The Medical and Ecological Effects of Nuclear War
Don G. Bates*
Though the task of describing the horrible
medical and ecological effects of a nuclear
war is disagreeable, it is also essential. Only
when the leaders of the Warsaw Pact and
NATO nations are made more afraid of such
a war than they are of each other, will signifi-
cant nuclear weapon reductions be achieved.
Historical analogies to the bombs dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not very useful.
Today’s weapons are vastly more numerous,
powerful and sophisticated. The author
paints a vivid picture of the immediate
effects of a one megaton explosion detonated
two miles above a city –
a third of the
population dead, another third seriously in-
jured, many to die because of a total lack of
medical assistance. But this is only the be-
ginning. Longer term effects of a nuclear
detonation –
contaminated food and water,
devastating epidemics, local radioactive fall-
out, and the disappearance of the instruments
of social order – would make survivors
desperate, even envious’of those less “for-
tunate”. Finally, the author speculates as to
the long term effects of nuclear radiation,
including cancers that would plague persons
exposed, possible genetic damage to their
offspring and the biological consequences of
a long-contaminated environment. He con-
cludes that a nuclear war would create a
different world, one in which the war’s
causes would have become simply
irrelevant.
Bien que cela soit ddsagr6able, il est essen-
tiel de ddcrire les effets m6dicaux et 6cologi-
ques horribles d’un conflit nucldaire. Des
rdductions sensibles des stocks d’armes nu-
cl6aires ne seront possibles que lorsque les
leaders des nations membres du Pacte de
Varsovie et de I’OTAN apprendront A
craindre l’6ventualit6 d’un tel conflit plus
qu’ils ne se craignent les uns les autres. Les
rappels historiques aux bombes largudes sur
Hiroshima et Nagasaki ne sont pas tr~s
utiles, les armes d’aujourd’hui 6tant beau-
coup plus nombreuses, puissantes et perfec-
tionn6es. L’auteur d~peint un tableau saisis-
sant des effets imm6diats de l’explosion d’un
engin nucl6aire deux milles au dessus d’une
ville: le tiers de sa population serait tu6 et un
autre tiers s6rieusement bless6 avec peu d’es-
poir de survie consid6rant l’absence totale de
soins m6dicaux. Et ceci ne serait que le d6-
but. Les effets A plus long terme d’une ddto-
nation nucldaire-
contamination de l’eau et
de la nourriture, dpid6mies d6vastatrices, re-
tomb~es radioactives et disparition des
modes de maintien de l’ordre social-rddui-
raient les survivants au d6sespoir, les rendant
m~me envieux des “victimes”. Finalement,
l’auteur examine les effets possibles A long
terme de la radioactivitd, y compris les can-
cers dont seraient afflig~es les personnes ex-
pos~es, les possibilit~s de mutations provo-
qu6es chez les descendants, et les cons6-
quences biologiques au milieu suite 4 une
contamination prolong6e. L’auteur conclut
qu’un conflit nuclaire crderait un monde
diff6rent, oth les causes d’un tel conflit n’au-
raient plus d’importance.
*Thomas F. Cotton Professor of the History of Medicine, McGill University. Dr Bates is
also Chairman of the McGill Study Group for Peace and Disarmament.
19831
MEDICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
Synopsis
The Failure of Historical Analogies
Immediate Effects of Nuclear Detonation
Introduction
I.
II.
M. Longer Term Effects of a Nuclear Detonation
IV. Long Term Effects of Nuclear Radiation
Conclusion
Introduction
At the present time, the fear and dislike that the Warsaw Pact nations and
NATO have of each other is greater than the fear that both have of nuclear
war. When those fears become reversed, a negotiated, meaningful reduction
of nuclear weapons on both sides will be achieved more easily. That is why
some attention must be focused upon the terrible effects of nuclear war, even
though the task is a disagreeable one.
To impress upon people that the present arms race and current gov-
ernmental policies are leading us to war; to explain how a nuclear war would
be hell on earth; to shut off all avenues of mental escape –
no victory, no
medical response, no military or civil defence; and to chronicle the dreary
story of sickened survivors lapsing into stone-age brutality is not an assign-
ment that any sensitive person undertakes willingly. But unless we contem-
plate the likely outcome of mankind’s present course clearsightedly, and until
our leaders confront it realistically, the alternative path of slow, patient,
carefully negotiated withdrawal from the brink of the holocaust will seem
impossible when, in fact, it is the only route the human race can afford.
