McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 6
VIC RESTAURANT INC. v. CITY OF MONTREAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS – BY-LAWS – VALIDITY
LICENSE
LICENSING OF RESTAURANTS AND PLACES OF AMUSEMENT
–
REQUIRING APPROVAL OF CHIEF OF POLICE – WHETHER DELEGATION OF
CHARTER OF CITY OF MONTREAL, SS. 299, 299a,
POWER OF MUNICIPALITY –
300, 300(c).
–
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA –
JURISDICTION – MANDAMUS
COURTS –
FOR ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO OPERATE RESTAURANT –
LICENSE WOULD HAVE
RFSTAURANT SOLD PRIOR TO ARGU-
EXPIRED PRIOR TO NOTICE OF APPEAL –
MENT IN THIS COURT – WHETHER ls pendens REMAINS BETWEEN PARTIES.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, in the matter of
Vic Restaurant Inc. v. City of Montreal,’ has aroused considerable interest
in lay circles as well as among members of the legal profession. This judgement
of the nation’s highest tribunal is interesting and significant from several
points of view. The ruling of the court –
six to three in favour of the
appellant – was a propos the power of a municipal council to delegate its
legislative authority to a city official; of ‘greater controversy was the opinion
of the Clourt as to what constitutes such a delegation of law-making powers.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme ‘Court reversed the judgement of
the Quebec Court of Appeal,2 which,
to being a unanimous
judgement, had confirmed the original judgement of the trial court.3 In so
doing, the Supreme Court continued its recent and increasingly consistent
habit of overruling the Quebec courts on constitutional matters.4 This situation
is unusual per se; but when it is added -to the fact that the three Supreme
the three Quebec
Court justices who dissented
appointees, and that therefore not a single Quebec judge at any level ruled
issue acquires a new and somewhat
in favour of the appellant, the entire
intriguing, if not disturbing, significance. Finally, the decision contains some
noteworthy observations with respect to the common law right of an individual
to pursue the lawful trade or calling of his choice.
judgement were
in addition
in the
II. THE FACTS
The appellant company, operating a restaurant on St. Catherine St. in
the City of Montreal, had applied for and been refused a renewal of the
1[1959] S.C.IL 58.
2[1957] Q.B. 1.
3[1955] R.L. 540.
4See for example, Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 11959] S.C.R. 122; Chaput v. Romain,
[1955].S.C.R. 834; Switzman v. Elbling, [19571 S.C.1. 285.
No. 3]
CASE AND COMMENT
203
annual permits required under the terms of By-law 1862 of -the City in order
to operate a restaurant and to sell alcoholic
liquor.’ The appellant was
notified that the refusal of the City Finance Director to issue the permits
was based on the fact that the Director of Police had not given his written
approval of the permit applications, and hence, “in conformity with
the
procedure set forth in By-law 1862”, the permits would not -be issued.
Appellant applied- to the Superior Court for a writ of mandamus against the
City of Montreal, directing the City and its competent officers to issue the
permits referred to in the By-law. Appellant also alleged that those portions
of -the By-law making the approval of -the Director of Police a necessary
prerequisite to the issuance of permits and licenses were illegal and ultra vires
the powers of the respondent; they constituted a delegation of the powers
given to the respondent, and further, constituted a restraint of trade and
of free enterprise.
The City, in its defence, upheld its power to prescribe conditions upon
which licenses should issue; it asserted that since the duty of the Director
of Police was to maintain public order, as outlined in By-law 247 of the City,6
the Director was performing a function prescribed by the By-law in a
ministerial or administrative, and not in a legislative, capacity. It was asserted
that the By-law provisions referred to were intra vires and also that the
applicant had -been guilty, inter alia, of breaches of the closing laws and had
permitted prostitutes on the premises, thereby continually breaking the law.
the action; an appeal was also dismissed by
the unanimous judgement of a Court consisting of St. Jacques, Owen and
Hyde JJ.
Superior Court dismissed
5By-law 1862 of the City of Montreal, adopted by Council on March 15, 1948 and
amended by By-law 1911, provides inter alia that:
Art. 2(A) “Aucune personne ne poss6dera ou n’exploitera une industrie, un commerce
ou un 6tablissement . . . dans les limites de la cit6 de Montr6al, i moins
d’avoir prtalablement demand6 et obtenu du directeur des finances un
permis A cet effet et payE au directeur”
the required fee.
Art. 2(B) “Toute personne d~sirant un permis en vertu du present riglement doit
faire sa demande au directeur des finances sur la formule requise. Avant
l’6mission d’un permis, le directeur des finances est requis d’obtenir r’ap-
probation &rite de chacun des directeurs des services concern6s. Si cette
approbation 6crite n’est pas donn& par tous les directeurs concernis, ledit
le demandeur, par 6crit, que le permis
directeur des finances informera
ne sera pas
‘nis.
