1984 and Beyond: Canadian Policy on Arms Control
and Disarmament
J. Alan Beesley, Q.C.*
Introduction
Given the complexity, diversity and scope of arms control and disarma-
ment, it may seem ambitious to attempt to summarize Canadian policy in a
brief article. However, in light of the intrinsic importance of the subject, and
the unprecedented public interest in and concern over the arms race, it seems
appropriate to include an outline of some of the salient features of Canadian
policy in an issue of a Canadian university law journal devoted wholly to arms
control and disarmament.
I.
Canada’s Tradition of Arms Control and Disarmament
Canada’s involvement in arms control and disarmament can be traced
back to the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 whereby the U.S.A. and Great Britain
agreed to limit the size of their naval forces on the Great Lakes, an early
example of a bilateral agreement between two Great Powers affecting the fate
in this case favourably – of less powerful countries such as Canada. In
–
more recent times, in 1945, Canada, together with the United States and
United Kingdom, proposed the establishment of a United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission for the purpose of “entirely eliminating the use of atomic
energy for destructive purposes”. In August 1957, Canada, France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States submitted a “package” of measures in
the sub-committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission includ-
ing a commitment “not to transfer out of [their] control any nuclear weapons
or to accept transfer to [them] of such weapons” except for the purposes of
com-
self-defence. Canada was a member of that original sub-committee –
prising also the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union –
which was established in 1952. Canada has been continuously a member of
the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee [ENDC] which commenced its
operations in 1962, the Conference on the Committee on Disarmament
[CCD] established in 1969, and the forty-member Committee on Disarma-
*Ambassador of Canada for Disarmament. Ambassador Beesley is a career diplomat who
was Head of the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Canadian Department of External Affairs and
later Chairman of the Drafting Committee for the UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (1982). This article is based, in part, on a speech given by the author to the John E. Read
International Law Society in Halifax, 8 March 1983.
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ment [CD] set up in 1978. The tradition of active and constructive participa-
tion by Canada in arms control and disarmament negotiations has continued
unabated and has, indeed, intensified in recent years.
H.
The Legal Framework
The “law of disarmament” is not lacking in important and effective
examples of conventional law, but is sadly deficient in terms of universal
binding norms. While the League of Nations proved unable to prevent war by
controlling the arms race, it should nonetheless be noted that the Covenant
included the declaration that “maintenance of peace requires the reduction of
national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the
enforcement by common action of international obligations”. Moreover, the
Treaty of Versailles imposed strict limitations upon Germany’s armaments
and demilitarized the Rhineland, and the allied powers attempted to establish
agreed limits on weapons. These efforts failed when Germany walked out of
the 1932 General Disarmament Conference and left the League, although the
Disarmament Conference continued intermittently until 1937, when it broke
up in the face of deadlock.
The United Ndtions Charter attempted a markedly different approach
based on a system of collective security envisaging multinational U.N. forces
operating under the direction and control of the Security Council. Unlike the
Covenant, the Charter did not assign a high priority to disarmament. On the
contrary, the five Great Powers would retain their armaments and act together
as the “five policemen” to ensure the disarmament of Germany and Japan and
the maintenance of peace pending the establishment of effective U.N. mili-
tary forces. The framers of the Charter intended to prevent “the scourge of
war” by controlling the use of force rather than by the elimination of arms.
Thus the Charter does not include the elimination of the arms race as a
Charter obligation. One must search elsewhere for norms.
Canada has argued before the U.N. General Assembly First Committee
that the principles embodied in the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War ofAsphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and ofBacteriologic-
al Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva, 17 June 1925, have developed
through the customary law process into peremptory norms of law binding
upon all states (although over a score of the member-states of the U.N. have
not ratified or acceded to the Protocol). Even in the case of some of the most
important and far-reaching arms control agreements concluded since the
Second World War, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Partial Test
Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the SeabedArms Control Treaty, all
of which have been accepted by well over 100 states, it is not argued seriously
that the principles embodied in such treaties constitute jus cogens (that is to
say, peremptory norms binding on all states).