The task is also made difficult because one must conjure up the uni-
maginable and make palpably real events that have never before happened
and seem only the stuff of nightmares. The greater we struggle to envision that
reality, the more unreal it becomes, and those who construct such images of
devastation appear as end-of-the-world hysterics.
There is a further problem. The incredible complexity of all the effects
acting, interacting, and interacting again, precludes any confident, detailed
presentation of the events in a holocaust. We deal inevitably with approxima-
tions, probabilities, even guesses. About all that can be stated with certainty is
that our present understanding of the effects of nuclear war probably under-
states what really would happen because, to the actions and interactions of
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
(Vol. 28
consequences that we know would occur, would be added those that we have
never even imagined.’
It is the uncertainty, the incredibility and the dismal portent of this
message, then, that generate resistance and criticism. It is so much easier, so
much more comforting to believe the claims that nuclear deterrence and
balanced arms will continue to prevent war; or to hope, vaguely, that if the
holocaust does happen, it really won’t be so bad.
Thus, the motive for this paper is not to sow despair, but to make
manifest the true significance of finding alternatives to the nuclear arms race
and deterrence: such options are not merely desirable, they are imperative,
however difficult their realization may appear.
I.
The Failure of Historical Analogies
Before examining the details of those effects, a sense of perspective is
needed. It is only natural that, in trying to imagine something that has never
happened in the history of mankind, we should reach back in our collective
memory for something analogous to act as a guide. But, in the case of nuclear
war, the gap between ourpast and what could prove to be our future is so great
that we must start by disabusing ourselves of the idea that nuclear war would
be merely an extension or multiplication of the effects of past wars and
disasters.
Since the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945
furnish us with the world’s only experience of atomic explosions over popu-
lated areas, we are obliged to draw heavily on studies of those events.2 But it is
also important to appreciate the limitations of that experience for constructing
a picture of what would happen in an all-out nuclear war. The most obvious
difference is that those explosions, three days apart, were isolated events.
They offer no information on the cumulative effects on society, or on the
environment, of hundreds or thousands of such weapons exploding in
countries all across the northern hemisphere.
Similarly, the quantitative effects of even a single bomb are also, now,
quite different. The Japanese explosions, in the range of fifteen to twenty
J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth (1982) 23 et seq. The first chapter of this book is the most
comprehensive treatment of the effects of nuclear war forthe general readerpresently available
in English.
2 The standard work is, Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by
the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the Physical,
Medical and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings (E. Ishikawa & D. Swain, trans 1981).
1983]
MEDICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
up to ten kilotons –
kilotons, are only slightly above the level of what are now regarded as
“tactical” weapons –
and designed for use on the
battlefield. Today a city of comparable size, of 300,000 to 400,000 inhabit-
ants, would be targeted with a bomb fifty to seventy times larger (one
megaton), while a larger population centre, of say two million or more, would
undergo an attack equivalent to two hundred Hiroshimas (three to five
megatons).
A different way of expressing the quantitative differences is to compare
these modem nuclear weapons to the amount of TNT that would produce
explosions of equivalent force. To generate the same power as a one megaton
bomb, for example, it would require a million tons of TNT. To ship that much
high explosive by rail, it would require a train two hundred miles long. A
five megaton weapon represents more explosive power than all of the bombs
used in the five years of World War II. And some nuclear weapons contain
above twenty megatons of explosive potential, more than all of the explosives
used in all of the wars in the history of mankind. Indeed, the present arsenals
of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are so vast
that they represent a million Hiroshimas. If an explosion equivalent to one
Hiroshima bomb went off every hour, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week, it would take almost 115 years to detonate all of the nuclear explosives
presently stockpiled by the two superpowers.
The difference in scale between the Japanese experience and anything
that would happen now in a nuclear war, even the detonation of one bomb, is
fundamental. But there are other differences as well. Simply because today’s
bombs are so much larger, for instance, there are qualitative as well as
quantitative differences. In any nuclear weapon, detonation is associated with
the release of radioactivity directly over the area around ground zero. In the
case of Japan in 1945, many survivors were exposed to this “immediate”
radiation, as it is called. The result for some was radiation sickness and even
death. For others, it was leukemia and cancer in later years. With the size of
current nuclear warheads, however, everyone exposed to immediate radiation
would be killed by the blast and fire. Almost all the radioactive damage done
to those still alive would come, not from immediate radiation, but from fallout
in the hours following the attack.
