Human Rights, Culture, and
the Singapore Example
Simon S.C. Tay’
Culture haunts the search fora system of human rights that
can truly be universal. Today, when we value cultural diversity,
religious and regional factors have increasingly emerged as rea-
sons for differences in human rights. In Asia, the main propo-
nents for this cultural argument are governments representing
polyglot, largely multi-ethnic, modem capitalist societies. Singa-
porean representatives, dubbed “the Singapore school”, have
been prominent among them. These proponents say that Asian
views and practices of human rights necessarily differ from those
in the West because Asian culture differs.
A closer look at the Singapore example demonstrates the
reasons for which these characterizations may be rejected. The
roots of Singaporean society are not originally and wholly
“Asian”. Rather, they are a hybrid of colonial influences, includ-
ing laws relating to fundamental civil and political liberties. The
Singapore example shows that culture is plastic, moulded by
polities. There is, as such, no pure or original Asian culture that
precedes and predetermines human rights. The Asian emphasis
on cultural difference is, instead, a will to differ. Accordingly,
culture should not assert a priority over other human rights.
Cultural difference may still, however, enter the human-
rights equation. As Asia develops, Asians do not want to be ho-
mogenized with the West nor to give into the dominant, pre-
dominantly Western interpretation of human rights. This Asian
will to differ can be welcome insofar as it adds to the cultural
richness and true universality of human rights.
But how can this claim to culture be mediated with other
human rights? Beyond the rhetoric of the Singapore school, a
survey of Singapore’s actual record shows no gross human-rights
transgressions. Instead, there has been a reinforcing cycle be-
tween socio-economic and civil and political rights to create a
core of human rights. The Singapore example may stand as a
minimum standard for other developing nations.
La recherche d’un systame des droits de la personne rel-
lement universel ne peut faire abstraction de la culture. Au-
jourd’hui, alors qu’est valoris6 la diversit6 culturelle, des facteurs
religieux et rdgionaux apparaissent plus frdquemment pour crder
des diffdrences en droit de la personne. En Asie, les partisans
principaux de cet argument culturel sont des gouvemements qui
reprisentent des socidtds polyglottes, largement multi-ethniques,
modemes et capitalistes. Parmi celles-ci, les representants de
jouent un rtle
Singapour, sumomms .d’ cle de Singapour
important. Ces partisans estiment que la notion et le respect des
droits de la personne en Asie diflgrent ndcessairement de
l’occident car la culture asiatique est diffdrente.
Une 6tude plus approfondie de l’exemple de Singapour
ddmontre les raisons pour lesquelles ces caractdrisations peuvent
8tre rejettes. Les racines de la socidt6 singapourienne ne sont
pas, a l’origine, enti~ement asiatiques. Elles sont plus exacte-
ment un hybride d’influences coloniales, y compris des lois con-
cemant les libertds civiles et politiques. L’exemple de Singapour
ddmontre que la culture est plastique, moulde par la politique. I1
n’y a done pas de culture asiatique pure ou originelle qui prd&e
et pri6dtermine les droits de la personne. L’emphase asiatique
sur I diffdrence culturelle n’est, en fait, qu’une volont6 de se dif-
fdrencier. Par consdquent, la culture ne devrait pas avoir priorit6
sur les droits de la persoane.
Toutefois, les diffdrences culturelles peuvent encore
s’insdrer dans le probldmatique des droits de la personne. Face au
ddveloppement de l’Asie, les asiatiques refusent d’Etre homog-
ndisds avec l’occident ainsi quo e6er a l’interprdtation domi-
nante et en grande pate occidentale des droits de la personne.
La volont6 de se distinguer des asiatiques est positive dans la
mesure oh elle contribue hi a richesse culturelle et h l’universalit6
rdelle des droits de la personne.
Toutefois, comment cette revendication culturelle peut-elle
se concilier avec d’autres droits de la personne ? Au-delA de la
rhdtorique de I’lcole singapourienne, il n’y a eu aucune violation
flagrante des droits de la personne h Singapour. Au contraire, un
cycle entre les droits socio-deonoiques et les droits civils et
politiques a servit h crder un noyau de droits de la personne.
L’exemple de Singapour pourrait reprdsenter un critare minimal
pour d’autres pays en daveloppement.
. LL.B. (N.U.S.), LL.M (Harvard), and Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore,
teaches constitutional and international law at the Faculty of Law at the National University of Singa-
pore. He was the 1994 winner of the Harvard Law School Laylin Prize for international law. He is
also a writer of fiction and poetry and, in 1995, won a national award as Young Artist of the Year.
McGill Law Journal 1996
Revue de droit de McGill
To be cited as: (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 743
Mode de rdftrence : (1996) 41 R.D. McGill 743
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL/REVUE DE DROITDE MCGILL
[Vol. 41
Introduction: The Significance of Singapore’s Example
Synopsis
I. The Asian View of Human Rights
A. Culture and the Dominant View
B. Specifics of the Asian View
C. Culture as the Difference
D. Problems of Cultural Argument
UI. Singapore as Asian
A. Western Influence
B. Multi-racialism, Multi-culturalism
C. Asian Values
D. Legal and Constitutional Development
m. The Will to Differ
IV. Singapore’s Record
Conclusion
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S.S. C. TAY – THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
Introduction: The Significance of Singapore’s Example
Singapore disturbs many who believe in the universal application of human
rights and democracy. The small island-nation is economically rich.’ It is largely
open to foreign influence through trade, media, and visitors. Many in the West have
theorized that wealth and openness would be sufficient for liberal democracy,’ and
that this in turn would be best for the promotion of human rights.’ Yet Singapore
seems intent on going its own way.
The nation has recently faced Western critics over issues such as the caning of a
youth from the United States,’ judicial proceedings for contempt of court against a
foreign academic and an international newspaper,’ and social controls such as a ban
on chewing gum.’ In these confrontations, Singapore’s representatives have not
been apologetic but have, instead, sought to justify their actions by reference to
another way of life, an Asian culture. What they say, moreover, does not seem
meant wholly for internal consumption: Singapore may serve as an example for
other Asian governments, that want economic development but which wish to
avoid the increased political freedoms and rights called for by Western democra-
cies. The Singapore example – whether labelled soft authoritarianism,’ “Asian de-
‘ In 1994, Singapore’s per capita G.D.P. was 20,415 US dollars. This is the second highest in Asia,
after Japan, and close to Switzerland’s mark of.21,307 US dollars in 1984 (adjusted to 1994 dollars)
(see C. George, “Beyond Vision 1999” The [Singapore] Sunday imes (6 August 1995) 1).
2 See: S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century (Norman, Okla.:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); R. Scalapino, “Democratizing Dragons: South Korea & Tai-
wan” (1993) 4 J. Democracy 70. Scalapino argues that “socio-economic transformation” will bring
democratic change.
‘See R.E. Howard & J. Donnelly, “Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes” (1986)
80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 801, who conclude that Western liberal democracy is the political regime that is
consonant with human rights.
4 The punishment of caning, in particular, has received attention in the United States following the
sentencing of a U.S. citizen, Michael Fay (see: “A Flogging in Singapore” The New York Times (2
April 1994) 18; “Condemn Singapore’s Brutality” The New York limes (10 April 1994) 18; A.M. Ro-
senthal, “On My Mind: Flog Asians Only” The New York Times (15 April 1994) A14).
“Ibis was the incident involving Christopher Lingle and the International Herald Tribune
(“I.H.T.”) (see “Lingle fined $10,000 as he had shown no contrition” The Straits Times (8 February
1995) 19). The I.H.T. has also been the subject of recent proceedings for defamation against Singa-
pore’s government leaders (see Chua Mui Hoong, “IHT libel case: PM’s lawyer asks court for
$500,000 damages” The Straits Times (22 July 1995) 1). For a more general description of media and
other human-rights related events in the late 1980s, see B.S. Frank et aL, The Decline in the Rule of
Law in Singapore and Malaysia (New York: Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1991) at
73-76. Note, however, that a U.S. State Department report in 1992, admitted that many uncensored
international magazines and newspapers could be purchased (see Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (Washington: D.C.: Department of State, 1992) at 643 [hereinafter Country Reports]).
6 For a description of such social controls as, for example, the prohibition against the sale of chew-
ing gum, or 1000 dollar fines for littering, see S. Stesser, The Lands of Charm and Cruelty: Travels in
Southeast Asia (New York: Knopf, 1993).
7 See generally F Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL/REVUE DE DROITDE McGILL
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mocracy’ ‘ or “the Singapore school” ‘- is significant insofar as it is meant for ex-
port.'” Some contend that the nation has “cast itself as Asia’s ideological cham-
pion.””
The argument from Singapore and some other Asian governments is that, while
many human rights are now accepted as universal aspirations, their form, priority
and scope of applicability will vary. Asian societies, it is said, place the community
in priority to the individual and proceed by “consensus”, not conflict.'” The author-
ity and dominance of state leaders are not suspect and limited, but trusted and en-
hanced. Asian approaches to human rights, it is argued, emphasize economic and
social rights and are legitimized by the continued enjoyment of stability and good
economic progress, which is what Asians value.” This “Asian” view of human
rights has come into greater prominence since the run-up to the World Convention
on Human Rights, when Asian government representatives came together to issue
the Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference for
Human Rights.” The argument highlights culture -whether
explicitly or implicitly.
8The term has been preferred by some Asian commentators. In Singapore, see H.C. Chan,
“Democracy: Evolution and Implementation – An Asian Perspective” in R. Bartley et al., eds., De-
mocracy and Capitalism: Asian and American Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1993) 1 [hereinafter “Evolution and Implementation”]. In Indonesia, see J. Wanandi,
“Sociopolitical Development and Institution Building in Indonesia” in R. Scalapino et al., eds., Asian
Political Institutionalization (Berkeley: University of California, 1986) 181.
9E. Jones, “Asia’s Fate: A Response to the Singapore School” [1994] National interest 18. Looking
at Singapore and other Asian societies, commentators also have resorted to labels such as “demi-
democracy”, “soft authoritarianism” or “pluralist authoritarianism” (see e.g. K. Hewison, R. Robison
& G. Rodan, eds., Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism (New
South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1993)). See also: Tu Wei-Ming who applies the term, “soft authoritari-
anism” to the emerging situation in China (see T. Wei-Ming, “Intellectual Effervescence in China”
(1992) 121 Daedalus 251). See also Scalapino, supra note 2, who describes South Korea and Taiwan
as systems of “authoritarian pluralism.”
‘ See Jones, ibid. at 18,21.
“E. Mortimer, “New world order, but struggles will not end” The Straits Tmes (10 January 1994)
26.
2 This and other generalizations about Asian culture in comparison to that of the West can be found
in most writings by the Singapore school. For further discussion of such characterizations, see Parts
.B, I.C, below. See e.g. B. Kausikan, “Asia’s Different Standard” (1993) 92 Foreign Pol’y 24:
Values and institutions are important determinants of development. But what institu-
tions and which values? The individualistic ethos of the West or the communitarian
traditions of Asia? The consensus-seeking approach of East and South-East Asia or the
adversarial institutions of the West? (Kausikan, ibid. at 35).
, For example, Kausikan writes:
What may have struck a chord with the peasants was not “democracy,” but complaints
against inflation, corruption, and nepotism … [Plopular pressures against East and
Southeast Asian governments may not be so much for “human rights” or “democracy”
but for good government: effective, efficient, and honest administrations able to pro-
vide security and basic needs with good opportunities … (Kausikan, ibid. at 37).
“See Bangkok Declaration, 2 April 1993, republished in (1993) 14 H.R.L.J. 370. See also United
Nations, World Conference on Human Rights (New York: UN Department of Public Information,
1996]
S.S.C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
Human rights and democracy in Asia differ, these representatives say, because its
culture differs.
This cultural argument is problematic. Critics will say the Asian view tends to
generalizations and stereotypes of what is “Asian”. It underestimates both the his-
torical ruptures of colonization and the present forces of global interaction. It
privileges culture and leaves us in a quandary if there are elements in that culture
that we find unacceptable on more universal grounds. Moreover, while some may
respect these emerging concepts as signalling a growing self-awareness and self-
confidence in Asia, others suspect that the cultural argument is a pretext to excuse
continuing transgressions by repressive governments.” Certainly, there are different
views of human rights voiced in Asia, by opposition politicians, scholars, and non-
government organizations.” Most prominent among these, perhaps, are the views
expressed in the Bangkok Non-Governmental Organizations Declaration of March
27, 1993.” The N.G.O. Declaration differs significantly both from the Bangkok
Declaration by governments and what this essay has, for convenience, termed the
“Asian view”.” The N.G.O. Declaration places a stronger emphasis on civil and
political rights than does the Declaration by government representatives. It calls for
democracy to be “fostered and guaranteed in all countries”‘9 and for Asian govern-
ments to “lift constraints on political rights … by repealing repressive laws … and
liberalising the political system.”2 Like the Bangkok Declaration by the Asian gov-
ernments, it calls for cultural rights to be recognized on the basis that “[t]here is
emerging a new understanding of universalism encompassing the richness and wis-
dom of Asia-Pacific cultures”.’ The N.G. 0. Declaration explicitly stipulates, how-
ever, that “cultural practices which derogate from universally accepted human
rights … must not be tolerated.”2
1993) [hereinafter Vienna Conference], Declaration of June 25, republished in (1993) 14 H.R.L.J.
