The Duty of Fair Representation: Individual Rights in the
Collective Bargaining Process, or Squaring the Circle
Margriet Zwarts*
In the author’s opinion, trade unions have
become a social and economic force of criti-
cal importance, capable of wielding a power
over union members that rivals the power of
employers. Until recently, the existence of
and the potential for abuse –
this power –
has been largely ignored and trade unions
have been allowed to justify the sacrifice of
individual interests in the name of the collec-
tivity. Only within the last few years have we
seen legislative recognition of the individual
union member’s right to control, however
feebly, union behavior. Thus, the two legis-
latures who share jurisdiction over labour
relations in Qudbec have imposed a duty of
fair representation on unions, leaving them
free to decide when and why they will act,
provided they do so fairly. The task of decid-
ing what is fair has been given to the Cana-
dian LabourRelations Board and the Tribun-
al du travail. This has led both tribunals into
an often crabbed and seemingly endless de-
bate on how to reconcile individual interests
with collective interests. They have, as a
result, been forced to articulate implicitly or
explicitly theirview of the role unions play in
Quebec today. Regrettably, the Board and
the Tribunal have decided that Canadian un-
ions remain weak and that collective in-
terests must be buttressed. The author con-
cludes that the statutory duty of fair repre-
sentation seems to have changed little and
that we must await the day when a new
compromise will be struck, with a more
equitable and realistic balancing of indi-
vidual and collective rights.
*M.A. (Tor.); B.C.L., LL.B. (McGill).
Selon l’auteur, les syndicats se sont trans-
form6s en une force sociale et 6conomique
d’importance capitale, capables d’exercer
sur leur membres une autorit6 comparable A
celle des employeurs. Jusqu’A tout r~cem-
ment, l’existence de ce pouvoir ainsi que la
possibilit6 d’abus qui en r6sulte, restaient
essentiellement ignordes: On a ainsi permis
aux syndicats dejustifier au nom de ]a collec-
tivit6, le sacrifice d’intrrts individuels. Ce
n’est que depuis quelques ann6es qu’on a vu
une reconnaissance l6gislative du droit de
chaque syndiqu6 d’exercer un droit de re-
gard, si andmique soit-il, sur la conduite de
son syndicat. De cette fagon, les deux 16-
gislatures qui se partagent la juridiction sur
les relations du travail au Qubec ont impos6
aux syndicats un devoir de juste reprrsenta-
tion; ceux-ci garderont alors une discretion
large qui devra toutefois 8tre exerc~e de fa-
gon juste. On a charg6 le Conseil canadien
des relations du travail et le Tribunal du
travail de determiner la nature et Ia portde de
ce devoir, ce qui devait les mener A s’aventu-
rer dans une discussion prnible et vraisem-
blablement interminable au sujet de la rrcon-
ciliation des int6r~ts individuels et collectifs.
Par consdquent, ils se sont vus forc6s de
declarer, implicitement ou explicitement,
leur perception du r6le contemporain des
syndicats. Malheureusement, le Conseil et le
Tribunal semblent croire que les syndicats
canadiens demeurent faibles et que les int6-
r~ts de Ia collectivit6 devront rester favoris~s
avec plus de vigueur. L’auteur conclut que le
devoir statutaire de juste repr6sentation n’a
en fait chang6 que peu de choses et que nous
devons des lors attendre la venue d’un nou-
veau compromis qui saura dquilibrer de fa-
on plus rraliste et dquitable les droits indivi-
duels et collectifs.
Ou
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL,
[Vol. 28
Synopsis
Introduction
I.
H.
Enforcement of the Collective Agreement by the Individual
The Duty of Fair Representation
A. Preconditions Under the Quibec Labour Code: Discharge or
Disciplinary Sanction
B. Preconditions Under the Canada Labour Code: Intra-Union
Disputes
C. The Duty of Fair Representation and Non-Members of the Bar-
gaining Unit
M. Scope of the Duty of Fair Representation
A. Toward a Standard of Fair Behaviour
Conclusion
Introduction
“[A]w a muddle! Fro’ first to last, a muddle!” Thus the central character
in Charles Dickens’ Hard Times ‘ sums up a life that unfolds in a desolate
Lancashire mill town and that ends with his accidental death in an abandoned
mine shaft –
the black pit that aptly epitomizes the abyss of his blind despair.
Like so many of Dickens’ characters, Stephen Blackpool dies as a victim to
the will of a social institution created for no apparent purpose other than that
of stifling individuality and keeping the masses of humanity downtrodden. In
Hard Times, that villain social institution is the trade union.
When we first encounter Stephen he is an honest and steady workman,
virtuous although long-suffering, and with an innate grace far exceeding that
of his social betters. Despite his crippling marriage to a drunkard and the
horror of his daily work, he has managed to salvage some human dignity from
the hardships of his life as a factory hand. Then, the United Aggregate
Tribunal arrives on the scene. Stephen makes and keeps a promise not to
involve himself in the trade union movement. A union agitator, whose natural
endowments mark him as a man “above the mass in little but the stage” on
which he stands,2 manoeuvres Stephen’s fellow workers into punishing him
C. Dickens, Hard Times (New York: New American Library, 1961) 267.
21bid., 142.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
for his refusal to show solidarity. Having lost the sympathy of the union,
Stephen proceeds to lose the sympathy of his employers. In rapid sequence,
then, Stephen is fired, cast out of his community and dies. All of this, Dickens
tries to persuade us, stems from the collusion between trade unionists and
capitalists, neither of whom can tolerate independent thought or individual-
ism within their midst. The evil that lies in the heart of trade unionism is,
moreover, so insidious that even its victim, Stephen, fails to understand how
or why his honourable desire to keep his word comes to be rewarded by social,
then economic, and finally physical death.
Anti-union rhetoric, such as that found in Hard Times, was not of course
uncommon in the early days of the trade union movement. What is prophetic
in Dickens’ work, however, is his vision of the union as a social institution
that would sacrifice the interests of the very worker it was supposed to
represent. Curiously, the legal recognition of trade unions in the 1870’s did
not bring forth any special legislation to curb the power unions might exercise
over their members. Perhaps it was believed that the new legislation suffi-
ciently circumscribed union power or that, in any case, the small craft unions
typical of the era would never command enough support to be truly harmful to
their own members. Cases such as Allen v. Flood’ reveal some judicial
sympathy for the plight of the individual who tries to defy the union. But apart
from the rare cases where the union flagrantly abused its power, 4 the courts
normally showed themselves indifferent to what might happen within the
union. For example, when considering the rights of an individual to be
admitted to a union, the courts rather whimsically likened unions to gentle-
men’s clubs;5 in neither case could the law force the members to associate with
those whom they found odious. 6
3[1898] A.C. 1, [1895-9] All E.R. Rep. 52 (H.L.). In the end, however, Flood and his
companions lost their case. But cf. Quinn v. Leathem [1901] A.C. 495, [1900-3] All E.R. Rep.
1 (H.L.).
4See Rigby v. Connol (1878) 14 Ch. D. 482, [1874-80] All E.R. Rep. 592.
5The English jurisprudence relating to gentlemen’s clubs is rich. Courts will intervene to
force association only when a club abuses its normally wide discretion to control membership.
See, e.g., Fisher v. Kean (1878) 11 Ch. D. 353; Dawkins v. Antrobus (1881) 17 Ch. D. 615,
[1881-5] All E.R. Rep. 126. In Canada, club jurisprudence is rare but it seems from cases such
as Andreas v. Edmonton Hospital Board [1944] 4 D.L.R. 747 (Alta S.C., App. Div.), that
courts are loath to interfere with the free exercise of club members’ discretion in admitting new
members. It appears also that, as in England, courts will step in to prevent expulsion only when
discretion is abused. See, e.g., L’Acaddmie de Musique de Quebec v. Payment [1936] S.C.R.
323, [1936] 4 D.L.R. 279.
6See Weinberger v. Inglis [1919] A.C. 606 (H.L.). For a modem expression of the same
attitude, see Faramus v. Film Artists’ Association [1963] 2 Q.B. 527,547, [1963] 1 All E.R.
636 (C.A.) per Upjohn L.J. On the whole, the courts were more concerned with the adverse
effects of unionism on employers, rather than on the workers themselves. Compare the holding
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
As Dickens foretold, the trade union has become a social and economic
institution of paramount importance, capable of exercising a power over
union members that rivals the power of employers. Under the Canada Labour
Code 7 and the Quebec Labour Code,8 a legally accredited union is given
exclusive authority to negotiate and to administer the collective agreement
that will determine the unionized worker’s terms and conditions of employ-
ment. As a result, this worker can no longer hope to win special benefits for
himself by dealing directly with his employer; he must assert his rights
through the union. If the union refuses to negotiate a particular term or to
advance a grievance, the individual affected is ostensibly left without re-
course. If the union has secured a closed or union shop agreement, the
individual may become even more dependent on his union for, unless the
union agrees to admit him as a member, he can expect no job from an
employer bound by the agreement. Unions have been vested with the power to
act as lawmaker, judge and policeman of workers’ rights.
As the strength and importance of unions has grown, the criticisms
voiced by Dickens in Hard Times have taken on a new relevance. It would be
naive to believe that modem unions always exercise their powers with the
utmost good faith and that unionists have somehow remained miraculously
untainted by incompetence or corruption. A more serious charge levelled
against unions is that they seem to have forgotten their role as the advocate of
workers’ rights. Like the United Aggregate Tribunal, modem unions are
accused of pursuing goals diametrically opposed to those of the working men
they are mandated to represent. For example, the union may wish to husband
its resources, whereas an individual worker who has been fired may want to
see union funds spent on the arbitration of his dismissal. Because the union
controls both the money and the arbitration procedure, the individual must
yield to the decision of the union, no matter how meritorious his claim.
Worse, the union may negotiate a superseniority clause to reward staunch
supporters. The less ardent in the bargaining unit would be understandably
aggrieved by such discriminatory treatment, but will not be able to complain
because they are not parties to the negotiations. Worse still, a predominantly
white union could negotiate the systematic phasing out of all those jobs
inAllen v. Flood, supra, note 3, with the decision in Quinn v. Leathem, supra, note 3. See also
Russell v. Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners [1912] A.C. 421, [1911-13] All
E.R. Rep. 550 (H.L.) for an excellent example of judicial indifference to the rights of union
members. The Law Lords refused to recognize the legal status of a union for the purposes of an
action to recover superannuation benefits owed by the union to a member of some forty years’
standing.
7R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, s. 116, as am. S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1 replacing s. 116 with subs.
136(1) and adding s. 154.
8R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27, s. 67.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
hitherto held by blacks and unless a court sees fit to intervene, on the basis of
fundamental rights legislation, as did the United States Supreme Court when
confronted with such a fact pattern, 9 the black workers in the bargaining unit
have no legal cause to complain. If courts and legislatures remain indifferent
to individual rights within the union, the result may be that the modem union
becomes as remote and unassailable as was the employer in the nineteenth
century; once again, the individual will be powerless.
Although it is in the main overstated, the case against modem unionism
does raise an intractable problem. Unionization involves the pursuit of collec-
tive interests, often at the expense of individual interests. Whatever may have
been the case in the past, the collective interests of present-day unions are
determined democratically by the majority of its members. In the face of that
majority will, no individual interests can, at least in theory, prevail. In the
name of fairness, however, courts and legislatures sometimes derogate from
democratic principles and will insist that individual interests should prevail.
There are two methods whereby individual rights can be protected: either
the worker is allowed to assert certain employment rights individually, or the
union’s exclusive power is tempered by a duty of fair representation. In
Qudbec, the recent jurisprudence and legislation indicate that the first method
is no longer available. The underlying assumption of this development is,
presumably, that the individual should not be allowed to disturb the equilib-
rium established by our collective bargaining system. The union remains the
watchdog of the collective agreement even though, at times, threats of
penalties are necessary to make it behave as such. The courts and the
lawmakers have unequivocally affirmed that labour relations involves two,
and only two, parties: the union and the employer. The employee can only
hope that the union will be required to act fairly. There remains one crucial
question to be addressed: what meaning are we to ascribe to “fairness”? It may
be perfectly clear that, in fairness, blacks should have the same rights as
whites under a collective agreement, even if ninety percent of the membership
opposes the granting of such rights. It is not quite so clear that, in fairness,
every worker who is dismissed from his job has an absolute right to arbitrate
the dismissal.
The fairness of union decisions can only be ascertained by weighing the
relative urgency or merit of collective and individual interests. Even this test,
however, does not provide a particularly helpful way of proceeding, since it
presupposes that we have formed some understanding of the role unions play
in modem Canadian society. If the modem-day union is seen as no different
from any big business, then union members should presumably have rights at
9Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
least as powerful as those of a corporate shareholder: the member should have
an absolute right to arbitrate in circumstances analogous to those which
trigger the shareholder’s appraisal rights –
that is, whenever the individual is
in jeopardy of losing membership in the organization. But if the union
remains, in our view, the vulnerable and humble champion of labour, we
might be more inclined to let it exact tougher standards of discipline. To save
money and energy for more worthy battles, the union should be left free to
screen out frivolous or vexatious claims.
Although it shares certain qualities with both, the modem Canadian
union is in fact neither big business nor grass-roots champion. It follows that
neither corporate democracy nor military autocracy serves as an appropriate
model. It is the failure, perhaps even the unwillingness, to establish an
appropriate model that has plagued the case law on the duty of fair representa-
tion. For without such a model, the task of reconciling the individual worker’s
interests with those of his union becomes impossible.
I.
