This Child Does Have 2 (Or More) Fathers …
Step-parents and Support Obligations
Alison Harvison Young*
The Supreme Court of Canada’s unanimous ruling in
Chartier v. Chartier has expanded the in loco parentis
doctrine (or its statutory equivalent) in the context of step-
parent support obligations. In holding that a stepfather can-
not unilaterally terminate his in loco parentis status, the
Court has recognised the possibility that a child may have
two (or more) “fathers” for the purposes of support obliga-
tions, thereby opening the door to the notion of multiple
parents and debtors of support (and other) obligations. This
comment analyses the implications of the Chartier deci-
sion, situating it within a broader examination of the norm
of the exclusive family and exploring both the Canadian
and the comparative contexts.
The comment begins with a discussion of the two
conflicting lines of jurisprudence which preceded the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Charier. The author argues that
notwithstanding unresolved questions concerning the de-
termination of threshold and quantum of support, the
Court’s resolution of the in loco parentis issue is a positive
development since it reflects a principled approach to the
Divorce Act which privileges the best interests of the child.
Furthermore, this development represents a move towards
a less exclusive vision of the family, one which is not par-
alleled in the American case law. The author considers
both the points of divergence and of overlap between Ca-
nadian and American case law, noting the ways in which
the policy questions explored in both bodies of case law
might serve as a useful foundation for further jurisprudence
and legislative debate. The author concludes that in virtue
of its assertion that once the parental mantle has been as-
sumed, it cannot be unilaterally terminated by a step-
parent’s post-separation conduct, Chartier is to be wel-
comed for the direction in which it moves Canadian law.
Le jugement unanime de la Cour supreme du Canada
dans Chatier c. Chatier a renforcd l’6tendue de la doc-
trine in loco parentis (ou son &tuivalent Idgislatif) dans le
contexte de l’obligation alimentaire des beaux-parents. En
soutenant qu’un beau-plre ne peut unilatdralement mettre
fin A son statut in loco parentis, la Cour a reconnu Ia possi-
bilith qu’un enfant puisse avoir deux
ce qui a trait a l’obligation alimentaire, et par extension la
possibilit6 d’une pluralit6 de parents et de crdanciers
d’aliments (et autres obligations). Ce commentaire analyse
la decision Chartier, en la plaant au sein d’une 6tude plus
gdnerale de la norme de la famille exclusive et en s’appuyant
sur le contexte canadien ainsi que sur le droit compar6.
Le commentaire expose d’abord les deux tendances
incompatibles de la jurisprudence pr6cddant Ia d6ecision
Chartier. L’auteur soutient que, malgr6 des questions non
rdsolues quant A la d6termination du seuil et du quantum
d’aliments A accorder, la d6ecision de la Cour concemant la
question in locoparentis est un d6veloppement positif dtant
dorn6 qu’elle adopte une interprdtation de la Loi sur le di-
vorce qui tient compte des meilleurs int6rets de ‘enfant. De
plus, ce d6veloppement, qui n’a pas d’dquivalent dans la
jurisprudence amiricaine, reprdsente un pas vers l’avant
pour une perception moins exclusive de la famille. En dtu-
diant la mesure dans laquelle les jurisprudences canadien-
nes et am~ricaines divergent et se chevauchent, l’auteur
prend note des fagons par lesquelles les choix de politique
consid6r s dans ces deux systhmes de droit peuvent servir
de fondement pour approfondir le d6bat jurisprudentiel et
Idgislatif. L’auteur conclut que ]a d6cision Chartier, en af-
firmant que l’autoritd parentale, une fois assum6e, ne peut
etre mise 4 terme unilatdralement dans la pdriode post-
s6paration par la conduite du beau-parent concerd, met le
droit canadien sur la bonne voie.
“Dean and Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario. The author gratefully
acknowledges the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the
opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at the International Society of Family Law Con-
ference in Albuquerque, New Mexico in June 1999. She is especially indebted to Shannon Chace-
Hall for her superb research assistance.
McGill Law Journal 2000
Revue de droit de McGill 2000
To be cited as: (2000) 45 McGill LJ. 107
Mode de r6fdrence: (2000) 45 R.D. McGill 107
108
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1.
Introduction
A. Exclusivity as a Norm: The Status of Step-parents in Family Law
B. Challenging the Norm: The Canadian versus the American Perspective
II. The Changing Context of Step-parent Support Obligations in
Canada: Chartierv. Chartler
A. An Overview
B. The Pre-Chartier Context
C. The Chartier Decision
D. The Chartier Reconfiguration of the In Loco Parentis Doctrine
III. The Comparative Context
A. Step-parent Support Obligations in the United States
IV. Future Developments
A. The Implications of Chartier
Conclusion
2000] A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
109
I. Introduction
A. Exclusivity as a Norm: The Status of Step-parents in Family Law
Family law has been relatively slow to reflect the dramatic social changes which
have taken place in this century. As I have argued in a recent article, family law has
tended to be preoccupied with excluding players from the family circle rather than
with finding ways to encourage and recognize the roles that persons other than bio-
logical parents may play, and are increasingly playing, in the day-to-day lives of our
children. Of particular relevance to the case of step-parents and the reality of many
blended families is the fact that while the law does provide for ending and re-creating
family units (as through divorce, remarriage and adoption), each new unit legally “an-
nihilates” the pre-existing unit. The law has been slow to contemplate the reality of
overlapping families, children with multiple parents, families in which parenting roles
are shared by custodial and non-custodial, natural and step-parents, families that re-
unite for weddings and funerals and share memories, children, and friends.! In this
sense, the legal notion of family has constructed boundaries which, by definition, ex-
clude all but a limited number of relationships as relevant. Until very recently, the law
has, in effect, created two classes of persons vis-4-vis children: parents (only two) and
legal strangers. This norm of exclusivity has served neither the interests of children
nor of society as a whole because of the extent to which it severs children (and their
parents) from the broader community and, particularly, from certain members of that
community who might contribute to children’s lives. These individuals could be seen
as supplementary and complementary to parents; a list of such persons might include
step-parents, birth mothers and gestational mothers?
‘A. Harvison Young, ‘ Reconceiving The Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Far-
fly” (1998) 6 Am. U. J. Gender &L. 505 passim.
2 A graphic and humorous example of one such overlapping family appeared in The Globe & Mail.
In a “Back-Page” column entitled “Life with(out) Brian”, Anne Martin (a pseudonym) described the
relationship that developed between Brian’s three ex-wives, who got to know each other through the
children of the various marriages (who were half-siblings) who visited back and forth (A. Martin,
“Life with(out) Brian: the Ex-wives Club” The Globe & Mail (8 February 1996) A22). These net-
works can be supportive and constructive, especially for the children involved, yet our legal constructs
generally fail even to acknowledge their existence.
3 See generally G. A. Holmes, ‘The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Main-
tain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals” (1994) 53 Mod. L. Rev. 358 at 393. An increasing
number of American academics are suggesting the importance of visitation and custody laws which
recognize children’s interests in maintaining relationships with step-parents. See e.g. ICL. Burks,
“Redefining Parenthood: Child Custody and Visitation When Nontraditional Families Dissolve’
(1994) 24 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 223; B. Levine, “Divorce and the Modem Family: Providing In
Loco Parentis Step-parents Standing to Sue for Custody of their Step-children in a Dissolution Pro-
ceeding” (1996) 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 315; and J.K. Mangnall, “Step-parent Custody Rights After Di-
vorce” (1997) 26 Sw. U.L. Rev. 399. More generally, see B. B. Woodhouse, “Hatching the Egg: A
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights” (1993) 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 at 1753. The author
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Despite the law’s general tardiness in responding, the norm of exclusivity has al-
ready been fundamentally challenged by changing social practices. For example,
while adoption normally severs all links with the biological family in favour of the
new family, “open adoption”, which allows the birth mother a continuing role, is be-
coming increasingly common.! Parental figures such as grandparents are also in-
creasingly demanding greater legal recognition for the roles that they frequently play.!
In addition, the reality of gay and lesbian family units has challenged the notion that a
child can have only one mother or one father (for an aggregate of two parents), largely
by creating units that understand themselves as, and live as, families with (as is more
common) two mothers.’ Finally, and of particular significance here, are the growing
numbers of reconstituted families’ that typically allocate parenting roles among resi-
rightly points out that “children know their parents by what they do and not necessarily for what they
are:’ This point can be transposed to other relationships, not just parental ones. It is in itself a basis for
recognizing the contributions of various actors who play a role in a child’s life. The connections worth
maintaining should not be limited to vertical relationships (such as those between a child and a step-
parent, for example). Horizontal connections should also be recognized in a more inclusive vision of
the family. See e.g. V(A) v. R(MA.) (Litigation Guardian of) (1995), 122 D.L.R. (4th) 719, 11 R.F.L.