1983]
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Yet the two important “non-armament” treaties, the Outer Space Treaty,
banning the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, and the
Seabed Arms Control Treaty, banning the emplacement of such weapons on
the seabed and ocean floor, together wholly encompass two huge environ-
ments. Perhaps it is open to be argued-that these treaties embody principles
that have already developed into normative rules or are in the process of doing
so, but definitive conclusions are not possible. Still less success has been
achieved in developing peremptory norms with respect to land areas (subject
to national sovereignty) and the high seas (beyond national sovereignty), even
in the case of the limited field of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless,
important albeit limited conventional law exists even with respect to these
environments, including, in particular, the Antarctic Treaty and the Latin
American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. It is not inconceivable that these con-
ventions may be developing into “law-making treaties”, laying down peremp-
tory norms.
It is more difficult to make such an argument in the case of the Partial
Test Ban Treaty and the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty, because important
nuclear weapons states have not yet become parties, and still less so in the
case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has well over 100 parties, but
which has not yet been adopted by France or China, and which is vigorously
opposed by some non-nuclear weapons states. Perhaps there is too much of a
tendency to accept arms control treaties as conventional law binding only
upon their respective parties and insufficient effort to encourage the greater
utilization of the customary law process as a means of translating treaty
obligations on arms control into universally binding norms. It is necessary,
therefore, to employ a variety of means in advancing Canadian arms control
and disarmament objectives.
II. Recent Diplomatic Initiatives
A significant diplomatic initiative was taken by Canada on 1 February
1983, when Canada’s Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for
External Affairs went to Geneva to deliver a major policy statement in the
Committee on Disarmament. His statement is worthy of careful considera-
tion. It was, in fact, much more than a policy declaration; it constituted a part
of the negotiating process now undeiway in Geneva, in particular the negotia-
tions on intermediate-range nuclear forces [INF]. As part of that negotiating
approach, Mr MacEachen had arranged to see both the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R. INF and strategic arms [START] negotiators prior to making his
policy statement. Thus, in enunciating the Canadian position, his statement
reflected not only the results of the discussions with the negotiators for the two
superpowers, but was directed to bringing Canada’s influence to bear in those
very negotiations.
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In his address, the Deputy Prime Minister made a public reaffirmation of
NATO solidarity and of continuing commitment to the NATO two-track
decision. Such statements were echoed shortly afterwards by U.S. Vice-
President Bush, as well as by the Foreign Minister of the Federal German
Republic. Rarely does such a series of high level statesmen address the
Committee on Disarmament. It is evident that these policy statements consti-
tute an important part of the negotiating process, even on those issues
discussed bilaterally outside the Committee on Disarmament.
By the same token, the meetings these statesmen have held with the
negotiators on both sides, beginning with those held by Mr MacEachen, are
an important element in the negotiating process. It is by such means possible
–
that Canada’s voice be heard by both sides on
questions of vital concern to Canadians.
and perhaps essential –
Turning to the substance of the policy statement, entitled Mutual Secu-
rity: Negotiations in 1983, it is important to note the overall thrust of the
statement: “[A]n increase in mutual security is the only sound basis for
effective arms control and disarmament”. The message was very clearly
addressed to both superpowers. The Deputy Prime Minister quoted Prime
Minister Trudeau’s statement at the Second United Nations Special Session
on Disarmament [SSOD I], stressing that security in today’s world cannot be
achieved on a purely national basis; that attempts by one side to make gains at
the expense of the security of the other ultimately will not work; and that
action produces reaction and in the end, neither side achieves a long-term
gain.