Enforcement of the Collective Agreement by the Individual
Spectacular cases of union corruption-the stuff of Royal Commissions
arise but rarely. 0 Much more frequently, the
and yellow journalism –
complaints brought against unions involve the same humdrum, and yet for the
employee critical, set of facts: The employer sees fit to discipline an indi-
vidual and the union refuses to arbitrate the individual’s claim of a breach of
the collective agreement. The individual then turns to the courts, asking that
they do justice according to his reading of the collective agreement. Before
deciding on the merits of the case the courts must ask whether an individual
can seek to enforce a collective agreement without the assistance of his union.
Neither the Canada Labour Code nor the Qudbec Labour Code offers a
straightforward answer to this preliminary question.” Both stipulate that
10See, e.g., Government of Canada, Report of the Industrial Inquiry Commission on the
Disruption of Shipping on the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence River System and Connecting
Waters (1963).
“The Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, s. 132 used to read as follows:
“Notwithstanding anything in this Part, any employee may present his personal grievance to his
employer at any time.” There is no judicial authority on the meaning of this provision. Two
readings, at least, are possible: the section either confers a right on the individual to process his
own grievance or confers a privilege on the employer to negotiate for a collective agreement
that allows individual processing of grievances. For a similar problem of interpretation, see
NationalLaborRelationsAct of 1935, 9(a), 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1970) and the debate between
Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement (1956) 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 622 and Summers,
Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration (1962) 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 362,
378.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
grievances must be submitted to arbitration according to the terms of the
collective agreement or, in the absence of such terms, to an arbitrator selected
by the parties to the agreement. Since the individual is not himself a party to
the agreement,” he cannot settle with the employer on the choice of an
arbitrator. Whatever right the individual may have to take his grievance to
arbitration without the assistance of his union must, then, be found in the
collective agreement. If, as is usually the case, the union is made the sole
master of the arbitration process, the individual has a right to arbitrate a
dispute arising from the collective agreement only in so far as the union is
prepared to pursue that right for him. It can also be taken for granted that a
court, when faced with an express clause in a collective agreement barring
individual access to the arbitration process, will not assume jurisdiction to
decide on the merits of the individual’s complaint.
This refusal to assume jurisdiction stems from an understandable reluct-
ance to side-step the terms of a freely bargained and legally effective collec-
tive agreement. It also makes logical sense, as long as we are prepared to
accept that the benefits flowing from collective bargaining are best pursued
collectively. More often than not, an individual complainant will ask the court
either to act as though it were an arbitrator or to refer the dispute to arbitration.
He wants not damages but reinstatement, or the substitution of some lesser
penalty. The types of remedies that an arbitrator can order were not available
at common law. Indeed, arbitration itself avails only because a union has been
accredited or recognized and has negotiated with the employer for an arbitra-
tion procedure. It follows from our initial assumption that arbitration is
rightfully controlled by the union. Moreover, in the absence of an express
clause in the collective agreement, we should presume that the union alone is
responsible for the bringing of any dispute to arbitration. We might also note
that there are cogent policy reasons for allowing the union to control the
arbitration procedure. For example, to require the arbitration of every grie-
vance would quickly drain even the most powerful and wealthy unions of
money and energy; it would also tax the employer unnecessarily. 3
Yet certain job interests, such as seniority rights or the right not to be
dismissed without just cause, are today considered fundamental. It might
appear unduly harsh to deny the worker access to the enforcement procedure,
especially if he himself proposes to bear the cost. If we decide once and for all
that, absent a clause to the contrary in the collective agreement, the union is
vested with the sole authority to control the arbitration procedure, we may be
1
2 See the definition of “parties” in Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-l, subs. 107(1)
as am. S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1 and the definition of “collective agreement” in the QufbecLabour
Code, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27, para. l(d).
“See Cox, supra, note 11, 625.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
telling the individual employee that collective agreement guarantees of
rights that he
seniority and the like are nothing more than paper rights –
possesses, but that are unenforceable except by the good offices of the union.
Before we accept an irrebuttable presumption in favour of the union’s power
to control the arbitration procedure, we should perhaps be allowed to consider
whose interests are sacrificed by so doing.
Be that as it may, the Supreme Court decision in General Motors of
Canada Ltd v. Brunet has made it amply clear that an irrebuttable presump-
tion already exists. 4 Regrettably, the reasons for judgment have to do more
with statutory and collective agreement interpretation than with policy.
Claiming reinstatement and damages for lost wages, Brunet had sued both his
employer and his union in the Quebec Superior Court for their failure to
observe the collective agreement. The employer countered with a preliminary
objection to the Court’s jurisdiction to hear complaints arising from an alleged
breach of a collective agreement. Mr Justice Pigeon duly noted, as had Laskin
C.J.C. in McGavin Toastmaster v. Ainscough ‘1 and Judson J. in Le Syndicat
catholique des employ~s de Magasins de Quibec v. Cie PaquetLt6e,6 that all
the rights enjoyed by a unionized employee against his employer must flow
either from the collective agreement or from labour relations legislation. In
effect, the statutory regime of collective bargaining, which applies once a
bargaining unit is certified, sweeps away all rights the employee may have
enjoyed under his individual contract of employment. 7 The logical conclu-
sion, given this premise, is that these rights can be enforced legally only by
the mechanism spelled out in the collective agreement or the relevant labour
code. Because Brunet could point to no clear provision in either the agreement
or the Qu6bec Labour Code granting the right to process grievances indi-
vidually, Pigeon J. simply assumed that no such right existed. 8
The result of Brunet is that considerations such as the importance of the
job interest at stake or the willingness of the employee to bear costs have
become totally extraneous to the issue. Courts are spared the difficult task of
sifting through the competing claims and facts of each case; they can rely
strictly on the wording of the collective agreement. Moreover, if the collec-
tive agreement is vague, any ambiguity will presumably be resolved neatly in
favour of the union’s absolute right to control the arbitration procedure.
For those who distrust their union’s ability to represent their interests
fairly or competently, Brunet appears to be an extremely harsh decision.
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 537, 548 [hereinafter Brunet].
15[1976] 1 S.C.R. 718, (1975) 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
16 [1959 S.C.R. 206, 212, (1959) 18 D.L.R. (2d) 346.
17See Brunet, supra, note 14, 549.
‘-Ibid., 548.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Pigeon J. did indicate, however, that his decision might have differed had the
union acted in bad faith.’ 9 Since Brunet came before the Supreme Court as a
question of jurisdiction, we can assume Pigeon J. meant that the ordinary
courts could decide an issue arising from the alleged breach of a collective
agreement, provided that the plaintiff prove the union’s bad faith. This “bad
faith exception” is an extremely narrow one, especially since the presumption
of good faith places a heavy evidentiary burden on the employee. It also fails
to provide any assistance to those who complain of simple negligence or
imprudence.
Although it has closed the door firmly on the individual’s right to
arbitrate, the Supreme Court has shown itself more liberal when considering
the individual’s right to participate in an arbitration undertaken on his behalf.
The leading case, Hoogendoorn v. Greening Metal Products & Screening
Equipment Co., held that it would be a breach of natural justice to deny the
right to be heard to any individual directly interested in an arbitration
proceeding.” When is an individual directly interested? The majority in
Hoogendoorn did not suggest that the right to participate existed only in
individual or group grievances; it would seem that the individual may have the
right to be heard even in a policy grievance, as long as his interests are
affected by the outcome of the arbitration award.2′ For example, a dispute
concerning the contracting-out of certain bargaining unit work will normally
be resolved by way of a policy grievance. Yet, under Hoogendoorn, the
worker whose job will disappear if the employer is allowed to contract-out
should be given the right to participate in the arbitration of the grievance.
The dissenting opinion of Judson J. is based on a rigid distinction
between policy and individual grievances. Because he could not show that the
grievance was an individual one, the plaintiff in this case had no right to
participate.2 Unfortunately, Qudbec cases following Hoogendoorn seem to
have adopted Mr Justice Judson’s somewhat mechanical approach, and have
not allowed employees affected by the outcome of the arbitration to partici-
pate in what has been classified as a policy complaint.3 A union eager to avoid
the effects of Hoogendoorn would be well advised to dress up disputes as
policy grievances –
a relatively easy task given the problems arbitrators and
’91bid., 548 and 552.
2[1968] S.C.R. 30, 39-40, (1968) 65 D.L.R. (2d) 641 [hereinafter Hoogendorn; cited to
S.C.R.]. See also Re Bradley and Ottawa Professional Fire Fighters Association [1967] 2
O.R. 311, (1967) 63 D.L.R. (2d) 376 (C.A.).
2’Ibid., passim.
“Ibid., 34.
23See, e.g., Blanchette v. Beaubien [1975] R.D.T. 43 (Qud. C.A.); Guay v. Lalancette
[1977] C.S. 725; The Danby Corp. v. Clinent [1978] C.S. 746.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
courts have encountered in trying to pin down the exact nature of the policy
grievance.’
The right to participate in arbitration is, of course, a cold comfort to
those whose claims the union has dismissed peremptorily as frivolous or
hopeless. In light of the decision in Brunet, Hoogendoorn’s union should
simply have refused to arbitrate his claim altogether. It appears that Hoogen-
doom’s claim was hopeless, the union at all times was acting bonafide, and a
decision not to arbitrate would likely have been unimpeachable. In a sense,
Hoogendoorn can be rationalized as simply one more case affirming the duty
to follow the rules of natural justice during a hearing, even though such a
hearing need not have been held at all.21 Nonetheless, it seems somewhat odd
that the individual should have stronger rights if the union does act than if the
union fails to act altogether.
Brunet notwithstanding, it should be noted that certain rights remain
directly enforceable by the employee. These rights all involve some pecuni-
ary claim, although, as Mr Justice Pigeon pointed out in Brunet, not all
pecuniary claims are ipso facto enforceable individually. 6 The Supreme
Court decision in Hamilton Street Railway v. Northcott27 indicates that the
unionized employee can ask a court to enforce an arbitration award in his
favour, even though this will require the court to calculate the amount of the
award: Lower level courts have also affirmed repeatedly that the unionized
worker has a right to proceed directly against his employer for unpaid wages.58
It is not clear what other pecuniary claims fall within this exception to the
general rule that the union controls the enforcement procedure for rights
arising from a collective agreement.
2’See E. Palmer, Collective Agreement Arbitration in Canada (1978), 139 and Supplement
1980 (1981) 30; Re Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Association of Broadcast
Employees and Technicians (1973) 4 L.A.C. (2d) 263.
‘ See, e.g., R. v. Johnson [1979] 2 W.W.R. 571 (Sask. C.A.); Re Clauson andSuperinten-
dent of Motor-Vehicles (1977) 82 D.L.R. (3d) 656 (B.C. Co. Ct). See also dicta of the
minority in Martineau & Butters v. Matsqui Institution Inmate Disciplinary Board [1978] 1
S.C.R. 118, (1977) 74 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
‘Brunet, supra, note 14, 542.
2[1967] S.C.R. 3, (1966) 58 D.L.R. (2d) 708.
‘See, e.g., Grottoli v. Lock & Son Ltd [1963] 2 O.R. 254, (1963) 39 D.L.R. (2d) 128
(H.C.) [hereinafter Grottoli]; L’Association des policiers de Giffard v. La Cite de Giffard
[1968] B.R. 863; Arsenault v. Ville de Louisville [1977] C.P. 285. See also St Pierre v. Le
Syndicatdesfonctionnairesprovinciaux du QubecInc. [1979] C.P. 67 [hereinafter St Pierre],
where the employee claimed compensation for lost wages from his union. The union had
blocked the plaintiff’s access to his office during the course of an illegal strike; the employer
refused to pay wages for that period and the plaintiff then sued his union for the lost wages. The
union raised as a defence that the plaintiff could only recover the wages through the mechanism
set out in the collective agreement. Interestingly, the Court held that the union was a third party
19821
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Nor is it clear to what extent a court will be allowed to interpret a
collective agreement as part of a claim for unpaid wages. Of Mr Justice
McRuer’s judgment in Grottoli v. Lock & Son Ltd,29 Pigeon J. had this to say:
All that was decided… was that nothing prevents an employee from bringing an action to
recover unpaid wages. It is now well established that this is true only in so far as it is
simply a matter of unpaid wages. If there is in fact a dispute over the interpretation or
application of the collective agreement, the provision requiring arbitration is a bar to such
action and must be dismissed.”
It appears, then, that the courts may settle straightforward, but not disputed,
cases. But what if one of the parties decides to dispute the perfectly obvious?
Furthermore, if there were no dispute, would the employee be asking a court
of law to order the payment of back wages? Is the employee whose union
refuses to represent him in a claim for back wages effectively without direct
recourse against his employer? Surely, the jurisdiction of the court to hear a
claim for unpaid wages does not hang on the mere existence of a dispute,
however misguided or even frivolous that dispute may be. Let us assume,
then, that the court has at the very least the jurisdiction to determine the prima
facie validity of the dispute; this would entail an examination of the terms of
the collective agreement. It may well be that such an examination raises
complicated and perplexing questions of law, best decided by an arbitrator.
On the other hand, the merit of the employee’s claim may be readily apparent
on the face of the collective agreement. Whatever the case, the court is now
engaged in interpreting the collective agreement, if only to conclude that it
raises questions beyond the court’s competence or that it explicitly spells out
the individual’s rights. Yet Brunet tells us that in no circumstances does the
court have jurisdiction to interpret a collective agreement. We cannot assume
that the court has the power to consider even the prima facie validity of a
dispute. If we follow Brunet to its logical limits, we discover that all the
earlier jurisprudence on the individual’s right to claim back wages was wrong
and that, in truth, the court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain such
complaints.”
to that agreement for the purposes of the suit in delict, and so could not rely on the terms of the
agreement to bar the plaintiff’s claim. The Court stated at 73: “Il appert A la Cour… que
l’intim6 n’dtait que le repr6sentant des fonctionnaires et que, comme entit6 distincte, il n’a pas
acquis, notamment en ce qui concerne les salarids, d’autre droit que celui d’agir comme
repr6sentant des fonctionnaires. Un syndicat ne saurait r~clamer pour son binifice personnel
un avantage dfi L un de ses membres en vertu de Ia convention. … Dans un conflit oil il
n’agirait pas comme repr6sentant desdits employ6s, mais bien pour son propre compte, la
convention collective devra 8tre consid6r6e comme res inter alios acta.”