(4th) 95 (Ont. Gen. Div.). In this case, a woman brought two orphaned children to Canada from
Mexico. She cared for these children, and they lived with her, for a period of two years. At the end of
this period, however, she decided to adopt only one of the children and to make the other a Crown
ward. The latter sought access to his sister. In the context of his ruling in the case, Jarvis J. said that,
while he was conscious of the effect that the proceedings started by the child must have on the adop-
tive mother and her family, the relationship of brother and sister was a “basic human relationship”
which “existed between these two children long before [the adoptive mother] became involved in
their lives” (at 728) (although it is important to note that he also emphasized the role that the “unusual
circumstances” played in his decision). The maintenance of such horizontal connections is not sys-
tematically seen as worthy of protection. Indeed, courts have, for instance, concluded that the French
word “parent” in art. 583 of the Civil Code of Quebec only refers to the father or the mother of an
adopted person and does not include brothers or sisters: Droit de lafamille 2046, [1994] RJ Q. 2413
(C.Q.); Droit de lafamille 321, [1987] RD.F. 1 (Trib. jeun.).
4 See e.g. N. E. Dowd, “A Feminist Analysis of Adoption” (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 913 at 929-
932, reviewing E. Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption and the Politics of Parenting (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1993). Also relevant in this context is the recent discussion of the merits of open step-parent
adoption in M. Mahoney, “Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and Enforceability of Visitation
Orders for Former Parents Under Uniform Adoption Act 4-13” (1999) 51 Fla. L. Rev. 89 [hereinafter
“Open Adoption”].
‘KSee Czapanskiy, “Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency in
Law” (1994) 26 Conn. L. Rev. 1315 and K Czapanskiy, “Babies, Parents, and Grandparents: A
Story in Two Cases” (1993) 1 Am. UJ. Gender & L. 85.
See in particular M. Minow, “Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out” (1991) 62 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 269; N. D. Polikoff, ‘This Child Does Have Ivo Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families” (1990) 78 Geo. L.I. 459; N.
D. Polikoff, ‘The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It an Option for Lesbian
and Heterosexual Mothers?” (1996) 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 375; and N. D. Polikoff, “The Social Con-
struction of Parenthood in One Planned Lesbian Family” (1996) 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
203. In the Canadian context, see M.A. McCarthy and J.L. Radford, “Family Law for Same Sex Cou-
ples: Chart(er)ing the Course” (1998) 15 Can. J. Fain. L. 101.
‘ See generally Holmes, supra note 3 at 363.
20001 A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
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dential, non-residential and step-parents.’ Although the law has been slow to recog-
nize the contributions of step-parents, recent developments in Canadian law have
opened the door for a reevaluation of the various roles that step-parents play in the
lives of children.
B. Challenging the Norm: The Canadian versus the American
Perspective
Given the prevalence of step families in Canada and the United States,9 it is
somewhat surprising that there has been relatively little judicial activity concerning
the role of step-parents. The issue has recently been brought to the fore in Canada as a
result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Chartier v. Chartier,0 which held
that a step-parent cannot unilaterally terminate a parental relationship and avoid child
support after his or her relationship with the natural parent breaks down. This paper
will first review the Chartier decision and its implications, and consider the extent to
8 Joint custody may be understood as a recognition that child-rearing responsibilities may be spread
across family units. It may also be understood, however, as arising from a notion of parental “rights”
that give parents entitlements over children. For a broader discussion of the issues surrounding joint
custody, see A. Harvison Young, “Joint Custody as Norm: Solomon Revisited” (1994) 32 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 785.
9 In a fact sheet entitled “Canadian Families: Diversity and Change”, Statistics Canada reported that
in 1995, 10% of all families composed of couples with children were stepfamilies (approximately
430,000 in total). According to the data, just over half of these stepfamilies were composed of married
couples, while the remainder were common-law couples. The data also suggests the gendered nature
of many of the issues relating to stepfamilies: “In 1995, slightly over 50% of step-families consisted
only of children who lived with the biological mother and a step-father. Step-families which consisted
only of children living with the biological father and a step-mother represented 13% of all step-
families. Evidently, mothers who brought their biological children to a new union outnumbered fa-
thers.” The remaining 37% of stepfamilies were “blended,” with both parents bringing children from pre-
vious unions into the new family. See online: Statistics Canada
(date accessed: 9 July 1999).
‘o (1998), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242, 168 D.L.R. (4th) 540, [1999] 4 W.W.R. 633 [hereinafter Chartier
(S.C.C.) cited to S.C.R.]. On appeal from the Manitoba Court of Appeal (1997), 154 D.L.R.(4th) 431,
[1997] 8 W.W.R. 348 [hereinafter Chartier (C.A.) cited to D.L.R.], allowing in part an appeal and
dismissing a cross-appeal from a judgement of De Graves J.: (1996), 111 Man. R. (2d) 27 (Q.B.)
[hereinafter Chartier (trial)].
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
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which this case has helped to resolve the complex questions central to this area of the
law. Secondly, it will attempt to relate this area of law and policy to broader social and
legal changes in family forms.
The paper’s particular focus is the comparative context, as it explores the Chartier
decision and the questions it raises in light of both Canadian and American case law
and literature on the subject. The discussion will emphasize the fact that while in the
pre-Chartier context there were two lines of appellate decisions in Canada, one which
paralleled the American case law and held that a step-parent can unilaterally terminate
their in loco parentis standing and another which held that he or she (usually he) can-
not,” Chartier takes Canadian jurisprudence definitively in a direction that contrasts
sharply with American case law. American jurisprudence has been quite unequivocal
in expressing the view that the in loco parentis relationship can be unilaterally termi-
nated,” subject to the limited exception of equitable estoppel.’3
From a comparative perspective, the Chartier decision and, more broadly, the
relative treatment of the issue of step-parent support in Canada and the United States
is significant in two chief respects. First, the basic premise of Chartier goes much
farther than anything comparable in the American case law: it recognizes the reality
of multiple parents and the centrality of the child’s interest in maintaining relation-
ships with those who have played significant roles in their lives.” Moreover, the impo-
sition of support obligations on the stepfather in Canada does not hinge on the ab-
sence of the natural father from the scene, creating a very real possibility of multiple
debtors of the child support obligation.'” Relative to Canadian law, American law has
“In referring to the question of support, I will use the term “stepfather”. As noted above, the issues
relating to stepfamilies are indeed gendered at a number of levels. First of all, most stepchildren live
with their natural mothers and a stepfather (see supra note 9); the phenomenon of a residential step-
mother and natural father is much less frequent and more likely to arise from the death of the natural
mother. Secondly, the phenomenon of a natural father seeking support from a stepmother following
the breakdown of their relationship is virtually non-existent in the case law. Interestingly, stepmothers
are disproportionately represented among the relatively few cases in which access, visitation, or cus-
tody rights are asserted seriously. For a discussion of the centrality of stepmothers in the lives of step-
children, see David Cheal, “Stories About Step-families” in Statistics Canada, Growing Up In Can-
ada: National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 1996) 93. For
an exploration of related issues in the American context, particularly the gendered impact of the
American laws on step-parent support, see M. Engel, “Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club
Examining the Financial (In)Security of Women in Remarriages” (1999) 5 Win. & Mary J. Women &
L. 309.
2See itifra note 18.
,3 For a discussion of equitable estoppel in this context, see infra note 19 and the text accompanying
notes 58-63.
‘4 Some academics in the United States are calling for a reconceptualization of the role of step-
parents to recognize these changing-and very common–realities: see e.g. M.A. Mason & D.W.
Simon, “The Ambiguous Stepparent: Federal Legislation in Search of a Model” (1995) 29 Fain. L. Q.
445 and M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies and the Law (Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press, 1994).
” See e.g. Therlault v. Theriault (1994), 149 A.R. 210, 113 D.L.R. (4th) 57 (C.A.) [hereinafter The-
riault cited to A.R.], in which the mother had not exhausted her remedies for support against the natu-
2000] A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
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been, and continues to be, very reluctant to recognize a notion of multiple parents or
overlapping families. ‘ This difference may well be linked to the constitutionalization
of parental rights in the United States, something that has not materialized in Canada.”
Secondly, and somewhat ironically, the policy considerations involved in impos-
ing support obligations on step-parents following divorce or separation have been de-
veloped with greater nuance and subtlety in the U.S. case law than has so far been the
case in Canada. As I have mentioned, the general rule throughout the United States is
ral father. Indeed, as the Court notes at 215, she had begun a suit for child support against him.