Art. 8(a) provides for the licensing of restaurants, food establishments, etc.
Art. 20
requires “Toute personne qui d~tient un permis de
la Commission des
Liqueurs de Quebec pour la vente de liqueurs alcooliques, et qui de fait
en vend, pour consommation sur les lieux” to obtain a license. In both
cases the permit application must be approved by, the Director of the
Police Department.
It shall be his [the Director of the Police Department’s] duty to cause the
public peace to be preserved, to secure the protection of property, and to see that
all the Laws and Ordinances are enforced. .. .”
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 6
Following the first hearing of the case before the Supreme Court in March,
its
1957, the Court formulated three questions on which it wished to base
subsequent hearings. The first of these was:
In view of the fact that the license period in respect of which the mandamus
was sought would have expired on May 1, 1956. prior to the giving of the notice
of appeal to this Court, is there any issue remaining between
the parties other
than as to costs?
This question was given added impetus when, on February 17, 1958, it was
brought to the attention of the Court that on July 18, 1957, four months
after the matter was first argued before the Court and some two and a half
months before the Court had issued an order directing the re-argument, the
appellant had sold the restaurant in question to a company named Pal’s
Restaurant Inc., and that this company had taken possession of the premises
and was carrying on a restaurant business there, including the sale of liquor
under a permit from the Quebec Liquor Commission.
On the same date, appellant moved for leave to amend the conclusions
of its petition for a mandamus, by asking that the ‘City be directed to issue
permits to the restaurant for the years 1955-58 on payment of the required
fees. This application was supported by an affidavit showing that, while .the
City had refused to issue licenses for the years 1955, 1956 and 1957, the
restaurant had been permitted to operate. Ten charges, however, had been
laid in the Recorder’s Court in Montreal against the applicant in respect o-
such operations, but these proceedings had ‘been held in abeyance, apparently
pending the determination of this appeal.
III. THE FINDINGS
a) Re whether or not there was a justiciable issue before the Court
On this question, the three Quebec justices dissented as they did on all
the other issues confronting the Court in this case; the schism was complete
and total. Fauteux J., speaking on behalf of Taschereau and Abbott JJ.,
felt that
i ..- il ne fait aucun doute qu’entre les parties –
et c’est ce qui doit nous guider
dans la d&ermination de la question – il ne saurait rester devant la Cour, en
l’acte pos6 par I’appelante elle-m~me, soit ]a vente de son
raison surtout de
itablissement, qu’une simple question de frais.T
As a result of this conclusion, Mr. Justice Fauteux continued,
… les questions au m6rite, y compris celle de la validit6 du r6glement, sont
clairement, dans la pr~sente cause, devenues, entre
les parties, des questions
purement acad~miques.8
He was -therefore of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed on this
as well as on other grounds.
The majority of the Court felt otherwise:
The appellant, in my opinion, has an interest in the subject-matter of this appeal
other than as to the costs of the proceedings. I may add that I do not assent
7At p. 62.
slbid.
No. 3]
CASE AND COMMENT
to the view that even if its only interest was as to costs this Court has not
jurisdiction
in certain
circumstances.9
that it should not exercise it
to hear
the appeal or
Locke J. based his opinion on two counts: firstly, -that the appellant was
entitled as of right to have the opinion of the Court on the question of law
as to whether or not the portion of the By-law requiring the consent of the
Director of the Police Department was within the powers of the City Council
and as to whether or not the appellant was entitled to a permit for the year
1955; and secondly, that the very real and tangible fact that the ten pending
prosecutions in the Recorder’s Court in Montreal against the appellant for
operating without a license in -the years 1955, 1956 and 1957 were being held
in abeyance pending the disposition of the appeal, with convictions on these
charges inevitable if the appeal were dismissed. These factors, coupled with
the appellant’s right to operate another restaurant in the City of Montreal
being subject to the provisions of the portions of the By-law which were within
the power of the council, convinced the learned judge that the appellant had
an “actual interest” in the judgement beyond the determination of costs.
Cartwright J. went even further and held that -the rule prohibiting the
Court from rendering judgement in a dispute where such judgement would
have no “direct and immediate practical effect” was, in his opinion, a rule of
the Court may relax”. 10 In this particular case, he was
practice “which
of the opinion that the Court could and should entertain the appeal.
It is indeed difficult to understand how Fauteux J., aware of the prosecu-
tions pending in Montreal Recorder’s Court and presumably cognizant of the
fact that the appellant’s right to operate another restaurant at a future date
in Montreal would depend in all probability on the outcome of the case, could
nevertheless assert that the only issue remaining between
the parties was
“une simple question de frais”. It is an inescapable conclusion that the
appellant had a real and actual pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case
precisely because of these pending prosecutions in Recorder’s Court.