19Ibid.
1″Brunet, supra, note 14, 551-2.
“1 In his article, Rights Under a LaborAgreement, supra, note 11, Archibald Cox provides a
more rational basis for distinguishing personal claims from claims that can only be pursued by
the union. According to Cox, we must ask whether the employee could reasonably have
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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We are left only with arbitration awards, which the individual can
enforce directly against his employer because the dispute that gave rise to his
claim has been settled. Even here it could be argued, albeit weakly, that the
individual is statutorily barred from pursuing judicial enforcement. Section
93 of the Qudbec Labour Code reads as follows:
93. The award shall have the effect of a collective agreement signed by the parties.
It may be executed under the authority of a court of competent jurisdiction at the suit of a
party who shall not be obliged to implead the person for whose benefit he is acting.”
It may be that s. 93 subrogates the union in the employee’s rights, with the
effect that the individual himself cannot ask for judicial enforcement. More
likely, however, s. 93 should be compared with s. 69, which has been read to
create no subrogation whatsoever:
69. A certified association may exercise all the recourses which the collective agreement
grants to each employee whom it represents without being required to prove that the
interested party has assigned his claim.”
In Arsenault v. Ville de Louisville I the Court held that, because s. 69 uses no
imperative or specific language to create a legal subrogation, we must assume
the employee himself remains master of his own rights –
at least in so far as
those rights have been settled by arbitration. Section 69 is permissive only:
the union may pursue the recourses otherwise available to the individual
employee, but it may do so only if the employee wishes the union to act on his
behalf. If he does not so wish, the employee keeps his right to enforce
personally. The Court concluded that the individual’s right to enforce is so
sacrosanct that it lives on, even after the union has ostensibly settled the
matter. Thus, an employer who has paid a union the amount of an arbitration
expected to be paid the sum claimed. If so, he may sue the employer directly. But if his claim
arises from a difficult and contorted reading of the collective agreement, the union alone can
pursue the claim. In short, the issue is one of reliance interests: the court can award damages for
the loss of reasonably expected benefits, not for the loss of an unforeseeable windfall. Cox
gives an example of such a windfall at 606-7: a carpenter is called on Labour Day to do
maintenance work on a high roof; he works from 7:00 A.M. until 7:00 P.M. to do the job.
Underthe collective agreement, the normal workday extends from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. All
work in excess of eight hours a day, as well as work done outside the normal scheduled
workday, is paid at double time. Work performed at great heights is to be paid at double time;
finally, work performed on statutory holidays is also paid at double time. The carpenter’s
normal hourly pay is $2.00, yet he could argue that he is owed $8.00 for each hour between
8:00 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. and $16.00 for each hour worked before 8:00 A.M. and after 5:00
P.M.
31R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27, s. 93. [The English text is cited throughout. However, the French
text will be cited when it is critical to an understanding of a tribunal decision.].
33R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27, s. 69.
-“Supra, note 28.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
award may subsequently find himself liable to the employee for the same
amount. This conclusion is not entirely justifiable in the light of s. 93, which
suggests that a court order in favour of the union would protect the employer
from the subsequent suit of the individual employee. If the union can obtain a
court order, one effect of which is to bar any subsequent action by the
employee, it would seem likely that the union could also settle the matter
informally but irrevocably. Nonetheless, the Court inArsenault was probably
right in pointing to the permissive nature of s. 69 and, by analogy, s. 93: both
allow the union to enforce an individual’s recourses, but neither denies to the
individual a concurrent right to enforce.
The principle articulated in Brunet has been embraced warmly by
Qu6bec courts 5.3 In particular, special mention should be made of the recent
Court of Appeal decision in Hotte v. Bombardier LtDe,36 which effectively
makes the individual more dependent than ever upon his union. The union had
taken Hotte’s grievance to arbitration, but the award was not in his favour. He
thereupon proceeded to the Superior Court, without the assistance of his
union, for a writ of evocation. Evocation is available, according to art. 846 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, only at the demand of one of the parties to the
case evoked. Hotte was not, and indeed could not be, according to the
collective agreement, a party to the arbitration proceedings and so his applica-
tion was dismissed. 37 This simple, but neat, solution accords perfectly with
the conclusions of Brunet, a decision to which Mr Justice Melangon does not
refer. If the individual has no right to see his grievance arbitrated, why should
he have any right to ask for evocation of an unfavourable arbitration award?
On the other hand, one unfortunate effect of Hotte may be that Hoogen-
doom has only limited applicability in Qudbec. If there is a duty to arbitrate
according to the dictates of natural justice, that duty is most properly enforced
by way of evocation. But if the only person who might care to see Hoogen-
doom applied –
is not a party to the arbitration
then, under Hotte, evocation is not available. In short, the Qu6bec employee
may find that he has a right, but no remedy. 38
the individual employee –
“See, e.g., The Danby Corp. v. Climent, supra, note 23; Dayon v. Cournoyer [1974] C.S.
316; Gagni v. Association des pompiers de Montrial Inc. , C.A. (Montral, 500-09-001,
106-772) 20 February 1978; Venditelli v. La citg de Westmount [1980] C.A. 49.
[t1981] C.A. 376 [hereinafter Hotte].
37Ibid., 383.
-This is not strictly accurate. The individual may yet have a remedy in injunction, possibly a
writ of mandamus, or even a declaratory motion. His most assured remedy is likely an
injunction. Mandamus, according to art. 844 of the Qudbec Code of Civil Procedure, depends
upon the existence of “a duty or an act which is not of a purely private nature”; it is not at all
clear whether an arbitrator is under such a duty. On the other hand, art. 453 C.C.P. makes a
declaratory motion depend on a “right, power or obligation which he [the applicant] may have
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
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In fairness, it should be added that the Court in Hotte never indicated that
the complainant was bereft of all remedy. Melangon J.A. pointed out careful-
ly that other, more appropriate, remedies may exist at law but he failed to
name those remedies. Presumably he had in mind a direct recourse against the
union. According to Melangon J.A., Hotte’s complaint is based ultimately on
the union’s failure to act on his behalf; let Hotte, then, make out a case if he
can against the union in, say, a writ of mandamus.39
As long as one agrees with the result of Brunet, recourse against the
union does indeed seem like a logical way of proceeding. The underlying
assumption of the case can be put simply: We cannot allow the individual to
proceed against his employer, because that would destroy the integrity of a
system of labour law built on the existence of two parties, the union and the
employer. The individual can in no circumstances hope to bypass the union,
which is vested with the exclusive authority to represent his interests. If he
could, the solidarity so necessary for effective union action might be jeopar-
dized. The courts are not interested in the importance of the job interest at
stake, nor in whether the individual agrees to pay for his own arbitration, for
the collective agreement serves as conclusive evidence of the individual’s
rights.
But no union should be able to shield itself behind a collective agreement
if its failure to arbitrate is capricious or negligent. The absolute power to
control the arbitration procedure should be tempered by a duty to act fairly and
responsibly. Canadian courts have decided that fairness can be best achieved
not by opening up the arbitration procedure to the individual, but by creating
more powerful recourses against the union. Thus, Qudbec courts have im-
posed on unions the duty to represent fairly the interests of all the members in
the bargaining unit.40 Legislatures have followed suit and have imposed
under a contract, will or any other written instrument”. One would have to argue, therefore,
that the right to participate, as enunciated in Hoogendoorn, supra, note 20, is a right under a
written instrument (i.e. the collective agreement).
9The classic Qudbec case on the availability of mandamus to review union decisions is
Seafarer’s International Union of North America (Canadian District) v. Stern [1961] S.C.R.
682, (1961) 29 D.L.R. (2d) 29 [hereinafter Stern].
*SeeBrais v. Association des contremaitres de la C.E.C.M., C.S. (Montreal 500-813-850)
29 May 1972; Boisvert v. Syndicat national des employis de garage de Quebec Inc., C.S.
(Quebec 200-05-001 802-763) 4 September 1980. See also the discussion of the unreported
Herder and Hamilton cases in L’Administration de Pilotage des Laurentides et la Guilde de la
marine marchande du Canada v. Gagnon [1981] C.A. 431. All of these cases find inspiration
in the leading American decision of Vaca v. Sipes 386 U.S. 171 (1967), which was first
accepted by a Canadian court in Fisher v. Pemberton (1969) 8 D.L.R. (3d) 521, (1969) 72
W.W.R. 575 (B.C.S.C.).
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
similar statutory duties.4
Cases such as Brunet might have been used to resolve the competing
interests of the employee and his union in controlling the collective agreement
enforcement procedure. They were not used and, in the end, the task of
resolving these interests has been shifted to another forum, another cause of
action. 42 The union’s power to control the enforcement procedure is control-
led by the duty to represent fairly. In the name of fair representation,
therefore, courts and labour boards have been permitted to chip away at the
monolith of union power created by labour relations law and confirmed by
Brunet. In these suits or complaints brought against the union, courts and
boards can engage in the kind of flexible and subtle analysis that could not be
undertaken in Brunet. How effective that analysis is, depends largely on how
we define the scope of the duty to represent fairly.
Even though Qudbec and Canadian legislation now provides for a statutory duty of fair
representation, some employees might have preferred to pursue their rights before the Superior
Court. Under the Quebec Labour Code, the only remedy available to a complainant is
arbitration. The Tribunal du Travail has no jurisdiction to award costs or damages for lost
wages: See Boutin v. Le Syndicat international des travailleurs en glectricitg [1979] T.T. 91,
96-7; Rivest v. Association internationale despompiers, section locale 1121 [1980] T.T. 276.
The Superior Court, however, can order full compensation for any damage suffered. Cf.
Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1 as am. S.C. 1972, s. I adding s. 189, which allows
the Canada Labour Relations Board to fashion remedies as it deems appropriate. For examples
of the types of awards the Board has made, see Massicotte and Teamsters Union, Local 938
[1980] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 427, cert. denied in Teamsters Union, Local 938 and Massicotte
(1980) 34 N.R. 611 (F.C.A.), affd (1982) 134 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.); Cameron and
Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers [1981] 1 Can. L.R.B.R.
273, cert. denied in Re Via Rail Canada Inc. and Cameron (1981) 125 D.L.R. (3d) 254
(F.C.A.).
4 1 Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1 as am. S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, s. 49 adding s.
136.1; QudbecLabour Code, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 141 as am. S.Q. 1977, c. 41, s. 28 adding subs.
38(b) now consolidated R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27, s. 47.2.
“An alternative approach may be found in the classic works of three American authors:
Cox, supra, note 11; Summers, supra, note 11 and Union Powers and Workers’ Rights (1951)
49 Mich. L. Rev. 805; and Blunrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-
Management Authority versus Employee Autonomy (1959) 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631 and The
Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-
Union Relationship (1963) 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435. Of the three, Cox seems the least prepared
to erode the union’s absolute power to administer the collective agreement. Even he, however,
accepts that certain so-called property rights remain vested in the individual and can be pursued
in the ordinary courts. By contrast, Summers maintains that the individual should always be
permitted to act on his own behalf when a union withholds its support. Blumrosen adopts the
middle ground. For him, the individual can himself enforce any claim that involves a critical
job interest: e.g., dismissals, severe disciplinary sanctions, seniority grievances, and unpaid
wages.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
H. The Duty of Fair Representation
A.
Preconditions Under the Quebec Labour Code: Discharge or Disci-
plinary Sanction
Even the most cursory exahnination of the statutory duty of fair repre-
sentation imposed by the Canada and Qu6bec Labour Codes will reveal a
fundamental difference in approach. Section 136.1 of the Canada Labour
Code provides for a positive duty in the following terms:
Where a trade union is the bargaining agent for a bargaining unit, the trade union and every
representative of the trade union shall represent, fairly and without discrimination, all
employees in the bargaining unit. 43
Section 47.2 of the Quebec Labour Code, however, speaks in negative terms:
A certified association shall not act in bad faith or in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner
or show serious negligence in respect of employees comprised in a bargaining unit
represented by it, whether or not they are members.”
Notwithstanding certain dicta in a Canada Labour Relations Board decision,”
the effect of this difference in phrasing may be more apparent than real. What
distinguishes the duty of fair representation under the Quebec Labour Cade is
not merely the wording of the statutory provisionper se; it is the three sections
that follow s. 47.2:
47.3. If an employee who has been the subject of dismissal or of a disciplinary sanction
believes that the certified association is, in that respect, violating section 47.2, he shall, if
he wishes to invoke this section, submit a written complaint to the Minister within six
months. The Minister shall appoint an investigator who shall endeavour to settle the
dispute to the satisfaction of the interested parties and of the certified association.
47.4 If no settlement has been reached within fifteen days of the appointment of the
investigator or if the association does not carry out the agreement, the employee shall, if
he wishes to invoke section 47.2, apply to the Court within the fifteen ensuing days to
request that his claim be referred to arbitration.
47.5 If the Court considers that the association has violated section 47.2, it may authorize
the employee to submit his claim to an arbitrator appointed by the Minister for decision in
the manner provided for in the collective aggreement, as in the case of a grievance.
Sections 100 to 101.10 apply mutatis mutandis. The association shall pay the employee’s
costs.
The Court may, in addition, make any other order it considers necessary in the
circumstances.46
41R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1 as am. S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, s. 49.
44R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27, s. 47.2.
4 Laplante and Cartage and Miscellaneous Employee’s Union, Local 931 [1981] 3 Can.
L.R.B.R. 52 [hereinafter Laplante].