Nonetheless, the Court found a support obligation on the part of the stepfather. Note that the mother
and stepfather had attempted to exclude the natural father from the lives of the children-a fact which
might have brought the case within the purview of the American doctrine of equitable estoppel. Also
of interest here is Boyle v. Boyle (1998), 41 RF.L. (4th) 388 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Boyle], in
which the Court noted that it was “unfortunate” that the natural father, a third party in the case, was
“frozen ouf by the custodial mother and the stepfather during their marriage (at 391), and that the
natural father was never asked to pay support prior to the stepfather’s action (at 390). The Court sug-
gested that, as a result, the Child Support Guidelines “in this case appear to trump equity” (at 391).
The Court nonetheless applied the Guidelines and assessed the natural father’s obligation (according
to his gross income relative to the stepfather’s) at 37.5% of the total child support.
6 As I have argued elsewhere, with particular emphasis on the U.S. context, the “history of the legal
treatment of unwed fathers and of step-parent adoptions … serves as a potent metaphor for the exclu-
sive family,” as these areas “underline the legal imperative that a child has two parents and cannot
have more than two.” The law, in other words, “provides no half-way house … One is either a legal
parent, or one is, in effect, a stranger.” In successful step-parent adoption cases, it is the natural father
who is rendered a legal stranger. See supra note 1 at 519 and 520ff.
‘In
the U.S. context, as E. Anderson has noted,
The parent’s interest enjoys a distinguished legal pedigree, including important af-
firmation from the Supreme Court and other federal courts, state courts, and state leg-
islatures. Typically framed in terms of “rights:’ it encompasses the custody and com-
panionship of the child, opportunities to influence the child’s values and moral devel-
opment through religious training, and important education and health care decision
(“Children, Parents, and Nonparents: Protected Interests and Legal Standards” (1998)
B.YU.L. Rev. 935 at 942 [footnotes omitted]).
Canadian jurisprudence has drawn attention to, and been implicitly critical of, the extent of this con-
stitutionalization of parental rights by American courts. In Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, 108
D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Young cited to S.C.R.], La Forest J. noted that “[tlhe United States Su-
preme Court has given a liberal interpretation to the concept of liberty, as it relates to family matters.
It has elevated both the notion of the family unit and that of parental rights to the status of constitu-
tional values, through its interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments” (at 369). In com-
parison to the U.S. position, the various judgements in Young, particularly those of LHeureux-Dub6
and McLachlin J., reflect a much more cautious approach to the notion of broad parental rights in
this sense. This reticence in terms of recognizing a constitutionally protected parental liberty interest
is also evident in KB. v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, 122
D.L.R. (4th) 1. Even though the reasons of La Forest, L’Heureux-Dube, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ.
and those of Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ. might be seen as recognizing a parental liberty interest
(though the judgements disagree on its breadth), the constitutional protection accorded to this interest
is quite narrowly construed in comparison to the rights that parents are granted over their children in
American jurisprudence.
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that step-parents may unilaterally terminate their relationships with their stepchildren
following the end of their relationships with the natural parent, thus eliminating any
obligation to pay child support.’8 The exception to this rule has developed within the
rubric of the “equitable estoppel” doctrine which has been applied, albeit restrictively,
to prevent a step-parent from denying liability for child support.’9 Some of the policy
discussions in the context of these American decisions are rich and could provide use-
ful resources for Canadian judges and policymakers as they grapple with the implica-
tions of Chartier These policy questions will be addressed below in the context of a
discussion of the implications of Chartier
” Numerous American critics have noted and criticized the fact that under U.S. law, in loco parenfis
status is terminable at will. See e.g. Stepfamilies and the Law, supra note 14 at 22-27. The relevant
case law includes Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So.2d 1032 (Ala.Civ.App. 1990) (holding, in the
context of a stepfather’s claim for visitation privileges, that the legal severance of the step-
parent/biological parent relationship also severed any legal relationship the step-parent had with the
stepchild); E.H. v. M.H., 512 N.W.2d 148 (S.D. 1994) (holding that the step-parent had no duty, based
on a claim of equitable estoppel, to provide child support for stepchildren after divorce. The Court
noted that “[u]suaily a stepparent had no legal duty to support the stepchildren after termination of the
marriage to the children’s natural parene’ [footnotes omitted], and, further, that “[e]ven one who ac-
cepts the responsibility for a child as in loco parentis cannot be required to furnish support for the
child subsequent to the dissolution of the marriage” (at 149)); and Quintela v. Quintela, 544 N.W. 2d
S11 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996) (holding, as part of a broader ruling, that the husband’s desire to terminate
his in loco parentis status, evidenced in his denial of paternity and his challenge to the requirement of
child support, was sufficient to end all legal rights and responsibilities afforded thereby to the child).
‘” For a recent example of the use of equitable estoppel to establish a post-separation (temporary)
support obligation, see in particular W. v. W, 728 A.2d 1076 (Conn. 1999) [hereinafter W. v. W]. For
further discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 60-63, 68, 70. See also Miller v. Miller,
478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984) [hereinafter Miller], and text accompanying notes 59, 61-63, and 70. Some
American courts will also impose post-separation support obligations on step-parents in cases in
which the separating parties have made a contractual agreement to this effect. See D.B. Sweet, ‘An-
notation: Step-parents Postdivorce Duty to Support Step-child” (1998) 44 A.L.R. 4th 520 at 6 for a
more comprehensive review of the case law in this area, which includes Dewey v. Dewey, 886 P.2d
623 (Alaska 1994) (finding that the stepfather had entered into “an enforceable contractual obligation
to support [his stepchild], which was incorporated into the divorce decree” (at 630)); and Duffey v.
Duffey, 438 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 1994) (finding a step-parent support obligation arising from the combi-
nation of the voluntary assumption of in loco parends status and a written agreement to support the
stepchild in question). Also of relevance is Moyer v. Moyer, 471 S.E.2d 676 (N.C. 1996), in which the
Court of Appeal overruled the trial court’s order that the defendant stepfather provide child support
and other benefits, including dental and health insurance, for his stepchild, because the voluntary
written agreement between the spouses was not “executed with formalities required by law” (at 677).
2000] A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
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II. The Changing Context of Step-parent Support Obligations in
Canada: Chartierv. Chartier
A. An Overview
The Chartier case may be seen as the culmination of numerous cases dealing with
very. similar issues. As a number of judges have observed, these cases have become
common and are likely to become more so.’ For example, the principle of maximiz-
ing contact with parents following divorce or separation has become a driving force in
family law, as the rise of joint custody illustrates, and the reasons supporting such
contact may increasingly apply in step-parent situations. Family breakdown can be
devastating for children and one of the stated purposes of the law is to attempt to
minimize this detrimental impact.2′ Prior to Chartier, however, the law treated stepfa-
milies very differently. Even the cases which held that a step-parent could not unilat-
erally terminate parental obligations imposed standards which made it relatively easy
for a step-parent to terminate obligations to a child.’ To this extent, pre-Chartier law
failed to reflect the changing forms and needs of modem-day families. Today, how-
ever, it is clear that the law should seek to endorse broader conceptions of family that
encourage the continuation of nurturing and supportive relationships, particularly with
respect to children.
The Chartier case may be seen as a positive step in this direction. While the ap-
proach endorsed by Chartier cannot be reduced to a simple and predictable formula,
it is based on a purposive and principled interpretation of the Divorce Act’ which
gives centrality to the best interests of the child and is to be welcomed for this reason.
See e.g. the comments of Philp J.A. of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Chartier (C.A.), supra
note 10 at 436, who noted that “modem marriages (and other forms of cohabitation) are often fragile
and time-limited relationships”, and who queried “how many obligations must divorced or separated
parties carry with them as they travel from relationship to relationship?”
21 See McLachlin J. in Young, supra note 17 at 117 who observed that s. 16(10) of the Divorce Act
allows courts “to give effect ‘to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact
with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.” She also noted that the principle
of maximizing contact is “the only specific factor which Parliament has seen fit to single out as being
something which the judge must consider” In so doing, she argued, “Parliament has expressed its
opinion that contact with each parent is valuable”
2 See e.g. Andrews v. Andrews (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 426, [1992] 3 W.W.R. 1 (Sask. C.A.) [here-
inafter Andrews cited to D.L.R.]. For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying note 32.
