, 156.
6 Lawrence Report, supra, note 5, 67.
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
the apparent residual discretion of the court, it is unlikely that a shareholder
will be able to obtain leave under s. 97 in order to abuse it. In Abraham v.
Prosoccer Ltd,67 Reid J. suggests that a derivative action is commenced once
leave is granted. Therefore, once a shareholder has received leave, he cannot
thereafter discontinue or settle the action without the approval of the court.
This would certainly discourage the use of leave applications as a lever to
promote secret settlements. However, the requirement of court approval for
the settlement of a derivative action, where leave has been obtained but no
writ has yet been issued, may prove to be onerous in terms of the time and
expense associated with reaching a court-approved settlement. Nonetheless,
the view of Reid J. is preferred. Once leave is obtained, the applicant
shareholder undertakes to act, not only on his own behalf, but also for the
benefit of the other shareholders and the corporation on whose behalf he is
suing. Accordingly, the shareholder who obtains leave should not be
permitted to disregard his obligation to the other shareholders in attempting
to settle the suit. Section 97(6) must protect, to some extent, the interests of
the shareholders not before the court.
Similarly, Bill 6 requires that court approval be given for any stay,
discontinuance, settlement or dismissal for want of prosecution of an
application made or action brought or intervened in. This clarifies the issue
that s. 97(6) leaves in doubt, namely, whether court approval is only required
once the writ of summons has been issued. Section 247(2) of the proposed
Act makes it clear that once an application for leave is made, the approval of
the court is required for any settlement. This would seem to indicate that not
only can the matter not be settled without court approval once leave is
granted, but approval is also required to settle once the notice of motion is
filed.
Where a discontinuance, settlement or dismissal of the action for want of
prosecution may substantially affect the interest of the shareholders or any
class of shareholders, the court has the discretion to require that notice be
given to those parties. Section 247(2) of the proposed Act also allows the
court to order that notice be given to any complainant whose interest, the
court has determined, may be substantially affected by a stay,
discontinuance, settlement or dismissal for want of prosecution. This notice
provision will offer the other shareholders (on whose behalf the plaintiff is
generally suing) some protection where the action is dismissed, since such a
dismissal will be binding upon them. 68 In addition, where a settlement is
being effected, the notice provision would promote shareholder disclosure
and prevent secret profits. However, there is no provision in s. 97 for the
67(1981) 31 O.R. (2d) 475 (H.C.).
68 If a limitation period has not expired, the shareholder will be able to seek leave to
commence his own derivative action. However, since the dismissal was court-approved in
the first instance, it may well be unlikely that leave will be gianted in the second instance.
REVUE DE DR OITDEMcGILL
[Vol. 27
distribution of any settlement funds to the other shareholders. Presumably,
the court will require that they receive notice of the intended settlement in
order that they may look after their own interests. Under Bill 6, the court
may, where its approval is sought to stay, discontinue, settle or dismiss for
want of prosecution an application made or action brought or intervened in,
grant such approval upon such terms as it thinks fit.69 Accordingly, the court
would be able to order a distribution of the settlement funds among the
shareholders of the corporation.
It is uncertain whether s. 97(6) of the Act would enable a shareholder,
who was a stranger to the proceedings, to assume carriage of the derivative
action and be substituted for the original plaintiff who has or is about to
withdraw from the action. It would seem that one of the reasons for
requiring the giving of notice under s. 97(6) is to enable a shareholder who is
a stranger to the proceedings to become involved in the derivative suit. Since
the purpose of requiring that a derivative action be brought in a
representative capacity was to bind all the shareholders by the judgment and
prevent a multiplicity of actions, it would seem logical that where the
shareholder who has commenced
to
discontinue the suit, any other interested shareholder should be able to
substitute himself for the original plaintiff. This would obviate the necessity
of having to make another application for leave and the duplication of costs
in repeating the same procedural steps that the original plaintiff has already
completed. In addition, if the second shareholder is required to start a new
action, he may be at a disadvantage when he applies for leave in that there
would likely be a presumption that since the first settlement was sanctioned
by the court, the second action is either multiplicitous, harassing or
illegitimate. 70 Under the proposed Act, since the discontinuance would have
to be court approved, the court can impose such terms as it thinks fit.
Therefore, the court would have the power to substitute one party in the
place of another who is about to withdraw from the action.
the derivative action decides
Section 97(6) does not indicate when approval will be granted to
discontinue or settle the action. It would seem obvious that the court should
not approve discontinuance or settlement of the suit unless it is in the interest
of the corporation or its shareholders to do so. The action should not be
dismissed for want of prosecution without notice to the shareholders whose
interests may be affected by the dismissal. Unreasonable delay in the
prosecution of the derivative action by the original plaintiff ought not to
69 Bill 6, s. 247(2).
70 See Abraham v. Prosoccer Ltd, supra, note 67, where leave to substitute a plaintiff in a
class action and an intended derivative action was refused. Note that leave had not yet been
obtained to commence the derivative action, therefore there could have been no prejudice to
the second shareholder. In addition, the bonafides of the party seeking to be substituted was
suspect.