In Japan, because the bombs were detonated in the air, there were few
heavy radioactive particles settling back to earth in the vicinity of the explo-
sion. As a result, most of what we know about the effects of “local” fallout, as
31Barnaby, The Effects ofa GlobalNuclear War: The Arsenals (1982) 11 Ambio 76,78. This
special double issue has many articles, all of them devoted to, in the words of the Editors, “a
realistic assessment of the possible human and ecological consequences of a nuclear war”.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
this regional form that falls within the first day is called, arises from accidents
that occurred after World War II, in atmospheric testing done in the United
States and South Pacific.4
In a future war, population centres would likely suffer air bursts, as in the
Japanese case, and therefore would also not experience significant local
fallout from such attacks. But, unlike the experience of 1945, most military,
and some energy targets such as nuclear power generators, would be sub-
jected to ground bursts and it is these explosions that would send clouds of
highly radioactive dust to rain down on cities even hundreds of miles away.
In fact, nuclear explosions on nuclear reactors are a good example of an
event which has no precedent in history. The effects of the worst possible
accident in a nuclear reactor by itself are minuscule by comparison with those
of even a one megaton nuclear explosion. But a nuclear attack on a nuclear
reactor would give rise to lethal doses of radiation to exposed persons 150
miles downwind and would produce significant levels of radioactive con-
tamination of the environment more than 600 miles away. Moreover, the
radioactivity would be particularly long-lasting. For example, a year after
such an explosion, 680 square miles would still be uninhabitable because of
sickening levels of radiation.5
We also cannot extrapolate from the Japanese experience any informa-
tion about the effects of long term global fallout. Such fallout would be
produced by thousands of megatons of nuclear explosives, particularly air
bursts, carrying radioactive particles high into the stratosphere. Here they
would spread around the world, particularly, but not exclusively, in the
latitudes where the detonations occurred, and would fall gradually to earth
over the ensuing months and years. Again, some insight into these problems
has been gained through atmospheric tests, but only in so far as the detonation
of single bombs is relevant to a massive barrage of explosions around the
world.6
‘See R. Conard et al., A Twenty-Year Review of Medical Findings in a Marshallese
Population Accidentally Exposed to Radioactive Fallout (1975). For a discussion of testing
done in the U.S., see Lyon, Klauber, Gardner & Udall, ChildhoodLeukemias Associated with
Fallout from Nuclear Testing (1979) 300 New Eng. J. Med. 397; and Caldwell, Kelley &
Heath, Leukemia Among Participants in Military Maneuvers at a Nuclear Bomb Test: A
Preliminary Report (1980) 244 J.A.M.A. 1575.
5 See Fetter & Tsipis, Catastrophic Releases ofRadioactivity (1981) 244 Sci. Am. 41, 45.
6 See Machta & Telegadas, Radioiodine Levels in the U.S. Public Health Service Pasteur-
ized Milk Network from 1963-1968 and Their Relationship to Possible Sources (1970) 19
Health Physics 469. Some attempt to estimate the cumulative effects of all atmospheric testing
has been made by the United States National Academy of Sciences, infra, note 7.
19831
MEDICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
Finally, the potential for other environmental effects has been appreci-
ated fully only in the 1970s when new insights about the intricate ecological
mechanisms that make up the earth’s biosphere have been applied retroactive-
ly to what was learned previously about the physical effects of individual
nuclear explosions during the years of atmospheric testing.7 New questions
have thus ar’sen and further studies are now in progress.8
Anyone who studies the question of the medical and biological effects of
nuclear war realizes that it is not a static picture, constructed many years ago
and still being sustained by repetition. Rather, it is an actively growing field
of inquiry and education. With only one possible exception, 9 all of the
expanded knowledge has promoted the realization that the effects would be
worse, much worse, than previously thought.
The situation that mankind faces presently, then, has not only been made
more critical by the proliferation and sophistication of nuclear weapons, it has
also been recognized to be more critical as more of the manifold effects of a
nuclear war have come to light. This trend toward increased knowledge will
continue, but we have almost reached the point where, just as the proliferation
of more and more weapons has become redundant, so too will the prolifera-
tion of our knowledge of effects. Once it becomes clear that all hope for
twentieth century man is lost if a nuclear war is started, it hardly adds any
meaningful knowledge to learn of additional effects. Already many students
of the subject regard the short term effects as so utterly devastating that they
see little point in studying the longer term of a world already blighted beyond
repair.
H.
Immediate Effects of Nuclear Detonation
What then are the effects? 0 The immediate ones are best imagined by
thinking of the consequences of a one megaton explosion detonated, as it
would be, roughly two miles above a city. Unlike chemical explosives, a
7 See National Academy of Sciences, Long-Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear
Weapon Detonations (1975).
IFor the most recent information, see articles in Ambio, supra, note 3.