Mr MacEachen applied these principles in very specific terms to the
bilateral intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations. He pointed out that
such negotiations can succeed only if both parties accept, as their fundamental
objective, increased mutual security rather than unilateral advantage. He
went on to explain that it was only as a result of the December 1979
“two-track” decision by NATO, taken in response to the Soviet build-up of
intermediate-range missiles targeted on Western Europe, that the INF nego-
tiations were begun at all. It will be recalled that the NATO governments
proposed negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States to limit
land-based intermediate-range missile systems on both sides. At the same
time, the NATO Alliance agreed to deploy Pershing II missiles and ground-
launched cruise missiles beginning in late 1983 if such negotiations were
unsuccessful. Mr MacEachen reminded the Committee on Disarmament that
while, initially, the Soviet Union was critical of the NATO decision and
reluctant to engage in negotiations, eventually, in the autumn of 1980, the
Soviet Union agreed to preliminary discussions, and a year later, in Novem-
ber 1981, formal negotiations began.
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It is suggested that these events constitute a classic example of the direct
application of the principle of mutual security. As was pointed out by Mr
MacEachen, there is some encouragement to be derived from the fact that the
Soviet Union clearly has recognized that NATO governments have a legiti-
mate concern about the number of SS-20s aimed at their European member-
states, and that a reduction is necessary, as evidenced by a recent Soviet
proposal concerning possible reductions of such weapons. As stated by the
Secretary of State for External Affairs in Geneva, “[t]his in itself is progress.
However, it is not yet clear that both sides have accepted that mutual security
must be the basis of the negotiations. That is why 1983 is crucial.” The events
of 1983 will have important and far-reaching implications for 1984 and
beyond.
At this stage, it is appropriate to make reference to another important
policy pronouncement contained in the February Geneva statement, again
one clearly addressed to all parties, and with significant implications for
future Canadian policy.
After outlining the principles underlying effective arms control and
disarmament negotiations, and emphasizing mutual security as the only
acceptable basis for arms control and disarmament,* Mr MacEachen made
the following statement: “An attempt by any power to develop a policy which
assumes that nuclear war can be winnable contributes to mutual insecurity.”
He went on to describe this statement as a home truth, albeit directly relevant
to the current situation. This statement provides a sharp contrast to some of
the rhetoric directed to the other element of the arms control and disarmament
equation, namely the necessity for sufficient arms to provide an effective
deterrent.
Examples of statements by both sides questioning the long-standing
concept of mutual deterrence, which, in turn, is founded on the certainty of
“Mutually Assured Destruction” [MAD], are readily available. Canada re-
jects the “winnable nuclear war” approach, and will resist it. This, it is
suggested, is an encouraging fact of life.
*In Dr MacGuigan’s statement of 25 February 1982, he indicated the Canadian perception of
the crucial issue of the degree of balance of forces between the two superpowers in the
following words: “We now face approximate parity at the strategic level between the Soviet
Union and the United States, Soviet superiority in intermediate-range nuclear weapons in
Europe, and the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional land forces.”
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IV. Canadian Arms Control and Disarmament Objectives
Canada’s long-standing and active pursuit of arms control and disarma-
ment has never consisted of mere policy pronouncements. Canada has pro-
posed and is today pressing forward negotiations on a series of concrete
proposals on fundamental arms control and disarmament problems. What
follows is a brief summary of recent Canadian proposals which give some
indication of the scope, variety and intensity of Canada’s position.
The control and reduction of armaments form an important part of
Canada’s security policy. Canadian priorities remain:
(a)
(b)
to strongly support negotiations to limit and reduce nuclear arms;
to promote early progress toward the realization of a multilateral
comprehensive test ban treaty [CTBT];
to press forward negotiations on a convention to completely prohibit
chemical weapons;
to promote the evolution of an effective non-proliferation regime based
on the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
to work toward the objective of prohibiting the development, testing
and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space;
to participate actively in negotiations to limit and reduce conventional
forces; and
to seek, step-by-step, to ultimately achieve general and complete
disarmament, consistent with the legitimate security needs of states.
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
The Canadian Government takes every opportunity to stress the impor-
tance it attaches to the continuation of the SALT/START process, for exam-
ple, at the recent meetings in Geneva followed by talks in Ottawa with
Vice-President Bush and at later consultations in Washington between Prime
Minister Trudeau and President Reagan, as well as in exchanges with the
U.S.S.R. through diplomatic channels. In the Committee on Disarmament in
Geneva, Canadian expertise is being applied in the search for a comprehen-
sive nuclear test ban and for a ban on chemical weapons. The Chairman of the
Working Group on Chemical Weapons is Canadian Ambassador D.S.