As to the contention of Mr. Justice Fauteux that the Court was unable to
render judgement because the Quebec Civil Code of Procedure requires that
every judgement be susceptible of execution,”
two replies are possible. Firstly,
it would appear that the notion or concept of “execution” in art. 541 C.P. would
he sufficiently broad and flexible
to include a situation such as is here
envisaged; thus, in effect, the “execution” would be the granting of restaurant
permits retroactively for the period 1954-56 inclusively, and -the automatic
dismissal of the prosecutions being held in abeyance in Recorder’s Court.
Secondly, whether the Quebec rules of civil procedure would be applicable
to a public law matter before the Supreme Court of Canada is a moot question;
in other circumstances, where the Court has been called upon to adjudicate
9At p. 88, per Locke J.
1OAt p. 92.
“-Art. 541 C.P.: “Every judgment must be susceptible of execution. .. .
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 6
on a matter of substantial significance in the areas of constitutional law and
fundamental rights, the Court has purposely interpreted the procedural require-
ments of the Civil law in an extremely liberal fashion in order that -these
the
adjectival rules should not frustrate
substantive ‘law.42
true purpose and effect of
the
One last argument was eloquently advanced by the Court itself in its majority
judgment. Locke J. asserted that the case in point was “one of general
public interest to municipal institutions throughout Canada”, and that it was
“in the interest of the due administration of justice that this Court should
now pronounce -upon the matter.”
b) The merits of the case
The two other questions posed by the Court as the basis for -the re-argument
in question
dealt with the validity, i.e. the constitutionality, of the By-law
Did the Council, in fact, delegate its authority -to the Director of Police? Could
the Council, in daw, make such a delegation?
The Court did not divide on the second question. As Fauteux J. said:
La deuxiime question ne pr~sente aucun problime. Personne, en effet, n’a song6
i contester que si le conseil de la cit6 a, par le r~glement en question, d16gu6
a qui que ce soit une autorit6 16gislative dont seul il 6tait nanti par la LUgislature,
le r~glement est ultra vires du conseil.13
Locke J., on -behalf of the majority, was of -the same opinion. He expressed
his agreement with the statement of the law governing by-laws of municipal
corporations as expressed by Osler J. A. in Merritt v. City of Toronto .4
the
to make by-laws, should be confined strictly within
Municipal corporations, in the exercise of the statutory authority conferred upon
limits of their
them
authority, and all attempts on their part to exceed it should be firmly repelled
by the Courts.
Thus the issue appeared -to have boiled down to whether the portion of
By-law 1862 complained of amounted to a delegation to the Director of the
Police Department of legislative authority vested in the City Council. The
resulting cleavage ni the Court’s opinion represents two conflicting approaches
to this problem -that have arisen in Canadian jurisprudence. The majority of
the Court found that legislative authority had in fact been conferred on the
Police Director by the provisions of By-law 1862, whereas
the minority
judgment was of the contrary opinion.
c) The Court’s reasoning in its majority and minority judgements:
an analysis
The basis for the majority opinion in this judgement was summarized with
admirable clarity and precision by Cartwright J. :16
12See for example Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 122, and especially
attitude of the Court majority towards the requirements of art. 88 C.P.
1SAt p. 64.
14(1895), 22 O.A.R. 205 at p. 207.
16At pp. 99-100.
the
No. 3 ]
CASE AND COMMENT
The impugned provisions of by-law no. 1862 appear to be fatally defective in that
no standard, rule or condition is prescribed for the guidance of the Director of
the Police Department in deciding whether to give or to withhold his approval.
It is expressly provided that if that approval is withheld no license shall issue in
respect of the activities or things comprised in the 41 sections of the by-laws, many
of which contain a number of sub-paragraphs which in turn include numerous
activities.
He therefore concluded that
the effect of the by-law is to leave it to the Director of the Police Department,
to decide whether an applicant should or
without direction, [emphasis mine],
should not be permitted to carry on any of the lawful callings set out in the
41 sections referred to above.15a
Locke J. was of the same opinion and concluded that the vesting of such an
arbitrary and unlimited discretionary power in the Police Director was dearly
contrary to law, with the result that the impugned provisions of the By-law
were invalid and u/tra zires.
The dissenting opinion of Fauteux J. seems to be based on the learned
judge’s feeling that the terms of ithe disputed By-law were of a sufficiently
precise and well-defined nature, when read together with other by-laws
to preclude that official from
applying to the Police Director’s functions,
exercising a purely arbitrary or discretionary authority. He reasoned that
since the By-law required only those directors of services “concerned” with
the subject matter of the permit to grant their approval before such permit
were issued, the implication was obvious that the director of a “concerned”
department was to base his considerations of the permit application solely
on those grounds that did in fact “concern” or “affect” his particular department.