R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 3. See s. 2: “For the purposes of the definition ‘child of the marriage’
in subsection (1), a child of two spouses or former spouses includes (a) any child for whom they both
stand in the place of parents; and (2) any child of whom one is the parent and for whom the other
stands in the place of a parent.” Note that similar considerations have arisen in the interpretation of
provincial and territorial statutes. See e.g. Beatty v. Beatty, [1997] 6 W.W.R. 519,28 R.F.L. (4th) 211
(B.C.C.A.) (under the Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128); Laracque v. Allooloo, [1993]
N.W.T.R. 124,44 R.F.L. (3d) 10 (S.C.) (under the Domestic Relations Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. D-8);
Spring v. Spring (1987), 61 O.R. (2d) 743 (Unif. Fam. Ct.) (under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. F-3).
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As will be asserted below, this approach also removes the financial incentives for step-
parents to sever contact with their stepchildren after a marriage or relationship breaks
down. It would of course be simplistic to assert that, once the financial incentive for a
stepfather to repudiate his relationship with his stepchildren following divorce or
separation is removed, he will be any more likely to continue to play a significant role
in the lives of these stepchildren. The question that thus remains is whether the post-
Chartier climate will encourage the continuation of constructive step-parent/child re-
lationships after the parental relationship ends.
Chartier and its aftermath raise two related categories of concerns: first, what is
the threshold or trigger that renders a step-parent a parent for the purpose of support
obligations, and secondly, once that threshold is reached, how should the issue of
quantification be resolved. This paper will concentrate on the question of threshold. It
is important to recognize, however, that the quantification issue is a vexing one which
has already arisen in the Canadian context and is inherent in the possibility of multiple
“legal” parents. This issue in Canada arises only two years after the introduction of
the Federal Child Support Guidelines,’ which were intended to introduce a level of
predictability and consistency in the determination of child support and to reduce liti-
gation. On a practical level, the question of quantification when there is or may be an-
other payor parent in the picture is a difficult one, the resolution of which is not obvi-
ous within the present framework of the Guidelines.5 In order to illustrate the impor-
24 SOR/97-105 [hereinafter Guidelines].
‘The
Guidelines came into effect on May 1, 1997. While.generally considered successful, their
implementation has drawn attention to a number of the complex issues that attend child support set-
tlements. See N. Bala, “The Child Support Guidelines: Highlights and Insights” (Paper delivered to
the Family Law Institute, Canadian Bar Association, 29 January 1999) [unpublished] (at para. 1 and
2), online: Family Law Centre Homepage
ticular interest in this context is the effect of the Guidelines on step-parents’ support obligations. Sec-
tion 5 of the Guidelines, ibid [emphasis added] states that “[w]here the spouse against whom a child
support order is sought stands in the place of a parent for a child, the amount of a child support order
is, in respect of that spouse, such amount as the court considers appropriate, having regard to these
Guidelines and any other parent’s legal duty to support the child”. The wording of this provision cre-
ates significant ambiguity as to how the Guidelines are to be applied in situations in which there are
multiple payors. For a discussion of this issue, see Bala at para. 45-53. For a number of the different
approaches taken by courts, see Bromberg v. Bromberg, [1998] N.S.J. No. 112 (S.C.), online: QL
(NSJ) (holding that the stepfather had stood in the place of a parent, and ordering him to pay child
support based on the Guidelines; the child’s natural father had “substantial but sporadic access” to
child but had not “lived up to his child support obligations and a substantial arrears had accumulated”
(at para. 4)); Butzelaar v. Butzelaar (1998), 174 Sask. IL 125 (Q.B.) (holding that the stepfather, who
had acted in loco parentis to the child, was required to pay support in the amount required under the
Guidelines reduced by the amount paid by the biological father); Halliday v. Halliday (1998), 164
Sask. R. 12 (Q.B.) (holding that the stepfather, on the basis of’the relationship between the stepfather
and the child, was required to pay two-thirds of the table amount); and, more recently, Kolada v. Ko-
lada, [1999] A.T No. 609 (Q.B.), online: QL (AJ) (holding that the stepfather must pay child support
for his stepchild in the amount established by the Guidelines for individuals with his gross income;
2000] A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
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tance of the Chartier decision to the questions surrounding both threshold and, by
implication, quantum of support, it will be necessary to explore briefly the law as it
existed beforehand.
B. The Pre-Chartier Context
At first glance, the Canadian law prior to Chartier appears difficult to discern,
particularly as to whether and how a stepfather could unilaterally sever parental obli-
gations arising in the course of a marriage or relationship with the natural parent. It is
fair to suggest that there were two lines of cases on the issue. Carignan v. Carignan6
was the leading case supporting the view that such obligations could be unilaterally
terminated. Its reasons were heavily dependant on the application of the common law
doctrine of in loco parentis. Indeed, it is striking that while relatively little time was
spent discussing the principles governing the interpretation of the Divorce Act, there
was considerable discussion of the history of in loco parentis, particularly regarding
its development in the context of the law of wills and trusts. The Court also held that
the 1985 reform of the Divorce Act which had, inter alia, removed the term “in loco
parentis” from the section defining “child of the marriage”, had not affected the appli-
cability of the common law doctrine.” The Court was quite insistent that an essential
attribute of the common law doctrine was its voluntary status and that its application
thus depended on the intention of the adult “at the time the order is made.’ This po-
sition remains, it seems, an accurate portrayal of the doctrine as it is applied in the
United States.’
Although the case does seem to have been grounded more in the common law
doctrine than the statutory framework, it did reflect on the policy implications of the
rule in expressing the view that to impose a legal obligation on a person in loco pa-
rentis to continue their generosity “might deter many a person from being generous in
the first place,” which would be “self-defeating from the standpoint of the interests of
the child “‘ This argument will be discussed below in relation to Chartier, but it is
useful to observe at this point that the in loco parentis doctrine developed in a context
rather far removed from the objects and purposes of modem family law. As Alison
Diduck has noted, “The in loco parentis doctrine is a creature of 19” century patriar-
chy. It evolved during a time when it was a morally offensive notion for a man to be
held responsible for another man’s child”‘3’ Cases such as Carignan thus suggested
the Court noted that, while the stepfather might have a remedy against the natural father, he would
have to sue him in order to realize any such contribution to the child support obligation).
26 (1989), 64 D.L.R. 4th 119, [1990] 1 W.W.R. 641 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter Carignan cited to
D.L.R.].
Ibid. at 125.
2!bid. at 128.
29 See supra note 18.
‘ Supra note 26 at 134.
3, A. Diduck, “Carignan v. Carignan: When is a Father not a Father? Another Historical
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the need for an updated, and more flexible, interpretation of the in loco parentis doc-
trine appropriate to the changing nature of the family in the late twentieth century.
Another line of cases effectively modified the Carignan approach in the following
years. This approach was typified by Andrews,” a 1992 Saskatchewan Court of Ap-
peal decision which rejected the view that a step-parent could unilaterally terminate
his or her relationship with the child. Such cases required the court to take factors
apart from intention into account, in particular the parental role assumed prior to, as
well as following, the separation. This approach, however, seems to have made it
relatively easy for a step-parent to avoid the obligation, particularly because of the
weight given to the post-separation period. In Andrews, the cessation of contact with
the stepchildren following separation appears to have been determinative.?3 In the re-
cent Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision in Johb v. Johb, ‘ it appears that the
post-separation conduct played a similar role. In Johb, the separation seems to have
been rather acrimonious, and the mother both refused to allow the stepfather any ac-
cess and rebuffed his attempts to contact the children. The Court of Appeal (Jackson
J.A. dissenting) held that the mother’s post-separation conduct had terminated Mr.
Johb’s relationship as a parent. The majority’s argument rested largely on the view
that the mother could not claim support having refused access. Of course, such dis-
putes often arise in cases involving children born during the marriage and, while a
parent cannot simply refuse access, a pre-existing access dispute is in no sense a bar
to a claim for support. A natural parent cannot opportunistically rely on an access dis-
pute to avoid support obligations, a point that was made by Jackson J.A. in her dis-
senting reasons.”
The 1994 Alberta Court of Appeal decision in Theriaull’ may be seen as a “high
watermark” prior to Chartier as far as step-parent obligations are concerned. In The-
riault, the parties had been married for 14 years, and the stepfather had acted in a pa-
rental role towards the two boys. The stepfather claimed that the relationship had
ended prior to the hearing of the application for support and that, as a result, there was
no support obligation. Kerans J.A. wrote as follows:
Our society values parenthood as a vital adjunct to the upbringing of children.
Adequate performance of that office is a duty imposed by law whenever our
society judges that it is fair to impose it. In the case of the natural parent, the
biological contribution towards the new life warrants the imposition of the duty.