9ILe. the possibility of genetic damage to offspring arising from exposure to radiation by the
parents. See also infra, Part IV.
“The standard authority on the physical effects of thermonuclear explosions is S. Glasstone
& P. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3d ed. (1977) (a publication of the United States
Dep’t of Defense and the United States Energy Research and Development Administration).
See also Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of
Nuclear War (1979), which, as its title suggests, applies the knowledge of these effects to likely
war situations. A systematic account of the effects on a single large city can be found in 0.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
thermonuclear weapon has three important effects –
blast, thermal and
nuclear radiation. These occur almost simultaneously, but, for simplicity’s
sake, are usually described separately.
Out of the bright fireball, in which the temperature and pressure are the
same as those at the centre of the sun, a blast front or concussion wave moves
out in a widening circle at supersonic speed, followed by high winds. Within a
two mile radius of ground zero, nothing can withstand this blast or the 500
mph winds that follow. Even at four miles, only the skeletons of buildings
with I-beam construction would remain, the following winds still having
twice the velocity of a hurricane. Out to eight miles from the centre, large
commercial buildings would be damaged heavily and all homes destroyed.
Up to twelve miles, the concussion would be great enough to shatter glass,
and send the splinters flying off at over 100 mph. At this distance, damage to
homes would be significant but they could probably continue to provide
shelter.
Even before this blast front, however, there would be a heat wave
radiating out from the fireball at the speed of light igniting spontaneously
everything inflammable within a three to five mile radius. Ten miles away this
thermal radiation is still severe enough to cause second degree burns to
exposed skin. At thirty miles, a person who happened to focus his gaze at the
spot just as the detonation occurred would suffer retinal bums and possibly
blindness.
In a typical explosion, about half of the energy is released as blast and
another third as thermal radiation. The remainder, roughly fifteenper cent, is
released in the form of nuclear radiation. But, as has been said, those who
have been exposed to immediate radiation from today’s larger weapons do not
survive the blast and heat. The rest of the radiation occurs as fallout which can
be discussed more appropriately after this description of the immediate effects
is concluded.
Mortality within the first two mile radius is essentially one hundred per
cent and almost entirely instantaneous. Even out to four miles, it is fifty per
cent, another forty per cent being injured seriously. At eight miles, half the
population would be dead or injured and at twelve miles, a quarter would be
injured, some seriously, by flying glass and debris. People can withstand
concussion much better than rigid buildings, but in a city this fact has little
Greene, B. Rubin, et al., London After the Bomb [:] What a Nuclear Attack Really Means
(1982). Medical considerations are detailed in R. Adams & S. Cullen, eds, The Final Epidemic
[:] Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War (1981); and E. Chivian, S. Chivian, R. Lifton &
J. Mack, eds, Last Aid [:] The Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War (1982).
19831
MEDICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
relevance. Death and injury occur not so much from the explosion itself but
from the fact that it turns people and debris into projectiles that hurl into
stationary objects and into each other. Multiple fractures, puncture wounds
and the smashing of skulls, limbs and internal organs makes the list of
possible injuries endless. But the special horror of nuclear war, so far as
immediate effects are concerned, is flesh-cooking heat.
In the central area, total devastation is combined with incineration.
Nothing is left. But beyond this perimeter of annihilation, what is striking
about survivors is that, whatever injury they may or may not have sustained
from the physical blow, the great likelihood is that they are burned seriously.
Third degree burns, even to protected skin, can occur within three miles and,
to exposed flesh, within five. Burns can also occur secondarily. At Hiroshi-
ma, the hundreds of fires started by thermal radiation coalesced within twenty
minutes into a raging fire storm. This is a giant, self-feeding bonfire in which
the updraft sucks powerful surface winds toward its centre thereby fanning the
flames of the ever-widening perimeter. Temperatures can reach 800 degrees
celsius –
almost 1,500 degrees fahrenheit. Anyone in the area, even if in a
shelter, is either incinerated by the intense heat, asphyxiated by the lack of
oxygen which is consumed instead by the flames, or suffocated by the lethal
doses of carbon dioxide that are released. An alternative result of many small
fires would be a conflagration in which a wall of flame, fanned by prevailing
winds, advances in one direction on a wide front. Under certain conditions,
either sort of fire, fire storm or conflagration, could lead to a destructive force
that would kill more people than the initial effects of the bomb.
The likelihood of either of these events is disputed however. With bigger
bombs, there is a time lag between the heat wave and the ensuing concussion
and winds. This could mean that the fires started by the thermal pulse would
be snuffed out by the following blast. Moreover, it may be that the density of
inflammable materials in modern cities is not sufficient to generate or sustain
such mammoth fires. Because only a nuclear expolsion over a modern city
could resolve the debate, it is to be hoped that the controversy remains
academic.