“R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27, ss 47.3-47.5.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
If the complaint does not concern a dismissal or a disciplinary sanction,
the employee may yet have recourse to s. 47.2, but in that case s. 144 alone
determines the penalty: the union may suffer a fine of $100 to $500 for its
failure to represent adequately the employee’s best interests. This penalty is
derisory, if not meaningless, to most employees. It is highly unlikely that a
worker who, for example, has suffered from the lackadaisical treatment of his
claim to seniority will be much consoled by the imposition of a $500 fine.
Such a fine may spur the union to act more equitably or competently in future,
but does not solve the immediate problem: does the worker have a valid claim
to seniority? What the worker wants is arbitration. Yet the gateway to
arbitration is through s. 47.3 et seq. The worker must not only make out a case
that the union acted improperly; he must also show that the union’s improprie-
ty occurred in the context of a dismissal or a disciplinary sanction. 47 We may
note in passing that any disciplinary sanction, no matter how trivial, may give
rise to s. 47.3 liability. This result is bizarre, especially because the section
excludes from its scope certain job interests that are surely more critical than
those involved in a minor disciplinary sanction. It would appear that a worker
could conceivably use s. 47.3 et seq. to force the arbitration of a verbal
reprimand, even though he can never hope to do so with regard to a seniority
dispute.
Since a meaningful remedy for a breach of s. 47.2 is available only under
s. 47.3, the meaning of the term “un renvoi ou une sanction disciplinaire” has
become crucial.48 An initial grammatical difficulty as to whether the adjective
“disciplinaire” modifies the noun “renvoi” has been resolved in favour of a
reading that gives the broadest meaning possible to “renvoi”. Briefly, a
dismissal is any action that deprives the employee of his job; it need not be
disciplinary in nature, and can result from events such as the non-renewal of a
contract,49 a layoff or even a transfer from one work place to another.50
,”In other words, the Quebec Code has incorporated a somewhat twisted version of
Blumrosen’s methodology: only two critical job interests –
have
been singled out for special protection. For the rest, the individual must apparently submit
himself to the union’s will.
dismissal and discipline –
“The French version of s. 47.3 of the Quebec Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1977 c. C-27 is as
follows:
47.3 Si un salari6 qui a subi un renvoi ou une sanction disciplinaire croit que r’association
accr6ditde viole 4 cette occasion l’article 47.2, il doit, s’il veut se prrvaloir de cet article,
porter plainte par 6crit au ministre dans les six mois. Le ministre nomme un enquateur qui
la satisfaction de l’intdress6 et de l’association accrdditde.
tente de rdgler la plainte
‘9See Bordeleau v. Syndicat des professeurs du College du Nord-Ouest [1979] T.T. 133.
The holding in this case may, however, hang on the crucial fact that Bordeleau’s contract was to
be renewed automatically, unless the employer gave prior notice. In light ofProcureur gingral
du Qubec v. Tribunal du Travail [1978] C.A. 103, there may be no dismissal, within the
meaning of s. 47.3, if the collective agreement stipulated that the term of employment was of
limited duration with no obligation on the part of the employer to renew.
-‘See Guinette v. L’Union des chauffeurs de camions, hommes d’entrep6ts et autres”
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
More problematic is the meaning of the term “sanction disciplinaire”. At
first blush, s. 47.3 does not appear to restrict disciplinary sanctions to those
imposed by an employer; it may also cover union disciplinary sanctions such
as expulsion or suspension. The success of an argument in favour of the
individual’s right to arbitrate intra-union disputes depends largely on the
effect of s. 47.5. It is this section which empowers the Tribunal du Travail to
order the arbitration of the individual’s claim, in the event that a union has
mismanaged a dismissal or disciplinary sanction. Whereas the French version
of s. 47.5 speaks of arbitration “selon la convention collective, comme s’il
s’agissait d’un grief”, the English version refers to “the manner provided for
in the collective agreement, as in the case of a grievance”. The French version
seems to suggest that the individual’s claim must arise from a dispute con-
cerning the application or meaning of that collective agreement. On the other
hand, the English version points to an alternative, if somewhat strained,
interpretation. Perhaps it is only the manner, and not the substance, of the
arbitration that must be determined by reference to the collective agreement.
If this interpretation is correct, an intra-union dispute, which normally arises
from a disagreement over the terms of the union’s constitution, can be
arbitrated by virtue of s. 47.5. Support for this interpretation can be found in
the draftman’s apparently careful distinction between claims under s. 47.5
and grievances under the collective agreement. If a s. 47.5 claim is substan-
tively the same as a grievance (which, by definition, is a dispute concerning
the meaning and effect of a collective agreement), then why was it necessary
to add that a claim must be settled “as in the case of a grievance”? Seemingly,
a claim is something broader than a grievance, something that need not
concern rights arising from the collective agreement.
This argument is quixotic and was peremptorily rejected in Imbeau v.
Syndicat des professeurs du College de Maisonneuve,5l the first case to
consider the meaning of disciplinary sanctions as used in s. 47.3. The
complainant, Imbeau, and eight fellow teachers at the College de Maison-
neuve had refused to participate in what they rightly thought to be an illegal
strike. The union retaliated in much the same way as Dickens’ United
Aggregate Tribunal might have done –
it promptly expelled the nine
teachers .52 An intra-union dispute is best resolved in proceedings less adversa-
ouvriers, local 106 [1979] T.T. 409. It might be noted that the English version of s. 47.3 does
not pose the same problem as the French version: s. 47.3 applies if there has been a “dismissal
or… a disciplinary sanction”, and so it is clear that the dismissal need not be punitive.
5 [1979] T.T. 340 [hereinafter Imbeau].
1If Imbeau had also been dismissed, as a result of a closed or union shop agreement, s. 47.3
might have been available. The union would in that case have acted in bad faith with regard to
his dismissal. The problem here, however, is that arbitration would not serve as a particularly
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
rial, not to mention less time-consuming and costly, than those of the courts.
Indeed, arbitration would appear to be the most appropriate way of settling
such disputes. Arbitration is expeditious, informal and conciliatory. 3 Small
wonder, then, that Imbeau turned to the Tribunal du Travail, asking it to use
its powers under s. 47.5 to appoint an arbitrator. His application was,
however, rejected for the simple reason that s. 47.5 cannot be stretched to
protect individuals in intra-union disputes.
Judge Auclair began by stressing that s. 47.5 must be read with ss 47.2
through 47.4; that is, before the Tribunal du Travail can nominate an arbitra-
tor to settle a claim, it must appear that the union acted improperly with regard
to a dismissal or a disciplinary sanction. Nothing in s. 47.5 expressly stipu-
lates that the claim submitted to the arbitrator arises from the collective
agreement. However,
ce m~me article prdcise que la reclamation du salarid6 peut 8tre soumise un arbitre pour
d6cision selon la convention collective. Cette mention indique bien que le l6gislateur voit
helpful remedy. The arbitration will presumably concern the dismissal, not the expulsion, and
that should be unimpeachable as long as the employer acted within the limits of the collective
agreement. The employer could have resisted the union’s demand of dismissal by invoking s.
63 of the Qu6bec Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27. The employer is not bound, under a
closed or union shop agreement, to dismiss an expelled or suspended union member unless that
member had been employed (i.e. semble hired) contrary to a term of the collective agreement or
the member participated, at the behest of the employer, in activities against the union. There is
no reported decision to date on this section. Reference may be had to the Ontario Labour
Relations Board decision on a similar section of the relevant Ontario legislation in Walker and
McNally Freight-Ways (1964) 64 (3) C.L.L.C., para. 16,011, which suggests that the section
was intended to protect the individual from dismissal for exercising a right under theAct. Thus,
participation in the election campaign of an unsuccessful candidate for the local presidency
cannot be used to ask for the dismissal of an employee. Notice however, that s. 63 of the
Qu6bec Labour Code cannot be invoked by the employee himself; it is the employer who is not
bound to dismiss and thus presumably it is the employer alone who has standing under s. 63.
Nonetheless, an arbitrator who is asked to consider a dismissal pursuant to a closed shop
agreement may impose on an employer the obligation to verify the union’s bonafides before
dismissing an expelled or suspended union member: see, e.g., Re International Ass’n of
Machinists (1958) 8 L.A.C. 116 per Laskin; Re Toronto Printing Pressmen & Assistants’
Union No. 10 (1958) 8 L.A.C. 251 per Laskin.
13 For some examples of the types of remedies that might be available in the ordinary courts,
see Stern, supra, note 39 (mandamus to set aside the union’s decision to suspend and fine a
member); St Pierre, supra, note 28 (action in damages to recover wages lost for a period during
which the union’s illegal strike barred the plaintiff’s access to his work); Allardv. Congrs du
Travail du Canada [1976] R.D.T. 533 (interlocutory injunction ordering the union to desist in
its attempts to bar a vote of the membership on a motion to withdraw an application for
certification); La Fraternitd unie des charpentiers menuisiers, local 134 v. Le Syndicat
national de la construction Hauterive [1977] C.S. 1008 (direct action in nullity of a union
resolution to charge preferential membership dues for former F.T.Q., but not C.S.N., mem-
bers).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
la convention collective ou ce qui tient lieu Idgalement, comme la source de ]a rdclama-
tion. Un arbitre ne peut d6cider selon la convention une r6clamation qui n’en d6coule
pas.
54
Accordingly, if the claim to be arbitrated must arise from the collective
agreement, so must the disciplinary sanction to which that claim relates.
Because the only party who can discipline for breaches of the collective
agreement is the employer, the discipline of which s. 47.3 speaks must be
imposed by the employer. 5 Why is it, then, that s. 47.5 seems to distinguish
between claims and grievances? The answer that Imbeau suggests is logical,
although somewhat contrived. A grievance concerns a dispute between the
employer and the union. But if an employee has had to resort to s. 47.2 et seq.,
it is quite obvious that the union wants to dissociate itself from the dispute. A
s. 47.5 claim, therefore, concerns only the employee and his employer. In
other words, the difference between the two terms lies in the parties to the
dispute, not in the substantive issues involved. 6
To the reasons given in Imbeau for rejecting the complainant’s applica-
tion, we may add one other. However suitable in the abstract arbitration may
be as a way to settle intra-union disputes, arbitration in accordance with the
terms of a collective agreement is hardly a satisfactory way of so doing. It
would likely be impossible in most cases to adapt to intra-union disputes a
procedure meant to accommodate the interests of employer and union in
collective agreement disputes.
B.
Preconditions Under the Canada Labour Code: Intra-Union Disputes
There can be little doubt that s. 136.1 of the Canada Labour Code has a
far broader scope than does the duty of fair representation under the Qu6bec
Labour Code17 The Canada Code sets no express limits to the type of job
interests protected, leaving it to the Canada Labour Relations Board to decide
on the facts of each case whether the union acted properly given the job
interest at stake. Matters such as seniority claims, payment for work done,
5’Imbeau, supra, note 51, 344.
51Ibid., 344-5. Judge Auclair seems to forget that s. 47.2 can stand alone, provided that the
complainant is seeking a remedy under s. 144 and not arbitration. There is nothing in s. 47.2, if
read separately from ss 47.2-47.5, that leads us inexorably to the conclusion reached in
Imbeau. It would seem, therefore, that a union member can still invoke s. 47.2 and s. 144 if he
has been improperly expelled from his union. Imbeau simply precludes the use of arbitration to
settle the differences between union and member.
Ib9d., 345.
-1R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1 as am. S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, s. 49.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
work schedules, and job descriptions can all conceivably form the substance
of a s. 136.1 complaint. Moreover, the Board has jurisdiction to hear com-
plaints arising from the union’s alleged conduct during collective
bargaining, 8 the processing of an unfair labour practice, 9 mid-contract
negotiations,’ or any other action the union has undertaken on behalf of
bargaining unit members.6
Yet the Canada Labour Relations Board may have gone even further than
the Tribunal du Travail in excluding internal union affairs from the scope of
the statutory duty of fair representation. According to the Board, internal
affairs include the appeal mechanism provided for in the union’s constitution
and by-laws –
a mechanism which can normally be used to force a reconsid-
eration of the union’s decision concerning a grievance. If, therefore, a
member decides first to appeal internally a refusal to arbitrate his grievance,
he may find himself forever barred from invoking s. 136.1 of the Code. The
few Labour Board decisions on point are regrettably difficult to follow, and
their reasoning is not entirely convincing. 2 Suffice it to note that the Board
will scrutinize the internal mechanisms of the union only
to the extent they relate directly to and form part of the bargained relationship between the
union and employer and if they are accessible to all employees in the bargaining
unit…
“aThere is no Canada Labour Relations Board decision specifically on this point, but
reference may be had to Group of Seagram’s Employees and Distillery, Brewery, Winery, Soft
Drink & Allied Workers, Local 604 [1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 375 (B.C.L.R.B.); Group of
Employees of the Board of School Trustees of School District No. 39 [1981] 1 Can. L.R.B.R.
267 (B.C.L.R.B.); Cook and International Woodworkers of America, Local 1-184 [1981] 1
Can. L.R.B.R. 413 (Sask. L.R.B.).
“Again, there is no Canada Labour Relations Board decision on point, but see Hebert-
Vaillant and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 2327 [1981] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 449.
‘See Larmour and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers [1980] 3 Can. L.R.B.R. 407
[hereinafter Larmour].
61The statutory duty does not, however, extend beyond the employer-union-employee
relationship created by labour relations legislation. See, e.g., Morgan and Registered
Psychiatric Nurses’ Association of British Columbia [1980] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 441
(B.C.L.R.B.) (no duty to represent bargaining unit member in coroner’s inquest); Wood v.
Napanese Industries Ltd [1972] O.L.R.B. Rep. 353 (no duty to represent before Workman’s
Compensation Board).