352.
5 See A. Neier, “Asia’s Unacceptable Standard” (1993) 92 Foreign Pol’y 42, which responds to
Kausikan, supra note 12. Neier says that in discussing Asian human rights, “Kausikan’s main con-
cem, in sum, is to delegitimate international efforts to address the abuses that particularly characterize
his own government and its regional allies …” (Neier, ibid. at 51). See also Jones: “They rely on per-
suading us that the greatest good of the greatest number in Asia absolutely requires the use of repres-
sive political methods” (Jones, supra note 9 at 18).
6 See e.g. Y Ghai, “Asian Perspectives on Human Rights” (1993) 23 Hong Kong L.J. 342, for a
critique of the viewpoints put forward by Asian governments. Ghai’s article is re-published in slightly
amended form in J.T.H. Tang, ed., Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia-Pacific Re-
gion (London: Pinter Press, 1995) 54.
” Re-published in various journals and books, including Tang, ed., ibid. at App. II [hereinafter
N.G.O. Declaration ‘ Summary].
“See Jones, supra note 9.
‘9N.G.O. Declaration-Summary, supra note 17 at 209.
20 77ze Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights (27 March 1993) at General Recommendation
5 [on file with the author, hereinafter N.G.O. Declaration].
2 N.G.0. Declaration-Summary, supra note 17 at 208.
2 N.G. 0. Declaration, supra note 20 at para. I.
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While important, the differences between Asian viewpoints are not the focus of
this essay and will not be examined. This essay attempts, instead, to address the
specifics of the government arguments that represent the Asian view and of the
culture that is said to justify that view. In what ways would human rights specifi-
cally differ if this Asian view were permitted? How valid is this cultural argument?
Is Asian culture a preserved heritage from the past that must have priority over pre-
sent human-rights claims, or is it something that is simply moulded by present day
politics? How is Asian culture discussed and transmitted? It is against this back-
ground that we look at the question of culture and human rights in the example of
Singapore.
This essay will first present an overview of how the Asian view of human
rights, as articulated by Singaporean representatives, differs from the Western view,
specifically identifying particular rights that are doubted or denied. It will not,
however, dwell at the general level of geo-politics, culture, and theories of democ-
ratization, where much of the debate has tended to remain. Instead, the essay will
consider the cultural basis for the Asian argument in the specific situation of Singa-
pore. This will include examining the discourse and process of culture that aims to
create an Asian identity, amidst the heterogeneous character caused by the nation’s
mainly immigrant population and its founding as part of the British empire, which
presented a constitution with fundamental liberties that parallel civil and political
rights.” This essay argues that, in the Singapore example, culture is plastic,
moulded by politics. Asia’s differences in its approach to human rights are main-
tained not by “natural” culture but by a will to differ. The paper therefore questions
why we should privilege culture, as the Asian view suggests, over a system of uni-
versal human rights.
We will then look to Singapore’s human-rights record to suggest what the
Asian view might truly mean for other countries. This is not intended to be a full
assessment; rather, it is a survey which serves to emphasize the inherently hybrid
nature of Singapore’s legal, social, and political heritage and, accordingly, high-
lights some important features that the city-state shares –
despite all the protesta-
tions of Asian cultural difference – with liberal democracies. In this vein, we con-
sider whether what some see as Asian culture has indeed been placed before civil
and political rights and, if so, to what extent. We also examine, in the Singaporean
context, what is sometimes called the “trade-off’ or “Lee Kuan Yew hypothesis” of
rights and development –
that is, that human rights must necessarily be traded-off
for economic prosperity.
3 The rights that are common between the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, reproduced in
A.T Blaustein & G.H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World, vol. 17 (New York:
Oceana, 1996) [hereinafter Singapore Constitution] and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
GA Res. 217 (M), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 [hereinafter Uni-
versal Declaration] include: freedom of speech, assembly and association; freedom of religion; rights
against slavery and torture; and freedom against discrimination.
19961
S.S.C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
By considering such questions, this essay, while focusing on a limited set of is-
sues facing one people and one nation, hopes to address broader concerns of many
other Asian or Western nations that seek a system of universal human rights. Sin-
gapore has spoken often and influentially on whether cultural differences should af-
fect the content of human rights. What is found in the Singapore example, both in
its arguments and actual practice, may have wider resonance.
I. The Asian View of Human Rights
A. Culture and the Dominant View
Culture haunts the search for a system of human rights that can truly be univer-
sal. Ever since F. de Vitoria’s first consideration of the native-American Indians in
“the New World”, we have wondered if those who are not like us should be given
rights and treated as human.’
In the modem development of human rights, cultural
relativism was an early obstacle put forward by anthropologists:’ relativists argued
that values were specific to a particular society and its culture and could not be said
to be “universal” to all people. Thereafter, Western democracies and Socialist
countries disputed first and second “generations” of rights as matters of political
and cultural preferences.” Today, when we increasingly value cultural diversity,
many recent works have considered human-rights perspectives in Islam, Hinduism,
Confucianism, and other systems of religion and belief2
Yet the recurring question of culture has neither silenced nor reduced to doubt
the advocates of human rights. Despite the question of culture, the post-World War
era has witnessed a growing articulation of human rights: first, with the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration and, then, in 1966, with the two international covenants on civil
and political rights28 and economic, social, and cultural rights. The body of human
rights has grown to such an extent that many argue that at least some rights –
such
as the prohibitions against genocide and torture and the right to self-determination
–
have become norms of customary international law.
24F. de Vitoria, “On the American Indians” in A. Pagden & J. Lawrance, eds., Political Writings
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 231. For a brief study of Vitoria, see M. van
Gelderen, “Vitoria, Grotius and Human Rights” in W. Schmale, ed., Human Rights and Cultural Di-
versity (Goldbach, Germany: Keip, 1993) 215.
“See American Anthropological Association, “Statement on Human Rights Submitted to the
Commission on Human Rights” (1947) 49 Am. Anthropology 539.
ing World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).
6 For a summary of socialist and Western perspectives, see A. Cassese, Human Rights in a Chang-
27 See A.A. An-Na’im, ed., Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Quest for Consensus
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).
” See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 [hereinafter I.C.C.P.R.].
,9 hternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19 December 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46.
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Arguably, human rights bind even those nations, like Singapore, that have not
acceded to the major human-rights treaties or that were not nations when the Uni-
versal Declaration was made.” Commentators suggest we are in the age of rights,
that consensus exists on an “irreducible core of integrity and dignity” in which
“human rights is the essential idea”.’ This is despite the comparative youth of hu-
man-rights discourse in the history of international law and humankind and trans-
gressions by many nations. 2 A nation’s conduct as regards its citizens is no longer
purely a matter of its internal laws; it is the legitimate subject of international con-
cern.
In this progress, a dominant view of human rights has arisen. This view asso-
ciates human rights primarily with civil and political rights, and places less empha-
sis on social, economic, cultural, and other emergent, “third generation”, rights.”
This is evident in the reports and actions of international human-rights organiza-
tions,’ who ignore the latter set of rights. It is also marked in the United Nations
(“U.N.”) system, in which economic and social matters come under development
agencies, wholly separate from human-rights organs.”3 The dominant view may,
with some justification, be associated with liberal Western perspectives. 6 This cer-
tainly seems to be the perception among Asian governments.-”
” See 0. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Ni-
jhoff, 1991) at 330-42.
L. Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) at 193.
32 See H.J. Steiner’s review of Henkin, ibicL, H.J. Steiner, “The Youth of Rights” (1991) 104 Han’.
L. Rev. 917. Steiner agrees with Henkin on the force and promise of the human-rights movement but
suggests that “today’s world reveals … the youth of rights in an age of continuing and massive
wrongs” (Steiner, ibid. at 935).
“‘Tis tendency has manifested itself since the two international covenants were drawn up. See V.
Pechota, “The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” in L. Henkin, ed., The l-
ternational Bill of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981) 32, for a description of the
negotiating and drafting process. See also V.A. Leary, “The Effect of Western Perspectives on Inter-
national Human Rights” in A.A. An-Na’im & FM. Deng, eds., Human Rights in Africa: Cross-
Cultural Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990) 15.
‘ See, for example, the annual report series by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
These reports set out detailed allegations of transgressions of civil and political rights and do not seek
to evaluate social or economic rights.
” See P. Alston, “The Right to Development” in Human Rights Yearbook, vol. 1 (New York:
Hutchinson, 1988) 1. Looking at the U.N. and its Center for Human Rights, Alston comments that
“one of the principal failings of existing intergovernmental institutional approaches to human rights …
is the rigid separation of the human rights organs and that of the development and financial agencies”
(Alston, ibid. at 15).
36See e.g. Howard & Donnelly, supra note 3. See also Leary, supra note 33.
This perception became apparent in the run-up to the 1993 Vienna Conference (see supra note
14). In preparation for the Vienna Conference, Asian governments gathered for a regional discussion
and issued the Bangkok Declaration, supra note 14. The preamble to that Declaration, inter alia, reit-
erated “the interdependence and indivisibility of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights”,
and while noting that progress had been made in the codification of international human-rights in-
struments, it expressed “concern that these mechanisms relate mainly to one category of rights” (ibid.
1996]
S.S. C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
The question of culture continues to speak against that dominant view. The
question of culture, however, no longer comes from indigenous peoples, anthro-
pologists, socialists, or insular religious or ethnic minorities; rather, it comes in-
creasingly from governments representing polyglot, largely multi-ethnic, and in-
creasingly modem and capitalist societies in Asia.
The Asian view of human rights came into greater prominence with the Bang-
kok Declaration. In Bangkok, Asian government representatives railed against the
imposition of “incompatible values” in the name of human rights.” Yet, they did not
wholly reject universal human rights, as others might argue.”‘ In fact, the Asian rep-
resentatives reaffirmed “their commitment to principles contained in … the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights”.’ Moreover, the Asian approach argues that
while human rights are universal norms, there must be allowance for national and
regional differences in priorities, emphases, and specific forms of practice in rec-
ognizing them.” To the extent that norms are accepted, the approach may be charac-
terized as a form of “weak” cultural relativism.”2 Where cultural practices differ
from what the dominant view of human rights might otherwise require, however,
the Asian view privileges culture. In this sense, the cultural relativism of the Asian
view is strong – near absolute –
at the level of practice. 3
This approach may be associated with the views of some that “culture is the su-
preme ethical value, more important than any other. Human rights, in particular,
at 370) (i.e. political rights). This was amplified in statements by governments at the Vienna Confer-
ence. Perhaps the clearest of these was made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Myanmar
(Burma): “[W]e must not fail to address the whole spectrum of rights … In recent years while civil
and political rights have been highlighted the right to development has not been given the attention it
deserves” (reproduced in “Statements by Representatives of Asian Governments at the Vienna World
Conference on Human Rights” in Tang, ed., supra note 16, App. 111, 213 at 224).
” See the preamble to the Bangkok Declaration, which recognizes that “the promotion of human
rights should be encouraged by cooperation and consensus, and not through confrontation and the
imposition of incompatible values” (ibid. at 370).
” For a total rejection of universality, see R. Panikkar, “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western
Concept?” (1982) 120 Diogenes 75. Pannikar answers the question: “Is the Concept of Human Rights
a Universal Concept? The answer is a plain no …” (ibid. at 84).
40 Bangkok Declaration, supra note 14, “Preamble” at 370.
‘ The Bangkok Declaration, ibid., stresses “the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of all
human rights” (ibid. at art. 7) and recognizes “the significance of national and regional particularities
and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds,” (ibid. at art. 8) as well as the right of
countries “to determine their political systems … and free pursue their economic, social and cultural
development” (ibid. at art. 6).
“This follows the typology between strong and weak forms of cultural relativism set out by J.
Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1989) at 109-10.
“, R.E. Howard, “Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community” (1993) 15 Hum. Rts. Q.
315. Howard suggests: “Cultural absolutism is a philosophical position that declares a society’s cul-
ture to be of supreme ethical value … It thus posits particularist cultures as of more ethical value than
any universal principle of justice” (ibit. at 315).