En somme, cette direction, donne par le rtglement au directeur du service concern6,
est de ne pas approuver la demande de permis si l’approuver serait promouvoir
la r~alisation de ces hasards, risques ou dangers que le service qu’il dirige a
prcis&nent pour mission de pr6venir ou combattre.16
To grant such a specified right, the ‘learned judge asserted, was a power which
the City Council clearly possessed, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the
City Charter. It was impossible to admit, he maintained, that the By-law
conferred a legal power “A un directeur de service de d&ider arbitrairement de
la demande d’un perlis.”
The Director of Police was obliged
to cause the public peace to be preserved, to secure the protection of property,
…
and to see that all the Laws and Ordinances are enforced.1 T
This duty, Mr. Justice Fauteux maintained, obviously did not need an actual
violation of the public peace before it merited or necessitated action; it also
had what the dearned judge termed “un caract~re pr~ventif”. It was in this
sense that the Police Department was “concerned” or “affected” by an
application for a permit to operate a restaurant selling alcoholic liquors. To grant
lGaAt p. 101.
1bAt p. 68, per Fauteux J.
17 By-law 247 of the City of Montreal.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[VoL 6
such a permit might very well be equivalent, in certain, circumstances,
to a
virtually certain violation of the daw in the future and the Police Director,
under these circumstances, could veto such a permit application in order to
eschew a potential violation of the law.
In the case of Re Kiely,18 the general rule of municipal law was first
laid down in this country in definitive form; the power to grant or withhold
a license, being a power of a quasi-judicial nature, cannot be delegated by the
body in which it is vested, without statutory authority.
In Merritt v. City of Toronto,19 a by-law of the city whose council had
the power to require any person exercising any trade or calling -to obtain
a license, provided that no one might obtain a license as an auctioneer unless
his character should be first reported on and approved by the police. This
proviso was held to be ultra vires for it constituted an unlawful delegation
of legislative or discretionary powers.
In Re Elliot,2″ the City of Winnipeg was empowered to pass by-laws for
licensing, inspecting and regulating vendors of milk and dairies, and providing
that it be a condition of any such license -that the prospective licensee should
submit to the inspection of his dairy -by an officer to be appointed by the council.
Purporting to act under this authority, the City of Winnipeg passed a by-law
which authorized the inspection of dairies by the health officer or veterinary
inspector and said:
. . . if satisfactory to him in all respects, he shall direct a license to issue to such
cow keeper, dairyman or purveyor of milk.
This proviso was held to be ultra ires as
. . . a delegation of authority that cannot be justified; for the Council has really
delegated to an official the judgment and discretion that the Legislature intended
and expected that it would exercise itself.21
In Hall v. Moose Jaw,2 a case in which the facts as well as -the law were
almost identical with these of the case at hand, a by-law was passed with
respect to the licensing of hackmen. It provided, inter alia, that
no license shall be granted to any driver unless the same has been previously
the good
…
to
recommended by
conduct and ability of the applicant to fill the position of hack driver.
the Chief of Police for the city, he certifying
The court held that the impugned provisions of the by4aw imposed upon
the Inspector or Chief of Police a “judicial” duty and then went on to say:
Upon the report of either of these officers depends the issue of a license. No
licenses can be granted unless and until the Inspector in one case, and the Chief
of Police in the other, has reported favorably. These officials are empowered
arbitrarily to decide whether an applicant is to receive his license or not. This is
18(1887), 13 O.A.R. 451.
19(1895), 22 O.A.R. 205.
20(1896), 11 Man. R. 358.
2-Ibid., at p. 363.
22(1910), 12 W.L.R. 693. See also Rex v. Sparks, 10 D.L.R. 616.
No. 3)
CASE AND COMMENT
clearly a delegation of authority that cannot be justified. The council has dearly
delegated to these officials named the judgment and discretion that the legislature
intended and expected the council should exercise.23
Canadian jurisprudence is replete with instances where the delegation of
powers by a municipal council, under the same terms and within the same
factual circumstances as the disputed Montreal By-law provision, has been
decreed unlawful. Examples of powers held to have been illegally delegated
are: a by-law empowering an officer to require fire escapes in such cases as
he deems proper ;24 a by-law delegating the council’s power to select subjects
in respect of its statutory right to impose .taxation;25 a by-law giving power
to a “Committee on Public Works” to remove any building which had become
a public disfigurement ;26 and a by-law authorizing the cancellation by the
mayor of building permits issued under the by-law.27
It would seem to be clear from the foregoing that the weight of juris-
prudential evidence in Canada is overwhelmingly against the validity of By-law
1862. In particular, the decision of the court in Hall v. Moose Jaw appears
to be so emphatic in its enunciation of the law and so directly relevant in its
attendant facts to the present matter that it would seem to preclude any
controversy. There are, however, several instances in which Canadian courts
have ruled otherwise in virtually identical situations; and it is significant that
the majority of these contrary opinions have emanated from the courts
of Quebec.