In any event, the number of severely burned survivors would be very
large. In Hiroshima, where there was a fire storm, it is estimated that half of
the early deaths resulted from bums. So far as immediate effects upon people
are concerned, it is the high proportion of severe burn cases that distinguishes
injuries from a thermonuclear attack from those of other kinds of warfare.
This fact can serve to illustrate another consequence of nuclear war –
the hopelessness of counting upon medical services in the post-attack period.
Burns present special medical problems. They are particularly painful; their
victims especially helpless; their medical needs urgent; and the outcome, in
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terms of life or death, more dependent on the medical and nursing care given
than most other conditions. But most of all, the care of bums requires some of
the most sophisticated and specialized equipment and personnel that modem
medicine can provide. In fact, so expensive and specialized is this form of
care, that facilities are scarce, even at the best of times. For example,
Montr6al, a city of over two million people, presently has facilities for six
severe burn cases. There is talk of expanding these facilities but, even at a cost
of $1.5 million, there would only be twelve such beds. In fact, for the whole
of North America, there are estimated to be approximately 2,500 beds for
serious bum cases. Yet, if a one megaton bomb were exploded over Montr6al,
there could be as many as ten thousand people requiring such facilities. The
final irony is that those six beds in Montr6al are located in a hospital within
three miles of the city centre – which would almost surely be destroyed in the
initial explosion.
This example reveals two aspects of the medical reponse to nuclear
attack which, when combined, make any meaningful help an impossibility.
One fact is that the number of casualties would overwhelm the locally-
available medical services even if these were intact. The other is that they
would not be intact. In most modem cities, there tends to be a concentration of
medical facilities and personnel in the city centre, particularly the large
hospitals and sophisticated equipment and specialists that would be required
by many of the badly injured survivors. In the example of Montr6al again,
about eighty per cent of its medical facilities are within a five mile radius of
the city centre and eighty per cent of these facilities could be expected to be
rendered inoperative by a single, one megaton warhead. In fact, given the
special population distribution of Qu6bec, it seems that fiftyper cent of all the
practising physicians in the province have their offices within this five mile
circle.
In the first twenty-four hours, then, the immediate effects of a one
megaton bomb would be to leave a circle of damage twenty-five miles in
diameter in which an inner core, fifteen miles wide, would be more or less
totally destroyed. At least a third of the population would be dead, another
third seriously injured, many of these dying in the days ahead, in part because
of a total lack of medical assistance. But a city such as Montr6al would not
escape so lightly. One official estimate suggests that a city of this size would
be attacked by two to five megatons.1’ In this case, the city and the countryside
around would be simply obliterated. But that is only the beginning.
” Emergency Planning Canada, Planning Guidance in Relation to a Nuclear Attack on
North America in the 1980’s (1981) (document EPC 2/81).
1983]
MEDICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
HI. Longer Term Effects of a Nuclear Detonation
Any country that suffered from a determined nuclear attack on its cities,
military installations and energy production would have to contend with a
great deal more in the days and weeks that followed. The loss of communica-
tions, transportation, electricity, and other social utilities; the absence or
scarcity of uncontaminated food and water; the heavy burden of the sick,
injured and mentally incapacitated; and the disappearance of the instruments
of social organization and social order would create chaos for the relatively
healthy survivors and would make their situation as desparate as that of those
less “fortunate”.
As if this were not enough, there would be the additional problem of
“local” radioactive fallout that would settle back to earth over the first
twenty-four hours in the form of relatively heavy particles or dust, raised by
ground bursts and carried by the winds. Because the speed and direction of the
wind in a given location can vary enormously over the seasons, days and even
hours, just where and how far such radioactivity would spread is wholly
unpredictable. Moreover, weather conditions, especially the presence or
absence of preciptation, as well as features of the terrain, would make the
actual distribution erratic.
For the sake of illustration, these variables are often taken as uniform for
the twenty-four hours during which fallout would occur. For example, after a
one megaton ground burst, if the wind blew steadily in the same direction at
fifteen mph, a long cigar-shaped plume of radioactive dust would be laid
down, assuming no rain and perfectly level ground. People inhabiting this
region would then be subjected to the radiation given off by this fallout. The
amount that a person would receive would decline rapidly –
less rapidly if a
but the exposed individual would be
nuclear reactor had been struck –
accumulating biological damage as long as he remained exposed.