In the case of a step-parent, it is the voluntary assumption of that role. It is not
in the best interests of children that step-parents or natural parents be permitted
to abandon their children, and it is their best interests that should govern. Fi-
nancial responsibility is simply one of the many aspects of the office of parent.
Perspective” (1990) 19 Man. L. 580 at 601, cited approvingly by Bastarache I in Chartier
(S.C.C.), supra note 10 at para. 18.
“Supra note 22.
“Ibid. See in particular at 438.
(1998), 165 D.L.R. (4th) 88,40 RF.L. (4th) 379 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter Johb cited to D.L.R.].
“5 Ibid. at 99-100.
m Supra note 15.
2000] A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
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A parent, or step-parent, who refuses or avoids this obligation neglects or
abandons the child. This abandonment or neglect is as real as would be a re-
fusal of medical care, or affection, or comfort, or any other need of a child?7
The implication of this analysis (and as we shall see, of Chartier itself) is that once
the role of step-parent is assumed, the child is accorded the status of a “child of the
marriage” and is entitled to the sorts of benefits accruing to natural or legally adopted
children upon separation or divorce of their parents. This is the hallmark of a very
child-centred approach to the notion of support. Kerans J.A. further stated that the
existence of the natural father did not preclude the stepfather’s liability, and that the
financial obligations of all parent figures were joint and several.’ As will be explained
below, this perspective is consistent with developments in other areas of family law. In
general, the priority formerly afforded to the rights of parents or adults is giving way
to considerations that attempt to focus on the best interests of the child.
C. The Chartier Decision
Chartier itself, in its rejection of a stepfather’s unilateral termination of his rela-
tionship with and his support obligation to his stepchild, will further the move in Ca-
nadian jurisprudence towards decisions that prioritize the best interests of the child. In
the case, the parties had begun a common law relationship in November 1989, and
subsequently married in June 1991. The wife already had a child from a previous re-
lationship, Jessica, and Jeena was born to the Chartiers in August 1990. The couple
separated in 1992. During the time that the parties lived together, the husband had
been actively involved in the care of both children and was a father figure for Jessica.
The parties had also amended Jessica’s birth registration to reflect (falsely) that Mr.
Chartier was her natural father?9 In 1994 proceedings under the Family Maintenance
Act,’ the husband acknowledged both children as children of the marriage and was
granted access to them. The consent judgment provided for maintenance for his natu-
ral daughter but did not deal with the question of support for Jessica and the wife. The
wife began divorce proceedings in 1995 and, as part of her claim, requested a decla-
ration that the husband stood in the place of a parent to Jessica. He contested the
claim. An October 1995 report from Family Conciliation Services recorded his desire
to sever his relationship with Jessica.”‘ It is interesting to note the absence of any dis-
cussion or evidence in Chartier concerning Jessica’s natural father, particularly in
MIbid. at 213.
at 214.
3Ibid.
31 See Chartier (S.C.C.), supra note 10 at 247. They had apparently discussed the husband’s adop-
tion of Jessica as well, but did not proceed with this.
40 C.C.S.M., c. F20.
4 See Chartier (S.C.C.), supra note 10 at 247.
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light of the importance placed on the attitude of the stepfamily toward the natural fa-
ther in applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the United States.”
At trial, De Graves J. applied Carignan and held that the husband had repudiated
his parental relationship with Jessica and was therefore not obligated to pay support.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the wife’s appeal on the same grounds. Philp J.A. was
of the view that Carignan should be followed as this was not one of those rare cases
in which the court was justified in departing from its own earlier ruling.’ He also ob-
served that Carignan had the “virtue of establishing an understandable and easily de-
termined basis for imposing or excusing responsibility.”
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously allowed the appeal. The decision is
significant in two key respects. First, it overruled Carignan and, in doing so, made it
clear that a step-parent cannot unilaterally terminate the parental relationship that
gives rise to obligations. Secondly, it rejected the emphasis placed on the post-
separation relationship which developed in cases such as Andrews. In the post-
Chartier environment it now seems that once a step-parent assumes the role of a par-
ent, and the child or children qualify as the child or children of the marriage pursuant
to the Divorce Act, the step-parent remains a parent for the purposes of the Act. This
development appears consistent with the direction that family law is taking and ar-
guably should take, despite concerns such as those expressed at the Court of Appeal
by Philp J.A. about the number of obligations persons should be obliged to carry
around with them in the days of time-limited, fragile relationships.” It is suggested
that such concerns are unduly exagerrated, particularly relative to the goal of ensuring
adequate support for children in situations in which the marriage or relationship be-
tween their custodial parent and their step-parent has dissolved.
D. The Chartier Reconfiguration of the In Loco Parentis Doctrine
Chartier’s holdings on step-parent child support obligations are rooted in a recon-
figuration and an expansion of the in loco parentis doctrine. In its analysis of the pre-
Chartier caselaw in this area, the Supreme Court observed that in both the cases
which allowed and those which denied step-parents’ unilateral termination of their
” There is only a brief discussion in the trial judgment of the obligation of the stepchild’s natural
father, a factor which De Graves 3. dismissed as immaterial to the issue at hand: “The petitioner has
not, for reasons best known to herself, pursued Jessica’s natural father for support. He, as I understand
it, is not a person without resources. Counsel for the respondent suggests that on the basis of William-
son v. Williamson (1991), 112 N.B.R. (2d) 368; 281 A.PR. 368; 31 R.F.L. (3d) 378 (Q.B. Fam. Div.),
I should suspend any order of maintenance for Jessica to be paid by the respondent until Jessica’s
natural father’s obligation is determined. In view of my finding on ‘loco parentis’ the matter is no
longer germane” (Chartier (trial), supra note 10 at 32-33).
” Chartier (C.A.), supra note 10 at 440. In concurring reasons, Twaddle J.A. declined to discuss the
merits of Carignan on the basis that he was bound to follow it in any event (at 441).
“Ibid. at 438.
45Supra note 20.
2000] A. HARVlSON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 121
relationships with their stepchildren, the courts engaged in an historical review of in
loco parentis which failed to take adequate account both of the principles of statutory
interpretation and of the realities of contemporary society. Bastarache J. cited Elmer
Driedger as follows: “Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the
words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and or-
dinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the
intention of Parliament.” Accordingly, Bastarache J. was of the view that the com-
mon law principle was not helpful in determining the meaning of “in the place of a
parent” in the Divorce Act. The proper starting point, he held, was illustrated by the
decision of Theriault and focused on “what is in the best interests of the children of
the marriage, not on biological parenthood or legal status of children.”‘ The Court
was highly critical of the Carignan decision for a number of reasons, in particular due
to the fact that it “nullifies the effect of the relevant provisions of the Divorce Act.’ As
Bastarache J. asked, “[i]f one can unilaterally terminate a relationship where a person
stands in the place of a parent to a child, why define such a relationship as giving rise
to obligations under the Divorce Act?'”
Central to Chartier is the unequivocal finding that once the parental link has been
established between step-parent and stepchild, it is not contingent on the continued
existence of the relationship between the adult partners:
The breakdown of the parent/child relationship after separation is not a relevant
factor in determining whether or not a person stands in the place of a parent for
the purposes of the Divorce Act. Jessica was as much a part of the family unit
as Jeena and should not be treated differently from her because the spouses
separated.!9
This, as will be seen, is the most significant and far-reaching aspect of the decision
since it allows for the creation of the parent/child relationship in an ultimately func-
tional way, refusing to draw the traditional distinctions between legal (i.e., natural or
adopted) parentage and informal relations which have historically not carried juridical
consequences.
Bastarache J. identified the test to be applied as follows:
Whether a person stands in the place of a parent must take into account all
factors relevant to that determination, viewed objectively. What must be deter-
mined is the nature of the relationship. The Divorce Act makes no mention of
formal expressions of intent. The focus on voluntariness and intention in
Carignan … was dependent on the common law approach discussed earlier. It
E. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87, as cited by
Bastarache J. in Chartier, supra note 10 at para. 19.
47 Chartier (S.C.C.), supra note 10 at 252.
. ‘bid at 256.
49 IN at 259. Bastarache J. also states that the “material time” factor referred to in the context of
the definition of “child of the marriage” applies only “to the age considerations that are a precondition
to the determination of need” (ibid).