For example, in the case of Citi de Montfrial v. Savich,28 By-law 432 of
the City (of which By-law 1862 was the direct descendant) was being
attacked. At the outset of its judgement the Court of Appeal was quick to
uphold the general principle that a municipal council cannot delegate its
discretionary or legislative powers. However, the Court did not agree that
the By-law in question did, in fact, delegate such discretionary powers to the
Director of Police. In the opinion of the Court the rules by which the Director
of Police was to be guided in granting or withholding his approval were
stated with sufficient particularity, and the Director could be overruled by
23Ibid., at p. 697.
24Taylor v. People’s Loan and Savings Corp., (1928), 63 O.L.R. 202.
25Quebec v. Grand Trunk Railway, (1899), 8 Q.B. 246.
2 Simon v. Castonguay, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 75.
2 7Re By-law 92, Winnipeg Beach, [1919] 3 W.W.R. 696.
28(1939), 66 K.B. 124. See also Parg v. Citi de Quibec, (1929), 67 S.C. 100, where
a by-law of that city similar to By-law 1862 of Montreal was attacked. The court
again conceded that a municipal corporation cannot delegate its powers, but denied
that the terms of the by-law did in effect constitute such a delegation. The court
seemed to feel that the ability of the council to revoke the powers which it vested
in the Director of Police preserved the ministerial quality of the powers thus conferred,
and prevented their absolute or arbitrary exercise by the Director of Police.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 6
the Court if he exercised his power unreasonably or arbitrarily; this seemed
to the Court to preclude the fact that he had been delegated a legislative power.
In the case of Stiffel v. Cit6 de Montrial,29 the Court upheld the right of
the Director of Police to withhold his approval of an application for a permit
(as required by By-law 1643 of -the City) to open a billiard parlor. The Court
seemed to assume the validity of the By-law and simply considered whether or
not the Police Director acted in an abusive or arbitrary manner. Since, in
the Court’s opinion, he had “exercised a reasonable discretion”, the application
by the plaintiff for a writ of mandamus compelling the City and its competent
officers to issue the permit was dismissed.
In the case of Jaillard v. City of Montreal,”0 Greenshields C. J. ppears
to have assumed the validity of By-law 432 (mentioned supra in the Savich
case) which provided inter alia that no permit or license would be granted
without the written recommendation of the superintendent of -police and the
inspector of buildings. The learned judge found for plaintiff, but on the
grounds that the officer had acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in refusing
to grant the permit.
It is a well-known principle that a discretionary power given to a public officer
must be exercised not capriciously or arbitrarily..
.X
This statement clearly implies -that a discretionary power can be delegated.3 2
In Vic Restaurant Inc. v. City of Montreal, the Quebec Court of Appeal3 3
adhered closely to the line of reasoning prevalent in the above Quebec cases.
Owen J., who with Hyde and St. Jacques JJ., constituted the Court, admitted
that
.. a very wide discretion is given to the Director of Police in deciding whether
or not his written approval should be given with respect of these applications.
But the learned judge nevertheless felt that
* . .this does not mean that the liberty of the citizen is thereby curtailed. In the
event of the Director of Police refusing to give his written approval, the matter
can be brought before the Courts … by a mandamus and the Courts can decide
29[1945] K.B. 258.
30(1934), 72 S.C. 112.
31Ibid., at p. 114.
2It is interesting to note en passant that the Court found the police officer’s action
8
in refusing to approve the license application to have been unreasonable and arbitrary
because the officer had decided not to approve it on the advice of the parish cur6;
thus the officer substituted the judgment and discretion of another for his own and
the Court was of the opinion that . . .if the authority to exercise that discretion is
. . that discretion should be exercised by the officer
delegated to an officer of the City.
and not by another.
33[1957] Q.B 1.
Here the implication
its
discretionary powers. The statement recognised the general rule prohibiting such delega-
tion but why the judge was willing to except the City from the application of this
rule is not revealed at any point.
is even clearer to the effect that the City can delegate
No. 3]
CASE AND COMMENT
whether
Director of Police was acting in an arbitrary manner.34
there was cause for withholding the written approval or whether the
-Canadian jurisprudence on this issue leads inexorably to the conclusion
that two conflicting schools of thought have arisen; the one claiming that the
delegation of discretionary powers by a municipal council to its officers is
ipso facto unlawful;’the other admitting that the delegation is invalid in
principle, but at the same time so restricting the rule’s applicability as virtually
to nullify its effect. Generally, Quebec courts have inclined to the latter view,
whereas courts of the common law provinces and the Supreme Court have
upheld the former. Thus a distinct dichotomy exists in the present state of
Canadian law on this point.