6See Lochner and Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers
[1980] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 149 [hereinafter Lochner]; Huggins and Canadian Brotherhood of
Railway, Transport and General Workers [1980] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 364 [hereinafter Huggins].
For a similar result in Ontario, see Britnell and International Union of Electrical Workers,
Local 523 [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 319 (O.L.R.B.). But see Pap and International Union of
Electrical Workers, Local 523 [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 74 (O.L.R.B.).
6Lochner, ibid., 156.
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Because union members alone have access to the internal union appeal
mechanism, the Board will limit its examination to the fairness of first
instance decisions and not intervene in appeal decisions.
Despite the carefully written reasons for judgment in cases such as
Lochner or Huggins,64 the basis of this distinction between appeal and first
instance decisions remains obscure and puzzling. We can perhaps understand
why a labour relations board might hesitate to use s. 136.1 to interfere in an
intra-union dispute such as that involved in Imbeau. In that case, the dispute
had nothing to do with the employer-employee relationship. But in Lochner
and Huggins, the Board was asked to review the fairness of an appeal decision
on a union’s refusal to process a member’s grievance. Such an appeal, like a
first instance decision, “relate[s] directly to and form[s] part of the bargained
relationship between the union and employer”.6 5 It decides once and for all
whether the union will undertake to pursue rights claimed by the individual
under the collective agreement. It is true that only union members have access
to the internal appeal mechanism, but this in itself should not serve to justify
the rejection ofa s. 136.1 complaint. The appeal procedure may be as corrupt
or inadequate as the procedure followed at first instance. It seems reasonable
to expect, therefore, that the individual should have recourse to s. 136.1 to
remedy what he believes to be a dereliction of the union’s duty to represent his
interests in the observance of the collective agreement.
Be that as it may, the Board’s reluctance to interfere in such cases may
yet be vindicated on constitutional grounds. An examination of the fairness of
the appeal mechanism, which the union’s constitution and by-laws has
brought into being, may usurp the provinces’ jurisdiction over property and
civil rights.’ In addition, the Canada Labour Relations Board has suggested
‘Lochner, ibid.; and Huggins, supra, note 62.
‘Lochner, ibid., 156.
‘It should be noted that subss 185(e)-(h) of the Canada Labour Code R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1 as
am. S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1 raise similar constitutional problems. These foursubsections all deal
with internal union affairs, more specifically certain unfair union practices as against union
members. Their constitutionality has been discussed in Abbott and International Longshore-
men’s Association, Local 1953 [1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 305; Matus and International Long-
shoremen’s Union, Local502 [1980] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 21; and InternationalLongshoremen’s
and Warehousemen’s Union, Local 502 and Matus [1981] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 115. The
conclusion of these cases is that, although it cannot purport to regulate internal affairs of the
union’s constitution, Parliament can regulate the effects of improper union activity. For
example, the Board can sanction a union for improperly expelling a member, but it cannot
declare void the clause in the constitution that allowed the union to expel as it did.
The Federal Court of Appeal has confirmed recently the constitutionality of s. 185 in
International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, Local 502 v. Matus (1981) 40.
N.R. 541 and International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, Local 502 v. Matus
(No. 2) (1981) 40 N.R. 594, (consolidated in (1981) 129 D.L.R. (3d) 616). See especially, the
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
subss 185(e), (f), (g), and
that other, more appropriate provisions -namely,
(h) of the Code I7- apply to complaints about the internal working of a union.
For example, facts such as those in the Imbeau case could have given rise to an
application under subs. 185(h).1 Unfortunately for Imbeau, his case had to be
brought under the Qu6bec Labour Code, which contains no comparable
provisions.
C.
The Duty of Fair Representation and Non-Members of the Bargaining
Unit
Before considering the substantive content of the duty of fair representa-
tion, one final issue should be noted. Both s. 47.2 of the Qu6bec Code and s.
136.1 of the Canada Code impose a duty of fair representation on the union in
favour of all employees in the bargaining unit, whether or not they are union
members. What happens, then, if the issue that the individual wishes to
arbitrate is precisely his status as a member of the bargaining unit? Is the
individual, whose status as a bargaining unit member is in doubt, automatical-
ly barred from invoking ss 47.2 or 136.1? Two recent Tribunal du Travail
decisions indicate that the answer is not simple, at least not under the Qu6bec
Code.
decision of Urie J., at 549 of the first of these interlocking appeals, which suggests that
Parliament can legislate regarding the internal rules of a union as long as these rules affect the
availability of work on a federal work or undertaking.
It might be noted that the ordinary courts of Qu6bec have also assumed jurisdiction over
disputes involving unions and members employed on a federal work. In Association interna-
tionale des ddbardeurs, local375 v. Chenard [1981] C.A. 427, for example, it was apparently
never even suggested to the Court of Appeal that there might be some jurisdictional problem in
awarding damages against a union whose members were almost exclusively employed on a
federal work. This case is, of course, in line with Stern, supra, note 39 and, more generally,
Bell Telephone Co. of Canada v. Harding Communications Ltd [1979] 1 S.C.R. 395, (1978)
92 D.L.R. (3d) 213.
67R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1 as am. S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1.
6But a complaint about the union appeal mechanism cannot be brought under s. 185.
Moreover, to judge from the decision in Solly and Communications Workers of Canada, Local
49 [1981]2Can. L.R.B.R. 245 [hereinafterSolly], the CanadaLabour Relations Board intends
to reserve s. 185 for extreme abuses of union power. In Solly, the union had refused Solly’s
application for membership because all evidence seemed to indicate his violent hostility to the
union. Solly applied to the Board under s. 136.1 as well as subss 185(f) and (g). The Board
rejected the application because, in its view, a union has the right to reject objectionable
candidates. What made Solly particularly objectionable was his activities as a strikebreaker.
This sufficed, said the Board, to justify the union’s decision. It also appears that complaints
about the union appeal mechanism are not possible under s. 185 nor under s. 136.1 of the
Canada Labour Code.
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In Perry v. Syndicat Qu~b~cois de l’Imprimerie,69 the Tribunal refused
to order arbitration under s. 47.5 because in its view the complainant had no
arbitrable claim under the collective agreement:
[L]e pr6sent recours n’a pas d’objet si la r6clamation du salari6 est manifestement
irrrcevable en vertu de la convention collective en vigueur, puisque le Tribunal ne peut
qu’autoriser le salari6 A soumettre sa r~clamation
un arbitre “pour drcision selon ]a
convention collective” (art. 47.5). II n’y a certainement pas lieu de d6frer A l’arbitrage
une reclamation qui serait non arbitrable en vertu de la convention collective.70
Once more, then, the success of a s. 47.3 complaint was seen to hinge upon
the existence of an arbitrable claim under the collective agreement. Having
established this principle, the Tribunal disposed of Perry’s application by
deciding, first, that he was not an employee as defined by the collective
agreement and, second, that he could not have an arbitrable claim with respect
to a collective agreement by which he was not bound. In brief, the court
suggests that a claim of employee status is arbitrable only if the employee has
such status. This is a somewhat surprising suggestion, especially since it
allows the court to usurp the role of the arbitrator and to decide on the very
issue that it is supposed to refer onward. The Judge was himself aware of this
problem, but came to the following conclusion:
Certes, il s’agit l d’une question prdjudicielle dont un arbitre de grief pourrait 8tre saisi.
Mais cela n’empeche pas, A mon avis, que le Tribunal ne puisse et ne doive en disposer,
s’il le peut, c’est-A-dire s’il est saisi de tous les 6lments n~cessaires A cette fin, sans pour
autant usurper la juridiction de l’arbitre de grief. I1 s’agit ici d’un recours manifestement
exceptionnel ayant pour but la correction d’un d6ni de justice lorsqu’un salari6 est priv6
d’un droit d’arbitrage par suite de mauvaise foi … de son syndicat dans le traitement de
son renvoi. .. .Ces dispositions du Code n’ont pas pour objet de crier un droit d’arbi-
trage qui n’ aurait jamais autrement exist.1″
This conclusion does not, however, dispel the lurking suspicion that the
Tribunal had indeed stepped into the arbitrator’s shoes. According to all the
earlier jurisprudence on s. 47.2 et seq.,7 the Tribunal has the competence to
determine the primafacie validity of the employee’s claim only to the extent
that this validity is relevant to the issue of union representation –
that is, if the
claim seems valid, the Tribunal will consider the union to have been all the
more remiss in not arbitrating. The problem raised in Perry was handled in a
completely different, and more satisfactory, manner in the earlier case of
Maurice v. Local d’union 301, Montreal et Quebec de l’union canadienne
des travailleurs unis des brasseries. 11 The union in that case had rejected the
‘[1981] T.T. 107 [hereinafter Perry].
7 Ibid., 115.
7 Ibid., 116 [emphasis in original].
See cases cited, infra, note 102.
7[1979] T.T. 82.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
complainant’s claim on the basis that he had not worked the necessary six
months to give him status under the collective agreement. It apparently never
occurred to the Tribunal to sift through the evidence and make a conclusive
determination of the employee’s status. Instead, the Tribunal concerned itself
only with the union’s conduct and, after deciding that the inquiry into the
employee’s status had been far too cursorily completed, ordered the arbitra-
tion of the complainant’s claim. 74
The decision in Perry points to another complex problem: the em-
ployee’s status under the certificate of accreditation. Even if we decide that a
-claim is arbitrable under a collective agreement, it remains to be decided
whether the employee is covered by the certification. For example, an
employee who works as a “general helper” may rightfully believe that he has
an arbitrable grievance under a collective agreement made to apply to “all
employees”. Yet the certificate by virtue of which this agreement was con-
cluded may refer to “toolmakers, lead hands, inspectors, tool designers,
draftsmen, floorclerks, and planners”. 5 Does the employee have recourse to
the statutory duty of fair representation in the event that the union capriciously
refuses to process that grievance? Under the Qu6bec Labour Code, the short
answer to this question is –
no. According to Judge Lesage in Boivin v.
Association internationale des machinistes et des travailleurs de l”airoastro-
nautique, Local 987,76 the Tribunal du Travail could only assume jurisdiction
over such matters if the Code gave legal status to voluntarily recognized
unions. Under the Qu6bec Code, only certification can vest a union with sole
authority to represent the members of a bargaining unit. Because s. 47.2
applies only in favour of those “salarids compris dans une unit6 de n6gociation
qu’elle [l’association] repr6sente”, the absence of a certificate covering the
employee is, according to Judge Lesage, fatal to such an employee’s claim. 77
We may have hoped that the Tribunal would read s. 47.2 liberally so as
to encompass both legally and voluntarily recognized associations, especially
since the type of facts that arose in the Boivin case are probably common-
place. As the composition of a work force changes, the certificate may
become outdated, no longer serving as an accurate description of the types of
jobs performed by bargaining unit members. The individual whose s. 47.3
application has been refused because he does not fall within the certificate can
only protect himself by seeking certification for a new association. Because
the employer has already shown himself willing to bargain, it should be a
-Ibid., 85.
“These are the facts of Boivin v. Association internationale des machinistes et des travail-
leurs de l’adroastronautique, local 987 [1981] T.T. 149.
76Ibid.
-lbid., 151-2.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
fairly simple matter to obtain a certificate78 and then negotiate for a new
collective agreement. But if, as is likely, the employee’s complaint concerns
a discharge, certification of a separate association is no remedy at all: the
worker will have lost his status as an employee and so cannot apply for
certification. A more efficacious remedy might lie in the amendment of the
existing certificate. Yet such an amendment would have prospective effects
only, and any union impropriety which occurred before the amendment was
obtained will remain unimpeachable.
By contrast, the Canada Labour Code does give legal status to voluntari-
ly recognized unions 11 and it is not surprising that the Labour Relations Board
has enforced the duty of fair representation with regard to recognized and
certified unions alike.8′ Section 107 makes recognition depend upon the
existence of a collective agreement concluded by the union on behalf of the
employees in the bargaining unit. The issue before the Board, therefore, is
whether the employee who applies under s. 136.1 falls within the scope of the
collective agreement. This returns us to the question raised in Perry:8’ Does
the Board have jurisdiction to decide finally on employee status or does that
matter rightfully fall within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction? The answer that the
Canada Labour Code provides is much simpler than that of the Qu6bec
Labour Code. Even though subs. 189(a) of the Canada Code confers a far
broader remedial jurisdiction than does s. 47.5 of the Qu6bec Code, the
Canada Labour Relations Board apparently cannot arbitrate a claim itself. But
the recent Supreme Court decision in Teamsters Union, Local 938 v.
Massicotte 82 has affirmed that para. 11 8(p)(vii) of the Code gives the Board
final jurisdiction to determine who properly belongs within a voluntarily
recognized bargaining unit. Thus the Board does not usurp the arbitrator’s
role when it considers the scope of a collective agreement and the status of a
particular employee.
7 Following the procedure set out in the Qudbec Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27, ss 25
and 26. The conditions for certification are established by s. 28 of the Code.
79See the definition of “bargaining agent” in Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-l,
subs. 107(1) as am. S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1.
wIt should be noted that the French version of s. 136.1 is written in the following terms:
“Lorsqu’un syndicat est accredit6 A titre d’agent n6gotiateur d’une unit6 de n6gotiation. .. “.
See Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970 c. L-1 as am. S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, s. 49. Recognized
associations do not seem to be covered. It was decided in Massicotte and Teamsters Union,
Local 938, supra, note 40, that the English version of s. 136.1 mirrors most clearly Parlia-
ment’s intent in legislating the duty of fair representation; that version therefore prevails.
“1Supra, note 69.
‘Supra, note 40.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
H.