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was wrong. The Court must determine the nature of the relationship by looking
at a number of factors, among which is intention. Intention will not only be ex-
pressed formally. The court must also infer intention from actions, and take into
consideration that even expressed intentions may sometimes change. The ac-
tual fact of forming a new family is a key factor in drawing an inference that
the stepparent treats the child as a member of his or her family, i.e., a child of
the marriage. The relevant factors in defining the parental relationship include,
but are not limited to, whether the child participates in the extended family in
the same way as would a biological child; whether the person provides finan-
cially for the child (depending on ability to pay); whether the person disciplines
the child as a parent; whether the person represents to the child, the family, the
world, either explicitly or implicitly, that he or she is responsible as a parent to
the child; the nature or existence of the child’s relationship with the absent
biological parent The manifestation of the intention of the stepparent cannot be
qualified as to duration, or be otherwise made conditional or qualified, even if
the intention is manifested expressly’
After setting out these factors, Bastarache J. noted that “not every adult-child relation-
ship will be determined to be one where the adult stands in the place of a parent.
Every case must be determined on its own facts and it must be established from the
evidence that the adult acted so as to stand in the place of a parent to the child.”‘
The test developed in Chartier, as outlined above, raises a number of issues in
terms of the application and development of the law henceforth. How, for example,
might the test be applied in a situation in which the natural father has continued his
involvement, as in a joint custody arrangement? This point potentially raises once
again Philp J.A.’s concern, noted earlier, about how many obligations divorced or
separated parties must carry with them as they travel from relationship to relation-
ship. 2 Although this may appear to be a serious concern in this context, a considera-
tion of the application of the test in Chartier suggests that it is not likely to be prob-
lematic. In Chartier, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the possibility of
collecting support from the biological father should preclude characterization of the
stepchild as a “child of the marriage.’53 Bastarache J. did, however, include the nature
of the child’s relationship with the biological parent, as well as existing financial ar-
rangements, as relevant factors in making the determination. This inclusion suggests,
for example, that if the child’s natural parents have a joint custody arrangement and
are both actively involved in the raising of the child, it is less likely that the step-
parent would be treated as standing in the place of the parent. Financial support is an-
other factor; the more support and the greater the role played by the natural parent, it
appears, the harder it likely will be to show that the step-parent has assumed the pa-
rental role. Where the situation is more ambiguous, and where multiple parents have
been acting in concurrent parental capacities towards children (including providing fi-
Ibid. at 260-61.
sIbid. at 261.
‘2 Supra note 20.
‘ Supra note 10 at 262.
2000] A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
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nancial support), it is fully appropriate that the law should recognize and validate this
reality. In such circumstances, according to Bastarache J., the obligations are joint and
several and the question will be one of relative quantum. ‘ In reality, it is probably all
too rare that children have multiple persons in their lives who are acting in authentic
parental capacities, and the law should risk over-counting rather than under-counting
these scenarios.
As Nicholas Bala has documented, there is already considerable case law on the
application of the Child Support Guidelines in order to determine the quantum of
support payable by a step-parent. Section 5 of the Guidelines, he notes, provides that
where the payor spouse is a person “who stands in the place of a parent;’ the amount
of child support shall be “such amount as the court considers appropriate, having re-
gard to these Guidelines and any other parent’s legal duty to support the child:’ ‘ As
Bala points out:
It seems to be generally accepted that if no child support obligation by the non-
custodial natural parent has been established when the stepparent is before the
court, the stepparent will be required to pay the full Guideline amount. To re-
duce the amount of child support without an obligation having been established
for another person to pay support would be contrary to the interests of the
child.m
Not surprisingly in light of the law immediately prior to Chartier, issues related to
quantum remain to be determined. For example, does a natural parent bear any onus
to establish that some attempt has been made to seek support from the other natural
parent? Furthermore, once the step-parent has been found to stand in the place of a
parent, how should the responsibilities be divided as between the payor step-parent
and payor natural parent, assuming they are both before the court5 7 Now that the
concurrency of such relationships has been recognized and validated by the Supreme
Court in Chartier, these issues will perhaps receive greater attention.
Many of the most difficult issues that arise out of Chartier, such as ascertaining
when the threshold of becoming a “child of the marriage” is met and determining the
appropriate allocation of child support obligations among parents, remain to be ad-
dressed. It is here that the unpredictability of the decision lies. 8 If the threshold test is
5]bid.
5- See Bala, supra note 25 at para. 49 [footnotes omitted]. As Bala further notes, “[w]ith the adop-
tion of the Guidelines in Ontario, the legislature repealed the former s.33(7)(b) of the Family Law Act
which had ‘recognized that the obligation of a natural … parent outweighs the obligation of a person
who is not a natural… parent.’ Section 5 of the Guidelines appears to give courts significant discretion
to award the amount of support considered appropriate”
56 Ibid. at para. 47. In support of this point, Professor Bala cites Clarke v. Clarke, [1998] B.C.J. No.
2370 (S.C.), online: QL (BCJ).
-7 For a discussion of the various approaches that have been taken to these issues so far, see Bala,
ibid. at para. 47-52. See also the case law cited supra note 25.
58 In Canada, Chartier seems to have been greeted with some alarm, especially by trial court judges.
I presented a review of the decision to a session run by the Canadian Judicial Institute in Quebec City
124
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applied widely, for example, the practical effects will be very significant and vexing
(at least in the short term) as questions such as the process for, and the apportionment
of, support obligations between natural parents and step-parents are considered. If,
however, it is narrowly or strictly applied, it is possible that the net difference between
the legal situations in Canada (post-Chartier) and the United States (with the applica-
tion of the equitable estoppel doctrine) will be very small indeed. In order to explain
this, it will be useful to describe briefly the legal situation as it currently exists in the
United States.
III. The Comparative Context
A. Step-parent Support Obligations in the United States
As I have outlined above, the relationship of stepchild to step-parent is regulated
at common law by the in loco parentis doctrine. The judicial interpretation of this
doctrine in the United States has remained traditional and consistent with the views
expressed in the Carignan decision. To this extent, the American position has resisted
the development of a doctrine that could recognize multiple parents, something that is
especially problematic when parental rights have significant constitutional status. This
position is very different from the one articulated in Chartier, where it is precisely by
broadening the notion of in loco parentis (or its statutory equivalent) that the Court
has opened the door to the notion of multiple parents and debtors of support (and
other) obligations.
The potential severity of the strict interpretation of in loco parentis in the United
States has been mitigated somewhat by the application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. When its traditional requirements are adapted to the step-parent support
context, the doctrine requires proof of the step-parent’s “representation of support to
either the children or the natural parent as to his or her responsibilities in his or her
relationship with them’as well as reliance on this representation by, and a resulting
“economic detriment” to, the children or the natural parent*9 Under this doctrine, in
certain circumstances, the stepfather cannot be heard to deny his parental obligations
of support. A review of some of the cases that have applied this doctrine in the United
in February 1999, just after the reasons were released, and there was, as I noted, a marked divergence
of opinion about Chartier between the appellate court judges, who generally seemed to welcome the
decision, and the trial judges who were very concerned about how to apply the rather vague test set
out in Bastarache J.’s reasons to particular fact situations.
” Miller, supra note 19 at 358-59. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s stipulation in Miller of the re-
quirements under which post-separation support obligations can be imposed on step-parents through
the application of equitable estoppel continues to be an influential precedent in this regard, which is
much cited in both case law and scholarship. It is interesting to note that the case itself was remanded
to trial for a determination of whether or not these requirements were met on the facts. For useful
general discussions of the equitable estoppel standard as it relates to step-parent support obligations,
see “Stepfamilies and the Law”, supra note 14 at 31-38 and Engel, supra note 11 at 330-34. These
critics explore some of the cases referenced infra note 63 in more detail.
2000] A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
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States reveals a remarkable consistency in fact patterns with those Canadian cases that
have allowed support claims by stepchildren.
In one case, W v. W, ‘ the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a decision in which
a stepfather was estopped from denying paternity and ordered to pay temporary child
support. On the facts, the stepfather had represented himself generally and to the child
as the father, and the court found that the emotional, and more significantly, the finan-
cial elements of detrimental reliance had been met. It is clear that this test will not be
easily met in all stepfamilies. Although the focus in W. v. W was the use of estoppel to
prevent a step-parent from denying paternity, the Court engaged in a relevant broader
discussion of equitable estoppel as it relates to step-parents seeking to avoid support
obligations:
[W]e conclude that the equitable estoppel doctrine properly imposes a burden
on the party seeking to invoke the doctrine to demonstrate representations of fi-
nancial as well as emotional support. The concerns about misrepresentation
and detrimental reliance are placed more appropriately on any promises of
emotional and financial support, not on any misrepresentations and reliance re-
garding biological parentage. Requiring that children believe that the stepparent
is their natural parent unjustly would deny support to some children who, nev-
ertheless, have relied detrimentally on representations of emotional and finan-
cial support 6′
The court in W. v. W emphasized that the test for the application of equitable estoppel
is strict. In the wake of Miller,’2 there must not only be a representation of support on
the part of the step-parent and a resultant financial detriment to the child if this sup-
port is withdrawn, but also active interference with the natural parent’s support
obligations:
The Miller court required that the natural parent invoking the doctrine establish
that, if the stepparent is not estopped, the children will sufferfiture financial det-
riment as a result of the stepparent’s past active interference with the financial
support by the child’s natural parent. It is imperative for the stepparent to have
taken positive steps of interference with the natural parent’s support obligations
in order for the court to bind the stepparent to support the children in the event of
a divorce. Future economic detriment is established, for instance, whenever a
custodial natural parent proves “that he or she (1) does not know the where-
abouts of the natural parent; (2) cannot locate the other natural parent; or (3)
cannot secure jurisdiction over the natural parent for valid legal reasons, and that
the natural parent’s unavailability is due to the actions of the stepparent..’