One of the reasons for this divergent attitude of the Quebec Courts may be
traced to “administrative necessity”. This type of reasoning is best exemplified
by the statement of Barclay J. in the Savich case:
While, in principle, municipal corporations cannot delegate their administrative or
constitutional powers, there are exceptions to this rule. Owing to the increasing
complexity of modern society and the multiplicity of matters which require a
municipality’s attention, it has become practically impossible to provide in laws
and ordinances specific rules and standards to govern every conceivable situation.
To require the recommendation of . .
. a director of police is not in reality a
delegation of authority but a matter of legitimate prudence.35
This statement was quoted with approval by the Court of Appeal in the
present case and the attitude expressed therein seems to represent a considerable
segment of judicial thought in Qubec, as well as among the Supreme Court
justices who hail from Quebec3 6
With respect, it is submitted that this attitude ought not to be encouraged in
our courts. While it is true that the dictates of efficiency demand a delegation
of authority in the running of the affairs of a large, complex and modem
municipal government, it is equally true that the law is dear and unequivocal
in its rule that no such delegation can take place without express authorization
to do so. Potestas delegata non est delegari. The authors have unanimously
agreed on this principle and on its particular applicability to the powers granted
to municipal councils. 37 The principle, it is submitted, should be even more
strictly applied to situations in which the rights of individuals are concerned;
to relax unduly the rigidity of the law in such cases is to endanger or even,
3 4Ibid., at p. 22.
3 5Supra, footnote 28, p. 131.
3 6 See Fauteux J. at p. 22 of the Supreme Court Report.
3 7Rogers, I. MacF., The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, says at p. 327:
“Councils are sometimes specifically authorized by statute to vest certain discretionary
powers in officials, but, in the absence of such express right, the council itself must
exercise all discretionary powers.” See also the Municipal Code of Quebec, sec. 65:
“The city council must directly exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Code;
it cannot delegate them.”
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 6
in extreme cases, to nullify these rights. In the common law tradition, any
individual has a right to engage in any lawful calling. If that right is to be
limited by a municipal requirement that an individual acquire a permit or
license before he will be allowed to engage in such lawful calling, such require-
ment should be interpreted restrictively, and in such a manner as not to
deprive the individual of his common law rights. This line of reasoning is
perhaps best summarized by the statement of Osler J. A. in Merritt v. City
of Toronto :38
limits of
Municipal corporations, in the exercise of the statutory powers conferred upon
their
them to make By-laws, should be confined strictly within the
authority, and all attempts on their part to exceed it should be firmly repelled by
the Courts. A fortiori should this be so where their By-laws are directed against
the common law right, and the liberty and freedom, of every subject, to employ
himself in any lawful trade or calling he pleases.
It would thus appear that reasons of “administrative necessity” –
the
legal counterpart of, or euphemism for, the infamous “raison d’tat” –
do not
provide a satisfactory basis for a liberal interpretation of a city’s powers to
delegate its legislative authority. If a city wishes to possess such powers,
there would, in law, be nothing to prevent it from petitioning the Legislature
to grant same; or, alternatively, granted the necessary power of delegation had
been given -the council by the city charter, a by-law might very well have
prescribed definitively a state of facts the existence of which would render a
‘ritten into the
person ineligible to receive a permit. Such criteria were not
Montreal By-laws; but they were read into them by -the courts of
the
Province, in a sort of ex post facto justification of what doubtless was an
arbitrary, that is, in the sense of
arbitrary decision of the Police Director –
having been arrived at on purely subjective grounds or criteria.
There is yet another factor which may account for the conflict in judicial
opinion as to the validity of by-laws granting wide discretionary powers to
Police Directors et al. It will -be noted that in all the Quebec cases cited,
except one, -the City of Montreal was involved as defendant. Some Quebec
judge 9 are of the opinion that the powers granted to the City of Montreal
are so formidable and sweeping that they (a) render the by-laws in question
intra vires, and (b) differentiate Montreal from most other municipal corpora-
tions whose statutory powers are more confined.
It is respectfully submitted that this argument cannot be maintained. As
Locke J. points out, article 299 of the Montreal Charter, which gives the general
power -to the City Council to enact by-laws for the peace, order, good govern-.
ment and general welfare of the city, is the so-called “good government clause”
which appears in the municipal acts of the other provinces. Furthermore, the
asSupra, footnote 14, at p. 207.