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should not be promoted if their implementation may result in a change in a particu-
lar culture.”‘ Other cultural relativists take exception to such strong views. They
allow that human-rights abuses may be criticized, even if it must be acknowledged
to be from another culture’s standpoint.” Relativists disagree with each other when
confronted by concrete practices. Acceptance of human rights as universal princi-
ples may unwittingly veil difference and disagreement at various levels of sub-
stance, interpretation, and form of human rights. 6
As such, the practical application of human rights is telling. Only in the specific
content and interpretation of rights can actual meaning –
and the international un-
derstanding that legitimates it – be found. Abstracted universal norms are insuffi-
cient for human beings in a real world. What are the specifics of the Asian view of
human rights? Do we mean the same thing when we agree, say, that there is a right
against torture? What is the difference of degree when we differ? Relativism –
and universality – which it accepts
which the Asian view calls for on one hand –
on the other –
are in tension. It is therefore useful, before proceeding, to briefly set
out some specifics of the Asian view, where it agrees with and differs from the
dominant view of human rights.
B. Specifics of the Asian View
The Asian view tends toward general statements of difference, perhaps because
it is an emerging argument. An outline may still be suggested, however, by refer-
ence to the Bangkok Declaration and to speeches and writings of representatives of
the Singapore school, particularly those of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew.” These
sources may reveal a core of civil and political rights that are acceptable: rights to
due process and to equality;’ prohibitions against slavery;’ prohibitions against
” E.R. Tes6n, “International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism” (1985) 25 Va. J. Int’l L. 869 at
870.
41 See A.D. Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (Newbury Park,
Cal.: SAGE, 1990) at 69.
46 The typology between hierarchical levels of variation, between substance, interpretation and
forms, is developed by Donnelly, supra note 42 at 109-24.
” This question of specifics can also be asked skeptically. As acknowledged, the Asian argument
for cultural context may be, instead, a pretext for repression. Because of this concern, Asian non-
governmental organizations working in human rights have doubted the efficacy of instituting a re-
gional or sub-regional human-rights convention. In a change of position, the N.G.O. Declaration, st-
pra note 20, accepted the need for a regional human-rights mechanism. Yet, this support was subject
to, inter alia, safeguards against governmental influence (see ibid. at Recommendation I (ix)).
” This essay will draw primarily on the following statements of Singaporean leaders: Senior Minis-
ter Lee Kuan Yew, “Democracy, human rights, and the realities” (Speech to The Create 21 Asahi Fo-
rum, Tokyo, 10 November 1992), reproduced in Speeches, vol. 16:6 (Singapore: Ministry of Infor-
mation and the Arts, 1992) 20; Kausikan, supra note 12.
” See: Lee Kuan Yew, ibid. at 30 who refers to the “rule of law”; Bangkok Declaration, supra note
14 at arts. 14,26.
“o See: Kausikan, supra note 12 at 39; Bangkok Declaration, ibid. at art. 8.
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S.S.C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
murder and genocide;’ prohibitions against torture; 2 rights to self-determination; 3
prohibitions against racial discrimination; ‘ equal rights between the sexes; and
rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities to their culture, religion, or use
of their language. 6
Despite acceptance of these norms, some differences from the dominant view
remain in their interpretation and practice. In its interpretation of “cruel and degrad-
ing treatment”, for example, the Singapore school would not likely accept the stan-
dard established by the European Court of Human Rights, which has ruled against
the “five techniques” of interrogation. 7 These techniques were: wall-standing;
hooding; subjection to noise; deprivation of sleep; and deprivation of food and
drink. In the European case, the British government classified these techniques as
“interrogation in depth”, but the Court found that the combined use of the five
techniques constituted a practice of inhuman treatment and of torture. Asian gov-
ernments may not take the same view as the court to prohibit such techniques. An-
other difference in the Asian view is that it circumscribes the right of self-
determination within existing territorial boundaries. This is similar to the position
of United Nations resolutions but falls short of newer views of self-determination
voiced by non-government organizations and others in cases such as East Timor
and Tibet.
There are other human rights with which the Asian approach expressly does not
agree. ” These, and the corresponding articles in the I.C.C.P.R., are: prohibitions
against detention without trial;’ the right to freedoms of speech and of the press;6′
See: Kausikan, ibid.; Bangkok Declaration, ibid. at art. 6.
52See: Kausikan, ibid.; Bangkok Declaration, ibid. at art. 7.
55See: Kausikan, ibid.; Bangkok Declaration, ibid. at arts. 1, 12. Note, however, that the support for
self-determination does not extend to the idea of changing existing state borders and supporting, say,
independence in East Timor or Tibet (see Kausikan, ibid. at 40).
‘ See Kausikan, ibid. Note that the I.C.C.ER., supra note 28, does not expressly prohibit racial dis-
crimination; however, it seems to be an underlying premise since article 2 states all rights should be
ensured to all individuals “without distinction of any kind, such as race …”. The leading international
law document on racial discrimination is the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 7 March 1966, Can. T.S. 1970 No. 28, 5 LL.M. 350 (in force 4
January 1969).
” See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 14 at arts. 3, 22.
56 See Bangkok Declaration, ibid. at arts. 11, 27.
” See Republic ofIreland v. United Kingdom (1978), Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser. A., No. 25 at 26. The Asian
view is also likely to rely on the U.N.’s exception of pain arising from punishment made with legal
sanction (see Convention against Torture and Other Cruei Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 9 March 1984, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36, 23 I.L.M. 1027, and its exception of “pain and
suffering arising only from … lawful sanctions” (ibid at art. 1)).
8 See Kausikan, who directly addresses this difference: “mhe West can legitimately object to the
torture or murder of Tibetans … But to demand independence … is an entirely different matter. It is a
fantasy” (supra note 12 at 40).
59 See Kausikan, ibid.
60 See I.C.C.PR., supra note 28 at art. 9.
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and prohibitions against capital punishment.’2 Not to accept these rights absolutely
does not mean that they are rejected out of hand. In reality, for example, there are
limited freedoms of speech, while legal proceedings and protections may also exist
against capital punishment and the misuse of detention without trial. What the
Asian view rejects is the dominant view of the meaning and scope of these rights.
Similarly, other civil and political rights that Asian governments have neither ex-
pressly accepted nor rejected”3 are substantially recognized and enjoyed in Singa-
pore and other Asian countries. It is the form and scope of these rights in practice
that are in question, not their very existence as norms.
C. Culture as the Difference
To what extent are differences of form and scope of human-rights recognition
predicated on culture? Culture is referred to in the Bangkok Declaration, first, inso-
far as Asian governments are called upon to recognize “the contribution that can be
made … with their diverse rich cultures and traditions”‘ and, second, insofar as hu-
man-rights norms must account for “the significance of national and regional par-
ticularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds”.’
There is much else in the Bangkok Declaration that does not seem strictly cul-
tural but, rather, geo-political. For instance, there is the over-arching concern with
“conditionality”, using human rights as a precondition for aid.’ At other fora, the
concern of many who put forward the Asian view is that Western countries selec-
tively apply human rights to slow Asia’s growth and assert leadership, despite
dwindling economic power and influence. 7 These geo-political concerns may have
some validity but their presence shows that the Asian view of human rights is very
much a governmental construct.”4 Asian governments are no longer taking a purely
6 See ibid. at art. 19 granting the right to freedom of opinion and expression as well as the “right to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas … through any media” but not, explicitly, freedom of
the press.
2 See ibid. at art. 6, which establishes some limits to the use of capital punishment. No article in the
Covenant, however, states an express prohibition, although an optional protocol to the I.C.C.P.R. al-
lows states to accept this position (see Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47). A number of human-
rights organizations take the position that capital punishment constitutes cruel and inhuman punish-
ment and, therefore, violates human rights.
6 By elimination, these would include: due process (see Universal Declaration, supra note 23 at
art. 10), liberty of movement and freedom of residence (ibid. at art. 13), freedom of thought, con-
science and religion (ibid. at art. 18); rights of peaceful assembly and of association (ibid. at art. 20);
and rights of political participation (ibid. at art. 21).
Bangkok Declaration, supra note 14 at “Preamble”.
63 Ibid at principle 8.
See ibid. at principle 4, which calls for a rejection of linking human rights and aid.
6,See Kausikan, supra note 12 at 24, 27.
The Bangkok Declaration was signed by approximately 40 Asian countries. Some nations ex-
pressed reservation but signed in an effort not to be seen as “un-Asian”. The Declaration does not
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S.S. C. TAY – THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
defensive stance when Western countries place democracy and human rights on the
international agenda. They are, instead, explaining their differences.’
The Asian view also acknowledges that many Asian countries are in the midst
of development. “Development” is, of course, a complex term, with an evolving lit-
erature unto itself.” Where once it signified mainly macro-economic policy and
mega-projects in the vain search for the promised “take-off” in Rostow’s theory,”
“development” has increasingly come to include environmental and human factors
or what has been called human and sustainable development.’ To a considerable
degree, the Asian view elicits support for its human-rights arguments from the need
for and right to development. These arguments advance the idea that developing
countries require government to take on a more central and powerful role than
many Western countries imagine. Where, as in Singapore’s case, the government
succeeds in encouraging economic development and in building a sense of nation-
hood, its role becomes different from that of Western governments in liberal de-
mocracies. Rather than distrusting and limiting it as the United States and liberal
theorists do,” the strong state is largely trusted in Asia.’ Consequently, the govern-
necessarily represent the sentiments of the people of Asia and regional non-governmental organiza-
tions. For a critique of the Bangkok Declaration, see Ghai, supra note 16.
” See K. Mahbubani, “New Areas of Asean Reaction: Environment, Human Rights and Democ-
racy” (Paper delivered to the First Asean Congress, October 1992), excerpted in K. Mahbubani, “Best
for Asean to follow Asian wisdom and walk the middle path” The Straits Times (15 October 1992)
28.
70 For an analysis of the development discourse and the different meanings and significance at-
tached to this term, see A. Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the
Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). For a brief survey of the use of develop-
ment in human rights, see K Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited (London:
Pinter, 1993)c. 1.
“‘ See: W.W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960);
W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1960).
” See: the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Fu-
ture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), which brought the phrase “sustainable development”
into wider recognition; World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992); the United Nations Development Project series of Human Develop-
ment Reports from the 1990s (see United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Report 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) and subsequent years’ reports). These reports
have, together with other publications and with international fora, intertwined development with hu-
man and environmental concerns.
73 For a view of American constitutional law and the distrust of powerful government, see J.H. Ely,
Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
74 While these arguments may be valid, it is also clear that the historical exigencies and needs of na-
tion-building are receding. The success in creating a more developed, richer, and sophisticated society
may well require a different form of governance in the future. There is also a question of how the
dominant party attempts to retain its dominance –
are its means legitimate or a transgression of
norms?
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ment and party who led the nation’s independence movement and subsequent de-
velopment has tended to be dominant. ‘
Another developmental basis for the Asian view is suggested by speakers from
the Singapore school. The argument is that Asia, first, requires the accumulation of
wealth and the formation of a civic society before it can fully address human-rights
issues. This has been criticized for being ahistorical.” The argument also seems
unclear as to whether Asia is truly on a different trajectory from Western nations or
is only in a transient stage. If Asia’s situation is transitory, the developmental argu-
ment is, at best, an explanation for the present differences; it does not argue against
future convergence. We may, therefore, look forward to a future in which Asia and
the West have evolved to human-rights views that are more similar, if not identical.
Asia’s plea to differ, in such a scenario, only represents a passing phase. Accord-
ingly, the question is: When? At what stage of development will economic rights in
Asia be sufficiently met so that other rights –
will come increasingly into focus?
including civil and political rights –
But, while developmental and geo-political factors do feature, the heart of the
Asian view seems to be that cultural factors should not take precedence over a uni-
versal conception of human rights. That is the recurring and perhaps predominant
theme of its proponents, most notably Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew.” In critically
discussing the Singapore school, Eric Jones sees that “the core of the position
seems to be that values are learned differently in West and East with one’s mother’s
mil.
78
Accordingly, while development is central to the fulfilment of human rights,
this essay focuses on the cultural basis of the Asian view. This specific focus will
allow us to consider more fully what factors might explain why the Asian concep-
tion of human rights differs from its Western counterparts even after developmental
need – economic and social rights – have largely been met.
‘ This pattern is seen not only in Singapore, but also in Malaysia, Taiwan, India (except for a brief
interruption), and until recently, Japan. There is more to such party dominance than winning in con-
secutive elections. The dominant party can shape ideological context in the political system and es-
tablish itself as a centrist, “catch-all”, party (see T.J. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: The One-
Parry Dominant Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990) at 351-52).
76 See Neier, supra note 15 at 44.
” See especially, F. Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew” (1994) 73
Foreign Affairs 109. The interviewer concludes: “The dominant theme throughout our conversation
was culture” (ibid. at 125).
78 Jones, supra note 9 at 19. The Asian view of human rights has a developmental basis. It argues,
for example, that basic social and economic needs of education, food and shelter come before politi-
cal rights. In this respect, it is similar to the view expressed in well-rehearsed arguments by the former
Socialist countries and other developing countries, especially Africa. The Asian view may be distin-
guished, however, by its recognition of culture as the main reason for its difference.