‘
o Supra note 19.
61 Ibid. at 1085.
62 Supra note 19.
63 Supra note 19 at 1084-85 [footnotes omitted]. Additional cases which affirm the strictness of this
standard include Murphy v. Murphy, 714 A.2d 576 (R.I. 1998) (finding no support obligation, based
on a claim of equitable estoppel, on the part of the stepfather because “[a]lthough [the stepchildren’s]
natural father has been absent from their lives, that absence was apparently as much by his design as
by anyone else’s. There were no findings that the plaintiff [the stepfather] was responsible for [the
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While such legal tests seem to be largely absent from Canadian case law, it is in-
teresting to note the points at which the Canadian and American case law do con-
verge. If one reviews the facts of most of the step-parent support cases in recent years,
the pattern that emerges is one closer to cases such as W. v. W. than to the multiple or
overlapping family situations that have become common. It is clear that the natural
father is largely absent in the Canadian cases, and it also seems clear that in some
cases this absence has been encouraged at least partly through the wishes of the new
stcpfamily.’ Unlike the American cases, however, there is no suggestion so far in
Canada that active exclusion of the natural father by the stepfamily is a condition
precedent of liability for child support.’ Chartier, for instance, is silent as to the rela-
tive importance of the role played by the natural father, except to the extent that the
“nature or existence of the child’s relationship with the absent biological parent” is
listed as one of the factors relevant to a finding that the adult was standing in the place
of a parent.” It seems unlikely that such a finding would be made in a situation in
which the natural father had maintained a continuing involvement in the life of his
child and had made significant financial contributions. A more difficult question
would arise, however, if the economic disparity between the “fathers;’ with the step-
father being much better off, was so great that failing to impose any obligation on the
affluent stepfather would result in a serious drop in the child’s subsequent standard of
living.
In short, although the legal tests are very different, there are some striking simi-
larities between the fact patterns which have so far given rise to support obligations in
stepchildren] not receiving financial support from their natural father, nor was there evidence that the
natural father had ever attempted to contact his children only to be rebuffed by plaintiff’ (at 581)); Ul-
rich v. Cornell, 484 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. 1992) (holding that the husband was not equitably estopped
from denying responsibility for financially supporting his stepson after separating from the stepson’s
mother, even though during the marriage the husband had hired and paid for an attorney to handle the
termination of the natural father’s rights and had initiated adoption proceedings (which were never
completed for financial reasons). The stepson also lived with his stepfather for a 15 month period after
the divorce; still, the Court found that the mother was unable to prove that she “terminated the natural
father’s parental rights and obligations because the stepfather made an unequivocal representation of
intent to support the child” (at 546)); KA.T v. CA B., 645 A.2d 570 (D.C. 1994) (holding, in a situa-
tion potentially involving the imposition of paternity by estoppel, that equitable estoppel was not ap-
plicable because of the absence of financial detriment); and Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546 (Md. 1986)
(holding that the husband was not equitably estopped from denying his duty to support a child, bom
during the marriage but who was not his biological child, as there was no deprivation of the child’s or
his mother’s right to seek support from the natural father).
See e.g. 77teriault and Boyle, supra note 15.
‘5 Though, as Bala has noted, in many of the cases before the courts on this issue (as opposed to is-
sues of quantum of support), the natural parent has not played a major role during the relationship
between the other parent and the step-parent and the step-parent has typically been obliging in the ar-
rangement. It accordingly seems unjust to allow the step-parent to escape a financial obligation on the
basis of a theoretical obligation existing on the part of the natural parent. See Bala, supra note 25 at
para. 47.
“Charter (S.C.C.), supra note 10 at 261.
2000] A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
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both Canada and the United States. The American cases have focused very clearly on
the nature of the relationship between the stepfather and the stepchildren during the
marriage or relationship (not afterwards, as some pre-Chartier cases suggested) and
the attitude of the mother and stepfather to the natural father. If Canadian courts
wished to limit the potential breadth of Chartier, these are considerations they could
explicitly develop as they already seem to be implicitly important.
IV. Future Developments
A. The Implications of Chartier
The above analysis suggests some of the potential points of convergence between
American and Canadian case law, and also illustrates the ways in which the policy
discussions characteristic of certain American cases might be used to inform future
Canadian decisions. There remain, however, fundamental differences between Ameri-
can and Canadian approaches to questions of step-parent support, particularly in the
post-Chartier context. It is in these differences that Chartier reveals its potential in
terms of transforming Canadian law. Chartier takes a clear and unequivocal stand in
rejecting traditional approaches to the definition of “child of the marriage” and in ar-
ticulating a functional test. Once a person has met this functional test on the basis of
the factors set out above, he or she is as much a parent for the purposes of support ob-
ligations as a natural parent. Chartier thus endorses a basis for familial obligation that
is based on the reality of relationships and the needs of children over time.
As I have outlined above, the direction signaled by Chartier is different from the
approach taken in the American jurisprudence in two key ways. First of all, it is
driven by an explicitly child-centred approach; the driving rationale is clearly the con-
cem about the effect on a child of allowing a parent to unilaterally sever relations.
Second, this approach opens the door to the possibility of multiple parents; the exis-
tence of a stepfather who stands in the place of a father does not preclude the possi-
bility that the natural father (or even a previous stepfather) also occupies such a posi-
tion.67 While this approach also opens the door to a number of serious practical and
logistical complications (for example, the procedure for determining quantum) it is a
welcome shift in principle both because it flows from a consideration of the best in-
terests of children, rather than from a privileging of parental rights over those of chil-
dren, and also because it reflects the growing and complex realities of modem family
life.
At the level of principle, then, Chartier unequivocally reinforces two central
points. First, the question as to whether a step-parent stands in the place of a parent is
to be determined as part of a functional, child-centred exercise. The obligation does
67Though having said this, the factors enumerated by Bastarache J. do imply that it will be practi-
cally more difficult to establish step-parent obligations when there is an actively involved natural fa-
ther, but this remains to be seen.
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not stand or fall as a matter of status. Secondly, and related, is the clear fact that a
number of parents may occupy the role of parent concurrently. Both of these points,
however, raise another policy concern which has been the subject of discussion in
both Canadian and American case law on this issue: whether imposing financial li-
ability for support upon an actively involved step-parent after the relationship with the
natural parent ends will discourage, to the detriment of children, step-parents from
becoming active players in the lives of their stepchildren.
Such concerns about creating disincentives to the development of close and lov-
ing relationships between step-parents and their step-children are particularly manifest
in American courts’ development of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this context.
Indeed, these concerns seem to be the primary reason that the courts have insisted not
only on “emotional” but also on “financial” detriment. For example, in W. v. W., the
Court commented as follows: “A requirement of emotional detriment alone would
discourage parent-child bonding by rewarding stepparents who do not create a famil-
ial bond with their stepchildren, while punishing those who do, by requiring them to
be responsible for them as a legal parent in the event of a divorce.”‘ Another case,
KA.T v. C.EB, supported the cautious application of the equitable estoppel doctrine
and cited the “deep practical concern that extending the in loco parentis relationship
beyond dissolution of marriage would ‘discourage the voluntary support that is so of-
ten provided by step-parents.””‘ In making this point, the court, as in W. v. W., drew
on the finding in Miller that “emotional bonding” was not sufficient for the imposi-
tion, through the use of equitable estoppel, of support obligations:
mo hold otherwise would create enormous policy difficulties. A stepparent
who tried to create a warm family atmosphere with his or her stepchildren
would be penalized by being forced to pay support for them in the event of a
divorce. At the same time, a stepparent who refused to have anything to do
with his or her stepchildren beyond supporting them would be rewarded by not
having to pay support in the event of a divorce.70
There seems to be very little in the way of empirical evidence, in either the Cana-
dian or the U.S. context, to support such assertions. Will a concern about possible finan-
cial liability for support in fact affect conduct during a happy phase of a relationship
when a family unit is being formed? Will this really, for example, deter a stepfather from
taking a child to soccer practice? If so, it may well be better, as some have suggested, to
have this reticence flushed out early in the relationship, thereby preventing the creation
of a doomed family unit. Bastarache J. himself expresses this view in Chartier’ Clearly,
“Supra note 19 at 1085.