Scope of the Duty of Fair Representation
Any discussion of the statutory duty of fair representation should proper-
ly begin with a brief look at Rayonier Canada (B.C.) Ltd and International
Woodworkers of America, Local 1-21 and Ross Anderson,3 a Paul Weiler
decision that has provided the inspiration for most of the fair-representation
cases decided under the Canada Labour Code. The importance of this case
lies not so much in its holding as in its consideration of the policy issues that
are involved in setting the parameters of the duty of fair representation.
Weiler never attempts to define the precise nature of fair representation;
instead, he provides a list of criteria that we should weigh before intervening
in union actions.
The issue that the British Columbia Labour Relations Board was specifi-
cally asked to address in Rayonier concerned the unionized worker’s right to
arbitration: does the worker have an absolute right to insist on the arbitration
of his grievance, or does the union retain some discretion to veto what it
believes are frivolous or unmeritorious claims? Weiler pitches the issue at a
slightly higher level of abstraction: Who ultimately controls the administra-
tion of the collective agreement? For Weiler, the question – when rephrased
in this way –
almost suggests its own answer. The administration of a
collective agreement is merely an extension of the bargaining process and,
because this process was meant to confer primarily a group benefit, it seems
clear that the group interests in such administration should prevail over
individual interests.” It follows that the union should have exclusive authority
to identify what group interests merit attention.8 Weiler finds support in the
writings of Archibald Cox who suggested that certain institutional interests
would also be better served if the union were vested with the power to control
the administration of the collective agreement. 6 Among these, Weiler men-
tions the union’s interest in saving precious time, money and energy, as well
as in ehancing its credibility with management. Most important for him is,
however, the union’s interest in resolving the type of intra-union conflict that
typically arises in, for example, seniority claims. According to Weiler, such a
conflict usually stems from a clause in the collective agreement which has
been left purposely vague. It is expected that the parties will hammer out some
compromise during the life of the collective agreement and thus the union
should be given as much latitude as possible to negotiate on behalf of all.Y
3[1975] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 196 (B.C.L.R.B.) [hereinafter Rayonier]. See also P. Weiler,
Reconcilable Differences[:] New Directions in Canadian Labour Law (1980) 132-9 for a
subsequent reassessment of the Rayonier decision.
“Rayonier, ibid., 202.
“Ibid., 203-4.
-Ibid., 204.
“Ibid., 203-4.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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In sum, unless pressing and exceptional circumstances require it to give
special weight to individual interests, a labour relations board should not
interfere with union decisions. The mere fact that the union refused to go
ahead with arbitration is not conclusive evidence of a breach of the duty of fair
representation; the individual must also adduce facts that show the refusal was
improper. Weiler suggests that a board should take into account the following
factors: the significance of the grievance to the individual, the validity of the
grievance, the care with which the union made its decision not to arbitrate, the
union’s previous practice when confronted with similar grievances, the indi-
vidual’s expectations in seeing the grievance arbitrated, and the weight of the
institutional interests that prompted the refusal to arbitrate.”
Since the time of the Rayonierjudgment, Weiler has modified his earlier
views and now claims that discharge cases should give rise to an absolute right
to arbitrate, provided that the employee himself agrees to support the costs. 9
Among the reasons he gives for this change of heart, the most compelling
arises from recent developments in labour standards legislation. Under s.
61.5 of the Canada Labour Code, for example, the non-unionized worker
who believes he has been unjustly dismissed from his job may apply for the
arbitration of the dismissal. If the non-unionized worker may arbitrate his
discharge, how can we maintain that the unionized worker should have any
lesser right?9 Some three years after the enactment of s. 136.1, the Canada
Labour Relations Board made clear its position concerning the right to
arbitrate in the two Haley and Canadian Airline Employees’ Association and
Eastern Provincial Airways (1963) Ltd 91 decisions. The Board considered
Weiler’s new stance, yet followed the decision in Rayonier. Its reasons for so
doing are not entirely cogent, let alone convincing.
First of all, the Board insisted that certain institutional interests must be
protected by allowing the union to screen out truly hopeless cases.9 This
insistence, of course, begs the question. What Weiler argues is that institu-
tional costs are small when set against the cost to the employee who loses his
job; that a discharge grievance, however hopeless, is so crucial to the em-
ployee that for once, institutional interests assume a secondary importance.
Moreover, the Board ignored Weiler’s suggestion that the right to arbitrate be
made subject to an agreement by the aggrieved employee to pay for his and the
union’s share of the arbitration costs.
-Ibid., 204.
“See Weiler, supra, note 83, 137-9.
Ibid., 139, fn.
91[1980] 3 Can. L.R.B.R. 501 [hereinafter Haley No. 1]; [1981] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 121
[hereinafter Haley No. 2].
“Haley No. 2, ibid., 129.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Secondly, the Board thought that a mandatory duty to arbitrate dismissal
would give rise to a flood of arbitration. Of particular concern to the Board
was arbitration in a system of progressive discipline, where any sanction
imposed on an employee can escalate into his eventual dismissal. If not
arbitrated, the sanctions become resjudicata and are not open to review by the
arbitrator who adjudicates on the dismissal. It follows that a union, if bound to
arbitrate a discharge, would be well advised to arbitrate every disciplinary
sanction. Otherwise, it might eventually be saddled with the task of defending
the indefensible –
a record of employment that the arbitrator must take as
conclusive evidence of the employee’s poor work habits. 93
This argument, apart from its in terrorem aspect, is somewhat question-
able. Systems of progressive discipline already provide a strong incentive to
arbitrate. Most unions would contest any disciplinary sanctions that could
escalate into discharge, simply to keep the employee’s record clean. In any
case, we can probably trust unions to arbitrate only meritorious disciplinary
grievances: the employee’s record is just as much tainted by an adverse
arbitrator’s award as it would be by a failure to arbitrate altogether.
The Board further suggested that “the grievance procedure is a source of
information and education for all parties” and if “arbitration were inevitable
then there would be no need for the employer to disclose the facts it has
marshalled in support of the dismissal until the arbitration hearing”. 4 This
reason for allowing unions to pick and choose among discharge grievances is
hardly credible. Most collective agreements require the parties to submit to a
multi-step grievance procedure before turning to arbitration and one would
imagine that all relevant information would emerge during that procedure.
Arbitration has also become a very costly procedure and the Board
objected to any union expenditure that would be disproportionate to the
amount in dues normally collected from bargaining unit members. 95 Again,
however, the Board ignored the option of making the individual pay his way.
If the union were made to pay for successful cases, the price would not be too
high. The union is, after all, charged with promoting the rights of workers and
the success of the arbitration surely indicates the existence of a right that
merited union support.
The Board also feared the effect of compulsory arbitration on the time
delays typically stipulated in a collective agreement. If the union knows it
must, in the end, arbitrate, it could blithely disregard those delays. 96 Yet
93Ibid.
9 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 129-30.
Ibid., 130.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
arbitrators can always award damages if the union negligently or intentionally
delays the processing of a grievance and if the employer suffers loss as a
result.
The Board’s final reason is, without a doubt, the most telling. If arbitra-
tion is made mandatory,
then with what standard must [the union] perform? If it can afford counsel must it retain
counsel? If cost is no factor to the union in going to arbitration then may it be a factor in the
preparation and conduct of the proceeding? … If the focus of union activity is trans-
planted from the grievance procedure to the arbitration hearing then the focus of the duty
to fairly represent will necessarily follow in the individual’s view.’
In other words, to insist on the arbitration of all discharge grievances does not
automatically solve the problem of erratic union conduct. All we have done
by insisting on arbitration is to change the arena; the opportunities for
improper behaviour remain the same. The Board overlooked, however, one
crucial factor: cases such as Hoogendoorn 98 allow the aggrieved individual to
take an active part in the arbitration. This participation in a hearing before a
presumably impartial arbitrator would, one hopes, cancel out the effect of
shoddy union representation.
The reasoning in the Plenary Board decision in Haley No. 2 masks what
is probably the only real justification for refusing to recognize mandatory
arbitration. In the end, this decision turns on a particular vision of the role of
the Canadian trade union movement and of the institutional interests that must
be protected. The Board’s view of that role was perhaps best summarized in
the first Haley decision:
For us the competing policy considerations canvassed at length in the literature and the
numerous decisions by Canadian labour relations boards can be focused in one question.
What is the role or character of unions contemplated by the Code? If they are to be viewed
as one of the big three, big business, big government and big unions, then the role and
scope of protection of the individual through the duty of fair representation from even
innocent mistakes causing harsh consequences would lie in favour of extensive protec-
tion. If unions are to be viewed as voluntary, underfinanced, understaffed, extremely
democratic, participatory entities acting as the extension of basic tenets of our free society
many errors must be excused. The reality no doubt lies between the extremes and each
union, local or international, sits at a different place on the spectrum. … Our view is that
in 1978 when Parliament enacted the duty of fair representation it must be taken to have
viewed unions as participatory entities which, although vested with exclusive bargaining
authority for certain units of employees, must also act as the instruments to foster,
preserve and further the laudable purposes expressed in the Preamble. They do this in a
social and economic context where a lack of funding, education, staffing and participation
is a real, every day fact of life. 99
9 Ibid.
“Supra, note 20.
“Haley No. 1, supra, note 91, 509.
19821
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
The Board’s main concern in this passage was to demonstrate that unions
should not be held responsible, at least not under s. 136.1 of the Canada
Labour Code, for simple negligence. But the passage also serves to explain
why the Board has so adamantly refused to impose a duty to arbitrate. If they
remain as weak and beleaguered as the Board assumes them to be, unions
should be allowed to husband their resources. As one member of the Board so
aptly stated, the “parsimonious and rigid administration” 10 of funds will
make the union strong. The same rationale presumably holds true for the
administration of talent, loyalty and whatever else is needed to put the union
on a battle footing. As a result, the institutional costs of arbitrating each and
every grievance are simply too high, even when the grievance concerns the
discharge of a bargaining unit member.
Cases decided under the Qu6bec Labour Code are to the same effect.
After an initial flirtation with the notion of compulsory arbitration, 0 1 the
Tribunal du Travail has steadfastly favoured the union’s discretion to veto the
arbitration of grievances.” Since the reasons for this are largely the same as
those offered by the Canada Labour Relations Board, we need not rehearse
them. Suffice it to say that the net effect of the jurisprudence under the Canada
and Qu6bec Codes, coupled with the holding in the Brunet case, is to cut off
entirely any individual access to the arbitration procedure. The unionized
worker can neither ask a court to by-pass the enforcement procedure set out in
the collective agreement, nor force the union to go through that procedure on
his behalf.03
10’Cloutier and Cartage and Miscellaneous Employees’ Union, Local 931 [1981] 2 Can.
L.R.B.R. 335, 342 [hereinafter Cloutier].
“‘ See Courchesne v. Le Syndicat des travailleurs de la corporation de batteries CEGELEC
(C.B.C.) de Louisville (C.S.N.) [1978] T.T. 328 [hereinafter Courchesne].
,’oBoulayv. LaFraternitddespoliciers de la communaut6 urbaine de Montrdal Inc. [1978]
T.T. 319; Bibeau v. La Fraternitj unie des charpentiers et menuisiers d’Amdrique, section
locale 2533 [1978] T.T. 131; Droletv. Syndicat des employ6s du SupermarchiRoy Inc. [1979]
T.T. 221 [hereinafter Drolet]; Godin v. La Fraternitg unie des charpentiers et menuisiers
d’Amdrique, local 2533 [1979] T.T. 157; Boutin v. Le syndicat international des travailleurs
en ilectricitg [1979] T.T. 91 [hereinafter Boutin]; Hubert v. Syndicat (unitd) des policiers
pompiers de la Ville de Nicolet [1980] T.T. 302 [hereinafter Hubert]; Jacques v. Travailleurs
canadiens de l’alimentation, local P-551 [1981] T.T. 85 [hereinafter Jacques]; Leduc v.
Syndicat international des travailleurs unis de l’automobile de l’aironautique, de l’astronauti-
que et des instruments aratoires d’Amdrique, section locale 1163 [1981] T.T. 93 [hereinafter
Leduc].
3It is interesting to note that E. Palmer, in Responsible Decision-making in Democratic
Trade Unions (1969) 172-3 (Woods Task Force on Labour Relations, Study No. 11), made the
following recommendation:
Obviously, to obtain a speedy, inexpensive and orderly system of dispute settlement, the
arbitration process must be strengthened. In so doing, however, more extensive rights
must be given to individuals during this process.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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A.
Toward a Standard of Fair Behaviour
In sum, to establish a contravention of the statutory duty of fair repre-
sentation, the complainant must prove something more than merely a refusal
to arbitrate. Under the Qu6bec Labour Code, this requires proof of bad faith,
arbitrariness, discrimination, or serious negligence.” 4 To define the precise
nature of negligent, arbitrary or discriminatory behaviour is a notoriously
difficult undertaking, and it is not surprising that the Tribunal du Travail has
not tried to do so. The approach is largely casuistic; much depends on factors
such as the complainant’s own behaviour, the merits of the complaint, the
union’s good intentions and so on. Regrettably, we have no coherent judg-
ment such as the Rayonier case to set some limits to the relevant factors the
Tribunal may consider. The compilation of such a list would be easier under
the Quebec Labour Code than under any other provincial labour code, simply
because the reach of the duty of fair representation is for all practical purposes
so much more restricted. The legislature has already indicated that only
dismissal and disciplinary sanctions are serious enough to warrant interven-
tion. It has also defined the context in which the duty arises: the administra-
tion of the collective agreement. Despite these differences between the
Qudbec and other provincial codes, there seems to be good reason to use
Rayonier as a guidepost. For even under the Qudbec Code, factors such as the
prima facie validity of the claim or previous practice with respect to such
claims remain highly relevant.