McPhail. In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna,
Canada is seeking to limit and reduce conventional forces in Europe.
The Prime Minister, in his address to the Second U.N. Special Session
on Disarmament on 18 June 1982, proposed a “policy of stabilization”, with
two complementary components: the strategy of suffocation which seeks to
inhibit the development of new weapons systems, and Canada’s negotiating
1983]
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approach aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals
designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels. The Prime
Minister had proposed the strategy of suffocation at the First U.N. Special
Session on Disarmament [SSOD I] in 1978. Its objective was to arrest the
dynamics of the strategic nuclear arms race through the realization of four
interrelated verifiable agreements designed to reduce the “technological im-
pulse”: a comprehensive test ban treaty; a ban on the flight-testing of all new
strategic delivery vehicles; a ban on the production of fissionable material for
weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce
military spending on new strategic weapons systems. As the Prime Minister
has noted, “the strategy was never meant to be applied unilaterally”. It was
always envisaged within the context of negotiated agreements between the
nuclear powers.
The strategy of suffocation is being actively promoted in international
fora, in particular at the United Nations. Moreover, Canada continues to
contribute concretely to more specific discussions which deal with im-
plementing elements of the strategy. Canada has called for the resumption of
the U.K.-U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. talks on a comprehensive test ban. In the Com-
mittee on Disarmament in Geneva, Canada is participating in the working
group on a nuclear test ban and, also, in the work of the Seismic Experts
Group which is developing an international verification system for an even-
tual test ban treaty. Canada has also continued its efforts to effect implementa-
tion of the second and third elements of the strategy. Although Canada is also
pressing for action with regard to the fourth element, agreements to reduce
military budgets cannot be concluded until the U.S.S.R. and its allies assume
a more open policy with regard to information about their military spending.
It has been a long-standing Canadian position since the outset of arms
control and disarmament negotiations after the Second World War that
verification mechanisms are not only the key to the implementation of arms
control and disarmament agreements, but in some cases a virtual precondition
to their conclusion. It is encouraging that both superpowers are now directing
their attention to various aspects of the problems of verification which go to
the heart of every arms control and disarmament problem. Canada will
continue to pursue most vigorously its efforts to push forward verification
studies utilizing expertise inside and outside of government.
V.
Canadian Priorities for the Committee on Disarmament
This is an appropriate stage at which to turn to the second part of the
policy statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in
Geneva on 1 February 1983, namely, Canada’s priorities in the Committee on
Disarmament. It is worth noting that the statement was made in the full
knowledge that with respect to some of these priority issues, Canada’s
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proposals present difficulties for one or both of the superpowers. Thus, while
recognizing the facts of life concerning the limits upon Canada’s ability to
influence events, Canada has not hesitated to press vigorously for action and
has sought support for such action from others where it is needed.
Mr MacEachen emphasized that the pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear
test ban is a fundamental – perhaps the fundamental –
nuclear issue before
the Committee on Disarmament. He urged that the new working group begin
to discharge its mandate on that subject as a matter of urgency in 1983. He
argued for a step-by-step approach that could ensure that the key elements of a
treaty are in place even before a final political commitment to a comprehen-
sive nuclear test ban treaty has been undertaken by the nuclear weapons
states.
Mr MacEachen then stressed the importance Canada has always attached
to the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons. He pointed out that
the Non-Proliferation Treaty emphasizes the non-discriminatory transfer of
peaceful nuclear technology, but provides also for the de-escalation of the
arms race by nuclear weapons states. He reminded the Committee that while
more non-nuclear weapons states have adhered to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, such voluntary renunciation has not been matched by corresponding
action by the nuclear weapons states. He suggested that those states with
nuclear technology and those without must seek to persuade the nuclear
weapons states to live up to their bargain.