“Supra note 63 at 572.
7” Miller, supra note 19 at 358.
“, Chartier (S.C.C.), supra note 10 at para. 41. In this section of his judgement, Bastarache J. draws
on the analysis of Beaulieu J. in Siddall v. Siddall (1994), 11 R.L. (4th) 325 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 337,
including the assertion that “[i]f requiring men to continue their relationship, financially and emotion-
ally, with the children is a discouragement of generosity then, perhaps such generosity should be dis-
couraged. This type of generosity which leaves children feeling rejected and shattered once a relation-
2000] A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
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the various concerns about deterring step-parents from becoming emotionally involved
with their stepchildren should be given some empirical consideration.
While the question of whether imposing support obligations on step-parents will
discourage them from establishing strong relationships with their stepchildren during
the marriage remains an open one, Chartier will eliminate a related problem created
by the pre-Chartier line of cases led by Carignan: the incentive for step-parents to
discontinue contact after divorce or separation in order to avoid support obligations.
The relevance of post-separation contact to the characterization of the step-parent re-
lationship was never entirely clear. Moreover, by placing the emphasis on the post-
separation relationship between the child and step-parent, the test in these cases rein-
forced tendencies that already seem to exist in reality. Step-parent relationships are
often not durable after the adult relationship ends and this fact amounts to another loss
for the child or children involved. It is very striking that there are relatively few access
or custody disputes involving step-parents and stepchildrenn especially if one distills
out those in which the central issue is really financial obligations and the custody or
access issue is being used primarily as a bargaining tool.:3 Although there is no em-
ship between the adults sours is not beneficial to society in general and the children, in particular.” See
also D.L. Abraham’s article “California’s Step-parent Visitation Statute: For the Welfare of the Child,
or a Court-Opened Door to Legally Interfere with Parental Autonomy: Where are the Constitutional
Safeguards” (1997) 7 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 125 at 155-56 [footnotes omitted]. She argues,
in the American context, that step-parent visitation and support obligations should be corollary to one
another
Opponents of a step-parent support rule that is correlative with visitation suggest that
such a rule would discourage remarriage of people with children. However, “to the ex-
tent that a support rule would give pause to the [party] contemplating step-parenthood…
the pause could be [greatly] beneficial” One sociologist has observed that, when po-
tential partners do not discuss their finances and expectations of support for step-
children, the realities they discover may lead to the destruction of the step-marriage. If
step-parent support requirements following a dissolution would promote disclosure,
advance planning and possibly discourage dissolution of the step-marrriage, then such
a rule can only benefit the parties and children involved.
7 See e.g. R. Levy, ‘Rights and Responsibilities for Extended Family Members?” (1993) 27 Fain.
L.Q. 191 at 193-94 [footnotes omitted] who notes that in the American context “[t]here seem to be
very few appellate cases adjudicating disputes in which a step-parent has sought custody of a child
despite the opposition of a noncustodial biological parent following either the death of, or the step-
parent’s divorce from, the custodial biological parent. Although there could be many more unap-
pealed trial court decisions, it seems likely that few such claims are in fact made’.
73 Interestingly, there is some indication that there may be a gendered aspect to this issue, with
women being more likely to seriously seek custody of, or access to, stepchildren. See e.g. Brinkerhoff
v. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Prior to this case, Brenda Brinkerhoff had been
awarded joint legal custody of her stepchildren in the parties’ divorce decree. The case is interesting
because of the Court’s finding that Ms. Brinkerhoff did not have a post-divorce support obligation to-
wards her stepchildren. The Court rejected Mr. Brinkerhoff’s argument that, while “‘generally, under
Utah law, a step-parent’s legal responsibility to support step-children terminates upon divorce’
this
principle should not apply to a step-parent who actively pursues and obtains joint legal custody (at
115).
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pirical evidence here either, it does seem probable that a person going through a
stressful, unhappy and often angry period of separation will respond to a test that em-
phasizes the post-separation relationship by severing contact to avoid the financial
obligations. The removal of the incentive to terminate a relationship may thus result in
greater stability for children following the disruption of their family units, although
this argument is admittedly speculative.
The crucial point to be made here is that, in developing laws in this area, policy-
makers should take care to assess the effects of their decisions on the lives of children.
Flowing from the recognition of the possibility of multiple and overlapping parents
and family structures is an obligation to try to facilitate and encourage the continua-
tion of the constructive role that various parental figures have in the lives of children.
Given that the underlying assumption that the considerations explored here would
actually affect step-parents’ conduct remains untested and subject to some question,
further discussion in both the Canadian and the American contexts of the potential ef-
fects of post-separation financial obligations is to be welcomed.
Absent so far from the post-separation step-parent obligation debate is an explo-
ration of how law and legal policy might facilitate and encourage the continuation of
step-relationships. The cases cited above assume that the imposition of financial obli-
gations constitutes a “punishment” of sorts. Perhaps there is another way of under-
standing such obligations. ‘ With natural parents, the obligation to pay child support is
not understood as penal in nature, but is rather understood as an integral aspect of pa-
rental status. While the law has sought to separate the obligation to pay from the right
to access, there is a level at which they are corollary to one another.’ Even as a sym-
bolic matter, an obligation to pay support might serve as a form of institutional vali-
dation, an imprimatur of sorts, that would help to encourage the continuation of a re-
lationship, and thereby refute the assumption that the step-parent no longer has a role
once the relationship with the natural parent has ended” The evaluation and, ulti-
mately, the resolution of such issues will require not only the direction of further at-
4 Of relevance here is Abraham’s article, supra note 71 at 127, in which she argues that step-parents
whose interest in visitation stems from a genuine concern for their stepchildren’s well being would
not be adverse to assuming support obligations: “[ilf a former step-parent is truly committed to the
child, and the relationship between child and adult was substantive, the step-parent petitioning the
court for visitation would not be offended, but would in fact welcome a concurrent order of child sup-
port to insure the minor’s economic welfare”
” Some academics argue for a very strong correlation between access and support. See e.g. G.
Geisman, “Strengthening the Weak Link in the Family Law Chain: Child Support and Visitation as
Complementary Activities” (1993) 38 S.D.L. Rev. 568.
76 This point is analogous to one made in the context of joint legal custody, where the argument was
made that fathers would perform their obligations towards their children more readily if there was-
even at a merely symbolic level-some validation of their significance as parents. “Joint custody” de-
notes a level of commitment and responsibility that “generous access” does not, even though in many
jurisdictions and situations the actual legal entitlements of the parent are not very different. E.S. Scott
provides a useful overview of this perspective on joint custody in “Pluralism, Parental Preference, and
Child Custody” (1992) 80 Calif. L. Rev. 615 at 624-26.
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A. HARVISON YOUNG – STEP-PARENTS AND SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
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tention to the policy implications of step-parent support obligations following separa-
tion, but also the empirical validation of some of the assumptions as to the likely con-
duct of step-parents.
Conclusion
While Chatier does not provide answers to all of the outstanding questions sur-
rounding step-parent support obligations, it does clarify the direction that Canadian
jurisprudence on the subject should take. The determinations which courts will now
be called upon to make in light of Chartier will be both fact-specific and require some
time to develop. There will, no doubt, be many cases in which the application of the
factors will be difficult. In this sense, a simple benchmark such as post-separation
termination of contact might be seen as preferable. Nevertheless, as with issues such
as the determination of custody, simple rules are rarely capable of resolving the com-
plexity and diversity of human social life. Judges dealing with family law, moreover,
are accustomed to having such discretion.
Despite some continued uncertainty about the application of the law, Chartier is
to be welcomed both for the direction in which it moves Canadian jurisprudence and,
more specifically, for the issues it does resolve: a child can have two (or more) “fa-
thers” for the purposes of support obligations, and the interests of the child motivate
the assertion that, once the parental mantle has been assumed, it cannot be cast aside
by post-separation conduct. While this perspective differs markedly from that found
in American jurisprudence, courts and policy-makers on both sides of the border will
increasingly be required to weigh similar sorts of policy concerns as they work
through the difficult threshold and (in the Canadian context) quantum issues that lie
ahead. Canadian and American lawmakers and policymakers would thus benefit con-
siderably from examining each other’s respective perspectives on these challenging
issues.