The Tribunal du Travail believes itself to be without jurisdiction to
decide on the actual validity of the claim. The Tribunal’s main concern is with
the fairness of the union’s conduct; for this purpose, it suffices that the
Tribunal consider the prima facie validity of the claim only.’ The Tribunal
asks what kind of inquiry was necessary given the nature of the claim, and
then decides whether the union pursued an appropriate course of action. As a
result, the Tribunal’s examination of the facts bears primarily upon the
procedure followed by the union. What would happen if the normal proce-
dure, as required by the collective agreement or the union’s constitution and
practice, seems to be inadequate? There is no clear answer to this question,
but it appears that fairness is ultimately determined by practice; the union has
no obligation to go beyond what its constitution or collective agreement
requires of it. In fact, the Tribunal du Travail has attempted to do nothing
Initially, therefore, the union should be given the right to meet its responsibilities,
given by certification, to sift out wholly frivolous grievances that would clog the
grievance procedure. When an individual is unhappy with the disposition he should be
able to pursue to arbitration those matters which are personal to him.
“See R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27, s. 47.2.
“‘See the cases cited supra, note 102.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
more than infuse “normal procedure” with some content. It is not enough, for
example, to hold an inquiry; the inquiry must also be serious 11 and directed to
the issues at hand.'” A union clearly violates s. 47.2 if it decides to drop a
grievance, not because it is unmeritorious, but because the complainant
fanatically supports a rival union.’ 8 The Tribunal has even shown itself
willing to look behind a vote of the general membership taken to ratify a
decision not to arbitrate.’
One factor that figures consistently in the Qu6bec jurisprudence is the
applicant’s own behaviour when dealing with his union.” ‘ As one might
expect, the Tribunal has found it difficult to sympathize with the worker who
changes his mind at the last minute and decides to arbitrate, who refuses to
take the time to fill out a grievance form or who fails altogether to inform the
union of his cause for complaint. Nonetheless, apart from these cases involv-
ing what might loosely be described as contributory negligence, the Tribunal
initially tended to intervene quite readily. The highwater decision is probably
Gudrard v. Travailleurs canadiens de l’alimentation, Local 748,”‘ a 1980
judgment of Judge Morin, who apparently placed on the union the burden of
showing that its decision was taken properly:
Les faits soumis par le requdrant que l’intim6 n’a pas jug6 bon 6clairer ou contredire,
d6montrent qu’il y a eu, sinon discrimination, du moins n6gligence grave de la part de
l’intim6. I1 n’a pas prouv6 qu’il ait fait enqu~te sur les all6gations du requ6rant. II faut
donc les prendre pour av6r6es.112
In other words, the complainant need only allege the inadequacy of the
union’s conduct and then the burden of proof shifts to the union. In the
absence of positive proof that the union acted properly, the application must
succeed. If this judgment is correct, it may be easier to obtain a remedy under
s. 47.3 et seq. than the words of that provision themselves indicate. A mere
allegation that the. union refused to arbitrate will not suffice, but if that
allegation is coupled with the further allegation of improper behaviour, the
success of the application will hang on the force of the union’s and not the
applicant’s proof.
‘See Boutin, supra, note 102.
“‘See Legault v. Syndicat des travailleurs amalgamifs du v4tement et du textile, local 644
[1979] T.T. 375.
“‘ lbid.
‘9 See Rivest v. Association internationale des pompiers, section locale 1121 [1980] T.T.
276.
“‘See, e.g., Boutin, supra, note 102; Drolet, supra, note 102; Jacques, supra, note 102;
Gendron v. Syndicat international des travailleurs de la boulangerie, confiserie et du tabac,
local 335 [1980] T.T. 192.
” [1980] T.T. 420.
“‘Ibid., 424.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
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Since the Guirard decision, however, the Tribunal has retreated from its
earlier position.”3 Recent cases have generally involved allegations of serious
negligence; that is, the union did pursue the complainant’s grievance in good
faith, but then made a mistake in some procedural matter. Typical of this line
of jurisprudence is the “missed time delay” case: the union representative
makes a fairly elementary mistake in counting the delay for the bringing of a
grievance and so informs the employee that his right to arbitration has lapsed.
To judge from the jurisprudence, an inability to count is not necessarily
serious negligence, “4 but the following errors may well be: not knowing that
dismissals can be contested by grievances, that grievances should be submit-
ted in writing and to the employer or that delays exist for the bringing of a
grievance.”‘ We may note that all these errors are not merely serious; they are
egregious. And, if this list of errors reflects truly the Tribunal’s understanding
of the standard of care required under s. 47.2, then it would appear that the
duty of fair representation will be breached but rarely.
The attitude implicit in this recent jurisprudence is mirrored in the cases
decided under the Canada Labour Code. Although s. 136.1 does not refer
expressly to negligence as a ground for complaint, the Canada Labour
Relations Board has decided that union negligence may be a breach of the
duty of fair representation.” 6 Like the Tribunal du Travail, the Board has
further decided that the standard of care imposed on the union should not be
pitched at too high a level. Only gross negligence, and not simple mistakes
such as the inadvertent missing of a delay, suffices to bring a complaint under
s. 136.1 of the Code. This unwillingness to impose any higher duty of care
stems in part from the Board’s vision of itself as the protector of a still weak, if
not fledgling, union movement. It also stems from a belief that union mem-
bers, when dissatisfied, can and should shop for better services elsewhere:
Union members get the leadership they select or neglect to actively select. The leaders are
not analogous to lawyers paid to service clients but more like legislators selected to service
a constituency. They will make errors and mistakes through ignorance, lack of training or
experience, or lack of resources….
The union’s duty of fair representation does not guarantee individual or group union
decision makers will be mature, wise, sensitive, competent, effectual or suited for their
job. It does not guarantee they will not make mistakes. The union election or selection
process does not guarantee competence any more than the process does for those selected
to act in other democratic institutions such as Parliament or appointees to administrative
agencies.”‘
“‘See Jacques, supra, note 102; Leduc, supra, note 102.
“‘See Jacques, ibid.
“‘ See Leduc, supra, note 102, 97.
‘6See e.g., Haley No. 1, supra, note 91; Haley No. 2, supra, note 91; Cameron and
Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers [1981] 1 Can. L.R.B.R.
273.
17Haley
No. 2, ibid., 131.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
This type of statement seems almost to draw inspiration from the maxim
volenti non fit injuria: the union member chooses his representative and so
must live with the consequences until such time as he either changes the
people in office or chooses a new union.
We can understand the Board’s reluctance to hold unions liable for
simple negligence. What is more troublesome, however, is the Board’s
suggestion that liability is to be measured according to a subjective standard.
The Board’s understanding of the legislative and the administrative process
seems regressive. It overlooks the growing legal concern with the unfettered
exercise of power, governmental or otherwise. The development of adminis-
trative law reflects this concern. In Canada, as in England, it appears that no
level of governmental decision-making is immune from judicial scrutiny.”i
Even that bastion of liberal laissez-faire, corporate law, has moved toward a
greater protection of minority interests. When reviewing the exercise of
power, the courts do not ask whether the power holder was “mature, wise,
sensitive, competent, effectual or suited for [his] job”. 119 Nor, for that matter,
will a court seized of a constitutional challenge exonerate parliamentarians
who lack these qualities. In law, the standard of behaviour is ex hypothesi
objective. Legislation does not become constitutional, nor decisions fair,
simply because the actors were well meaning, albeit dull-witted. This objec-
tive standard of behaviour is exacted not only from parliamentarians but also
from low level civil servants. If, therefore, a transport commissioner who
issues licences must behave in a scrupulously proper manner, it is difficult to
accept that a union – which is vested with sweeping powers to control an
individual’s livelihood –
should be held to any lesser standard of behaviour.
One would imagine, then, that legislation to create a duty of fair representa-
tion similarly sets objective standards. It seems a contradiction of terms to
suggest that in some circumstances the right to fair representation in fact
entails no more than a duty to suffer incompetence.
Nevertheless, the Canada Labour Relations Board has decided to vary
the standard of fairness according to the sophistication and clout of the union
in question. Notwithstanding the opinion expressed in the Haley case about
Parliament’s intention when enacting s. 136.1, the Board clearly recognizes
that some unions are less in need of protection than others. For example, one
Board member took note of the “fighting spirit” of the Teamsters, a union that
“ISee cases such asRoncarelliv. Duplessis [1959] S.C.R. 121, (1959) 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689;
Nichblson v. Haldimand-NorfolkRegional Board of Commissioners of Police [1979] 1 S.C.R.
311, (1978) 88 D.L.R. (3d) 671; R. v. Liverpool Corporation, Exparte Liverpool Taxi Fleet
Operators’ Association [1972] 2 Q.B. 299, [1972] 2 All E.R. 589 (C.A.).
“9Haley No. 2, supra, note 91, 131.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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is “well established, seasoned, [and] experienced”.,20 The standard of care
placed on the Teamsters was accordingly higher than that which might be
placed on a small, home-grown and weak union.
The Canada Labour Code is broader in scope than the Qu6bec Labour
Code and raises certain additional problems in setting the standard of care
required of unions. The first of these problems concerns the relevance of the
job interest at stake. For the Board, the importance of the job interest cannot
serve as conclusive evidence of a breach of s. 136.1 of the Code, but does
remain highly relevant. The more important the job interest, the higher the
duty of care placed on the union. A more perplexing problem concerns the
standard of care imposed on the union in situations other than that of collec-
tive agreement administration. To date, the Canada Labour Relations Board
has had only one occasion to consider this problem, in Larmour, which
concerned the fairness of mid-contract negotiations conducted by the union
and the employer.’ The holding reveals clearly the Board’s view that collec-
tive agreement negotiations import a lower standard of care than does collec-
tive agreement administration. The justification for this approach apparently
flows from the very nature of bargaining. When the union sits at the bargain-
ing table, it must have the latitude to engage freely in the give-and-take of
negotiations, as well as to reconcile the competing interests of various
members of the bargaining unit with what the employer is willing to offer.
A more subtle and sophisticated justification appears in the works of
Alfred Blumrosen, who distinguishes negotiations from administration on the
basis of the type of expectations raised. ‘1 In collective bargaining, the
employee’s expectations are generalized, rooted merely in hopes for im-
proved working conditions. By contrast, expectations in collective agreement
administration are created by the agreement itself and tend to be more
specific, more objectively rooted. Moreover, negotiations have a broad
‘”Cloutier, supra, note 100, 341. The Board has, in effect, created an exception to the
general rule that legal liability does not vary according to the level of sophistication. In
determining legal liability, courts will but rarely give credence to subjective factors such as
age, level of education, or mental capacity. Like the insane or the prodigal, however, unions
have been singled out for special protection. Arguably, such protection is as justifiable in the
context of union-member relationships as comparable protection would be in the employer-
union relationship. Clearly, lack of sophistication is no defence in an unfair labour practice
complaint against an employer; why then should a union be shielded by a similar lack of
sophistication? Perhaps, the onus should be placed on the union to become sophisticated.
Legislation can, after all, serve as an educator. In this case, it is left to the union to learn how to
conduct its affairs fairly and competently.
U’Larmour, supra, note 60.
‘”Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial
Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, supra, note 42, 1476.
19821
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
impact on all bargaining unit members, whereas administration normally
affects no more than a handful of individuals. Finally, the consequences of a
breakdown in negotiations are far graver than those of a breakdown in the
administration: the former may trigger a strike, while the latter can at most
lead to the forced arbitration of the grievance.” For these reasons, we must
give the union room to manoeuvre in bargaining and bar employees from
delaying or endangering the process.
This summary account of Blumrosen’s analysis requires qualification.
First, we should recognize that even bargaining may be rooted in settled
expectations. At the very least, the employees expect no dilution of the rights
enjoyed previously. Also, the issues considered at the bargaining table are
often those which were first mooted during the administration of the previous
agreement. Indeed, many unsettled grievances usually hang over the negotia-
tions and it is expected that they will be dealt with at the bargaining table in a
manner at least as favourable as would have been possible under the expired
agreement. For example, a discharged employee who hoped to be reinstated
may be justifiably disgruntled to see his unsettled grievance bought off with
money during the negotiations.
Whereas negotiations are more firmly rooted in settled expectations than
Blumrosen would have us believe, administration is often less firmly rooted
in such expectations. In the end, Blumrosen’s analysis appears to rest on a
distinction between rights disputes and interests disputes, a distinction which
is more apparent than real. This distinction is most often referred to in debates
about an arbitrator’s competence to hear matters that involve more than the
mere enforcement of the collective agreement. It is argued that only the union
and the employer can handle such matters, because the resolution of the
dispute will lead to the creation of new rights not hitherto enjoyed. The
arbitrator, by contrast, has no jurisdiction to create new rights and so must
limit himself to enforcement of rights already enjoyed under the collective
agreement. In short, interest disputes are more properly the subject of bar-
gaining, while rights disputes are the subject of arbitration.
This allocation of decision-making power is, however, highly artificial
and fails to reflect accurately the reality of the arbitrator’s role. Arbitrators do,
and often must, resolve interest disputes within the course of a hearing. A
dispute arises because the collective agreement is itself vague. The arbitrator
must then fill in the gaps and in so doing may increase or dilute the rights
already in existence. The facts of the Rayonier case’ 24 provide a ready
example of the function of an arbitrator. At the heart of the case was a
seniority dispute, a claim that a senior employee had lost his standing because
” Ibid.
“‘Supra, note 83.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
certain formalities, as required by the collective agreement, had not been met.
The language of the collective agreement did seem to lend some support to the
complainant’s claim, but the success of his grievance would have entailed
great hardship for many other employees in the plant. It also would have
brought an end to a long-established policy of the union and the employer to
ignore the strict letter of the collective agreement in certain circumstances. No
writing had ever formalized that policy, yet it is likely that an arbitrator would
have invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel to give it effect. 115 In other
words, an arbitrator would have gone well beyond the terms of the collective
agreement so as to resolve the dispute, creating a right from what had hitherto
been a privilege.