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S.S.C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
The Asian argument views culture as the factor that makes Asian people and
societies, in contrast to their Western counterparts, more “consensus-seeking”,
“communitarian”, and “accepting of authority”.” The state and the citizen, the ma-
jority and the minority: these are not necessarily in conflict, contrary to what West-
em democratic theorists suppose when they warn of the Leviathan or the “tyranny
of the majority”. They can be brought into harmony. This belief is evident in Con-
fucian
to bring
“consensus”.’ The emphasis is not on individual rights, which are Western con-
structs; rather, it is on duties. Duties, once fulfilled, create and earn rights for the
individual. In this way, conceptions of “rights” in Asian society differ from their
Western concepts that see rights as self-evident, not earned.8′
thought, which emphasizes proper conduct, or li, so as
These are some of the generalizations put forward by Asian governments about
how culture requires human rights (and democracy) to differ in Asia. This cultural
argument is problematic. While it is beyond the scope of this essay to fully discuss
prevailing theories of culture, a brief overview may be necessary, insofar as these
form the backdrop to the problems of the Asian view and, in particular, its applica-
tion to Singapore.
D. Problems of Cultural Argument
The characterizations and arguments for the Asian view, as briefly described,
stress the idea of traditional Asian cultures. Taking such an approach, the culture of,
say, China, is to be located in books about ancient Confucian philosophy, rather
than in the May 4th movement or the modem discos and stock exchange of Shang-
hai and Guangzhou. Similarly, discussion of Iran and human rights tends to centre
around fundamentalist views of Islam and gives little credit to either secular views
held by some citizens or to the interpretation of the political statements of Islamic
leaders.” A few of the many objections to this traditional, historical emphasis in
mapping out the present-day interaction between culture and human rights will be
briefly considered.
79 It is unclear what, precisely, is meant by these terms other than what is conveyed by their use by
Asian government spokesmen to differentiate Asians from Westerners who are said in contrast to be,
“confrontational”, “individualistic”, and “anarchic”.
‘ See A.H. Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China
(Singapore: Butterworths, 1992) c. 2. According to Chen, Confucianism claims, for example, that
were people governed by the li (rites, custom, and rules governing proper conduct), then “disputes
and conflicts would be easily resolved” (ibid. at 9). See also: H. Rosemont, “Why Take Rights Seri-
ously? A Confucian Critique” in L.S. Rouner, ed., Human Rights and the World’s Religions (Notre
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 167; R.P. Peerenboom, “What’s Wrong with Chi-
nese Rights?: Toward a Theory of Rights with Chinese Characteristics” (1993) 6 Harv. Hum. Rts. J.
29.
8 See references listed ibid. See also B.I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1985), who doubts a “rights” concept in Chinese tradition.
82 For such a contrary view of Islam, see R. Afshari, “An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in
the Discourse of Human Rights” (1994) 16 Hum. Rts. Q. 235.
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The first and most direct objection to these characterizations of Asian culture is
in respect of content. Other commentators find more liberal and universal strands in
the vast body of Asian culture ‘ and within classical Confucian thought.” For ex-
ample, some would argue that the Confucian system is not wholly authoritarian, but
based on morality, compassion, and mutual respect between the rulers and the
ruled, all of which are consistent with democratic values.” Similar values of natural
law and human rights have been located by commentators in other religions and
philosophies practised in Asia, such as Islam.’
At a second level, the problem with talking about an “Asian” culture is that the
discourse tends to generalizations and stereotypes of what is “Asian” and the es-
sentialist arguments of what Edward Said has termed “orientalism”. 7 Orientalism in
colonial times was a tool of control imposed by the West for “dominating, structur-
ing and having authority over the Orient”.” Asia, in this sense, is not a natural geo-
graphical entity, but an idea created by an expanding Europe seeking to define what
it was and was not; Asia was invented as the “Other” in this dialectic.
Today, we witness a neo-orientalism re-drawing lines between East and West.
The difference is that this idea of Asia is no longer weak and despotic –
as Euro-
peans once constructed it – but, rather, harmonious and vital; it is the West that is
now disorganized and decadent. Western intellectuals engage in this discourse of
differences between Asia and the West, hoping to suggest ways to revitalize what
they believe needs repair in their own culture.”9 Moreover, Asian 61ites have begun
to wear culture as a badge of difference and pride on the new-sewn suit of eco-
83 Writings about Buddhism, for example, have emphasized the dignity it gives to the individual, a
dignity that would provide a basis for human rights (see P. de Silva, “The Concept of Equality in
Theravada Buddhist Tradition” in R. Siriwardena, ed., Equality and the Religious Traditions of Asia
(London: Pinter, 1987)).
8 See e.g.: W.T. de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China (New York: Columbia University Press,
1983); Tu Wei Ming, “When Confucianism grapples with democracy” The Straits 7imes (27 Novem-
ber 1988) 26.
‘ Wejen Chang suggests that classical Confucianism does not support the idea of authoritarianism
but, rather, has democratic attributes (see W. Chang, “Traditional Chinese Attitudes towards Author-
ity” (Paper presented to the East Asian Legal Studies Department, Harvard University Law School,
18 April 1994) [unpublished]).
86 See A.A. An-Na’im, “Islam, Islamic Law and the Dilemma of Cultural Legitimacy for Universal
Human Rights” in C.E. Welch & V.A. Leary, eds., Asian Perspectives on Human Rights (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1990) 31.
87 See E.W. Said, Orientalismn (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).
“Ibid. at3.
See e.g. E.F. Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1979). A Singaporean minister, B.G. George Yeo, has spoken of the process of Oc-
cidentalism –
the process by which Asia will identify and selectively adopt the best of the West (see
S. Goh, “Asia has much to offer the West-BG Yeo” The Straits Tunes (13 August 1991) 1).
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S.S.C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
nomic success, warding off the human rights and democracy that the West urges.
As Said put it, “the modem Orient … participates in its own Orientalizing.”‘
The methods of characterizing the content of Asia’s culture are what have been
called “interpretive studies”.9 ‘ This methodology may be criticized for using only
selected examples, deploying ill-defined terms, and for tending toward the use of
tautological statements.” When done effectively, it may render a good sketch of a
broad picture. But when done badly, it is caricature.
As an example of the latter form of characterization, one writer suggests that
for most Asians the acceptance of authority is not inherently bad but rather is
an acceptable key to finding personal security. For most Asians the happiest
times in their lives are inevitably their childhood years, when they are most de-
pendent, whereas autonomy and self-identity usually bring loneliness and the
sadness of independence … Most Asians respect authority too much to share
the Western distrust of authority and power.93
How do such writers know what “most Asians” accept, respect, or find happiest?
How are the lives or childhood years of Asians today different from what those in
the West experience? Given the great diversity found in Asia, to talk about “Asia’s”
It seems a re-creation
culture, as if there were just one, risks over-generalization.’
of the stereotype of “oriental” despotism, replete with such assertions as the idea
that “Oriental” authoritarianism arises from the very character of the Asian or the
need for massive irrigation projects.
The third, and connected, flaw in the cultural argument is that culture is seen as
a static and reified artifact, rather than something that is transmitted from one gen-
eration to another. A static view of Asian culture does not recognize the fractures of
colonial rule, the experience of independence and on-going modernization in the
9Said, supra note 87 at 325.
“This term is used by L.W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China’ Political Cultures (Ann
Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1988) at 8.
92 See AJ. Nathan & T. Shi, “Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings from a Survey”
(1993) 122 Daedalus 95 at 96. Their own approach to considering the democratic culture was based
on survey findings about the attitude of the Chinese. The survey provides more concrete evidence that
comes to no such easy conclusions about culture and democracy. It confirms that present Chinese
culture does not have the strong civic tradition that marks the United States or the United Kingdom.
Less expectedly, China out-scored Italy and Mexico in some measurements, such as the expectation
of equal treatment. The survey concludes that there is no absolute bar in Chinese culture to the growth
of democracy.
9’L.W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press, 1985) at x [hereinafter Asian Power].
9 Kausikan, supra note 12 at 26, admits as much. Neier, supra note 15, correctly points out that
Kausikan “paints with too broad a brush” (ibid. at 42).
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[Vol. 41
globalization process. 5 Even if pre-industrial Asian societies did place community
above the individual, it is a leap in logic to assume that Asian societies can simply
return to that historical culture. If Asian nations claim to be different from the West,
the third problem with the cultural argument leads us to consider how those differ-
ences are maintained or, indeed, created-
that is, how culture is transmitted.
It is against these criticisms of the cultural argument, particularly the second
problem of discourse and the third issue of cultural transmission, that we look at the
example of Singapore.
II. Singapore as Asian
To maintain and transmit a vahte system, human beings are
punched, bullied, sent to jail, … cajoled, bribed, made into he-
roes … To speak of cultural inertia is to overlook tie concrete
interests and privileges that are served by indoctrination, edu-
cation, and the entire complicated process of transmitting
culture from one generation to the next.9″
B. Moore
Singapore is located in Asia and is populated by citizens of different Asian
races. It therefore may seem incontrovertibly, naturally, “Asian”. Accordingly, ob-
servers have applied ideas of an Asian culture to Singapore’s political development;
because the majority of Singaporeans are Chinese, it is specifically Confucian cul-
ture that is deemed relevantY Some Singaporean political scientists believe that a
rule that is “both authoritarian and paternalistic seems to respond to the notions of
good government”.” Such approaches, as we have seen earlier, emphasize the tra-
ditional aspects of culture. Therefore, in defining Singapore’s culture with its mix
of peoples of Chinese, Indian, and Malay descent, we might look at evidence of
their respective traditions. In this way, the Chinese may be associated with Confu-
cianism, the Malays identified with Islam, and the Indians with, say, Hinduism.
Singapore’s cultural difference in human rights would then be the accumulation of
these traditions and their respectively different conceptions of human rights.
9″ See G. Evans, ed., Asia’s Cultural Mosaic: An Anthropological Introduction (Singapore: Prentice
Hall, 1993).
B. Moore, Social.Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) at 486.
97 See e.g. Asian Power, supra note 93. Pye assumes that Confucian tradition applies to Singapore
and that, with Japan and other newly industrialized economies, this shows “Confucian tradition does
indeed present no barriers to modernization” (ibid. at 55). A Singaporean sociologist, E. Kuo, exam-
ines different aspects of Confucianism and suggests that a “folk Confucian” tradition exists in Singa-
pore but distinguishes this from the form of Confucianism promoted by the government (see E. Kuo,
The Triadic Chord: Confucian Ethics, Industrial East Asia and Max Weber, ed. by Wei-Ming Tu
(Singapore: N.U.S., Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1991) at 310).
98 H.C. Chan, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grass-Roots (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 1976) at 230.
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S.S. C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
761
Yet the question of culture in relation to human rights today goes beyond tradi-
tion, geography, and demography. In the Asian view of human rights, there must be
something in “Asianness” that affects what common men and women make of hu-
man rights and that causes it to differ from the dominant view. In this sense, being
Asian is a state of mind. There is nothing natural or fixed about it. What does it
mean to be “Asian”? And how does one become or remain “Asian”?
Talking about culture and relativism tends to move the debate about human
rights away from government policies or practices and laws and toward more ab-
stract moral and philosophical concerns. Yet looking closely at the Singapore ex-
ample demonstrates how the process of defining and ensuring Asianness is tied in
with government policies, laws and politics. This is primarily because the nation
has, perhaps more than most others in Asia, a strong current of Western influence,
both historical and on-going. It also lacks a single, homogeneous Asian reference
point.
A. Western Influence
Western influence in Singapore begins at its very founding, as a port in the
British empire. Without embarrassment, Singaporeans will point to an Englishman,
Sir Stamford Raffles, as the city-state’s founder. While Malays and some Chinese
were already present in Singapore before the coming of Raffles, the forebears of the
vast majority of present-day Singaporeans emigrated to the island while it was un-
der British control. Many, indeed, came as a direct result of colonial policies that
encouraged trade in Singapore as well as tin-mining and other economic activities
in the Malayan peninsula.
Although political independence was achieved by political means, it was not
marked by a prolonged and heroic struggle that would have delineated a fuller clo-
sure with the colonial past. Thus, for instance, Singapore did not take up the com-
mon symbolic practice of converting colonial names of places and buildings to in-
digenous titles. Moreover, Western influence continues today in economic devel-
opment that is encouraged by (mainly Western) multi-national companies. The na-
tion has always invited foreign companies and capital, rather than taking up the
practices of expropriation, closed markets, and import substitution, which were ad-
vocated in the 1960s and 70s. Singapore is very much interconnected with the in-
ternational world through industry, trade, media, and the movement of peoples.”‘
The vast majority of Singaporeans speak English and are open to the influence of
the Western world through an increasingly pervasive media. Isolation is not only
‘The history of neighbouring Indonesia is a study in contrast on this issue.