In this example, it can be calculated that, over a two week period, any
person who lived within roughly 700 square miles downwind of the blast, that
is to say anyone in an area about 80 miles long and 11 miles wide, would
receive a potentially lethal dose of radiation unless he remained specially
sheltered for that length of time. Someone living within a band 19 miles wide
and 175 miles long would need to take some precautions for most of that time
in order to avoid radiation sickness. And people in a strip 45 miles wide and
440 miles long, an area of more than 14,000 square miles, would be living on
land contaminated with long-lasting radioactive particles that could be in-
haled in the air they breathed or incorporated in the food they ate for the rest of
their lives. 12
‘2The area covered is not a rectangle. Hence it is less than the product of length times width.
For a comprehensive discussion of all aspects of radiation, see J. Rotblat, Nuclear Radiation in
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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Most of the industrialized nations of Asia, Europe and North America
that would suffer attacks in a nuclear war thus would undergo an initial,
devastating blow that would produce death, injury and social chaos on a scale
unprecedented in human history. Then, within twenty-four hours, much of
that same territory would be blanketed with radioactive fallout, much of it
with serious short term consequences and all of it potentially hazardous for
years to come.
Against this background, how can anyone guess the course of events
over the weeks and months that follow an attack? For example, assuming that
only half of the megatons in the current United States and Soviet arsenals were
detonated, one scenario estimates that, of the 1.3 billion people in the cities of
the northern hemisphere, there would be 750 million immediate deaths, 340
million seriously injured and 200 million “healthy” survivors. 3 This might
lead one to suppose, for instance, that short term food supplies would be
abundant. But this overlooks completely the dependence of modem societies
on daily food transportation and distribution, and the likelihood of vast
quantities being destroyed or rendered inedible. Large numbers of people in
some areas probably would starve while stocks of food elsewhere would rot.
A more specifically medical problem would be the appearance of devas-
tating epidemics. The various glands and organs of the body that provide
natural immunity against infection are particularly sensitive to radiation.
When combined with social disintegration, this would invite the rapid spread
of communicable diseases in unusually severe forms. 4
Today in the industrialized world, diseases such as the plague, smallpox,
cholera, and typhoid fever have been relegated, we assume, to the history
books. We commonly think that we have banished their microbes, or can fight
them so effectively that rare cases cannot fuel a general epidemic. But, in
truth, it is the affluence and orderliness of our society –
ample nutrition,
sanitation and immunization programmes, as well as the immune systems of
that hold these diseases at bay. After a nuclear war all these
our own bodies –
defences would be compromised severely; they may even be non-existent,
along with the medical services and supplies needed to treat the cases that did
appear.
For example, it has been estimated that as much as three-quarters of the
United States population is no longer protected adequately against smallpox
Warfare (1981) (a SIPRI monograph). This information is applied to the effects on a specific
country in Bates, Briskin, et al., “What Would Happen to Canada in a Nuclear War?”, in E.
Regehr & S. Rosenblum, eds, Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race (1983) 171.
“Middleton, Epidemiology [:1 The Future isSicknessandDeath (1981) 11 Ambio 100, 102.
” See Abrams & Von Kaenel, Medical Problems of Survivors of Nuclear War: Infection and
the Spread of Communicable Disease (1981) 305 New Eng. J. Med. 1226.
1983]
MEDICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
because the odds of suffering ill effects from vaccination, although very low,
are nonetheless higher than the odds of catching smallpox, which are practi-
cally zero. The virus is stored in disease control centres, in case a vaccine has
to be made. These centres exist in areas likely to suffer a nuclear attack. If-the
germs escaped into the community, would there be facilities left to produce
vaccine? Would there be transportation to distribute it? Would the health
services be able to vaccinate people? Would the immune systems of hundreds
of thousands of radiated victims respond sufficiently to furnish protection?
And would all this take place before an epidemic of smallpox decimated the
survivors? Whatever happened, one thing is certain: bacteria, viruses and
insects are highly resistant to radiation. An all-out nuclear war could tilt the
favourable balance of nature from humans to bugs.
And what would twentieth century citizens of the industrialized world do
in the absence of any industrial base, any capital to rebuild it, or any energy
source to run it?