The union in Rayonier did not seek the arbitration of the complainant’s
grievance; nor did the British Columbia Labour Relations Board impeach this
decision. The collective agreement – which supposedly embraces the full
range of bargained-for and agreed-upon rights –
provided no clear cut
solution to the complainant’s grievance. The real issue here was not only the
rights of the individual as determined by the collective agreement, but also the
interests of all employees in formalizing a particular system of seniority
ranking. In short, the union had to deal with an interest dispute, similar to the
type of dispute that normally arises at the bargaining table. The same can be
said even of simple disciplinary grievances, where the arbitrator’s award may
add flesh to the bare bones of the collective agreement and will likely set a
significant, if not dangerous, precedent for all future cases of the same sort. In
the interests of the entire unit, then, the union has considerable freedom to
seek out a settlement in such a way as to avoid arbitration.
If the type of dispute that arises during the administration of the collec-
tive agreement is in essence no different from the type of dispute settled at the
bargaining table, then there is little logic in distinguishing between the
standard of conduct required of the union in each situation. A more logical
distinction can be drawn according to the degree to which individual interests
or settled expectations are affected by the union’s conduct. Thus, the standard
of conduct during bargaining or administering remains more or less the same.
In both situations, the union will suffer few limits to its power to settle
disputes. When, however, a union tampers with the perceived rights or the
interests of the individual employee, the Board should carefully supervise the
union’s decision to do so. For example, we would expect a union to take as
much care in negotiating away seniority rights or accepting monetary com-
pensation for unsettled grievances, as in refusing to arbitrate a discharge. In
all three cases, the union should be able to justify its decision on the basis of
collective interests. If it cannot, then s. 136.1 of the Code has been breached.
‘See Weiler, supra, note 83, 134.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Of course, in asserting that a union has failed in its duty to represent
fairly, an individual must not be allowed to abuse s. 47.2 et seq. of the Qu6bec
Code and s. 136.1 of the Canada Code. A straightforward example of such
abuse can be found in the Canada Labour Relations Board decision in
Laplante.’26 The applicant in that case did not truly care whether the arbitra-
tion he sought would result in his reinstatement. What he wanted was some
documentary proof that he had suffered an industrial accident, which he could
then use to obtain workmen’s compensation. The Board viewed the applica-
tion as a dubious invocation of s. 136.1:
To allow such a complaint would amount to a gross distortion of Parliament’s intention,
permitting an individual to manipulate the system to his own advantage and to impose
upon the parties, as a last straw, the cost and labour of arbitration proceedings. Such
would be a mockery of a recourse and remedy incorporated into the Code….”I
More problematic are the cases of union-employee collusion. For exam-
ple, in the Tribunal du Travail judgment in Courchesne ” we find a union
advising its member to apply under s. 47.5 of the Code. The collective
agreement set out time limits for the processing of grievances, but these had
expired. The presidency of the local changed hands and the new president, in
the hope of repairing the damage done by his predecessor, suggested that s.
47.5 be used to get around the time delays. The Tribunal du Travail apparent-
ly did not consider the collusion to be relevant, and found for the applicant.
The opportunity to address this issue arose before the Canada Labour
Relations Board in the first Haley case. 9 The results of this case are hardly
more satisfying than those of the Courchesne decision. The Board merely
indicated that, in cases where collusion is in evidence, the employer will be
allowed to take a more active role in the proceedings. Collusion will not be an
absolute bar to the application of s. 136.1 of the Canada Code; at best, it may
tip the balance in favour of the employer if the Board is asked to exercise its
discretion in extending time delays.’30 The Board’s decision is probably
“”Supra, note 45.
‘Ibid., 58.
“‘Supra, note 101.
“‘Haley No. 1, supra, note 91.
“”Ibid., 505. This decision is somewhat surprising, especially in light of the considerable
warmth with which the Plenary Review Board, in deciding on the same case, protested against
the flouting of those procedural requirements set out in the collective agreement. In fact, no
better argument against the holding in the first Haley decision can be made than that presented
in Haley No. 2, supra, note 91, 130:
[I]f arbitration is mandatory why should a union concern itself with procedural require-
ments to get to arbitration? Time limits would work only one way in favour of the union
and against the employer. Other procedural requirements in collective agreements could
be ignored. What would be the deterrent to this when the employer knows it must face
arbitration on the merits eventually?
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
(Vol. 28
correct, but overlooks the most compelling argument in its favour. The
argument presented by the employer in Haley No. 1 stems from a desire to
penalize the union for collusion. Yet it would appear that arbitration is a more
appropriate forum for a consideration of the effects of collusion. An arbitrator
has the power to order compensation for losses suffered by an employer as a
result of the union’s failure to follow stipulated procedure. In that way, the
union is penalized, but the individual’s claim is heard. But if the Board
purported to penalize the union by refusing arbitration, it is not the union that
suffers; it is the individual.
Conclusion
Since the Supreme Court decision in Brunet, it has become clear that a
worker who feels himself harmed because of his union’s incompetence or
indifference cannot personally pursue his interests against his employer. This
rule has been somewhat relaxed to enable the worker to enforce certain
monetary claims on his own. When union sponsorship is needed to bring a
claim arising from a collective agreement, the worker may also have a right to
participate in the proceedings. Yet the scope of these exceptions to the general
rule is ill-defined and in the end the worker is better advised to proceed against
his union, forcing it to act on his behalf.
In Qu6bec, recourse against the union has ostensibly become easier since
the promulgation of s. 136.1 of the Canada Labour Code 3′ and s. 47.2 et seq.
of the Qu6bec Labour Code. 32 Even these statutory provisions, however, fail
to give full protection against abuses of union power. Section 136.1 of the
Canada Code is undoubtedly the broader of the two provisions, imposing a
general duty to represent the interests of bargaining unit members fairly. The
Canada Labour Relations Board has, however, diluted the force of this
section in a number of ways. First, the case law suggests that s. 136.1 can
never be used to review internal union affairs, even if such affairs concern the
existing rights of a union member under the collective agreement. Secondly,
the intensity of the duty varies, according to the nature of the task the union is
asked to perform. For example, the union need be less concerned about the
specific interests of each member during collective bargaining than it need be
while administering the collective agreement. In practice, this approach
means that only a failure to arbitrate grievances will normally give rise to a
successful application under s. 136.1. Thirdly, the duty of fair representation
Much the same could be said about allowing unions to acquiesce in their own negligence: if the
union knows it can always arbitrate a grievance by confessing to negligence, why should it
bother about procedural requirements at all?
“13R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1. as am. S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, s. 49.
112R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27.
19821
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
only protects against gross negligence and other blatant abuses of union
power. The gravity of the union’s fault is, moreover, to be measured in light
of the union’s sophistication and the importance of the job interest at stake.
Only critical job interests such as discharge or disciplinary sanctions will
warrant the Board’s intervention, and even then the union may yet exonerate
itself by pleading its lack of sophistication. Finally, the Board has adamantly
refused to read into s. 136.1 an absolute right to arbitration, even for such
critical job interests as discharge.
These glosses on the duty of fair representation make s. 136.1 look very
much like s. 47.2 et seq. of the Quebec Labour Code. According to s. 47.2,
the duty imposed on unions only protects against bad faith, discrimination,
arbitrary actions, or serious negligence. Again, the Code itself does not limit
the applicability of s. 47.2 to any particular facet of the worker-union
relationship, but s. 47.3 et seq. allow the Tribunal du Travail to order
arbitration only if the employee has been discharged or disciplined. As a
result, the duty of fair representation is ordinarily invoked only when a highly
critical job interest has been jeopardized by the shoddy management of a
grievance. In addition, the Tribunal du Travail has followed the Canada
Labour Relations Board in refusing to recognize an absolute right to arbitrate.
Finally, for the purposes of a s. 47.5 order to arbitrate, the applicant must
allege a breach of a collective agreement as the basis of his claim: arbitration
cannot be ordered to regulate purely internal union affairs which have no
bearing on the collective bargaining process.
In short, it would seem that the duty of fair representation only serves to
control the quality of union representation in the grievance procedure. The
union must apparently act in a most cavalier fashion before a worker has legal
cause to complain. This cautious and non-interventionist approach, which
resembles the methodology advanced by Archibald Cox, is not always pur-
sued consistently. The Quebec Code in particular appears to have been
drafted haphazardly. For example, the legislator shows some concern about
opening the floodgates to frivolous or vexatious claims by setting strict limits
to the types of contract disputes which fall within the scope of s. 47.3 et seq.
Yet even minor disciplinary sanctions may serve as justification for a judicial
order to arbitrate. As a result, the Code fails to provide for the arbitration of
serious claims such as those concerning seniority disputes, but allows for the
arbitration of even the most trivial of disciplinary disputes.
Why a labour tribunal or legislator may want to adopt a cautious
approach can be briefly explained: it is argued that unions should be allowed
to decide once and for all which interests must be sacrificed, so as to save
precious time, energy and money. Implicit in this argument is a particular
perception of the Canadian trade union movement. Labour rights exist, it is
said, only in so far as unions have the strength to assert those rights. Strength,
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
in turn, depends upon union solidarity –
the joining together of many
workers into a cohesive unit to pursue common goals. If unionism in Canada
is perceived as a relatively weak movement, it follows that unions should be
able to silence internal dissent of minority groups. Only in truly exceptional
cases should the law intervene to protect those minority interests. It should be
noted that this reluctance concerns only the worker’s interests in his employ-
ment. If the union trifles with the free exercise of rights otherwise acquired,
such as political or religious rights, the law readily intervenes. When, howev-
er, a worker tries to pursue personally an interest he has under his collective
agreement, legislators and labour tribunals balk. Those rights that flow from
the collective bargaining relationship are not considered to be individual
rights; they remain collective rights, enforceable through the offices of the
union. At best, the individual has no more than an interest in seeing that an
advantageous collective agreement is negotiated and then enforced,
Yet more than one hundred and ten years have passed since the enact-
ment of the first Canadian labour relations laws. Even though certain indus-
tries have proved to be extremely resistant to unionization, the social and
economic importance of the trade union movement has become fairly well
established. Because of this, a less cautious approach to the quality of union
representation may now be warranted.
The major difficulty that faces the legislator lies in reconciling the
competing interests of the union and the individual worker. Of course, the law
constantly engages in a process of crystallizing intrinsically conflicting in-
terests into rights and duties. This process occurred first with proprietary, and
then with contractual and economic interests; today, this process has begun to
occur with human and fundamental rights. The effect of such a crystallization
of rights is inevitably to fetter the discretion of the powerful, and at times even
to erode the strength of the majority. The recent evolution in corporate law
provides an excellent example of such an erosion. Increasingly, minority
shareholders have been allowed to undercut the right of the majority to decide
on the fate of the company. At times a two-third majority, rather than a simple
majority, is needed to ratify managerial decisions; minorities who may be
peculiarly affected by a fundamental change in the corporate structure are
usually given a power of veto; specially-designed remedies allow a minority
shareholder to take suit on behalf of the company, even when the majority
refuses to support the suit; and, as a final gesture of dissent, a minority
shareholder may demand that the company buy out his holding. In effect, the
shareholder’s interest in the corporation has been transformed into a right,
albeit limited, to control the affairs of the company, and this transformation
has occurred at the expense of the majority rights. Certain business advan-
tages may, as a result, have been lost. Yet the legislator has decided that the
loss of such advantages is small in comparison to the loss to a minority
shareholder who is prejudiced by a change in the corporate structure.
1982]
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
that between the individual and his union –
The interests of labour have also been crystallized into rights, but in this
case the rights are primarily held by the collectivity and not the individual
worker. Despite the interests of capital in maintaining a quiescent labour
force, unions have been allowed to exact certain standards and conditions of
employment. Unionization has, however, generated a new conflict of interest
and it remains to be seen how
–
that conflict will be resolved. To judge from the law on the duty of fair
representation, it would appear that the individual must continue to rely on his
union to guarantee his job interests. Oddly enough, the recent trend in labour
standards legislation seems to point in a different direction. Certain benefits,
which used to flow from unionization alone, are now so thoroughly accepted
that they have become statutory rights, exercisable even by the non-unionized
worker. Thus, we have legislation on minimum wage, hours of work, health
and safety requirements, and most recently the right to arbitrate dismissals.
The law has begun to provide for the direct enforcement of certain labour
rights, the enjoyment of which does not depend on unionization.
If the non-unionized worker now has certain limited statutory rights in
his ’employment, it seems paradoxical that the unionized worker has no
absolute right to insist on the performance of a collective agreement. It is true
that the unionized worker generally benefits from an agreement that is far
more generous than any statutory regime of employment rights, but this
should be irrelevant. More justifiable is the fear that industrial harmony
would be destroyed if a union were held strictly accountable to every worker it
represents. At the very least, such accountability would lead to endless
arbitration. Nonetheless, some compromise other than that devised by the
Tribunal du Travail and the Canada Labour Relations Board is desirable. For
example, the worker could be granted an absolute right to arbitrate on the
condition that he pay the costs of any claim that failed or was of little moment.
The possibility of paying costs should serve to deter the litigiously-minded
from pressing vexatious or unmeritorious claims.
But neither the Tribunal du Travail nor the Canada Labour Relations
Board has been willing to go this far. For the moment, then, the crystallization
of individual labour rights among unionized workers has been arrested. In the
interest of strength through solidarity, the union retains sole power to create
and control the unionized worker’s interests in the collective bargaining
process. Labour law today resembles corporate law of half a century ago: the
sole obligation of those who control the power structure is no more than a
vaguely expressed fiduciary duty. One might have hoped that the statutory
duty of fair representation would be used to reconcile the protection of
individual interests with the preservation of institutional strength. Regrett-
ably, the Tribunal du Travail and the Canada Labour Relations Board have
failed to respond adequately to the challenge.