“iTe country receives over five million foreign visitors per year. Conversely, a very high percent-
age of Singaporeans have travelled, studied or lived abroad. A quarter of Singaporeans who pursue
post-secondary education will do so overseas in North America, Australia, the United Kingdom, and
New Zealand.
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impossible, but also undesirable. This is the first problem of viewing Singapore as
wholly, originally Asian.
B. Multi-racialism, Multi-culturalism
Singapore’s assertion of a homogeneous Asian culture is also complicated by
the fact that it is multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-lingual. Sin-
gaporeans have disparate origins. The Malay Muslim, the Indian Hindu and the
Chinese who believes in a form of animistic Taoism: these may be median types in
Singapore. But other lines of difference exist: between Tamils and those from other
parts of the Indian sub-continent; between Malays and Arabs; between Indians who
are Muslim and those who are Hindu; between dialect- and Mandarin-speaking
Chinese; and between Chinese-speaking and English-speaking Singaporeans.
Eurasians, Jews, and others who may have been on the island for several genera-
tions can also be acknowledged, as should Christians, who are many and increasing
in number. Amidst these differences of religion, race, and language, it may be diffi-
cult to meaningfully identify a particularly Asian culture –
especially when non-
Asian elements of Christianity and the English language are mixed in and, arguably,
ascendant.
Singapore has no mythic, pre-colonial civilization on which to base a unique
Asian identity. This is problematic, given the presumption that the nation-state
would be more legitimate if its people were racially homogeneous. If the nation is
an imagined community, as Anderson has suggested,”‘ the basis of the Singaporean
imagination of nationhood must depend on things other than a deep connection
with the territory or the people’s ancient and common ancestry.
The Singaporean approach has not been to admit that their culture is hybrid.
The inherent diversity remains a problem in constructing a single Asian identity,’2
but a policy of multi-racialism aims at keeping harmony between the different
races.”3 Government policies have been threefold: first, to contain the very diverse
associations of race, language and religion within the main, official administrative
categories of Chinese-Malay-Indian; second, to maintain and even re-invent a sepa-
ration between these main cultures,'” representing them through their traditional
forms and with a very limited synthesis; 3 and, third, to create an Asian identity that
encompasses the separate cultures, but does not mix them to create a cultural hy-
brid.
‘o’ See B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).
,021n contrast, Malaysia with a similar mix of races lays claim to an indigenous origin as a Malay
state.
‘. There may be sound reasons for this separation between races, given the history of ethnic tension
between, mainly, the Malays and Chinese. This led to riots in Singapore in 1965.
,’ See I. Ang & J. Stratton, “The Singapore Way of Multiculturalism: Western Concepts/Asian
Cultures” (1995) 10 Sojourn 65 at 75.
‘ See ibid at 79-81.
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S.S.C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
The first two policies – which together advocate collapsing differences to three
main categories, while at the same time maintaining these three separately –
can be
seen in a number of different practices. In the issuance of identity cards and the
conduct of official surveys, for example, a Singaporean must choose from a limited
set of race affiliations; those born of mixed parentage are deemed to follow the race
of their father. Similarly, the government policy of encouraging a “mother tongue”
both coalesces and separates. A person’s language is not identified as a question of
fact of what language his or her mother actually speaks, but presumed on the basis
of fixed race. For many Chinese in Singapore, this has meant that different Chinese
dialects are de-emphasized in favour of Mandarin; this coalesces those categorized
as Chinese'” and separates Chinese from other ethnic groups. The mother tongue
policy also helps protect Asian elements against the intrusion of the English lan-
guage, which cannot – by definition – be a mother tongue. It should be restricted
to administrative and technical use, important for technology and trade but not for
culture. This policy persists despite the fact that almost all Singaporeans speak
English, and increasing numbers use it at home. The mother tongue policy is thus a
“formalist and essentialist definition … which … highlights the synthetic, artificial
nature of Singaporean Asianness”. 7 Such practices suggest that questions of race
and language are not “natural” in any sense of self-identification with race, lan-
guage, and culture. They are more part of a government policy of categorization for
administration.
The third government policy –
of creating and transmitting comprehensive
Asian culture –
is also in evidence. For example, the Singapore government has
articulated a set of “national values”, it promotes the teaching of Confucianism in
schools, and it still condones the practice of caning as a form of legal sanction. This
third policy merits fuller treatment.
C. Asian Values
In the late 1980s, Singapore government leaders began a process of identifying
the nation’s shared or national values in order to locate “the characteristic ethos and
spirit of a people” which “distinguish them from other peoples and countries”.”
National values became the subject of a parliamentary white paper and political de-
bate. From this process, the following core values were identified: (1) nation before
community, and society over self; (2) upholding the family as the basic unit of so-
ciety; (3) regard and community support for the individual; (4) resolving issues
’06For example, there is an official “Speak Mandarin” campaign. One slogan was, “If You’re Chi-
nese, Make a Statement-In Mandarin”.
o7 Ang & Stratton, supra note 104 at 81.
” This idea was put forward by Minister for Trade and Industry and Second Minister for Defence
(Services), Brigadeer-General Lee Hsien Loong (see Lee Hsien Loong, “The National Identity – a
direction and identity for Singapore” in Speeches, vol. 13:1 (Singapore: Ministry of Information and
the Arts, 1989) 26 at 30).
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through consensus instead of contention; and (5) racial and religious tolerance and
harmony.'”
We may or may not have regard for such values.”‘ But the point to note, for this
essay, is that they are prescribed for cultural purpose: “If we are not to lose our
bearings, we should preserve the cultural heritage of each of our communities, and
uphold certain common values which capture the essence of being a Singapo-
rean.'”” The values stress that establishing a unique “Asian” tradition is the only
true course for Singapore. The implication is that not to share these values is to be
less than “Asian”, to have lost one’s bearings and to become “Westernized”. The
contrast to the West is persistent. In the value of “consensus instead of contention”,
for example, there is little doubt that the West is portrayed as holding the reverse
view. Similarly, it is said: “Western societies place more weight on the individual,
while Oriental societies tend to place more weight on the group.”” 2
The difference is not mere semantics. By formulating
these values as
“national”, other values may be reviled and dismissed, not on their merits, but for
simply being outside the defined national values: un-Asian. The value that advo-
cates consensus may be used to justify the limitation of free speech; for example, a
street demonstration may be viewed as being in conflict with national values, as
representing a position of “conflict” rather than one of “consensus”.”‘ The creation
of shared, Asian values shows both the political significance of and the political
processes behind being Asian.
Another example of the government’s implementation of an Asian values pol-
icy is found in the way Confucianism was taught in schools in the mid 1980s. Al-
though this policy has since been abandoned, it was notable for revealing three pe-
culiarities about the official conception of Asian culture in Singapore. First, the
government could not assume that this aspect of culture was imbibed with mother’s
” The five values as stated here were formulated after discussion by the present Prime Minister,
Goh Chok Tong (see “Five Shared Values” The Straits imes (6 January 1991) 16-17). Four values
were first proposed by Lee Hsien Loong, ibid. at 31.
..0 See: Republic of Singapore, Parliament, “Shared Values” Cmnd. 1 (1991), 2 January 1991; J.S.J.
Quah, ed., In Search of Singapore’s National lkilues (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1990). For a
critical analysis of “Shared Values”, see J. Clammer, “Deconstructing Values: the Establishment of a
National Ideology and Its Implications for Singapore’s Political Future” in G. Rodan, ed., Singapore
Changes Guard (New York: Longman Cheshire, 1993).
“‘ “Shared Values”, ibid. at 1. This was repeated in the Presidential address to Parliament in January
1989 (see Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 52:1, col. 12 at col. 14 (9 January 1989)).
12 Lee Hsien Loong, supra note 108 at 33.
“‘ This was the experience of the student movements in the mid 1970s, during which several lead-
ers were detained and the union was reorganized. A student leader, Tan Wah Piow, is still in the
United Kingdom as he is wanted under criminal charges in Singapore (see W.E Tan, Let the People
Judge: Confessions of the Most Wanted Person in Singapore (Selangor, Malaysia: INSAN, 1987)).
For a discussion of informal restrictions on speech and other fundamental liberties in Singapore, see
S.S.C. Tay, Imagining Freedom in Imagining Singapore, 2d ed. by Ban Kah Choon (Singapore:
Times Academic Press [forthcoming]).
1996]
S.S.C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
milk or transmitted through the mother tongue. Instead, Singapore government
policies expressly set out to create an Asian culture and to transmit it to the youth,
thus, suggesting that culture can be created or manipulated by political will. Sec-
ond, the effort was an attempt to inculcate Asian ethics and religious knowledge as
an antidote to a decadence that is associated with Westernization. This policy,
which is also used as protection against Western influence, is echoed in the promo-
tion of the mother tongue, discussed above,”‘ where the mother language is deemed
to carry the mother culture. Third, the teaching of Confucianism revealed the ironic
and inescapable hybrid nature of this apparently Asian initiative; many of the in-
structors, although of Asian descent, had studied or taught Confucian philosophy in
the West.”‘
The practice of caning, administered under judicial sanction for some crimes, is
another example of this hybrid element. The punishment was recently defended
when meted out to a U.S. citizen in Singapore found guilty of vandalism. The de-
fence rested, in part, on the basis that caning was part of Asian culture, and that it
was part of Asia’s self-defence mechanism against corruption and waywardness in
society. It may well be true that the majority of Singaporeans support caning as
punishment. This should not obscure the fact, however, that caning in Singapore
has its origins in British colonial practice, a practice continued as part of the United
Kingdom’s judicial system until this century.”6 The difference with respect to can-
ing in Asian Singapore has been that it is extended to new offences, like vandalism.
D. Legal and Constitutional Development
Legal concepts of justice and human rights in Singapore also seem to be rooted
in the Western tradition. The Singapore Constitution”‘ was drafted by the departing
British. It sets out the legal structure for democracy, or the Westminster style of
government.”8 The Singapore Constitution promises fundamental liberties which
“, See text accompanying notes 106-107.
For example, Professor Tu Wei-Ming of Harvard College’s Department of East Asian Civiliza-
dons.
116 The practice of caning continued in the Isle of Man, just a few miles off the coast of England,
until the 1970s (see Tryer v. United Kingdom (1978), Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser. A, No. 26).
117 Supra note 23.
“‘ A representative, multi-party democracy was created, with a unicameral Parliament and a “first-
past-the-post” electoral system. With universal suffrage and compulsory voting, the citizenry vote in
free and regular elections for Members of Parliament (“M.P.”s). From these M.P.s, the Prime Minister
is chosen (see D.S. De Smith, “Westminster’s Export Models: The Legal Framework of Responsible
Government” (1961-63) 1 J. Commonwealth & Pol. Stud. 2, excerpted in B. Tan, L. Yeo & F Lee,
eds., The Constitutional Development of Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: Malaysia Law Journal,
1991)). De Smith warns: “The Westminster model will never be a legal term of art” (ibid. at 40). He
then proceeds to list its characteristic features:
[The limitation of parliamentary sovereignty, guarantees of fundamental human rights,
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, … the responsibility for terminat-
ing a superior judge’s tenure of office from a legislative to a judicial forum, and the
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parallel Western civil and political rights, such as “9 the rights of freedom of speech,
assembly and association,’0 freedom from discrimination,” the protection of life
and liberty'” and freedom of religion.'” Within this framework, elections have been
held without interruption or allegation of irregularity. 2’
Moreover, this English source of laws was not abandoned after independence.
Instead, the Privy Council, comprising British judges sitting in London, was placed
at the pinnacle of the legal system as the highest court of appeal. Under its influ-
ence, legal reform tended to take a path of evolution, not revolution.'” Academics
were among a minority that sought legal autonomy.’26 Up to the late 1980s, how-
ever, politicians upheld the Privy Council as a symbol that assured all of the legiti-
macy of Singapore’s legal system.
Only in 1994 did appeals to the Privy Council stop.’27 By that time, Singapore’s
laws had begun to differ from some British and much U.S. law in respect of civil
and political rights. These differences did not emerge despite the law, but through
it. For instance, limitations to the aforementioned fundamental liberties were en-
acted or interpreted by the legal system.’23 Constitutional amendments have made
the form of Singapore’s parliament increasingly hybrid.'” Some of these changes
vesting of full control over the public service and the conduct of elections in the hands
of independent commissions (Tan, Yeo & Lee, eds., ibid.).
The British themselves, most notably, do not have a written constitution.
“9 Other rights stated in the Singapore Constitution, supra note 23, include rights to personal liberty
(ibid. at art. 9), for the accused in criminal trial, against retrospective criminal laws and double jeop-
ardy (ibid at art. 11), and special rights for the Malays and other racial minorities (ibid. at art. 152).
20 See ibid, Part IV at art. 14.
“2 See ibid. at art. 12.
. See ibid. at art. 9.
…See ibid. at art. 15.