The task… would be not to restore the old economy but to invent a new one, on a far more
primitive level. … The economy of the Middle Ages, for example, was far less produc-
tive than our own, but it was exceedingly complex, and it would not be within the capacity
of people in our time suddenly to establish a medieval economic system in the ruins of
their twentieth century one. . . .Sitting among the debris of the Space Age, they would
find that the pieces of a shattered modem economy around them – here an automobile,
there a washing machine- were mismatched to their elemental needs. … [Tihey would
not be worrying about rebuilding the automobile industry or the electronics industry; they
would be worrying about how to find non-radioactive berries in the woods, or how to tell
which trees had edible bark.”5
A final question is: Would the numbers, physical health and reproduc-
tive capacities of the survivors, combined with the social and natural environ-
ment, be adequate for the continuation of the human species, let alone for its
eventual restoration to something akin to civilization? Of course, no one can
answer this question. And no amount of scientific enquiry is ever likely to
decide the matter beyond dispute. All that can be done is to speculate on the
basis of the information we have.
To make the question easier, it can be considered in two parts. Suppose,
first, that no important, long-lasting, deleterious effects were inflicted on the
natural environment of half of the world’s land mass. Would mankind
survive? Surely the answer is – yes. For even if humans died out throughout
most of the northern hemisphere it is not likely that the southern half would
suffer the same fate. Of course, it is quite possible that some, even several,
targets in the south would be attacked. 6 And, in any event, the collapse of the
5 Schell, supra, note 1, 69 et seq.
16 See ibid., 71 et seq.; and Barnaby, Rotblat, et al., Reference Scenarios How a Nuclear
War Might be Fought (1982) 11 Ambio 94, and appended maps.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
I [Vol. 28
economies of the north, along with their food-producing capacities, would
trigger massive starvation and political turmoil throughout the developing and
undeveloped countries of the Third World. But it remains difficult to imagine
that if large areas of cultivable land remained, and the environment continued
to sustain crops and human habitation, that man, agricultural man, would not
survive. Nuclear war might undo, for a considerable time, the industrial
revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but it would not reverse
the agricultural revolution of 10,000 B.C.
What would be critical, therefore, would be the second part of the
question –
the long term, life-supporting capacity of the natural environ-
ment. At this point, conjecture becomes so large a part of the assessment that
completely contradictory effects may be postulated. For example, in a 1975
report, the United States National Academy of Sciences raised the question of
damage to the stratospheric ozone layer which shields the earth from a
biologically damaging range of ultra-violet rays from the sun. 7 The premise
for this calculation, however, was that of a large number of nuclear weapons
in the one to five megaton range. A recent study, using a more sophisticated
model of the same scenario, concurs broadly with these findings. But, using a
different premise, reflecting recent changes in nuclear weaponry, the same
study postulates very different results. In the latter case, weapons chiefly in
the range of 100 to 500 kilotons are presumed to constitute the major mode of
attack. When this model is assumed, the reduction of ozone in the strato-
sphere is not significant but its production in the trophosphere is increased,
thereby producing, along with particulate matter and chemicals from many
fires, a large amount of photochemical smog.”
In either scenario, however, the final result could be the same –
crop
failures inducing large scale famine among survivors. This famine would
depopulate the world further, especially the northern hemisphere. But,
beyond this, the atmospheric, ozone effects would not be sufficiently long-
lasting to have an impact upon succeeding generations.
Alterations of regional weather patterns and larger scale changes of
climate caused by nuclear explosions are conceivable but not presently
predictable with any confidence. Moreover, it is not possible to say whether
any changes that might occur would persist to affect generations beyond that
of the survivors. Predicting such global changes, and their evolution over
many decades, requires accounting for a multitude of interacting variables, a
task that presently overwhelms the capacities of a field of study that is still in
its infancy.
‘”Supra, note 7.
I8See Crutzen & Birks, The Atmosphere After a Nuclear War [:] Twilight at Noon (1982) 11
Ambio 114, 121.
1983]
MEDICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
IV. Long Term Effects of Nuclear Radiation
Finally, there is the question of the long term effects of nuclear radiation.
This question should actually be broken down into two: the long term effects
of short term exposure to high doses from local fallout in the days immediate-
ly following the nuclear exchange; and, the effects of continuing long term
exposure to low doses arising from the long-contaminated environment.
Our chief source of evidence regarding the first issue is the experience of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The impact of short term high doses would be
severe on the surviving generation. Death, radiation sickness or the radiation-
enhanced severity of wounds, burns and infections would be the short term
results. Miscarriages, still births or birth defects like microcephaly and
mental retardation would be the lot of the fetuses of exposed pregnant women.
Epidemic levels of leukemia, especially in children, would appear in five to
ten years. Cataracts and temporary sterility would afflict many. Excessive
numbers of cancers would plague the exposed populations for the rest of their
days. But whether or not they would, through genetic damage, pass on this
blight to generations conceived after the war is still a matter of controversy.