A third priority cited by Mr MacEachen was the conclusion of a compre-
hensive treaty on chemical weapons. He noted that the time is ripe for
progress toward a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production
and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on the destruction of existing
stocks. He referred to the allocation of funds to enable Canadian technical
experts to be made available to the Canadian Delegation for longer periods to
enhance the active role Canada has been playing in the Chemical Weapons
Working Group.
Mr MacEachen turned then to the sensitive question of weapons for use
in outer space.* He urged the Committee to begin as soon as possible its
essential task of defining the legal and other issues necessary to build upon the
outer space legal regime and made clear Canada’s intention to participate
actively in this work. He concluded by urging the establishment of a working
group on this subject.
*Critics of the Outer Space Treaty as a mere “non-armament” convention, agreed to by the
superpowers in their own self-interest, overlook the possible consequences of the non-
existence of an agreement precluding claims to sovereignty and banning the emplacement of
weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies; it is not hard to imagine the
potentially serious consequences of the U.S.A. landing men on the moon and the U.S.S.R.
landing space vehicles on the moon in the absence of prior agreement on such a treaty,
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NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
VI. Canada’s Security Policy
Various questions raised about Canada’s policy on arms control and
disarmament and some suggestions for future policies resolve themselves into
a single issue, namely, Canada’s role in two collective defence arrangements,
NATO and NORAD. It will be recalled that a searching examination of
Canada’s defence policy and potential contribution to the maintenance of
world peace was carried out by the Canadian Government in the late 1960s.
At the end of this study, on 3 April 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau delivered a
public policy pronouncement which reads, in part, as follows:
The Government has rejected any suggestion that Canada assume a non-aligned or neutral
role in world affairs. Such an option would have meant the withdrawal by Canada from its
present alliances and the termination of all cooperative military arrangements with other
countries. We have decided in this fashion because we think it necessary and wise to
continue to participate in an appropriate way in collective security arrangements with
other states in the interests of Canada’s national security and in defence of the values we
share with our friends. . .. In summary, Canada will continue to be a member of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and so cooperate closely with the United States within
NORAD and in other ways in defensive arrangements.
Canada’s membership in these collective security arrangements constitutes an
important element of Canadian security policy.
It is widely accepted that there is a virtually symbiotic relationship
between arms control and disarmament on the one hand, and defence on the
other. It is necessary, therefore, to expand upon, if only briefly, Canada’s
policy for national security. This policy was expressed recently by Canada’s
then Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark Mac-
Guigan, to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence
on 25 February 1982. Dr MacGuigan pointed out that Canada’s security
policy has three complementary thrusts: “They are (1) deterrence of war
through the collective security arrangements of NATO (the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) and NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defence
Command); (2) active cooperation in efforts to achieve equitable and verifi-
able arms control and disarmament agreements; (3) support for peaceful
settlement of disputes and the collective effort to resolve the underlying
economic and social cauba of international tensions.” This long-standing
security policy of Canada remains, it is suggested, a further fact of life for
Canadians seeking to develop realistic and attainable arms control and dis-
armament policy options for 1984 and beyond.
The reference made to “deterrence of war” is an important one, the more
so in light of the attention now being focused in Canada and in other NATO
countries on the whole concept of deterrence. In the statement just quoted, Dr
MacGuigan went on to underline that “Canada recognizes the need for
collective efforts to deter aggression against the North American and Euro-
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pean regions of the North Atlantic alliance. It supports and contributes to this
defence effort. We are members of an alliance which relies on a deterrent
strategy in which nuclear weapons play an important part. This is unavoidable
in the world as we know it. … The NATO strategy of flexible response and
forward defence depends on our being ready and able to respond to aggression
at whatever level is necessary to counter it. The nuclear weapons of the United
States and other NATO allies make an essential contribution to the security of
Canada and of the alliance as a whole.”