124 See Country Reports, supra note 5, which states: “Voting and vote-counting systems in elections
are fair, accurate, and free from tampering” (ibid. at 653). Note, however, that the U.S. State Depart-
ment report also indicated that “[i]n 1992, the Government continued to use its power to handicap
Singapore’s two main opposition parties” (ibid. at 647).
‘5 See Hinds v. R. (1975), [1977] A.C. 195 (PC.). The Privy Council opined:
[T]he new Constitutions … were evolutionary, not revolutionary. They provided for
continuity of government …
[EJach institution (of government) was to exercise powers
which, although enlarged, remained of a similar character to those that had been exer-
cised by the corresponding institution (before independence) (Hinds, ibid. at 212).
See A. Phang, The Development of Singapore Law: Historical and Socio-Legal Perspectives
(Singapore: Butterworths, 1990).
,2’ The first, partial, break with the Privy Council came after it had decided an appeal in favour of a
former member of the political opposition (see Jeyaratnam v. Law Society of Singapore, [1988] 3
M.L.L 425).
“2 For example, courts could review preventive detention without trial until legislation ousted those
powers, except on procedural matters. This, however, still stands in contrast to non-judicial disap-
pearances.
‘ See Thio Li-Ann, “The Post-Colonial Constitutional Evolution of the Singapore Legislature: A
Case Study” (1993) Singapore J. Legal Stud. 80 at 110.
19961
S.S. C. TAY – THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
have encouraged a broader participation in the political process within Parliament'”
and in part of the executive, through the enlargement of the previously ceremonial
office of the President to one with some veto powers.” These constitutional
changes parallel policies, also from the second half of the 1980s, aimed at provid-
ing more consultation and at allowing greater public participation in shaping gov-
ernment policy.’2 The new hybrid nature of the Constitution does not, however,
mean free rein for the political opposition.’3 Rather, some see the constitutional
changes as providing ways in which the government may adopt or co-opt a wider
range of non-partisan voices and ideas, thus, de-emphasizing the need for opposi-
tion and for more vigorous forms of checks and balances.
These changes may have been effected in order to make the Singapore Consti-
tution and laws more consistent with Asian cultural values. It may be said that they
emphasize “consensus” rather than “confrontation” in a one party dominant state by
allowing different voices but by avoiding the clash and challenge of actual opposi-
tion. Whatever the reason, Singapore’s constitutional and legal development dem-
onstrates not an Asian heritage that was intrinsic or original. It is, instead, born of
‘” Elections of members of M.P.s in some constituencies were conducted on a group basis of four
candidates, of whom one had to be a racial minority. Beyond the elected M.P.s, different types of rep-
resentatives were created, such as nominated and non-constituency M.P.s. Both nominated and non-
constituency M.P.s may speak and move motions but have restricted voting powers. They cannot, for
example, vote on matters of finance. Nominated M.P.s (“N.M.P.”s) are screened by a panel before
admission. At present, there are six N.M.P.s (see Constitution of the Republic of Singapore
(Amendment), Act 1990 (Sing.), 1990, No. 11). Non-constituency M.P.s (“N.C.M.P.”s) can be admit-
ted in the event of the opposition winning three or less seats; if so, the three next-best electoral con-
tenders will be admitted. One N.C.M.P. has served. Presently, there are four Opposition M.P.s and, as
such, the provision for N.C.M.P.s does not arise (see Singapore Constitution, supra note 23 at art.
39(l)(b), as amended by Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 1984 (Sing.),
1984, No. 16 and Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act 1991 (Sing.), 1991, No. 9). For com-
mentaries on the provisions, see: Thio, ibid.; V.S. Winslow, “Creating a Utopian Parliament: The
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 1984; The Parliamentary Elections
(Amendment) Act 1984″ (1986) 28 M. L. Rev. 268.
,” The office of the President, originally a largely ceremonial role, is now popularly elected with in-
creased powers to check and veto cabinet decisions that require deficit financing, as well as key ap-
pointments (e.g. the Chief Justice). The President may also veto government decisions in respect of
laws concerning security and stability. These powers are exercised with the concurrence of a six-
person Presidential Council. It is not, however, a U.S. or French system of presidency. The Prime
Minister and cabinet remain in charge of government. The President is described as a “safeguard”,
taking on a reactive, not proactive, role.
,’ These initiatives were started by Gob Chok Tong when he was Deputy Prime Minister and are
associated with his ascension to the office of Prime Minister. Chief among them are: a Feedback Unit
which gathers opinions of a broad spectrum of citizens; town councils which allow more local say
over municipal matters; and the Institute of Policy Studies, which receives alternative thoughts on
government policies, usually from professionals and others of higher educational learning.
’33 In 1981, an opposition member, Mr. J.B. Jeyaretnam of the Workers’ Party, was elected in a by-
election. At present, four opposition members have entered Parliament, the highest number since the
Barisan walk-out in the 1960s. Prime Minister Gob recognized that the opposition had a role to play
in Singapore politics, albeit a minor one.
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Western sources and influence. The changes proceed through politics” and have a
political effect.
Looking at the Singapore example in these four ways –
in terms of its Western
heritage, the diversity of its people, its deliberate construction of Asian values, and
its legal and constitutional development – demonstrates that Asian culture is not a
natural thing that pre-exists and determines human rights. It is, in fact, dynamic and
plastic. Culture is open to influences, whether from the West or from a politic that
seeks to create an Asian identity that is different from the West.
If culture is dynamic and malleable in the face of politics and other forces, then
perhaps a more accurate characterization of the Singaporean experience would be
one that does not evoke pre-existing, traditional culture but, rather, one that em-
phasizes a culture in the process of re-invention. This process does not, however,
aim at mimicry of the human rights policies of the West by adopting the dominant
view. Rather, the cultural re-invention aims at what some have termed the
“Asianisation of Asia”.’. The force that drives Asia’s cultural differences is not a
deterministic, pre-existing culture, but acts of will.
IH. The Will to Differ
“We are all in the midst of very rapid change and at the same
time we are all groping towards a destination which we hope
will be identifiable with our past.’ 6
Lee Kuan Yew
The emphasis on Asia’s will to differ recognizes that it is not primarily an exist-
ing cultural difference that makes Asia’s view of human rights distinct; rather, the
differences are those that are being re-created.”‘ Asia’s will to differ runs counter to
the phenomenon of convergence between cultures and between political and eco-
nomic systems, what some have called the end of history.”‘ Although considerable
forces suggest a greater convergence between nations is emerging, these are not the
only forces at play. There are those who believe that Asia, with its culture, histori-
cal development, and its ethnic and religious pluralism, will remain different,
evolving on its own path. It is beyond the scope of this essay to enter fully into the
” They are, moreover, made possible not because they are culturally necessary, but because the
Peoples’ Action Party (“P.A.P.”) government has an ample Parliamentary majority to pass any law or
constitutional amendment it thinks fit. The P.A.P. now holds all but four seats in Parliament. Constitu-
tional amendment is passed with two-thirds majority and the assent of the President.
’33 y. Funabashi, “The Asianisation of Asia” (1993) 72:5 Foreign Affairs 75.
136 Quoted in Zakaria, supra note 77 at 118.
, From this perspective, the view that there are great and pre-existing civilizational and cultural
differences is, I believe, wrong (see S.P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” (1993) 72 Foreign
Affairs 22).
‘ See Fukuyama, supra note 7.
1996]
S.S.C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
debate on convergence. Yet, the focus on Asia’s will to differ, rather than a
“natural” difference, is significant for the cultural argument in relation to human
rights. If we agree that the accentuation of cultural difference is an act of will, for
instance, how do we decide how acts of will should be exercised? Or again, if cul-
ture is malleable, why should we privilege it? This latter question becomes espe-
cially difficult if we find elements in that culture that are unacceptable on more
universal grounds.
The will to differ may be understood sympathetically. It is fairly widely ac-
cepted, for example, that during Japan’s period of modernization, a trend, analo-
gous to Singapore’s current experiment,’39 was to identify and emphasize its unique
cultural aspects, to preserve the essence of being “Japanese”.”‘ Similar impulses
can be detected in the present politics of diversity in Western democracies, in which
indigenous peoples and minorities struggle to maintain or create a culture that is
different from the mainstream and dominant culture. There is something in each of
us that does not want to be homogenized.
In times of great social change, as we now witness, people seek out symbols
and strands of a more comfortable, known past. It makes no difference, from that
perspective, if elements of that past culture are invented traditions.’4’ Past culture
does not serve to resist wholly the ineluctable processes of change but, rather, to re-
assure people going through the uncertainties of change.
In the example of Singapore, the goal has not been to remain in the past. The
challenge of development has been to create “a modem, industrialized, affluent
state which has as its base a strong cultural foundation”.”.2 The Singaporean past is
insufficient, given the racial and other issues that have been briefly described, to
anchor the society against the tide of change; it provides no cohesion to the nation-
state. Singapore’s Senior Minister, Lee, has described the dilemma between tradi-
tion and development in the following way: “‘We are all in the midst of very rapid
change and at the same time we are all groping towards a destination which we
hope will be identifiable with our past..””
From this perspective, there is something admirable and human about the Asian
view of democracy and human rights and the Asian will to differ. It can be seen as a
‘”” Senior Minister Lee has also made a personal journey of rediscovery: educated in Cambridge
and originally unable to speak either Chinese dialect or Mandarin, he now speaks fluently in that lan-
guage and evokes five thousand years of Chinese culture (see Zakaria, supra note 77 at 125). See also
L. Pan, Sons of the Yellow Emperor (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990).
“* See e.g.: R.E. Mouer & Y. Sugimoto, Images of Japanese Society (London: K.RI., 1986); I. Bu-
ruma, God’s Dust: A Modern Asian Journey (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1989).
“‘ See E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1983).
“‘ RK. Shee, “The Evolution of the Political System” in J.S.T. Quah et aL, eds., Government and
Politics of Singapore (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987) 3 at 16.
,’ Quoted in Zakaria, supra note 77 at 118.
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[Vol. 41
form of collective reassurance in times of sweeping change. It can be seen as a
working out of collective rights to a cultural heritage. It is the exercise of the inter-
nationally recognized right to determine one’s own system of culture and politics.'”
There are, however, bleaker views of the process of cultural transmission and
re-invention. Some believe that culture has to be created anew in each generation,
often with much pain and suffering.”‘ Seen in this way, efforts to hinder this regen-
eration of culture may be suspected of being the self-serving machinations of a
ruling 61ite. Such suspicion should be more widely cast in the context of the geo-
politics that surrounds human rights. Should we suspect Asia’s 61ites – who pro-
pound the Asian view of human rights – of self-interest? Or should we suspect the
dominant view promoted by Western nations as cultural imperialism disguised as
“universal” values? Suspicion easily applies to both possibilities.
Whether we take one view or the other, however, the focus on Asia’s will to
differ allows us to see that culture is not determinative. Rather, it is added to a pool
of resources from which a selection can be made to constitute a political system.
The role of Asian culture and circumstance is plastic, not deterministic. So too are
the cultural and political ideas pushed in the mainstream of globalization –
such as
the market economy, democracy, and human rights.” Each factor is a necessary
condition but not, of itself, a sufficient one. The adage, “no bourgeois, no democ-
racy”, cannot mean that a bourgeoisie will necessarily bring democracy or entrench
the dominant view of human rights. Similarly, “no culture, no human rights”, can-
not be a blanket excuse.
Given the flexibility of the processes surveyed by this essay and the inter-
relation of factors, we can recognize that the debate between the dominant and
Asian views of human rights is not primarily a clash of cultures.”‘ It is essentially a
conflict and competition between systems of government. This recognition does not
deny the place and value of culture in a system of universal human rights. It does
not mean that we must all turn to the dominant view of human rights. There re-
mains, after all, the developmental bases for the Asian view, described earlier.”‘
“‘ See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970, GA
Res. 2625(XXV), UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970) 121. The principle
concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No 7, 145 U.K.T.S. 805,
includes the right for every state to choose its own political, economic, social, and cultural systems
without any interference by another state.
“45 See Moore, supra note 96 at 486-87.
‘6 This sense of alternatives and plasticity is particularly evident in the work of R.M. Unger (see
e.g.: R.M. Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987); R.M. Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical De-
mocracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)).
For a contrary view, see “The Clash of Civilizations”, supra note 137.
“‘See Part .C, above.
1996]
S.S. C. TAY – THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
Importantly, however, the recognition that culture is plastic does lead us to question
the privilege and deference that culture now enjoys in the human-rights debate.
We may decide that culture, because it is shaped by politics and policies, can
and should be submitted to the test that we accord to all other political and social
values when considering human rights. This, however, does not lead inevitably to
the dominant view of human rights which, as seen earlier, emphasizes civil and
political rights. We may still consider that social, economic, and cultural rights must
have more emphasis on the principle that all human rights are re-inforcing and in-
divisible. We may wish to be, in this sense, “universal”, with the firm understand-
ing that this cannot be completely equated with the dominant, mainly Western,
view.’ 9 We may expect that “universal” human rights have some regional influence.