The evidence from Hiroshima and Nagasaki is equivocal as yet, and whatever
the eventual results, that experience simply may not be relevant to the
conditions of a modem, all-out nuclear war.19
The experience of 1945 also tells us little about the effects of short term,
high dose exposure when combined with long term, low dose exposure, a
combination that did not occur then but that certainly would in any future
nuclear exchange. The long term presence of low dose radiation would come
from two sources: local fallout that would be distributed in “plumes” over
areas downwind from ground bursts as has been described above; and global
fallout coming down everywhere, from the stratosphere, over months and
years.
In either local or global fallout, the most important substances are
strontium-90 and cesium-137 because their radioactivity decays so slowly
that, in about thirty years, half of the material is still radioactive. Moreover,
by a complicated biological chain from soil to plants to animals to man, these
substances become incorporated in the human body; strontium, through milk
and meat, accumulates in bone; cesium, through fish, vegetables and other
plants, is taken up by soft tissues. Fromfoci of concentration within the body,
19 See Schull, Otake & Neel, Genetic Effects of the AtomicBombs: A Reappraisal (1981) 213
Science 1220. See also an editorial by Neel, Genetic Effects of Atomic Bombs (1981) 213
Science 1205. Among the ways in which the Japanese experience may not be applicable is in
the sheer number of subsequent matings where both parents have suffered from exposure to
radiation.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
doses of beta-rays and gamma-rays can eventually be built up that are harmful
to nearby tissues and organs.
More insidious still, plutonium, chiefly in the form of plutonium-239,
would also be a contaminant because it is used in the trigger of nuclear
weapons, is produced in the explosion and is also present in nuclear reactors.
This substance has a half-life of 24,400 years. Its radioactivity is in the form
of alpha particles that have almost no pentrating power. But plutonium-
contaminated dust can be inhaled and deposited in the lungs where a sufficient
dose can induce lung cancer.
The heaviest burden of long term, low level radiation would, of course,
fall upon the surviving generation. And while, through early death, relative
infertility and other effects, that generation’s capacity to reproduce and to
provide for the next generation would most certainly be compromised, it is
radiation – would not be a sentence of death for
clear that this factor alone –
the whole human race in the way that Nevil Shute imagined in his novel On
The Beach. I In Japan, excess deaths from cancer, for example, are occurring
in age ranges that are typical for the same cancer caused by other means,
regardless of the amount of time since exposure. If this holds true, most
cancers would appear after the age of reproduction. And, while there would
be obvious and measurable effects on the next generation through their own
exposure to the continuing presence of radioactive contamination, this factor
alone would not be likely to lead to the disappearance of the human race.
What we cannot predict, though, and perhaps never will with any
confidence, is the impact of many ill effects working in combination on man
and nature. As with other animals, there may be a minimum number of
humans required to drive the population dynamics in the direction of growth
rather than extinction. A combination of population thinning through im-
mediate decimation, the subsequent ravages of disease, famine and social
disorder, relative infertility and shortened life spans, and a climatically
unsupportive environment conceivably could push man into the position of an
endangered species. Moreover, the fact that no catastrophic and terminal
effect on the life supporting capacity of the biosphere has yet been proven
should not diminish our awareness of the possibility that this could occur and
that human life on earth could come to an end fairly quickly on this basis
alone.
“N. Shute, On the Beach (New York: Morrow, 1957). But the superpowers are working on
it. See Feld, “Mechanics of fallout” in Adams & Cullen, supra, note 10, 110, 115.
1983]
MEDICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
Conclusion
This survey of the medical and ecological effects of an all-out nuclear
war is by no means complete. Rather, it has been an attempt to give some idea
of the state of present knowledge on the subject, with particular attention to
the long term, large scale trends. The best information we currently possess
suggests, not surprisingly, that the physical impact of nuclear exchanges
would be greatest in the first minutes to hours after the war started. But, unlike
in previous conflicts, the physical damage and the biological consequences
could continue, at first with severity, but then at a lower level, for many years.
The result would be catastrophic for the surviving generation, but an impact
would be felt, though with decreasing severity, over the next generation or
two at the very least.
But when all is said and done, most of the effects that have been
discussed would be but the physiological and enviromental substrata to the
real impact of a nuclear war –
the economic, social and cultural destruction
of modem, industrialized society. Nuclear war would represent a turning
point in human history, more sudden and more drastic that anything that has
gone before. Just where it would turn us, and just what it would portend for
the future of humanity and civilization is impossible to predict. But one effect
would surely be that a very different world would emerge, a world in which
the values, ideologies and struggles for power that had caused the war in the
first place would have become simply irrelevant.