89 See Fauteux J. at p. 64 of the Supreme Court Report.
No. 3]
CASE AND COMMENT
general license power conferred upon the Montreal City Council by article
300 sec. 22 of the Charter cannot be distinguished from that conferred on the
City Council of Moose Jaw by sec. 187 of -the Cities Act of 1908 ;4
the Hall
case 4′ is therefore indistinguishable from the present one. “General omnibus
or catch-all provisions of this nature are a common feature of most municipal
statutes.”42 Section 260 of the Municipal Act of Ontario is, in substance and
effect, synonymous with article 300 (c) of the Montreal Charter; it provides
that councils are authorized to “pass such by-laws and make such regulations
for the health, safety, morality and welfare of the inhabitants of the municAty
in matters not specifically provided for by this Act, as may be deemed expedient
and are not contrary to law …”
It is therefore difficult to determine how and why the dissenting judgement
those of most other Canadian
from
differentiated Montreal’s powers
municipalities.
One last point deserves comment. It will be recalled that Fauteux J. felt
that By-law 1862, read in conjunction with the duties of the Director of
Police mentioned in By-law 247, outlined with sufficient detail the standards
or rules by which the .Police Director was to govern himself in the exercise
of his discretion to grant or withhold approval of a permit application. The
learned judge expressed the belief that the Police Director was duty-bound
to exercise such discretionary authority solely on the basis of whether or
not his approval would lead to those hazards, risks and dangers that his
department was supposed to prevent or combat. This principle seems to be
salient in the minds of most of the Quebec judges who adjudicated the cases
cited since they continue to assume the validity of the by-laws and then proceed
to determine whether the powers granted to the Police Directors by such
by-laws were exercised arbitrarily and/or unreasonably, i.e. beyond the criteria
tacitly imposed.
Cartwright J., in reply to this suggestion, noted some of* the varied and
indeed quaint activities or callings for which a license approved by the Police
Department is required –
including, inter alia, a dealer in canaries, an embalmer,
a phrenologist and a bicycle. On the basis of such evidence, the learned judge
concluded that
40Sec. 187: “The power to license shall include power to fix the fees to be paid
for licenses, to specify the qualifications of the persons to whom and the conditions
to regulate the manner in which any licensed business shall be carried on, to specify
the fee or prices to be charged by the licenses, to impose penalties upon unlicensed
persons or for breach of the conditions upon which any license has been issued or of
any regulations made in relation thereto and generally to provide for the protection of
licensees . . .”
4’Supra, footnote 22.
42Rogers, I. MacF., op. cit., at p. 313.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 6
. . any general standard or rule which could be arrived at inductively from a
.
consideration of the multifarious activities and things enumerated in the 41 sections
the Director of the
referred to in association with the duties resting upon
Police Department under tr-law no. 247 . . . would of necessity be so wide and
vague as to be valueless.
In connection with this issue, an interesting distinction was made by
Fauteux J. between the present case and that of Bridge v. The Queen. 44 In the
latter case, the validity of a by-law of the City of Hamilton was attacked. The
by4aw provided that all gasoline stations should be closed at specified hours,
but also provided that the City Clerk, on the recommendation of the Property
and License Committee, might issue permits to remain open during times
specified in the permit. A section of the by-law said that the occupiers of
gasoline shops should be entitled to emergency service permits except those
who, “according to evidence satisfactory to the City Clerk”, failed to keep
their shops open as authorized. The court hel that this provision of the by-law
that the clerk shll omit from the list of those entitled to permits such
–
occupiers as have, “according to evidence satisfactory to the City Clerk”, failed
to keep their shops open as authorized – was invalid.
It is within the powers of the Council to’ prescribe a state of facts the existence
of which shall render an occupier ineligible to receive a permit for a stated time;
but express words in the enabling Statute would be necessary to give the Council
lie
power to confer on an individual
might find sufficient, whether or not the prescribed state of facts exists and there
are no such words.45
the right to decide, on such evidence as
The majority of the Supreme Court, in the present case, found the decision
of Bridge v. The Queen to be directly applicable.
While it was attempted to distinguish the judgement of this Court in Bridge v.
The Queen*, the argunment completely failed to do so .
. 46
Fauteux J., however, felt that the Bridge case was distinguishable from the
present matter, apparently with respect to the degree of arbitrariness assigned
to an official in each case. The by-law of the City of Hamilton, reasoned
Fauteux J., provided that the City Clerk could act on such evidence as he
might find sufficient. This, the learned judge continued, was not the situation
envisaged in the Montreal By-law. If one gave to By4aw 1862 its true
“sens”, “esprit”, and “fin viritable”, it followed, to his mind, that the City
-Council had effectively and for all intents and purposes indicated the grounds
on which the director of a service was to withold his approval of a permit
application. The Council had simply given to this official the right to verify,
in each case, if those conditions did in fact exist and to act on such evidence
as is sufficient.
4aAt p. 100.
4[1953] 1 S.C.R. 8.
45Ibid., at p. 13, per Cartright J.