Thus, for example, if we are Asians, we could commit ourselves to a system of hu-
man rights that differs from the Asian view enunciated by governments but that still
is, somehow, Asian. In this view, therefore, there is still a place for culture –
even if we do not privilege it at all cost to hu-
something that is recognizably us –
man rights. As such, how we adapt to the Asian view, once we accept that culture is
politically malleable, very much depends on how we assess the resulting realities
and practices, specifically, regarding how we rate a nation’s human-rights record.
A full human-rights assessment of Asia, or even of Singapore, is clearly beyond
the scope of this essay. However, a brief consideration of Singapore’s human-rights
record will serve to sketch the possible significance of the Singapore example for
other Asian countries and will test the rhetoric and arguments of the Singapore
school against actual experience. In particular, this sketch will help us consider if
there has been a trade-off of political rights for economic progress, as some say. A
brief consideration of Singapore’s record on human rights may also give us an idea
of what may result if human rights are mediated by calls for cultural differentiation.
IV. Singapore’s Record
transgression, as
This essay began by noting the controversy that surrounds Singapore’s record
on human rights. Some of its critics see Singapore as a “dictatorship”” or focus
international human-rights non-
exclusively on its every
governmental organizations are prone to do. Yet Singapore has not been among the
marked and gross abusers of human rights, reviled at the United Nations. It has
known no period of emergency since independence. There have been no mass kill-
ings or widespread disappearances. No military force or dictator has curtailed the
right to vote, which is widely acknowledged as being untampered and unbought. A
number of cross-country comparisons on human rights compliance and governance
‘ This strand of thought is evident in the N.G.O. Declaration, supra note 20, which differs from
“0 William Satire, of The New York Times, has called Singapore a “dictatorship” (see W. Safire,
both the dominant view and Asian view of human rights.
“Crime in Singapore” The New York Tmes (7 April 1994) A-27).
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have tended to place Singapore toward the middle of the human-rights spectrum
among Asian countries.”
Accordingly, perhaps the more interesting and more accurate starting point for
thinking about Singapore’s human-rights record is not its divergence from Western
practices, but its similarity. This assertion may be counter-intuitive to those influ-
enced by the dominant view. Moreover, it may be surprising in light of the consid-
erable efforts of Singaporean representatives in articulating the Asian view and in
staking out their differences from the West. A full justification for this thesis is be-
yond the scope of this essay, but what is said may point the way.
A modem, bureaucratic nation-state has been established in Singapore with the
mandate and ability to govern. This is the first similarity to Western democracies,
contrasting sharply with many nations tom apart by civil and ethnic wars, warlord-
ism, and other problems.’52 A second point of similarity is that Singapore has also
been able to ensure a core of rights against genocide and slavery. This accomplish-
ment is put into perspective by looking at recent transgressions in other countries.'”
There is no parallel in Singapore, despite past ethnic conflict, to the genocidal inci-
dents in East Timor and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, for instance. Nor has
Singapore witnessed anything like the June 4 killings in Tiananmen Square and
other places in China or the 1992 killing of civilians by the military in Bangkok.
“‘ A number of cross-national comparisons support this contention. The 1992 annual Freedom
House Survey on civil and political rights ranked Singapore as “partly free”. On its scale of I to 7,
Singapore scored 4. Among Asian countries, only Japan and South Korea were considered “free”.
The Philippines and India, although also “partly free”, were rated above Singapore (reproduced in
“Evolution and Implementation”, supra note 8 at 3). The political scientist, Huntington, has listed
Singapore as “non-democratic”, alongside Thailand and Malaysia. In contrast, India, South Korea,
Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan were classified as democratic (see Huntington, supra note
2). Another observer, Fukuyama, lists Singapore among 61 liberal democracies on the basis of the
existence of a market economy, representative government, external sovereignty, and judicial rights.
He notes, however, its inclusion is controversial (see Fukuyarna, supra note 7 at 49-50). Similar re-
sults are seen in D.K. Gupta, A.J. Jongman & A.P. Schmid, “Creating a Composite Index for Assess-
ing Country Performance in the Field of Human Rights: Proposal for a New Methodology” (1994) 16
Hum. Rts. Q. 131. For the year 1991, the United States was rated at the top with 13.39, while Myan-
mar was last with 36.18. The mean score was 22.57, and Singapore was rated at 23.09, above other
countries in Asia such as India, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and China (see ibid. at Annex 1).
Chan Hang Chee reports that Singapore is given a “medium freedom” ranking, where Sweden is
scored highest and Iraq is at the bottom of the list. Among Asian countries, Singapore is rated below
Japan but, among others, above the Philippines and Malaysia (reproduced in “Evolution and Imple-
mentation”, ibid.).
… See R.D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy” The Atlantic (February 1994) 44, who gives a good
contemporary survey of the present problems of governance in Africa and other parts. Kaplan has a
book forthcoming on the same theme.
,53 In contrast, economic disparity and severe poverty are the background to young Northern Thai
and Burmese girls who are sold into prostitution (see “AsiaWatch” in Human Rights Watch Annual
Report 1993 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993) 147).
1996]
S.S.C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
In terms of the rule of law, Singapore’s legal system is largely noted for its
transparency and fairness, especially in matters of business and commerce.'” The
concept of legality is well-entrenched. Order was imposed against Chinese gangs,
resulting in lower crime rates than are found in many of the Western democracies.’5
Laws have been enforced even against those in ministerial or other positions of
authority.'” The practice in many countries and democracies’.. is less secure in this
respect. One of the achievements of Singapore, as such, is the creation of order
through law, while avoiding the excesses of corruption and force that result in Rus-
sian-style gulags, illegal killings, or disappearances. 8
Allied to this is Singapore’s palpable progress in securing economic and social
rights. Education, housing, health care, incomes, and opportunity have all seen
marked improvement since independence. Singapore has entrenched the belief in
equality and fairness of opportunity, called “meritocracy”. A middle class has de-
veloped with an increasing overlap of attitudes, interests and aspirations as befits a
citizenry, rather than a mere collection of disparate people in one place.’59 Govern-
ment policies mix social programmes with capitalism, and the government has en-
couraged greater feedback and participation.
This economic and social progress is not simply a measure of quality of life; it
reinforces rights of political participation. The citizen has the literacy and education
to exercise his or her vote and the economic wherewithal not to be tempted to sell
it. With electoral propriety and high voter turn-out, Singapore enjoys the vote as the
basic exercise of the right of political participation. The P.A.P. is a dominant party,
but that status is not from the legislated creation of a one-party state. It is main-
tained at the ballot box. Although the opposition has not been able to form the gov-
emrnment,w the vote has bite. For instance, the P.A.P. has shifted policies and tactics
“s’ The World Competitiveness Report 1993 (Lausanne: World Economic Forum, 1993) rated the
Singapore legal system as the best in the world, above America’s. It was felt that the system was “fast
and fair” (reported in “S’pore’s legal system rated best in world” The Straits 7imes, Weekly ed. (2
October 1993) 3).
… Comparing official figures between the United States and Singapore, for example, per 100,000
population in 1991: murder & manslaughter: U.S.: 9.8, Singapore 1.8; rape: U.S.: 42.3, Singapore:
1.3; robbery: U.S.: 272.7, Singapore 50.8, burglary: U.S.: 1252.0, Singapore 127.4 (see Criminal In-
vestigation Department, Singapore Government, Press Release (March 1994)). This comparison was
made by the Singapore government at the time of the Michael Fay caning incident.
’56 In 1994, for example, a senior public official was charged and convicted of corruption and sen-
tenced to jail (see Lim Li Hsien, “$12 million[:] Sum in PUB graft case could be the largest in cor-
ruption probes here” The Straits 7imes (I1 October 1995) 3).
‘ Note, for example, the present reforms in Italy and Japan against political corruption.
‘5 The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1993)
state that there are no illegal killings or disappearances; preventive detention, as discussed, is a differ-
ent matter (ibid. at 725-26).
“9 See: J. Quah, “Government Policies and Nation-Building” in Quah, ed., supra note 110, 45; S.K.
Chiew, “National Identity, Ethnicity and National Issues” in Quah, ed., ibid., 66.
” The opposition has been in disarray over leadership squabbles. The Singapore Democratic Party
founder and opposition M.P., Chiam See Tong, has been ousted from the central committee of his
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in the face of declining votes, even if it insists on the need not to rule by opinion
polls.”
On these bases, the differences between Singapore –
as an example of the
Asian view –
and Western democracies, who hold the dominant view, may not
seem so great. The rhetoric of Singaporean spokesmen may place the nation along-
side countries such as China, in a stand-off against the Western dominant view. The
reality of its record is, however, quite a different picture: Singapore stands very
close to the midpoint.
The difference at the level of rhetoric is exacerbated by the focus of those who
subscribe to the dominant view. They, and increasing numbers of younger Singapo-
reans,'” take for granted the achievements of the Singaporean P.A.P. government.
Their focus is on the question: “Is that all?”. While credit and greater recognition
must be given to Singapore’s achievements, such questions should also be wel-
come. The claims and aims of human rights and of democracy are high; higher than
any nation has reached in reality. The point of setting such goals is, after all, to en-
courage further ambition.
It is at this point, beyond the voting rights and the other achievements men-
tioned, that Singapore’s record is more mixed. There are instances that suggest that
legitimate reasons for P.A.P. dominance are supplemented by other means, such as
subtle forms of cooperation, co-option and control over media, labour, the grass-
roots, business –
the roots from which civil society must grow.
Less subtle forms of control over civil society and the opposition are also pres-
ent. Government institutions undertake prosecutions against members of the op-
position on what may seem like trivial offences and prosecute them to the limit of
the law. One opposition candidate has been convicted of tax offences.” Another
was sacked from the university where he worked for the alleged misuse of research
funds to courier his wife’s thesis to a U.S. university.” Citizens have been detained
party (see Z. Ibrahim, “Opposition should deal with its weaknesses and face challenges” The Over-
seas Straits 77mes, Weekly ed. (9 April 1994) 12).
,6, After the 1991 elections, for example, the P.A.R re-emphasized its commitment to Chinese lan-
guage and culture and the “bread-and-butter” issue of costs which affect the middle class. This fol-
lowed a poorer result than it had anticipated which was blamed on its attention to the concerns of the
English-educated, Singaporeans, and minorities.
’62 See Z.A. Rasheed & A. Mahizhnan, “The New Environment, The Young Singaporeans and Na-
tional Values” in Quai, ed., supra note 110, 80.
‘6 Francis Seow, a candidate for the Worker’s Party, was investigated on a number of tax charges.
He left Singapore for the United States and did not return, citing ill-health. He has been tried in ab-
sentia. Leaving aside the merits of the case, the investigation into Seow’s tax matters seems to have
been far more intense than that given to the average citizen (see: Frank et aL, supra note 5; RT. Seow,
To Catch a Tartar (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994)).
6’ It is widely known that this action involved Dr. Chee Soon Juan and followed an investigation
started by Dr. Chee’s Head of Department – who also happened to be a PA.P. member of Parlia-
19961
S.S. C. TAY- THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
without trial for fifteen years or more.'” Detainees allege mistreatments that may
amount to transgressions of human rights, and these have yet to be publicly investi-
gated.'”
Yet, in the example of Singapore and the P.A.P. government, restraints and
transgressions did not seem to amount to a widespread use of force, coercion, or
blatant intimidation. Despite an array of wide and largely unchecked powers, there
was considerable restraint and a sense of incorruptibility in their exercise.
It is frequently argued that Singapore has traded human rights for economic
prosperity.'”7 This has even been called the “Lee Kuan Yew hypothesis” of rights
and development.'” Some supporters of the Asian view have suggested that “[g]ood
government may well require … detention without trial to deal with military rebels
or religious and other extremists; curbs on press freedoms to avoid fanning racial
tensions or exacerbating social divisions; and draconian laws to break the power of
entrenched interests in order to,. for instance, establish land reforms.”” The ques-
tion however seems to be whether a government is “good” despite these measures
or, somehow, because of them.
Others will remind us that Asian countries with “repressive” governments, such
as Burma, are among the world’s poorest.”‘ As such, it seems a strong government
is not necessarily “good” government. The relationship between progress and
strong government is more complex.” A close look at Singapore also suggests that
the “trade-off” hypothesis is an over-simplification.
The assessment of Singapore’s example does not show a blanket barter of
rights for prosperity. Rather, both social and economic rights and civil and political
ment. While, again, the moral and legal merits of the case itself may be debated, it is clear that a sys-
tematic and special scrutiny was paid to Dr. Chee’s doings after he entered opposition politics.
By contrast, other members of the opposition seem not to have been subject to the same level of
scrutiny. In particular, Chiam See Tong, the founder of the opposition Singapore Democratic Party
(“S.D.R”) and an M.R, has been acknowledged as being constructive and reasonable by the P.A.P.