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
prejudice the interests of the corporation or the other shareholders on whose
behalf the action was commenced. Notice in such circumstances would
enable an interested shareholder to assume carriage of the action.
The proposed Act also does not indicate when approval will be granted
to stay, discontinue or settle the derivative action. Accordingly, the above
discussion would still be of some relevance.
At common law, where a judgment is recovered in favour of the
corporation, the damages recovered belong to the corporation and not to the
minority shareholder who instituted the action. 71 While the plaintiff
shareholder will see some appreciation in his shares reflecting the amount
recovered from the wrongdoers, where the wrongdoers are the majority
shareholders in control of the corporation, most of the damages recovered
from them will revert to them as shareholders. Section 97 of the Act does
nothing to change this. However, under s. 245 of Bill 6, the court can direct
that any judgment recovered be paid, in whole or in part, directly to former
and present security holders of the corporation or its subsidiaries instead of
to the corporation or its subsidiaries. Presumably, the court will be able to
direct payment to innocent past or present security holders to the exclusion
of those who have engaged or acquiesced in misconduct.
Conclusion
The statutory derivative action has been in effect for just over ten years.
Notwithstanding this fact, there is not an abundance of judicial authority on
the subject. The focal point of the derivative action is now the courts, who
have become the final arbiter of the question of whether a derivative action
will be commenced. In view of the liberal approach taken by the courts to
applications for leave, one would expect much future judicial development
in the area of shareholder derivative actions.
The procedural requirements of s. 97 of the Act, while designated to
prevent abuses of the system, are not so restrictive nor so strictly interpreted
by the courts that they preclude the institution of derivative suits in all
appropriate cases. The procedural requirements of s. 97(3) have been
criticized as making the derivative action more expensive and time
consuming than it was at common law. 72 While these criticisms may be
valid, the statutory derivative action unquestionably provides a more
effective means to right corporate wrongs than existed at common law.
Section 97 has attempted to do away with the strictures spawned by Foss v.
Harbottle. A minority shareholder seeking to assert a corporate right of
action need only comply with the statutory conditions precedent to maintain
a derivative action. In addition, the ability of the nominal plaintiff to apply
71 Gower, supra, note 28, 651.
72See Zacks, supra, note 6, 194-6; Buckley, supra, note 53, 169.
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to the court at any time while a derivative action is pending for an order for
the payment by the corporation of reasonable interim legal costs would
mitigate the financial burden attendant on derivative actions by providing
interim financial assistance without the necessity of having to await the final
disposition of the action.73
The proposed Act expands and develops the present statutory derivative
action. It makes the action available to a wider class of persons rather than
just to shareholders. A complainant is now entitled to defend an action as
well as bring one in the name of and on behalf of the corporation. In
addition, the possibility of the ratification of the wrong by the shareholders
will not per se determine the application or action. If the procedural
requirements work as they are designed to, s. 97 can serve as an effective
procedure whereby a shareholder may commence and prosecute a derivative
action, on behalf of the corporation and all the other shareholders, to
enforce any rights, duties or obligations owed to the company.
Appendix
I. Section 97 of The Ontario Business Corporations Act provides:
97.(1) Subject to subsection (2), a shareholder of a corporation may maintain an
action in a representative capacity for himself and all other shareholders of the
corporation suing for and on behalf of the corporation to enforce any right,
duty or obligation owed to the corporation under this Act or under any other
statute or rule of law or equity that could be enforced by the corporation itself,
or to obtain damages for any breach of any such right, duty or obligation.
(2) An action under subsection (1) shall not be commenced until the shareholder
has obtained an order of the court permitting the shareholder to commence the
action.
(3) A shareholder may, upon at least seven days notice to the corporation, apply to
the court for an order referred to in subsection (2), and, if the court is satisfied
that,
(a)
(b)
(c)
the shareholder was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the
transaction or other event giving rise to the cause of action;
the shareholder has made reasonable efforts to cause the corporation to
commence or prosecute diligently the action on its own behalf; and
the shareholder is acting in good faith and it is primafacie in the interests
of the corporation or its shareholders that the action be commenced, the
court may make the order upon such terms as the court thinks fit, except
that the order shall not require the shareholder to give security for costs.