4OAt p. 85, per Locke J.
No. 3]
CASE AND COMMENT
When this case was argued before the Quebec Court of Appeal, that tribunal
used the same reasoning as Fauteux J. to distinguish it from the Bridge case.
Hyde J. 47 felt that the City Clerk, acting under the provisions of the Hamilton
By-law, was “beyond the reach of mandamus because a Court could not
presume to say what was ‘satisfactory’ to him.” Refusal by the Chief of Police
under the terms of the Montreal By-law was, on the other hand, “subject to
control by mandamus, as the Court is not deprived of the power of determining
whether the decision was in abuse of his power or was arbitrary or capricious.”
With respect, it is submitted that this distinction drawn between the Bridge
case and the present matter cannot be maintained. The reasoning applied by
Mr. Justice Fauteux begs the question. He points out that the Police Director
is to proceed “on such evidence as is sufficient” and not “on such evidence as
he might find sufficient”; but who is to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence? Surely it is the Police Director himself who is empowered by the
By4aw to decide whether or not the evidence “is sufficient” and to ‘act
accordingly. Is this not simply a circuitous way of stating that the Police
Director is to act when he finds the evidence to be sufficient. Someone must
of necessity make a decision as to the sufficiency of the evidence. The Council
has not done so under the terms of the By-law, because no standards or
criteria for measurement or determination are even mentioned in it; nor does
the Council make the decision and then instruct the Police Director to carry
out his administrative duties. It
is the Police Director himself who both
decides and acts. The “act” may be purely “ministerial” in nature, but the
“decide” is unquestionably discretionary.
The interpretation of the Bridge case by the Court of Appeal is difficult
to understand. It surely cannot be maintained, as the Court apparently tried to
do, that the City Clerk of Hamilton had been granted such a sweeping mandate
that, even if it were proved that he acted arbitrarily, capriciously and in abuse
of his rights, the courts would be powerless to upset his decision. Hyde J.
nevertheless, maintains that this unlimited quality of the City Clerk’s powers
constituted the ratio decidendi of the case and that “the Court did not discuss
the larger aspects of delegation now before us”. But is it not self-evident that
the powers of the City Clerk were no more, no less than those of the Montreal
Police Director; both were granted a broad measure of discretionary, i.e.
legislative authority, within which they could enforce their own legislative will.
It was, in both instances, only when they exceeded themselves, and stepped
beyond the wide area of discretion granted to them, that the Courts could
reverse their decisions. The ruling that the discretionary authority of these
officers cannot be exercised beyond certain limits is obviously a corollary of
the fact that it can be exercised at all; and the By-law granting the power
to exercise such discretionary authority is, in both of these cases as in every
other case where no statutory right to do so exists, ultra sires and illegal.
47[1957] Q.B. 1 at p. 20.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 6
IV. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
Whether or not the decision of the nation’s highest tribunal in Vic Restaurant
Inc. v. City of Montreal will unify Canadian jurisprudence and law on the pro-
blen of what constitutes an illegal delegation of powers by a municipality, is a
moot question. Hitherto, the courts of the common law provinces had, for
the most part, adhered strictly to the legal maxim of delegatus non polest
delegare and had invalidated such delegation unless the enabling statute
expressly conferred the power to do so. On the other hand, the decisions of
the courts of the province of Quebec on this issue have been characterized
by the payment of lip service to the principle, followed by a justification of
derogations from that principle on the grounds of a variety of factors, mostly
centering about practical considerations such as reasons of “administrative
necessity”. In the process, the common law rights of the citizens of
the
municipalities concerned to carry on a lawful trade or calling have been often
overlooked, intentionally or otherwise.
The Vic Restaurant case saw the Supreme Court of Canada render a decision
affecting a Quebec municipality of no small consequence and thus may have
finally resolved the conflict in judicial opinion. Nevertheless, it is conceivable
that in future cases of -this nature, the courts of Quebec may return to the
the
long-established
Vic Restaurant case, in the same way as they distinguished Bridge v. The
Queen. This possibility is lent further credence and support when it is recalled
that all three justices of the Supreme Court who acquired their legal training
and experience in Quebec, dissented from the majority of the Court in the
Vic Restaurant case, and instead affirmed the decisions of lower courts and
completed the unanimity of Quebec-bred judges on this matter.
jurisprudence of that province and may distinguish
The tendency of modern governments, at the municipal as well as at other
levels, has been increasingly to regulate the private affairs and to intervene
in the private activities of their citizens. Under such circumstances, it would
e a dangerous practice, it is submitted, to continue the policy of Quebec’s
courts and to countenance the delegation of what they themselves admit to be
“very broad powers” to an official who is not in any direct way responsible
to the electorate.
NORMAN MAY*
*Of the Board of Editors, McGill Law Journal, second year law student.