6’ Chia Thye Poh was detained for 22 years (see Neier, supra note 15 at 51). Tracing the Amnesty
International Annual Report series (London: Amnesty International) from the 1960s, it would seem
the following have served 15 years or more: Poo Sai Kee (1963-73, 1976-82); Ho Piao and Lee Tze
Tong (1963-80); Said Zahari (1963-78); Lim Hock Siew (1963-78).
’66See Seow, supra note 163. Another detainee, Ms. Teo Soh Lung also alleged mistreatment during
her detention in 1987 in interviews with the B.B.C.
’67In a political commentary, Russell Heng, then ajournalist, coined the phrase, “Give me liberty, or
give me wealth”, substituting “wealth” for “death” in the well-known U.S. quotation (R. Heng, “Give
me liberty or give me wealth” in Trends, Institute of South-East Asian Studies 2, distributed with The
Straits 7Times (28 April 1991)).
‘ See A. Sen, “Freedoms and Needs: An Argument for the Primacy of Political Rights” The New
Republic (10 January 1994) 31 [hereinafter “Freedoms and Needs”].
,”Kausikan, supra note 12 at 38.
7 0 See Neier, supra note 15 at 44.
‘
‘.’ See “Freedom and Needs”, supra note 168.
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rights have grown over the last twenty years.'” The P.A.R government provided
equitable distribution of economic goods and social justice’ while consistently
maintaining the popular vote. In minority rights, because Malays were dispropor-
tionately represented among lower-income Singaporeans, the government recog-
nized their special position in the Constitution,'” targeted their economic advance-
ment, and entrenched their rights of political participation and representation by
legislation.” In these examples, rights were not traded-off. Rather, the two sets of
rights were used in conjunction to promote development.
This suggests a cycle: the P.A.P. governments worked to achieve prosperity and
fulfill social and economic rights in order to gain political support and votes; the
increased political support and votes then returned them to office and strengthened
their mandate and ability to make further reform and progress possible. The inter-
play between civil and political rights on one hand and social and economic rights
on the other, was not a trade-off but rather a re-inforcing cycle. A strong state
emerged, able to implement many policies effectively and legitimately, without
widespread use of force. It has been argued that political rights of freedom of
speech and of the press and the right of political participation make government
more responsive to basic economic needs and contribute to a system that success-
fully alleviates shortages.’ 6 Singapore’s development –
although in less desperate
circumstances –
tends towards a similar conclusion of the nexus between the two
groups of rights: not as a trade-off, but as a re-inforcing and growing relationship.
Civil and political rights were not assumed to exist automatically upon Singa-
pore gaining independence nor because the government inscribed these rights in the
Singapore Constitution. Time and a social and economic base were needed to build
the supporting and necessary institutions, such as a functioning and effective ad-
ministration and judiciary drawn from Singaporeans. Yet their realization, although
“2 Donnelly has made an analysis of the development of South Korea in similar terms, as compared
to Brazil, in which both sets of rights were devalued over time (see Donnelly, supra note 42 at 166-
79, 198-200).
‘” The Singaporean political scientist, Chan Heng Chee has described the P.A.P program as “one of
the most advanced programs of social redistribution
in Asia and in the World” (H.C. Chan,
“Democracy, Human Rights and Social Justice as Key Factors for Achieving Balanced Develop-
ment” (Paper presented to the Colloquy on Democracy and Economic Development in the Asia-
Pacific, the Strasbourg Conference on Parliamentary Democracy, 22 and 23 October 1992), summa-
rized and reported in H. de Jonge, “Democracy and Economic Development in the Asia-Pacific Re-
gion” (1993) 14 H.R.L.J. 301.
‘”See Singapore Constitution, supra note 23 at art. 152, which provides that the government
should recognize the special position of the Malays.
‘”The social and economic support was both through the government (e.g. free education for Ma-
lays at all levels) and a government-supported, Malay self-help organization. The system of political
representation is through the Group Representative Constituency scheme which requires that M.Ps be
elected as a team with at least one Malay (see Singapore Constitution, ibid. at art. 39A).
’76 See: “Freedoms and Needs”, supra note 168; Donnelly, supra note 42.
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SS. C. TAY – THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
gradual, was real. Despite the practical difficulties of development, “civil and po-
litical rights are always in the picture”, as commentators say is necessary.’n
Why then is there talk of a “trade-off”? Perhaps those who believe this sub-
scribe to the idea that civil and political rights require very little effort other than
the absence of state intervention. Or they mistake the gradual and inter-related
growth described as a blanket trade-off. A more cogent view of trade-offs may hold
in respect of further liberalization and fulfillment of civil and political rights be-
yond the present levels. Now that Singapore enjoys material prosperity on par with
some Western democracies, they ask, why it does not adopt the same practices of
democracy and human rights?
Such questions may only be answered with assurance by the country’s future.
New targets for Singapore’s development have been set.’8 Economically, the new
target is to achieve a Swiss-type standard of living by the turn of the twenty-first
century, requiring the search for.higher value-added jobs'” and the development of
business in the region by Singaporean companies. Beyond economic development,
social and artistic goals have also been enunciated.” These ambitions will both re-
quire and encourage greater education, independence of thought, and initiative of
action in the workplace and in society. They will affect the ways people live, the
real culture of the people.
These ambitions and changes do not imply an inevitable adoption of the domi-
nant view of human rights. They do suggest, however, an opportunity for change.
Within that change, there may well be more things that are common with the domi-
nant view, that are more universal. There is however an instinct, and perhaps a
hope, that Singapore, as a mark of the uniqueness that all peoples and nations have,
will demonstrate a degree of diversity.
Conclusion
The debate between the dominant view and the Asian view to human rights
seems at first to be about cultures. There is something to this. Human rights may be
better respected when they coincide with the culture in which people believe and
‘ See Donnelly, ibid., who suggests that “any potentially justifiable trade-off of civil and political
rights must be selective, flexible, and specific” and advises that “whatever the analytical and practical
difficulties, it is necessary to keep civil and political rights always in the picture” (ibid. at 202).
… These goals are mainly contained in The Next Lap (Singapore: Government of Singapore, 1991),
a government publication bringing together and endorsing ideas from over one thousand Singapore-
ans.
‘” See M.H. Best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993) for a description of the processes in Italy.
‘ 7e Next Lap, supra note 178, declares: “Now that we have achieved a measure of affluence, we
can better address the other dimensions of arts. … In pursuing excellence, we should not forget the
less fortunate in our midst” (ibid. at 16).
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with which they live. It is therefore tempting to search for cross-cultural values that
serve this function.’8’ The problems in this approach become apparent, however,
when we look beyond the culture that is recorded in history or “museumized”.
When we see culture as a living thing, caught up in social and political forces, it
becomes more difficult to posit any “original” culture that supersedes or limits the
search for truly universal human rights.
This essay suggests that –
in the experience of Singapore, at least –
any dif-
ferences in human rights do not primarily stem from deep and immutable cultural
a hybrid form – was the starting point
variations. A blend of Asia and the West –
for the Singaporean nation-state, not a discrete and “original” culture. Differences
that have arisen since have resulted primarily from a conflict of political power and
systems. In this conflict, culture is malleable in the hands of state policies regarding
education and other spheres. Culture is asserted by will. It is not the determinative
but, at most, one factor – however important –
among several that explain the dif-
ferences between the Asian and Western view of human rights.
Perhaps this should not surprise us. Culture is often the subject of politics, par-
ticularly in developing nations and in the process of nation-building. Culture and
the arts are managed, encouraged, or repressed, as components for the common
purpose and for ideology, rather than for mere individual expression and prefer-
ence. During the Cold War, even painting was politicized: Soviet art was associated
with the sober duty of socialist-realism and U.S. art with the freedom of abstract
expressionism.” A similar political process, therefore, exists in the current debate
over culture and different views of human rights.
The patina of tradition and culture may often conceal the hard iron of past he-
gemony and force. To recognize that culture is dynamic is the first step. The second
and more revealing step is to bear witness to the forces that control the process of
change, that is, the politics that selectively encourage, allow, or deny new elements
that might change culture.
Recognizing the plasticity of culture does not necessarily mean it has no place
when one is considering human-rights issues. What becomes essential, however, is
to consider the exact place culture does hold. If culture is privileged above other
rights, and above a more universal approach to human rights, it is a form of absolut-
ism which many may want to resist. If culture comes into the human-rights equa-
tion on par with other rights, however, it can be welcomed.
“”This approach is taken by those who examine cross-cultural perspectives for human rights, no-
tably the work of: An-Na’im, supra note 27; Renteln, supra note 45.
.. See R Fuller, Beyond the Crisis in Art (London: Writers and Readers, 1980): “The most percep-
tive apologists for corporate American capitalism saw the decisive comparison…. [U.S.] abstract ex-
pressionism was manifestly unregulated and imaginatively free … Thus it could be seen to contrast
sharply with the Soviet visual tradition [of socialist realism]” (Fuller, ibid. at 79).
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S.S. C. TAY – THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE
Where does the Singapore example stand in this analysis of human rights and
culture? This essay has summarised the statements of the Singapore school and has
tried to set out the specifics of how this approach views human rights as different in
Asia. Singapore is sometimes taken as an ideological champion for Asia, excusing
human rights abuses as differences dictated by Asian cultural heritage. Yet, in a de-
bate about East and West, this essay suggests that the true position of Singapore
would seem to be an intermediate position. This is also evident from Singapore’s
own human-rights record.
Singapore’s example of actual practice, unlike interpretations of what the Sin-
gapore school says, does not explain away human-rights abuses in other parts of
Asia. The Singapore example, as we have seen in summary, shows no gross, wide-
spread abuses of human rights. In Singapore’s experience, freedoms have been ex-
panded in conjunction with economic progress and not traded-off absolutely and
indefinitely. There is a core of rights that has been observed for the vast majority of
citizens. Accordingly, we may surmise that whatever place culture is accorded in
Singapore, culture has not eroded that core of rights.
From this, perhaps the better approach may be to acknowledge the positive as-
pects of the Singapore example. We may then expect the same, as a minimum, from
others who take the Asian view. The lessons drawn from the Singapore experience,
rather than the statements of the Singapore school, seem useful and necessary ex-
amples to set before nations who do not ensure a minimum core of human rights.
For Singapore itself, the direction and pace in the development of democracy
and human rights is still being charted and measured. Civil society is growing, most
Singaporean commentators suggest,'” although that growth may seem slower than
might be hoped. Some may feel that more subtle controls prevent a greater scope
for civil and political rights. Other nations may hope and encourage a greater and
more rapid dynamic.
Yet, carping criticism of Singapore does not help. Harsh words seem to go
against the idea of promoting human rights and treating different nations with re-
spect. It often results in equally loud rebuttal; voices rise; both sides speak but nei-
ther listens. Unless there are gross abuses and a failure to safeguard those rights al-
ready attained, this may cause greater harm than good for universal human rights.
Attacks by those perceived to be outsiders can cause sharper dichotomies between
Asia and the West, and if hard and fast lines are drawn, many more will come to
their country’s defence in the name of culture and nationalism. Human-rights dis-
course, then, is in danger of being seen exclusively as a Western instrument of
criticism. Asians who call for universal human rights can be painted as people who
are somehow not Asian or who are disloyal.
” 3 See Pang Gek Choo, “Civil society ‘shows hopeful signs of growing stronger’ The [Singapore]
Sunday imes (5 May 1996) 16.
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Outside of gross abuses, perhaps the better approach to human rights between
nations is not to protest its absence but to promote its growth. There is a subtle but
real difference in these attitudes. Foreigners may encourage the progressive ele-
ments within another society. They can help foster improvements, but they cannot,
and should not, foist change.
What, then, should we make of the tension between culture and human rights?
There is great value in affirming the beliefs and practices we all share as human
beings. Yet something in each of us also resists the aggregation of our experience
and aspirations. We seek out something unique, something that is more ourselves –
as a nation, a community, an individual. This tension runs through the idea of hu-
man rights and culture. The ideal, after all, aims to enrich and ennoble us as human
beings, not to impoverish us as common denominators. The idea of human rights
speaks to us –
as political, social, economic and cultural beings, as individuals and
members of families and communities – not to limit and simplify these many as-
pects of our self-expression, but to recognize the full complexity of our shared
dignity and humanity. It is not uniformity that human rights should seek, but a true
universality. In defining who we are, the ideal of human rights requires that we re-
sist the imposition of cultural identity by others – whether they propound the
dominant view or the Asian approach –
and that we accept others and they, us.
With such aims, culture has a place in human rights but not a privileged and prior
position. Beyond this, there is no easy conclusion to the search for human rights in
the different regions and nations of the world and its relationship to culture. There
is, rather, a tension with which we must live and from which we must grow. We are
the same, and yet we are different.