73 Ont. B.C.A., R.S.O. 1980, c. 54, s. 97(4). However, the plaintiff is accountable to the
corporation for such costs if the action is dismissed with costs on a final disposition at trial or
on appeal. Section 247(4) of Bill 6 allows the applicant to apply for interim costs when he
applies for leave.
1982]
THE ONTARIO DERIVATIVE ACTION
(4) At any time or from time to time while an action commenced under this section
is pending, the plaintiff may apply to the court for an order for the payment to
the plaintiff by the corporation of reasonable interim costs, including solicitor’s
and counsel fees and disbursements, for which interim costs the plaintiff shall
be accountable to the corporation if the action is dismissed with costs on final
disposition at the trial or on appeal.
(5) An action commenced under this section shall be tried by the court and its
judgment or order in the cause, unless the action is dismissed with costs, may
include a provision that the reasonable costs of the action are payable to the
plaintiff by the corporation or other defendants taxed as between a solicitor
and his own client.
(6) An action commenced under this section shall not be discontinued, settled or
dismissed for want of prosecution without the approval of the court and, if the
court determines that the interests of the shareholders or any class thereof may
be substantially affected by such discontinuance, settlement or dismissal, the
court, in its discretion, may direct that notice in manner, form and content
satisfactory to the court shall be given, at the expense of the corporation or any
other party to the action as the court directs, to the shareholders or class thereof
whose interests the court determines will be so affected.
II. The Derivative Action Provisions of Bill 6 provide:
243.
In this Part,
(a) “action” means an action under this Act;
(b) “complainant” means,
(i) a registered holder or beneficial owner, and a former registered
holder or beneficial owner, of a security of a corporation or any of its
affiliates,
(ii) a director or an officer or a former director or officer ofa corporation
or of any of its affiliates,
(iii) any other person who, in the discretion of the court, is a proper
person to make an application under this Part. New.
244.(1) Subject to subsection (2), a complainant may apply to the court for leave to
bring an action in the name and on behalf of a corporation or any of its
subsidiaries, or intervene in an action to which any such body corporate is a
party, for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the action on
behalf of the body corporate.
(2) No action may be brought and no intervention in an action may be made under
subsection (I) unless the complainant has given fourteen days’ notice to the
directors of the corporation or its subsidiary of his intention to apply to the
court under subsection (1) and the court is satisfied that,
(a)
the directors of the corporation or its subsidiary will not bring, diligently
prosecute or defend or discontinue the action;
(b)
the complainant is acting in good faith; and
(c)
it appears to be in the interests of the corporation or its subsidiary that the
action be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued.
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(3) Where a complainant on an ex parte application can establish to the
satisfaction of the court that it is not expedient to give notice as required under
subsection (2), the court may make such interim order as it thinks fit pending
the complainant giving notice as required.
(4) Where a complainant on an application can establish to the satisfaction of the
court that an interim order for relief should be made, the court may make such
order as it thinks fit. R.S.O. 1980, c. 54, s. 97, part, amended.
245.
In connection with an action brought or intervened in under section 244, the
court may at any time make any order it thinks fit including, without limiting
the generality of the foregoing,
(a) an order authorizing the complainant or any other person to control the
conduct of the action;
(b) an order giving directions for the conduct of the action;
(e) an order directing that any amount adjudged payable by a defendant in
the action shall be paid, in whole or in part, directly to former and present
security holders of the corporation or its subsidiary instead of to the
corporation or its subsidiary; and
(d) an order requiring the corporation or its subsidiary to pay reasonable legal
fees and any other costs reasonably incurred by the complainant in
connection with the action. R.S.O. 1980, c. 54, s. 97, part, amended.
247.(1) An application made or an action brought or intervened in under this Part shall
not be stayed or dismissed by reason only that it is shown that an alleged breach
of a right or duty owed to the corporation or its affiliate has been or may be
approved by the shareholders of such body corporate, but evidence of approval
by the shareholders may be taken into account by the court in making an order
under section 205, 245 or 246. R.S.O. 1980, c. 54, s. 97, part, amended.
(2) An application made or an action brought or intervened in under this Part shall
not be stayed, discontinued, settled or dismissed for want of prosecution
without the approval of the court given upon such terms as the court thinks fit
and, if the court determines that the interests of any complainant may be
substantially affected by such stay, discontinuance, settlement or dismissal, the
court may order any party to the application or action to give notice to the
complainant.
(3) A complainant is not required to give security for costs in any application made
or action brought or intervened in under this Part.
(4)
In an application made or an action brought or intervened in under this Part,
the court may at any time order the corporation or its affiliate to pay to the
complainant interim costs, including reasonable legal fees and disbursements,
for which interim costs the complainant may be held accountable to the
corporation or its affiliate upon final disposition of the application or action.
R.S.O. 1980, c. 54, s. 97, part, amended.