It is this very policy, this further “fact of life” for Canadians, which is
being questioned by some in Canada, and it may be worthwhile therefore to
examine the policy a little further. In the White Paper Foreign Policy for
Canadians – United Nations, the question is dealt with as follows:
At the present time and in the foreseeable future, the ultimate preventative of war
between the super powers is the mutual balance of nuclear deterrence –
that is, the
existence in both the United States and the Soviet Union of a credible capability to inflict
unacceptable retaliatory damage in a nuclear exchange. However, a sharply accelerated
pace in the competitive evolution of strategic nuclear weapons could upset the existing
balance, which constitutes a credible deterrent, and make it less stable. Potentially
destabilizing developments in the strategic arms race are capable of presenting grave risks
for international security in the 1970s. This adds urgency to the search for successful
nuclear arms control measures.
The relationship between deterrence and disarmament was dealt with by
Dr MacGuigan in the statement previously referred to, in which he empha-
sized that Canada’s support for the maintenance of forces sufficient to deter
aggression and to defend the NATO area is entirely consistent with Canada’s
commitment to a vigorous arms control and disarmament policy. He pointed
out that the two policies are more than consistent; they complement and
support one another, and together constitute a single coherent policy serving
the same goal of enhancing security and preserving peace. Dr MacGuigan
emphasized also that only on a basis of undiminished security can nations be
expected to accept limitations on the numbers and quality of their weapons. It
is suggested that this thesis is a fact of life for all states and all peoples for 1984
and well beyond. It was this concept of “mutual security” that was later
emphasized by the Prime Minister at SSOD II and developed further by
Canada’s present Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External
Affairs at the Committee on Disarmament in the February policy statement.
VII. Attainability of Priority Objectives
The Geneva policy statement indicates very clearly that in the view of the
Canadian Government, 1983 is a crucial year for both bilateral and multilater-
al arms control and disarmament negotiations. It makes equally clear the
views of the Canadian Government as to the priority areas for action in 1983
and, as a consequence, for 1984 and beyond, because few if any of the
–
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Canadian objectives can be attained in the space of a single year. The time it
takes to negotiate arms control and disarmament agreements even in the best
conditions is, of course, one of the most significant facts of life for those
engaged in negotiating on such issues.
It will be noted, moreover, that in attempting to determine which
important subjects, all needing urgent attention, should be given priority over
others, difficult choices are entailed, the more so because it is already evident
that Canada’s priorities are not necessarily those of the Soviet bloc or the
non-aligned “Group of 21”, who have somewhat different perceptions from
the West and from each other. Thus, another fact of life is that it is not possible
to do everything at once, and Canada’s priorities, such as the strategy of
suffocation, may not be those of others.
Public opinion is having an important and highly desirable impact in the
whole field of arms control and disarmament, at least in Western countries.
Those committed to the pursuit of arms control and disarmament, both in and
out of government, have long sought to awaken public opinion to the crucial
nature of the issues involved. Clearly, public opinion is now deeply engaged
in these matters. Equally encouraging is the clear evidence that there is a very
broad spectrum of interest groups and individuals from all walks of life who
are taking a serious and sustained interest in these crucial issues.
Not infrequently, the question is posed: “What can Canada do?” It is
necessary to be realistic and to recognize the constraints within which a
country which is not a Great Power can influence events. It is equally
essential, however, to ensure that every ounce of pressure that countries such
as Canada can bring to bear should be exerted.
The “strategy of suffocation” presented by Prime Minister Trudeau at
SSOD I, and developed at SSOD II, includes, for example, a ban on the flight
testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles and a ban on the production of
fissionable material for weapons purposes. It has been pointed out on a
number of occasions by the Prime Minister that the strategy of suffocation
will not be implemented by Canada unilaterally, There is a problem as to how
much can be achieved with respect to such objectives if they are not supported
actively by the Great Powers, as well as by other countries of both the
industrialized and developing world. The outlook is not always encouraging,
but it reflects the basic fact of life for negotiators. Canada must keep up the
pressure by every available means and attempt gradually to expand support
for such objectives. It is a lengthy and difficult process. Those charged with
the task must bring to it commitment and creativity, coupled with patience
and perseverance. It is essential and, indeed, urgent for Canada to participate
in the process of developing imaginative, realistic proposals, utilizing every
legitimate means to seek support for them.
